March 16, 2018
Flashpoints in Syria and Iraq Create Challenges for U.S. Policy
Interconnected active and latent armed conflicts in Syria
lucrative oil fields. U.S. force protection strikes in response
and Iraq involving a range of domestic groups and
reportedly killed dozens of fighters, including some Russian
international actors could further destabilize the region and
nationals. Russian officials stated that no Russian armed
create evolving policy challenges for U.S. policymakers.
forces personnel were killed, and suggested that the Asad-
Related instability gives Iran opportunities to expand its
linked forces did not coordinate their attack with Moscow.
influence and could lead to resurgence of the Islamic State
Turkish Operations in Afrin
(IS, also known as ISIS/ISIL), which has lost control over
nearly all of the territory it once occupied. Several incidents
Turkey’s military operations in Syria began with an
in 2018 have focused attention on this complex, dynamic
offensive against IS-held territory in August 2016, and
environment, complicating U.S. priorities and policies.
expanded to the Kurdish-held territory of Afrin in January
2018. Afrin is administered by the People’s Protection
Israeli Strikes in Syria
Units (Kurdish acronym YPG), a group that Turkey views
Since 2012, Israel reportedly has conducted dozens of
as a direct extension of the PKK (a U.S.-designated Foreign
airstrikes in Syria. Initially, these focused mainly on
Terrorist Organization that has waged a decades-long
preventing the transfer of weapons to Hezbollah in
insurgency against Turkey). Asad-linked militias may be
Lebanon. However, because Iran-backed forces and Russia
indirectly aiding the YPG in Afrin, but giving the regime a
have strengthened the Syrian regime’s position
foothold there could undermine the Kurdish goal of
considerably since late 2015, Iran’s posture toward Israel
autonomy.
from Syria appears to have grown more assertive.
Outside of Afrin, the United States has partnered with the
Consequently, Israeli strikes in the past two years have also
YPG—whose commanders and fighters have been core
focused on preventing Iran from establishing bases or
elements of SDF forces—against the Islamic State. Turkish
weapons factories in Syria, or “opening new terror fronts”
officials have stated their intention to extend military
along Israel’s northern border. A February 2018 cross-
operations eastward from Afrin, and the town of Manbij has
border incident highlighted the possibility that Israel’s
emerged as a focal point of U.S.-Turkish tensions. (Turkish
limited strikes against Iran-backed forces to enforce its
officials argue that U.S. promises made in 2016 that YPG
“redlines” could expand into wider conflict, particularly in
elements would withdraw from Manbij have not been
cases of miscalculation by one or both sides.
fulfilled.) U.S. forces have deployed in and around Manbij
The reported exchange of fire, apparently sparked by the
since at least March 2017. A series of high-level U.S.-
entry of an Iranian drone into Israeli airspace, caused Israel
Turkey meetings that took place in February 2018
to down the drone and retaliate against its Iranian operators
established a mechanism for resolving tensions. Doing so
in central Syria. When a Syrian air defense battery shot
may prove difficult given apparent gaps between U.S. and
down an Israeli F-16 in Israeli airspace (the first loss of an
Turkish priorities in Syria.
Israeli jet in combat since 1982), Israel responded by
Security and Internal Disputes in Iraq
destroying a number of Syrian air defense units and Iranian
Iraqi leaders declared victory against the Islamic State in
facilities in Syria. Reports indicate that Israel’s reprisal may
December 2017 but face ongoing IS insurgent attacks.
have been more extensive, if not for a Russian demand to
Tensions also persist between the national government and
limit its scope. Advanced Russian air defenses deployed in
the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)—the United
Syria have the potential to challenge Israeli air superiority.
States’ principal security partners.
Actions since February seem to indicate that neither Israel
nor Iran and its allies seek a broader military confrontation
In September 2017, the KRG held a referendum on
at present, but miscalculation remains a risk.
independence, in spite of opposition from the U.S. and Iraqi
Conflict Along the Euphrates
governments and Iraq’s neighbors. Kurds overwhelmingly
backed independence, but in October 2017 the Iraqi
The U.S.-supported Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have
government returned security forces, including volunteer
captured much of northeastern Syria north of the Euphrates
Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), to long-disputed areas
River from the Islamic State. Forces aligned with the
between the constitutionally recognized Kurdistan region
government of Syrian President Bashar al Asad, including
and the rest of Iraq. This included areas secured by Kurdish
from Russia and Iran, have taken much of the territory
forces after the 2014 IS offensive, such as oil-rich Kirkuk.
south of the river, leading to a situation in which the two
PMF units are set to be incorporated into Iraq’s military
sides share a fluid de facto line of control (or “deconfliction
chain of command, but the presence of some Iran-supported
line”) that mostly corresponds to the river. Clashes between
Shia PMF units may exacerbate inter-communal tensions.
the two sides fuel risks of a more general escalation. Such
National elections in Iraq planned for May could reshape
clashes include a February 2018 incident near Deir ez Zor
the balance of political forces, with implications for
that reportedly involved a large column of Asad-linked
Baghdad-KRG relations, KRG leadership, stabilization, and
forces advancing on SDF positions outside the city near
the continued deployment of U.S. military personnel.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Flashpoints in Syria and Iraq Create Challenges for U.S. Policy
Figure 1. Entangled Regional Conflicts
Source: CRS using ESRI and State Department data, Areas of Influence derived from IHS Markit Conflict Monitor data, March 12, 2018.
Possible IS Resurgence
are necessary to accomplish those missions? What
In February 2018, the U.S. intelligence community told
authorities govern the presence of U.S. forces in both
Congress that the Islamic State “has started—and probably
countries, and to what extent, if any, should they be
will maintain—a robust insurgency in Iraq and Syria as part
revisited to reflect political or military developments?
of a long-term strategy to ultimately enable the
Security Cooperation. What support should the United
reemergence of its so-called caliphate.”
States provide to its state and non-state partners? On what
In Iraq, U.S. officials describe the Islamic State as having
terms? How effective are measures intended to prevent
reverted to an “underground insurgency,” and reports
weapons provided to U.S. partners from falling into the
describe ongoing clashes between government forces and
hands of third parties (e.g., PMF or IS) or from being used
IS fighters in northern and western areas. Stabilization and
against other U.S. partners (e.g., SDF and Turkey)? How
reconstruction needs are considerable, and relative unity
can the United States reconcile tactical support for the YPG
among Iraqis that came from confronting the Islamic State
in Syria with Turkish concerns? Can Israel sufficiently
has frayed in the run-up to national elections.
prevent, deter, or defend against missile threats from Iran,
Hezbollah, and others? Are current Jordanian capabilities
Officials from members of the U.S.-led anti-IS coalition
sufficient to defend against incursions into its territory
have noted that despite the Islamic State’s loss of territory
and/or airspace (by IS, Iran, or others)?
in Syria, it retains the ability to launch successful surprise
offensives and retake ground from Syrian government
Reconstruction. To what extent and on what terms should
forces. Moreover, some IS fighters have fled west into
the United States provide grants or loans for reconstruction
Syrian government-controlled territory, where coalition
efforts in Syria and Iraq? What are the reasons (strategic,
officials have stated that they do not intend to operate. This
legal, political, moral, or otherwise) for or against? What
raises the possibility that the group could reemerge in areas
considerations should underpin how the U.S. determines
of Syria outside the coalition’s operating space. U.S.
partners through whom it might disperse development and
officials have warned that the Turkish operation in Afrin is
reconstruction assistance in Syria and Iraq?
“detracting from our efforts against ISIS” by diverting SDF
Regional Dynamics. How much of a priority is addressing
attention and resources, leading to an “operational pause” in
Iran’s influence in the region? Should the U.S. goal be
the anti-IS campaign. Clashes between the SDF and Asad-
containment of Iran, or rollback of its regional reach? What
linked forces, like those in Deir ez Zor, further reduce the
means should the United States use, if any, to counter Iran?
space for effective anti-IS cooperation.
How might Iran respond? Does Iran’s presence in Syria
Potential Questions for Congress
complicate Israel’s traditional defense posture/prerogatives?
How likely and imminent is conflict between Iran-backed
The Trump Administration is requesting additional funding
forces and Israel? What form(s) might such a conflict take?
and extensions of existing authorities to address some of
How do Iranian and Russian interests in the region align
these interrelated security challenges. As Members of
with each other and with those of the Asad regime? How do
Congress fund, help shape, and oversee executive branch
those interests differ?
actions, they may consider some questions, including:
U.S. Strategy. What are the principal U.S. strategic
Clayton Thomas, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
interests in Syria and Iraq? How do actions in pursuit of
some goals shape the context in which others are pursued?
IF10849
U.S. Military Presence. What missions have U.S. forces
been given in Syria and Iraq, and how many U.S. personnel
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Flashpoints in Syria and Iraq Create Challenges for U.S. Policy
Disclaimer
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10849 · VERSION 2 · NEW