Updated April 25, 2019
Algeria: In Focus
President Abdelaziz Bouteflika (82) stepped down on April
Figure 1. Algeria at a Glance
2, 2019, in the face of large, peaceful protests, ushering in a
new era of political uncertainty in Algeria. The protests first
erupted in February in opposition to Bouteflika’s candidacy
for a fifth term, despite his evident ill health and advanced
age, in elections originally slated for April. On March 11,
Bouteflika had renounced his reelection bid while delaying
elections indefinitely pending constitutional and electoral
reforms. Protests continued. Bouteflika ultimately stepped
down after the military chief of staff, Gen. Ahmed Gaïd
Salah—previously viewed as an ally—publicly called for
constitutional impeachment procedures.
Following Bouteflika’s resignation, Algeria’s parliament
recognized Senate leader Abdelkader Bensalah as interim

president with new elections to be held within 90 days,
Source: CRS graphic; data from CIA World Factbook + IMF (2018).
consistent with constitutional succession provisions.
Bensalah has scheduled elections for July 4. Law
The political opposition is diverse and divided, comprising
enforcement bodies have also launched what appears to be
leftist, Islamist, Berber-led, and regionally focused groups.
a sweeping anti-corruption crackdown targeting prominent
Many parties—including the FLN—also exhibit internal
business leaders; some, but not all, were considered close to
divisions. Some analysts argue that political Islam has been
Bouteflika. Large protests have continued, with activists
discredited in Algeria due to Islamists’ role in the 1990s
pressing for more comprehensive political changes.
civil conflict, or—alternatively—due to some Islamist
politicians’ accommodation with the state. The Islamic
Algeria’s political system is a republic with a strong
Salvation Front (FIS), whose rapid electoral gains in 1991
presidency and security apparatus, a state-centric economy,
sparked a military coup and the subsequent conflict,
and social welfare programs underpinned by oil and gas
remains banned. Religiously conservative Salafist social
revenues. State decisionmaking is diffuse and opaque, with
movements have grown in prominence since the conflict.
elected politicians, military and intelligence officers, and
business leaders reportedly wielding influence behind the
Terrorism and Counterterrorism
scenes. The State Department’s human rights reports cite
Internal security has improved markedly since the civil
“official corruption” as a key issue. This system had
conflict of the 1990s. Small cells linked to Al Qaeda and
withstood turmoil in the region since 2011 as well as
the Islamic State (IS) reportedly remain active in some
internal pressures. The prospect of an uncertain leadership
areas, but the pace of attacks has continuously decreased.
transition has nonetheless preoccupied Algerians as
Since the start of wars in Libya and Mali in 2011, Algerian
members of the “revolutionary generation” that fought for
security forces have bolstered their presence in border
independence from France in the mid-20th century have
regions and conduct frequent counterterrorism operations.
aged or passed away.
The government also runs de-radicalization programs and
Politics: Context
has sought to control the content of religious sermons.
President Bouteflika was first elected in 1999 with military
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a U.S.-
backing, as Algeria’s decade-long brutal counterinsurgency
designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, originated as an
against armed Islamist groups was winding down. He
insurgent faction from Algeria’s 1990s conflict. An AQIM
advanced reconciliation initiatives and sought to
splinter faction claimed an assault in 2013 on a gas plant in
consolidate executive powers under the presidency, in part
southeastern Algeria in which 39 foreigners (including
by asserting greater control over the army and military
three Americans) were killed. AQIM’s leader reportedly
intelligence service. Bouteflika was last reelected in 2014, a
remains based in northeast Algeria, but the group’s center
year after suffering a stroke that appeared to leave him
of gravity has moved south into Mali over the past decade.
Since 2017, AQIM’s southern branch has been subsumed
physically debilitated. For years, analysts have observed
“political paralysis” due to a lack of elite consensus over
under a Mali-based jihadist coalition known as the Group
“the general outline of the post-Bouteflika era.”
for Supporting Islam and Muslims, or JNIM after its
transliterated Arabic name. AQIM elements and offshoots
The bicameral parliament is institutionally weak and
are also active in Libya and Tunisia.
dominated by two parties long supportive of Bouteflika: the
National Liberation Front (FLN), which led Algeria’s fight
In 2014, an Algerian IS affiliate known as Jund al Khilafah
(“soldiers of the caliphate”)
for independence and was the sole legal party for decades,
emerged and beheaded a
and the National Rally for Democracy (RND).
French tourist. Algerian security forces reportedly killed the
group’s leader the following year and they appear to have
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Algeria: In Focus
been effective in preventing the further spread of IS-linked
talks on Western Sahara since late 2018, but does not
groups within the country.
consider itself a party to the dispute.
Algerian Islamist “foreign fighters” were prominent in the
Algeria mediated Mali’s 2015 peace accord and has backed
Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq in the 1980s-2000s.
the U.N.-led political process in Libya. Given its large
Relatively few Algerians reportedly joined the Islamic State
military, financial resources, and aversion to Western direct
at its height in Syria (2014-2015), however, compared to
intervention, Algeria has also periodically sought to
flows from neighboring Tunisia and Morocco. At one time,
coordinate a regional response to terrorism and other cross-
26 Algerians were held at the U.S. base in Guantánamo;
border security threats in the Sahel region. Yet the
nearly all have been repatriated or sent to third countries.
country’s complex and often distrustful relations with
The Economy and Energy Sector
neighboring states have hindered cooperation, as has the
leadership’s current focus on domestic political questions.
Algeria has the world’s 11th-largest proven natural gas

reserves and 16th-largest proven oil reserves, and is the
Algeria’s foreign policy has often conflicted with that of the
seventh-largest natural gas exporter. It is also estimated to
United States: for example, Algeria has close ties to Russia,
have the world’s third-largest recoverable shale gas
is highly critical of Israel, opposed the 2011 NATO-led
reserves. Over half of the formal economy is reportedly
intervention in Libya, and maintains relations with the Asad
comprised of state-owned enterprises, led by the national
government in Syria. With regard to Western Sahara, the
oil and gas company Sonatrach. Most of Algeria’s natural
United States has recognized neither Morocco’s claim of
gas exports go to Europe, by pipeline or ship. As of 2017,
sovereignty nor the Polisario’s self-proclaimed Sahrawi
Italy was Algeria’s top export destination and China its top
Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), which Algeria
source of imports.
recognizes as an independent state. The United States has
High global energy prices prior to 2014 allowed Algeria to
backed the U.N.-led talks on the territory’s final status.
accrue large foreign exchange reserves, which protected it
U.S. Relations
from global economic swings, financed its large military,
Like its predecessors, the Trump Administration has
and funded social programs that arguably assuaged
emphasized the value of U.S.-Algerian cooperation to
domestic dissent. Amid the drop in prices since then,
counter terrorism (notably via information sharing and
Algeria’s foreign reserves declined by more than half,
coordination in multilateral forums) and respond to crises in
according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), while
Libya and Mali, while continuing to issue occasional
its “oil stabilization fund” decreased from $20 billion to
criticism of Algeria’s human rights performance and
about $7 billion as of 2017. The IMF has documented
challenging business environment. Algeria’s reliance on
ongoing fiscal deficits and a gradual rise in unemployment.
Russia for most defense acquisitions remains a point of
(Algeria does not borrow from the IMF but submits to
friction, though Algeria has increased purchases of U.S.
monitoring.) Economic frustrations have reportedly fueled
equipment in recent years. U.S. foreign direct investment
illicit, often dangerous, migration to Europe.
(FDI) stocks totaled $3 billion as of 2017 (latest),
Algerian leaders have called for diversification and more
concentrated in the energy sector.
foreign investment, but reforms that could encourage such
During a visit to Algiers in 2018, Deputy Secretary of State
outcomes have not advanced. Foreign investment projects
John Sullivan emphasized the United States’ “commitment
are required to be 51% locally owned, there are limits on
to strengthening and broadening U.S.-Algerian relations.”
capital flows and currency exchange, and the process of
In early 2019, Algeria’s then-Foreign Minister, Abdelkader
setting up a business is “heavily bureaucratic,” according to
Messahel, visited Washington, DC, for a high-level U.S.-
the State Department. The government imposed sweeping
Algeria Strategic Dialogue, which had last convened in
import restrictions in 2017 in an effort to promote increased
2015. Officials also meet regularly for bilateral
local production, causing trade to plummet and possibly
counterterrorism and joint military dialogues. U.S.
fueling inflation and smuggling. Weak infrastructure
educational and cultural exchange programs seek to build
linkages with neighboring countries and the closure of the
relations with young Algerians and other emergent actors.
border with Morocco since 1994 also inhibit growth.
U.S. bilateral aid comprised $1.3 million for International
Analysts further point to the absence of a modern financial
Military Education and Training (IMET) and $0.8 million
market and an underdeveloped stock exchange and banking
for Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related
system. Algeria has applied to join the World Trade
Programs (NADR) in FY2018. The Administration has
Organization (WTO) but has yet to qualify.
requested similar funding for FY2020. Additional regional
Foreign Policy and Regional Issues
or global funds have periodically been provided to promote
Algeria’s foreign policy emphasizes state sovereignty and
economic growth, strengthen civil society, and counter
noninterference; residual skepticism of Western powers and
violent extremism. Algeria also participates in the State
NATO is a legacy of its armed struggle for independence
Department-led Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism
from France (1954-1962). Although Algeria has by far the
Partnership (TSCTP), but has not been a top recipient of aid
largest defense budget in Africa, long-standing policy
under the program and appears to prefer bilateral activities.
prohibits troop deployments beyond its borders. Relations
In contrast to Tunisia and Egypt, Congress has not granted
with Morocco remain tense due to a rivalry for regional
specific authority to the Department of Defense to aid
influence and opposing views regarding the disputed
Algeria in securing its border with Libya.
territory of Western Sahara. Morocco claims Western
Sahara and de facto administers most of it. Algeria hosts
Alexis Arieff, Specialist in African Affairs
and backs the Polisario Front, which seeks independence
IF11116
for the territory. Algeria has participated in U.N.-convened
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Algeria: In Focus


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11116 · VERSION 5 · UPDATED

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