

 
 Legal Sidebari 
 
High Court to Determine Proper Method to 
Serve Process on a Foreign Government 
Updated March 27, 2019 
Update: On March 26, the Supreme Court held 8-1 in favor of Sudan, finding that the most natural 
reading of the statute requires the mailing of service of process directly and expeditiously to the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs of a foreign country at his ordinary place of business in the foreign state rather than 
the country’s embassy in the United States. This reading, the Court noted, avoids tension with the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations and  the anomalous situation that would arise under the opposing 
interpretation, which would seemingly make it easier to serve a foreign government than any foreign 
individual abroad. The Court reversed the judgment below, leaving the plaintiffs to file their complaint 
anew with proper service of process on Sudan. 
The original post from October 26, 2018, appears below: 
In its October 2018 term, the Supreme Court is to hear Republic of Sudan v. Harrison, a case concerning 
the interpretation of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) as it relates to the permissible methods 
of serving process on a foreign government in order to gain jurisdiction to pursue a civil lawsuit. 
Specifically, Sudan urges the Court to toss out a $315 million default judgment against it for its support to 
terrorists responsible for the U.S.S. Cole bombing in Yemen in October 2000. Sudan claims it was 
improperly notified of the lawsuit because the plaintiffs addressed the complaint to its foreign minister via 
its embassy in the United States. The judgment creditors urge the Court to uphold that particular means of 
serving process as compatible with the relevant provision of the FSIA. 
The FSIA provides four hierarchical methods to serve process on a foreign government: 
(1) by delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint in accordance with any special arrangement 
for service between the plaintiff and the foreign state or political subdivision; or 
(2)  if  no  special  arrangement  exists,  by  delivery  of  a  copy  of  the  summons  and  complaint  in 
accordance with an applicable international convention on service of judicial documents; or 
(3) if service cannot be made under paragraphs (1) or (2), by sending a copy of the summons and 
complaint and a notice of suit… by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and 
dispatched by the clerk of the court to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs of the foreign state 
concerned; or 
Congressional Research Service 
https://crsreports.congress.gov 
LSB10212 
CRS Legal Sidebar 
Prepared for Members and  
 Committees of Congress 
 
  
 
Congressional Research Service 
2 
(4)  if  service  cannot  be  made  within  30  days  under  paragraph  (3),  by  sending  two  copies  of  the 
summons and complaint and a notice of suit…by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be 
addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the Secretary of State in Washington, District 
of Columbia…. 
Paragraph (3) is at issue in this case. The plaintiffs addressed the summons and complaint to the head of 
the foreign ministry of Sudan, but sent the package to the embassy in Washington, D.C. rather than to the 
foreign ministry in Khartoum. The plaintiffs note that paragraph (3) does not require that the complaint be 
sent to any particular place; it is to be addressed to a person. In their view, the text suggests the complaint 
may be sent to the embassy as an extension of the country’s foreign ministry. 
Sudan reads paragraph (3) differently. It believes the most natural reading of the text is that the summons 
and complaint must be sent to the foreign minister at his ordinary place of business in the foreign nation’s 
capital. Sudan argues that the phrase “addressed and dispatched to” the foreign minister forecloses 
sending the service package to some agent or other intermediary at another address, including a 
diplomatic mission. Moreover, Sudan argues that delivery of a summons by mail to its embassy violates 
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR). Article 22 of the VCDR provides that “[t]he 
premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the receiving State may not enter them, except 
with the consent of the head of the mission.” The plaintiffs dispute that mail delivery of a summons to an 
embassy constitutes an infringement of that embassy’s inviolability.  
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Second Circuit), in the opinion below, distinguished 
between serving process on an embassy, which it held impermissible under the FSIA and the VCDR, and 
serving process on a foreign minister via his country’s embassy, which it held to be consistent with the 
FSIA. The Second Circuit rejected the United States’ argument in its submission that effecting service of 
process in the latter manner treats the ambassador as an agent of the foreign minister.  
The Solicitor General has submitted an amicus brief in support of Sudan. While expressing sympathy for 
the respondents as victims of a terrorist act, the United States agrees with Sudan that service of process 
through its embassy in the United States was defective under the FSIA. It argues that the Second Circuit’s 
opinion contravenes the most natural reading of the statute, places the United States in breach of its treaty 
obligations, and “threatens harm to the United States’ foreign relations and reciprocal treatment in courts 
abroad.”  
Like the petitioner and respondents, the government bases its argument mainly on its reading of the plain 
text of the statute in context. If Congress had meant to permit service of process via a foreign 
government’s embassy, the government argues, it would have written the statute expressly to permit 
service of process on an agent or on the ambassador. The government also points to legislative history that 
demonstrates how Congress rejected a provision that would have permitted service of process on an 
embassy. The government disagrees with the Second Circuit’s contention that there is a significant 
distinction between service on and service via an embassy. It recommends the Court adopt the reading of 
the statute given it by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and remand the case to give the 
plaintiffs an opportunity to effect service of process by sending the summons and complaint to Sudan’s 
foreign minister in Khartoum. 
A number of groups filed briefs of amici curiae for the Court’s consideration. Libya and Saudi Arabia 
have filed briefs in essence arguing that the VCDR does not permit service of process via or in care of an 
embassy, and that service by that method causes delay and confusion. A group of international law 
professors also urges the Court to reverse the decision below, arguing that the FSIA should be interpreted 
consistently with the VCDR’s principle of inviolability. A group of former U.S. counterterrorism officials 
supports the respondent judgment creditors, arguing that service of process on an embassy does not 
violate international law, is often the most effective way to notify a foreign state of a lawsuit, and is 
especially necessary to assist victims of terrorism in cases such as this one. Finally, the Veterans of 
Foreign Wars of the United States also urges the Court to affirm, arguing that a reversal would undermine
  
Congressional Research Service 
3 
 Congress’s efforts to hold terrorist states responsible for injuries and deaths caused by terrorist acts 
undertaken with a terrorist state’s support.  
The Supreme Court’s decision will likely rest on its interpretation of the FSIA’s text and Congress’s 
intent. In previous cases, the Court has declined to read new language into the FSIA and has relied on a 
natural reading of the text. For example, in Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd. the Court stated 
that “any sort of immunity defense made by a foreign sovereign in an American court must stand on the 
[FSIA] text. Or it must fall.” But in Harrison, both sides believe that the omission of certain text favors 
their interpretation. Sudan argues that Congress could have provided expressly for mailing service of 
process to a nation’s embassy in the United States, if it intended to permit such a method. The 
respondents believe Congress would have referenced sending the service package to the foreign minister 
in the state’s seat of government, if that is what it intended.  
The Court has scheduled oral argument for November 7, 2018. The Solicitor General is to 
participate. 
 
Author Information 
 
Jennifer K. Elsea 
   
Legislative Attorney 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
Disclaimer 
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff 
to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of 
Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of 
information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. 
CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United 
States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, 
as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the 
permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material. 
 
LSB10212 · VERSION 2 · UPDATED