Updated May 8, 2019
Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions
For more than a decade, the United States has employed
Silva (former defense minister and governor of Trujillo
sanctions as a policy tool in response to activities of the
State), and Ramón Rodríguez Chacín (former interior
Venezuelan government and Venezuelan individuals. These
minister and former governor of Guárico); in 2011, Freddy
have included sanctions related to terrorism, drug
Alirio Bernal Rosales and Amilicar Jesus Figueroa Salazar
trafficking, trafficking in persons, antidemocratic actions,
(United Socialist Party of Venezuela, or PSUV, politicians),
human rights violations, and corruption. Currently, the
Major General Cliver Antonio Alcalá Cordones, and
Treasury Department has financial sanctions on 112
Ramon Isidro Madriz Moreno (a Venezuelan intelligence
individuals, and the State Department has revoked the visas
officer); in 2017, then-Vice President Tareck el Aissami;
of hundreds of individuals. On January 28, 2019, the Trump
and in May 2018, Pedro Luis Martin (a former senior
Administration announced sanctions on Venezuela’s state-
intelligence official) and two of his associates. Others
oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., or PdVSA.
designated include drug trafficker Walid Makled, three dual
Several days before the imposition of the PdVSA sanctions,
Lebanese-Venezuelan citizens allegedly involved in a drug
the United States recognized Juan Guaidó, the head of
money-laundering network, and several Colombian drug
Venezuela’s National Assembly, as the country’s interim
traffickers with activity in Venezuela.
president and ceased to recognize Nicolás Maduro as the
Targeted Sanctions Related to Antidemocratic
president of Venezuela.
Actions, Human Rights Violations, and Corruption
Terrorism-Related Sanctions
In response to increasing repression in Venezuela, Congress
Since 2006, U.S. officials have expressed concerns about
enacted the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil
Venezuela’s lack of cooperation on antiterrorism efforts.
Society Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-278; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) in
Since then, the Secretary of State has made an annual
December 2014. Among its provisions, the law requires the
determination that Venezuela is not “cooperating fully with
President to impose sanctions (asset blocking and visa
United States anti-terrorism efforts” pursuant to Section
restrictions) against those whom the President determines
40A of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2781). The
are responsible for significant acts of violence or serious
most recent determination was made in May 2018. As a
human rights abuses associated with protests in February
result, the United States has prohibited all U.S. commercial
2014 or, more broadly, against anyone who has directed or
arms sales and retransfers to Venezuela since 2006.
ordered the arrest or prosecution of a person primarily
because of the person’s legitimate exercise of freedom of
In 2008, the Treasury Department imposed sanctions (asset
expression or assembly. In 2016, Congress extended the
freezing and prohibitions on transactions) on two
2014 act through 2019 in P.L. 114-194.
individuals and two travel agencies in Venezuela for
providing financial support to the radical Lebanon-based
In March 2015, President Obama issued E.O. 13692 to
Islamic Shiite group Hezbollah. The action was taken
implement P.L. 113-278, and the Treasury Department
pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, aimed at
issued regulations in July 2015 (31 C.F.R. Part 591). The
impeding terrorist funding.
E.O. targets (for asset blocking and visa restrictions) those
Drug Trafficking-Related Sanctions
involved in actions or policies undermining democratic
processes or institutions; those involved in acts of violence
U.S. concerns about the lack of Venezuelan cooperation on
or conduct constituting a serious human rights abuse; those
counternarcotics efforts date back to 2005. Since then, the
taking actions that prohibit, limit, or penalize the exercise
President has made an annual determination, pursuant to
of freedom of expression or peaceful assembly; public
procedures set forth in the Foreign Relations Authorization
corruption by senior Venezuelan officials; and any person
Act, FY2003 (P.L. 107-228, §706; 22 U.S.C. 2291j), that
determined to be a current or former leader of any entity
Venezuela has failed demonstrably to adhere to its
engaged in any activity described above or a current or
obligations under international narcotics agreements.
former official of the government of Venezuela.
President Trump made the most recent determination for
FY2019 in September 2018, but also waived foreign aid
Currently, the Treasury Department has financial sanctions
restrictions for programs to support democracy promotion.
on 82 Venezuelans pursuant to E.O. 13692. Under the
Obama Administration, the Treasury Department froze the
The Treasury Department has imposed economic sanctions
assets of seven Venezuelans—six members of Venezuela’s
on at least 22 individuals with connections to Venezuela
security forces and a prosecutor involved in repressing
and 27 companies by designating them as Specially
antigovernment protesters. Under the Trump
Designated Narcotics Traffickers pursuant to the Foreign
Administration, the Treasury Department currently has
Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (Kingpin Act; P.L. 106-
sanctions on an additional 75 Venezuelan government and
120, Title VIII; 21 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.).
military officials. These officials include President Nicolás
Designated individuals include several current or former
Maduro and his wife, Cecilia Flores; Executive Vice
Venezuelan officials: in 2008, General Hugo Carvajal
President Delcy Rodriguez; PSUV First Vice President
(former military intelligence head), General Henry Rangel
Diosdado Cabello; eight Supreme Court members; the
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Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions
leaders of Venezuela’s army, national guard, and national
Treasury sanctioned Venezuela’s Central Bank in order to
police; four state governors; the director of the Central
cut off its access to U.S. currency and limit its ability to
Bank of Venezuela; and the foreign minister. On May 7,
conduct international financial transactions.
2019, the Treasury Department lifted sanctions against the
head of Venezuela’s intelligence service,
Additional Financial Sanctions
General Manuel
In addition to targeted sanctions against individuals and
Cristopher Figuera, who recently broke ranks with
companies, President Trump has imposed financial
President Maduro.
sanctions on Venezuela through three additional E.O.s
Broader Sanctions on the Oil and Gold Sectors
because of the government’s serious human rights abuses,
On November 1, 2018, President Trump issued E.O. 13850,
antidemocratic actions, and responsibility for the deepening
setting forth a framework to block the assets of, and
humanitarian crisis. In August 2017, he issued E.O. 13808,
prohibit certain transactions with, any person determined by
which prohibits access to the U.S. financial markets by the
the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the
Venezuelan government, including PdVSA, with certain
Secretary of State, to operate in the gold sector (or any
exceptions to minimize the impact on the Venezuelan
other sector of the economy as determined in the future by
people and U.S. economic interests. The sanctions restrict
the Secretary of the Treasury) or to be responsible for or
the Venezuelan government’s access to U.S. debt and
complicit in transactions involving deceptive practices or
equity markets.
corruption and the Venezuelan government. Currently, six
individuals are sanctioned pursuant to E.O. 13850: five
In March 2018, President Trump issued E.O. 13827 to
were sanctioned in January 2019 for involvement in a
prohibit transactions involving the Venezuelan
corruption scheme involving Venezuela’s currency
government’s issuance of digital currency, coin, or token.
exchange practices that generated more than $2.4 billion in
The Maduro government launched a cryptocurrency known
corrupt proceeds; the president of Venezuela’s state gold
as the petro in 2018 in an effort to circumvent sanctions.
mining company was sanctioned in March 2019.
In May 2018, President Trump issued E.O. 13835, which
On January 28, 2019, pursuant to E.O. 13850, the Treasury
prohibits transactions related to the purchase of Venezuelan
Department designated PdVSA as operating in the oil sector
debt, including accounts receivable, and to any debt owed
of the Venezuelan economy, and Secretary of the Treasury
to Venezuela pledged as collateral. U.S. officials assert the
Steven Mnuchin determined that the company was subject
action was intended to deny corrupt Venezuelan officials
to U.S. sanctions. As a result, all property and interests in
the ability to improperly value and sell off public assets in
property of PdVSA subject to U.S. jurisdiction are blocked,
return for kickbacks.
and U.S. persons generally are prohibited from engaging in
Policy Considerations
transactions with the company.
Although Venezuelan oil exports to the United States
already had been declining, sanctions on that trade are
At the same time, OFAC issued general licenses to allow
requiring U.S. refineries that process Venezuelan crude oil
certain transactions and activities related to PdVSA and its
to find alternative sources. Some analysts are concerned
subsidiaries, some within specified time frames or wind-
that the stronger sanctions on PdVSA are further
down periods. Transactions with two U.S.-based PdVSA
exacerbating Venezuela’s difficult humanitarian crisis,
subsidiaries, PDV Holding, Inc. (PDVH) and CITGO
already marked by shortages of food and medicines and
Holding, Inc., originally were authorized through July 27,
mass migration, by limiting the country’s key source of
2019, but in March 2019, the Treasury Department
revenue. This is a particular concern in the event that
extended a general license for 18 months. PDVH, CITGO,
Maduro remains in power over an extended period of time.
and other U.S. companies were also authorized to import
Some observers also maintain that economic sanctions
petroleum from PdVSA through April 28, 2019, although
ultimately may need to be accompanied by efforts to foster
payments benefiting PdVSA were to be made to a blocked
a negotiated solution leading to free and fair elections.
account in the United States. Several U.S. companies with
operations in Venezuela involving PdVSA are authorized to
For guidance on the Venezuela sanctions, see U.S.
continue their operations through July 27, 2019.
Department of the Treasury, “Venezuela-Related
Sanctions,” at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/
In March 2019, the Treasury Department expanded
sanctions/programs/pages/venezuela.aspx; and U.S.
sanctions pursuant to EO 13850. On March 11, it
Department of State, “Venezuela-Related Sanctions,” at
sanctioned the Moscow-based Evrofinance Mosnarbank,
https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/venezuela/.
jointly owned by Russia and Venezuela, for helping PdVSA
funnel its cash flow from oil sales. On March 19, it
For more from CRS, see CRS In Focus IF10230,
sanctioned Venezuela’s state-owned gold sector company,
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy; CRS Report
Minerven, for using illicit gold operations to help the
R44841, Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations; CRS
regime financially. On March 22, it sanctioned the state-
In Focus IF11029, The Venezuela Regional Migration
affiliated Venezuelan Economic and Social Development
Crisis; and CRS Insight IN11037, Venezuela Oil Sector
Bank (BANDES) and five of its subsidiaries that the
Sanctions: Market and Trade Impacts.
Maduro regime uses to move money outside of Venezuela.
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs
In April 2019, the Treasury Department sanctioned 44
IF10715
vessels (along with 6 shipping companies) involved in
transporting Venezuelan oil, including 5 companies that
have transported Venezuelan oil to Cuba. On April 17,
https://crsreports.congress.gov

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Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10715 · VERSION 20 · UPDATED

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