Updated March 8, 2019
Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions
For more than a decade, the United States has employed
Designated individuals include several current or former
sanctions as a policy tool in response to activities of the
Venezuelan officials: in 2008, General Hugo Carvajal
Venezuelan government and Venezuelan individuals. These
(former military intelligence head), General Henry Rangel
have included sanctions related to terrorism, drug
Silva (former defense minister and governor of Trujillo
trafficking, trafficking in persons, antidemocratic actions,
State), and Ramón Rodríguez Chacín (former interior
human rights violations, and corruption. Overall, the
minister and former governor of Guárico); in 2011, Freddy
Treasury Department has imposed financial sanctions on
Alirio Bernal Rosales and Amilicar Jesus Figueroa Salazar
111 individuals and the State Department has revoked the
(United Socialist Party of Venezuela, or PSUV, politicians),
visas of more than 250 individuals. On January 28, 2019,
Major General Cliver Antonio Alcalá Cordones, and
the Trump Administration announced sanctions on
Ramon Isidro Madriz Moreno (a Venezuelan intelligence
Venezuela’s state-oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela,
officer); in 2017, then-Vice President Tareck el Aissami;
S.A., or PdVSA. Several days before the imposition of the
and in May 2018, Pedro Luis Martin (a former senior
PdVSA sanctions, the United States recognized Juan
intelligence official) and two of his associates. Others
Guaidó, the head of Venezuela’s National Assembly, as the
designated include drug trafficker Walid Makled, three dual
country’s interim president and ceased to recognize Nicolás
Lebanese-Venezuelan citizens allegedly involved in a drug
Maduro as the president of Venezuela.
money-laundering network, and several Colombian drug
traffickers with activity in Venezuela.
Terrorism-Related Sanctions
Since 2006, U.S. officials have expressed concerns about
Trafficking in Persons Sanctions
Venezuela’s lack of cooperation on anti-terrorism efforts.
Since 2014, Venezuela has been on the State Department’s
Since then, the Secretary of State has made an annual
Tier 3 list in its annual Trafficking in Persons Report. Tier 3
determination that Venezuela is not “cooperating fully with
countries are those whose governments do not fully comply
United States anti-terrorism efforts” pursuant to Section
with the minimum standards of the Trafficking Victims
40A of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2781). The
Protection Act (P.L. 106-386, Division A, 22 U.S.C. 7101
most recent determination was made in May 2018. As a
et seq.) and are not making significant efforts to do so; they
result, the United States has prohibited all U.S. commercial
are subject to a variety of U.S. aid restrictions, which may
arms sales and retransfers to Venezuela since 2006.
be waived by the President for national interest reasons.
In 2008, the Treasury Department imposed sanctions (asset
Targeted Sanctions Related to Antidemocratic
freezing and prohibitions on transactions) on two
Actions, Human Rights Violations, and Corruption
individuals and two travel agencies in Venezuela for
In response to increasing repression in Venezuela, Congress
providing financial support to the radical Lebanon-based
enacted the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil
Islamic Shiite group Hezbollah. The action was taken
Society Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-278; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) in
pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, aimed at
December 2014. Among its provisions, the law requires the
impeding terrorist funding.
President to impose sanctions (asset blocking and visa
Drug Trafficking-Related Sanctions
restrictions) against those whom the President determines
are responsible for significant acts of violence or serious
U.S. concerns about the lack of Venezuelan cooperation on
human rights abuses associated with February 2014 protests
counternarcotics efforts date back to 2005. Since then, the
or, more broadly, against anyone who has directed or
President has made an annual determination, pursuant to
ordered the arrest or prosecution of a person primarily
procedures set forth in the Foreign Relations Authorization
because of the person’s legitimate exercise of freedom of
Act, FY2003 (P.L. 107-228, §706; 22 U.S.C. 2291j), that
expression or assembly. In 2016, Congress extended the
Venezuela has failed demonstrably to adhere to its
2014 act through 2019 in P.L. 114-194.
obligations under international narcotics agreements.
President Trump made the most recent determination for
In March 2015, President Obama issued E.O. 13692 to
FY2019 in September 2018, but also waived foreign aid
implement P.L. 113-278, and the Treasury Department
restrictions for programs to support democracy promotion.
issued regulations in July 2015 (31 C.F.R. Part 591). The
E.O. targets (for asset blocking and visa restrictions) those
The Treasury Department has imposed economic sanctions
involved in actions or policies undermining democratic
on at least 22 individuals with connections to Venezuela
processes or institutions; those involved in acts of violence
and 27 companies by designating them as Specially
or conduct constituting a serious human rights abuse; those
Designated Narcotics Traffickers pursuant to the Foreign
taking actions that prohibit, limit, or penalize the exercise
Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (Kingpin Act; P.L. 106-
of freedom of expression or peaceful assembly; public
120, Title VIII; 21 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.).
corruption by senior Venezuelan officials; and any person
determined to be a current or former leader of any entity
https://crsreports.congress.gov

Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions
engaged in any activity described above or a current or
antidemocratic actions, and responsibility for the deepening
former official of the government of Venezuela.
humanitarian crisis. In August 2017, President Trump
issued E.O. 13808, which prohibits access to the U.S.
To date, the Treasury Department has imposed financial
financial markets by the Venezuelan government, including
sanctions on 80 Venezuelans pursuant to E.O. 13692.
PdVSA, with certain exceptions to minimize the impact on
Under the Obama Administration, the Treasury Department
the Venezuelan people and U.S. economic interests. The
froze the assets of seven Venezuelans—six members of
sanctions restrict the Venezuelan government’s access to
Venezuela’s security forces and a prosecutor involved in
U.S. debt and equity markets. Among the exceptions are
repressing antigovernment protesters. Under the Trump
transactions for new debt by CITGO, owned by PdVSA;
Administration, as the political situation in Venezuela has
certain transactions by U.S. owners of certain
deteriorated, the Treasury Department sanctioned an
Venezuelan/PdVSA bonds on secondary markets; financing
additional 73 Venezuelan government and military officials
for agricultural and medical exports; and short-term
from May 2017 to March 2019. These officials include
financing to facilitate trade.
President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cecilia Flores;
Executive Vice President Delcy Rodriguez; PSUV First
In March 2018, President Trump issued E.O. 13827, which
Vice President Diosdado Cabello; eight Supreme Court
prohibits transactions involving the Venezuelan
members; the leaders of Venezuela’s army, national guard,
government’s issuance and use of digital currency, digital
and national police; and four state governors.
coin, or digital token. The Maduro government launched a
cryptocurrency known as the petro in February 2018 in an
On November 1, 2018, President Trump issued E.O. 13850,
effort to circumvent sanctions.
setting forth a framework to block the assets of, and
prohibit certain transactions with, any person determined by
In May 2018, President Trump issued E.O. 13835, which
the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the
prohibits transactions related to the purchase of Venezuelan
Secretary of State, to operate in the gold sector (or any
debt, including accounts receivable, and to any debt owed
other sector of the economy as determined in the future by
to Venezuela pledged as collateral. U.S. officials assert the
the Secretary of the Treasury) or to be responsible or
action was intended to deny corrupt Venezuelan officials
complicit in transactions involving deceptive practices or
the ability to improperly value and sell off public assets in
corruption and the Venezuelan government. On January 8,
return for kickbacks.
2019, pursuant to E.O. 13850, the Trump Administration
Policy Considerations
sanctioned 7 individuals and 23 companies for involvement
in a corruption scheme involving Venezuela’s currency
Although Venezuelan oil exports to the United States
exchange practices that generated more than $2.4 billion in
already had been declining, sanctions on that trade are
corrupt proceeds.
requiring U.S. refineries that process Venezuelan crude oil
to find alternative sources. A complicating factor in the
Sanctions on PdVSA
sanctions on PdVSA is that the company owns CITGO,
On January 28, 2019, pursuant to E.O. 13850, the Treasury
which operates three crude oil refineries, three pipelines,
Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
and numerous petroleum product terminals in the United
States; however, Venezuela’s interim government is in the
designated PdVSA as operating in the oil sector of the
Venezuelan economy and Secretary of the Treasury Steven
process of asserting control over CITGO. Some analysts are
Mnuchin determined that the company was subject to U.S.
concerned that the stronger sanctions on PdVSA will
sanctions. As a result, all property and interests in property
further exacerbate Venezuela’s difficult humanitarian crisis,
of PdVSA subject to U.S. jurisdiction are blocked, and U.S.
already marked by shortages of food and medicines and
mass migration, by limiting the country’s key source of
persons generally are prohibited from engaging in
transactions with the company.
revenue. This is a particular concern in the event that
Maduro remains in power over an extended period of time.
At the same time, OFAC issued general licenses to allow
Some observers also maintain that economic sanctions
certain transactions and activities related to PdVSA and its
ultimately may need to be accompanied by efforts to foster
subsidiaries, some within specified time frames or wind-
a negotiated solution leading to free and fair elections.
down periods. Transactions with two U.S.-based PdVSA
For guidance on the Venezuela sanctions, see U.S.
subsidiaries, PDV Holding, Inc. (PDVH) and CITGO
Department of the Treasury, “Venezuela-Related
Holding, Inc., are authorized through July 27, 2019, and
Sanctions,” at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/
PDHV, CITGO, and other U.S. companies are authorized to
sanctions/programs/pages/venezuela.aspx; and U.S.
import petroleum from PdVSA through April 28, 2019;
Department of State, “Venezuela-Related Sanctions,” at
payments for these transactions benefiting PdVSA must be
https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/venezuela/.
made into a blocked account in the United States. Several
U.S. companies with operations in Venezuela involving
For more from CRS, see CRS In Focus IF10230,
PdVSA are authorized to continue their operations through
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy; CRS Report
July 27, 2019.
R44841, Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations; CRS
Additional Financial Sanctions
In Focus IF11029, The Venezuela Regional Migration
Crisis
; and CRS Insight IN11037, Venezuela Oil Sector
In addition to targeted sanctions against individuals and
Sanctions: Market and Trade Impacts.
companies, President Trump has imposed broader financial
sanctions on Venezuela through three additional EOs
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs
because of the government’s serious human rights abuses,
IF10715
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Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10715 · VERSION 17 · UPDATED