Updated March 6, 2019
Mexico: Evolution of the Mérida Initiative, 2007-2019
Violent criminal organizations have threatened security and
and (3) institution building. U.S. assistance and intelligence
governance in parts of Mexico for more than a decade. This
supported Mexico’s strategy of arresting (and extraditing)
situation affects U.S. security interests, particularly in the
kingpins from each of the major TCOs, but this strategy
Southwest border region. Although the illicit drug trade has
also fueled violence, as fractured criminal groups fought to
long been prevalent in Mexico, violence has escalated as
regroup and reorganize. Congress withheld 15% of certain
transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) have fought for
U.S. aid for the Mexican military and police until the State
control of smuggling routes into the United States.
Department submitted an annual report stating that Mexico
was taking steps to meet human rights requirements.
In 2007, Mexico and the United States created the Mérida
Initiative, a security and rule-of-law partnership to address
The Four-Pillar Strategy:
drug trafficking and crime. Through this partnership, which
FY2011-FY2017
has since been the centerpiece of bilateral security
The Obama and Calderón Administrations broadened the
cooperation, both countries have invested in a broad range
scope of bilateral efforts to a four-pillar strategy that
of efforts to combat transnational crime and its
prioritized institution building. In 2012, incoming Mexican
consequences. U.S. appropriations for the Mérida Initiative
President Enrique Peña Nieto initially sought to scale back
since FY2008 (some $3.0 billion) have constituted only 2%
U.S. involvement in some law enforcement operations. By
of Mexico’s total security budget but have enabled the U.S.
mid-2013, however, the U.S. and Mexican governments
government to help shape Mexico’s policies.
agreed to focus on these four pillars:
The Mérida Initiative has strengthened U.S.-Mexican law
1. Combating TCOs through intelligence
enforcement cooperation and intelligence sharing.
sharing and law enforcement operations,
Nevertheless, homicides in Mexico and opioid-related
with a new focus on money laundering;
deaths in the United States have surged. Against that
2. Institutionalizing the rule of law while
backdrop, the Mérida Initiative may change its emphasis
protecting human rights through justice
now that Andrés Manuel López Obrador has taken office as
sector reform, forensic equipment and
president. López Obrador, a leftist populist, won 53% of the
training, and federal- and state-level
vote and captured a legislative majority in elections held on
police and corrections reform;
July 1, 2018. Three months in to his six-year term,
3. Creating a 21st century U.S.-Mexican
President López Obrador remains extremely popular.
border, while improving immigration
Origins of the Mérida Initiative
enforcement in Mexico and security along
Mexico’s southern borders; and,
Prior to FY2007, Mexico did not receive large amounts of
U.S. antidrug assistance, partially due to Mexican
4. Building strong and resilient
sensitivity about U.S. involvement in the country’s internal
communities by piloting approaches to
affairs. In March 2007, then-Mexican President Felipe
address root causes of violence and
Calderón asked for U.S. assistance in combating drug and
supporting efforts to reduce drug demand
weapons trafficking. In response to this historic request, the
and build a “culture of lawfulness”
George W. Bush and Calderón Administrations proposed
through education programs.
the Mérida Initiative, a package of U.S. counter-drug and
Some analysts praised the wide-ranging cooperation
anti-crime assistance to Mexico (and Central America) in
between the governments; others criticized the increasing
October 2007. As part of the Mérida Initiative’s emphasis
number of priorities they adopted. Experts warned that it
on shared responsibility, the Mexican government pledged
would be difficult for Mexico to implement an accusatorial
to tackle crime and corruption and the U.S. government
justice system requiring better evidence collection by police
pledged to address drug demand and the illicit trafficking of
and public trials with oral arguments in only eight years.
firearms and bulk currency to Mexico. Both governments
have struggled to fulfill those commitments.
U.S. technology and training under pillar one supported
Mexican intelligence-gathering and information-sharing
Initial Funding for the Mérida Initiative:
efforts, including biometrics and telecommunications.
FY2008-FY2010
Under pillar two, U.S. agencies provided more than $400
During the first phase of the Mérida Initiative, Congress
million in training, courtroom infrastructure, and technical
appropriated some $1.5 billion, including $420.7 million in
assistance to support Mexico’s transition to an accusatorial
foreign military financing (FMF), which enabled the
justice system (adopted in 2008) at the federal and state
purchase of equipment, including aircraft and helicopters,
levels. Pillar three expanded beyond efforts to modernize
to support Mexico’s federal security forces (military and
the U.S.-Mexican border to include more than $100 million
police). U.S. assistance focused on (1) counternarcotics,
in training and equipment for securing Mexico’s southern
border security, and counterterrorism; (2) public security;
border. Under pillar four, the U.S. Agency for International
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Mexico: Evolution of the Mérida Initiative, 2007-2019
Development has implemented $25 million in human rights
the Trump Administration’s emphasis on combating Central
programs and $90 million in crime prevention projects.
American migration and may back other U.S. priorities,
FMF has not been part of the Mérida Initiative since
despite the domestic criticism he may receive.
FY2011, although the State Department and the U.S.
Department of Defense coordinate their assistance. Unlike
As a candidate, López Obrador emphasized anti-corruption
FMF, Mérida Initiative funds have not been subject to
initiatives, social investments in at-risk youth, human
human rights conditions since FY2016.
rights, drug policy reform, and transitional justice for
Trump Administration’s Focus for the
nonviolent criminals. In line with those priorities, Mexico’s
Mérida Initiative: FY2018-FY2019
new security strategy, released in February 2019, includes a
focus on addressing the socioeconomic drivers of violent
President Trump’s executive orders on combatting TCOs
crime. The Administration has launched a program to
(E.O. 13773) and enhancing border security (E.O. 13767)
provide scholarships to youth to attend university or to
led to a new focus for the Mérida Initiative. Trump
complete internships. As president, López Obrador created
Administration officials have held several Cabinet-level
a presidential commission to coordinate efforts to
dialogues on security with the Peña Nieto government
investigate the Ayotzinapa case. Observers expect he will
focused on attacking the TCOs’ business model. As a
soon decriminalize marijuana production and distribution.
result, recent Mérida Initiative programs have focused on
combating the production and distribution of opioids and
At the same time, President López Obrador has backed
other drugs, improving border interdiction and port
constitutional reforms to allow military involvement in
security, training forensic experts to gather evidence and
public security to continue for five more years, despite a
testify in criminal trials, and combating money laundering.
2018 Supreme Court ruling that prolonged military
Assessing the Mérida Initiative
involvement in public security violated the constitution. He
secured congressional approval of a new National Guard
Many analysts have observed the need for more reporting
(composed of military police, federal police, and new
on Mérida Initiative outcomes, such as the impact of U.S.
recruits) to combat crime. After criticism from human
training on police performance. The State Department has
rights groups, the congress modified President López
pointed to some indicators of success: (1) intelligence-
Obrador’s original proposal to ensure the National Guard
sharing and law enforcement cooperation that has helped
will be under civilian command. President López Obrador
capture high-profile criminals; (2) the establishment of
also has deployed security forces to secure oil pipelines and
national training standards for police, investigators,
facilities in an effort to combat oil theft, which has caused
prosecutors, and judges; (3) increased extraditions,
some fuel shortages.
including Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán (extradited in 2017
and sentenced to life in U.S. prison in February 2019);
Civil society and the private sector are urging President
(4) Mexico’s seizure of more than $4 billion in illicit drugs
López Obrador to fulfill his pledges to combat corruption.
and currency; and, (5) Mexico’s apprehension of more than
Mexico’s congress approved the creation of an independent
520,000 Central American migrants from 2015 to 2018.
attorney general’s office, but some are concerned that the
individual selected for that nine-year post is a longtime
Critics of the Mérida Initiative have focused on continued
associate of the president. The government also has not yet
violence, the government’s poor human rights record, and
specified how it will move forward to implement the
prosecutors’ inability to secure convictions. Homicides in
national anti-corruption system established through
Mexico are at record levels. Fighting among TCOs has
constitutional reforms in 2017.
intensified as new criminal organizations have emerged and
more groups are competing for control over drug
Congressional Action
production and trafficking, including synthetic opioids.
There has been bipartisan support in Congress for the
They also have expanded their involvement in oil theft,
Mérida Initiative. The FY2019 Consolidated
kidnapping, extortion, and other crimes.
Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-6) provided some $145
million for the initiative ($68 million above the budget
Mexico’s human rights record has been widely criticized, as
request). The increased resources are primarily for
has the justice system’s inability to address corruption and
addressing the flow of U.S.-bound opioids. The joint
impunity. In 2018, 49 human rights defenders and 9
explanatory statement accompanying the act (H.Rept. 116-
journalists were killed. In the past, Mexico’s attorney
9) requires a State Department strategy on international
general’s office has failed to resolve those types of killings.
efforts to combat opioids (including efforts in Mexico); a
Even the high-profile case of 43 students in Ayotzinapa,
report on how the Mérida Initiative is combating cocaine
Guerrero, who were forcibly disappeared in 2014 remains
and methamphetamine flows; and a report on recent
unresolved. Prosecutors have not pursued credible reports
incidents resulting in injuries and deaths of U.S. tourists in
of corruption, including alleged illegal contributions to the
Mexico. See also CRS In Focus IF10215, Mexico’s
Peña Nieto campaign by the Brazilian firm Odebrecht.
Immigration Control Efforts; CRS In Focus IF10400,
López Obrador’s Security Strategy
Transnational Crime Issues: Heroin Production, Fentanyl
Trafficking, and U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation
.
The future of the Mérida Initiative is yet unclear. Some
observers predict the four-pillar strategy may remerge with
Clare Ribando Seelke, Specialist in Latin American
an emphasis on pillar four, which appears to align with
Affairs
some of President López Obrador’s priorities. Others
IF10578
maintain that López Obrador has thus far accommodated
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Mexico: Evolution of the Mérida Initiative, 2007-2019


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10578 · VERSION 11 · UPDATED