Updated May 3, 2019
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Since the early 1960s, when the United States imposed a
his independence from the previous government. Díaz-
trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy
Canel continues to faces two significant challenges—
toward Cuba has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at
moving forward with economic reforms that produce results
isolating the government.
and responding to citizens’ desires for greater freedom.
In December 2014, the Obama Administration initiated a
In February 2019, almost 87% of Cubans approved a new
major policy shift moving away from sanctions toward
constitution in a national referendum. Among the changes
engagement and the normalization of relations. The policy
are the addition of an appointed prime minister to oversee
change included the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a
government operations; age and term limits on the
state sponsor of international terrorism in May 2015; the
president; and some market-oriented economic reforms,
restoration of diplomatic relations in July 2015; and efforts
including the right to private property and the promotion of
to increase travel, commerce, and the flow of information to
foreign investment. However, the new constitution ensures
Cuba by easing restrictions on travel, remittances, trade,
the state sector’s dominance over the economy and the
telecommunications, and banking and financial services
predominant role of the Communist Party.
(accomplished through amendments in 2015 and 2016 to
Government-to-Government Engagement. With the
the Cuban Assets Control Regulations [CACR],
restoration of relations in 2015, bilateral engagement
administered by the Department of the Treasury, and the
increased significantly. U.S. and Cuban officials held seven
Export Administration Regulations [EAR], administered by
Bilateral Commission meetings, the most recent in June
the Commerce Department).
2018, to coordinate efforts on areas of engagement.
President Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba in
Officials negotiated numerous bilateral agreements,
2017 introducing new sanctions and rolling back some of
including on such issues as environmental cooperation,
the Obama Administration’s efforts to normalize relations.
direct mail, civil aviation, maritime navigation, agriculture,
In 2019, the Administration has increased economic
health, counternarcotics efforts, federal air marshals, cancer
sanctions significantly to pressure the Cuban government
research, seismology, meteorology, wildlife conservation,
on its human rights record and its support for the regime of
animal and plant health, oil-spill preparedness and
Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela. These include actions
response, law enforcement cooperation, search and rescue,
announced on April 17, 2019, allowing lawsuits to go
and the delimitation of the U.S.-Cuban maritime boundary
forward against those trafficking in property confiscated by
in the eastern Gulf of Mexico. Bilateral dialogues were also
the Cuban government and tightening restrictions on
held on these and other issues including counterterrorism,
remittances and nonfamily travel to Cuba. With these
U.S. property claims, human rights, renewable energy and
actions, U.S. policy toward Cuba has again shifted to a
efficiency, trafficking in persons, migration, and
policy of strong economic pressure. In response to the
cybersecurity. Given the current tensions in U.S.-Cuban
Trump Administration’s increased pressures, Cuban
relations, the future of bilateral cooperation is uncertain.
President Miguel Díaz-Canel asserted “We Cubans do not
surrender.”
Trump Administration Sanctions. President Trump
issued a national security presidential memorandum on
Cuban Political Developments. In April 2018, Díaz-
Cuba in June 2017 that introduced new sanctions. These
Canel, who was serving as first vice president, succeeded
included restrictions on transactions with companies
Raúl Castro as president, but Castro continues to head the
controlled by the Cuban military, and the elimination of
Cuban Communist Party until 2021. The selection of Díaz-
people-to-people travel for individuals. To implement these
Canel, now 58 years old, reflects the generational change in
changes, the Treasury and Commerce Departments
Cuban leadership that began several years ago and marks
amended the CACR and EAR in November 2017. The
the first time since the 1959 Cuban revolution that a Castro
regulations require people-to-people travel to be under the
is not in charge of the government. While in power from
auspices of an organization specializing in such travel and
2006 to 2018, Raúl Castro began to implement significant
prohibit financial transactions with entities controlled by
economic policy changes, moving toward a more mixed
the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services.
economy with a stronger private sector, but his
government’s
The Department of State issued a list of “restricted entities”
slow, gradualist approach did not produce
in November 2017, which was updated in November 2018,
major improvements to the Cuban economy, which has
March 2019, and most recently April 24, 2019. Currently,
experienced minimal growth in recent years.
the list includes 214 entities and subentities, including 2
In December 2018, President Díaz-Canel backtracked on
ministries, 5 holding companies (including GAESA) and 49
implementing regulations that likely would have shrunk the
of their subentities (including the Mariel Special
private sector and slowed implementation of a controversial
Development Zone), 102 hotels (with 29 in Havana), 2
decree regulating artistic expression, actions that appeared
tourist agencies, 5 marinas, 10 stores in Old Havana, and 39
to demonstrate his responsiveness to public criticism and
entities serving the defense and security sectors.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
On April 5 and April 12, 2019, the Department of the
On April 30, 2019, President Trump threatened Cuba with
Treasury imposed sanctions on six companies and five
“a full and complete embargo” and “highest-level
vessels that have transported Venezuelan oil to Cuba (39
sanctions” unless it stopped military support for Venezuela.
other vessels that have transported Venezuelan oil were also
Continued Human Rights Concerns. Human rights
sanctioned). Venezuela currently provides some 40,000-
violations in Cuba have remained a fundamental U.S.
50,000 barrels of oil per day to Cuba, about one-third of its
policy concern for many years. In October 2018, the U.S.
consumption.
Mission to the United Nations launched a campaign to call
On April 8, 2019, the Department of the Treasury scuttled
attention to Cuba’s “estimated 130 political prisoners.” In
an agreement between Major League Baseball and the
recent years, Cuba has shifted to using short-term
Cuban Baseball Federation, announced in December 2018,
detentions and harassment to repress dissent, with at least
which would have allowed Cuban baseball players to sign
5,155 such detentions in 2017 and 2,873 in 2018 (the lowest
with U.S. teams directly. Trump Administration officials
level since 2010) according to the Cuban Commission for
maintained that the Cuban Baseball Federation is part of the
Human Rights and National Reconciliation. In the first
Cuban government and therefore no payments could be
three months of 2019, there were 639 short-term detentions
made to the federation under U.S. sanctions.
(about a 36% decline from the same period in 2018).
On April 17, 2019, the Administration announced
Injuries of U.S. Embassy Personnel in Havana.
significant new sanctions.
According to the Department of State, 26 U.S. Embassy
community members suffered a series of unexplained
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo announced that the
injuries, including hearing loss and cognitive issues (most
Administration would, effective May 2, 2019, allow the
occurred from November 2016 to August 2017, but two
right to file lawsuits against those trafficking in
incidents occurred in May 2018.) The Department of State
confiscated property in Cuba pursuant to Title III of the
maintains that the U.S. investigation has not reached a
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD)
definitive conclusion regarding the cause, source, or any
Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114). Lawsuits can be brought by
kind of technologies that might have been used.
any U.S. national, including those who were not U.S.
nationals at the time of the confiscation. (The first such
In September 2017, the Department of State ordered the
lawsuits were filed in U.S. federal court in Miami
departure of nonemergency personnel from the U.S.
against Carnival Corporation, the Miami-based cruise
Embassy to minimize the risk of their exposure to harm;
ship operator, on May 2, 2019.) Prior to this action, all
embassy staff was reduced by about two-thirds. In early
Administrations had suspended, at six-month intervals,
October 2017, the Department of State ordered the
the right to file such lawsuits pursuant to the provisions
departure of 15 diplomats from the Cuban Embassy in
of the law. Secretary Pompeo cited Cuba’s repression of
Washington, DC. According to then-Secretary of State Rex
its own people and its support for the Maduro regime in
Tillerson, the action was taken because of Cuba’s failure to
Venezuela as reasons for the implementation of Title III.
protect U.S. diplomats in Havana and to ensure equity in
The European Union and Canada criticized the
the impact on diplomatic operations. Cuba strongly denies
Administration’s action, vowing to ban enforcement or
responsibility for the injuries. The staff reduction at the
recognition of any judgement, allow counterclaims in
U.S. Embassy has affected embassy operations, especially
European and Canadian courts, and potentially seek
visa processing, and has made bilateral engagement more
action in the World Trade Organization.
difficult.
National Security Advisor John Bolton announced that
116th Congress. The 116th Congress has continued to
the Department of the Treasury would make further
provide funding for democracy assistance and U.S.-
regulatory changes to restrict nonfamily travel to Cuba,
government sponsored broadcasting to Cuba. For FY2019,
limit remittances to $1,000 per person per quarter, and
Congress appropriated $20 million for democracy programs
end the use of “U-turn transactions” (in which funds
in Cuba and $29.1 million for Cuba broadcasting in the
from a bank outside the United States may pass through
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6,
one or more U.S. financial institutions before being
H.J.Res. 31, conference report H.Rept. 116-9) approved in
transferred to a bank outside the United States).
February 2019. For FY2020, the Administration has
Bolton began the Administration’s strong criticism of Cuba
requested $6 million for Cuba democracy programs, a 70%
cut from FY2019, and $12.973 million for Cuba
for its support of Venezuela in a November 2018 speech in
broadcasting, a 55% cut from FY2019.
which he asserted that Cuba was responsible for enabling
the Venezuelan regime’s repression; in rhetoric reminiscent
For additional information, see CRS Report R45657, Cuba:
of the Cold War, he referred to Cuba, Venezuela, and
U.S. Policy in the 116th Congress; CRS Report RL31139,
Nicaragua as the “Troika of Tyranny” in the hemisphere
Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances; and
and its leaders as the “three stooges of socialism.” He has
CRS Report R43888, Cuba Sanctions: Legislative
alleged that Cuba has 20,000 to 25,000 security forces in
Restrictions Limiting the Normalization of Relations.
Venezuela, but some U.S. analysts say the number is far
smaller. Press reports have indicated that the Central
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Intelligence Agency has concluded that Cuba has been far
less involved in Venezuela and far less important than
IF10045
senior Administration officials believe. Cuba maintains that
its 20,000 workers in Venezuela are providing healthcare
other social services.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10045 · VERSION 52 · UPDATED