Updated April 24, 2019
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Since the early 1960s, when the United States imposed a
to demonstrate his responsiveness to public criticism and
trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy
his independence from the previous government. Díaz-
toward Cuba has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at
Canel continues to faces two significant challenges—
isolating the government.
moving forward with economic reforms that produce results
and responding to citizens’ desires for greater freedom.
In December 2014, the Obama Administration initiated a
major policy shift moving away from sanctions toward
In February 2019, almost 87% of Cubans approved a new
engagement and the normalization of relations. The policy
constitution in a national referendum. Among the changes
change included the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a
are the addition of an appointed prime minister to oversee
state sponsor of international terrorism in May 2015; the
government operations; age and term limits on the
restoration of diplomatic relations in July 2015; and efforts
president; and some market-oriented economic reforms,
to increase travel, commerce, and the flow of information to
including the right to private property and the promotion of
Cuba by easing restrictions on travel, remittances, trade,
foreign investment. However, the new constitution ensures
telecommunications, and banking and financial services
the state sector’s dominance over the economy and the
(accomplished through amendments in 2015 and 2016 to
predominant role of the Communist Party.
the Cuban Assets Control Regulations [CACR],
Government-to-Government Engagement. With the
administered by the Treasury Department, and the Export
restoration of relations in 2015, bilateral engagement
Administration Regulations [EAR], administered by the
increased significantly. U.S. and Cuban officials held seven
Commerce Department).
Bilateral Commission meetings, the most recent in June
President Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba in
2018, to coordinate efforts on areas of engagement.
2017 introducing new sanctions and rolling back some of
Officials negotiated numerous bilateral agreements,
the Obama Administration’s efforts to normalize relations.
including on such issues as environmental cooperation,
In 2019, the Administration has increased economic
direct mail, civil aviation, maritime navigation, agriculture,
sanctions significantly and taken other actions against Cuba
health, counternarcotics efforts, federal air marshals, cancer
to pressure the Cuban government on its human rights
research, seismology, meteorology, wildlife conservation,
record and its support for the regime of Nicolás Maduro in
animal and plant health, oil-spill preparedness and
Venezuela. These include actions announced on April 17,
response, law enforcement cooperation, search and rescue,
2019, allowing lawsuits to go forward against those
and the delimitation of the U.S.-Cuban maritime boundary
trafficking in property confiscated by the Cuban
in the eastern Gulf of Mexico. Bilateral dialogues were also
government and tightening restrictions on remittances and
held on these and other issues including counterterrorism,
nonfamily travel to Cuba. With these actions, U.S. policy
U.S. property claims, human rights, renewable energy and
toward Cuba has again shifted to a policy of strong
efficiency, trafficking in persons, migration, and
economic pressure. In response to the Trump
cybersecurity. Given the current state of U.S.-Cuban
Administration’s increased pressures, Cuban President
relations, the future of bilateral cooperation is uncertain.
Miguel Díaz-Canel asserted, “We Cubans do not
surrender.”
Trump Administration Sanctions. President Trump

issued a national security presidential memorandum on
Cuban Political Developments. In April 2018, Díaz-
Cuba in June 2017 that introduced new sanctions. These
Canel, who was serving as first vice president, succeeded
included restrictions on transactions with companies
Raúl Castro as president, but Castro continues to head the
controlled by the Cuban military, and the elimination of
Cuban Communist Party until 2021. The selection of Díaz-
people-to-people travel for individuals. To implement these
Canel, now 58 years old, reflects the generational change in
changes, the Treasury and Commerce Departments
Cuban leadership that began several years ago and marks
amended the CACR and EAR in November 2017. The
the first time since the 1959 Cuban revolution that a Castro
regulations require people-to-people travel to be under the
is not in charge of the government. While in power from
auspices of an organization specializing in such travel and
2006 to 2018, Raúl Castro began to implement significant
prohibit financial transactions with entities controlled by
economic policy changes, moving toward a more mixed
the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services.
economy with a stronger private sector, but his
government’s
The State Department issued a list of “restricted entities” in
slow, gradualist approach did not produce
November 2017, which was updated in November 2018 and
major improvements to the Cuban economy, which has
March 2019. Currently, the list includes 210 entities and
experienced minimal growth in recent years.
subentities, including 2 ministries, 5 holding companies
In December 2018, President Díaz-Canel backtracked on
(including GAESA) and 47 of their subentities (including
implementing regulations that likely would have shrunk the
the Mariel Special Development Zone), 99 hotels (with 28
private sector and slowed implementation of a controversial
in Havana), 2 tourist agencies, 5 marinas, 10 stores in Old
decree regulating artistic expression, actions that appeared
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Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Havana, and 40 entities serving the defense and security
thousands of undocumented Cuban migrants have entered
sectors.
the United States in recent years. Cuban nationals who
attempt to enter the United States illegally and do not
On April 17, 2019, the Administration announced
qualify for humanitarian relief are now subject to removal.
significant new sanctions.

Continued Human Rights Concerns. Human rights
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo announced that the
violations in Cuba have remained a fundamental U.S.
Administration would, effective May 2, 2019, allow the
policy concern for many years. In October 2018, the U.S.
right to file lawsuits against those trafficking in
Mission to the United Nations launched a campaign to call
confiscated property in Cuba pursuant to Title III of the
attention to Cuba’s “estimated 130 political prisoners.” In
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD)
recent years, Cuba has shifted to using short-term
Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114). Lawsuits can be brought by
detentions and harassment to repress dissent, with at least
any U.S. national, including those who were not U.S.
5,155 such detentions in 2017 and 2,873 in 2018 (the lowest
nationals at the time of the confiscation. Prior to this
level since 2010) according to the Cuban Commission for
action, all Administrations had suspended, at six-month
Human Rights and National Reconciliation. In the first
intervals, the right to file such lawsuits pursuant to the
three months of 2019, there were 639 short-term detentions
provisions of the law. Secretary Pompeo cited Cuba’s
(about a 36% decline from the same period in 2018).
repression of its own people and its support for the
Maduro regime in Venezuela as reasons for the
Injuries of U.S. Embassy Personnel in Havana.
implementation of Title III. The European Union and
According to the Department of State, 26 U.S. Embassy
Canada criticized the Administration’s action, vowing to
community members suffered a series of unexplained
ban enforcement or recognition of any judgement, allow
injuries, including hearing loss and cognitive issues (most
counterclaims in European and Canadian courts, and
occurred from November 2016 to August 2017, but two
seek to protect their companies in the context of the
incidents occurred in May 2018.) The State Department
World Trade Organization.
maintains that the U.S. investigation has not reached a

definitive conclusion regarding the cause, source, or any
National Security Advisor John Bolton announced that
kind of technologies that might have been used.
the Treasury Department would make further regulatory
changes to restrict non-family travel to Cuba, limit
In September 2017, the State Department ordered the
remittances to $1,000 per person per quarter, and end
departure of nonemergency personnel from the U.S.
the use of “U-turn transactions” (in which funds from a
Embassy to minimize the risk of their exposure to harm;
bank outside the United States may pass through one or
embassy staff was reduced by about two-thirds. In early
more U.S. financial institutions before being transferred
October 2017, the State Department ordered the departure
to a bank outside the United States). He also noted that
of 15 diplomats from the Cuban Embassy in Washington,
the State Department would add five entities to its
DC. According to then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, the
“Cuba Restricted List.” Bolton began the
action was taken because of Cuba’s failure to protect U.S.
Administration’s strong criticism of Cuba for its support
diplomats in Havana and to ensure equity in the impact on
of Venezuela in a November 2018 speech in which he
diplomatic operations. Cuba strongly denies responsibility
asserted that Cuba was responsible for enabling the
for the injuries. The staff reduction at the U.S. Embassy has
Venezuelan regime’s repression; in rhetoric reminiscent
affected embassy operations, especially visa processing,
of the Cold War, he referred to Cuba, Venezuela, and
and has made bilateral engagement more difficult.
Nicaragua as the “Troika of Tyranny” in the hemisphere
and its leaders as the “three stooges of socialism.”
116th Congress. The 116th Congress has continued to

provide funding for democracy assistance and U.S.-
On April 5 and April 12, the Treasury Department imposed
government sponsored broadcasting to Cuba. For FY2019,
sanctions on six companies and five vessels that have
Congress appropriated $20 million for democracy programs
transported Venezuelan oil to Cuba (39 other vessels that
in Cuba and $29.1 million for Cuba broadcasting in the
have transported Venezuelan oil were also sanctioned).
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6,
Venezuela currently provides some 40,000-50,000 barrels
H.J.Res. 31, conference report H.Rept. 116-9) approved in
of oil per day to Cuba, about one-third of its consumption.
February 2019. For FY2020, the Administration has
requested $6 million for Cuba democracy programs, a 70%
On April 8, 2019, the Treasury Department scuttled an
cut from FY2019, and $12.973 million for Cuba
agreement between Major League Baseball and the Cuban
broadcasting, a 55% cut from FY2019.
Baseball Federation, announced in December 2018, which
would have allowed Cuban baseball players to sign with
For additional information, see CRS Report R45657, Cuba:
U.S. teams directly. Trump Administration officials
U.S. Policy in the 116th Congress; CRS Report RL31139,
maintained that the Cuban Baseball Federation is part of the
Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances; and
Cuban government and therefore no payments could be
CRS Report R43888, Cuba Sanctions: Legislative
made to the federation under U.S. sanctions.
Restrictions Limiting the Normalization of Relations.
Change in U.S. Immigration Policy. In early January
2017, the Obama Administration announced the ending of
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs
the so-called wet foot/dry foot policy, under which
IF10045

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Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview



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