Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress

(name redacted)
Specialist in Naval Affairs

January 12, 2018
Summary

The Columbia (SSBN-826) class program, previously known as the Ohio replacement program (ORP) or SSBN(X) program, is a program to design and build a new class of 12 ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) to replace the Navy’s current force of 14 Ohio-class SSBNs. The Navy has identified the Columbia-class program as the Navy’s top priority program. The Navy wants to procure the first Columbia-class boat in FY2021. The Navy’s proposed FY2018 budget requests $842.9 million in advance procurement (AP) funding and $1,041.7 million in research and development funding for the program.

The Navy as of January 2017 estimates the procurement cost of the lead ship in the class at $8.2 billion in constant 2017 dollars, not including several billion dollars in additional cost for plans for the class, and the average unit procurement cost of ships 2 through 12 in the program at $6.5 billion each in constant FY2017 dollars. A March 2017 GAO report assessing selected major Department of Defense (DOD) weapon acquisition programs stated that the estimated total acquisition cost of the Columbia-class program is $100,221.9 million (about $100.2 billion) in constant FY2017 dollars, including $12,648.1 million (about $12.6 billion) in research and development costs and $87,426.5 million (about $87.4 billion) in procurement costs. Observers are concerned about the impact the Columbia-class program will have on the Navy’s ability to fund the procurement of other types of ships at desired rates in the 2020s and early 2030s.

Issues for Congress for the Columbia-class program for FY2018 include the following:

- whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s FY2018 funding requests for the program;
- the impact of using a CR to fund Department of Defense (DOD) operations for the first few months of FY2018 on the execution of FY2018 funding for the Columbia-class program;
- cost, schedule, and technical risk in the Columbia-class program; and
- the prospective affordability of the Columbia-class program and its potential impact on funding available for other Navy programs.

This report focuses on the Columbia-class program as a Navy shipbuilding program. CRS Report RL33640, *U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues*, by (name redacted) discusses the Columbia class as an element of future U.S. strategic nuclear forces in the context of strategic nuclear arms control agreements.
Contents

Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1
Background .................................................................................................................. 1
  U.S. Navy SSBNs in General .................................................................................. 1
    Mission of SSBNs ................................................................................................ 1
  Current Ohio-Class SSBNs ................................................................................... 2
  U.S.-UK Cooperation on SLBMs and the New UK SSBN ................................... 4
Submarine Construction Industrial Base ............................................................... 4
Columbia-Class Program ......................................................................................... 5
  Program Name ........................................................................................................ 5
  Program Origin and Early Milestones ................................................................... 5
  Planned Procurement Quantity and Schedule .................................................... 5
  Columbia Class Design .......................................................................................... 8
  Program Cost ........................................................................................................... 10
  National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund ................................................................... 12
  Submarine Unified Build Strategy (SUBS) ............................................................ 17
  January 2017 Milestone B Approval ..................................................................... 18
  Columbia-Class Program Funding ....................................................................... 19

Issues for Congress .................................................................................................. 20
  FY2018 Funding Request ...................................................................................... 20
  Impact of CR on Execution of FY2018 Funding ................................................... 20
  Cost, Schedule, and Technical Risk ....................................................................... 21
    Cost Risk ............................................................................................................... 21
    Schedule and Technical Risk ............................................................................... 27
  Program Affordability and Impact on Other Navy Shipbuilding Programs ....... 33
    Overview ............................................................................................................. 33
    Columbia-Class Program Is Navy’s Top Priority Program ............................... 34
  Some Options for Addressing the Issue ................................................................. 35

Legislative Activity for FY2018 ................................................................................. 41
  Summary of Congressional Action on FY2018 Funding Request ....................... 41
    House .................................................................................................................... 42
    Senate ................................................................................................................... 44
    Conference ......................................................................................................... 46
  FY2018 DOD Appropriations Act (Division A of H.R. 3219/S. XXXX) ............... 50
    House .................................................................................................................... 50
    Senate ................................................................................................................... 50

Figures

  Figure 1. Ohio (SSBN-726) Class SSBN ................................................................. 3
  Figure 2. Columbia (SSBN-826) Class SSBN ......................................................... 9
Tables
Table 1. Navy Schedule for Procuring Columbia-Class Boats and Replacing Ohio-Class SSBNs ................................................................. 7
Table 2. Columbia-Class Program Funding ................................................................................................................................. 19
Table 3. Navy Confidence Levels for Estimated Columbia-Class Unit Procurement Costs .......... 23
Table 4. Navy Columbia Class Procurement Schedule and a Notional Alternative Schedule .......................................................................... 40
Table 5. Congressional Action on FY2018 Funding Request ........................................................................................................ 41

Table A-1. U.S. SSBN Classes ......................................................................................................................................................... 52

Appendixes
Appendix A. Summary of U.S. SSBN Designs .......................................................................................................................... 52
Appendix B. U.S.-UK Cooperation on SLBMs and the New UK SSBN ................................................................................ 54
Appendix C. Columbia-Class Program Origin and Early Milestones ...................................................................................... 57
Appendix D. Earlier Oversight Issue: A Design with 16 vs. 20 SLBM Tubes ........................................................................ 59
Appendix E. June 2013 Navy Blog Post Regarding Ohio Replacement Options ................................................................. 65

Contacts
Author Contact Information .................................................................................................................................................. 66
Introduction

This report provides background information and potential oversight issues for Congress on the Columbia-class program, a program to design and build a new class of 12 ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) to replace the Navy’s current force of 14 Ohio-class SSBNs. The program was previously known as the Ohio replacement program (ORP) or SSBN(X) program. The Navy has identified the Columbia-class program as the Navy’s top priority program. The Navy wants to procure the first Columbia-class boat in FY2021. The Navy’s proposed FY2018 budget requests $842.9 million in advance procurement (AP) funding and $1,041.7 million in research and development funding for the program.

The program poses a number of funding and oversight issues for Congress. Decisions that Congress makes on the Columbia-class program could substantially affect U.S. military capabilities and funding requirements, and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base.

For an overview of the strategic and budgetary context in which the Columbia-class program and other Navy shipbuilding programs may be considered, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).

This report focuses on the Columbia-class program as a Navy shipbuilding program. Another CRS report discusses the Columbia class as an element of future U.S. strategic nuclear forces in the context of strategic nuclear arms control agreements.

Background

U.S. Navy SSBNs in General

Mission of SSBNs

The U.S. Navy operates three kinds of submarines—nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines (SSGNs), and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). The SSNs and SSGNs are multi-mission ships that perform a variety of peacetime and wartime missions. They do not carry nuclear weapons.

1 CRS Report RL33640, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues, by (name redacted)
2 In the designations SSN, SSGN, and SSBN, the Ss stand for submarine, N stands for nuclear-powered (meaning the ship is powered by a nuclear reactor), G stands for guided missile (such as a cruise missile), B stands for ballistic missile.
3 These missions include covert intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), much of it done for national-level (as opposed to purely Navy) purposes; covert insertion and recovery of special operations forces (SOF); covert strikes against land targets with the Tomahawk cruise missiles; covert offensive and defensive mine warfare; anti-submarine warfare (ASW); and anti-surface ship warfare. The Navy’s four SSGNs, which are converted former SSBNs, can carry larger numbers of Tomahawks and SOF personnel than can the SSNs. SSGN operations consequently may focus more strongly on Tomahawk and SOF missions than do SSN operations. For more on the Navy’s SSNs and SSGNs, see CRS Report RL32418, Navy Trident Submarine Conversion (SSGN) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted), and CRS Report RS21007, Navy Trident Submarine Conversion (SSGN) Program: (continued...)
The SSBNs, in contrast, perform a specialized mission of strategic nuclear deterrence. To perform this mission, SSBNs are armed with submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), which are large, long-range missiles armed with multiple nuclear warheads. SSBNs launch their SLBMs from large-diameter vertical launch tubes located in the middle section of the boat. The SSBNs’ basic mission is to remain hidden at sea with their SLBMs, so as to deter a nuclear attack on the United States by another country by demonstrating to other countries that the United States has an assured second-strike capability, meaning a survivable system for carrying out a retaliatory nuclear attack.

Navy SSBNs, which are sometimes referred to informally as “boomers,” form one leg of the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent force, or “triad,” which also includes land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and land-based long-range bombers. At any given moment, some of the Navy’s SSBNs are conducting nuclear deterrent patrols. The Navy’s report on its FY2011 30-year shipbuilding plan states the following: “These ships are the most survivable leg of the Nation’s strategic arsenal and provide the Nation’s only day-to-day assured nuclear response capability.” The Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) report on the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), released on April 6, 2010, states that “strategic nuclear submarines (SSBNs) and the SLBMs they carry represent the most survivable leg of the U.S. nuclear Triad.”

Current Ohio-Class SSBNs

The Navy currently operates 14 Ohio (SSBN-726) class SSBNs (see Figure 1). The boats are commonly called Trident SSBNs or simply Tridents because they carry Trident SLBMs. A total of 18 Ohio-class SSBNs were procured in FY1974-FY1991. The ships entered service in 1981-1997. The boats were designed and built by General Dynamics’ Electric Boat Division (GD/EB) of Groton, CT, and Quonset Point, RI. They were originally designed for 30-year service lives but were later certified for 42-year service lives, consisting of two approximately 19-year periods of operation separated by an approximately 4-year midlife nuclear refueling overhaul, called an engineered refueling overhaul (ERO). The nuclear refueling overhaul includes both a nuclear refueling and overhaul work on the ship that is not related to the nuclear refueling.

(...continued)

Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).

4 The Navy’s non-strategic nuclear weapons—meaning all of the service’s nuclear weapons other than submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)—were removed from Navy surface ships and submarines under a unilateral U.S. nuclear initiative announced by President George H. W. Bush in September 1991. The initiative reserved a right to rearm SSNs at some point in the future with nuclear-armed Tomahawk land attack missiles (TLAM-Ns) should conditions warrant. Navy TLAM-Ns were placed in storage to support this option. DOD’s report on the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), released on April 6, 2010, states that the United States will retire the TLAM-Ns. (Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010, pp. xiii and 28.)

5 SSBNs, like other Navy submarines, are also equipped with horizontal torpedo tubes in the bow for firing torpedoes or other torpedo-sized weapons.

6 This informal name is a reference to the large boom that would be made by the detonation of an SLBM nuclear warhead.


8 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010, p. 22. The next sentence in the report states: “Today, there appears to be no viable near or mid-term threats to the survivability of U.S. SSBNs, but such threats—or other technical problems—cannot be ruled out over the long term.” The report similarly states on page 23: “Today, there appears to be no credible near or mid-term threats to the survivability of U.S. SSBNs. However, given the stakes involved, the Department of Defense will continue a robust SSBN Security Program that aims to anticipate potential threats and develop appropriate countermeasures to protect current and future SSBNs.”
Ohio-class SSBNs are designed to each carry 24 SLBMs, although by 2018, four SLBM launch tubes on each boat are to be deactivated, and the number of SLBMs that can be carried by each boat consequently is to be reduced to 20, so that the number of operational launchers and warheads in the U.S. force will comply with strategic nuclear arms control limits.

The first 8 boats in the class were originally armed with Trident I C-4 SLBMs; the final 10 were armed with larger and more-capable Trident II D-5 SLBMs. The Clinton Administration’s 1994 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) recommended a strategic nuclear force for the START II strategic nuclear arms reduction treaty that included 14 Ohio-class SSBNs, all armed with D-5s. This recommendation prompted interest in the idea of converting the first 4 Ohio-class boats (SSBNs 726-729) into SSGNs, so as to make good use of the 20 years of potential operational life remaining in these 4 boats, and to bolster the U.S. SSN fleet. The first 4 Ohio-class boats were converted into SSGNs in 2002-2008, and the 4 four (SSBNs 730-733) were backfitted with D-5 SLBMs in 2000-2005, producing the current force of 14 Ohio-class SSBNs, all of which are armed with D-5 SLBMs.

Eight of the 14 Ohio-class SSBNs are homeported at Bangor, WA, in Puget Sound; the other 6 are homeported at Kings Bay, GA, close to the Florida border.

Unlike most Navy ships, which are operated by single crews, Navy SSBNs are operated by alternating crews (called the Blue and Gold crews) so as to maximize the percentage of time that they spend at sea in deployed status.

The first of the 14 Ohio-class SSBNs (SSBN-730) will reach the end of its 42-year service life in 2027. The remaining 13 will reach the ends of their service lives at a rate of roughly one ship per year thereafter, with the 14th reaching the end of its service life in 2040.

---

9 For more on the SSGN conversion program, see CRS Report RS21007, *Navy Trident Submarine Conversion (SSGN) Program: Background and Issues for Congress*, by (name redacted).
The Navy has initiated a program to refurbish and extend the service lives of D-5 SLBMs to 2042 “to match the OHIO Class submarine service life.”

Including the Ohio class, the Navy has operated four classes of SSBNs since 1959. For a table summarizing these four classes, see Appendix A.

U.S.-UK Cooperation on SLBMs and the New UK SSBN

SSBNs are also operated by the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and India. The UK’s four Vanguard-class SSBNs, which entered service in 1993-1999, each carry 16 Trident II D-5 SLBMs. Previous classes of UK SSBNs similarly carried earlier-generation U.S. SLBMs. The UK plans to replace the four Vanguard-class boats with three or four next-generation SSBNs, previously called Successor-class SSBNs and now called Dreadnought-class SSBNs. Dreadnought-class boats are to be equipped with 12 missile launch tubes, but current UK plans call for each boat to carry eight D-5 SLBMs, with the other four tubes not being used for SLBMs. The United States is providing technical assistance to the United Kingdom for the Dreadnought-class program; for additional discussion, see Appendix B.

Submarine Construction Industrial Base

U.S. Navy submarines are built at two shipyards—General Dynamics’ Electric Boat Division (GD/EB) of Groton, CT, and Quonset Point, RI, and Huntington Ingalls Industries’ Newport News Shipbuilding (HII/NNS), of Newport News, VA. GD/EB and HII/NNS are the only two shipyards in the country capable of building nuclear-powered ships. GD/EB builds submarines only, while HII/NNS also builds nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and is capable of building other types of surface ships. The two yards currently are jointly building Virginia-class attack submarines.

In addition to GD/EB and HII/NNS, the submarine construction industrial base includes hundreds of supplier firms, as well as laboratories and research facilities, in numerous states. Much of the total material procured from supplier firms for the construction of submarines comes from single or sole source suppliers. For nuclear-propulsion component suppliers, an additional source of stabilizing work is the Navy’s nuclear-powered aircraft carrier construction program. Much of the design and engineering portion of the submarine construction industrial base is resident at GD/EB. Smaller portions are resident at HII/NNS and some of the component makers.

---

10 Statement of Rear Admiral Stephen Johnson, USN, Director, Strategic Systems Programs, Before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the Senate Armed Services Committee [on] FY2011 Strategic Systems, March 17, 2010, p. 4.
11 Although the SLBMs on UK SSBNs are U.S.-made, the nuclear warheads on the missiles are of UK design and manufacture.
12 On October 21, 2016, the UK Ministry of Defence announced that the first of its planned new SSBNs will be named Dreadnought, and the class will be referred to as the Dreadnought class. See Jon Rosamond, “U.K. Revives Dreadnought Name for Successor SSBNs,” USNI News, October 21, 2016.
13 For more on the arrangement for jointly building Virginia-class boats, see CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).
14 For more on this program, see CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted). In terms of work provided to nuclear-propulsion component suppliers, a carrier nuclear propulsion plant is roughly equivalent to five submarine propulsion plants.
Columbia-Class Program

Program Name
For several years, the Columbia-class program was known as the Ohio replacement program (ORP) or SSBN(X) program, and boats in the class were referred to as Ohio replacement boats. On July 28, 2016, it was reported that the first boat in the class will be named Columbia in honor of the District of Columbia. As a consequence, the program is now referred to as the Columbia-class program, and the boats are referred to as Columbia-class boats. Terms such as Ohio replacement boat, Ohio replacement program, ORP, and SSBNX will likely continue to be used as well, at least for some time.

Program Origin and Early Milestones
Although the eventual need to replace the Ohio-class SSBNs has been known for many years, the Columbia-class program can be traced more specifically to an exchange of letters in December 2006 between President George W. Bush and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair concerning the UK’s desire to participate in a program to extend the service life of the Trident II D-5 SLBM into the 2040s, and to have its next-generation SSBNs carry D-5s. For more on the Columbia-class program’s origin and early milestones, see Appendix C.

Planned Procurement Quantity and Schedule

Planned Procurement Quantity
Navy plans call for procuring 12 Columbia-class boats to replace the current force of 14 Ohio-class SSBNs. In explaining the planned procurement quantity of 12 boats, the Navy states the following:

- Ten operational SSBNs—meaning boats not encumbered by lengthy maintenance actions—are needed to meet strategic nuclear deterrence requirements for having a certain number of SSBNs at sea at any given moment.
- Fourteen Ohio-class boats are needed to meet this requirement because, during the middle years of the Ohio class life cycle, three and sometimes four of the boats are non-operational at any given moment on account of being in the midst

---

15 In the designation SSBN(X), the (X) meant that the design of the boat had not yet been determined.

While the name Columbia for a U.S. ships and aircraft is not new—at least eight U.S. ships, a Space Shuttle and the Apollo 11 command module have all shared the name—it will be the first time the name has been used to commemorate the U.S. capital, the sources told USNI News. The fleet’s current USS Columbia (SSN-771)—a Los Angeles attack submarine—is named in honor of Columbia, S.C., Columbia, Ill and Columbia, Mo. The submarine is expected to decommission before the first SSBN(X) enters service.

Other ships in the fleet were named after the romantic female personification of the Americas—Columbia.
of lengthy midlife nuclear refueling overhauls or other extended maintenance actions.

- Twelve (rather than 14) Columbia-class boats will be needed to meet the requirement for 10 operational boats because the midlife overhauls of Columbia-class boats, which will not include a nuclear refueling, will require less time (about 2 years) than the midlife refueling overhauls of Ohio-class boats (which require about 4 years from contract award to delivery), the result being that only 2 Columbia-class boats (rather than 3 or sometimes 4) will be in the midst of midlife overhauls or other extended maintenance actions at any given moment during the middle years of the Columbia-class life cycle.

**Planned Procurement Schedule**

**Table 1** shows the Navy’s proposed schedule for procuring 12 Columbia-class boats, and for having Columbia-class boats replace Ohio-class SSBNs. As shown in **Table 1**, under the Navy’s FY2012 budget, the first Columbia-class boat was scheduled to be procured in FY2019, and Columbia-class boats were to enter service on a schedule that would maintain the Navy's SSBN force at 12 boats. The Navy’s FY2013 budget deferred the procurement of the first Columbia-class boat by two years, to FY2021.

As a result of the deferment of the procurement of the lead boat from FY2019 to FY2021, the Navy’s SSBN force will drop to 11 or 10 boats for the period FY2029-FY2041. The Navy states that the reduction to 11 or 10 boats during this period is acceptable in terms of meeting strategic nuclear deterrence requirements, because during these years, all 11 or 10 of the SSBNs in service will be operational (i.e., none of them will be in the midst of a lengthy midlife overhaul). The Navy acknowledges that there is some risk in having the SSBN force drop to 11 or 10 boats, because it provides little margin for absorbing an unforeseen event that might force an SSBN into an unscheduled and lengthy maintenance action. (See also “Planned Procurement Quantity” above.)

The minimum level of 10 boats shown in **Table 1** for the period FY2032-FY2040 can be increased to 11 boats (providing some margin for absorbing an unforeseen event that might force an SSBN into an unscheduled and lengthy maintenance action) by accelerating by about one year the planned procurement dates of boats 2 through 12 in the program. Under this option, the

---

17 Navy budget submissions show that Ohio-class midlife nuclear refueling overhauls have contract-award-to-delivery periods generally ranging from 47 months to 50 months.


19 Source: Navy update briefing on Columbia-class program to CRS and CBO, September 17, 2012. A September 28, 2012, press report similarly quotes Rear Admiral Barry Bruner, the Navy’s director of undersea warfare, as stating that “During this time frame, no major SSBN overhauls are planned, and a force of 10 SSBNs will support current at-sea presence requirements,” and that “This provides a low margin to compensate for unforeseen issues that may result in reduced SSBN availability. The reduced SSBN availability during this time frame reinforces the importance of remaining on schedule with the Columbia-class program to meet future strategic requirements. As the Ohio Replacement ships begin their midlife overhauls in 2049, 12 SSBNs will be required to offset ships conducting planned maintenance.” (Michael Fabey, U.S. Navy Defends Boomer Submarine Replacement Plans,” *Aerospace Daily & Defense Report*, September 28, 2012: 3.)
second boat in the program would be procured in FY2023 rather than FY2024, the third boat in the program would be procured in FY2025 rather than FY2026, and so on. Implementing this option could affect the Navy’s plan for funding the procurement of other Navy shipbuilding programs during the period FY2022-FY2025.

Table 1. Navy Schedule for Procuring Columbia-Class Boats and Replacing Ohio-Class SSBNs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Number of Columbia-class SSBNs procured each year</th>
<th>Cumulative number of Columbia-class SSBNs in service</th>
<th>Ohio-class SSBNs in service</th>
<th>Combined number of Ohio- and Columbia-class SSBNs in service</th>
<th>Number of Columbia-class SSBNs procured each year</th>
<th>Cumulative number of Columbia-class SSBNs in service</th>
<th>Ohio-class SSBNs in service</th>
<th>Combined number of Ohio- and Columbia-class SSBNs in service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2022</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2023</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2024</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2025</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2026</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2027</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2028</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2029</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2030</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2031</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2032</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2033</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2034</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2035</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2036</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2037</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2038</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2039</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2040</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2041</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2042</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Table prepared by CRS based on Navy FY2012-FY2018 budget submissions.
Columbia Class Design

Some Key Design Features

The design of the Columbia class, now being developed (see Figure 2), will reflect the following:

- The Columbia class is to be designed for a 42-year expected service life.\(^{20}\)
- Unlike the Ohio-class design, which requires a midlife nuclear refueling,\(^{21}\) the Columbia class is to be equipped with a life-of-the-ship nuclear fuel core (a nuclear fuel core that is sufficient to power the ship for its entire expected service life).\(^{22}\) Although the Columbia class will not need a midlife nuclear refueling, it will still need a midlife nonrefueling overhaul (i.e., an overhaul that does not include a nuclear refueling) to operate over its full 42-year life.
- The Columbia class is to be equipped with an electric-drive propulsion train, as opposed to the mechanical-drive propulsion train used on other Navy submarines. The electric-drive system is expected to be quieter (i.e., stealthier) than a mechanical-drive system.\(^{23}\)
- The Columbia class is to have SLBM launch tubes that are the same size as those on the Ohio class (i.e., tubes with a diameter of 87 inches and a length sufficient to accommodate a D-5 SLBM).
- The Columbia class will have a beam (i.e., diameter)\(^{24}\) of 43 feet, compared to 42 feet on the Ohio-class design,\(^{25}\) and a length of 560 feet, the same as that of the Ohio-class design.\(^{26}\)
- Instead of 24 SLBM launch tubes, as on the Ohio-class design, the Columbia class is to have 16 SLBM launch tubes. (For further discussion of the decision to equip the boat with 16 tubes rather than 20, see Appendix D.)

---


\(^{21}\) As mentioned earlier (see “Current Ohio-Class SSBNs”), the Ohio-class boats receive a midlife nuclear refueling overhaul, called an Engineered Refueling Overhaul (ERO), which includes both a nuclear refueling and overhaul work on the ship that is not related to the nuclear refueling.

\(^{22}\) U.S. Navy, *Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2011*, February 2010, p. 5. The two most recent classes of SSNs—the Seawolf (SSN-21) and Virginia (SSN-774) class boats—are built with cores that are expected to be sufficient for their entire 33-year expected service lives.


\(^{24}\) Beam is the maximum width of a ship. For Navy submarines, which have cylindrical hulls, beam is the diameter of the hull.


• Although the Columbia class is to have fewer launch tubes than the Ohio-class SSBN, it is to be larger than the Ohio-class SSBN design, with a reported submerged displacement of 20,815 tons (as of August 2014), compared to 18,750 tons for the Ohio-class design.  

• The Navy states that “owing to the unique demands of strategic relevance, [Columbia-class boats] must be fitted with the most up-to-date capabilities and stealth to ensure they are survivable throughout their full 40-year life span.”

Figure 2. Columbia (SSBN-826) Class SSBN
Notional cutaway illustration

In an article published in June 2012, the program manager for the Columbia-class program stated that “the current configuration of the Ohio replacement is an SSBN with 16 87-inch-diameter missile tubes, a 43-foot-diameter hull, electric-drive propulsion, [an] X-stern, accommodations for 155 personnel, and a common submarine radio room tailored to the SSBN mission.”

For a June 26, 2013, Navy blog post discussing options that were examined for replacing the Ohio-class SSBNs, see Appendix E.

Common Missile Compartment (CMC)

Current U.S. and UK plans call for the Columbia class and the UK’s Dreadnought-class SSBN to use a missile compartment—the middle section of the boat with the SLBM launch tubes—of the same general design. As mentioned earlier, Dreadnought-class SSBNs are to each be armed with

---

27 Navy information paper on Columbia-class program dated August 11, 2014, provided to CBO and CRS on August 11, 2014.
29 The term X-stern means that the steering and diving fins at the stern of the ship are, when viewed from the rear, in the diagonal pattern of the letter X, rather than the vertical-and-horizontal pattern of a plus sign (which is referred to as a cruciform stern).
30 The common submarine radio room is a standardized (i.e., common) suite of submarine radio room equipment that is being installed on other U.S. Navy submarines.
32 Statement of Rear Admiral Stephen Johnson, USN, Director, Strategic Systems Programs, Before the Subcommittee (continued...)
eight D-5 SLBMs, or half the number to be carried by the Columbia class. The modular design of the CMC will accommodate this difference.

Since the UK’s first Vanguard-class SSBN was originally projected to reach the end of its service life in 2024—three years before the first Ohio-class SSBN is projected to reach the end of its service life—design work on the CMC began about three years sooner than would have been required to support the Columbia-class program alone. The UK has provided some of the funding for the design of the CMC, including a large portion of the initial funding. Under the October 2010 UK defense and security review report (see Appendix B), the UK now plans to deliver its first Dreadnought class SSBN in 2028, or about four years later than previously planned.

**Program Cost**

**Acquisition Cost**

The Navy as of August 2017 estimated the total procurement cost of the Columbia-class program at $109.2 billion in then-year dollars and the program’s research and development cost at $13.0 billion in then-year dollars, for a total acquisition (research and development plus procurement) cost of $122.3 billion in then-year dollars. The Navy as of January 2017 estimated the procurement cost of the lead ship in the Columbia class at $8.2 billion in constant 2017 dollars, not including several billion dollars in additional cost for plans for the class, and the average...

(...continued)

on Strategic Forces of the Senate Armed Services Committee [on] FY2011 Strategic Systems, March 17, 2010, p. 6, which states: “The OHIO Replacement programs includes the development of a common missile compartment that will support both the OHIO Class Replacement and the successor to the UK Vanguard Class.”

33 A March 2010 Government Accountability office (GAO) report stated:

> According to the Navy, in February 2008, the United States and United Kingdom began a joint effort to design a common missile compartment. This effort includes the participation of government officials from both countries, as well as industry officials from Electric Boat Corporation and BAE Systems. To date, the United Kingdom has provided a larger share of funding for this effort, totaling just over $200 million in fiscal years 2008 and 2009.


A March 2011 GAO report stated:

> The main focus of OR [Ohio Replacement program] research and development to date has been the CMC. The United Kingdom has provided $329 million for this effort since fiscal year 2008. During fiscal years 2009 and 2010, the Navy had allocated about $183 million for the design and prototyping of the missile compartment.


A May 2010 press report stated that “the UK has, to date, funded the vast majority of [the CMC’s] upfront engineering design activity and has established a significant presence in Electric Boat’s Shaw’s Cove CMC design office in New London, CT.” (Sam LaGrone and Richard Scott, “Deterrent Decisions: US and UK Wait on Next Steps for SSBN Replacements,” *Jane’s Navy International*, May 2010, pp. 10-11.)

34 Source: Navy briefing to CRS and CBO on the Columbia-class program, August 1, 2017.

35 The Navy as of February 2015 estimated the procurement cost of the lead boat in the program at $14.5 billion in then-year dollars, including $5.7 billion in detailed design and nonrecurring engineering (DD/NRE) costs for the entire class, and $8.8 billion in construction costs for the ship itself. (It is a traditional budgeting practice for Navy shipbuilding programs to attach the DD/NRE costs for a new class of ships to the procurement cost of the lead ship in the class.) In constant FY2010 dollars, these figures become $10.4 billion, including $4.2 billion in DD/NRE costs and $6.2 billion in construction costs for the ship itself. (Source: Navy information paper dated February 3, 2015, provided to CRS and CBO on February 24, 2015.) See also Statement of the Honorable Sean J. Stackley, Assistant Secretary of (continued...)
unit procurement cost of ships 2 through 12 in the program at $6.5 billion each in constant FY2017 dollars.  

A November 6, 2017, press report states:

The Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine program (SSBN-826) is coming down in cost and staying on schedule despite an early challenge, program officials said last week.

After moving into engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) at the beginning of 2017 and beginning early construction prototyping activities, the SSBN program is proving it can leverage all the tools at its disposal to take cost and schedule out of the Navy’s top acquisition priority.

The program was giving a $8-billion affordability cap, and when the Milestone B decision was made in January to move into EMD, the program was sitting at about $7.3 billion for the average procurement unit cost (APUC) across all 12 planned submarines, Program Executive Officer for Submarines Rear Adm. Michael Jabaley said at the Naval Submarine League’s annual conference.

“Through innovative legislative authority and contracting techniques, we’ve already reduced cost by $80 million per hull, to bring APUC down to $7.21 (billion),” Jabaley said.

“So that was a combination of missile tube continuous production … and advance construction, which is pulling key construction activities to the left. Really the focus of that was to reduce the risk of not delivering on time, but it had an added benefit of savings as well.”...

Jabaley said the Navy still hopes for a few additional authorities, including continuous production for components beyond the missile tubes—but leveraging the existing authorities plus potentially adding a few more creates a situation where “we have the ability to get the APUC below $7 billion. That is a stretch goal, but again, as I said, when you understand that the cost of this program is significant, then we really need to do everything we can to buy margin back into the program both in terms of cost and schedule.”

Jabaley would not elaborate on what other authorities he wanted from Congress, but he told USNI News that “what you always have to balance is the opportunity cost, because nothing comes for free—all of those efforts require investment in the near-term. You have to put money in to pull activities to the left, to smooth the workload at the shipbuilders

(...continued)

the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition) and Vice Admiral Joseph P. Mulloy, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities and Resources and Lieutenant General Kenneth J. Glueck Jr., Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and Integration & Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Before the Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces of the House Armed Services Committee on Department of the Navy Seapower and Projection Forces Capabilities, February 25, 2015, p. 7.)

and the vendors, and you get it back in savings beyond the [five-year Future Years Defense Program], but from a budgetary standpoint that’s money you have to invest and you can’t buy something else, whether it’s another ship, another squadron of airplanes, whatever. So those trades are made all the time, first in the Navy. The work that we do with Congress is to ensure they understand what our intention is, and then if necessary provide the legislative authority to do it.”

A March 2017 GAO report assessing selected major DOD weapon acquisition programs stated that the estimated total acquisition cost of the Columbia-class program is $100,221.9 million (about $100.2 billion) in constant FY2017 dollars, including $12,648.1 million (about $12.6 billion) in research and development costs and $87,426.5 million (about $87.4 billion) in procurement costs.

The above cost figures do not include costs for refurbishing D-5 SLBMs so as to extend their service lives to 2042.

**Operation and Support (O&S) Cost**

The Navy as of January 2017 estimates the average annual operation and support (O&S) cost of each Columbia class boat at $119 million per year.

**National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund**

*Created by P.L. 113-291; Amended by P.L. 114-92*

Section 1022 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (H.R. 3979/P.L. 113-291 of December 19, 2014) created the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund (NSBDF), a fund in the DOD budget, codified at 10 U.S.C. 2218a, that is separate from the Navy’s regular shipbuilding account (which is formally known as the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy, or SCN, appropriation account).


§2218a. National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund

(a) Establishment.—There is established in the Treasury of the United States a fund to be known as the “National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund”.

(b) Administration of Fund.—The Secretary of Defense shall administer the Fund consistent with the provisions of this section.

---


(c) Fund Purposes.-(1) Funds in the Fund shall be available for obligation and expenditure only for construction (including design of vessels), purchase, alteration, and conversion of national sea-based deterrence vessels.

(2) Funds in the Fund may not be used for a purpose or program unless the purpose or program is authorized by law.

(d) Deposits.-There shall be deposited in the Fund all funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for construction (including design of vessels), purchase, alteration, and conversion of national sea-based deterrence vessels.

(e) Expiration of Funds After 5 Years.-No part of an appropriation that is deposited in the Fund pursuant to subsection (d) shall remain available for obligation more than five years after the end of fiscal year for which appropriated except to the extent specifically provided by law.

(f) Authority to Enter Into Economic Order Quantity Contracts.- (1) The Secretary of the Navy may use funds deposited in the Fund to enter into contracts known as “economic order quantity contracts” with private shipyards and other commercial or government entities to achieve economic efficiencies based on production economies for major components or subsystems. The authority under this subsection extends to the procurement of parts, components, and systems (including weapon systems) common with and required for other nuclear powered vessels under joint economic order quantity contracts.

(2) A contract entered into under paragraph (1) shall provide that any obligation of the United States to make a payment under the contract is subject to the availability of appropriations for that purpose, and that total liability to the Government for termination of any contract entered into shall be limited to the total amount of funding obligated at time of termination.

(g) Authority to Begin Manufacturing and Fabrication Efforts Prior to Ship Authorization.- (1) The Secretary of the Navy may use funds deposited into the Fund to enter into contracts for advance construction of national sea-based deterrence vessels to support achieving cost savings through workload management, manufacturing efficiencies, or workforce stability, or to phase fabrication activities within shipyard and manage sub-tier manufacturer capacity.

(2) A contract entered into under paragraph (1) shall provide that any obligation of the United States to make a payment under the contract is subject to the availability of appropriations for that purpose, and that total liability to the Government for termination of any contract entered into shall be limited to the total amount of funding obligated at time of termination.

(h) Authority to Use Incremental Funding to Enter Into Contracts for Certain Items.- (1) The Secretary of the Navy may use funds deposited into the Fund to enter into incrementally funded contracts for advance procurement of high value, long lead time items for nuclear powered vessels to better support construction schedules and achieve cost savings through schedule reductions and properly phased installment payments.

(2) A contract entered into under paragraph (1) shall provide that any obligation of the United States to make a payment under the contract is subject to the availability of appropriations for that purpose, and that total liability to the Government for termination of any contract entered into shall be limited to the total amount of funding obligated at time of termination.

(i) Authority for Multiyear Procurement of Critical Components to Support Continuous Production of the Common Missile Compartment.- (1) To implement the continuous production of the common missile compartment, the Secretary of the Navy may use funds deposited in the Fund, in conjunction with funds appropriated for the procurement of
other nuclear-powered vessels, to enter into one or more multiyear contracts (including economic ordering quantity contracts), for the procurement of critical contractor-furnished and Government-furnished components for the common missile compartments of national sea-based deterrence vessels. The authority under this subsection extends to the procurement of equivalent critical parts, components, systems, and subsystems common with and required for other nuclear-powered vessels.

(2) In each annual budget request submitted to Congress, the Secretary shall clearly identify funds requested for the common missile compartment and the individual ships and programs for which such funds are requested.

(3) Any contract entered into pursuant to paragraph (1) shall provide that any obligation of the United States to make a payment under the contract is subject to the availability of appropriations for that purpose and that the total liability to the Government for the termination of the contract shall be limited to the total amount of funding obligated for the contract as of the date of the termination.

(j) Budget Requests.-Budget requests submitted to Congress for the Fund shall separately identify the amount requested for programs, projects, and activities for construction (including design of vessels), purchase, alteration, and conversion of national sea-based deterrence vessels.

(k) Definitions.-In this section:

(1) The term “Fund” means the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund established by subsection (a).

(2) The term “national sea-based deterrence vessel” means any submersible vessel constructed or purchased after fiscal year 2016 that is owned, operated, or controlled by the Department of Defense and that carries operational intercontinental ballistic missiles.

**Precedents for Funding Navy Acquisition Programs Outside Navy Appropriation Accounts**

Prior to the establishment of the NSBDF, some observers had suggested funding the procurement of Columbia-class boats outside the Navy’s shipbuilding budget, so as to preserve Navy shipbuilding funds for other Navy shipbuilding programs. There was some precedent for such an arrangement:

- Construction of certain DOD sealift ships and Navy auxiliary ships has been funded in past years in the National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF), a part of DOD’s budget that is outside the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) appropriation account, and also outside the procurement title of the DOD appropriations act.

- Most spending for ballistic missile defense (BMD) programs (including procurement-like activities) is funded through the Defense-Wide research and development and procurement accounts rather than through the research and development and procurement accounts of the individual military services.

A rationale for funding DOD sealift ships in the NDSF has been that DOD sealift ships perform a transportation mission that primarily benefits services other than the Navy, and therefore should not be forced to compete for funding in a Navy budget account that funds the procurement of ships central to the Navy’s own missions. A rationale for funding BMD programs together in the Defense-Wide research and development account is that this makes potential tradeoffs in spending among various BMD programs more visible and thereby helps to optimize the use of BMD funding.
In addition, it can be noted that as a reference tool for better understanding DOD spending, DOD includes in its annual budget submission a presentation of the DOD budget reorganized into 11 program areas, of which one is strategic forces. The FY2016 budget submission, for example, shows that about $11.9 billion is requested for strategic forces for FY2016.  

**Potential Implications of NSBDF on Funding Available for Other Programs**

The NSBDF has at least two potential implications for the impact that the Columbia-class program may have on funding available in coming years for other DOD acquisition programs:

- A principal apparent intent in creating the NSBDF is to help preserve funding in coming years for other Navy programs, and particularly Navy shipbuilding programs other than the Columbia-class program, by placing funding for the Columbia-class program in a location within the DOD budget that is separate from the Navy’s shipbuilding account and the Navy’s budget in general. This separation, it might be argued, might encourage observers, in discussing defense budget issues, to consider funding for the Columbia-class program separately from funding for other Navy shipbuilding programs, rather than add the two figures together to create a single sum representing funding for the procurement of all ships. In addition, referring to the fund as a national fund and locating it outside the Navy’s budget might encourage a view (consistent with an argument made by supporters of the Columbia-class program that the program is intended to meet a national military need rather than a Navy-specific need) that funding for the Columbia-class program should be resourced from DOD’s budget as a whole, rather than from the Navy’s budget in particular.

- The authorities in subsections (f), (g), (h), and (i) of 10 U.S.C. 2218a, which were added by P.L. 114-92 and P.L. 114-328, could marginally reduce the procurement costs of not only Columbia-class boats, but also other nuclear-powered ships, such as Virginia-class attack submarines and Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carriers, by increasing economies of scale in the production of ship components and better optimizing ship construction schedules.

An April 22, 2016, press report states the following:

The Navy could cut Ohio Replacement Program (ORP) missile tube acquisition costs by 25 percent if Congress granted a “continuous production” authority that would allow the U.S. and UK ballistic missile submarine replacement programs buy the tubes at a steady pace, according to a recent report obtained by USNI News.

The Navy will further cut costs based on authorities Congress has already granted by looking at common components across ORP, the Virginia-class attack submarine program and the Ford-class aircraft carrier program, according to the Report to Congress on the Ohio Replacement Acquisition Strategy and National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund Accountability, sent to Congress earlier this week by Navy acquisition chief Sean Stackley.

---

40 Department of Defense, *National Defense Budget Estimates For FY 2016*, March 2015, Table 6-4, “Department of Defense TOA by Program,” page 102. See also Table 6-5 on page 102, which presents the same data in constant FY2015 dollars. The other 10 program areas in addition to strategic forces are general purpose forces; C3, intelligence and space; mobility forces; guard and reserve forces; research and development; central supply and management; training, medical and other; administration and associated; support of other nations; and special operations forces. (A 12th category—other—shows relatively small amounts of funding.)
In the report, the Program Executive Office for Submarines was tasked with identifying how authorities already granted by Congress would help save money and time and reduce risk on ORP, and what opportunities there were for further savings if Congress approved further assistance.

The report recommends a new authority called continuous production, which the Navy would apply just to missile tubes and missile tube modules for now. By taking the total amount of work for the U.S. and UK programs and spreading the workload evenly across between now and 2035, the Navy would create “savings through manufacturing efficiencies, increased learning and the retention of critical production skills. In addition to lowering costs, Continuous Production would reduce schedule risk for both the U.S. and UK SSBN construction programs and minimize year-to-year funding spikes,” the report reads....

“Missile Tube Continuous Production could achieve an average reduction of 25 percent in Missile Tube procurement costs across the class” compared to the current acquisition schedule, the report notes, and adds that the Navy will look at other build rates to see if any other scenario produces even further savings....

Funding would be needed earlier under this plan, which would increase the cost of the ORP in the current five-year Future Years Defense Program, but the report states that continuous production “results in significant overall program reductions.”

The report does not include a projected savings total but notes that the ORP’s Milestone B cost estimate, due to the Pentagon’s acquisition chief in August 2016, will reflect the efficiencies outlined in the report.

If granted by Congress, the Navy would look for other opportunities to apply continuous production within nuclear and non-nuclear components in the ORP, Virginia-class and Ford-class programs, according to the report....

The report also outlines the efficiencies the Navy can create through the authorities already granted by Congress in the FY 2015 and 2016 defense bills. The Navy can now enter into economic order quantity (EOQ) contracts, thanks to last year’s defense bill, which “provide substantial cost savings to the Navy from procuring materials and equipment in bulk quantities.

“In addition to the cost savings typically associated with EOQ authority, the Navy has identified an opportunity to implement EOQ procurements to achieve (Ohio Replacement) schedule efficiencies and commonality contract actions with (Virginia-class submarine) Block V and CVN (aircraft carriers),” according to the report.

“Coordinated and cross-platform procurements will optimize production facility utilization, stabilize the nuclear shipbuilding industrial base, and eliminate costly production surges and gaps. … EOQ allows vendors to optimize their raw material purchases, human and capital resources, and establish most efficient manufacturing framework which results in reduced cost and schedule.”

Specifically, this authority allows the Navy to pull some work up in FY 2019 through 2021, buying Virginia-class sub parts ahead of the first ORP in 2021, CVN-81 in 2023 and the second ORP in 2024.41

---

Submarine Unified Build Strategy (SUBS)

The Navy, under a plan it calls the Submarine Unified Build Strategy (SUBS), is proposing to build Columbia-class boats jointly at GD/EB and HII/NNS, with most of the work going to GD/EB. As part of this plan, the Navy is also proposing to adjust the division of work on the Virginia-class attack submarine program (in which boats are jointly built at GD/EB and HII/NNS),\(^{42}\) so that HII/NNS would receive a larger share of the work for that program than it has received in the past. Key elements of the Navy’s proposed plan include the following:

- GD/EB is to be the prime contractor for designing and building Columbia-class boats;
- HII/NNS is to be a subcontractor for designing and building Columbia-class boats;
- GD/EB is to build certain parts of each Columbia-class boat—parts that are more or less analogous to the parts that GD/EB builds for each Virginia-class attack submarine;
- HII/NNS is to build certain other parts of each Columbia-class boat—parts that are more or less analogous to the parts that HII/NNS builds for each Virginia-class attack submarine;
- GD/EB is to perform the final assembly on all 12 Columbia-class boats;
- as a result of the three previous points, the Navy estimates that GD/EB would receive an estimated 77%-78% of the shipyard work building Columbia-class boats, and HII/NNS would receive 22%-23%;
- GD/EB is to continue as prime contractor for the Virginia-class program, but to help balance out projected submarine-construction workloads at GD/EB and HII/NNS, the division of work between the two yards for building Virginia-class boats is to be adjusted so that HII/NNS would perform the final assembly on a greater number of Virginia-class boats than it would have under a continuation of the current Virginia-class division of work (in which final assemblies are divided more or less evenly between the two shipyards); as a consequence, HII/NNS would receive a greater share of the total work in building Virginia-class boats than it would have under a continuation of the current division of work.\(^{43}\)

The Navy described the plan in February 25, 2016, testimony before the Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. At that hearing, Navy officials testified that

In 2014, the Navy led a comprehensive government-Industry assessment of shipbuilder construction capabilities and capacities at GDEB and HII-NNS to formulate the

---

\(^{42}\) For more on the arrangement for jointly building Virginia-class boats, see CRS Report RL32418, *Naval Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress*, by (name redacted).

Submarine Unified Build Strategy (SUBS) for concurrent OR and Virginia class submarine production. This build strategy’s guiding principles are: affordability, delivering OR on time and within budget, maintaining Virginia class performance with a continuous reduction in costs, and maintaining two shipbuilders capable of delivering nuclear-powered submarines. To execute this strategy, GDEB has been selected as the prime contractor for OR with the responsibilities to deliver the twelve OR [Ohio replacement] submarines [i.e., GD/EB will perform final assembly on all 12 boats in the program]. HII-NNS will design and construct major assemblies and OR modules leveraging their expertise with Virginia construction [i.e., HII/NNS will build parts of Ohio replacement boats that are similar to the parts it builds for Virginia-class boats]. Both shipbuilders will continue to deliver [i.e., perform final assembly of] Virginia class submarines throughout the period with GDEB continuing its prime contractor responsibility for the program. Given the priority of the OR Submarine Program, the delivery [i.e., final assembly of] Virginia class submarines will be adjusted with HII-NNS performing additional deliveries. Both shipbuilders have agreed to this build strategy.\textsuperscript{44}

January 2017 Milestone B Approval

On January 4, 2017, DOD gave Milestone B approval to the Columbia-class program. Milestone B approval, which permits a program to enter the engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) phase, is generally considered a major milestone for a defense acquisition program, permitting the program to transition, in effect, from a research and development effort into a procurement program of record. A January 6, 2017, Navy notification to Congress on the Milestone B approval for the Columbia-class program states the following:

On 4 November 2016, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Frank Kendall chaired the Milestone B Defense Acquisition Board, and on 4 January, 2017 signed the acquisition decision memorandum approving COLUMBIA Class program’s Milestone B and designating the program as an Acquisition Category ID major defense acquisition program. Milestone B also establishes the Acquisition Program Baseline against which the program’s performance will be assessed. Additionally, this decision formally authorizes entry into the Engineering and Manufacturing Development Phase of an acquisition program, permitting the transition from preliminary design to detail design, using Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) funds. Cost estimates for this program have been rebaselined from CY2010 dollars to CY2017 dollars in accordance with DoDI 5000.02, Rev p, dated 7 January 2015.

The MS B Navy Cost Estimate for Average Follow Ship End Cost (hulls 2-12) in 2010$ using specific shipbuilding indices is $5.0 billion, a $600 million reduction from the MS A estimate, which nearly achieves the affordability target of $4.9 billion set at MS A. To continue cost control, the Navy will focus on:

- Stable operational and technical requirements
- High design maturity at construction start
- Detailed plans to ensure manufacturing readiness including robust prototyping efforts and synergies with other nuclear shipbuilding programs

\textsuperscript{44} Statement of the Honorable Sean J. Stackley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition), and Vice Admiral Joseph P. Mulloy, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities and Resources, and Lieutenant General Robert S. Walsh, Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and Integration & Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, before the Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces of the House Armed Services Committee on Department of the Navy Seapower and Projection Forces Capabilities, February 25, 2016, p. 12.
• Aggressive cost reduction actions

Affordability caps have been assigned that are consistent with current cost estimates and reasonable margins for cost growth. Relative to Milestone A, these estimates have been updated to adjust Base Year from 2010 to 2017, a standard practice to match Base Year with the year of Milestone B approval. The MS A unit cost affordability target ($4.9 billion in CY2010$ using Navy indices) used a unique metric, “Average Follow-on Ship End Cost,” which accounted for hulls 2-12. From Milestone B forward, the affordability cap for the unit cost will be measured by using the Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC), which includes all 12 hulls. The Affordability Cap of $8.0 billion in CY2017$ is based upon the approved APUC estimate of $7.3 billion plus 10%....

The Navy and industry are currently negotiating the detail design and construction (DD&C) contract, which is expected to award in early 2017. With negotiations continuing on the DD&C contract, the Navy has ensured the COLUMBIA Program design effort will continue without interruption. The Navy issued a contract modification to allow execution of SCN for detail design on the existing R&D contract. With this modification in place, detail design efforts that had initially planned to transition to the DD&C contract, will continue on the current R&D contract to ensure continued design progress. With the Milestone B approval and the appropriation of $773M in FY17 SCN under the second Continuing Resolution, funding is now available to execute detail design. In accordance with 10 U.S.C. §2218a and the FY17 National Defense Authorization Act, the Navy deposited the FY17 SCN into the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund (NSBDF). The first installment of funding will be executed on the existing R&D contract, which allows transition into detail design and continued design progress until the award of the DD&C contract.45

Columbia-Class Program Funding

Table 2 shows funding for the Columbia-class program. The table shows U.S. funding only; it does not include funding provided by the UK to help pay for the design of the CMC. The $773.1 million advance procurement (AP) funding shown for FY2017 was the first increment of procurement funding for the program.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY17 (req.)</th>
<th>FY18</th>
<th>FY19 (proj.)</th>
<th>FY20 (proj.)</th>
<th>FY21 (proj.)</th>
<th>FY22 (proj.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Research and development (R&amp;D) funding PE0603570N/Project 3219</td>
<td>390.3</td>
<td>265.5</td>
<td>190.1</td>
<td>114.0</td>
<td>80.1</td>
<td>60.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>700.8</td>
<td>776.2</td>
<td>514.5</td>
<td>447.4</td>
<td>326.0</td>
<td>208.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal R&amp;D funding</td>
<td>1,091.1</td>
<td>1,041.7</td>
<td>704.6</td>
<td>561.4</td>
<td>406.1</td>
<td>268.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement funding</td>
<td>773.1</td>
<td>842.9</td>
<td>3,024.2</td>
<td>1,473.9</td>
<td>4,237.9</td>
<td>4,260.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,864.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,884.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,728.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,035.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,643.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,529.4</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Navy FY2018 budget submission and an August 1, 2017, Navy briefing to CRS and CBO on the Columbia-class program.

Notes: PE means Program Element, that is, a research and development line item. A Program Element may include several projects. PE0603570N/Project 3219 is the SSBN(X) reactor plant project within the PE for Advanced Nuclear Power Systems. PE0603561N/Project 3220 is the Sea-Based Strategic Deterrent (SBSD) Advanced Submarine System Development project within the PE for Ohio Replacement. Procurement funding shown in FY2017 through FY2020 is advance procurement (AP) funding for the first Columbia-class boat, which is scheduled to be procured in FY2021. In addition to the figures shown in the table, the Navy’s FY2018 budget submission also projects a FY2019 request for $71.9 million in military construction (MilCon) funding for a submarine propulsor manufacturing support facility.

Issues for Congress

FY2018 Funding Request

One issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s FY2018 funding request for the program. In assessing this question, Congress may consider whether the Navy has accurately priced the work that is proposed to be done with FY2018 funding, as well as broader issues, including those discussed in some of the sections below.

Impact of CR on Execution of FY2018 Funding

Another potential issue for Congress concerns the impact of using a continuing resolution (CR) to fund DOD for the first few months of FY2018. Division D of the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2018 and Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Requirements Act, 2017 (H.R. 601/P.L. 115-56 of September 8, 2017) is the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2018, a CR that funds government operations through December 8, 2017. Consistent with CRs that have funded DOD operations for parts of prior fiscal years, DOD funding under this CR is based on funding levels in the previous year’s DOD appropriations act—in this case, the FY2017 DOD Appropriations Act (Division C of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 [H.R. 244/P.L. 115-31 of May 5, 2017]). Also consistent with CRs that have funded DOD operations for parts of prior fiscal years, this CR prohibits new starts, year-to-year quantity increases, and the initiation of multiyear procurements utilizing advance procurement funding for economic order quantity (EOQ) procurement unless specifically appropriated later. Division D of H.R. 601/P.L. 115-56 of September 8, 2017, does not include any anomalies for Department of the Navy acquisition programs.

A Navy point paper on the potential effects of a CR on FY2018 Department of the Navy programs states in part (emphasis added):

> The following contacts are scheduled to be awarded in Q1 FY18 [the first quarter of FY2018] and would be impacted by a 3 month CR without legislative relief. OMB has already said they are not accepting any requests for legislative relief. Accordingly, these programs will be delayed.

- Columbia Class AP [work funded with advance procurement funding] $843M (Oct. 2017)

---

46 For an overview discussion of the impact of the CR on FY2018 DOD acquisition programs, including Navy shipbuilding programs, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted). See also CRS In Focus IF10734, FY2018 Defense Spending Under an Interim Continuing Resolution, by (name redacted).

47 Anomalies are special provisions within a CR that exempt individual programs or groups of programs from the general provisions of the CR.
- VA Class submarine AP $1,921M (Oct. 2017)
- CMV-22 (Nov. 2017)
- JLTV (Dec. 2017)
- KC-130J (Dec. 2017)
- Trident Missile subsystems (Nov. 2017)
- RAM (Dec. 2017)
- Griffin (Dec. 2017)
- ESSM (Dec. 2017)
- Hellfire Missiles (Dec. 2017)48

An August 3, 2017, table of CR impacts to FY2018 DOD programs that was reportedly sent by DOD to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in August 2017 states that the CR will impact the execution of about $69.8 million in Columbia-class advance procurement (AP) funding (within a total of about $842.9 million of such funding), starting on October 1, 2017.49 A delay in awarding the contract for the Columbia-class program could affect the issue of schedule risk for the program that is discussed in the next section.

Cost, Schedule, and Technical Risk

Another potential issue for Congress concerns cost, schedule, and technical risk in the Columbia-class program.

Cost Risk

Overview

The accuracy of the Navy’s estimate is a key consideration in assessing the potential affordability of the Columbia-class program, including its potential impact on the Navy’s ability to procure other kinds of ships during the years of Columbia-class procurement. Some of the Navy’s ship designs in recent years, such as the Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier,50 the San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship,51 and the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS),52 have proven to

---

48 Navy point paper entitled “FY 2018 Continuing Resolution (CR) Impacts and Anomalies,” provided to CRS and CBO by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs on September 12, 2017.

49 Table entitled “Production Increases,” dated August 3, 2017, posted September 11, 2017, at InsideDefense.com (subscription required). InsideDefense.com states the following about the table: “In August 2017, the Defense Department sent the White House Office of Management and Budget a detailed list of acquisition program priorities it had hoped to fund at the beginning of fiscal year 2018 in the event Congress passed a stopgap budget measure restricting spending levels and prohibiting new programs. Includes the list of prioritized weapon production increases, a list of approximately 75 significant new-start programs that would be unable to begin in the event of a continuing resolution as well as a ‘list of anomalies OMB submitted for the FY-18 CR’ provided by a DOD spokesman to Inside Defense.” (“DOD’s Consolidated Anomaly List for OMB,” InsideDefense.com, September 11, 2017.)

50 For more on the CVN-78 program, see CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).

51 For more on the LPD-17 program, see CRS Report RL34476, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by (name redacted).

52 For more on the LCS program, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).
be substantially more expensive to build than the Navy originally estimated. An October 2015 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report on the cost of the Navy’s shipbuilding programs states that the Navy in recent years has underestimated the cost of lead ships in new classes by a weighted average of 27%.\textsuperscript{53}

The accuracy of the Navy’s procurement cost estimate for the Columbia-class program can be assessed in part by examining known procurement costs for other recent Navy submarines—including Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarines (which are currently being procured), Seawolf (SSN-21) class attack submarines (which were procured prior to the Virginia class), and Ohio (SSBN-726) class ballistic missile submarines—and then adjusting these costs for the Columbia-class program so as to account for factors such as differences in ship displacement and design features, changes over time in submarine technologies (which can either increase or reduce a ship’s procurement cost, depending on the exact technologies in question), advances in design for producibility (i.e., design features that are intended to make ships easier to build), advances in shipyard production processes (such as modular construction), and changes in submarine production economies of scale (i.e., changes in the total number of attack submarines and ballistic missile submarines under construction at any one time).

The Navy’s estimated unit procurement cost for the program at any given point will reflect assumptions on, among other things, the division of work between GD/EB and HII/NNS in building the boats, and how much Virginia-class construction will be taking place in the years when Columbia-class boats are being built. If shipbuilding affordability pressures result in Virginia-class boats being removed from the 30-year shipbuilding plan during the years of Columbia-class procurement, the resulting reduction in submarine production economies of scale could make Columbia-class boats more expensive to build than the Navy estimates.

\textbf{Navy Confidence Levels for Its Cost Estimates}

A January 24, 2017, Navy information paper provided to CRS and CBO in March 2017 stated that the Navy assigned a confidence level of 43% to its estimated procurement cost for the lead ship in the Columbia class and a confidence level of 46% to its estimated average procurement cost for ships 2 through 12 in program. What this means is that the Navy had calculated that there was more than a 50% chance that the procurement costs of Columbia-class boats will turn out to be greater than what the Navy currently estimates. (The Navy’s costs estimates are shown earlier in this report—see the section entitled “Acquisition Cost.”) The January 24, 2017, Navy information paper stated the following:

\begin{quote}
The confidence levels associated with the Milestone B Lead Ship End Cost (Less Plans) and Average Follow Ship End Cost estimate are approximately 43 percent and 46 percent respectively. The risk analysis was performed on 54 parameters influencing shipbuilder labor and material, changes, plans, and government furnished equipment costs.\textsuperscript{54}
\end{quote}

A December 1, 2017, Navy information paper provided the confidence levels for Columbia class unit procurement costs shown in Table 3.

\textsuperscript{53} Congressional Budget Office, \textit{An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2016 Shipbuilding Plan}, October 2015, p. 30 (Figure 10).

\textsuperscript{54} Navy information paper, “Confidence Level of Milestone B Cost Estimate,” January 24, 2017, received by CRS and CBO from Navy Legislative Affairs Office, March 1, 2017.
Table 3. Navy Confidence Levels for Estimated Columbia-Class Unit Procurement Costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Confidence level decile</th>
<th>End cost of lead ship</th>
<th>Average end cost of ships 2-12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30%</td>
<td>$7.8</td>
<td>$6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40%</td>
<td>$8.1</td>
<td>$6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50%</td>
<td>$8.3</td>
<td>$6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60%</td>
<td>$8.6</td>
<td>$6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70%</td>
<td>$8.9</td>
<td>$7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80%</td>
<td>$9.2</td>
<td>$7.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Navy information paper dated December 1, 2017, provided by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs to CRS and CBO on December 22, 2017.

Notes: End cost of lead ship includes cost for the ship’s missile tube module, which was funded through the Navy’s research and development account.

A December 2017 GAO report stated:

**Columbia Class Is Not Funded Adequately to Address Program Risks**

Our analysis determined that it is more likely than not that the Columbia class program will exceed the Navy’s $128 billion (then-year dollars) estimate of total acquisition cost to which the program will be funded. Specifically, the program’s 2017 Milestone B cost estimates are optimistic because they do not account for a sufficient amount of program risk due to ongoing technology development, as well as the likely costs to design and construct the submarines. In addition, the Navy has budgeted the program to a confidence level for the program that is lower than what experts recommend, with a particularly optimistic estimate for the lead ship. While there may be situations when this would be appropriate, this is not the case for the Columbia class program due to the technical and design risks that we identified above. As a result, program costs will more likely than not exceed requested funding, particularly for lead ship construction. Due to the significant level of funding required for this program, even a small percentage of cost growth could have far-reaching consequences on the Navy’s long-range plans to fund construction of its future fleet. For this review we conducted an initial analysis of the Navy’s cost estimate but did not assess if it was conducted in accordance with all of the best practices identified in our cost estimating guide. We plan to more fully assess the Navy’s life-cycle cost estimate for the entire Columbia class, including the program’s risk analyses, in future work.

**Confidence Levels and the Navy’s Estimate**

From early on, the Navy recognized the need to control costs for the Columbia class. In fact, the program’s cost estimates have decreased significantly since the program’s inception due to Navy decisions early in the program to trade off some capabilities and the incorporation of updated actual cost data from the continued procurement of Virginia class submarines. At Milestone B, OSD determined that Columbia class procurement costs had fallen almost 40 percent since the program’s original estimate. However, while the Navy did conduct a risk analysis for its recent Columbia class cost estimates, the confidence level of the Navy’s estimate at Milestone B for acquisition of the entire class is 45 percent. This means that it is more likely than not that actual costs to research, develop, and buy the submarines will exceed the Navy’s $128 billion estimate.
This situation is particularly apparent at this point with regard to costs to design the class and build the lead submarine. Any difficulties in ongoing technology development efforts would likely worsen the picture. At Milestone B, the Navy’s point estimate to develop the technologies, design the class, and build the lead Columbia was at a 43 percent confidence level.

Experts agree that programs should be budgeted to at least the 50 percent confidence level, but budgeting to a higher level (e.g., 70 to 80 percent, or the mean) is a common practice to cover increased costs resulting from unexpected design complexity and technology uncertainty, among other things. Navy cost guidance recommends using the “risk adjusted mean” for the cost for the program, which usually lies between 50 and 60 percent. If the Navy budgeted to an estimate at a higher confidence level like the risk adjusted mean, its Milestone B point estimates—meaning the selected estimate of cost—would be higher, reducing the probability of overruns occurring. According to Navy cost analysts, the program’s total acquisition cost, which the Navy estimated at Milestone B at $128 billion (then-year dollars), would exceed $131 billion (then-year dollars) at 50 percent confidence, which is the bottom range of the risk adjusted mean confidence level.

Cost Growth Potential Based on the Navy’s Estimate

Even if the Navy budgeted to the 90 percent—a “worst-case” scenario where significant programmatic challenges are realized and the probability of cost overruns is low—confidence level, Columbia class lead ship costs would not be dissimilar to cost outcomes on other lead ship programs. We have observed in prior work that cost growth for recent lead ships across the Navy’s shipbuilding portfolio is 28 percent on average. For example, the Navy’s lead Virginia class submarines (SSN 774 and SSN 775)—the most similar class to Columbia in terms of technology and component development as well as aspects of its design and build plans—experienced 15 and 24 percent budget growth respectively, with average cost growth of 28 percent for the three most recent lead submarines.

The 28 percent cost growth we have observed is slightly more than the 22 percent cost increase between the Navy’s point estimate and the 90 percent confidence level, meaning that even if the Navy budgeted the program to the 90 percent confidence level there would still be historical shipbuilding precedence for further cost growth. In particular, if costs to build the lead Columbia class submarine grow similar to the lead Seawolf and Virginia class submarines, the cost to construct the submarine would exceed the Navy’s Milestone B estimate by more than $2.5 billion. This would represent a total approaching $12 billion (then-year dollars) versus the current estimate of $9.2 billion for the lead submarine. Due to the magnitude of the Columbia class program’s expected cost, any cost growth, including for design and construction of the lead ship could impact the availability of funds for other Navy priorities.

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and CAPE also analyzed Columbia class program costs. CBO predicted higher costs than the Navy estimate. In its 2017 assessment of the Navy’s long-term shipbuilding plans, CBO concluded that the Navy underestimated the cost of the total Columbia class procurement by $8 billion (2017 dollars). [see next section on the February 2017 CBO report]

CAPE estimated a lower cost, but also identified areas where reliable cost data were unavailable. The independent cost estimate prepared by CAPE in support of the program’s Milestone B reflects a 3 percent lower total program life-cycle cost (2017 dollars) than the Navy estimate. In setting the program baseline in January 2017, DOD pragmatically opted to use the Navy’s higher estimate ($7.3 billion) instead of CAPE’s $7 billion estimate for the average unit cost to procure a Columbia class submarine (calendar year 2017 dollars). According to CAPE officials, this difference in estimates is largely due to CAPE incorporating more recent Virginia class actual cost data into its estimate than the Navy. However, CAPE also identified that there is a lack of reliable
cost data on some contractor-furnished materials and government furnished equipment (GFE) for the Columbia class program, which limited the quality of the estimate. GFE comprises critical areas of the Columbia class submarine, including the strategic weapon system managed by Strategic Systems Program and the IPS developed by Naval Reactors.55

**February 2017 CBO Report**

The February 2017 CBO report on the cost of the Navy’s shipbuilding programs stated the following:

The design, cost, and capabilities of the 12 Columbia class submarines included in the 2017 shipbuilding plan are among the most significant uncertainties in the Navy’s and CBO’s analyses of the cost of shipbuilding in the future....

The Navy currently estimates that the first Columbia will cost $12.2 billion in 2016 dollars and that the subsequent ships will have an average cost of $5.9 billion. (The Navy has stated that it aims to reduce that cost to $5.7 billion.) The implied total cost for the 12 submarines is $77 billion, or an average cost of $6.4 billion for each ship.... The Navy estimates that research and development costs will amount to $13 billion, bringing the total acquisition cost to $90 billion....

According to the Navy’s estimate, the cost per thousand tons for the first Columbia will be 17 percent less than that of the first Virginia class attack submarine—an improvement that would affect costs for the entire new class of ballistic missile submarines. The Navy anticipates lower costs by weight for the Columbia because it plans to recycle, to the extent possible, the design, technology, and components used for the Virginia class. Furthermore, because ballistic missile submarines (such as the Columbia class) tend to be larger and less densely built ships than attack submarines (like the Virginia class), they will be easier to build and thus less expensive per thousand tons, the Navy asserts. The Navy has stated, however, that there is a greater than 50 percent probability that the cost of the first Columbia and of subsequent ships of the class will exceed its estimates.

The costs of lead ships of new classes of submarines built in the 1970s and 1980s provide little evidence that ballistic missile submarines are cheaper by weight to build than attack submarines.... The first Ohio class submarine was more expensive to build than the lead ships of the two classes of attack submarines built during the same period—the Los Angeles and the Improved Los Angeles. (The design of the Improved Los Angeles included the addition of 12 vertical-launch system cells.) In addition, the average cost-to-weight ratio of the first 12 or 13 ships of the class was virtually identical for the Ohio, Los Angeles, and Improved Los Angeles classes. By the 1990s, although the cost by weight of lead ships for submarines had grown substantially, there was still little evidence that size makes a difference in the cost per thousand tons of submarines. The first Virginia class submarine, which was ordered in 1998, cost about the same by weight as the first Seawolf submarine even though the Seawolf is 20 percent larger and was built nine years earlier.

Using data from the Virginia class submarine program, CBO estimates that the first Columbia class submarine will cost $13.3 billion in 2016 dollars. (The Navy estimates that it will cost $12.2 billion.) Estimating the cost of the lead ship of a class with a new design is particularly difficult because of uncertainty about how much the Navy will spend on nonrecurring engineering and detailed design. CBO estimates that, all told, 12 Columbia class submarines would cost $87 billion, or an average of $7.3 billion each—

$0.9 billion more per submarine than the Navy estimates. That average is based on the $13.3 billion estimated cost of the lead submarine and an average cost of $6.7 billion estimated for the 2nd through 12th submarines. Research and development will cost between $13 billion and $17 billion, CBO estimates, for a total program cost of $100 billion to $104 billion.

Overall, the Navy expects a 19 percent improvement in the cost-to-weight ratio of the Columbia class compared with the first 12 submarines in the Virginia class. Given the history of submarine construction, however, CBO is less optimistic than the Navy. It estimates that the Navy will realize an 8 percent improvement, stemming in part from the projected savings attributable to the concurrent production of the Columbia and Virginia class submarines.

The costs for the Columbia class submarines could be lower than the Navy and CBO project, depending on the acquisition strategy. The savings could be considerable if, for example, lawmakers authorized the Navy to use a block-buy strategy—an approach that it has used with other types of ships—to purchase a group of submarines over a specified period (effectively lowering the price of the ships by promising a steady stream of work for the shipyard) and allowed the service to purchase components and materials for the submarines in optimal amounts that minimize costs (known as economic order quantities). However, some benefits of a block-buy strategy are already incorporated into the Navy’s and CBO’s estimates because they are based in part on the costs of the Virginia class, the first few ships of which the Navy purchased using a block-buy strategy. Similarly, if the Congress funded the purchase of the Columbia class submarines through the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund, which was established in the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, the Navy could potentially save several hundred million dollars per submarine by purchasing components and materials for several submarines, and possibly for other ships, at the same time. One disadvantage of such an acquisition strategy is that if lawmakers later decided not to build all the submarines for which the Navy purchased materials, the materials that were to be used for them might go unused. A second disadvantage is that under a block-buy strategy, if the Congress did not approve of how the program was progressing, it might have less flexibility to change procurement plans or to purchase fewer submarines.

Costs for the Columbia class submarines could, however, exceed both the Navy’s and CBO’s estimates. The new SSBN will be the largest submarine that the United States has ever built. It will reuse technology and components from the Virginia class submarine, but it will also include many new elements, such as a new missile compartment and a nuclear reactor designed to last the entire 42-year service life of the submarine.

The February 2017 CBO report also states the following:

On January 4, 2017, the Department of Defense (DoD) approved the Columbia class ballistic missile submarine for production. Specifically, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition signed the acquisition decision memorandum (ADM) that launched the program into engineering and manufacturing development—known as Milestone B in DoD’s complex acquisition process. That development is notable for several reasons, but the ADM is particularly significant because it included an updated cost estimate for the 12-ship program. Although the new ADM estimate appears to be significantly higher than the costs estimated in the Navy’s 2017 shipbuilding plan, the Navy states that the real (inflation-adjusted) costs in the ADM are actually similar. The Congressional Budget Office did not include the new ADM estimates in presenting the Navy’s estimates of the

---

2017 plan because detailed information is not yet available; the updated estimates in the ADM would not affect CBO’s projections of the costs of the plan.

In the ADM, the Navy estimates that the 12 submarines will cost an average of $7.1 billion each in 2017 dollars ($7.3 billion including outfitting and postdelivery costs). To compare that estimate with those in the Navy’s 2017 shipbuilding plan, CBO adjusted the amounts to 2016 dollars to match the dollars reported in that plan. The result is that the average cost per vessel for the 12-ship program under the Navy’s new estimate—excluding outfitting and postdelivery costs—would be $6.8 billion in 2016 dollars... That amount is about $400 million more than what the Navy reported in its 2017 shipbuilding plan and closer to CBO’s estimates of $7.3 billion.

According to the information about DoD’s new Milestone B cost estimate that is available to CBO, most of the difference between the Navy’s estimates should not be interpreted as a change in the underlying cost of the program; rather, it is the result of the two different methods that the Navy used to convert its constant-dollar estimates for the Columbia class program from the 2010 dollars in which they were expressed at Milestone A into 2016 dollars for the 2017 shipbuilding plan and 2017 dollars for the estimates in the ADM. The Navy used an inflation index based specifically on the Columbia class program to adjust its estimates for the ADM, whereas it had used the broader naval shipbuilding cost index discussed in Box 2 to prepare its estimates for the 2017 shipbuilding plan. The Navy’s method for preparing the estimates in the ADM accounts for the fact that inflation in the submarine shipbuilding industry has been greater than gross domestic product price inflation. It is similar to the method that CBO used throughout its analysis..., and explains why the Navy’s estimate in the ADM is much closer to CBO’s estimate for the Columbia class than its estimate in the 2017 shipbuilding plan.

In addition, the Navy’s estimate in the ADM is higher than its estimate in the 2017 shipbuilding plan for another reason: The ADM represents the Navy’s most current estimate of the costs of the submarines, whereas for the 2017 shipbuilding plan, the Navy based its estimates on its cost target for the ships, which is lower.

The ADM also includes an “affordability cap” of $8.0 billion per ship, essentially allowing for the possibility of cost growth of as much as 10 percent above the Navy’s estimate of $7.3 billion. According to Navy officials, all major acquisition programs at Milestone B must include an affordability cap or growth margin. If a program’s costs exceed its cap, DoD will review the program to determine whether major changes or other corrective actions are needed.57

Schedule and Technical Risk

Navy’s Schedule Has Limited Slack

The Navy’s schedule for designing, building, and testing the lead Columbia-class boat, and making it ready for its scheduled first deterrent patrol in 2031, currently includes limited slack between now and 2031 for absorbing delays due to things such as funding issues caused by CRs or lapses in appropriations, or problems in developing and testing new technologies intended for the Columbia class (such as its electric-drive propulsion system). The Navy is currently working to make the Columbia-class program’s schedule more resilient in terms of being able to absorb

---

57 Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2017 Shipbuilding Plan, February 2017, p. 26 (Box 3).
delays without jeopardizing the 2031 deadline for having the lead boat in the class be ready for the first deterrent patrol. A November 1, 2016, press report states the following:

The Program Executive Office for Submarines is working to create schedule and cost efficiencies on the Ohio Replacement (Columbia class) Program to counteract inevitable delays during construction, he said last week.

Rear Adm. Michael Jabaley said at the Naval Submarine League’s annual symposium that the first ship in the Navy’s most important acquisition program absolutely had to deliver on time—even though previous delays during early design work complicated that task.

“The biggest problem we have is there is no margin between the decommissioning of Ohios and the delivery of Ohio Replacements. And anyone who has been involved in shipbuilding knows that there will be unknowns that pop up and cause delays to the schedule,” he said.

“So my job is to try to buy margin back into that schedule so that when the inevitable unknown presents itself it’s not a fatal collision within the construction plan. So to buy that margin back into the schedule, we’re looking at targeted elements of the ship where we can accelerate construction through the use of advance procurement funding or advance construction authority to start those parts earlier and de-risk that schedule.”

PEO Subs is working with Congress to get needed contracting authorities and advance procurement and advance construction funding, and Jabaley said that effort will ultimately “provide a significant benefit for schedule de-risking.”

To reduce the risk of the program from a cost standpoint, Jabaley said the Ohio Replacement and Virginia-class attack submarine program officials—as well as nuclear-powered aircraft carrier personnel in some cases, and the prime contractors and vendor base that support all three ship programs—are working together to align material purchases and construction schedules.

On materials, Jabaley said “we the government have to get the volume discount that should accrue by combined purchasing of all the things you’re going to need for the two different classes of submarines, and here’s where the carrier comes in because a lot of the components are similar or identical on the carrier when you get to the nuclear power plant, nuclear shipbuilding concerns. … That’s a volume discount price that we need to take advantage of. In order to do that, we have to reinforce with our vendor base that this mountain of work is facing them as well and that they need to ensure that their quality, their cost and their capacity is ready to accomplish that.”

The admiral noted that PEO Subs has conducted an analysis of the top 25 suppliers to the submarine programs and is working with them to make sure they are ready to execute an increased workload and provide fair volume discounts. Within the government, Jabaley said the program offices are working to ensure that requirements are written such that the SSBNs, SSNs and nuclear carriers can all share parts such as chilled water pumps. This type of multi-program procurement would require special contracting authority that the Navy will brief lawmakers on and seek approval in the next year or two, Jabaley said.

As the Ohio Replacement Program moves towards construction—and as the Virginia subs become larger and more complex with the addition of the Virginia Payload Module and acoustic superiority design changes, the Navy is working closely with builders General Dynamics Electric Boat and Newport News Shipbuilding to finalize plans for facility expansions, manpower and training plans, and simulations of how components
for two or three ship classes will move through the yards without conflicting with each other.\textsuperscript{58}

\textbf{December 2017 GAO Report}

A December 2017 GAO report on the Columbia-class program stated:

Additional development and testing are required to demonstrate the maturity of several Columbia class submarine technologies that are critical to performance, including the Integrated Power System, nuclear reactor, common missile compartment, and propulsor and related coordinated stern technologies (see figure). As a result, it is unknown at this point whether they will work as expected, be delayed, or cost more than planned. Any unexpected delays could postpone the deployment of the lead submarine past the 2031 deadline.

Further, the Navy underrepresented the program’s technology risks in its 2015 Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA) when it did not identify these technologies as critical. Development of these technologies is key to meeting cost, schedule, and performance requirements. A reliable TRA serves as the basis for realistic discussions on how to mitigate risks as programs move forward from the early stages of technology development. Not identifying these technologies as critical means Congress may not have had the full picture of the technology risks and their potential effect on cost, schedule, and performance goals as increasing financial commitments were made. The Navy is not required to provide Congress with an update on the program’s progress, including its technology development efforts, until fiscal year 2020—when $8.7 billion for lead ship construction will have already been authorized. Periodic reporting on technology development efforts in the interim could provide decision makers assurances about the remaining technical risks as the Navy asks for increasing levels of funding....

Consistent with GAO’s identified best practices, the Navy intends to complete much of the submarine’s overall design prior to starting construction to reduce the risk of cost and schedule growth. However, the Navy recently awarded a contract for detail design while critical technologies remain unproven—a practice not in line with best practices that has led to cost growth and schedule delays on other programs. Proceeding into detail design and construction with immature technologies can lead to design instability and cause construction delays. The Navy plans to accelerate construction of the lead submarine to compensate for an aggressive schedule, which may lead to future delays if the technologies are not fully mature before construction starts, planned for 2021.\textsuperscript{59}

A December 21, 2017, Navy point paper responding to the GAO report stated:

\textbf{Background:} The report is a review of the Navy’s Technology Readiness Assessment, Technology Development Plan, and the status of key prototyping efforts for COLUMBIA, and compared efforts with GAO’s best practices for shipbuilding programs and technology readiness assessments. GAO submitted a draft report on 1 November 2017 for DoD/Navy comment. In the report GAO contends that the COLUMBIA Class program technologies are immature based on the GAO guidelines of Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 7 at Milestone B (MS B). The Assistant Secretary of Defense letter dated 1 December 2017 responded to the report disagreeing with the GAO findings.


Discussion:

Department of Defense (DoD) programs are required to meet Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 6 (system/subsystem model or prototype demonstration in a relevant environment) while the GAO’s “best practices” recommends TRL 7 (system prototype near or at the planned operational system demonstrated in an operational environment). The COLUMBIA program complied with all Navy, DoD, and statutory requirements for conducting its 2015 Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA) to TRL 6 and achieved Milestone B in January 2017.

GAO’s draft report identified additional efforts which they considered Critical Technology Elements (CTE); Integrated Power System (IPS), Propulsor / Coordinated Stern, nuclear reactor, and Common Missile Compartment. These components are engineering and integration efforts, rather than technology maturity efforts and labeling them as critical technologies would have been contrary to DoD guidance. In the 2015 TRA, the Navy identified two critical technologies that were not yet at TRL 6, consistent with statutory requirements and DoD policy. Those two CTEs were the Stern Area System (SAS) and a carbon dioxide removal system. The Navy received a waiver at MS B for the SAS. The carbon dioxide removal system had matured to TRL 6 prior to MS B.

GAO also contends that immature COLUMBIA technologies will present risks to achieving the program cost, schedule, and performance goals. The COLUMBIA Class Submarine Program is well positioned to provide needed capability at an affordable price on the timeline needed to meet national strategic deterrent requirements. The Navy’s management attention is focused on four main areas: stable operational and technical requirements, high design maturity at construction start, detailed plans to ensure manufacturing readiness including robust prototyping efforts, and aggressive cost reduction actions. The Navy continues to actively manage all COLUMBIA program cost, schedule, and performance goals including engineering and integration risks and routinely briefs Navy/DoD leadership, and Congress to ensure risks are transparent and fully understood.60

March 2017 GAO Report

A March 2017 GAO report assessing selected major DOD weapon acquisition programs stated the following regarding the Columbia-class program:

Technology Maturity

The Columbia Class program’s most recent Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA) identifies only two critical technologies—one carbon dioxide removal system and one major technical feature of the stern. The Navy has subsequently determined the carbon dioxide removal system is no longer a critical technology based on testing in a relevant environment. Only the stern feature remains as a critical technology, and the Navy does not expect to start detail design for this technology until fiscal year 2018. According to DOD’s guidance for conducting TRAs, a technology is critical if it may pose major technological risk during development, particularly during the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase of acquisition. Prior to starting EMD, the program obtained a waiver as required by statute in order to proceed with technology that has not been demonstrated in a relevant environment. As a result, the program will continue technology development activities concurrent with detail design-this strategy is inconsistent with best practices.

60 Navy information paper dated December 21, 2017, provided by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs (NOLA) to CRS and CBO on December 22, 2017. NOLA confirmed in an email to CRS on January 10, 2018, that the information paper could be reprinted in this CRS report.
Design Maturity

The Navy plans to include up to 70 percent of Virginia Class submarine parts and components in the Columbia Class design. It is also designing the Columbia Class to accommodate the existing Trident II D-5 strategic weapon system, and has already completed design work for the first article quad pack of missile tubes. The program is relying on a new three dimensional (3-D) computer model design tool, which it anticipates will produce electronic instructions in support of fabrication and assembly activities. In 2016, the design shipbuilder experienced a delay in issuing early design products due to problems with this software. According to the design shipbuilder, it has largely resolved the issue and is working to recover schedule. The program aims to complete 83 percent of the 3-D design model prior to the start of lead ship construction in fiscal year 2021.

Production Maturity

The Navy plans to award a contract to start detail design in 2017, with lead ship construction scheduled to begin in fiscal year 2021. The Navy expects to build the lead ship in 84 months with follow-on ships progressively decreasing to 70 months construction time. This schedule is aggressive, considering that it is approximately the same duration as the lead Virginia class submarine, even though the Columbia Class is over two times larger and the first ballistic missile submarine built in decades. According to the Navy, a decision in 2012 to delay construction start from 2018 to 2020 eliminated flexibility to accommodate delays during construction, given that the lead ship’s first strategic deterrent patrol remains scheduled for 2030. In an effort to gain back some schedule margin, the Navy is working with the future Columbia Class construction shipyards to identify production efficiencies and is requesting funding authorities from Congress to begin some construction work prior to authorization of the lead ship. Under the Navy’s current plans, the shipyards will construct two submarines per year (one Virginia Class and one Columbia Class) through the 2030s.

Program Office Comments

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office provided technical comments, which were incorporated where deemed appropriate.61

Press Reports on Problem with Electric Drive System Motor

A May 4, 2017, press report states the following:

The first known glitch in a $126 billion nuclear-armed submarine program—overheating of a prototype motor—was disclosed by a key U.S. lawmaker this week and confirmed by the Navy, which said it has fixed the problem.

The flaw in the main propulsion motor was discovered earlier this year, the Navy said in a statement Thursday [May 4]....

“It’s a technical hiccup in the performance of a motor,” Representative Rob Wittman, the Republican chairman of the House Armed Services seapower panel, told reporters Wednesday [May 3]. “There’s a motor that didn’t perform properly. It over heated.”

The Navy said in its statement that the issue with the motor designed by a General Dynamics subcontractor isn’t expected to delay planned delivery—anticipated for around 2028—of the first of 12 submarines that the service needs to have on patrol by 2031. Construction of the vessel is set to begin in fiscal 2021.

“Recovery from this manufacturing problem will result in late delivery of the prototype motor to the test facility” but “sufficient margin exists in the test program to accommodate” recovering from the issue “without impacting delivery of the shipboard motor” to the first ship, Captain Thurraya Kent, a Navy spokeswoman, said in an emailed statement....

Wittman said he planned to meet with the head of the Navy’s Nuclear Propulsion division Admiral James Caldwell and some of the contractors to ask “why did this happen?”

A July 21, 2017, press report states the following:

Bryan Clark, a naval analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank, said one of the reasons for the boat’s [risk of] delay is because of the new electric propulsion system.

“That’s a big change for U.S. nuclear submarines,” he said. “We’ve only built one that had all-electric propulsion, where you have an electric generator that then powers an electric motor that drives the ship, instead of using a steam turbine.”

During the Cold War, the [nuclear powered attack submarine] USS Glenard P. Lipscomb used such a turbine, he said. Electric systems are quieter since reduction gears are not needed, as they are with steam turbines, Clark added.

“The most efficient speed for the steam turbine to rotate is like 10,000 rpm, but the most efficient rate for the propeller to move at is maybe 15 or 20 rpm,” he said. “You got to have reduction gears to take that really high speed turbine and gear it down to a speed that you can actually turn that prop at.”

The Navy has had trouble perfecting the prototype version of the system, which has in turn caused delays, he said.

The electric turbine is one of the only components that gives Clark pause.

“The rest of the submarine has a lot of commonality with the Virginia-class, so there’s not a lot of new technology being incorporated into it,” he said. “They are doing some improvements in terms of sound silencing and sonar systems, but it’s all technology that has been tested out and has been proven.

“I’m not too worried about the rest of the submarine,” he added.

A November 6, 2017, press report states:

[Naval Reactors Director Admiral James] Caldwell said the [Columbia-class] program is still on track despite a challenge earlier this year with the electric drive’s motor—not one intended for use on a submarine, but the pre-production model meant to support testing.

“We have faced a challenge in the manufacturing of the pre-production full-sized motor that we’re going to use for testing. It was not a technology challenge; it was a manufacturing challenge. We addressed the cause on that and modified (the schedule)—we built the schedule, by the way, to have a good amount of margin in it, meaning months that we could use if we had a challenge that we found,” he told USNI News during a question and answer session [at a conference].

“We’ve re-torqued that schedule, we’ve approached the scheduling in an alternate way, and we still are on track to deliver the final motor well before the required in-yard date for the shipyard. So the testing … will start on the components that we have available in

63 The Glenard P. Lipscomb (SSN-685) entered service in 1974 and was decommissioned in 1990.
December of this year and will continue through next year. So there is a delay—and again, that’s the pre-production motor. That’s the motor we’re going to use to learn from, full-sized, just like we would pretend to build if we’re building the ship; we’re going to do a design turn, and then we’re going to build a final production motor, and that will be the one that will also be tested in our test facility.”

Caldwell told USNI News after his speech that Naval Reactors is responsible for the life-of-ship fuel and the electric drive, both of which are still on track to deliver ahead of need at the shipyards. He said the Navy and Congress are supporting the program with adequate funding but added that the submarine community needs to keep being vocal about what it needs to keep the Columbia program on track.

“There’s a complex project, it’s a very big submarine—it’s two and a half times the size of a Virginia-class submarine, and we’re going to build it in the same timeframe as the first Virginia class that we built—so the challenge is big,” he said.65

Program Affordability and Impact on Other Navy Shipbuilding Programs

Overview

Another issue for Congress concerns the prospective affordability of the Columbia-class program and its potential impact on funding available for other Navy shipbuilding programs. It has been known for some time that the Columbia-class program, if funded through the Navy’s shipbuilding account, could make it considerably more difficult for the Navy to procure other kinds of ships in desired numbers, unless the shipbuilding account were increased to accommodate the additional funding needs of the Columbia-class program. On February 26, 2015, for example, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, the Chief of Naval Operations, testified that

In the long term beyond 2020, I am increasingly concerned about our ability to fund the Ohio Replacement ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) program—our highest priority program—within our current and projected resources. The Navy cannot procure the Ohio Replacement in the 2020s within historical shipbuilding funding levels without severely impacting other Navy programs.66

Similarly, on February 25, 2015, Department of the Navy officials testified that

The Navy continues to need significant increases in our topline beyond the FYDP [Future Years Defense Plan], not unlike that during the period of [the original] Ohio [class] construction [effort], in order to afford the OR [Ohio replacement] SSBN procurement costs. Absent a significant increase to the SCN [Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy] appropriation [i.e., the Navy’s shipbuilding account], OR SSBN construction will seriously impair construction of virtually all other ships in the battle force: attack submarines, destroyers, and amphibious warfare ships. The shipbuilding industrial base will be commensurately impacted and shipbuilding costs would spiral unfavorably. The resulting battle force would fall markedly short of the FSA [Force Structure Assessment—the Navy’s force structure goal for the fleet as a whole], [and be] unable to meet fleet inventory requirements. The National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund [see discussion below] is a good first step in that it acknowledges the significant challenge of


resourcing the OR SSBN, but the fund is unresourced [i.e., no funding has been placed into the account].

Columbia-Class Program Is Navy’s Top Priority Program

On September 18, 2013, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, the Chief of Naval Operations, testified that the Columbia-class program “is the top priority program for the Navy.” Navy officials since then have reiterated this statement on numerous occasions.

The Navy’s decision to make the Columbia-class program its top program priority means that the Columbia-class program will be fully funded, and that any resulting pressures on the Navy’s shipbuilding account would be borne by other Navy programs, including shipbuilding programs. At a September 12, 2013, hearing before the Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on undersea warfare, a Navy official stated the following:

The CNO has stated, his number one priority as the chief of Naval operations, is our—our strategic deterrent—our nuclear strategic deterrent. That will trump all other vitally important requirements within our Navy, but if there’s only one thing that we do with our ship building account, we—we are committed to sustaining a two ocean national strategic deterrent that protects our homeland from nuclear attack, from other major war aggression and also access and extended deterrent for our allies.

At this same hearing, Navy officials testified that the service is seeking about $4 billion per year over 15 years in supplemental funding—a total of about $60 billion—for the Columbia-class program. The 15 years in question, Navy officials suggested in their testimony, are the years in which the Columbia-class boats are to be procured (FY2021-FY2035, as shown in Table 1). The $60 billion in additional funding equates to an average of $5 billion for each of the 12 boats, which is close to the Navy’s target of an average unit procurement cost of $4.9 billion in constant FY2010 dollars for boats 2 through 12 in the program. The Navy stated at the hearing that the $60 billion in supplemental funding that the Navy is seeking would equate to less than 1% of DOD’s budget over the 15-year period. The Navy also suggested that the 41 pre-Ohio class SSBNs that were procured in the 1950s and 1960s (see Table A-1) were partially financed with funding that was provided as a supplement to the Navy’s budget.

---

67 Statement of the Honorable Sean J. Stackley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition) and Vice Admiral Joseph P. Mulloy, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities and Resources and Lieutenant General Kenneth J. Glueck Jr., Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and Integration & Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Before the Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces of the House Armed Services Committee on Department of the Navy Seapower and Projection Forces Capabilities, February 25, 2015, p. 8.


69 Transcript of hearing. (Spoken remarks of Rear Admiral Richard Breckenridge. The other witness at the hearing was Rear Admiral David Johnson.)

70 Transcript of hearing. (Spoken remarks of Rear Admiral Richard Breckenridge.)

71 Transcript of hearing. (Spoken remarks of Rear Admiral Richard Breckenridge.)

72 Transcript of hearing (Spoken remarks of Rear Admiral Richard Breckenridge.) Regarding supplemental funding for the 41 earlier SSBNs, Breckenridge stated:

The—just a little backstep and history to talk about the two other times that we've had to, as a nation, build the strategic deterrent. So in—in the ’60s we built 41 SSBNs; they were called the 41 For Freedom. We did that in a seven-year period, which again is just an incredible—only in America could you go ahead and put out 41 ballistic missile submarines in a seven-year period.

(continued...)
The Navy officials stated at the September 12, 2013, hearing that if the Navy were to receive about $30 billion in supplemental funding for the Columbia-class program—about half the amount that the Navy is requesting—then the Navy would need to eliminate from its 30-year shipbuilding plan a notional total of 16 other ships, including, notionally, 4 Virginia-class attack submarines, 4 destroyers, and 8 other combatant ships (which might mean ships such as Littoral Combat Ships or amphibious ships). Navy officials stated, in response to a question, that if the Navy were to receive none of the supplemental funding that it is requesting, then these figures could be doubled—that is, that the Navy would need to eliminate from its 30-year shipbuilding plan a notional total of 32 other ships, including, notionally, 8 Virginia-class attack submarines, 8 destroyers, and 16 other combatant ships.73

Some Options for Addressing the Issue

In addition to making further changes and refinements in the design of the Columbia class, options for reducing the cost of the Columbia-class program or for otherwise reducing the program’s potential impact on funding available for other Navy programs (particularly shipbuilding programs) include the following:

- using block buy contracting (BBC) for procuring the first several Columbia-class boats, and either BBC or multiyear-procurement (MYP) contracting for procuring later boats in the program;
- using acquisition authorities granted under the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund (NSBDF);
- using a partial batch-building approach for building the Columbia-class boats;
- altering the schedule for procuring the Columbia-class boats so as to create additional opportunities for using incremental funding for procuring the ships; and
- reducing the planned number of Columbia-class boats.

Each of these options is discussed below.

Block Buy Contracting (BBC) and Multiyear Procurement (MYP) Contracting

To help reduce ship procurement costs, the Navy in recent years has made extensive use of MYP contracts and block buy contracting (BBC) in its shipbuilding programs. In light of this, the Navy may seek to use a block buy contract for procuring the first several Columbia-class boats, and

(...continued)

There was an impact to other shipbuilding accounts at that time, but the priority was such for national survival that we had to go ahead and—and make that a—an imperative and a priority.

There was a supplement to the Navy’s top line at that time when we—when we fielded the class, but it did leave—cast quite a shadow over the rest of the shipbuilding in the ‘60s.

We recapitalized those 41 For Freedom with 18 Ohio-class SSBNs in the ‘80s. It was the Reagan years. There was a major naval buildup. And underneath the umbrella of that buildup we were able to afford as a nation the recapitalization of building 18 SSBNs.


73 Transcript of hearing. (Spoken remarks of Rear Admiral Richard Breckenridge.) See also Christopher J. Castelli, “Admiral: DOD Likely To Support SSBN(X) Supplemental Funding,” Inside the Navy, November 11, 2013.
either BBC or an MYP contract for procuring later boats in the program. As discussed in other CRS reports and testimony, using BBC and MYP can reduce procurement costs in shipbuilding programs by roughly 10%, compared to costs under the standard or default DOD approach of annual contracting.74

The Navy is also investigating the possibility of using a single, joint-class block buy contract that would cover both Columbia-class boats and Virginia-class attack submarines. Such a contract, which could be viewed as precedent-setting in its scope, could offer savings beyond what would be possible using separate block buy or MYP contracts for the two submarine programs. A March 2014 GAO report stated that if the Navy decides to propose such a contract, it would develop a legislative proposal in 2017.75 The Navy reportedly planned to finalize its acquisition strategy for the Columbia-class program, including the issue of the contracting approach to be used, in the fall of 2016 as part of DOD’s Milestone B decision for the program.76

Authorities Granted Under NSBDF
As mentioned earlier (see “Potential Implications of NSBDF on Funding Available for Other Programs”), using the authorities in subsections (f), (g), (h), and (i) of 10 U.S.C. 2218a (the location in the U.S. Code where the NSBDF is codified) could marginally reduce the procurement costs of not only Columbia-class boats, but also other nuclear-powered ships, such as Virginia-class attack submarines and Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carriers, by increasing economies of scale in the production of ship components and better optimizing ship construction schedules.

The joint explanatory statement for the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1356/P.L. 114-92 of November 25, 2015) directed DOD to submit a report on the “acquisition strategy to build Ohio-class replacement submarines that will leverage the enhanced procurement authorities provided in the [NSBDF] ...” Among other things, the report was to identify “any additional authorities the Secretary [of Defense] may need to make management of the Ohio-class replacement more efficient....”77 The Navy submitted the report on April 18, 2016. The report states in part that

the high cost for this unique, next generation strategic deterrent requires extraordinary measures to ensure its affordability. Further, procuring the OHO Replacement (OR), the next generation SSBN, within the current shipbuilding plan presents an extreme challenge to the Navy’s shipbuilding budget. To minimize this challenge and reduce OR schedule risk, the Navy proposes to leverage those authorities provided by the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund (NSBDF) in conjunction with the employment of best acquisition practices on this critical program....

... the Navy is continuing to identify opportunities to further acquisition efficiency, reduce schedule risk, and improve program affordability. Most notably in this regard, the

74 For additional discussion, see CRS Report R41909, Multiyear Procurement (MYP) and Block Buy Contracting in Defense Acquisition: Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted) and (name redacted) , and CRS Testimony TE10001, Acquisition Efficiency and the Future Navy Force, by (name redacted) .


77 Joint explanatory statement for H.R. 1735, p. 165 (PDF page 166 of 542). Following the veto of H.R. 1735, a modified bill, S. 1356, was passed and enacted into law. Except for the parts of S. 1356 that differ from H.R. 1735, the joint explanatory statement for H.R. 1735 in effect serves as the joint explanatory statement for S. 1356.
Navy is currently assessing [the concept of] Continuous Production [for producing components of Columbia-class boats more efficiently than currently scheduled] and will keep Congress informed as we quantify the benefits of this and other initiatives that promise substantial savings....

... the Navy’s initial assessment is that the authorities and further initiatives described [in this report] will be essential to achieving the reductions to acquisition cost and schedule risk that are so critical to success on the OR program....

Section 1022 of the FY2016 NDAA authorized the use of funds in the NSBDF to enter into contracts for EOQ [Economic Order Quantity purchases of materials and equipment] and AC [advance construction activities in shipyards], and to incrementally fund contracts for AP [advance procurement] of specific components. These authorities are essential to successfully executing the OR acquisition strategy. The Navy is able to take advantage of these authorities largely due to how its submarine shipbuilding plan is phased....

Economic Order Quantity contracts provide substantial cost savings to the Navy from procuring materials and equipment in bulk quantities. In addition to the cost savings typically associated with EOQ authority, the Navy has identified an opportunity to implement EOQ procurements to achieve OR schedule efficiencies and commonality contract actions with VCS [Virginia-class submarine] Block V [boats] and CVN [nuclear-powered aircraft carriers]....

Advance Construction is the authority to begin [shipyard] construction [work] in fiscal years of AP [advance procurement] budget requests prior to the full funding/authorization year of a hull. Early manufacturing activities help retire construction risk for first-of-a-kind efforts, ease transition from design to production, and provide efficiencies in shipyard construction workload. Advance Construction would allow the shipbuilders to begin critical path construction activities earlier, thus reducing risk to the OR delivery schedule....

The FY2016 NDAA allows the Navy and shipbuilders to enter into incrementally funded procurements for long lead components that employ both AP and Full Funding (FF) SCN increments. This funding approach will provide significant schedule improvements and cost savings by maximizing the utilization of limited funding....

Maximum economic advantage can be obtained through Continuous Production. Procuring components and systems necessary for Continuous Production lines [as opposed to production lines that experience periods during which they are without work] would provide opportunities for savings through manufacturing efficiencies, increased [production-line] learning and the retention of critical production skills. In addition to lowering costs, Continuous Production would reduce schedule risk for both the U.S. and UK SSBN construction programs and minimize year-to-year funding spikes. To execute Continuous Production, the Navy requires authority to enter into contracts to procure contractor furnished and government furnished components and systems for OR SSBNs.

OR Missile Tube and Missile Tube Module component procurement through Continuous Production lines have been identified as the most efficient and affordable procurement strategy.... Missile Tube Continuous Production could achieve an average reduction of 25 percent in Missile Tube procurement costs across the [Columbia] Class. These savings are compared to [the] single shiptset procurement costs [that are] included in the PB17 PoR [the program of record reflected in the President’s (proposed) Budget for FY2017]....

The Navy estimates that procuring Missile Tube Modules in Continuous Production lines would result in a cumulative one year schedule reduction in Missile Tube Module manufacturing for the OR Class. This schedule reduction, on a potential critical path assembly, would reduce ship delivery risk and increase schedule margin for follow ship deliveries. In addition to improving schedule, Missile Tube Module Continuous
Production (including Strategic Weapon System (SWS) Government Furnished Equipment (GFE)) would produce savings as high as 20 percent compared to single shipset procurement costs included in the PB17 PoR. Executing Continuous Production of Missile Tubes or Missile Tube Modules requires re-phasing of funding from outside the PB17 Future Year’s Defense Program (FYDP) [to years that are within the FYDP] but results in significant overall program reductions. The Navy is evaluating additional Continuous Production opportunities for nuclear and non-nuclear components with common vendors required for VIRGINIA Class submarines and FORD Class aircraft carriers. Some examples include spherical air flasks, hull valves, pressure hull hemi heads, bow domes, castings, and torpedo tubes. The prerequisite to Continuous Production in each of these cases would be an affirmation of design stability consistent with completion of first article testing, or its equivalent....

The Navy’s position on the cost benefits of these authorities is not fully developed. However, the Congressional Budget Office stated in its Analysis of the Navy’s FY2016 Shipbuilding Plan, “...the Navy could potentially save several hundred million dollars per submarine by purchasing components and materials for several submarines at the same time.”... The Navy’s initial cost analysis aligns with CBO’s projections, and the cost reductions from employing these acquisition authorities will be further evaluated to support the Navy’s updated OR Milestone B cost estimate in August 2016....

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD AT&L) approved the OR Program Acquisition Strategy on January 4, 2016. This strategy emphasizes using alternative acquisition tools and cross-platform contracting to reduce schedule risk and lower costs in support of the Navy’s shipbuilding programs....

To reduce costs and help alleviate fiscal pressures, the Navy will work with Congress to implement granted authorities and explore the additional initiatives identified in this report.... The cost reductions from employing the granted and proposed acquisition authorities will be further evaluated to support the Navy’s updated OR Milestone B cost estimate in August 2016.... These authorities are needed with the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund, RDTEN [research, development, test, and evaluation, Navy], and SCN appropriations accounts. Together, these acquisition tools will allow the Navy, and the shipbuilders, to implement the procurement strategy which will reduce total OR acquisition costs and shorten construction schedules for a program with no margin for delay.78

**Partial Batch-Build Approach for Building Columbia-Class Boats**

As another possible means for further reducing the procurement cost of the Columbia-class boats, the Navy is considering a partial batch-build approach for building the boats. Under this approach, instead of building the boats in serial fashion, portions of several boats would be built together, in batch form, so as to maximize economies of scale in the production of those portions. Under this approach, the boats would still be finished and enter service one at a time, under the schedule shown in Table 1, but aspects of their construction would be undertaken in batch fashion rather than serial fashion. Implementing a partial batch-building approach might be facilitated by using existing or proposed authorities in the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund (see previous section), but fully implementing a partial batch-building approach might require additional authorities.

---

Altering Procurement Schedule to Make More Use of Incremental Funding

The Navy currently intends to use incremental funding to procure the first two Columbia-class boats, and traditional full funding to procure the final 10 ships in the program.\textsuperscript{79} Another option for managing the potential impact of the Columbia-class program on other Navy shipbuilding programs would be to stretch out the schedule for procuring Columbia-class boats so as to create opportunities for using incremental funding to procure some (perhaps most) of the final 10 boats in the program.\textsuperscript{80} This option would not reduce the total procurement cost of the Columbia-class program—to the contrary, it might increase the program’s total procurement cost somewhat by reducing production learning curve benefits in the Columbia-class program.\textsuperscript{81} This option could, however, reduce the impact of the Columbia-class program on the amount of funding available for the procurement of other Navy ships in certain individual years. This might reduce the amount of disruption that the Columbia-class program causes to other shipbuilding programs in those years, which in turn might avoid certain disruption-induced cost increases for those other programs. The annual funding requirements for the Columbia-class program might be further spread out by funding some of the final 10 Columbia-class boats with three- or four-year incremental funding.\textsuperscript{82}

Table 4 shows the Navy’s currently planned schedule for procuring 12 Columbia-class boats and a notional alternative schedule that would start two years earlier and end two years later than the Navy’s currently planned schedule. Although the initial ship in the alternative schedule would be procured in FY2019, it could be executed as if it were funded in FY2021. Subsequent ships in the alternative schedule that are funded earlier than they would be under the Navy’s currently planned schedule could also be executed as if they were funded in the year called for under the Navy’s schedule. Congress in the past has funded the procurement of ships whose construction was executed as if they had been procured in later fiscal years.\textsuperscript{83} The ability to stretch the end of the procurement schedule by two years, to FY2035, could depend on the Navy’s ability to carefully husband the use of the nuclear fuel cores on the last two Ohio-class SSBNs, so as to extend the

\textsuperscript{79} The Navy states that

To minimize overall impact to other department programs, the Navy is pursuing an incremental funding profile for the lead OR SSBN over the three year period, FY2021 to FY2023, with resources aligned to a 41% (FY2021), 35% (FY2022), and 24% (FY2023) profile. A similar funding strategy will be pursued for the second OR SSBN ([to be procured in] FY2024) with funding spread over FY2024 and FY2025. Once serial production of the OR SSBN begins [sic: begins] in FY2026, each successive OR SSBN is planned to be fully funded in the year in which Navy intends to contract for the vessel (standard advanced procurement funding profiles notwithstanding).


\textsuperscript{80} Under split funding, a boat’s procurement cost is divided into two parts, or increments. The first increment would be provided in the fiscal year that the boat is procured, and the second would be provided the following fiscal year.

\textsuperscript{81} Procuring one Columbia-class boat every two years rather than at the Navy’s planned rate of one per year could result in a loss of learning at the shipyard in moving from production of one SSBN to the next.

\textsuperscript{82} The Navy, with congressional support, currently uses split funding to procure large-deck amphibious assault ships (i.e., LHA). The Navy currently is permitted by Congress to use four-year incremental funding for procuring the first three Ford (CVN-78) class carriers (i.e., CVN-78, CVN-79, and CVN-80); the authority was granted in §121 of the FY2007 defense authorization act [H.R. 5122/P.L. 109-364 of October 17, 2006].

\textsuperscript{83} Congress funded the procurement of two aircraft carriers (CVNs 72 and 73) in FY1983, and another two (CVNs 74 and 75) in FY1988. Although CVN-73 was funded in FY1983, it was built on a schedule consistent with a carrier funded in FY1983; although CVN-75 was funded in FY1988, it was built on a schedule consistent with a carrier funded in FY1990 or FY1991.
service lives of these two ships by one or two years. Alternatively, Congress could grant the Navy the authority to begin construction on the 11th boat a year before its nominal year of procurement, and the 12th boat two years prior to its nominal year of procurement.

Table 4. Navy Columbia Class Procurement Schedule and a Notional Alternative Schedule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal year</th>
<th>Navy's Schedule</th>
<th>Boat might be particularly suitable for 2-, 3-, or 4-year incremental funding</th>
<th>Notional alternative schedule</th>
<th>Boat might be particularly suitable for 2-, 3-, or 4-year incremental funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2022</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2023</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2024</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2025</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2026</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2027</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2028</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2029</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2030</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2031</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2032</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2033</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2034</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2035</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2036</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2037</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>12</strong></td>
<td><strong>12</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Navy's schedule is based on Navy budget submissions. Notional alternative schedule prepared by CRS.

Notes: Notional alternative schedule could depend on Navy's ability to carefully husband the use of the nuclear fuel cores on the last two Ohio-class SSBNs, so as to extend the service lives of these two ships by one or two years. Alternatively, Congress could grant the Navy the authority to begin construction on the 11th boat a year before its nominal year of procurement, and the 12th boat two years prior to its nominal year of procurement.

Under Navy's schedule, the boat to be procured in FY2033 might be particularly suitable for 4-year incremental funding, and boat to be procured in FY2034 might be particularly suitable for 3- or 4-year incremental funding.

Reducing the Planned Number of Columbia-Class Boats

Some observers over the years have advocated or presented options for an SSBN force of fewer than 12 SSBNs. A November 2013 CBO report on options for reducing the federal budget deficit, for example, presented an option for reducing the SSBN force to eight boats as a cost-reduction measure.\(^{84}\) Earlier CBO reports have presented options for reducing the SSBN force to 10 boats as a cost-reduction measure.\(^{85}\) CBO reports that present such options also provide notional arguments for and against the options. A June 2010 report by a group known as the Sustainable Defense Task Force recommends reducing the SSBN force to 7 boats,\(^{86}\) a September 2010 report


\(^{85}\) See, for example, Congressional Budget Office, Rethinking the Trident Force, July 1993, 78 pp.; and Congressional Budget Office, Budget Options, March 2000, p. 62.
from the Cato Institute recommends reducing the SSBN force to 6 boats, and a September 2013 report from a group organized by the Stimson Center recommends reducing the force to 10 boats.

Views on whether a force of fewer than 12 Columbia-class boats would be adequate could depend on, among other things, assessments of strategic nuclear threats to the United States and the role of SSBNs in deterring such threats as a part of overall U.S. strategic nuclear forces, as influenced by the terms of strategic nuclear arms control agreements. Reducing the number of SSBNs below 12 could also raise a question as to whether the force should continue to be homeported at both Bangor, WA, and Kings Bay, GA, or consolidated at a single location. The Navy’s position (see “Planned Procurement Quantity”) is that the current requirement for having a certain number of SSBNs on patrol translates into a need for a force of 14 Ohio-class boats, and that this requirement can be met in the future by a force of 12 Columbia-class boats.

**Legislative Activity for FY2018**

**Summary of Congressional Action on FY2018 Funding Request**

Table 5 below summarizes congressional action on the Navy’s FY2018 funding request for the Columbia-class program.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Authorization</th>
<th>Appropriation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Request</td>
<td>HASC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research and development (R&amp;D)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PE0603570N (line 049)/Project 3219</td>
<td>265.5</td>
<td>265.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PE0603595N (line 054)/Project 3220</td>
<td>776.2</td>
<td>776.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal R&amp;D</td>
<td>1,041.7</td>
<td>1,041.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement (SCN account)</td>
<td>842.9</td>
<td>842.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,884.6</td>
<td>1,884.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Navy FY2018 budget submission and committee and conference reports and explanatory statements on FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act and FY2018 DOD Appropriations Act.

**Notes:** PE means Program Element, that is, a research and development line item. A Program Element may include several projects. PE0603570N/Project 3219 is the SSBN(X) reactor plant project within the PE for Advanced Nuclear Power Systems. PE0603561N/Project 3220 is the Sea-Based Strategic Deterrent (SBSD).
Advanced Submarine System Development project within the PE for Ohio Replacement. **HASC** is House Armed Services Committee; **SASC** is Senate Armed Services Committee; **HAC** is House Appropriations Committee; **SAC** is Senate Appropriations Committee; **Conf.** is conference agreement. **SCN** is Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy; **NSBDF** is National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund. The procurement funding requested for FY2018 is advance procurement (AP) funding.


**House**

The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 115-200 of July 6, 2017) on H.R. 2810, recommended the funding levels for the Columbia-class program shown in the HASC column of **Table 5**.

**Section 214** of H.R. 2810 as reported states the following:

SEC. 214. Critical technologies for Columbia class submarine.

(a) In general.—For purposes of sections 2366b and 2448b(a)(2) of title 10, United States Code, the components identified in subsection (b) are deemed to be critical technologies for the Columbia class ballistic missile submarine construction program.

(b) Critical technologies.—The components identified in this subsection are—

(1) the coordinated stern for the Columbia class ballistic missile submarine;

(2) the electric drive system for the submarine; and

(3) the nuclear reactor for the submarine.

**Section 1013** of H.R. 2810 as reported states the following:

SEC. 1013. Use of National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund for multiyear procurement of certain critical components.

(a) In general.—Subsection (i) of section 2218a of title 10, United States Code, is amended—

(1) by striking “the common missile compartment” each place it appears and inserting “critical components”; and

(2) in paragraph (1), by striking “critical parts, components, systems, and subsystems” and inserting “critical components”.

(b) Definition of critical component.—Subsection (k) of such section is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

“(3) The term ‘critical component’ means any—

“(A) any item that is high volume or high value; or

“(B) any common missile compartment component, shipyard manufactured component, valve, torpedo tube, or Government furnished equipment, including propulsors and strategic weapons system launchers.”.

(c) Clerical amendment.—The subsection heading for subsection (i) of such section is amended by striking “of the common missile compartment”.

**Section 1670** of H.R. 2810 as reported states the following (emphasis added):

SEC. 1670. Sense of Congress on importance of independent nuclear deterrent of United Kingdom.

It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) nuclear deterrence is foundational to the defense and security of the United States and the security of the United States is enhanced by a nuclear-armed ally with common values and security priorities;

(2) the United States sees the nuclear deterrent of the United Kingdom as central to transatlantic security and welcomes the commitment of the United Kingdom to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to continue to spend two percent of gross domestic product on defense;

(3) in the face of increasing threats, the presence of credible nuclear deterrent forces of the United Kingdom is essential to international stability and for NATO;

(4) the commitment of the United Kingdom to sustaining an independent nuclear deterrent, deployed continuously at sea, provides a vital second decision-making point within the deterrent capability of NATO, creating essential uncertainty in the mind of any potential adversary;

(5) the United States Navy must continue to execute the Columbia-class submarine program on time and within budget to ensure that the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad of the United States is sustained and the program delivers a Common Missile Compartment, the Trident II (D5) Strategic Weapon System, and associated equipment and production capabilities, to support the successful development and deployment of the Dreadnought submarines of the United Kingdom;

(6) the support that the United Kingdom provides to deployments of strategic ships and aircraft of the United States at specialized facilities enables a vital part of the deterrence posture of the United States as well as mutual deterrence of adversaries and assurance to the allies and partners of the United States; and

(7) the collaboration of the United Kingdom with the United States on the military use of atomic energy ensures a peer in the technology and science of nuclear weapons and provides independent expert peer review of the nuclear programs of the United States, ensuring resilience, and cost effectiveness to the nuclear defense programs of both nations.

H.Rept. 115-200 states the following:

Columbia-class submarine program

The committee continues to exercise specific oversight on the progress and challenges facing the Navy’s Columbia-class acquisition program and the replacement to the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines, which are scheduled to begin retirement in 2027. The committee notes the Department of Defense and the Navy consider the Columbia-class acquisition among the highest priorities in order to meet sea-based strategic deterrence requirements in the future threat environment through the 2080s. The magnitude of the program’s estimated cost, expected to exceed $267.0 billion over its life cycle, as well as the aggressive schedule on which the Navy and its shipbuilders plan to complete the submarine’s technology development and design, and start constructing the new class, among other issues, will be subjects of continued interest and concern to the committee.

Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to assess the Navy’s Columbia-class acquisition and submit a report to the congressional defense committees by March 1, 2018, that includes an analysis of the following:

(1) technology development including activities in support of the submarine’s nuclear propulsion system;

(2) progress of shipbuilder design products;

(3) program cost estimates;
(4) approved acquisition strategy and use of expanded authorities including cross-
program material procurement, early structural fabrication, and advance construction;
(5) industrial base capacity to meet the Navy’s plans and requirements; and
(6) construction readiness and feasibility of achieving on-time submarine delivery to
meet Navy operational requirements. (Page 21)

H.Rept. 115-200 also states the following:

Naval Reactors program

The Naval Reactors program is responsible for all aspects of naval nuclear propulsion
efforts, including reactor plant technology design and development, reactor plant
operation and maintenance, and reactor retirement and disposal. The program ensures the
safe and reliable operation of reactor plants in nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft
carriers. These ships comprise over 40 percent of the Navy’s major combatants.

The committee notes that the recent identification of a manufacturing problem with the
prototype electric-drive motor for the Columbia-class submarine will result in late
delivery of the prototype motor to the test facility. Naval Reactors assures the committee
that this delay will not delay delivery of the shipboard motor for the lead ship of the
Columbia class. The committee understands that there is no margin left in the Columbia-
class schedule and expects Naval Reactors to take strong action to ensure they meet all
deliverables to the Navy.

The committee has long been supportive of the Naval Reactors program and believes it is
an exceptional example of a nuclear-related government program that is safety-focused,
mission-driven, and well-managed. Due to this success, the committee and the Navy will
continue to have very high expectations for performance by Naval Reactors. The
committee will continue its oversight of Naval Reactors’ stewardship of the Navy’s
nuclear mission. (Page 335)

Senate

The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 115-125 of July 10, 2017) on S.
1519, recommended the funding levels for the Columbia-class program shown in the SASC
column of Table 5. The report states the following:

Columbia-class submarines

The budget request included $842.9 million in line item 1 of Shipbuilding and
Conversion, Navy (SCN), for Columbia-class submarines advance procurement.

The committee notes the cost estimate for the lead ship non-recurring engineering
program support increased from the 2014 Life Cycle Cost Estimate to the 2016 Milestone
B cost estimate. The committee asked about this increase, but the Navy did not provide a
timely answer to the questions. The committee is disappointed by the Navy’s
performance and expects the Navy to ensure robust, punctual explanations are provided
whenever the committee asks for program clarifications.

In addition, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to conduct a comprehensive
security classification review of the Columbia-class program to ensure all systems and
capabilities are properly classified. The Secretary shall submit his findings at the
appropriate classification level to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and
House of Representatives not later December 1, 2017.

Composite technology in submarine construction

The committee notes that the Navy has successfully integrated composite technology into
different submarine classes and that composites can reduce procurement costs and lower
overall lifecycle costs for certain components and subsystems. For example, a February 2016, Navy report to Congress found a composite technology alternative for Columbia-class bow domes would save the Navy at least $6.6 million and avoid an additional $8.7 million in tooling.

The committee believes the Navy should further explore opportunities to integrate proven composite technology, particularly for Virginia-class submarines, including the bow dome and Virginia Payload Module, and Columbia-class submarines, including the superstructure.

Therefore, not later than November 1, 2017, the Secretary of the Navy shall deliver a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives on the feasibility and merits of further integrating proven composite technology into Virginia-class and Columbia-class submarines. The report shall:

(1) Identify non-composite systems and components planned for Block V Virginia-class submarines and Columbia-class submarines for which a proven composite alternative is in development or fielded; and

(2) For those systems and components identified in paragraph (1), provide the approximate cost and schedule differences if such composite systems and components were substituted for non-composite systems and components.

**Domestic supply of submarine missile launcher tubes**

The committee supports the Navy’s ongoing efforts to reduce cost and risk in development and production of launcher tubes for both the Virginia Payload Module (VPM) and the Columbia-class program, including the Common Missile Compartment (CMC). In written testimony for a hearing of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee on June 7, 2017, Vice Admiral Terry Benedict, Director of the Navy’s Strategic Systems Programs, testified to the importance of the CMC as a critical component for both the U.S. Columbia-class and United Kingdom Dreadnought-class programs, with any delay to the joint CMC effort having the potential to impact the ability of both nations to maintain an effective sea-based deterrent.

Missile tube construction is a critical and fragile subset of the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base that is regenerating after the last Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine was built in the 1990s. The committee is aware of the Navy’s work to reduce risk in the restart of launcher system production at the surface test launch facility at the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, China Lake, to demonstrate that the launcher industrial base can replicate the successful performance of the Ohio-class Trident II (D5) launcher system.

The committee urges the Navy to take every appropriate measure to ensure a viable supply of launcher tubes are available through the U.S. industrial base to meet the cost and schedule requirements facing both the Columbia-class program and the Virginia-class guided missile variant through VPM. (Pages 28-29)

S.Rept. 115-125 also states the following:

**Undersea warfare applied research**

The budget request included $56.1 million in Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Navy, PE 62747N, for undersea warfare applied research. The committee notes that the Navy has been researching the capacity of the shipyards that build our nation’s nuclear submarine forces to maintain higher production rates for the Virginia-class submarines while also designing and then beginning construction of the first of the Columbia-class submarines in fiscal year 2021.

The committee encourages the Navy to align their efforts with qualified higher education partners focusing on undersea vehicle applications related to several key fabrication and
manufacturing process technologies including composites, metals, and electronics. In addition, investments should address the overall affordability challenge faced by current and future submarine and undersea vehicle programs, including fabrication process innovation and the ability to introduce continuous technology improvements at the Navy’s existing undersea shipyard industrial base.

The committee directs the Navy to closely coordinate this effort with its industrial base partners to ensure that funded research projects are relevant to specific engineering and manufacturing needs, as well as defined systems capabilities. Partnerships with academia should focus on specific, well-defined short- and long-term submarine and autonomous undersea vehicle research needs and accelerated technology transition, and they should include a strong workforce development component. To bolster this effort, the committee recommends an aggregate increase of $25.0 million in PE 62747N for a total of $81.1 million. (Page 57)

Conference

The conference report (H.Rept. 115-404 of November 9, 2017) on H.R. 2810, recommended the funding levels for the Columbia-class program shown in the authorization conference column of Table 5.

Section 231 of the conference version of H.R. 2810 states:

SEC. 231. Columbia-class program accountability matrices.

(a) Submittal of matrices.—Concurrent with the President’s annual budget request submitted to Congress under section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, for fiscal year 2019, the Secretary of the Navy shall submit to the congressional defense committees and the Comptroller General of the United States the matrices described in subsection (b) relating to the Columbia-class program.

(b) Matrices described.—The matrices described in this subsection are the following:

(1) DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION GOALS.—A matrix that identifies, in six-month increments, key milestones, development events, and specific performance goals for the design and construction of the Columbia-class program, which shall be subdivided, at a minimum, according to the following:

(A) Technology-readiness levels of major components and key demonstration events.
(B) Design maturity.
(C) Manufacturing-readiness levels for critical manufacturing operations and key demonstration events.
(D) Manufacturing operations.
(E) Reliability.

(2) COST.—A matrix expressing, in annual increments, the total cost phased over the entire Columbia-class design and construction period of—

(A) the Navy service cost position for the prime contractor’s portion of Columbia-class design and construction activities, including the estimated price at completion for each submarine and confidence level of this estimate;
(B) the program manager’s estimate for the prime contractor’s portion of Columbia-class design and construction activities, including the estimated price and variance at completion for each submarine; and
(C) the prime contractor’s estimate for the prime contractor’s portion of Columbia-class design and construction activities, including the estimated price and variance at completion for each submarine.

(c) Update of matrices.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date on which the Secretary of the Navy submits the matrices required by subsection (a), and concurrent with the submittal of each annual budget request to Congress under section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, beginning with the fiscal year 2020 request, the Secretary of the Navy shall submit to the congressional defense committees and the Comptroller General of the United States updates to the matrices described in subsection (b).

(2) ELEMENTS.—Each update submitted under paragraph (1) shall detail progress made toward the goals identified in the matrix described in subsection (b)(1) and provide updated cost data as prescribed in subsection (b)(2).

(3) TREATMENT OF INITIAL MATRICES AS BASELINE.—The matrices submitted pursuant to subsection (a) shall be treated as the baseline for the full Columbia-class design and construction period for purposes of the updates submitted pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection.

(4) REPORT TERMINATION.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall terminate upon delivery of the first Columbia-class submarine.

(d) Assessment by Comptroller General of the United States.—Not later than 90 days after the date on which the Comptroller General of the United States receives an update to a matrix under subsection (c)(1), the Comptroller General shall review such matrix and provide to the congressional defense committees an assessment of such matrix in whatever form that the Comptroller General deems appropriate.

(e) Repeal of report requirement.—Section 131 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (129 Stat. 754; Public Law 114–92) is hereby repealed.

(f) Major component defined.—In this section, the term “major component” includes, at a minimum, the integrated power system, nuclear reactor, propulsor and related coordinated stern features, stern area system, and common missile compartment.

Regarding Section 231, H.Rept. 115-404 states:

*Columbia-class program accountability matrices (sec. 231)*

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 214) that would deem certain Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine components as critical technologies.

The Senate amendment contained no similar provision.

The Senate recedes with an amendment that would require submittal and periodic updates of matrices on Columbia-class cost, design and construction goals. The Comptroller General of the United States would be required to review and assess each periodic update. The amendment would also repeal section 131 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92). 90

90 Section 131 of P.L. 114-92 states:

SEC. 131. REPORTING REQUIREMENT FOR OHIO-CLASS REPLACEMENT SUBMARINE PROGRAM.

If the budget of the President submitted to Congress under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, for a fiscal year includes a request for funds for the Ohio-class replacement submarine program, the Secretary of Defense shall include in the budget justification materials submitted to Congress...
Section 1022 states:

SEC. 1022. Use of National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund for multiyear procurement of certain critical components.

(a) In general.—Subsection (i) of section 2218a of title 10, United States Code, is amended—

(1) by striking “the common missile compartment” each place it appears and inserting “critical components”; and

(2) in paragraph (1), by striking “critical parts, components, systems, and subsystems” and inserting “critical components”.

(b) Definition of critical component.—Subsection (k) of such section is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

“(3) The term ‘critical component’ means any of the following:

“(A) A common missile compartment component.
“(B) A spherical air flask.
“(C) An air induction diesel exhaust valve.
“(D) An auxiliary seawater valve.
“(E) A hovering valve.
“(F) A missile compensation valve.
“(G) A main seawater valve.
“(H) A launch tube.
“(I) A trash disposal unit.
“(J) A logistics escape trunk.
“(K) A torpedo tube.
“(L) A weapons shipping cradle weldment.
“(M) A control surface.
“(N) A launcher component.
“(O) A propulsor.”.

(...continued)

Congress in support of the Department of Defense budget for such fiscal year a report that includes the following elements regarding such program (described in terms of both fiscal year 2010 dollars and current fiscal year dollars as of the date of the report):

(1) Lead ship end cost (with plans).
(2) Lead ship end cost (less plans).
(3) Lead ship non-recurring engineering cost.
(4) Average follow-on ship cost.
(5) Average operations and sustainment cost per hull per year.
(6) The average follow-on ship affordability target as determined by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
(7) The operations and sustainment cost per hull per year affordability target as determined by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
(c) Clerical amendment.—The subsection heading for subsection (i) of such section is amended by striking “of the common missile compartment”.

Regarding Section 1022, H.Rept. 115-404 states:

Use of National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund for multiyear procurement of certain critical components (sec. 1022)

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 1013) that would expand the authority of the Secretary of the Navy to enter into a multiyear contract for certain nuclear-powered vessel components to include missile tubes, torpedo tubes, and propulsors.

The Senate amendment contained no similar provision.

The Senate recedes with an amendment that would define “critical components” as the following: a common missile compartment component, a spherical air flask, an air induction diesel exhaust valve, an auxiliary seawater valve, a hovering valve, a missile compensation valve, a main seawater valve, a launch tube, a trash disposal unit, a logistics escape trunk, a torpedo tube, a weapons shipping cradle weldment, a control surface, a launcher component, and a propulsor. (Page 916)

Section 1672 states (emphasis added):

SEC. 1672. Sense of Congress on importance of independent nuclear deterrent of United Kingdom.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) nuclear deterrence is foundational to the defense and security of the United States and the security of the United States is enhanced by a nuclear-armed ally with common values and security priorities;

(2) the United States sees the nuclear deterrent of the United Kingdom as central to transatlantic security and welcomes the commitment of the United Kingdom to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to continue to spend two percent of gross domestic product on defense;

(3) in the face of increasing threats, the presence of credible nuclear deterrent forces of the United Kingdom is essential to international stability and for NATO;

(4) the commitment of the United Kingdom to sustaining an independent nuclear deterrent, deployed continuously at sea, provides a vital second decision-making point within the deterrent capability of NATO, creating essential uncertainty in the mind of any potential adversary;

(5) the United States Navy must continue to execute the Columbia-class submarine program on time and within budget to ensure that the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad of the United States is sustained and the program delivers a Common Missile Compartment, the Trident II (D5) Strategic Weapon System, and associated equipment and production capabilities, to support the successful development and deployment of the Dreadnought submarines of the United Kingdom;

(6) the support that the United Kingdom provides to deployments of strategic ships and aircraft of the United States at specialized facilities enables a vital part of the deterrence posture of the United States as well as mutual deterrence of adversaries and assurance to the allies and partners of the United States; and

(7) the collaboration of the United Kingdom with the United States on the military use of atomic energy ensures a peer in the technology and science of nuclear weapons and provides independent expert peer review of the nuclear programs of the United States, ensuring resilience and cost effectiveness to the nuclear defense programs of both nations.
FY2018 DOD Appropriations Act (Division A of H.R. 3219/S. XXXX)

House
H.R. 3219 as reported by the House Appropriations Committee (H.Rept. 115-219 of July 13, 2017) was the FY2018 DOD Appropriations Act. H.R. 3219 as passed by the House is called the Make America Secure Appropriations Act, 2018. H.R. 3219 as passed by the House includes the FY2018 DOD Appropriations Act as Division A and four other appropriations acts as Divisions B through E. The discussion below relates to Division A.

The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 115-219 of July 13, 2017) on H.R. 3219, recommended the funding levels for the Columbia-class program shown in the HAC column of Table 5. The paragraph in H.R. 3219 as reported that makes appropriations for the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) account includes this proviso:

*Provided further, That funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this Act for production of the common missile compartment of nuclear-powered vessels may be available for multiyear procurement of critical components to support continuous production of such compartments only in accordance with the provisions of subsection (i) of section 2218a of title 10, United States Code (as added by section 1023 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328)).*

Senate
On November 21, 2017, the Senate Appropriations Committee released a Chairman’s recommendation and explanatory statement for the FY2018 DOD Appropriations Act, referred to here as S. XXXX. The explanatory statement recommended the funding levels shown in the SAC column of Table 5. The recommended increase of $25 million for PE0603595N (line 054)/Project 3220 is for “Program increase: Advanced materials propeller program.” (Page 169)

The explanatory statement states:

*Submarine Industrial Base.—The fiscal year 2018 President’s budget includes $1,884,500,000 for the Ohio-class replacement program [ORP] and $5,581,500,000 for the Virginia-class program [VA] in Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Navy; Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy; and Other Procurement, Navy. The Committee understands that the budget request fully funds the programs’ respective cost estimates and recommends full funding. Further, the Committee notes that no special acquisition or funding authorities in addition to those previously provided have been requested in the President’s budget or are required in fiscal year 2018.

The Committee notes recent major accomplishments in these programs, including the approval of Milestone B for ORP in November 2016 and award of the ORP Integrated Product and Process Development contract in September 2017. Additionally, significant upcoming milestones include the cut-in to production of the Virginia Payload Module [VPM] in fiscal year 2019 and a planned ten-ship multi-year procurement contract award for the Virginia-class program in fiscal year 2018.

The Committee is aware of several issues that could potentially introduce risk to these programs, including: cost and schedule concerns raised by the shipbuilder regarding the Virginia-class Block V multi-year procurement program; capacity constraints at sub-tier vendors impacting critical component deliveries; schedule delays in design completions across the enterprise requiring aggressive remedial schedules; vendor oversight issues; loss of schedule margin in certain prototype manufacturing; and consistent manning shortfalls across all submarine programs. The Committee understands that these issues have not yet negatively affected costs and schedules of the ORP and VA programs.
However, the Committee is concerned with the accumulation of challenges and encourages the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations to remain focused on addressing these issues. The Committee recommends an additional $175,000,000 in Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy for submarine industrial base expansion in support of Navy efforts to implement action plans to improve readiness assessments of critical suppliers for the ORP and VA shipbuilding enterprise. (Pages 106-107)
Appendix A. Summary of U.S. SSBN Designs

This appendix provides background information on the four SSBN classes that the United States has operated since 1959. The four classes are summarized in Table A-1. As shown in the table, the size of U.S. SSBNs has grown over time, reflecting in part a growth in the size and number of SLBMs carried on each boat. The Ohio class carries an SLBM (the D-5) that is much larger than the SLBMs carried by earlier U.S. SSBNs, and it carries 24 SLBMs, compared to the 16 on earlier U.S. SSBNs. In part for these reasons, the Ohio-class design, with a submerged displacement of 18,750 tons, is more than twice the size of earlier U.S. SSBNs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>George Washington (SSBN-598) class</th>
<th>Ethan Allen (SSBN-608) class</th>
<th>Lafayette/Benjamin Franklin (SSBN-616/640) class</th>
<th>Ohio (SSBN-726) class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number in class</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length</td>
<td>381.7 feet</td>
<td>410.5 feet</td>
<td>425 feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beam</td>
<td>33 feet</td>
<td>33 feet</td>
<td>33 feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submerged displacement</td>
<td>6,700 tons</td>
<td>7,900 tons</td>
<td>8,250 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of SLBM launch tubes</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final type(s) of SLBM carried</td>
<td>Polaris A-3</td>
<td>Polaris A-3</td>
<td>Poseidon C-3/Trident I C-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diameter of those SLBMs</td>
<td>54 inches</td>
<td>54 inches</td>
<td>74 inches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of those SLBMs</td>
<td>32.3 feet</td>
<td>32.3 feet</td>
<td>34 feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weight of each SLBM (pounds)</td>
<td>36,000 pounds</td>
<td>36,000 pounds</td>
<td>65,000/73,000 pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range of SLBMs</td>
<td>~2,500 nm</td>
<td>~2,500 nm</td>
<td>~2,500 nm/~4,000 nm</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Preparing by CRS based on data in Norman Polmar, The Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet, Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, various editions, and (for SSBN decommissioning dates) U.S. Naval Vessel Register.

Notes: Beam is the maximum width of a ship. For the submarines here, which have cylindrical hulls, beam is the diameter of the hull.

The range of an SLBM can vary, depending on the number and weight of nuclear warheads it carries; actual ranges can be lesser or greater than those shown.

The George Washington-class boats were procured as modifications of SSNs that were already under construction. Three of the boats were converted into SSNs toward the ends of their lives and were

---

91 The larger size of the Ohio-class design also reflects a growth in size over time in U.S. submarine designs due to other reasons, such as providing increased interior volume for measures to quiet the submarine acoustically, so as to make it harder to detect.
decommissioned in 1982-1985. The two boats that remained SSBNs throughout their lives were decommissioned in 1981.

All five Ethan Allen-class boats were converted into SSNs toward the ends of their lives. The boats were decommissioned in 1983 (two boats), 1985, 1991, and 1992. Two of the Lafayette/Benjamin Franklin-class boats were converted into SSNs toward the ends of their lives and were decommissioned in 1999 and 2002. The 29 that remained SSBNs throughout their lives were decommissioned in 1986-1995. For 19 of the boats, the Poseidon C-3 was the final type of SLBM carried; for the other 12, the Trident I C-4 SLBM was the final type of SLBM carried.

A total of 18 Ohio-class SSBNs were built. The first four, which entered service in 1981-1984, were converted into SSGNs in 2002-2008. The remaining 14 boats entered service in 1984-1997. Although Ohio-class SSBNs are designed to each carry 24 SLBMs, by 2018, four SLBM launch tubes on each boat are to be deactivated, and the number of SLBMs that can be carried by each boat consequently is to be reduced to 20, so that the number of operational launchers and warheads in the U.S. force will comply with strategic nuclear arms control limits.
Appendix B. U.S.-UK Cooperation on SLBMs and the New UK SSBN

This appendix provides background information on U.S.-UK cooperation on SLBMs and the UK’s next-generation SSBN, previously called the Successor-class SSBN and now called the Dreadnought-class SSBN.

The UK’s four Vanguard-class SSBNs, which entered service in 1993-1999, each carry 16 Trident II D-5 SLBMs. Previous classes of UK SSBNs similarly carried earlier-generation U.S. SLBMs. The UK’s use of U.S.-made SLBMs on its SSBNs is one element of a long-standing close cooperation between the two countries on nuclear-related issues that is carried out under the 1958 Agreement for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes (also known as the Mutual Defense Agreement). Within the framework established by the 1958 agreement, cooperation on SLBMs in particular is carried out under the 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement and a 1982 Exchange of Letters between the two governments. The Navy testified in

92 Although the SLBMs on UK SSBNs are U.S.-made, the nuclear warheads on the missiles are of UK design and manufacture.

93 A March 18, 2010, report by the UK Parliament’s House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee stated:

During the Cold War, the UK’s nuclear co-operation with the United States was considered to be at the heart of the [UK-U.S.] ‘special relationship’. This included the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement, the 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement (PSA) (subsequently amended for Trident), and the UK’s use of the US nuclear test site in Nevada from 1962 to 1992. The co-operation also encompassed agreements for the United States to use bases in Britain, with the right to store nuclear weapons, and agreements for two bases in Yorkshire (Fylingdales and Menwith Hill) to be upgraded to support US missile defence plans.

In 1958, the UK and US signed the Mutual Defence Agreement (MDA). Although some of the appendices, amendments and Memoranda of Understanding remain classified, it is known that the agreement provides for extensive co-operation on nuclear warhead and reactor technologies, in particular the exchange of classified information concerning nuclear weapons to improve design, development and fabrication capability. The agreement also provides for the transfer of nuclear warhead-related materials. The agreement was renewed in 2004 for another ten years.

The other major UK-US agreement in this field is the 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement (PSA) which allows the UK to acquire, support and operate the US Trident missile system. Originally signed to allow the UK to acquire the Polaris Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) system in the 1960s, it was amended in 1980 to facilitate purchase of the Trident I (C4) missile and again in 1982 to authorise purchase of the more advanced Trident II (D5) in place of the C4. In return, the UK agreed to formally assign its nuclear forces to the defence of NATO, except in an extreme national emergency, under the terms of the 1962 Nassau Agreement reached between President John F. Kennedy and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to facilitate negotiation of the PSA.

Current nuclear co-operation takes the form of leasing arrangements of around 60 Trident II D5 missiles from the US for the UK’s independent deterrent, and long-standing collaboration on the design of the W76 nuclear warhead carried on UK missiles. In 2006 it was revealed that the US and the UK had been working jointly on a new ‘Reliable Replacement Warhead’ (RRW) that would modernise existing W76-style designs. In 2009 it emerged that simulation testing at Aldermaston on dual axis hydrodynamics experiments had provided the US with scientific data it did not otherwise possess on this RRW programme.

The level of co-operation between the two countries on highly sensitive military technology is, according to the written submission from Ian Kearns, “well above the norm, even for a close alliance relationship”. He quoted Admiral William Crowe, the former US Ambassador to London, who likened the UK-US nuclear relationship to that of an iceberg, “with a small tip of it sticking out, but beneath the water there is quite a bit of everyday business that goes on between our two governments in a fashion that’s unprecedented in the world.” Dr Kearns also commented that the personal bonds between the US/UK scientific and technical establishments were deeply rooted.

(continued...)
March 2010 that “the United States and the United Kingdom have maintained a shared commitment to nuclear deterrence through the Polaris Sales Agreement since April 1963. The U.S. will continue to maintain its strong strategic relationship with the UK for our respective follow-on platforms, based upon the Polaris Sales Agreement.”94

The first Vanguard-class SSBN was originally projected to reach the end of its service life in 2024, but an October 2010 UK defense and security review report states that the lives of the Vanguard class ships will now be extended by a few years, so that the four boats will remain in service into the late 2020s and early 2030s.95

The UK plans to replace the four Vanguard-class boats with three or four next-generation Dreadnought-class boats are to be equipped with 12 missile launch tubes, but current UK plans call for each boat to carry eight D-5 SLBMs, with the other four tubes not being used for SLBMs. The report states that “‘Main Gate’—the decision to start building the submarines—is required around 2016.”96 The first new boat is to be delivered by 2028, or about four years later than previously planned.97

The United States is assisting the UK with certain aspects of the Dreadnought SSBN program. In addition to the modular Common Missile Compartments (CMC), the United States is assisting the UK with the new PWR-3 reactor plant98 to be used by the Dreadnought SSBN. A December 2011 press report states that “there has been strong [UK] collaboration with the US [on the Dreadnought program], particularly with regard to the CMC, the PWR, and other propulsion technology,” and that the design concept selected for the Dreadnought class employs “a new propulsion plant based on a US design, but using next-generation UK reactor technology (PWR-3) and modern secondary propulsion systems.”99 The U.S. Navy states that

> Naval Reactors, a joint Department of Energy/Department of Navy organization responsible for all aspects of naval nuclear propulsion, has an ongoing technical exchange with the UK Ministry of Defence under the US/UK 1958 Mutual Defence

(...continued)


94 Statement of Rear Admiral Stephen Johnson, USN, Director, Strategic Systems Programs, Before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the Senate Armed Services Committee [on] FY2011 Strategic Systems, March 17, 2010, p. 6.


98 PWR3 means pressurized water reactor, design number 3. U.S. and UK nuclear-powered submarines employ pressurized water reactors. Earlier UK nuclear-powered submarines are powered by reactor designs that the UK designated PWR-2 and PWR-1. For an article discussing the PWR3 plant, see Richard Scott, “Critical Mass: Re-Energising the UK’s Naval Nuclear Programme,” Jane’s International Defence Review, July 2014: 42-45, 47.

Agreement. The US/UK 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement is a Government to Government Atomic Energy Act agreement that allows the exchange of naval nuclear propulsion technology between the US and UK.

Under this agreement, Naval Reactors is providing the UK Ministry of Defence with US naval nuclear propulsion technology to facilitate development of the naval nuclear propulsion plant for the UK’s next generation SUCCESSOR ballistic missile submarine. The technology exchange is managed and led by the US and UK Governments, with participation from Naval Reactors prime contractors, private nuclear capable shipbuilders, and several suppliers. A UK based office comprised of about 40 US personnel provide full-time engineering support for the exchange, with additional support from key US suppliers and other US based program personnel as needed.

The relationship between the US and UK under the 1958 mutual defence agreement is an ongoing relationship and the level of support varies depending on the nature of the support being provided. Naval Reactors work supporting the SUCCESSOR submarine is reimbursed by the UK Ministry of Defence.\(^\text{100}\)

U.S. assistance to the UK on naval nuclear propulsion technology first occurred many years ago: To help jumpstart the UK’s nuclear-powered submarine program, the United States transferred to the UK a complete nuclear propulsion plant (plus technical data, spares, and training) of the kind installed on the U.S. Navy’s six Skipjack (SSN-585) class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), which entered service between 1959 and 1961. The plant was installed on the UK Navy’s first nuclear-powered ship, the attack submarine Dreadnought, which entered service in 1963.

The December 2011 press report states that “the UK is also looking at other areas of cooperation between Dreadnought and the Ohio Replacement Programme. For example, a collaboration agreement has been signed off regarding the platform integration of sonar arrays with the respective combat systems.”\(^\text{101}\)

A June 24, 2016, press report states the following:

> The [U.S. Navy] admiral responsible for the nuclear weapons component of ballistic missile submarines today praised the “truly unique” relationship with the British naval officers who have similar responsibilities, and said that historic cooperation would not be affected by Thursday’s vote to have the United Kingdom leave the European Union.

> Vice Adm. Terry Benedict, director of the Navy’s Strategic Systems Programs, said that based on a telephone exchange Thursday morning with his Royal Navy counterpart, “I have no concern.” The so-called Brexit vote—for British exit—“was a decision based on its relationship with Europe, not with us. I see yesterday’s vote having no effect.”\(^\text{102}\)

---


Appendix C. Columbia-Class Program Origin and Early Milestones

This appendix provides background information on the Columbia-class program’s origin and early milestones.

Although the eventual need to replace the Ohio-class SSBNs has been known for many years, the Columbia-class program can be traced more specifically to an exchange of letters in December 2006 between President George W. Bush and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair concerning the UK’s desire to participate in a program to extend the service life of the Trident II D-5 SLBM into the 2040s, and to have its next-generation SSBNs carry D-5s. Following this exchange of letters, and with an awareness of the projected retirement dates of the Ohio-class SSBNs and the time that would likely be needed to develop and field a replacement for them, DOD in 2007 began studies on a next-generation sea-based strategic deterrent (SBSD). The studies used the term sea-based strategic deterrent (SBSD) to signal the possibility that the new system would not necessarily be a submarine.

An Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) for a new SBSD was developed in early 2008 and approved by DOD’s Joint Requirements Oversight Committee (JROC) on June 20, 2008. In July 2008, DOD issued a Concept Decision providing guidance for an analysis of alternatives (AOA) for the program; an acquisition decision memorandum from John Young, DOD’s acquisition executive, stated the new system would, barring some discovery, be a submarine. The Navy established an Columbia-class program office at about this same time.

The AOA reportedly began in the summer or fall of 2008. The AOA was completed, with final brief to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), on May 20, 2009. The final AOA report was completed in September 2009. An AOA Sufficiency Review Letter was signed by OSD’s Director, Cost Assessment & Program Evaluation (CAPE) on December 8, 2009. The AOA concluded that a new-design SSBN was the best option for replacing the Ohio-class SSBNs. (For a June 26, 2013, Navy blog post discussing options that were examined for replacing the Ohio-class SSBNs, see Appendix E.)

103 In February 2007, the commander of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) commissioned a task force to support an anticipated Underwater Launched Missile Study (ULMS). On June 8, 2007, the Secretary of the Navy initiated the ULMS. Six days later, the commander of STRATCOM directed that a Sea Based Strategic Deterrent (SBSD) capability-based assessment (CBA) be performed. In July 2007, the task force established by the commander of STRATCOM provided its recommendations regarding capabilities and characteristics for a new SBSD. (Source: Navy list of key events relating to the ULMS and SBSD provided to CRS and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) on July 7, 2008.)

104 On February 14, 2008, the SBSD ICD was approved for joint staffing by the Navy’s Resources and Requirements Review Board (R3B). On April 29, 2008, the SBSD was approved by DOD’s Functional Capabilities Board (FCB) to proceed to DOD’s Joint Capabilities Board (JCB). (Source: Navy list of key events relating to the ULMS and SBSD provided to CRS and CBO on July 7, 2008.)

105 Navy briefing to CRS and CBO on the SBSD program, July 6, 2009.

106 Navy briefing to CRS and CBO on the SBSD program, July 6, 2009.

107 An August 2008 press report states that the program office, called PMS-397, “was established within the last two months.” (Dan Taylor, “Navy Stands Up Program Office To Manage Next-Generation SSBN,” Inside the Navy, August 17, 2008.


The program’s Milestone A review meeting was held on December 9, 2010. On February 3, 2011, the Navy provided the following statement to CRS concerning the outcome of the December 9 meeting:

The OHIO Replacement Program achieved Milestone A and has been approved to enter the Technology Development Phase of the Dept. of Defense Life Cycle Management System as of Jan. 10, 2011.

This milestone comes following the endorsement of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), chaired by Dr. Carter (USD for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) who has signed the program’s Milestone A Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM).

The DAB endorsed replacing the current 14 Ohio-class Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs) as they reach the end of their service life with 12 Ohio Replacement Submarines, each comprising 16, 87-inch diameter missile tubes utilizing TRIDENT II D5 Life Extended missiles (initial loadout). The decision came after the program was presented to the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) on Dec. 9, 2010.

The ADM validates the program’s Technology Development Strategy and allows entry into the Technology Development Phase during which warfighting requirements will be refined to meet operational and affordability goals. Design, prototyping, and technology development efforts will continue to ensure sufficient technological maturity for lead ship procurement in 2019.110

---

110 Source: Email from Navy Office of Legislative Affairs to CRS, February 3, 2011.
Appendix D. Earlier Oversight Issue:  
A Design with 16 vs. 20 SLBM Tubes  

This appendix provides background information on an earlier oversight issues regarding the Columbia-class program—the question of whether Columbia-class boats should be equipped with 16 or 20 SLBM launch tubes.

Overview

The Navy’s decision to design Columbia-class boats with 16 SLBM tubes rather than 20 was one of several decisions the Navy made to reduce the estimated average procurement cost of boats 2 through 12 in the program to toward the Navy’s target cost of $4.9 billion in FY2010 dollars. Some observers were concerned that designing the Columbia class with 16 tubes rather than 20 would create a risk that U.S. strategic nuclear forces might not have enough capability in the 2030s and beyond to fully perform their deterrent role. These observers noted that to comply with the New Start Treaty limiting strategic nuclear weapons, DOD plans to operate in coming years a force of 14 Trident SSBNs, each with 20 operable SLBM tubes (4 of the 24 tubes on each boat are to be rendered inoperable), for a total of 280 tubes, whereas the Navy in the Columbia-class program is planning a force of 12 SSBNs each with 16 tubes, for a total of 192 tubes, or about 31% less than 280. These observers also cited the uncertainties associated with projecting needs for strategic deterrent forces out to the year 2080, when the final Columbia-class boat is scheduled to leave service. These observers asked whether the plan to design the Columbia class with 16 tubes rather than 20 was fully supported within all parts of DOD, including U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM).

In response, Navy and other DOD officials stated that the decision to design the Columbia class with 16 tubes rather than 20 was carefully considered within DOD, and that they believe a boat

---

111 At a March 30, 2011, hearing before the Strategic Forces subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Admiral Kirkland Donald, Deputy Administrator for Naval Reactors and Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion, National Nuclear Security Administration, when asked for examples cost efficiencies that are being pursued in his programs, stated:

The— the Ohio replacement [program] has been one that we’ve obviously been focused on here for—for several years now. But in the name of the efficiencies, and one of the issues as we work through the Defense Department’s acquisition process, we were the first program through that new process that Dr. [Aston] Carter [the DOD acquisition executive] headed up.

But we were challenged to—to drive the cost of that ship down, and as far as our part was concerned, one of the key decisions that was made that—that helped us in that regard was a decision to go from 20 missile tubes to 16 missile tubes, because what that allowed us to do was to down rate the—the propulsion power that was needed, so obviously, it’s a—a—it’s a small[er] the reactor that you would need.

But what it also allowed us to do was to go back [to the use of existing components]. The size [of the ship] fell into the envelope where we could go back and use components that we had already designed for the Virginia class [attack submarines] and bring those into this design, not have to do it over again, but several of the mechanical components, to use those over again.

And it enabled us to drive the cost of that propulsion plant down and rely on proven technology that’s—pumps and valves and things like that don’t change like electronics do.

So we’re pretty comfortable putting that in ship that’ll be around ’til 2080. But we were allowed to do that.

(Source: Transcript of hearing.)
with 16 tubes will give U.S. strategic nuclear forces enough capability to fully perform their deterrent role in the 2030s and beyond.

Testimony in 2011

At a March 1, 2011, hearing before the House Armed Services Committee, Admiral Gary Roughead, then-Chief of Naval Operations, stated the following:

I’m very comfortable with where we’re going with SSBN-X. The decision and the recommendation that I made with regard to the number of tubes—launch tubes are consistent with the new START treaty. They’re consistent with the missions that I see that ship having to perform. And even though it may be characterized as a cost cutting measure, I believe it sizes the ship for the missions it will perform.112

At a March 2, 2011, hearing before the Strategic Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, the following exchange occurred:

REPRESENTATIVE TURNER:

General Kehler, thank you so much for your continued thoughts and of course your leadership. One item that we had a discussion on was the triad, of looking to—the Ohio-class replacement is really a discussion in the context of the need to modernize the entire triad. And so, first of all, I think that it’s important for us to recognize that that is one piece, an important piece, but a piece of the decision process that we need to go through.

Second, the issue of the number of tubes is not a simple black-and-white answer. So let me just comment here for a minute.

First of all, the issue in my mind is the overall number of tubes we wind up with at the end, not so much as the number of tubes per submarine.

Second, the issue is, of course, we have flexibility and options with how many warheads per missile per tube, so that’s another consideration that enters into this mixture.

Another consideration that is important to me is the overall number of boats and the operational flexibility that we have with the overall number of boats, given that some number will need to be in maintenance, some number will need to be in training, et cetera.

And so those and many other factors—to include a little bit of foresight here, in looking ahead to 20 years from now in antisubmarine warfare environment that the Navy will have to operate in, all of those bear on the ultimate sideways shape configuration of a follow-on to the Ohio.

At this point, Mr. Chairman, I am not overly troubled by going to 16 tubes. As I look at this, given that we have that kind of flexibility that I just laid out; given that this is an

112 Source: Transcript of hearing.
element of the triad and given that we have some decision space here as we go forward to decide on the ultimate number of submarines, nothing troubles me operationally here to the extent that I would oppose a submarine with 16 tubes.

I understand the reasons for wanting to have 20. I understand the arguments that were made ahead of me. But as I sit here today, given the totality of the discussion, I am—as I said, I am not overly troubled by 16. Now, I don’t know that the gavel has been pounded on the other side of the river yet with a final decision, but at this point, I am not overly troubled by 16.\(^{113}\)

At an April 5, 2011, hearing before the Strategic Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, the following exchange occurred:

**REPRESENTATIVE LARSEN:**

General Benedict, we have had this discussion, not you and I, I am sorry. But the subcommittee has had a discussion in the past with regards to the Ohio-class replacement program.

The new START, though, when it was negotiated, assumed a reduction from 24 missile tubes per hole to, I think, a maximum a maximum of 20.

The current configuration [for the Columbia class], as I understand it, would move from 24 to 16.

Can you discuss, for the subcommittee here, the Navy’s rationale for that? For moving from 24 to 16 as opposed to the max of 20?

**NAVY REAR ADMIRAL TERRY BENEDICT, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS (SSP):**

Sir, as part—excuse me, as part of the work-up for the milestone A [review for the Columbia class program] with Dr. Carter in OSD, SSP supported the extensive analysis at both the OSD level as well as STRATCOM’s analysis.

Throughout that process, we provided, from the SWS [strategic weapon system] capability, our perspective. Ultimately that was rolled up into both STRATCOM and OSD and senior Navy leadership and in previous testimony, the secretary of the Navy, the CNO, and General Chilton have all expressed their confidence that the mission of the future, given their perspectives, is they see the environment today can be met with 16.

And so, as the acquisition and the SWS provider, we are prepared to support that decision by leadership, sir.

**REPRESENTATIVE LARSEN:**

Yes.

And your analysis supports—did your analysis that fed into this, did you look at specific numbers then?

**REARD ADMIRAL BENEDICT:**

Sir, we looked at the ability of the system, again, SSP does not look at specific targets with...

**REPRESENTATIVE LARSEN:**

Right. Yes, yes, yes.

\(^{113}\) Source: Transcript of hearing.
REAR ADMIRAL BENEDICT:

Our input was the capability of the missile, the number of re-entry bodies and the throw weight that we can provide against those targets and based on that analysis, the leadership decision was 16, sir.\(^{114}\)

At an April 6, 2011, hearing before the Strategic Forces subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the following exchange occurred:

SENATOR SESSIONS:

Admiral Benedict, according to recent press reports, the Navy rejected the recommendations of Strategic Command to design the next generation of ballistic missile submarines with 20 missile tubes instead of opting for only 16 per boat.

What is the basis for the Navy’s decision of 16? And I'm sure cost is a factor. In what ways will that decision impact the overall nuclear force structure associated with the command?

NAVY REAR ADMIRAL TERRY BENEDICT, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS (SSP):

Yes, sir. SSP supported the Navy analysis, STRATCOM’s analysis, as well as the OSD analysis, as we proceeded forward and towards the Milestone A decision [on the Columbia class program] that Dr. Carter conducted.

Based on our input, which was the technical input as the—as the director of SSP, other factors were considered, as you stated. Cost was one of them. But as the secretary, as the CNO, and I think as General Kehler submitted in their testimony, that given the threats that we see today, given the mission that we see today, given the upload capability of the D-5, and given the environment as they saw today, all three of those leaders were comfortable with the decision to proceed forward with 16 tubes, sir.

SENATOR SESSIONS:

And is that represent your judgment? To what extent were you involved—were you involved in that?

REAR ADMIRAL BENEDICT:

Sir, we were involved from technical aspects in terms of the capability of the missile itself, what we can throw, our range, our capability. And based on what we understand the capability of the D-5 today, which will be the baseline missile for the Ohio Replacement Program, as the director of SSP I'm comfortable with that decision.\(^{115}\)

Section 242 Report

Section 242 of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1540/P.L. 112-81 of December 31, 2011) required DOD to submit a report on the Columbia-class program that includes, among other things, an assessment of various combinations of boat quantities and numbers of SLBM launch tubes per boat. The text of the section is as follows:

SEC. 242. REPORT AND COST ASSESSMENT OF OPTIONS FOR OHIO-CLASS REPLACEMENT BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE.

\(^{114}\) Source: Transcript of hearing.

\(^{115}\) Source: Transcript of hearing.
(a) Report Required- Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Navy and the Commander of the United States Strategic Command shall jointly submit to the congressional defense committees a report on each of the options described in subsection (b) to replace the Ohio-class ballistic submarine program. The report shall include the following:

1. An assessment of the procurement cost and total life-cycle costs associated with each option.
2. An assessment of the ability for each option to meet—
   (A) the at-sea requirements of the Commander that are in place as of the date of the enactment of this Act; and
   (B) any expected changes in such requirements.
3. An assessment of the ability for each option to meet—
   (A) the nuclear employment and planning guidance in place as of the date of the enactment of this Act; and
   (B) any expected changes in such guidance.
4. A description of the postulated threat and strategic environment used to inform the selection of a final option and how each option provides flexibility for responding to changes in the threat and strategic environment.

(b) Options Considered- The options described in this subsection to replace the Ohio-class ballistic submarine program are as follows:

1. A fleet of 12 submarines with 16 missile tubes each.
2. A fleet of 10 submarines with 20 missile tubes each.
3. A fleet of 10 submarines with 16 missile tubes each.
4. A fleet of eight submarines with 20 missile tubes each.
5. Any other options the Secretary and the Commander consider appropriate.

(c) Form- The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

Subsection (c) above states the report “shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.”

The report as submitted was primarily the classified annex, with a one-page unclassified summary, the text of which is as follows (underlining as in the original):

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012 (FY12) directed the Secretary of the Navy and the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) to jointly submit a report to the congressional defense committees comparing four different options for the OHIO Replacement (OR) fleet ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) program. Our assessment considered the current operational requirements and guidance. The four SSBN options analyzed were:

1. 12 SSBNs with 16 missile tubes each
2. 10 SSBNs with 20 missile tubes each
3. 10 SSBNs with 16 missile tubes each
4. 8 SSBNs with 20 missile tubes each

The SSBN force continues to be an integral part of our nuclear Triad and contributes to deterrence through an assured second strike capability that is survivable, reliable, and
credible. The number of SSBNs and their combined missile tube capacity are important factors in our flexibility to respond to changes in the threat and uncertainty in the strategic environment.

We assessed each option against the ability to meet nuclear employment and planning guidance, ability to satisfy at-sea requirements, flexibility to respond to future changes in the postulated threat and strategic environment, and cost. In general, options with more SSBNs can be adjusted downward in response to a diminished threat; however, options with less SSBNs are more difficult to adjust upward in response to a growing threat.

Clearly, a smaller SSBN force would be less expensive than a larger force, but for the reduced force options we assessed, they fail to meet current at-sea and nuclear employment requirements, increase risk in force survivability, and limit flexibility in response to an uncertain strategic future. Our assessment is the program of record, 12 SSBNs with 16 missile tubes each, provides the best balance of performance, flexibility, and cost meeting commander’s requirements while supporting the Nation’s strategic deterrence mission goals and objectives.

The classified annex contains detailed analysis that is not releasable to the public.116

Appendix E. June 2013 Navy Blog Post Regarding Ohio Replacement Options

This appendix presents the text of a June 26, 2013, blog post by Rear Admiral Richard Breckenridge, the Navy’s Director for Undersea Warfare (N97), discussing options that were examined for replacing the Ohio-class SSBNs. The text is as follows:

Over the last five years, the Navy—working with U.S. Strategic Command, the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense—has formally examined various options to replace the Ohio ballistic missile submarines as they retire beginning in 2027. This analysis included a variety of replacement platform options, including designs based on the highly successful Virginia-class attack submarine program and the current Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine. In the end, the Navy elected to pursue a new design that leverages the lessons from the Ohio, the Virginia advances in shipbuilding and improvements in cost-efficiency.

Recently, a variety of writers have speculated that the required survivable deterrence could be achieved more cost effectively with the Virginia-based option or by restarting the Ohio-class SSBN production line. Both of these ideas make sense at face value—which is why they were included among the alternatives assessed—but the devil is in the details. When we examined the particulars, each of these options came up short in both military effectiveness and cost efficiency.

**Virginia-based SSBN design with a Trident II D5 missile.** An SSBN design based on a Virginia-class attack submarine with a large-diameter missile compartment was rejected due to a wide range of shortfalls. It would:

- Not meet survivability (stealth) requirements due to poor hull streamlining and lack of a drive train able to quietly propel a much larger ship
- Not meet at-sea availability requirements due to longer refit times (since equipment is packed more tightly within the hull, it requires more time to replace, repair and retest)
- Not meet availability requirements due to a longer mid-life overhaul (refueling needed)
- Require a larger number of submarines to meet the same operational requirement
- Reduce the deterrent value needed to protect the country (fewer missiles, warheads at-sea)
- Be more expensive than other alternatives due to extensive redesign of Virginia systems to work with the large missile compartment (for example, a taller sail, larger control surfaces and more robust support systems)

We would be spending more money (on more ships) to deliver less deterrence (reduced at-sea warhead presence) with less survivability (platforms that are less stealthy).

**Virginia-based SSBN design with a smaller missile.** Some have encouraged the development of a new, smaller missile to go with a Virginia-based SSBN. This would carry forward many of the shortfalls of a Virginia-based SSBN we just discussed, and add to it a long list of new issues. Developing a new nuclear missile from scratch with an industrial base that last produced a new design more than 20 years ago would be challenging, costly and require extensive testing. We deliberately decided to extend the life of the current missile to decouple and de-risk the complex (and costly) missile development program from the new replacement submarine program. Additionally, a smaller missile means a shorter employment range requiring longer SSBN patrol transits. This would compromise survivability, require more submarines at sea and ultimately
weaken our deterrence effectiveness. With significant cost, technical and schedule risks, there is little about this option that is attractive.

**Ohio-based SSBN design.** Some have argued that we should re-open the Ohio production line and resume building the Ohio design SSBNs. This simply cannot be done because there is no Ohio production line. It has long since been re-tooled and modernized to build state-of-the-art Virginia-class SSNs using computerized designs and modular, automated construction techniques. Is it desirable to redesign the Ohio so that a ship with its legacy performance could be built using the new production facilities? No, since an Ohio-based SSBN would:

- Not provide the required quieting due to Ohio design constraints and use of a propeller instead of a propulsor (which is the standard for virtually all new submarines)
- Require 14 instead of 12 SSBNs by reverting to Ohio class operational availability standards (incidentally creating other issues with the New START treaty limits)
- Suffer from reduced reliability and costs associated with the obsolescence of legacy Ohio system components

Once again, the end result would necessitate procuring more submarines (14) to provide the required at-sea presence and each of them would be less stealthy and less survivable against foreseeable 21st century threats.

**The Right Answer: A new design SSBN that improves on Ohio:** What has emerged from the Navy’s exhaustive analysis is an Ohio replacement submarine that starts with the foundation of the proven performance of the Ohio SSBN, its Trident II D5 strategic weapons system and its operating cycle. To this it adds:

- Enhanced stealth as necessary to pace emerging threats expected over its service life
- Systems commonality with Virginia (pumps, valves, sonars, etc.) wherever possible, enabling cost savings in design, procurement, maintenance and logistics

Modular construction and use of COTS equipment consistent with those used in today’s submarines to reduce the cost of fabrication, maintenance and modernization. Total ownership cost reduction (for example, investing in a life-of-the-ship reactor core enables providing the same at-sea presence with fewer platforms). Although the Ohio replacement is a “new design,” it is in effect an SSBN that takes the best lessons from 50 years of undersea deterrence, from the Ohio, from the Virginia, from advances in shipbuilding efficiency and maintenance, and from the stern realities of needing to provide survivable nuclear deterrence. The result is a low-risk, cost-effective platform capable of smoothly transitioning from the Ohio and delivering effective 21st century undersea strategic deterrence.117

**Author Contact Information**

(name redacted)
Specialist in Naval Affairs
[redacted]@crs.loc.gov

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) is a federal legislative branch agency, housed inside the Library of Congress, charged with providing the United States Congress non-partisan advice on issues that may come before Congress.

EveryCRSReport.com republishes CRS reports that are available to all Congressional staff. The reports are not classified, and Members of Congress routinely make individual reports available to the public.

Prior to our republication, we redacted names, phone numbers and email addresses of analysts who produced the reports. We also added this page to the report. We have not intentionally made any other changes to any report published on EveryCRSReport.com.

CRS reports, as a work of the United States government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Information in a CRS report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to members of Congress in connection with CRS’ institutional role.

EveryCRSReport.com is not a government website and is not affiliated with CRS. We do not claim copyright on any CRS report we have republished.