May 17, 2019
Venezuela: International Efforts to Resolve the Political Crisis
Background
sessions of the Permanent Council to discuss regional
The international community remains divided over how to
responses to the crisis, and spoken out against Maduro.
respond to the political crisis in Venezuela. The United
Member states remain divided on how to respond to the
States and 54 other countries have formally recognized the
crisis, with countries in the Caribbean Community
interim government of Juan Guaidó, who Venezuela’s
(CARICOM) particularly reluctant to intervene in
democratically elected National Assembly named president.
Venezuela’s internal affairs. Many of those countries had
These countries have undertaken a variety of initiatives to
close ties with Venezuela under Maduro’s predecessor, the
place pressure on authoritarian leader Nicolás Maduro, in
late president Hugo Chávez, and, until recently, received
power since 2013, and facilitate a political transition. Other
significant amounts of subsidized oil from Venezuela. In
countries, such as China, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Russia,
2017, Maduro denounced the OAS for meddling in his
have provided diplomatic, financial, and military support to
country’s domestic affairs and began a two-year process to
Maduro, and have sought to block anti-Maduro actions
withdraw from the organization.
within international organizations. A third group of
The OAS requires 18 votes to pass a resolution of the
countries, including Mexico, Norway, Uruguay and some
Permanent Council. In June 2018, 19 of 34 member states
Caribbean nations, has remained neutral in the crisis.
passed a resolution stating that the May 2018 presidential
These international dynamics appear to have contributed to
election in Venezuela lacked legitimacy and authorizing
a political stalemate in Venezuela, even as conditions
countries to take measures, including sanctions, necessary
within the country have continued to deteriorate. On April
to hasten a return to democracy. In January 2019, the same
30, a Guaidó-led, U.S.-backed uprising failed to garner
19 states approved a resolution that refused to recognize the
enough high-level military support to compel Maduro to
legitimacy of Maduro’s second term; called for new
leave office. While some observers maintain that Maduro is
presidential elections; and urged all member states to adopt
weak politically, others fear a prolonged, potentially violent
diplomatic, political, economic, and financial measures to
standoff between the respective supporters of Maduro and
facilitate the prompt restoration of the democratic order in
Guaidó. Some observers hope that international action will
Venezuela. After Maduro withdrew his OAS Ambassador,
coalesce behind talks leading to the convening of free and
the Permanent Council welcomed the Venezuelan National
fair elections. Both sides have sent envoys to Norway for
Assembly’s permanent representative to the OAS on April
exploratory talks on how to resolve the crisis, but actions
9, 2019. Some observers have praised Secretary-General
taken against the opposition by Maduro could hinder
Almagro’s activism on Venezuela, which has included
progress in reaching a political solution.
calling for international intervention in the country. Others
United Nations (U.N.)
have asserted that he has sided too closely with the
opposition, and is unlikely to help broker a diplomatic
The U.N. Security Council (UNSC) has discussed the
solution to resolve the current crisis.
political and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela, but divisions
within its members have stalled action. Russia, and to a
Lima Group
lesser extent, China, support Maduro. The United States,
In mid-2017, efforts to reach a consensus on how to
and most countries in Europe and the Western Hemisphere,
respond to the crisis in Venezuela at the OAS appeared to
support Guiadó. Despite that polarization, U.N. agencies
be stalling. On August 8, 2017, 12 Western Hemisphere
are increasing humanitarian relief within Venezuela after
countries signed the Lima Accord, a document rejecting
securing approval in April from Maduro and Guaidó. The
what it described as the rupture of democracy and systemic
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the
human rights violations in Venezuela. The signatory
International Organization for Migration (IOM) are
countries included Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
coordinating efforts to serve the roughly 3.7 million
Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico
Venezuelans who had left the country as of March 2019 and
Panama, Paraguay, and Peru. In 2018, Guyana and St.
the communities hosting them. The U.N. Human Rights
Lucia joined the Lima Group, which did not recognize
Council is investigating allegations of crimes against
Maduro’s May 2018 reelection.
humanity committed by security forces and armed militias
On January 4, 2019, 13 members of the Lima Group
loyal to Maduro.
(excluding Mexico) signed a declaration urging President
Organization of American States (OAS) Maduro not to assume power on January 10, 2019. The
The OAS, a regional multilateral organization that includes
countries resolved to reassess their level of diplomatic
all 35 independent countries of the Western Hemisphere
engagement with Venezuela, implement travel bans or
(Cuba currently does not participate), has focused attention
sanctions on Maduro officials (as Canada and Panama
on Venezuela’s political crisis. Since 2016, OAS Secretary-
have), suspend military cooperation with Venezuela, and
General Luis Almagro has issued a series of reports on the
urge others in the international community to take similar
deteriorating situation in Venezuela, convened special
actions. Under leftist President Andrés Manuel López
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Venezuela: International Efforts to Resolve the Political Crisis
Obrador, Mexico has pledged to remain neutral and is no
crisis in Venezuela; the regional migration crisis that
longer participating in the Lima Group. El Salvador is
Venezuela’s unrest has wrought throughout Latin America
likely to join the Lima Group after Nayib Bukele’s June 1
and the Caribbean; the influence of Russia and China in
inauguration.
Venezuela; and the role of Congress in authorizing possible
use of U.S. military force in Venezuela. The role of
On January 23, 2019, and in subsequent statements,
international actors and U.S. coordination with them may
11 members of the Lima Group have recognized the
influence congressional consideration of legislative
Guaidó government and pledged to support a
initiatives to require, authorize, or constrain certain
democratic transition in Venezuela. On February 4,
Administration actions regarding Venezuela (e.g., H.R. 920,
2019, the Guaidó government joined the Lima Group
H.R. 1477, S. 1025, H.R. 1004, and S.J.Res. 11).
and signed its statement calling “for a peaceful
transition … without the use of force.”
International perspectives, particularly from UNHCR, IOM,
and the Lima Group, may influence oversight of the $213
million in U.S. humanitarian assistance dedicated to help
The group has denounced human rights violations by the
support Venezuelans in the region. They may also inform
Maduro government and urged Venezuelan armed forces to
demonstrate their loyalty to Guaidó, but opposed U.S. or
decisions about the amounts and types of U.S. funds most
needed to support international organizations and U.N.
regional military intervention in the crisis. On May 3, 2019,
agencies working inside Venezuela, both now and in the
the Lima Group issued a declaration signed by 12 countries
(not St. Lucia or Guyana but including Venezuela) asking
future. The Administration’s proposed FY2020 budget
request asks for $9 million in democracy aid through the
the International Contact Group (see below) to meet to
Economic Support and Development Fund account and the
coordinate efforts and pledging to seek Cuba’s help in
resolving Venezuela’s
authority to transfer up to $500 million to support a
crisis.
transition or respond to a crisis in Venezuela. Should
European Union (EU)
Maduro leave office, the Administration proposes that such
The EU has imposed targeted sanctions on Maduro officials
funds could support international election observers,
and adopted an arms embargo against Venezuela. The EU
increased humanitarian assistance inside Venezuela, and/or
Parliament and most member states have recognized the
a potential International Monetary Fund package.
Guaidó government (with Norway a notable exception). At
the same time, the EU has opposed military intervention
While there generally has been international support for
and “any form of violence”
U.S. policy toward Venezuela, some U.S. actions have
in the country, most recently in
prompted concern among partners working to resolve the
a statement from April 30. Instead, the EU backed the
crisis. Most of these countries have supported U.S. targeted
formation of an International Contact Group (ICG).
sanctions on Maduro officials, but some are concerned
International Contact Group (ICG)
about the potential humanitarian impact of U.S. oil
The EU-backed International Contact Group, composed of
sanctions imposed in January 2019 that seek to prevent
several European countries (France, Germany, Italy, the
Maduro from benefitting from Venezuela’s oil revenue.
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United
Some countries also have expressed concern about repeated
Kingdom) and Latin American countries (Costa Rica,
U.S. threats to use military force in Venezuela despite
Ecuador, and Uruguay), first convened on February 7,
opposition from neighboring countries (such as Brazil and
2019. The group aimed to “establish necessary guarantees
Colombia), the Lima Group, and the European Union.
for a credible electoral process, within the earliest time
frame possible” and to hasten the delivery of humanitarian
Threats of U.S. military action have occurred alongside
denunciations of reported Russian and Cuban military
aid into Venezuela. U.S. officials have expressed
assistance to Maduro. Some observers caution that the
skepticism at the proposal, noting that Maduro has used
past attempts at dialogue (brokered by the Vatican and
Trump Administration could lose support from some
partners because of the U.S. decision to impose strong
others) as a delaying tactic. ICG supporters maintain the
“necessary
sanctions on Cuba because of its support for Maduro.
guarantees” include naming a new electoral
council, releasing political prisoners, and ending all bans on
Several U.S. partners on Venezuela have commercial ties
with Cuba. Many also have urged the United States to
political parties and candidates.
engage in diplomacy with Russia and prevent the situation
Since February, the ICG has met twice, most recently on
from turning into a proxy conflict for regional and global
May 6 and 7 in Costa Rica. At that meeting, also attended
influence.
by Chile from the Lima Group and representatives from
For related information, see CRS In Focus IF10230,
CARICOM and the Vatican, the ICG decided to send a
political mission to Caracas and to work with the Lima
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy; CRS Insight
IN11116, The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Group to hasten a political solution to the crisis. China is
Assistance and the Crisis in Venezuela; CRS In Focus
supporting that effort and has pledged to work with the EU
IF11029, The Venezuela Regional Migration Crisis; CRS In
and others for a political settlement to the Venezuela crisis.
Focus IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions;
Implications for U.S. Policy
and CRS Report R44841, Venezuela: Background and U.S.
The 116th Congress has closely followed developments in
Relations.
Venezuela, Trump Administration policy responses, and
international efforts to broker a solution to the crisis.
Clare Ribando Seelke, Specialist in Latin American
Congress has held hearings on the political crisis in
Affairs
Venezuela and U.S. policy responses; the humanitarian
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Venezuela: International Efforts to Resolve the Political Crisis

IF11216


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