Updated May 28, 2019
Sudan
On April 11, 2019, Sudan’s military removed President
Figure 1. Sudan Key Facts
Omar al Bashir from office after three decades in power.
Four months of near-daily protests across the country had
shaken the government, and in early April, huge crowds
gathered in front of the military’s headquarters in Khartoum
to demand regime change. The protests, triggered by
austerity measures amid an economic crisis, were fueled by
a range of grievances against the ruling National Congress
Party (NCP) and Bashir, who took power in a 1989 coup.
The trajectory of the post-Bashir transition in Sudan is
uncertain. The protests continue as a coalition of opposition
groups and professional unions—the Forces for Freedom
and Change (FFC)—seek to negotiate a transfer of power

from the Transitional Military Council (TMC) that ousted
Source: Fact information from CIA World Factbook and IMF, 2018.
Bashir to a civilian-led transitional government. The
Background
African Union has voiced support for the democratic
Sudan, when unified (1956-2011), was Africa’s largest
aspirations of the Sudanese people and condemned what it
terms a coup d’état, demanding that the military cede
country. In 2011, after decades of fighting often broadly
described as a conflict between the predominately Muslim
authority to civilians by June 30. While the TMC and FFC
“Arab” north and non-Muslim “African” south, Sudan split
have reached agreement on some aspects of a transitional
in two. The split did not resolve Sudan’s other conflicts;
arrangement, in which elections would be held in 2023,
overlapping struggles between security forces and rebels,
they remain at odds over the role of military leaders in the
nomadic and farming communities, and among ethnic
interim government. Meanwhile, the TMC has assumed de
groups have caused extensive displacement and suffering.
facto authority—issuing decrees, replacing various
government officials, and conducting foreign relations.
Northern regimes espousing Islamist ideals have dominated
government for much of Sudan’s post-independence
Sudan’s military has a long history of intervention in
history, despite its diversity, pressing distant provinces to
politics (Bashir’s 1989 coup was the country’s fourth).
conform to the riverine heartland, rather than
Military leaders played prominent roles in Bashir’s regime,
accommodating local customs and institutions. Instead of
and some observers question the TMC’s commitment to
forging a national identity, these policies exacerbated the
reform. The protest leaders have sought to pursue change
country’s racial, cultural, and religious differences.
peacefully, but several violent attacks on protesters by
Attempts to Arabize and Islamize the south sparked
members of the security forces have raised tensions during
insurgencies. Groups in other regions also rose up
the negotiations. While the TMC condemned the attacks
periodically, citing local grievances. Some in the states of
and blamed rogue elements, the incidents fuel concern
Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile joined the southern
about splits in the security forces and about TMC leaders’
rebels, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM).
intentions. Islamists are also seen as potential spoilers.
The north-south wars took a heavy toll. In 2005, the
With rampant inflation, a foreign currency shortage, and a
government and the SPLM signed the Comprehensive
heavy debt burden, Sudan needs international support to
Peace Agreement (CPA), which enshrined the south’s right
stabilize its economy. Its $1.3 billion in debt arrears to the
to self-determination after a six-year “interim period.”
International Monetary Fund restrict access to international
Southern Sudanese voted overwhelmingly in January 2011
financing, as does its designation by the United States as a
to secede and achieved independence in July of that year.
State Sponsor of Terrorism. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab
South Sudan’s secession was a major financial blow to
Emirates, and Egypt have supported the TMC politically
Sudan, which lost 75% of its oil production, two-thirds of
and financially, and by some accounts may have played a
export earnings, and over half its fiscal revenues. A bloated
role in facilitating Bashir’s ouster. The UAE and Saudi
security sector budget, mismanagement, and corruption
Arabia have offered $3 billion in aid, but economists say it
have all compounded Sudan’s economic troubles. The
will only provide short-term relief. The European Union
International Monetary Fund assesses that U.S. sanctions
says it stands ready to assist “as soon as a civilian transition
also undermined economic growth. Major U.S. enforcement
takes place.” The United States has suspended bilateral
actions for sanctions violations in 2014-2015 significantly
talks on easing sanctions and suggested that it would be
“
reduced Sudan’s access to U.S. dollars and further impeded
harder” to support Sudan’s economic development without
its access to international financial markets and institutions.
a transition to civilian rule. Some Members of Congress
have called for U.S. pressure to ensure a swift transfer of
While disputes remain, relations between Sudan and South
power to civilians in S.Res. 188 and in correspondence.
Sudan have improved in recent years. Sudan surprised
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Sudan
many when it mediated a new peace deal between South
Sudan’s Foreign Relations
Sudan’s warring parties in 2018. The deal, if it holds, would
Strategically positioned on the Red Sea, Sudan’s political
allow oil production in fields shut by South Sudan’s civil
trajectory is of interest to an array of foreign actors. Egypt’s
war to resume, generating needed revenue for both
engagement is driven by domestic political considerations
countries. Rebel activity along the countries’ shared border
and its concerns about the flow of the Nile. Sudan’s former
complicates the border’s demilitarization, as does the
ties with Iran and links to the Muslim Brotherhood under
unresolved status of contested areas, notably Abyei, which
Bashir strained its relations with key Arab Gulf countries,
was granted special semi-autonomous status in the CPA.
which are important sources of investment. In 2014,
An official referendum for Abyei residents on whether to
struggling with the loss of oil revenue and under mounting
retain their special status in Sudan or join South Sudan was
pressure from Saudi Arabia, Sudan severed relations with
slated for 2011 but has been delayed indefinitely. The
Tehran. It joined the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen in 2015,
deployment of the U.N. Interim Force for Abyei (UNISFA)
reportedly deploying as many as 14,000 troops, some
defused a violent standoff in 2011, but local tensions still
underage, in return for Gulf aid. Bashir’s refusal to cut ties
have the potential to spur a larger conflict.
with Qatar was a source of tension with the Saudis and
Conflicts
Emiratis. Sudanese officials worked to repair relations with
the United States, but Bashir also engaged Russia, already a
The CPA did not resolve longstanding center-periphery
top weapons source, seeking to expand cooperation and
tensions in Sudan. Successive governments have responded
offering to host Russian naval facilities. Russian security
to the political demands of restive regions more often with
contractors have been increasingly active there.
force than reform and have financed local militias to help
counter insurgencies. Those militias have been linked to
U.S. Policy and Foreign Assistance
indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks on civilians.
U.S. relations with Sudan have been turbulent for three
U.N. experts continue to document violations of an arms
decades. The United States restricted aid after the 1989
embargo and ban on offensive military overflights
coup, and in subsequent years imposed a range of sanctions
established in Security Council resolution 1591 (2005).
through Executive Orders and congressional measures.
Darfur. Violence continues to plague the Darfur region of
Restrictions on U.S. engagement are based on Sudan’s debt
western Sudan, where peace remains elusive. The
arrears, links to international terrorism, and pervasive
government launched a major offensive in early 2016 that
human rights violations. The State Department has
led to mass displacement. Fighting has diminished since
designated Sudan as a Country of Particular Concern under
Bashir declared a ceasefire in mid-2016, with some rebels
the International Religious Freedom Act.
withdrawing to Libya to regroup. U.N. monitors report that
Sudan has long sought relief from U.S. sanctions. The
significant clashes between government forces and one
Obama Administration moved to ease them in January 2017
rebel faction resumed in 2018. Sporadic skirmishes,
as part of a bilateral reengagement effort, after determining
intercommunal violence, and attacks on peacekeepers, aid
Sudan had taken positive steps on five “tracks”: enhancing
workers, and civilians persist. Nevertheless, the African
counterterrorism cooperation; ceasing hostilities in conflict
Union-U.N. Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) is
zones; improving humanitarian access; ending negative
withdrawing, with plans for the last troops to leave in 2020.
interference in South Sudan; and addressing the threat of a
In 2005, the U.N. Security Council granted the International
regional armed group, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).
Criminal Court jurisdiction over serious crimes committed
In October 2017, the Trump Administration reported that
in Darfur. The TMC has rejected calls to extradite Bashir to
Sudan had sustained positive actions on the five tracks and
the Hague, where he is wanted on Darfur-related charges of
permanently revoked certain sanctions. Others remain in
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.
place, and in November 2018, despite reports of backsliding
on some tracks, the Administration announced “Phase II” of
Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. The conflict in these
states, often referred to as “the Two Areas,” is driven by
the bilateral engagement framework. Under Phase II, the
Administration would consider rescinding Sudan’s 1993
unresolved grievances that date back to the north-south war,
State Sponsor of Terrorism designation if the country met
when some local groups joined the SPLM rebellion. The
the statutory criteria and made further progress on the
CPA set out a process by which the two states might
original tracks and other areas of longstanding U.S.
achieve greater autonomy within Sudan, but it stalled and
concern, including human rights, religious freedom,
the conflict reignited in 2011. The Sudanese government
has restricted aid agencies’ access to rebel
outstanding terrorism-related claims, and Sudan’s relations
-held areas.
with North Korea. The United States has suspended Phase
Humanitarian Situation
II discussions as it calls for a civilian-led transition.
Sudan began 2019 with over 5.7 million people in need of
Development aid for Sudan is extremely limited, and debt
aid, a situation expected to worsen in the lean season mid-
relief is restricted by Congress in annual appropriations.
year. Roughly 1.8 million Darfuris are displaced internally,
The State Department requested $1.5 million in
and Chad hosts over 330,000 Darfuri refugees. IDP
nonemergency aid for FY2020, to support civil society and
estimates for Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile vary; South
consensus-building. The United States has provided over
Sudan and Ethiopia host over 300,000 refugees from those
$378 million in humanitarian aid in FY2018-FY2019.
areas. Over 30,000 people are displaced in Abyei. Sudan
Lauren Ploch Blanchard,
hosts over 900,000 refugees, most from South Sudan.
IF10182
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Sudan


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