Updated April 3, 2019
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Since the early 1960s, when the United States imposed a
the state sector’s dominance over the economy and the
trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy
predominant role of the Communist Party.
toward Cuba has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at
isolating the government. In December 2014, however, the
Government-to-Government Engagement. With the
Obama Administration initiated a major policy shift,
restoration of relations in 2015, government-to-government
moving away from sanctions toward engagement and the
engagement increased significantly. U.S. and Cuban
normalization of relations. The policy change included the
officials have held seven Bilateral Commission meetings,
rescission of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of
the most recent in June 2018, to coordinate efforts to
international terrorism in May 2015; the restoration of
advance engagement. Officials have negotiated numerous
diplomatic relations in July 2015; and efforts to increase
bilateral agreements, including on such issues as
travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba.
environmental cooperation, direct mail, civil aviation,
maritime navigation, agriculture, health cooperation,
President Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba in
counternarcotics cooperation, federal air marshals, cancer
2017 introducing new sanctions and partially rolling back
research, seismology, meteorology, wildlife conservation,
some of the Obama Administration’s efforts to normalize
animal and plant health, oil-spill preparedness and
relations. On March 4, 2019, the Administration ratcheted
response, law enforcement cooperation, search and rescue,
up its economic pressure on Cuba by allowing some
and the delimitation of the U.S.-Cuban maritime boundary
lawsuits to go forward against over 200 Cuba entities
in the eastern Gulf of Mexico. Bilateral dialogues have been
operated by the Cuban military, intelligence, or security
held on these and other issues, including counterterrorism,
services for trafficking in confiscated property.
U.S. property claims, human rights, renewable energy and
efficiency, trafficking in persons, migration, and
Cuban Political Developments. First Vice President
cybersecurity.
Miguel Díaz-Canel succeeded Raúl Castro as president in
April 2018, but Castro continues to head the Cuban
Travel and Commerce. The Obama Administration’s
Communist Party until 2021. The selection of Díaz-Canel,
policy change of increasing travel and commerce with Cuba
now 58 years old, reflects the generational change in Cuban
required amendments to U.S. regulations administered by
leadership that began several years ago and marks the first
the Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets
time since the 1959 Cuban revolution that a Castro is not in
Control (Cuban Assets Control Regulations [CACR]; 31
charge of the government.
C.F.R. Part 515) and the Department of Commerce, Bureau
of Industry and Security (Export Administration
Raúl Castro (2006-2018) began the implementation of
Regulations [EAR]; 15 C.F.R. Parts 730-774). To
significant economic policy changes, moving toward a
implement the policy, the two agencies issued five rounds
more mixed economy with a stronger private sector. His
of amendments to the regulations in 2015-2016 that eased
government’s slow, gradualist approach, however, did not
restrictions on travel, remittances, trade,
produce major improvements to the Cuban economy, which
telecommunications, and banking and financial services.
has experienced minimal growth in recent years.
Trump Administration Sanctions. President Trump
In December 2018, President Díaz-Canel backtracked on
issued a national security presidential memorandum on
implementing regulations that likely would have shrunk the
Cuba in June 2017 that introduced new sanctions. These
private sector and slowed implementation of a controversial
sanctions include restrictions on transactions with
decree regulating artistic expression, actions that appeared
companies controlled by the Cuban military and the
to demonstrate his responsiveness to public criticism and
elimination of people-to-people educational travel for
his independence from the previous government. Díaz-
individuals.
Canel continues to faces two significant challenges—
moving forward with economic reforms that produce results
To implement these changes, the Treasury and Commerce
and responding to citizens’ desires for greater freedom.
Departments amended the CACR and EAR in November
2017. The regulations now require people-to-people travel
On February 24, 2019, almost 87% of Cubans approved a
to be under the auspices of an organization specializing in
new constitution in a national referendum. Among the
such travel and prohibit financial transactions with entities
changes are the addition of an appointed prime minister to
controlled by the Cuban military, intelligence, or security
oversee government operations; age and term limits on the
services, but with several exceptions.
president; and some market-oriented economic reforms,
including the right to private property and the promotion of
The State Department issued a list of “restricted entities” in
foreign investment. However, the new constitution ensures
November 2017, which was updated in November 2018 and
March 2019. Currently, the “Cuba Restricted List” includes
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Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
210 entities and subentities, including 2 ministries, 5
occurred from November 2016 to August 2017, but two
holding companies (including GAESA) and 47 of their
incidents occurred in May 2018.) The State Department
subentities (including the Mariel Special Development
maintains that the U.S. investigation has not reached a
Zone), 99 hotels (with 28 in Havana), 2 tourist agencies, 5
definitive conclusion regarding the cause, source, or any
marinas, 10 stores in Old Havana, and 40 entities serving
kind of technologies that might have been used.
the defense and security sectors.
In September 2017, the State Department ordered the
On March 4, 2019, Secretary of State Pompeo, pursuant to
departure of nonemergency personnel from the U.S.
Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
Embassy to minimize the risk of their exposure to harm;
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114), allowed certain
embassy staff was reduced by about two-thirds. In early
lawsuits to go forward against those trafficking in
October 2017, the State Department ordered the departure
confiscated property in Cuba. Since 1996, pursuant to the
of 15 diplomats from the Cuban Embassy in Washington,
provisions of Title III, all Administrations have suspended,
DC. According to then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, the
at six-month intervals, the right to file such lawsuits. The
action was taken because of Cuba’s failure to protect U.S.
next six-month suspension was due by February 1, 2019,
diplomats in Havana and to ensure equity in the impact on
but on January 16, Secretary Pompeo suspended the right to
diplomatic operations. Cuba strongly denies responsibility
file lawsuits for an additional 45 days, maintaining that the
for the injuries. The staff reduction at the U.S. Embassy has
extension would permit a careful review taking into account
affected embassy operations, especially visa processing,
U.S. national interests and efforts to expedite a transition to
and has made bilateral engagement more difficult.
democracy in Cuba. Then, on March 4, Secretary Pompeo
partially suspended the right to file lawsuits for an
115th Congress. The 115th Congress continued to provide
additional 30 days (through April 17) but allowed lawsuits,
funding for democracy assistance and U.S.-government
beginning March 19, against an entity or subentity on the
sponsored broadcasting to Cuba. For FY2017, Congress
State Department’s “Cuba Restricted List” controlled by the
appropriated $20 million in democracy funding and $28.1
Cuban military, intelligence, or security services. Lawsuits
million for Cuba broadcasting (P.L. 115-31). For FY2018,
can be brought by any U.S. national, including those who
Congress appropriated $20 million for democracy programs
were not U.S. nationals at the time of the confiscation.
and $28.9 million for Cuba broadcasting (P.L. 115-141;
However, lawsuits may not be brought against third-country
explanatory statement to H.R. 1625). The 2018 farm bill,
foreign investors in Cuba.
P.L. 115-334 (H.R. 2), permits funding for two U.S.
agricultural export promotion programs in Cuba, the Market
Change in U.S. Immigration Policy. In January 2017, the
Access Program and the Foreign Market Development
Obama Administration announced the ending of the so-
Cooperation Program, marking the first time Congress has
called wet foot/dry foot policy, under which thousands of
eased Cuba sanctions in almost a decade.
undocumented Cuban migrants have entered the United
States in recent years. Cuban nationals who attempt to enter
In other action, several measures (P.L. 115-232, P.L. 115-
the United States illegally and do not qualify for
244, and P.L. 115-245) extended a prohibition on the use of
humanitarian relief are now subject to removal.
funds in FY2019 to close or relinquish control of the U.S.
Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; the conference
Continued Human Rights Concerns. Human rights
report to P.L. 115-232 also requires a report on security
violations in Cuba have remained a fundamental U.S.
cooperation between Russia and Cuba. The FAA
policy concern for many years. When President Obama
Reauthorization Act of 2018, P.L. 115-254, requires the
announced the Cuba policy shift, he maintained that the
Transportation Security Administration to brief Congress
United States would continue to speak out on human rights
on certain aspects of Cuban airport security and to develop
but stressed that more could be done through engagement.
and implement a mechanism to better track public air
President Trump’s policy also emphasizes human rights but
charter flights between the United States and Cuba. In
links any changes to the bilateral relationship to an end to
2018, the Senate approved S.Res. 224, commemorating the
the Cuban government’s abuse of dissidents.
legacy of Cuban democracy activist Oswaldo Payá.
In October 2018, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations
116th Congress. For FY2019, Congress appropriated $20
launched a campaign to call attention to Cuba’s “estimated
million for democracy programs in Cuba and $29.1 million
130 political prisoners.” In recent years, Cuba shifted to
for Cuba broadcasting in the Consolidated Appropriations
using short-term detentions and harassment to repress
Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6, H.J.Res. 31, conference report
dissent, with at least 5,155 such detentions in 2017 and
H.Rept. 116-9) approved in February 2019. For FY2020,
2,873 in 2018 (almost a 24% decline from 2017 and the
the Administration has requested $6 million for Cuba
lowest level since 2010) according to the Cuban
democracy programs, a 70% cut from FY2019, and $12.973
Commission for Human Rights and National
million for Cuba broadcasting, a 55% cut from FY2019.
Reconciliation. In the first two months of 2019, there were
454 detentions.
For additional information, see CRS Report R45657, Cuba:
U.S. Policy in the 116th Congress; CRS Report RL31139,
Injuries of U.S. Embassy Personnel in Havana.
Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances; and
According to the Department of State, 26 U.S. Embassy
CRS Report R43888, Cuba Sanctions: Legislative
community members suffered a series of unexplained
Restrictions Limiting the Normalization of Relations.
injuries, including hearing loss and cognitive issues (most
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Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview

IF10045
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10045 · VERSION 48 · UPDATED

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