Updated March 28, 2019
Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy Overview
U.S. interests in Latin America and the Caribbean are
the framework reflects continuity with long-standing U.S.
diverse and include economic, political, security, and
policy priorities for the region, it also appears to be at odds
humanitarian concerns. Geographic proximity has ensured
with the Administration’s actions, sometimes accompanied
strong economic linkages between the United States and the
by tough rhetoric, on foreign aid, trade, and immigration.
region, with the United States being a major trading partner
The Administration’s proposed foreign aid budgets for
and source of foreign investment for many Latin American
FY2018 and FY2019 would have significantly cut
and Caribbean countries. Free-trade agreements (FTAs)
assistance to the region by more than a third; the FY2020
have augmented U.S. economic relations with 11 countries
proposed budget request also would cut funding to the
in the region. The Western Hemisphere is a large source of
region by about 30%.
U.S. immigration, both legal and illegal; geographic
Negative views of U.S. leadership in the region have
proximity and economic and security conditions are major
increased markedly since 2017, influenced by disparaging
factors driving migration trends.
political rhetoric and certain actions on immigration and
Curbing the flow of illicit drugs from Latin America and
trade. Such views could affect the willingness of some
the Caribbean has been a key component of U.S. relations
countries to cooperate with the United States on regional
with the region and a major interest of Congress for more
and global challenges, although some observers believe the
than three decades. The flow of illicit drugs, including
election of conservative governments in several Latin
heroin, methamphetamine, and fentanyl from Mexico and
American countries could lead to increased cooperation.
cocaine from Colombia, poses risks to U.S. public health
On trade, in 2017, President Trump ordered U.S.
and safety. Colombia has received long-standing support
withdrawal from the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership
through Plan Colombia and its successor programs. For
(TPP) free trade agreement that had been negotiated in
over a decade, the United States has engaged in close
2015; the TPP would have increased U.S. economic
partnerships to combat drug trafficking and related violence
linkages with three Latin American countries that were
and advance citizen security: the Mérida Initiative began in
parties to the agreement—Chile, Mexico, and Peru. The
2007 to support Mexico; the Central America Regional
President strongly criticized the North American Free Trade
Security Initiative (CARSI) began in 2008; and the
Agreement (NAFTA) with Mexico and Canada, warned
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) began in 2009.
that the United States might withdraw from it, and initiated
Although many countries in the region have made
renegotiations in 2017; ultimately the three countries agreed
enormous strides in terms of democratic political
in September 2018 to a new United States-Mexico-Canada
development since the 1980s, several face considerable
Agreement (USMCA), which leaves NAFTA largely intact
challenges. In Venezuela, undemocratic practices have risen
but includes some modernizing updates and changes,
significantly over the past several years under the
especially regarding the dairy and auto industries.
authoritarian regime of Nicolás Maduro; the political and
Beyond trade, relations with Mexico have been tested
humanitarian crisis in the country has resulted in mass
because of inflammatory anti-immigrant rhetoric and
migration to neighboring countries. In Nicaragua, long-
immigration actions. In September 2017, the
ruling President Daniel Ortega responded to protests and
Administration announced that it would end the Deferred
social unrest in 2018 with violent repression. Cuba remains
Action for Childhood Arrivals program (DACA); begun in
under authoritarian rule, although the government
2012 by the Obama Administration, the program provides
transitioned to a new president, Miguel Díaz-Canel, in
relief from deportation for certain immigrants who arrived
2018. High rates of crime and violence afflict a number of
as children. The future of the initiative remains uncertain
countries; in some, journalists and human rights and
given challenges in federal court; if ended, some 550,000
environmental activists have been targeted. High-profile
Mexicans and more than 100,000 migrants from other
corruption scandals have stirred strong anti-corruption
countries in the region could be affected. Despite tensions,
sentiment throughout the region and helped to fuel the
U.S.-Mexican relations remain strong, especially energy
election of populist presidents from the left and right,
ties and security cooperation related to drug interdiction.
respectively, in Mexico (Andrés Manuel López Obrador)
and Brazil (Jair Bolsonaro).
Other Administration actions on immigration have caused
concern in the region. The Administration announced the
Trump Administration Policy
termination of Temporary Protected Status (TPS)
Under the Trump Administration, the outlook for U.S.
designations for Nicaragua, Haiti, El Salvador, and
relations with Latin America and the Caribbean has
Honduras. Other immigration actions, such as the
changed. In February 2018, the State Department set forth a
implementation of a “zero tolerance” policy toward illegal
framework for U.S. policy toward the region focused on
border crossings, could restrict the ability of Central
three pillars for engagement—economic growth and
American migrants to receive asylum.
prosperity, security, and democratic governance. Although
https://crsreports.congress.gov

---

Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy Overview
In order to contend with the surge of unaccompanied
indicating policy preferences on a range of issues and
children and other migrants from Central America, the
countries: S.Res. 35 and H.Res. 259 on Venezuela, S.Res.
Obama Administration developed a broader policy
83 and H.Res. 336 on Mexico, H.Res. 54 on Argentina,
approach in 2015 known as the U.S. Strategy for
H.Res. 145 on Central America, S.Res. 224 on Cuba, and
Engagement in Central America to improve security,
H.Res. 981 on Nicaragua.
strengthen governance, and promote prosperity, especially
116th Congress. The 116th Congress completed action on
in the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador,
FY2019 foreign aid appropriations when it enacted the
Guatemala, and Honduras. The Trump Administration’s
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6) in
budget requests over the past several years would have cut
February 2019; although the measures and conference
assistance for the strategy significantly, and President
report did not specify appropriations levels for each country
Trump periodically has threated to cut assistance for it.
in the region, amounts appropriated for key U.S. initiatives
As the situation in Venezuela has deteriorated, the Trump
and countries significantly exceeded the Administration’s
Administration has imposed targeted and broader financial
request. Congress also has begun consideration of the
sanctions, including sanctions against the state oil company.
Administration’s FY2020 foreign aid budget request for
In January 2019, the Administration took action against the
almost $1.2 billion for the region, a 30% cut from almost
Maduro regime by recognizing the head of Venezuela’s
$1.7 billion provided in FY2018.
National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, as interim president. The
Congress has also been monitoring the crisis in Venezuela,
Administration has provided support for Venezuelans who
with oversight hearings and House approval of three bills in
have fled to other countries, especially Colombia, and has
March 2019: H.R. 854, providing humanitarian assistance
pre-positioned assistance in neighboring countries.
to the Venezuelan people, including Venezuela migrants
President Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba in
and refugees in the Americas; H.R. 920, restricting the
2017 that partially rolled back the Obama Administration’s
export of defense articles and crime control materials to
engagement policy and imposed new sanctions, including
Venezuelan security forces; and H.R. 1477, requiring a
restrictions on financial transactions with companies
threat assessment and strategy to counter Russian influence
controlled by the Cuban military. In March 2019, pursuant
in Venezuela. In other action, the House approved H.R. 133
to Title III of the LIBERTAD Act (P.L. 104-114), the
in January 2019 to promote U.S. economic partnership and
Administration authorized the right to file certain lawsuits
cooperation with Mexico.
against those trafficking in confiscated property in Cuba. In
Among other issues, the proposed USMCA could face
2017, in response to unexplained injuries of U.S. diplomatic
congressional examination and consideration in the 116th
staff in Havana, the State Department reduced the staff of
Congress; the agreement must be approved by Congress
the U.S. Embassy by about two-thirds.
before it can enter into force. In Central America, a
As political unrest began to grow in Nicaragua in 2018, the
potential oversight issue is the effectiveness of U.S.
Trump Administration spoke out against the Ortega
assistance to the Northern Triangle countries related to
government’s use of violence and employed targeted
efforts to combat insecurity, corruption, and human rights
sanctions against several individuals responsible for human
violations; of particular concern are efforts to undermine
rights abuses or significant corruption.
anticorruption efforts in Guatemala and Honduras,
especially the Guatemalan president’s actions against the
Congressional Action
U.N.-backed International Commission against Impunity in
Congress traditionally has played an active role in policy
Guatemala. Congress also potentially could take up
toward Latin America and the Caribbean in terms of both
consideration of immigration legislation related to the
legislation and oversight. Given the region’s proximity,
rescission of DACA and the termination of TPS for
U.S. foreign and domestic policy often overlap, particularly
Nicaragua, Haiti, El Salvador, and Honduras.
in areas of immigration and trade.
Other potential oversight issues include the surge in
115th Congress. The 115th Congress rejected many of the
Colombian coca cultivation and cocaine production and the
Trump Administration’s proposed FY2018 cuts in foreign
effectiveness of U.S. assistance focusing on
assistance to the region when it enacted the Consolidated
counternarcotics and counterterrorism; the effectiveness of
Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141). In other action,
U.S. assistance to Mexico, given the high level of crime-
Congress enacted the Nicaragua Human Rights and
related violence in the country; how to respond to increased
Anticorruption Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-335, H.R. 1918) in
political repression in Nicaragua; and the extent and
December 2018. The law requires the United States to vote
significance of Chinese and Russian influence engagement
against loans from the international financial institutions to
in the region and the appropriate U.S. policy response.
Nicaragua (except for basic human needs or democracy
promotion) and authorizes sanctions on persons responsible
For background, see CRS Insight IN11045, Latin America:
for human rights violations or corruption. In August 2018,
Challenges for U.S. Policymakers in 2019; and CRS Report
Congress enacted the FY2019 defense authorization
R45120, Latin America and the Caribbean: Issues in the
measure, P.L. 115-232 (H.R. 5515), with several Latin
115th Congress.
America provisions, including required reports on narcotics
trafficking corruption and illicit campaign financing in El
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, and on security
IF10460
cooperation between Russia and Cuba, Nicaragua, and
Venezuela. Both houses also approved resolutions

https://crsreports.congress.gov

---

Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy Overview



Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10460 · VERSION 9 · UPDATED

---