Updated January 22, 2019
Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy Overview
U.S. interests in Latin America and the Caribbean are
Colombia and Panama, which led to congressional
diverse and include economic, political, security, and
enactment of legislation for the two FTAs in 2011. In 2015,
humanitarian concerns. Geographic proximity has ensured
the Administration also concluded negotiations for the
strong economic linkages between the United States and the
proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement
region, with the United States being a major trading partner
that included Mexico, Chile, and Peru, among other nations.
and source of foreign investment for many Latin American
In the absence of congressional action on comprehensive
and Caribbean countries. Free-trade agreements (FTAs)
immigration reform, President Obama turned to executive
have augmented U.S. economic relations with 11 countries
action in 2012 with the Deferred Action for Childhood
in the region. The Western Hemisphere is a large source of
Arrivals program (DACA), which provided relief from
U.S. immigration, both legal and illegal; geographic
deportation for certain immigrants who arrived as children.
proximity and economic and security conditions are major
factors driving migration trends. Curbing the flow of illicit
Among other significant policy changes, the Obama
drugs from Latin America and the Caribbean has been a key
Administration launched a major policy shift toward Cuba
component of U.S. relations with the region and a major
in late 2014, moving away from the long-standing
interest of Congress for more than three decades. In recent
sanctions-based approach toward a policy of engagement.
years, the United States has engaged in close security
While the Administration pressed for dialogue in
cooperation with Mexico, Central America, and the
Venezuela, it also imposed targeted sanctions in 2015 on
Caribbean to combat drug trafficking and related violence.
those involved in human rights abuses. Spurred by a surge
of unaccompanied children and other migrants from Central
Although most countries in the region have made enormous
America, the Administration developed a broader approach
strides in terms of democratic political development since
in 2015 known as the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in
the 1980s, many countries in the region still face
Central America to improve security, strengthen
considerable challenges. Cuba remains under authoritarian
governance, and promote prosperity.
rule, although the government transitioned to a new
president, Miguel Díaz-Canel, in 2018. Undemocratic
Trump Administration Policy
practices have risen in in Venezuela, which most observers
Under the Trump Administration, the outlook for U.S.
view as a dictatorship under President Nicolás Maduro, and
relations with Latin America and the Caribbean has
Nicaragua, which has grown violently repressive under
changed. In February 2018, the State Department set forth a
President Daniel Ortega. High rates of crime and violence
framework for U.S. policy toward the region focused on
afflict a number of countries; in some, journalists and
three pillars for engagement—economic growth and
human rights and environmental activists have been
prosperity, security, and democratic governance. Although
targeted. High-profile corruption scandals have stirred
the framework reflects continuity with long-standing U.S.
strong anti-corruption sentiment throughout the region and
policy priorities for the region, it also appears to be at odds
helped to fuel the election of populist presidents from the
with the Administration’s actions, sometimes accompanied
left and right, respectively, in Mexico (Andrés Manuel
by tough rhetoric, on foreign aid, trade, and immigration.
López Obrador) and Brazil (Jair Bolsonaro).
The Administration’s proposed foreign aid budgets for
Obama Administration Policy
FY2018 and FY2019 would have significantly cut
In its policy toward the region, the Obama Administration
assistance to the region by 36% and 35%, respectively,
set forth a broad framework centered on promoting
compared with FY2017.
economic and social opportunity, ensuring citizen security,
Negative views of U.S. leadership in the region have
strengthening effective democratic governance, and
increased markedly over the past two years, influenced by
securing a clean energy future. It emphasized partnership
disparaging political rhetoric and certain actions on
and shared responsibility, with policy conducted through
immigration and trade. Such views could affect the
engagement and dialogue.
willingness of some countries to cooperate with the United
The Obama Administration provided significant support to
States on regional and global challenges. However, some
combat drug trafficking and organized crime and to
observers believe the election of conservative governments
advance citizen security. Efforts included a continuation of
in several Latin American countries could lead to increased
long-standing support to Colombia through Plan Colombia
cooperation with the region.
and its successor programs: the Mérida Initiative, begun in
On trade, President Trump ordered U.S. withdrawal from
2007 to support Mexico; the Central America Regional
the proposed TPP in January 2017; the TPP would have
Security Initiative (CARSI), begun in 2008; and the
increased U.S. economic linkages with several countries in
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), begun in 2009.
the region. The President strongly criticized the North
On trade matters, the Obama Administration resolved
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Mexico
outstanding congressional concerns related to FTAs with
and Canada, warned that the United States might withdraw
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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy Overview
from it, and initiated renegotiations in 2017; ultimately the
In other action, Congress enacted the Nicaragua Human
three countries agreed in September 2018 to a new United
Rights and Anticorruption Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-335, H.R.
States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which leaves
1918) in December 2018. The law requires the United
NAFTA largely intact but includes some updates and
States to vote against loans from the international financial
changes, especially regarding the dairy and auto industries.
institutions to Nicaragua (except for basic human needs or
democracy promotion) and authorizes sanctions on persons
Beyond trade, bilateral relations with Mexico have been
responsible for human rights violations or corruption. In
tested because of inflammatory anti-immigrant rhetoric;
President Trump’s calls for Mexico to pay for a border
August 2018, Congress enacted the FY2019 defense
authorization measure, P.L. 115-232 (H.R. 5515), with
wall; and the Administration’s September 2017
several Latin America provisions, including required
announcement that it would end DACA, potentially
reports on narcotics trafficking corruption and illicit
affecting some 550,000 Mexicans and more than 100,000
campaign financing in El Salvador, Guatemala, and
migrants from other countries in the region. Despite
Honduras, and on security cooperation between Russia and
tensions, U.S.-Mexican relations remain cooperative,
Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Both houses also
including security cooperation related to drug interdiction
approved resolutions indicating policy preferences on a
and efforts to bolster economic ties, particularly in energy.
range of issues and countries: S.Res. 35 and H.Res. 259 on
Other Administration actions on immigration have caused
Venezuela, S.Res. 83 and H.Res. 336 on Mexico, H.Res. 54
concern in the region. The Administration announced the
on Argentina, H.Res. 145 on Central America, S.Res. 224
termination of Temporary Protected Status (TPS)
on Cuba, and H.Res. 981 on Nicaragua.
designations for Nicaragua, Haiti, El Salvador, and
Honduras. Other immigration actions, such as the
116th Congress Outlook
implementation of a “zero tolerance” policy toward illegal
The 116th Congress faces completing action on FY2019
border crossings, could restrict the ability of Central
foreign aid appropriations and in early 2019 will begin
American migrants to receive asylum.
consideration of the Administration’s FY2020 foreign aid
budget request.
As the situation in Venezuela has deteriorated, the Trump
Administration has spoken out against the Maduro
The new Congress also will likely continue to monitor the
government’s actions and supported the country’s
crisis in Venezuela, including efforts to relieve the
democratically elected National Assembly, imposed
humanitarian crisis and consideration of next steps to
economic sanctions on Venezuela (both targeted sanctions
influence the Venezuelan government’s behavior in
on individuals and broader economic sanctions), and
returning to democratic rule. The proposed USMCA will
provided almost $100 million in humanitarian assistance for
face congressional examination and likely consideration in
Venezuelans who have fled to other countries.
the 116th Congress; the agreement must be approved by
Congress before it can enter into force. In Central America,
In 2017, President Trump unveiled a new policy toward
a potential oversight issue is the effectiveness of U.S.
Cuba that partially rolled back efforts to normalize relations
assistance to the Northern Triangle countries related to
and imposed new sanctions, including restrictions on
efforts to combat insecurity, corruption, and human rights
financial transactions with companies controlled by the
violations; of particular concern are efforts to undermine
Cuban military. In 2017, in response to unexplained injuries
anticorruption efforts in Guatemala and Honduras,
of U.S. diplomatic community members in Havana, the
especially the Guatemalan president’s action against the
State Department downsized the staff of the U.S. Embassy.
U.N.-backed International Commission against Impunity in
As political unrest began to grow in Nicaragua in 2018, the
Guatemala. Congress also potentially could take up
Trump Administration spoke out against the Ortega
consideration of immigration legislation related to the
government’s use of violence and employed targeted
rescission of DACA and the termination of TPS for
sanctions against several individuals responsible for human
Nicaragua, Haiti, El Salvador, and Honduras.
rights abuses or significant corruption.
Other potential oversight issues for the 116th Congress
115th Congress Legislative Action
include the surge in Colombian coca cultivation and
Congress traditionally has played an active role in policy
cocaine production and the effectiveness of U.S. assistance
toward Latin America and the Caribbean in terms of both
focusing on counternarcotics and counterterrorism; the
legislation and oversight. Given the region’s proximity,
effectiveness of U.S. assistance to Mexico, given the high
U.S. foreign and domestic policy often overlap, particularly
level of crime-related violence in the country; how to
in areas of immigration and trade.
respond to increase political repression in Nicaragua; the
Congress rejected many of the Trump Administration’s
extent and significance of Chinese and Russian engagement
proposed FY2018 cuts in foreign assistance to the region
in the region and the appropriate U.S. policy response; and
when it enacted the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018
U.S. relations with Brazil under President Jair Bolsonaro
(P.L. 115-141). Although the 115th Congress did not
amid concerns about human rights in the country.
complete action on foreign aid appropriations for FY2019,
both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees’
For additional information, see CRS Report R45120, Latin
bills, H.R. 6385 and S. 3108, would have funded key
America and the Caribbean: Issues in the 115th Congress,
countries and initiatives approaching FY2017 levels.
coordinated by Mark P. Sullivan.
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs
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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy Overview
IF10460
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