Updated December 11, 2018
Defense Primer: Command and Control of Nuclear Forces
The U.S. President has sole authority to authorize the use of
enduring” warning about attacks on the United States, its
U.S. nuclear weapons. This authority is inherent in his
allies, and its forces overseas.
constitutional role as Commander in Chief. The President
can seek counsel from his military advisors; those advisors
In a scenario where the system identifies an attack or an
are then required to transmit and implement the orders
anomalous event, the President would participate in an
authorizing nuclear use. But, as General John Hyten, the
emergency communications conference with the Secretary
Commander of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM),
of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
noted during his September 2016 confirmation hearing, his
other military advisors. They would offer the President
job is to give advice, while the authority to order a launch
details and an assessment of the possible incoming attack,
lies with the president.
while the STRATCOM Commander would explain the
President’s options for a retaliatory attack.
The President does not need the concurrence of either his
military advisors or the U.S. Congress to order the launch
The President would then evaluate and respond to the
of nuclear weapons. In addition, neither the military nor
information provided in the conference, then decide
Congress can overrule these orders. As former
whether to authorize the use of U.S. nuclear weapons. He
STRATCOM Commander General Robert Kehler has
would communicate his choices and provide this
noted, members of the military are bound by the Uniform
authorization through a communications device known as
Code of Military Justice “to follow orders provided they are
the nuclear “football”—a suitcase carried by a military aid
legal and have come from competent authority.” But
who is always near the President. The suitcase is equipped
questions about the legality of the order—whether it is
with communication tools and a book with prepared war
consistent with the requirements, under the laws of armed
plans for certain targets. The President could choose from
conflict (LOAC), for necessity, proportionality, and
these prepared plans or, time permitting, ask STRATCOM
distinction—are more likely to lead to consultations and
to prepare an alternative.
changes in the President’s order than to a refusal by the
military to execute the order. The President could delegate
If the President did choose to respond with a nuclear attack,
the authority to authorize the use of nuclear weapons to
he would identify himself to military officials at the
others in the chain-of-command (an option considered
Pentagon with codes unique to him. These codes are
necessary during the Cold War), but they also could not
recorded on an ID card, known as the “biscuit,” that the
overrule the President.
President carries at all times. He would then transmit the
launch order to the Pentagon and STRATCOM. The
The Nuclear Command and Control
Secretary of Defense would possibly contribute the process
System (NCCS)
by confirming that the order came from the President, but
According to the Nuclear Matters Handbook, published by
this role could also be filled by an officer in the National
the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Military Command Center at the Pentagon. STRATCOM
Nuclear Matters, the elements of the nuclear command and
would implement the order by preparing to launch the
control system (NCCS) “support the President, through his
weapons needed for the selected option. According to
military commanders, in exercising presidential authority
Bruce Blair, an expert on U.S. command and control, once
over U.S. nuclear weapons operations.” The system relies
the order is “transmitted to the war room, they would
on “a collection of activities, processes, and procedures
execute it in a minute or so.” If an immediate response was
performed by appropriate military commanders and support
selected, “the (land-based) Minuteman missiles will fire in
personnel that, through the chain of command, allow for
two minutes. The submarines will fire in 15 minutes.” Blair
senior-level decisions on nuclear weapons employment.”
also notes that there is no way to reverse the order.
Specifically, the NCCS provides the President “with the
means to authorize the use of nuclear weapons in a crisis
Options for Nuclear Use
and to prevent unauthorized or accidental use.”
As General Michael Hayden, the former director of the CIA
noted, the system “is designed for speed and decisiveness.
The NCCS collects information on threats to the United
It’s not designed to debate the decision.” Long-range
States, communicates that information through the chain of
missiles attacking the United States from Russian territory
command to the President, advises the President on options
could reach U.S. territory in around 30 minutes; sea-based
for a response, communicates the President’s chosen
systems deployed closer to U.S shores might arrive in half
response to the forces in the field, and controls the targeting
that time. If the United States wanted to retaliate before
and application of those forces. The process begins with the
U.S. weapons, or, more importantly, the U.S. command and
radars, satellites, and processing systems that provide
control system, were degraded by an attack, then the entire
“unambiguous, reliable, accurate, timely, survivable, and
process of identifying, assessing, communicating, deciding,
and launching would have to take place in less than that
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Defense Primer: Command and Control of Nuclear Forces
amount of time. Given that some time would be needed for
where the threat of a massive nuclear attack seems more
mechanical or administrative steps, analysts estimate that
remote than during the Cold War, they argue that the
the President would have less than 10 minutes to absorb the
President could take the time to consult with Congress
information, review his options, and make his decision.
before launching nuclear weapons in less extreme
circumstances.
The United States planned for such a scenario during the
Cold War, when the Soviet Union deployed thousands of
Some analysts outside the U.S. government have also
nuclear warheads that could reach the United States. U.S.
questioned whether the United States should retain the
doctrine argued that, to deter a Soviet attack, the United
option to launch nuclear weapons promptly because, they
States would need to be able to retaliate even if the Soviet
argue, the time pressures could lead to the accidental or
Union launched a massive attack with little warning. This
inadvertent start of a nuclear war. They note that the United
scenario, and the short time lines, would have provided the
States received false warning of nuclear attack several times
President with the option of launching U.S. weapons before
during the Cold War, and if the President had responded to
most of the attacking warheads detonated on U.S. soil.
that warning within the 30-minute time line of a nuclear
attack, it would have triggered global nuclear war. If the
But, even during the Cold War, an attack or anomalous
President could not launch the weapons in such haste, he
event was not the only possible scenario for the start of a
would necessarily have the time to wait for more accurate
nuclear war, and a massive U.S. response launched in under
or less ambiguous information.
30 minutes was not the only option available to the
President. If the nuclear war escalated out of a conflict in
Others, however, argue that there is nothing inherently
Europe, or if the Soviet Union launched a more measured
destabilizing or dangerous in the prompt launch options.
attack, the President might have more time to assess the
The President already has options to delay a response and
threat and determine his response. Moreover, because U.S.
await additional information. In addition, in the current
bombers could fly away from their bases earlier in a crisis
security environment, a President and his advisors would be
or conflict and U.S. submarine-based missiles might
unlikely to interpret ambiguous warning information as
survive an attack on U.S. territory, the President could
evidence of an all-out attack from Russia or another nation.
decide to delay the U.S. response. Nevertheless, some
Instead, they note that the presence of both prompt and
analysts have speculated that a launch under attack was the
delayed options bolsters deterrence by providing the
dominant option during the Cold War, and that the
President with the flexibility to choose the appropriate
command and control system was designed to permit such a
response to an attack on the United States or its allies.
prompt launch of U.S. nuclear weapons.
Legislation
The United States has reviewed and revised its nuclear
employment plans several times since the end of the Cold
H.R. 669, Restricting First Use of Nuclear Weapons Act of
War. According to unclassified reports, these reviews have
2017
added options to the plans available to the President. While
some options probably still provide responses to an attack
from a nation, like Russia, with a large nuclear force, others
might provide for more measured and discriminate attacks.
CRS Products
In addition, even though the plans likely include options for
CRS Report RL33640, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background,
a prompt response in the face of an unexpected attack, they
Developments, and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf
also likely have options for delayed responses. As a result,
although the prompt launch options that may have
dominated U.S. planning during the Cold War may no
longer dominate U.S. nuclear war plans.
Other Resources
Another scenario could see the United States choose to use
DOD. Nuclear Matters Handbook. April 2016.
nuclear weapons prior to a nuclear attack against the United
States or its allies, on a time line that did not reflect an
Steve Liewer, “A Nuclear Decision: As global tension builds,
imminent nuclear attack against the United States. The
voters must choose which candidate they trust with the
United States has never declared a “no first use” policy, and
codes," Omaha World Herald, November 1, 2016.
the President could order the first use of nuclear weapons.
Jeffrey Lewis, “U.S. presidents are currently given a four-
As noted above, his military advisors may seek to adjust his
minute window to decide whether or not to initiate an
orders to meet the laws of armed conflict, but there is,
irreversible apocalypse,” Foreign Policy, August 5, 2016.
otherwise, no legal barrier to first use.
Peter Huessy, “The Prompt Launch Scare,” Real Clear Defense,
November 9, 2016.
Recently, some Members of Congress and analysts outside
government have questioned whether the Commander-in-
Chief should have the sole authority to launch a nuclear
attack in all circumstances. They agree that the President
Amy F. Woolf, Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy
would not have the time to consult with Congress or seek
approval from other officials if the United States were
IF10521
under attack with nuclear weapons. But, in an environment
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Defense Primer: Command and Control of Nuclear Forces
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