Updated January 2, 2019
U.S. Sanctions on Russia: An Overview
The United States imposes sanctions on Russian persons
Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities
(individuals, entities, and vessels) in response to Russia’s
Sanctions imposed on Russian persons in response to
2014 invasion of Ukraine, election interference, malicious
malicious cyber activities are based on two authorities. The
cyber-enabled activities, human rights abuses, use of a
first is EO 13694, as amended by EO 13757 (and codified
chemical weapon, weapons proliferation, illicit trade with
by CRIEEA). This executive order targets those who
North Korea, and support to Syria.
engage in cyberattacks (1) against critical infrastructure, (2)
for financial or commercial gain, (3) to significantly disrupt
Sanctions against Russian persons may include blocking of
the availability of a computer or network, or (4) to interfere
assets subject to U.S. jurisdiction; limits on access to the
with U.S. election processes and institutions.
U.S. financial system, including limiting or prohibiting
transactions involving U.S. individuals and businesses; and
In December 2016, the Obama Administration designated
denial of entry into the United States. The United States
for election-related malicious cyber activities nine persons,
also tightly controls exports to Russia’s energy and defense
including Russia’s leading intelligence agency (FSB) and
sectors. For more, see CRS Report R45415, U.S. Sanctions
military intelligence (GRU). Two other persons were
on Russia.
designated for financial-related cyber activities.
Invasion of Ukraine
In March 2018, the Trump Administration designated 16
Most U.S. designations of Russian persons subject to
persons for election interference. In June and August 2018,
sanctions are in response to Russia’s 2014 invasion and
the Trump Administration designated 12 more persons it
annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea region and Russia’s
referred to as FSB enablers. In December 2018, it
fostering of conflict in eastern Ukraine. To date, the United
designated another six persons for election interference.
States has imposed Ukraine-related sanctions on more than
Many of these designees also have been indicted by the
650 persons.
Department of Justice’s Special Counsel’s Office for crimes
related to election interference.
The basis for Ukraine-related sanctions is a series of
executive orders (EOs 13660, 13661, 13662, and 13685)
CRIEEA, at Section 224, enlarged the scope of cyber-
that were issued in 2014 and codified by the Countering
related activities subject to sanctions to include a range of
Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017
activities conducted on behalf of the Russian government
(CRIEEA; P.L. 115-44, Title II; 22 U.S.C. 9501 et seq.).
that undermine “cybersecurity against any person, including
The EOs provide for sanctions against those the President
a democratic institution, or government.” In March 2018,
determines have undermined Ukraine’s security and
the Trump Administration designated, pursuant to Section
stability; misappropriated Ukrainian state assets; or
224, six persons previously designated under EO 13694, as
conducted business, trade, or investment in occupied
well as two others, for the 2017 “NotPetya” global
Crimea. They also provide for sanctions against any
ransomware attack. In June 2018, the Administration
Russian government officials and those who offer them
designated one more entity under Section 224. In December
support, persons who operate in the Russian arms sector,
2018, the Administration designated 13 GRU officers for
and persons who operate in key sectors of the Russian
election interference or cyber operations against the World
economy.
Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) and the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). All these
Sectoral sanctions apply to specific entities in Russia’s
officers also have been indicted by the Department of
financial, energy, and defense sectors. U.S. persons are
Justice for related crimes.
restricted from engaging in specific transactions with these
entities, which are identified as subject to one of four
To deter further Russian malicious cyber-enabled activities,
directives. Restrictions apply to new equity investment and
CRIEEA, at Section 231, requires secondary sanctions on
financing for identified entities in Russia’s financial sector;
persons that engage in significant transactions with the
new financing for identified entities in Russia’s energy
Russian defense or intelligence sectors. In September 2018,
sector; and new financing for identified entities in Russia’s
the Administration designated the Equipment Development
defense sector. Sectoral sanctions also prohibit U.S. trade
Department of China’s Central Military Commission, as
with identified entities related to the development of
well as its director, for taking delivery of 10 combat aircraft
Russian deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects that
and surface-to-air missile system-related equipment.
have the potential to produce oil and, as amended by
CRIEEA, such projects worldwide in which those entities
Human Rights Abuse and Corruption
have an ownership interest of at least 33% or a majority of
The Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of
voting interests.
2012 (P.L. 112-208, Title IV; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) requires
the President to impose sanctions on persons he identifies
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U.S. Sanctions on Russia: An Overview
as having been involved in either a “criminal conspiracy”
North Korea
uncovered by Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky or his
In 2017, the Administration designated seven Russia-
subsequent imprisonment and death. The act also requires
related persons under EO 13722 for trade in petroleum with
the President to impose sanctions on those he finds have
North Korea. The Administration also designated four
committed human rights abuses against individuals who are
Russian persons under EOs 12938 and 13382 for providing
fighting to expose the illegal activity of Russian
supplies and procuring metals to a North Korean company
government officials or seeking internationally recognized
subject to sanctions for its weapons of mass destruction
human rights and freedoms.
programs. In August and September 2018, the
Administration designated 10 more persons for facilitating
Forty-nine persons are designated under the Sergei
trade with North Korea, including through “ship-to-ship
Magnitsky Act. Other Russian persons have been
transfer of refined petroleum products,” under EO 13722
designated under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights
and EO 13810.
Accountability Act (P.L. 114-328, Title XII, Subtitle F; 22
U.S.C. 2656 note) and EO 13818, which address human
Syria
rights abuses and corruption more broadly.
The Trump Administration designated Rosoboronexport
and an associated bank for their support to the Syrian
The Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and
government under EO 13582 in April 2018, adding to the
Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014, as amended
Obama Administration’s designation of two Russian banks
(SSIDES; P.L. 113-95; 22 U.S.C. 8901 et seq.), requires
and related individuals under the same EO.
sanctions on those responsible for serious human rights
abuses in “any territory forcibly occupied or otherwise
Other Sanctions and Restrictions
controlled” by the Russian government. In November 2018,
In addition to Ukraine-related restrictions, the Department
the Administration designated three persons for human
of Commerce imposes export-licensing restrictions on
rights abuses in Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine.
Russian persons that engage in activities considered
contrary to U.S. national security and/or foreign policy
Use of a Chemical Weapon
interests. In December 2017, restrictions were imposed on
In August 2018, the United States determined that Russia
two entities for producing a ground-launched cruise missile
used a chemical weapon in contravention of international
system and associated launcher in violation of the
law in relation to the March 2018 nerve agent attack on
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.
British citizen Sergei Skripal, a former Russian military
intelligence officer and UK double agent, and his daughter.
As in past years, FY2018 and FY2019 national defense,
This finding triggered the Chemical and Biological
energy, and foreign operations appropriations restrict
Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991
assistance to the Russian government. The State
(CBW Act, P.L. 102-182, Title III; 22 U.S.C. 5601 et seq.).
Department’s 2018 Trafficking in Persons Report identifies
Russia as a Tier 3 nation that fails to meet minimum
The CBW Act requires the President to terminate most
standards for the elimination of human trafficking. This
foreign aid, arms sales, export licenses for controlled goods
designation requires limits on aid and cultural exchanges.
and services, and government-backed financial assistance.
A second round of sanctions could affect U.S. import and
Around three dozen Russian persons currently are
export of goods and services other than food or agriculture,
designated under global sanctions regimes related to
access to U.S. banks, U.S. support for Russia in the
terrorism and transnational crime.
international financial institutions, and diplomatic relations.
For more, see CRS In Focus IF10962, Russia, the Skripal
Other Available Sanctions
Poisoning, and U.S. Sanctions.
As of December 2018, the Administration has not made
designations under other new CRIEEA authorities related to
In December 2018, the Trump Administration designated
pipeline development, privatization deals, or support to
two GRU officers for the attempted assassination of Sergei
Syria (§§232-234). The Administration also has not made
Skripal and his daughter under cyber-related sanctions
other designations under SSIDES or the Ukraine Freedom
authority provided in Section 224 of CRIEEA.
Support Act of 2014 (UFSA; P.L. 113-272; 22 U.S.C. 8921
et seq.; as amended by CRIEEA, §§225-228) related to
Weapons Proliferation
weapons transfers abroad, certain oil projects, corruption,
Pursuant to the Iran, North Korea, and Syria
and secondary sanctions against foreign persons that
Nonproliferation Act, as amended (INKSNA, P.L. 106-178;
facilitate significant transactions or sanctions evasion for
50 U.S.C. 1701 note), state-owned arms exporter
Russia-related designees. Some Members of Congress have
Rosoboronexport and six other Russian defense entities are
called on the President to make more designations based on
denied most U.S. government procurement contracts,
CRIEEA’s mandatory sanctions provisions.
export licenses, and trade in U.S. Munitions List-controlled
items. In April 2018, Rosoboronexport was designated for
Dianne E. Rennack, Specialist in Foreign Policy
providing support to the Syrian government. In addition,
Legislation
Rosoboronexport is subject to Ukraine-related sectoral
Cory Welt, Analyst in European Affairs
sanctions and other restrictions that prohibit U.S.
government contracts and other transactions.
IF10779
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U.S. Sanctions on Russia: An Overview


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10779 · VERSION 5 · UPDATED

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