April 5, 2019
Crisis in the Central African Republic
Congress has held hearings, appropriated aid funds, and
Figure 1. Central African Republic: At a Glance
conducted oversight in response to the situation in the
Central African Republic (CAR), which has experienced
state collapse and conflict since a rebel movement known
as the Seleka seized control of the government in 2013.
Despite a post-rebellion political transition culminating in
the 2016 inauguration of a new president, Faustin Archange
Touadera (a former Prime Minister who ran as an
independent), security and humanitarian conditions have
deteriorated. The European Union (EU), U.N., Russia, and
the United States are providing support to the national
military (the FACA), but state security forces remain weak
and dogged by a history of abuses and militia infiltration.
Competitions over mineral resources, cattle migration

routes, and trade have been key drivers of conflict.
Source: CRS graphic. Data from U.N. agencies, IMF, and CIA World
Factbook; 2018 estimates unless otherwise noted.
Armed groups control much of the country, despite donor-
backed efforts to extend state authority. In February 2019,
Humanitarian and Human Rights Conditions
the government and 14 armed groups signed a peace accord
As of late 2018, one in five Central Africans were
brokered by the African Union (AU) in Khartoum, Sudan.
displaced: 580,700 as internally displaced persons (IDPs)
The new agreement—the eighth since 2013—calls for a
and 591,000 as refugees in neighboring countries. Over
unity government, demobilization of non-state combatants,
275,000 CAR refugees reside in Cameroon, which has
and the creation of interim mixed security units comprising
faced a rise in armed banditry along its border with CAR.
security forces and former rebels. Several groups threatened
About half of CAR’s population, 2.9 million people,
immediately to withdraw from the accord, prompting
reportedly need humanitarian aid, with nearly 2 million
questions over its durability and impact. Prospects for full
facing severe food insecurity. CAR is among the world’s
implementation—which arguably would require that armed
deadliest countries for aid workers; militia attacks on IDPs
groups relinquish control of lucrative economic interests—
have further impeded relief efforts.
are tenuous. Few drivers of grassroots-level conflict have
The State Department’s 2018 human right
been addressed.
s report on CAR
cites arbitrary killings, forced disappearances, sexual
Much of the violence in CAR has played out along ethnic
violence, harsh prison conditions, and impunity as key
and sectarian lines, driven by tensions over identity,
issues. A Special Criminal Court has been established to
citizenship, and exclusion. The Seleka was led by largely
prosecute crimes since 2003, but it has been slow to launch.
Muslim combatants with ties to CAR’s remote northeast,
The International Criminal Court (ICC) has also opened
and to neighboring Sudan and Chad, drawing support from
investigations related to CAR, with the trial of two anti-
communities that some in CAR view as foreign. Christian-
balaka leaders due to open in mid-2019.
and animist-led “anti-balaka” (“anti-machete” or “anti-
bullet”)
The Economy
militias formed to fight the Seleka, but ultimately
targeted Muslims in general. CAR’s population was about
CAR’s development indicators are among the lowest in the
15% Muslim and 85% Christian or animist, but anti-balaka
world: it ranked 188th out of 189 countries on the 2018 U.N.
attacks in 2013-2014 forced much of the Muslim population
Human Development Index. The already fragile economy
in the south, center, and west to gather in small enclaves or
collapsed with the onset of violence in 2013 and the
flee to other countries or the rebel-held northeast—a pattern
ensuing flight of much of the Muslim population, which
U.N. investigators termed “ethnic cleansing.”
had previously played a key role in trade nationwide.
Economic growth has recovered moderately, averaging
Rebel alliances have since shifted as groups have sought to
4.5% per year from 2015 to 2018, but this rate is
gain leverage in peace talks and advance their economic
insufficient to alleviate poverty significantly, and
interests. Some coalitions have bridged sectarian divides,
displacement and conflict continue to hinder wellbeing. In
underscoring the extent to which social cleavages have been
2015, legal diamond exports formally resumed from certain
instrumentalized during the conflict. Notably, some anti-
areas in the southwest deemed free of armed groups by the
balaka groups have collaborated with some ex-Seleka
Kimberley Process, an international certification initiative
factions to target members of the (mostly Muslim and
aimed at preventing diamonds that fund rebel groups from
pastoralist) Fulani ethnic community. Several Fulani-led
entering legal trade. Most diamonds reportedly continue to
armed groups have emerged in response.
https://crsreports.congress.gov

---

Crisis in the Central African Republic
be exported illegally, however, including from ex-Seleka
journalists were killed in CAR in unclear circumstances
controlled areas in the north and east.
while probing private military contractor activities.
U.N. Peacekeeping and Other Foreign Troops
U.S. Policy and Aid
The U.N. Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization
Mission in CAR (MINUSCA) was established in 2014,
“Our primary U.S. objective is to help the elected
absorbing a previous AU military force. MINUSCA is
government of President Touadera expand state
mandated to protect civilians, assist the peace process,
authority. We support the African Union-led peace
protect aid delivery, support the extension of state authority,
process, efforts to bring justice to victims of atrocities,
and, under certain conditions, take “urgent temporary
and reestablishment of civilian security and justice
measures...to arrest and detain in order to maintain basic
capabilities.” – U.S. Ambassador to CAR Lucy Tamlyn
law and order and fight impunity,” among other tasks. As of
The United States is the single largest donor to the
early 2019, MINUSCA had nearly reached its authorized
humanitarian response in CAR, allocating about $124
deployment of 12,870 uniformed personnel, including
million in emergency humanitarian aid per year in FY2017
11,650 military troops. Force protection, logistical capacity,
and FY2018. Other U.S. assistance has sought to support
and adequate equipment remain key challenges. A
conflict resolution and reconciliation, atrocity-prevention
sweeping sexual abuse scandal implicating MINUSCA
efforts, livelihoods, security sector reform, and
contingents has also hurt relations with local populations.
environmental conservation. U.S. bilateral aid totaled $34
As of late 2018, an EU Training Mission (EUTM)
million in FY2018, including $18 million in food aid, $13
established in 2016 had trained more than 4,000 vetted
million in security aid, and $3 million in development aid.
FACA soldiers, out of a total pre-2013 force of about 7,000.
Starting in 2014, during CAR’s transitional government,
The EU previously deployed some 750 soldiers to help
U.S. security assistance initially centered on the police and
secure Bangui in 2014-2015, and later established a military
justice sector. In 2016, it expanded to include military
advisory mission to support reforms. France, which
professionalization, right-sizing, and defense reform
deployed some 2,000 troops to CAR from 2013 to 2016 to
programs, along with efforts to encourage disarmament,
disarm militias and secure Bangui, has military personnel
demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of rebel fighters.
participating in the EUTM and MINUSCA.
The Trump Administration requested $6.6 million in State-
The U.N. Security Council has maintained an arms
and USAID-administered bilateral aid funding for CAR in
embargo and targeted sanctions regime on CAR since 2013,
FY2020. The Administration backed an increase in
but in recent years it has approved some arms transfers to
MINUSCA’s troop ceiling in 2017, but has recently sought
the government on a case-by-case basis. CAR officials have
to limit U.S. funding for the mission, in line with its broader
called for the embargo to be fully lifted for the government.
critique of U.N. peacekeeping. U.S. financial contributions
In late 2018, the Council authorized MINUSCA to provide
to MINUSCA totaled $267 million in FY2018, with $157
logistical support for the FACA’s “progressive
million and $163 million requested for FY2019 and
redeployment” through CAR’s territory. The mission had
FY2020, respectively.
previously coordinated some operations with the FACA in
The Administration has expanded U.S. targeted sanctions to
Bangui and other cities where the military had established a
deter support to CAR’s domestic armed groups and the
presence. Although some communities have welcomed the
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), which originated in
military, the legacy of FACA disintegration and
Uganda and is active in CAR. Sixteen individuals and three
involvement in anti-Muslim violence in 2013-2015 may
entities are designated for U.S. sanctions under Executive
hinder its effectiveness. U.N. sanctions investigators
Order 13667 (2014) on CAR, including former presidents
criticized a botched 2018 joint operation by U.N., FACA,
François Bozizé and Michel Djotodia, ex-Seleka leader
and CAR internal security forces in Bangui’s Muslim
Noureddine Adam, LRA leader Joseph Kony, two of his
“PK5” enclave for worsening intercommunal tensions.
sons, and the LRA as a group. The U.S. designations are
Russia’s growing presence in CAR has raised concerns for
more extensive than those imposed by the U.N. Security
French and U.S. policymakers. The Commander of U.S.
Council sanctions committee on CAR. In 2017, the
Africa Command testified to Congress in early 2019 that
Administration withdrew U.S. military advisors who had
CAR was an example of Russia’s “more militaristic
supported Ugandan-led counter-LRA operations in eastern
approach in Africa,” in which “oligarch-funded, quasi-
CAR since 2011.
mercenary military advisors” have secured mineral rights in
Congress has directed the executive branch to issue a
exchange for weapons. Russia may also be seeking greater
strategy toward CAR (S.Rept. 113-195); in 2015, the State
diplomatic influence in Africa at the expense of colonial
Department submitted a strategy document that defined
power France. Russian military personnel and private
U.S. interests and outlined U.S. diplomatic and aid efforts
contractors first deployed to assist the FACA in 2017, after
in CAR. Congress also has directed funding for
Russia secured a U.N. arms embargo exemption to donate
reconciliation and peacebuilding aid in CAR, and for DDR
small arms. As of late 2018, U.N. sanctions monitors
and early-warning programs in LRA-affected areas, via
reported that FACA deployments outside Bangui were
annual foreign aid appropriations measures (most recently,
“most often accompanied” by Russian instructors. Russian
under §7042 of P.L. 116-6). The conference agreement on
personnel also have established a presence in mineral-rich
P.L. 116-6 includes $8 million in military aid for CAR via
rebel-held areas, and Russia pushed to locate the AU-
the State Department’s Peacekeeping Operations account.
backed peace talks in Sudan, where it has close ties (as do
key Seleka figures). In 2018, three Russian investigative
Alexis Arieff, Specialist in African Affairs
https://crsreports.congress.gov

---

Crisis in the Central African Republic

IF11171
Tomas F. Husted, Analyst in African Affairs


Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11171 · VERSION 1 · NEW

---