Updated September 19, 2018
Conflict in Mali
Mali faces intertwined security and governance challenges.
Figure 1. Mali at a Glance
The government signed a peace accord with northern
separatists in 2015, but key provisions remain un-
implemented. Signatory armed groups continue to assert
territorial control in much of the vast desert north. At the
same time, an Islamist insurgency has spread from the north
into previously stable central Mali, where jihadists have
leveraged interethnic grievances and local resentment
toward state actors. The capital, Bamako, has also been
targeted in terrorist attacks. Rebel, terrorist, communal, and
criminal networks are fluid and shifting, posing an obstacle
to conflict resolution. Some Malians have proposed peace
talks with jihadist groups, but the government and Western
donors have rejected the idea.
These challenges have severely undermined already
daunting development prospects in Mali, one of the world’s
poorest countries. Recurrent droughts, poor infrastructure,
high population growth, and land degradation underlie
endemic food insecurity. Security threats and limited donor
funding have further constrained humanitarian relief. As of
mid-2018, more than 75,000 Malians were internally
displaced and over 140,000 were refugees in neighboring

states—more refugees than at the height of Mali’s north-
Source: CRS graphic; CIA World Factbook and IMF data (2018).
south war in 2012-2013. Insecurity and a lack of basic
services in northern Mali have impeded refugee returns.
Background: Mali’s 2011-2013 Crisis
President Ibrahim Boubacar Kéïta won reelection to a
Mali’s complex 2011-2013 crisis devastated the military,
second five-year term in August 2018, but the contest was
central government institutions, and northern populations.
marred by low turnout and procedural irregularities.
The crisis began when members of the semi-nomadic
Security incidents disrupted or prevented voting in
Tuareg minority launched a separatist rebellion in the north.
hundreds of polling stations, many of them in central Mali.
They leveraged flows of fighters and arms from war-torn
Kéïta’s margin of victory and the number of votes cast for
Libya, as well as support from a local group linked to Al
him were lower than his inaugural election in 2013, which
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), an Algerian-led
restored civilian government after a military coup. These
regional terrorist network. In early 2012, soldiers angered
trends may suggest declining confidence in the electoral
by their leaders’ mishandling of the war ousted Mali’s
process and political elites. Corruption scandals have
elected president in a coup. The northern rebels took
undermined citizens’ faith in Kéïta’s leadership, as has his
advantage of the ensuing military collapse to unilaterally
government’s inability to improve living standards, bolster
declare an independent state of “Azawad.” By mid-2012,
security, or reassert full control of the north.
however, AQIM and its local allies and offshoots had
Foreign troops have deployed to Mali in an effort to bolster
outmaneuvered the separatists to assert control over the
stability and counter terrorism. Over 1,000 French troops
north, an area about the size of Texas. These events
are in Mali under an enduring regional counterterrorism
displaced hundreds of thousands and exacerbated a
operation, Barkhane. The U.N. Multidimensional Integrated
drought-related regional humanitarian emergency.
Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is tasked with
In early 2013, citing a sudden southward jihadist advance,
protecting civilians and supporting the peace process. The
France deployed its military to oust jihadists from northern
European Union (EU) has a multi-year program to train and
towns. The United States provided logistical support, while
restructure the Malian military. In 2017, the G5 Sahel—a
Chadian soldiers aided French ground operations. Separatist
regional grouping of Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Burkina
rebels then reasserted control over some of the territory
Faso, and Chad—launched a “joint force” to counter
vacated by Islamist groups. A mid-2013 ceasefire between
security threats in border regions. The initiative has
the transitional government and rebel groups paved the way
received donor backing but has conducted few operations to
for elections and peace talks. MINUSMA deployed and
date. A large terrorist attack targeting the G5 operational
absorbed an African Union (AU) intervention force. Kéïta,
headquarters in central Mali in June 2018 highlighted
a veteran politician, was elected in late 2013, and his
ongoing challenges for the force.
coalition won a majority in parliament.
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Conflict in Mali
A Stalled Peace Accord
international targets, including at a Bamako resort in June
The signatories to the 2015 peace agreement, mediated by
2017, in the capital of neighboring Burkina Faso in March
Algeria, are the Malian government and two rival northern
2018, and at the G5 force headquarters in central Mali in
armed group coalitions. The Coordination of Azawad
June 2018. A separate Mali-based AQIM offshoot is
Movements (CMA), whose stronghold is in far-north Kidal
affiliated with the Islamic State; it claimed the deadly attack
province, comprises pro-independence factions, while the
on U.S. soldiers in Niger in October 2017.
Platform, based in the ethnically diverse northeastern Gao
Malian soldiers have been implicated in grave human rights
region, comprises groups that oppose the separatist cause.
abuses during counterinsurgency operations in central Mali,
These groups have periodically fought each other, and the
while the involvement of ethnic militia groups in state-
Platform is sometimes seen as a government proxy. Various
backed and French-led anti-terrorist operations has
new and splinter factions have emerged since 2015, some
apparently heightened interethnic tensions in the north and
pledging support for the accord (“compliant” groups).
center. A 2018 study by the U.S. Holocaust Memorial
The accord aims to increase the political autonomy and
Museum warned that overlapping violence by jihadists,
representation of northerners; foster the integration of rebel
Malian security forces, and communal self-defense groups
fighters into the state security forces; and encourage
could spur mass atrocities. These dynamics may also
development, justice, and reconciliation, among other goals.
amplify local recruitment by extremist groups who offer
However, signatory armed groups have yet to demobilize,
means of communal defense and retribution.
while progress toward decentralization, justice sector
U.N. Peacekeeping Operation
reform, the investigation of human rights abuses, and
The U.N. Security Council extended MINUSMA’s mandate
infrastructure improvements in the north has been slow and
for a year in June 2018, maintaining its troop ceiling of
halting. A lack of capacity and flagging political will on the
13,289 military personnel and 1,920 police. The mandate
part of the government and armed group signatories are key
emphasizes peace accord implementation as the mission’s
factors, as are efforts by spoilers, including jihadists, to
preeminent “strategic priority,” followed by support for the
undermine the peace process.
restoration of state authority in central Mali, facilitation of
The structure of the north-south peace process arguably
reconciliation, protection of civilians and stabilization,
contained seeds of Mali’s continued destabilization. Many
promotion of human rights, and facilitation of humanitarian
of the signatories are veterans of past conflicts who have
aid. MINUSMA faces stark logistical challenges and has
passed in and out of the government, military, and proxy
the highest fatality rate among active U.N. peacekeeping
militias for decades. Civil society groups have not
missions. European troops serve in the mission, but most of
meaningfully participated in implementation of the deal.
the largest contingents are from impoverished African
The accord commits the parties to concessions that are
countries. MINUSMA does not have a mandate for
unpopular among their respective constituencies. Moreover,
offensive counterterrorism operations, despite requests by
in granting largely Tuareg- and Arab-led armed groups a
the government of Mali and the AU. The Security Council
seat at the table, the process arguably incentivized taking up
has authorized MINUSMA to provide logistical support to
arms while alienating those (such as Fulani communities in
the G5 force, but only on a cost-reimbursable basis.
central and northeastern Mali) who feel themselves to be
U.S. Policy and Aid
victims of both the state and ethnic rivals. The U.N.
U.S. officials have called for Malians to implement the
Security Council has authorized sanctions against those
2015 peace accord and marginalize violent extremist
undermining peace in Mali, but has not designated anyone
groups. U.S. bilateral aid, totaling an estimated $132
to date. (Some Malian actors are designated under a
million in FY2017, aims to support development, health
separate terrorism-related regime.) In August 2018, U.N.
programs, conflict mitigation, improved governance, and
sanctions monitors issued a report alleging the involvement
military professionalism. The United States also provides
of Malian signatory and compliant armed group elements in
humanitarian aid ($48 million in FY2017), financial support
terrorist activities, drug trafficking, and ethnic conflict.
for MINUSMA ($271 million in FY2017), bilateral training
Islamist Insurgency
and equipment for African troops deploying under
Despite territorial losses in 2013, AQIM and its Malian
MINUSMA, and logistical support for French military
allies have proven resilient, able to leverage the evolving
operations. Twenty-six U.S. military personnel participate
conflict to their advantage and to withstand strikes by
in MINUSMA, the largest number in any U.N. mission.
Operation Barkhane. Islamist armed groups regularly attack
Mali participates in the State Department-led Trans-Sahara
U.N., French, humanitarian, and Malian state personnel in
Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), but it has not been
the north. Central Mali has seen the rise of an AQIM-allied
a major regional recipient of U.S. counterterrorism (CT) aid
Fulani-led Islamist insurgency. Terrorist groups have also
since the 2012 coup. Instead, U.S. security assistance for
attacked “soft” targets in and around Bamako, including a
Mali has focused on defense sector reform and urban crisis-
siege at a hotel in November 2015 in which 19 civilians—
response, while Mali’s neighbors (such as Niger,
one of them an American—were killed. In 2017, AQIM’s
Mauritania, and Burkina Faso) have received significant CT
Sahel branch, AQIM’s offshoot Al Murabitoun, and two
tactical training and equipment. The State Department has
Malian groups merged to form Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal
pledged over $100 million in military aid for the G5 force
Muslimeen (JNIM, “Union for Supporting Islam and
initiative, but Mali is not expected to be a major recipient.
Muslims”). U.S.-designated terrorist Iyad Ag Ghaly, a
Malian Tuareg, heads the coalition. The State Department
Alexis Arieff, Specialist in African Affairs
designated JNIM a Foreign Terrorist Organization in
IF10116
September 2018. JNIM has claimed attacks on Malian and
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Conflict in Mali


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10116 · VERSION 7 · UPDATED

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