Updated December 18, 2018
Defense Primer: Information Operations
Information Warfare
Unlike PSYOP, which are intended to influence and
While there is currently no official U.S. government
persuade, MILDEC is intended to deceive.
definition of information warfare (IW), practitioners
typically conceptualize it as a strategy for the use and
In 2010, PSYOP became military information support
management of information to pursue a competitive
operations (MISO), to reflect a broader range of activities
advantage, including both offensive and defensive
and the existing Military Information Support Teams
operations. Strategy can be defined as the process of
consisting of PSYOP personnel deployed at U.S. embassies
planning to achieve objectives and goals in the national
overseas. Joint Publication 3-13.2 replaced the term
interest. Operations link strategic objectives with tactics,
psychological operations with military information support
techniques, and procedures. For IW strategy, that link is
operations to “more accurately reflect and convey the
information operations (IO).
nature of planned peacetime or combat operations
activities.” The name change reportedly caused
Information Operations
administrative confusion, and the services are beginning to
Current and past definitions within the DOD have
revert to the PSYOP label.
conceptualized IO, as opposed to IW, as a purely military
activity involving a set of tactics or capabilities. In DOD
With the advent of U.S. Cyber Command, CNO became
Joint Publication 3-13 and the IO Roadmap, IO consisted of
cyberspace operations, offensive and defensive with its own
five pillars: computer network operations (CNO), which
doctrine in JP 3-12.
include computer network attack, computer network
defense, and computer network exploitation; psychological
The Secretary of Defense now characterizes IO in JP 3-13
operations (PSYOP); electronic warfare (EW); operations
as “the integrated employment, during military operations,
security (OPSEC); and military deception (MILDEC).
of information-related capabilities in concert with other
lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp
Computer network operations support IO with
the decision making of adversaries and potential
dissemination assets and the capabilities to deny or degrade
adversaries while protecting our own.” This definition
and adversary’s ability to access, report, process, or
shifts the focus from a set of tactics toward the desired
disseminate information.
effects and how to achieve them. JP 3-13 defines
information-related capability as a tool, technique, or
Psychological operations are central to IO. PSYOP has
activity employed within a dimension of the information
been defined in DOD doctrine as “planned political,
environment that can be used to create effects and
economic, military, and ideological activities directed
operationally desirable conditions.
towards foreign countries, organizations, and individuals in
order to create emotions, attitudes, understanding, beliefs,
Strategic communication, public diplomacy and public and
and behavior favorable to the achievement of United States
civil affairs, and cyberspace operations may be considered
and military objectives.”
supporting capabilities. These efforts may take place in and
throughout each of the global domains of air, land, sea,
Electronic Warfare represents military action involving
space, and cyberspace, and in various forms unrelated to
the use of electromagnetic and directed energy (e.g.,
cyberspace such as dropping pamphlets, cultural exchanges,
through radio, infrared, or radar) to control the
jamming or broadcasting targeted communications, and
electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. EW
foreign aid programs. Military Information Support
platforms provide a means of disseminating messages and
Operations are one of Special Operations Forces’ (SOF’s)
shaping the information environment through the electronic
core activities, but IO is not the exclusive purview of SOF.
dissemination of products.
Types of Information
Operations Security is a systematic method to identify,
In common parlance, the term “disinformation campaign” is
control, and protect critical information and analyze
often used interchangeably with information operations.
friendly actions associated with military operations and
However, disinformation or deception is only one of the
other activities. In an IO context, OPSEC is the protection
informational tools that comprise an IW strategy; factual
of plans and messages prior to execution through the proper
information can also be used to achieve strategic goals and
use of information security, information assurance, physical
in some cases more effectively than deceptive means.
security, and operations security.
Different categories of information that may be used in IO
include the following:
Military Deception involves actions that are executed to
deliberately mislead adversary military decisionmakers
Propaganda: This means the propagation of an idea or
about U.S. military capabilities, intentions, and operations.
narrative that is intended to influence, similar to
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Defense Primer: Information Operations
psychological or influence operations. It can be misleading
In JP 3-12, DOD defines cyberspace as “the global domain
but true, and may include stolen information. A government
within the information environment consisting of the
communicating its intent, policies, and values through
interdependent network of information technology
speeches, press releases, and other public affairs can be
infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet,
considered propaganda.
telecommunications networks, computer systems, and
embedded processors and controllers.” Some have
Misinformation: This is the spreading of unintentionally
criticized this as lacking the cognitive, human element that
false information. Examples include Internet trolls who
the internet represents, which in turn could adversely affect
spread unfounded conspiracy theories or web hoaxes
how the military organizes, trains, and equips for IO in
through social media, believing them to be true.
cyberspace. Additionally, there are concerns that the split
between IO and cyberspace operations in doctrine and
Disinformation: Unlike misinformation, disinformation is
organization creates a stovepipe effect that hinders
intentionally false. Examples include planting false news
coordination of these closely related capabilities.
stories in the media and tampering with private and/or
classified communications before their widespread release.
Who Is Responsible for the “I” in DIME?
Within the U.S. government, much of the current
All of these activities take place within the information
information operations doctrine and capability resides with
environment, which is the aggregate of individuals,
the military. Many consider DOD to be relatively well-
organizations, and systems that collect, disseminate or act
funded, leading some to posit that the epicenter for all IW
on information. This includes:
activities should be the Pentagon. Some fear that military
leadership of the IW sphere represents the militarization of
The Physical layer: Command and control systems and
cyberspace, or the weaponization of information. Title 10
associated infrastructure.
U.S.C. 2241 prohibits DOD from domestic “publicity or
propaganda,” although the terms are undefined. It is unclear
The Informational layer: Networks and systems where how IW/IO relate to this so-called military propaganda ban.
information is stored.
Information Operations as an Act of War?
The Cognitive layer: The minds of people who
Some have questioned whether tampering with, interfering
transmit and respond to information.
with, or otherwise influencing a sovereign nation’s
democratic processes in an IW campaign is an act of war
All instruments of national power—diplomatic,
that could trigger a military response, and not necessarily in
informational, military, and economic (DIME)—can be
cyberspace. A similar question is whether a cyberattack that
projected and employed in the information environment.
falls below the threshold of damage and destruction that a
kinetic event would impart could be considered an armed
Cyber-Enabled Information Operations
attack under international law.
Cyberspace presents a force multiplier for IW activities.
Social media and botnets can amplify a message or
Relevant Statutes
narrative, using all three elements of information to foment
discord and confusion in a target audience. Much of today’s
Title 10, U.S. Code, Armed Forces, Section 164: Organize and
IO is conducted in cyberspace, leading many to associate
employ commands and forces.
IO with cybersecurity. Within DOD, however, IO and
Title 50, U.S. Code, War and National Defense, Section 3093:
cyberspace operations are distinct doctrinal activities.
Secure US interests by conducting covert actions.
Cyberspace operations can be used to achieve strategic
information warfare goals; an offensive cyberattack, for
CRS Reports
example, may be used to create psychological effects in a
target population. A foreign country may use cyberattacks
CRS Report R45142, Information Warfare: Issues for Congress,
to influence decisionmaking and change behaviors, for
by Catherine A. Theohary.
example the DPRK-attributed cyberattacks on Sony in late
2014. Cyber operations may be conducted for other
Other Resources
information operations purposes, such as to disable or deny
DOD. Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations,
access to an adversary’s lines of communication or to
November 27, 2012.
demonstrate ability as a deterrent.
DOD. Defense Directive 3600.01, Information Operations, May
2, 2013.
IO may be overt, such as a government’s production and
dissemination of materials intended to convey democratic
values. In this case, the government sponsorship of such
activity is known. Covert operations are those in which
government sponsorship is denied if exposed. The
Catherine A. Theohary, Specialist in National Security
anonymity afforded by cyberspace presents an ideal
Policy, Cyber and Information Operations
battlespace to conduct covert information operations.
IF10771
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Defense Primer: Information Operations
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