Updated February 4, 2019
U.S. Withdrawal from the INF Treaty: What’s Next?
U.S. Withdrawal
and mandated that DOD begin a program of record to
On February 2, 2019, the United States suspended its
develop a new U.S. ground-launched cruise missile. Some
participation in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Members, have, however, criticized the decision to
(INF) Treaty and notified Russia of its intent to withdraw
withdraw from the treaty and proposed legislation that
from the treaty. Under Article XV of the treaty, the
would limit the production and deployment of new systems.
withdrawal will take effect in six months. The Trump
Administration has stated that this is in response to Russia’s
Some analysts argue that the United States does not have to
deployment of an INF-range ground-launched cruise
deploy new land-based missiles either to respond to
missile, which violated the treaty’s ban on missiles with a
Russia’s new cruise missile or to address challenges from
range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers (see CRS Report
China. They note that the United States could expand its
R43832, Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range
deployments of sea-based or air-delivered weapons that are
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for
not limited by the INF Treaty. Nevertheless, press reports
Congress).
indicate that the Pentagon has initiated research into a new
ground-launched cruise missile.
President Trump first indicated that the United States would
withdraw from INF on October 20, 2018. He not only cited
In a briefing on February 1, 2019, a senior U.S. government
Russia’s violation, but also argued that the United States is
official noted that the United States does not plan to deploy
at a disadvantage with respect to China because the latter is
any INF-range systems immediately, as it has not
not bound by the treaty’s limits. On December 4, 2018,
developed such systems while the treaty was in force. The
after a meeting of NATO’s foreign ministers, Secretary of
official also noted that the United States is considering only
State Pompeo declared that Russia was in material breach
conventional options at this time and does not plan to
of the treaty and announced that the United States would
develop new INF-range land-based nuclear-armed missiles.
suspend its obligations, effective in 60 days, “unless Russia
returns to full and verifiable compliance.” This 60-day
The United States could pursue a number of INF-range
period ended on February 2, 2019.
programs and technologies that could add potentially
valuable capabilities. For example, the Army is developing
U.S. Military Options
a new Precision Strike Missile with a range of 499
The United States first assessed in 2014 that Russia was in
kilometers (consistent with the INF Treaty), but could
violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty. It
extend it with little difficulty. The United States could also
determined that Russia had developed an intermediate-
adapt existing sea-based Tomahawk cruise missiles for
range ground-launched cruise missile, now known as the
land-based delivery by developing new or adapting existing
9M729. At the time, the Pentagon initiated a study to
land-based launchers, such as the MK-41 launchers that are
evaluate whether the United States needed new military
part of the U.S. missile defense system in Romania. (Russia
capabilities to offset any advantage Russia might acquire by
has expressed concerns about these launchers precisely
deploying a ground-launched cruise missile of INF range
because it fears they could be adapted to launch Tomahawk
(between 500 and 5,500 kilometers). While the results of
cruise missiles.) It could also acquire a new intermediate-
the study were not made public, Brian McKeon, then the
range ballistic missile and deploy it with either existing
Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy,
reentry vehicle technology (essentially replacing the
noted that the United States could respond by deploying
Pershing II missiles destroyed under INF), or design a new
new defenses against cruise missiles, developing and
trajectory-shaping reentry vehicle that could maneuver and
possibly deploying new intermediate-range missiles, and
glide to evade an adversary’s missile defenses.
deploying other military capabilities to counter the new
Russian capabilities.
A number of factors could affect the Pentagon’s approach.
Research, development and acquisition of new systems
While generally supportive of diplomatic efforts to bring
could be far more expensive than the adaptation of existing
Russia back into compliance with INF, Congress also
weapons. In addition, basing locations for a new ground-
supported the development of a military response. The
based missile might depend on allied approval. However,
FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 113-29,
the United States could expand its deployments of sea-
§1651) and FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act
based or air-delivered missiles without requiring new bases.
(P.L. 114-92, §1243) called on the Pentagon to study and
plan for the development of possible military options. The
Issues in Asia
FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 115-91,
Several analysts have argued that the INF Treaty places the
§1243) authorized funding for research into defenses,
United States at a disadvantage when addressing challenges
counterforce capabilities, and countervailing capabilities
from China because China has deployed thousands of land-
https://crsreports.congress.gov

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U.S. Withdrawal from the INF Treaty: What’s Next?
based intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles that
that it could accelerate an arms race with Russia and China,
threaten U.S. forces and allies in Asia. Some, including
and hinder progress toward North Korea’s denuclearization.
President Trump, have identified this imbalance as a part of
the rationale for the U.S. to withdraw from the treaty.
Press reports indicate that the United States had planned to
submit the official notice of withdrawal on December 4,
Others, however, have questioned whether the United
after the NATO Foreign Minister’s meeting. It delayed this
States needs to deploy land-based missiles to address its
for 60 days after the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel,
concerns with China. They note that the United States
and other European leaders argued that the United States
should not simply mirror Chinese capabilities, as U.S.
should allow time for additional consultations with Russia,
missiles would not be intended to offset or attack Chinese
in an effort to convince it to return to compliance.
missiles. In addition, the United States has limited access to
land areas in Asia that are within intermediate-range
The Russian Response
distances from China. It does enjoy far greater access to
Russia has consistently denied that it has violated the INF
open ocean areas, which may argue for greater deployments
Treaty and initially denied that the missile in question even
at sea than on land. Those who support land-based
existed. After the United States provided further details and
deployments respond by noting that sea-based and air-
the designation for the missile, it denied that the missile had
delivered capabilities would be both more expensive and
been tested to INF range. It has also accused the United
more vulnerable than mobile land-based missiles and that
States of violating the treaty by using intermediate-range
U.S. assets at sea are already burdened with expanding
missiles as targets during tests of U.S. missile defense
missions and responsibilities.
systems, employing armed drones, and by deploying
missile defense interceptors on land in the Navy’s MK-41
Allied Views
missile launchers. (The United States has denied these
In the joint statement released after their December 4
accusations.) Russian officials, including President Putin,
meeting, NATO Foreign Ministers stated that they
have asserted that if the United States withdraws from the
“strongly support the finding … that Russia is in material
treaty and deploys new missiles in Europe, Russia could
breach of its obligations under the INF Treaty.” In a
both respond in kind and, using existing capabilities, target
statement released on February 1, 2019, the North Atlantic
U.S. allies hosting new U.S. missiles in any subsequent
Council noted that Russia had “taken no demonstrable steps
military exchange.
toward returning to full and verifiable compliance” and that
“Russia will bear sole responsibility for the end of the
U.S. and Russian officials met on January 15, 2019, in a
Treaty.” At the same time, the statement noted that the
last attempt to resolve the dispute. According to press
“allies are firmly committed to the preservation of effective
reports, Russian diplomats said that Russia would display
international arms control, disarmament and non-
the 9M729 missile and demonstrate that it could not fly to
proliferation” and “will continue to uphold, support, and
INF range, while the United States, in exchange, could
further strengthen arms control, disarmament and non-
demonstrate that the MK-41 launchers in Romania could
proliferation, as a key element of Euro-Atlantic security.”
not be converted to launch INF-range cruise missiles. The
United States rejected this proposal. Andrea Thompson, the
Over the past few years, NATO, as a whole, has echoed
Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International
U.S. concerns about Russia’s new missile, but some
Security, noted that an inspection of the missile would not
Members have expressed doubt about whether the United
allow the United States to “confirm the distance that missile
States had enough evidence to conclude that the missile
can travel,” and that the “verifiable destruction of the non-
violated the INF Treaty. This lingering uncertainty was
compliant system” was the only way for Russia “to return
evident as recently as October 2018, when, after a meeting
to compliance in a manner that we can confirm.” Moreover,
of NATO Defense Ministers, NATO’s Secretary General,
although the United States has provided Russia with
Jens Stoltenberg, noted that Russia had failed to provide
technical details to demonstrate that the MK-41 launchers
“any credible answers on this new missile.” He did not,
in Romania cannot launch offensive cruise missiles, it
though, affirm the U.S. conclusion with the certainty
would be unwilling to link Russia’s objections to U.S.
contained in the December 4 statement, stating, instead, that
missile defense programs with the INF dispute by including
the “allies agree that the most plausible assessment would
them in an inspection regime.
be that Russia is in violation of the Treaty.”
After receiving the U.S. notice of withdrawal, Russia’s
According to press reports, U.S. allies in Europe and Asia
President Putin announced that Russia would also suspend
were surprised by the President’s October 20
its participation in the INF Treaty. He also indicated that
announcement; several suggested that the United States
Russia would develop INF-range missiles—including a
exercise caution before withdrawing from the treaty. For
land-based version of the sea-based Kalibr cruise missile
example, Germany’s Foreign Minister Heiko Maas noted
and hypersonic intermediate-range and shorter-range
that the INF Treaty had been an “important pillar of our
missiles—to counter new U.S. systems. However, he
European security architecture” for over 30 years and said
indicated that Russia would only deploy intermediate-range
that “the United States should consider the consequences,
systems in Europe or Asia after the United States deployed
both for Europe and for future disarmament efforts, of
these types of weapons in these regions. It is not clear that
pulling out of an international treaty aimed at eliminating a
this pledge applies to the 9M729 cruise missile, as Russia
class of nuclear weapons.” Japanese officials also expressed
continues to deny that this missile can fly to INF range.
concern, calling the withdrawal “undesirable” and noting
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U.S. Withdrawal from the INF Treaty: What’s Next?

IF11051
Amy F. Woolf, Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11051 · VERSION 3 · UPDATED

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