Updated February 25, 2019
Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions
For more than a decade, the United States has employed
(former military intelligence head), General Henry Rangel
sanctions as a policy tool in response to activities of the
Silva (former defense minister and governor of Trujillo
Venezuelan government and Venezuelan individuals. These
State), and Ramón Rodríguez Chacín (former interior
have included sanctions related to terrorism, drug
minister and former governor of Guárico); in 2011, Freddy
trafficking, trafficking in persons, antidemocratic actions,
Alirio Bernal Rosales and Amilicar Jesus Figueroa Salazar
human rights violations, and corruption; the Treasury
(United Socialist Party of Venezuela, or PSUV, politicians),
Department has imposed financial sanctions on more than
Major General Cliver Antonio Alcalá Cordones, and
100 individuals. On January 28, 2019, the Trump
Ramon Isidro Madriz Moreno (a Venezuelan intelligence
Administration announced sanctions on Venezuela’s state-
officer); in 2017, then-Vice President Tareck el Aissami;
oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., or PdVSA.
and in May 2018, Pedro Luis Martin (a former senior
Several days before the imposition of the PdVSA sanctions,
intelligence official) and two of his associates. Others
the United States recognized Juan Guaidó, the head of
designated include drug trafficker Walid Makled, three dual
Venezuela’s National Assembly, as the country’s interim
Lebanese-Venezuelan citizens allegedly involved in a drug
president and ceased to recognize Nicolás Maduro as the
money-laundering network, and several Colombian drug
president of Venezuela.
traffickers with activity in Venezuela.
Terrorism-Related Sanctions
Trafficking in Persons Sanctions
Since 2006, U.S. officials have expressed concerns about
Since 2014, Venezuela has been on the State Department’s
Venezuela’s lack of cooperation on anti-terrorism efforts.
Tier 3 list in its annual Trafficking in Persons Report. Tier 3
Since then, the Secretary of State has made an annual
countries are those whose governments do not fully comply
determination that Venezuela is not “cooperating fully with
with the minimum standards of the Trafficking Victims
United States anti-terrorism efforts” pursuant to Section
Protection Act (P.L. 106-386, Division A, 22 U.S.C. 7101
40A of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2781). The
et seq.) and are not making significant efforts to do so; they
most recent determination was made in May 2018. As a
are subject to a variety of U.S. aid restrictions, which may
result, the United States has prohibited all U.S. commercial
be waived by the President for national interest reasons.
arms sales and retransfers to Venezuela since 2006.
Targeted Sanctions Related to Antidemocratic
In 2008, the Treasury Department imposed sanctions (asset
Actions, Human Rights Violations, and Corruption
freezing and prohibitions on transactions) on two
In response to increasing repression in Venezuela, Congress
individuals and two travel agencies in Venezuela for
enacted the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil
providing financial support to the radical Lebanon-based
Society Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-278; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) in
Islamic Shiite group Hezbollah. The action was taken
December 2014. Among its provisions, the law requires the
pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, aimed at
President to impose sanctions (asset blocking and visa
impeding terrorist funding.
restrictions) against those whom the President determines
Drug Trafficking-Related Sanctions
are responsible for significant acts of violence or serious
human rights abuses associated with February 2014 protests
U.S. concerns about the lack of Venezuelan cooperation on
or, more broadly, against anyone who has directed or
counternarcotics efforts date back to 2005. Since then, the
ordered the arrest or prosecution of a person primarily
President has made an annual determination, pursuant to
because of the person’s legitimate exercise of freedom of
procedures set forth in the Foreign Relations Authorization
expression or assembly. In 2016, Congress extended the
Act, FY2003 (P.L. 107-228, §706; 22 U.S.C. 2291j), that
2014 act through 2019 in P.L. 114-194.
Venezuela has failed demonstrably to adhere to its
obligations under international narcotics agreements.
In March 2015, President Obama issued E.O. 13692 to
President Trump made the most recent determination for
implement P.L. 113-278, and the Treasury Department
FY2019 in September 2018, but also waived foreign aid
issued regulations in July 2015 (31 C.F.R. Part 591). The
restrictions for programs to support democracy promotion.
E.O. targets (for asset blocking and visa restrictions) those
involved in actions or policies undermining democratic
The Treasury Department has imposed economic sanctions
processes or institutions; those involved in acts of violence
on at least 22 individuals with connections to Venezuela
or conduct constituting a serious human rights abuse; those
and 27 companies by designating them as Specially
taking actions that prohibit, limit, or penalize the exercise
Designated Narcotics Traffickers pursuant to the Foreign
of freedom of expression or peaceful assembly; public
Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (Kingpin Act; P.L. 106-
corruption by senior Venezuelan officials; and any person
120, Title VIII; 21 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.).
determined to be a current or former leader of any entity
Designated individuals include several current or former
engaged in any activity described above or a current or
Venezuelan officials: in 2008, General Hugo Carvajal
former official of the government of Venezuela.
https://crsreports.congress.gov

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Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions
To date, the Treasury Department has imposed financial
issued E.O. 13808, which prohibits access to the U.S.
sanctions on 74 Venezuelans pursuant to E.O. 13692.
financial markets by the Venezuelan government, including
Under the Obama Administration, the Treasury Department
PdVSA, with certain exceptions to minimize the impact on
froze the assets of seven Venezuelans—six members of
the Venezuelan people and U.S. economic interests. The
Venezuela’s security forces and a prosecutor involved in
sanctions restrict the Venezuelan government’s access to
repressing antigovernment protesters. Under the Trump
U.S. debt and equity markets. Among the exceptions are
Administration, as the political situation in Venezuela has
transactions for new debt by CITGO, owned by PdVSA;
deteriorated, the Treasury Department sanctioned an
certain transactions by U.S. owners of certain
additional 67 Venezuelan government and military officials
Venezuelan/PdVSA bonds on secondary markets; financing
from May 2017 to February 2019. These officials include
for agricultural and medical exports; and short-term
President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cecilia Flores;
financing to facilitate trade.
Executive Vice President Delcy Rodriguez; PSUV First
Vice President Diosdado Cabello; eight Supreme Court
In March 2018, President Trump issued E.O. 13827, which
members; the leaders of Venezuela’s army, national guard,
prohibits transactions involving the Venezuelan
and national police; and four state governors.
government’s issuance and use of digital currency, digital
coin, or digital token. The Maduro government launched a
On November 1, 2018, President Trump issued E.O. 13850,
cryptocurrency known as the petro in February 2018 in an
setting forth a framework to block the assets of, and
effort to circumvent sanctions.
prohibit certain transactions with, any person determined by
the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the
In May 2018, President Trump issued E.O. 13835, which
Secretary of State, to operate in the gold sector (or any
prohibits transactions related to the purchase of Venezuelan
other sector of the economy as determined in the future by
debt, including accounts receivable, and to any debt owed
the Secretary of the Treasury) or to be responsible or
to Venezuela pledged as collateral. U.S. officials assert the
complicit in transactions involving deceptive practices or
action was intended to deny corrupt Venezuelan officials
corruption and the Venezuelan government. On January 8,
the ability to improperly value and sell off public assets in
2019, pursuant to E.O. 13850, the Trump Administration
return for kickbacks.
sanctioned 7 individuals and 23 companies for involvement
in a corruption scheme involving Venezuela’s currency
Policy Considerations
exchange practices that generated more than $2.4 billion in
Although Venezuelan oil exports to the United States have
corrupt proceeds.
been declining, sanctions on that trade are requiring U.S.
refineries that process Venezuelan crude oil to find
Sanctions on PdVSA
alternative sources. A complicating factor in the sanctions
On January 28, 2019, pursuant to E.O. 13850, the Treasury
on PdVSA is that the company owns CITGO, which
Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
operates three crude oil refineries, three pipelines, and
designated PdVSA as operating in the oil sector of the
numerous petroleum product terminals in the United States;
Venezuelan economy and Secretary of the Treasury Steven
however, Venezuela’s interim government is in the process
Mnuchin determined that the company was subject to U.S.
of asserting control over CITGO. Some analysts maintain
sanctions. As a result, all property and interests in property
that the stronger sanctions on PdVSA run the risk of
of PdVSA subject to U.S. jurisdiction are blocked, and U.S.
exacerbating Venezuela’s difficult humanitarian crisis,
persons generally are prohibited from engaging in
which already has been marked by shortages of food and
transactions with the company.
medicines, increased poverty, and mass migration. Some
maintain that economic sanctions should be accompanied
At the same time, OFAC issued general licenses to allow
by efforts to foster a negotiated solution leading to free and
certain transactions and activities related to PdVSA and its
fair elections.
subsidiaries, some within specified time frames or wind-
down periods. Transactions with two U.S.-based PdVSA
For guidance on the Venezuela sanctions, see U.S.
subsidiaries, PDV Holding, Inc. (PDVH) and CITGO
Department of the Treasury, “Venezuela-Related
Holding, Inc., are authorized through July 27, 2019, and
Sanctions,” at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/
PDHV, CITGO, and other U.S. companies are authorized to
sanctions/programs/pages/venezuela.aspx; and U.S.
import petroleum from PdVSA through April 28, 2019;
Department of State, “Venezuela-Related Sanctions,” at
payments for these transactions benefiting PdVSA must be
https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/venezuela/.
made into a blocked account in the United States. Several
For more from CRS, see CRS Insight IN11024, Venezuela:
U.S. companies with operations in Venezuela involving
U.S. Recognizes Interim Government; CRS In Focus
PdVSA are authorized to continue their operations through
IF10230, Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy; CRS
July 27, 2019.
Report R44841, Venezuela: Background and U.S.
Additional Financial Sanctions
Relations; CRS In Focus IF11029, The Venezuela Regional
In addition to targeted sanctions against individuals and
Migration Crisis; and CRS Insight IN11037, Venezuela Oil
companies, President Trump has imposed broader financial
Sector Sanctions: Market and Trade Impacts.
sanctions on Venezuela through three additional because of
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs
the government’s serious human rights abuses,
IF10715
antidemocratic actions, and responsibility for the deepening
humanitarian crisis. In August 2017, President Trump
https://crsreports.congress.gov

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Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10715 · VERSION 15 · UPDATED

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