February 26, 2019
Algeria: In Focus
Algeria’s political system, characterized by a strong
remains banned. Religiously conservative Salafist social
presidency and security apparatus, has remained stable
movements have grown in prominence since the conflict.
amid regional upheaval. Internal security has also improved
since a decade-long Islamist insurgency and civil conflict in
Figure 1. Algeria at a Glance
the 1990s. State decisionmaking is often opaque, however,
and the country faces an uncertain political transition as
members of the “revolutionary generation” that fought for
independence from France retire or pass away. President
Abdelaziz Bouteflika (81) is in ill health and rarely appears
in public. Frequent labor strikes and street protests are often
framed around socioeconomic grievances, but in February
2019, large protests against Bouteflika’s bid for a fifth term
in office also seemed to convey widespread desire for new
leadership among the country’s youthful population.
Decreased revenues from Algeria’s oil and gas exports have
arguably constrained the government’s options for

responding to such unrest.
Source: CRS graphic; data from CIA World Factbook + IMF (2018).
Politics

President Bouteflika’s stated intent to run for a fifth five-
Terrorism and Counterterrorism
year term in April 2019 has focused attention on succession
Terrorist threats persist, particularly in southern and eastern
issues. Term limits were reinstated in 2016 (after being
border regions, but the pace of attacks has decreased since a
abolished in 2008) but do not apply retroactively. The
2013 assault on a natural gas compound in which 39 foreign
president reportedly suffered a stroke in 2013. He has since
nationals (including three Americans) were killed. Recent
been confined to a wheelchair and appears visibly frail.
attacks have targeted security force outposts near the
Bouteflika won 82% of the vote in 2014. Top opposition
eastern border with Tunisia, where small cells linked to Al
candidate Ali Benflis, a former prime minister, decried the
Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) reportedly remain active.
results as fraudulent, while some observers asserted that
Since the start of wars in Libya and Mali in 2011, Algerian
Bouteflika remained broadly popular. Experts nonetheless
security forces have bolstered their presence in border
point to “political paralysis” due to a lack of elite consensus
regions and conduct frequent counterterrorism operations.
over “the general outline of the post-Bouteflika era.”
The government also runs de-radicalization programs and
seeks to control the content of religious sermons.
Bouteflika was first elected in 1999, with military backing,
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a regional
as Algeria’s counterinsurgency against armed Islamist
network and U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist
groups was winding down. He used his first term to
Organization, is the offshoot of an insurgent faction from
advance reconciliation initiatives. He has also sought to
Algeria’s 1990s conflict. An AQIM splinter faction claimed
consolidate executive powers under the presidency, in part
responsibility for the aforementioned 2013 gas plant attack.
by restructuring the military and asserting greater control
AQIM’s leader or emir, Abdel Malek Droukdel, reportedly
over the powerful military intelligence service.
remains based in Algeria’s mountainous northeast, but the
The bicameral parliament is institutionally weak and
group’s center of gravity has moved south into Mali over
dominated by two parties supportive of Bouteflika: the
the past decade. (Since 2017, AQIM’s southern branch has
National Liberation Front (FLN), which led Algeria’s fight
been subsumed under a Mali-based jihadist coalition known
for independence and was the sole legal party for decades,
as the Group for Supporting Islam and Muslims, or JNIM
and the National Rally for Democracy (RND). The political
after its transliterated Arabic name.) AQIM elements and
opposition is diverse and divided: it includes leftist, Berber-
offshoots are also active in Libya and Tunisia, as are IS-
led, Islamist, and regionally-focused groups. Many
linked factions. In 2014, an Algerian IS affiliate beheaded a
parties—including the FLN—also exhibit internal divisions.
French tourist. Algerian security forces reportedly killed the
faction’s leader the following year and they appear to have
Some analysts argue that political Islam has been
been effective in preventing the further spread of IS-linked
discredited in Algeria due to Islamists’ role in the 1990s
groups within the country.
civil conflict, or—alternatively—due to some Islamist
politicians’
Algerian “foreign fighters” were reportedly well
subsequent accommodation with the state. The
represented among Islamist militant groups in the Balkans,
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), whose rapid electoral gains
Afghanistan, and Iraq from the 1980s to the mid-2000s. At
in 1991 sparked a military coup and the subsequent conflict,
the height of IS territorial holdings in Iraq and Syria (2014-
2015), however, relatively few Algerians reportedly joined
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Algeria: In Focus
the group compared to numbers from neighboring Tunisia
Algeria mediated Mali’s 2015 peace accord and backs the
and Morocco, among other countries. At one time, 26
U.N.-led political process in Libya; generally, Algerian
Algerians were reportedly held at the U.S. naval base in
diplomats advocate inclusive political talks to address civil
Guantánamo, Cuba; nearly all have been repatriated or sent
conflicts. Given its large military, financial resources, and
to third countries.
aversion to Western direct intervention, Algeria has also
The Economy and Energy Sector
periodically sought to coordinate a regional response to
Algeria’s state-centric economy depends on energy exports:
terrorism and other cross-border security threats. Yet the
it has the world’s 11th largest proven natural gas reserves
country’s complex and often distrustful relations with
and 16th largest proven oil reserves, and is the 7th-largest
neighboring states have hindered cooperation, as has the
natural gas exporter. Algeria is also estimated to have the
leadership’s current focus on domestic political questions.
world’s third-largest recoverable shale gas reserves. More
Algeria's foreign policy has often conflicted with that of the
than half of the formal economy is reportedly comprised of
United States: e.g., Algeria regularly criticizes Israel,
state-owned enterprises, led by the national oil and gas
opposed the 2011 NATO-led intervention in Libya, and
company Sonatrach. Most of Algeria’s natural gas exports
maintains relations with the Asad government in Syria.
go to Europe, either by pipeline or ship. As of 2017 (latest),
With regard to Western Sahara, the United States has
Italy was the top destination for Algeria’s exports and
recognized neither Morocco’s claim of sovereignty nor the
China was its top source of imports.
Polisario’s self-proclaimed Sahrawi Arab Democratic
Republic (SADR), which Algeria recognizes as an
High global energy prices prior to 2014 allowed Algeria to
independent state. The United States has backed U.N.-led
accrue large foreign exchange reserves, which protected it
talks on the territory’s future status.
from global economic swings, financed its large military,
and funded social programs that arguably assuaged
U.S. Relations
domestic dissent. Amid a drop in energy prices since then,
Like its predecessors, the Trump Administration has
Algeria’s foreign exchange reserves have declined by more
emphasized the value of U.S.-Algerian cooperation to
than half, according to the International Monetary Fund
counter terrorism (notably via information sharing and
(IMF), while the country’s “oil stabilization fund”
coordination in multilateral forums) and respond to crises in
decreased from $20 billion to about $7 billion as of 2017.
neighboring Libya and Mali—while continuing to issue
The IMF has documented ongoing fiscal deficits and a
occasional criticism of Algeria’s human rights performance
gradual rise in unemployment. (Algeria does not borrow
and challenging business environment. Algeria’s reliance
from the IMF but submits to technical monitoring.)
on Russia for most defense acquisitions also remains a
Algerian leaders have called for diversification and more
point of friction, though Algeria has increased purchases of
foreign investment, but reforms that could encourage such
U.S. equipment in recent years. U.S. foreign direct
outcomes have not advanced. Algerian law requires 51%
investment (FDI) stocks totaled $3 billion as of 2017
local ownership of foreign investment projects, there are
(latest), largely in the energy sector.
limits on capital flows and currency exchange, and the
During a visit to Algiers in 2018, Deputy Secretary of State
process of setting up a business is “heavily bureaucratic,”
John Sullivan emphasized the United States’ “commitment
according to the U.S. State Department. The government
to strengthening and broadening U.S.-Algerian relations.”
imposed sweeping import restrictions in 2017 in an effort to
Algeria’s Foreign Minister, Abdelkader Messahel, visited
promote increased local production, causing trade to
Washington DC in early 2019 for a high-level U.S.-Algeria
plummet and possibly fueling inflation and smuggling.
Strategic Dialogue, which had last convened in 2015.
Weak infrastructure linkages with neighboring countries
Officials also meet for annual bilateral counterterrorism and
and the closure of the border with Morocco also inhibit
joint military dialogues.
growth. Critics further point to the absence of a modern
U.S. bilateral aid comprised $1.3 million for International
financial market and an underdeveloped stock exchange
Military Education and Training (IMET) and $0.5 million
and banking system. Algeria has applied to join the World
for Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related
Trade Organization (WTO), but has yet to qualify.
Programs (NADR) in FY2017 (latest available). The
Foreign Policy and Regional Issues
Administration has requested $1.0 million in IMET and
Algeria’s foreign policy
$0.5 million in NADR for FY2019. Additional funds have
emphasizes state sovereignty and
been provided periodically to promote economic growth,
non-interference; residual skepticism of Western powers
strengthen civil society, and counter violent extremism.
and NATO is a legacy of the country’s armed struggle for
U.S. exchange programs seek to build relationships with
independence from France (1954-1962). Although Algeria
young Algerians and emerging private sector actors.
has by far the largest defense budget in Africa, longstanding
policy prohibits troop deployments beyond its borders.
Algeria is also among 12 countries participating in the State
Department-led Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism
Relations with neighboring Morocco remain tense due to a
Partnership (TSCTP), but has not been a major recipient of
rivalry for regional influence and opposing views regarding
aid under the program and appears to prefer bilateral
the disputed territory of Western Sahara. Morocco claims
activities. In contrast to Tunisia and Egypt, Congress has
Western Sahara and de facto administers most of it. Algeria
not granted specific authority to the Department of Defense
hosts and backs the Polisario Front, which seeks
to aid Algeria in securing its border with Libya.
independence for the territory. Algeria participated in U.N.-
convened talks on Western Sahara in late 2018, but does
Alexis Arieff, Specialist in African Affairs
not consider itself a party to the dispute.
IF11116
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Algeria: In Focus


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11116 · VERSION 2 · NEW

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