Updated January 29, 2019
North Korea’s Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs
Overview
Nuclear Material Production
North Korea has made rapid advancements in its nuclear
North Korea continues to produce fissile material
weapons and ballistic missile programs. Since Kim Jong-un
(plutonium and highly enriched uranium) for weapons.
came to power in 2012, North Korea has conducted over 80
North Korea restarted its plutonium production facilities
ballistic missile test launches. In 2016, North Korea
after it withdrew from a nuclear agreement in 2009, and is
conducted two nuclear weapons tests and 26 ballistic
operating at least one centrifuge enrichment plant at its
missile flight tests on a variety of platforms. In 2017, North
Yongbyon nuclear complex. During the September 2018
Korea test launched 18 ballistic missiles (with five failures),
North-South Pyongyang Summit, the North stated its
including two launches in July and another in November
willingness to “permanently disable” the Yongbyon
that many ascribe as ICBM tests (intercontinental ballistic
facilities if the United States took “corresponding
missiles). It last conducted a nuclear test in September
measures.” U.S. officials have said that it is likely other
2017. The North Korean leader pledged to work toward
clandestine enrichment facilities exist. Open-source
“complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” in the
reports, citing U.S. government sources, in July 2018
U.S.-DPRK Singapore Summit statement. In its 2019
identified one such site at Kangson.
assessment to Congress, the DNI said that “North Korea is
unlikely to give up all of its nuclear weapons and
There is no public U.S. Intelligence Community (IC)
production capabilities, even as it seeks to negotiate partial
consensus of North Korea’s fissile material stockpiles.
denuclearization steps to obtain key US and international
News reports in August 2017 said that one component of
concessions.”
the IC, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), had
estimated a stockpile of up to 60 nuclear warheads.
Despite the absence of any missile launch activity or
Nongovernmental open source estimates are based on
nuclear tests in 2018, previous tests and official North
material production activities at the Yongbyon site as well
Korean statements suggest that North Korea is striving to
as past stockpile estimates. Some experts believe that North
build a credible regional nuclear warfighting capability that
Korea could have potentially produced enough material for
might evade regional ballistic missile defenses. Such an
13-21 nuclear weapons, and that North Korea could now
approach likely reinforces their deterrent and coercive
potentially produce enough nuclear material for an
diplomacy strategy—lending more credibility as it
additional 7 warheads per year.
demonstrates capability—but it also raises serious questions
about crisis stability and escalation control. Congress may
Doctrine
further examine these advances’ possible effects on U.S.
North Korean statements, taken at face value, appear to
policy.
describe North Korea’s nuclear arsenal as a deterrent to the
U.S. “nuclear war threats.” In his 2017 New Year’s address,
Nuclear Tests
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un stated that the North had
On September 3, 2017, North Korea announced that it had
“achieved the status of a nuclear power,” and promised to
tested a hydrogen bomb (or two-stage thermonuclear
continue to “build up our self-defense capability, the pivot
warhead) that it said it was perfecting for delivery on an
of which is the nuclear forces, and the capability for
intercontinental ballistic missile. North Korea has tested a
preemptive strike ... to defend peace and security of our
nuclear explosive device five other times since 2006.
state.” Kim also said at the 2016 Workers’ Party Congress
According to U.S. and international estimates, each test
that North Korea “will not use a nuclear weapon unless its
produced underground blasts that were progressively higher
sovereignty is encroached upon by an aggressive hostile
in magnitude and estimated yield. According to the North
force with nukes.” The statement also said that the “nuclear
Korean test announcement, the country had achieved
weapons of the DPRK can be used only by a final order of
“perfect success in the test of a hydrogen bomb for
the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).” In early 2018,
(Kim Jong Un) to repel invasion or attack from a hostile
North Korea announced that it had achieved its goals and
nuclear weapons state and make retaliatory strikes.”
would no longer conduct nuclear tests and would close
down its test site. It dynamited the entrances to two test
The U.S. intelligence community has characterized the
tunnels in May prior to the Trump-Kim summit. Kim Jong
purpose of North Korean nuclear weapons as intended for
Un told Secretary Pompeo in an October meeting that he
“deterrence, international prestige, and coercive
“invited inspectors to visit the Punggye Ri nuclear test site
diplomacy.” In its 2019 assessment to Congress, the DNI
to confirm that it has been irreversibly dismantled.” Such an
said that “North Korean leaders view nuclear arms as
inspection has not yet occurred.
critical to regime survival.”
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North Korea’s Nuclear and Bal istic Missile Programs
Warheads and Delivery Systems
Since the June 2018 Singapore Summit, reports have
According to the U.S. intelligence community, the prime
surfaced showing the dismantlement of a rocket engine test
objective of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is to
stand at the Sohae satellite launch complex. Although the
develop a nuclear warhead that is “miniaturized,” or
test stand could be rebuilt, some observers see this as a
sufficiently lighter and smaller to be mounted on long-range
positive development toward denuclearization while others
ballistic missiles. One of the most acute near-term threats to
have suggested the stand was no longer needed for liquid-
other nations may be from the medium-range Nodong
fuel engines, as North Korea may be opting instead to test
missile, which could reach all of the Korean Peninsula and
and deploy solid rocket motors for their missiles. There
some of mainland Japan. Outside the intelligence
have also been reports that North Korea may now be
community, U.S. officials have articulated conflicting
producing liquid-fueled ICBMs at another facility outside
assessments of North Korea’s ability to produce a nuclear
the North Korean capital, but other experts point out
warhead for its intercontinental-range missiles. The
developments there are not yet clear. Other observers note
intelligence community believes that North Korea has an
that closing a test stand would not prevent mass production
ICBM capability, but that neither North Korea nor the
of current designs.
United States knows whether that capability will work.
Mobile ballistic missiles, which North Korea is developing,
A December 2015 Department of Defense (DOD) report, as
and other measures also reduce U.S. detection abilities.
well as the intelligence community’s 2018 worldwide threat
These things together suggest that their test program may
assessment, said that “North Korea is committed to
be more than just for show or to make a political
developing a long-range nuclear-armed missile that is
statement—that it may be intended to increase the
capable of posing a direct threat to the United States.” The
reliability, effectiveness, and survivability of their ballistic
DOD report outlined two hypothetical ICBMs on which
missile force. North Korea has increased ballistic missile
North Korea could mount a nuclear warhead and deliver to
testing in recent years. These tests have demonstrated
the continental United States: the KN-08 and the
growing success and, coupled with increased operational
Taepodong-2, which was the base rocket for the Unha-2
training exercises, suggest a pattern designed to strengthen
space launch vehicle. North Korea has paraded what are
the credibility of North Korea’s regional nuclear deterrent
widely considered mock-ups or engineering models of the
strategy.
KN-08 and KN-14 ICBMs. In 2016, the intelligence
community assessed that “North Korea has already taken
A recent focus in North Korea’s ballistic missile test
initial steps toward fielding this [ICBM] system, although
program appears to be directed at developing a capability to
the system has not been flight-tested.” In July 2017, the
defeat or degrade the effectiveness of missile defenses, such
DPRK conducted what most have now assessed as two
as Patriot, Aegis BMD, and THAAD, all of which are or
ICBM tests.
will be deployed in the region. Some of the 2016 missile
tests were lofted to much higher altitudes and shorter ranges
In December 2012, North Korea launched an Unha-3 to
than an optimal ballistic trajectory. On reentry, a warhead
deliver a satellite into space. The DOD noted that although
from such a launch would come in at a much steeper angle
this space launch vehicle “contributes heavily to North
of attack and at much faster speed to its intended target,
Korea’s long-range ballistic missile development,” the
making it potentially more difficult to intercept with missile
country did not test a reentry vehicle (RV), and absent an
defenses. North Korea has demonstrated in 2017 the ability
effective RV, “North Korea cannot deliver a weapon to
to launch a salvo attack with more than one missile
target from an ICBM.” North Korea launched the Unha-3
launched in relatively short order. This is consistent with a
again in February 2016, placing a satellite into earth orbit.
possible goal of being able to conduct large ballistic missile
Some observers assert that the Unha-3 could be used as an
attacks with large raid sizes, a capability that could make it
ICBM, but no other country has deployed a space launch
more challenging for a missile defense system to destroy
vehicle as a nuclear-armed ICBM or developed an ICBM
each incoming warhead. Finally, North Korea’s progress
from the technology base of a space launch program alone.
with SLBMs might suggest an effort to counter land-based
Recent static engine tests of a large rocket engine in late
THAAD missile defenses by launching attacks from
2016 and early 2017 suggest to some progress in their
positions at sea that are outside the THAAD system’s radar
ICBM program, and to others progress in developing a
field of view, but not necessarily outside the capabilities of
larger space launch vehicle.
Aegis BMD systems deployed in the region.
North Korea has demonstrated limited but growing success
Taken together, North Korea’s progress in nuclear testing,
in its medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) program and
its declared standardization of warhead designs and
its submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) test
potential to put those warheads on MRBMs, increased
program. Moreover, North Korea appears to be making
confidence in the reliability of its short-range missile, and
some progress in moving slowly toward solid rocket motors
efforts seemingly designed to degrade regional ballistic
for its ballistic missiles. Solid fuel is a chemically more
missile defense systems suggest that North Korea may be
stable option that also allows for reduced reaction and
building a credible regional nuclear warfighting and ICBM
reload times. Successful tests of the Pukguksong-2 (KN-15)
nuclear deterrent capability.
solid fuel MRBM in 2017 led North Korea to announce it
would now mass produce those missiles.
Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Specialist in Nonproliferation
IF10472
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North Korea’s Nuclear and Bal istic Missile Programs


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10472 · VERSION 13 · UPDATED

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