Updated March 5, 2019
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Since the early 1960s, when the United States imposed a
ensures the state sector’s dominance over the economy and
trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy
the predominant role of the Communist Party in Cuba’s
toward Cuba has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at
political system.
isolating the Cuban government. In December 2014,
however, the Obama Administration initiated a major
Government-to-Government Engagement. With the
policy shift, moving away from sanctions toward a policy
restoration of relations in 2015, government-to-government
of engagement and the normalization of relations. The
engagement increased significantly. U.S. and Cuban
policy change included the rescission of Cuba’s designation
officials have held seven Bilateral Commission meetings,
as a state sponsor of international terrorism in May 2015;
the most recent in June 2018, to coordinate efforts to
the restoration of diplomatic relations in July 2015; and
advance engagement. Officials have negotiated numerous
efforts to increase travel, commerce, and the flow of
bilateral agreements, including on such issues as
information to Cuba.
environmental cooperation, direct mail, civil aviation,
maritime navigation, agriculture, health cooperation,
President Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba in
counternarcotics cooperation, federal air marshals, cancer
2017 introducing new sanctions and partially rolling back
research, seismology, meteorology, wildlife conservation,
some of the Obama Administration’s efforts to normalize
animal and plant health, oil-spill preparedness and
relations. On March 4, 2019, the Administration ratcheted
response, law enforcement cooperation, search and rescue,
up its economic pressure on Cuba by allowing some
and the delimitation of the U.S.-Cuban maritime boundary
lawsuits to go forward against some 200 Cuba entities
in the eastern Gulf of Mexico. Bilateral dialogues have been
operated by the Cuban military, intelligence, or security
held on these and other issues, including counterterrorism,
services for trafficking in confiscated property.
U.S. property claims, human rights, renewable energy and
efficiency, trafficking in persons, migration, and
Cuban Political Developments. First Vice President
cybersecurity.
Miguel Díaz-Canel succeeded Raúl Castro as president in
April 2018, but Castro continues to head the Cuban
Travel and Commerce. The Obama Administration’s
Communist Party until 2021. The selection of Díaz-Canel,
policy change of increasing travel and commerce with Cuba
now 58 years old, reflects the generational change in Cuban
required amendments to U.S. regulations administered by
leadership that began several years ago and marks the first
the Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets
time since the 1959 Cuban revolution that a Castro is not in
Control (Cuban Assets Control Regulations [CACR]; 31
charge of the government.
C.F.R. Part 515) and the Department of Commerce, Bureau
of Industry and Security (Export Administration
Raúl Castro (2006-2018) began the implementation of
Regulations [EAR]; 15 C.F.R. Parts 730-774). To
significant economic policy changes, moving toward a
implement the policy, the two agencies issued five rounds
more mixed economy with a stronger private sector. His
of amendments to the regulations in 2015-2016 that eased
government’s slow, gradualist approach, however, did not
restrictions on travel, remittances, trade,
produce major improvements to the Cuban economy, which
telecommunications, and banking and financial services.
has experienced minimal growth in recent years.
Trump Administration Sanctions. President Trump
In December 2018, President Díaz-Canel backtracked on
issued a national security presidential memorandum on
implementing regulations that likely would have shrunk the
Cuba in June 2017 that introduced new sanctions. These
private sector and slowed implementation of a controversial
sanctions include restrictions on transactions with
decree regulating artistic expression, actions that appeared
companies controlled by the Cuban military and the
to demonstrate his responsiveness to public criticism and
elimination of individual people-to-people travel.
his independence from the previous government. Díaz-
Canel continues to faces two significant challenges—
To implement these policy changes, the Treasury and
moving forward with economic reforms that produce results
Commerce Departments amended the CACR and EAR in
and responding to desires for greater freedom.
November 2017. The amended regulations require people-
to-people travel to be under the auspices of an organization
On February 24, 2019, almost 87% of Cubans approved a
specializing in such travel and prohibit financial
new constitution in a national referendum. Among the
transactions with entities controlled by the Cuban military,
changes are the addition of an appointed prime minister to
intelligence, or security services, albeit with several
oversee government operations; age and term limits on the
exceptions.
president; and some market-oriented economic reforms,
including the right to private property and the promotion of
The State Department issued a list of “restricted entities” in
foreign investment. However, the new constitution still
November 2017, which was updated in November 2018.
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Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Currently, the “Cuba Restricted List” includes 205 entities
occurred from November 2016 to August 2017, but two
and subentities, including 2 ministries, 5 holding companies
incidents occurred in May 2018.) The State Department
(including GAESA) and 43 of their subentities (including
maintains that the U.S. investigation has not reached a
the Mariel Special Development Zone), 99 hotels (with 28
definitive conclusion regarding the cause, source, or any
in Havana), 2 tourist agencies, 5 marinas, 10 stores in Old
kind of technologies that might have been used.
Havana, and 39 entities serving the defense and security
sectors.
In September 2017, the State Department ordered the
departure of nonemergency personnel from the U.S.
On March 4, 2019, Secretary of State Pompeo, pursuant to
Embassy to minimize the risk of their exposure to harm;
Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
embassy staff was reduced by about two-thirds. In early
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114), allowed certain
October 2017, the State Department ordered the departure
lawsuits to go forward against those trafficking in
of 15 diplomats from the Cuban Embassy in Washington,
confiscated property in Cuba. Since 1996, pursuant to the
DC. According to then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, the
provisions of Title III, all Administrations have suspended,
action was taken because of Cuba’s failure to protect U.S.
at six-month intervals, the right to file such lawsuits. The
diplomats in Havana and to ensure equity in the impact on
next six-month suspension was due by February 1, 2019,
diplomatic operations. Cuba strongly denies responsibility
but on January 16, Secretary Pompeo suspended the right to
for the injuries. The staff reduction at the U.S. Embassy has
file lawsuits for an additional 45 days, maintaining that the
affected embassy operations, especially visa processing,
extension would permit a careful review taking into account
and has made bilateral engagement more difficult.
U.S. national interests and efforts to expedite a transition to
democracy in Cuba. Then, on March 4, Secretary Pompeo
115th Congress. The 115th Congress continued to provide
partially suspended the right to file lawsuits for an
funding for democracy assistance and U.S.-government
additional 30 days (through April 17) but allowed lawsuits,
sponsored broadcasting to Cuba. For FY2017, Congress
beginning March 19, against an entity or subentity on the
appropriated $20 million in democracy funding and $28.1
State Department’s “Cuba Restricted List” controlled by the
million for Cuba broadcasting (P.L. 115-31). For FY2018,
Cuban military, intelligence, or security services. Lawsuits
Congress appropriated $20 million for democracy programs
can be brought by any U.S. national, including those who
and $28.9 million for Cuba broadcasting (P.L. 115-141;
were not U.S. nationals at the time of the confiscation.
explanatory statement to H.R. 1625). The 2018 farm bill,
However, lawsuits may not be brought against third-country
P.L. 115-334 (H.R. 2), permits funding for two U.S.
foreign investors in Cuba.
agricultural export promotion programs in Cuba, the Market
Access Program and the Foreign Market Development
Change in U.S. Immigration Policy. In January 2017, the
Cooperation Program, marking the first time Congress has
Obama Administration announced the ending of the so-
eased Cuba sanctions in almost a decade.
called wet foot/dry foot policy, under which thousands of
undocumented Cuban migrants have entered the United
In other action, several measures (P.L. 115-232, P.L. 115-
States in recent years. Cuban nationals who attempt to enter
244, and P.L. 115-245) extended a prohibition on the use of
the United States illegally and do not qualify for
funds in FY2019 to close or relinquish control of the U.S.
humanitarian relief are now subject to removal.
Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; the conference
report to P.L. 115-232 also requires a report on security
Continued Human Rights Concerns. Human rights
cooperation between Russia and Cuba. The FAA
violations in Cuba have remained a fundamental U.S.
Reauthorization Act of 2018, P.L. 115-254, requires the
policy concern for many years. When President Obama
Transportation Security Administration to brief Congress
announced the Cuba policy shift, he maintained that the
on certain aspects of Cuban airport security and to develop
United States would continue to speak out on human rights
and implement a mechanism to better track public air
but stressed that more could be done through engagement.
charter flights between the United States and Cuba. In
President Trump’s policy also emphasizes human rights but
2018, the Senate approved S.Res. 224, commemorating the
links any changes to the bilateral relationship to an end to
legacy of Cuban democracy activist Oswaldo Payá.
the Cuban government’s abuse of dissidents.
116th Congress. For FY2019, Congress appropriated $20
On October 15, 2018, the U.S. Mission to the United
million for democracy programs in Cuba and $29.1 million
Nations launched a campaign to call attention to Cuba’s
for Cuba broadcasting in the Consolidated Appropriations
“estimated 130 political prisoners.” In recent years, Cuba
Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6, H.J.Res. 31, conference report
has shifted to using short-term detentions and harassment to
H.Rept. 116-9).
repress dissent, with at least 5,155 such detentions in 2017,
according to the Cuban Commission for Human Rights and
For additional information, see CRS Report R44822, Cuba:
National Reconciliation (CCDHRN). In 2018, according to
U.S. Policy in the 115th Congress; CRS Report RL31139,
CCDHRN, there were 2,873 short-term detentions, almost a
Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances; and
45% decline from 2017 and the lowest level since 2010.
CRS Report R43888, Cuba Sanctions: Legislative
Restrictions Limiting the Normalization of Relations.
Injuries of U.S. Embassy Personnel in Havana.
According to the Department of State, 26 U.S. Embassy
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs
community members suffered a series of unexplained
injuries, including hearing loss and cognitive issues (most
IF10045
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Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview


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