Updated November 6, 2017
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab (aka Harakat Shabaab al Mujahidin, or
Zawahiri. Al Shabaab’s leadership have maintained
Mujahidin Youth Movement) is an insurgent and terrorist
allegiance to Al Qaeda despite defections by small factions
group that evolved out of a militant wing of Somalia’s
of fighters to the Islamic State (IS/ISIS).
Council of Islamic Courts in the mid-2000s. In its formative
Objectives
years, Al Shabaab drew on historical anti-Ethiopian
sentiment among Somalis for recruits and support,
Al Shabaab broadly ascribes to an irredentist and
including among the Somali diaspora in the United States
religiously driven vision of uniting ethnic Somali-inhabited
and Europe. Ethiopia intervened in Somalia in 2006 to oust
areas of Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Somalia under an
the council’s nascent government. Al Shabaab held
Islamist government. Its leaders have also repeatedly
significant territory in south-central Somalia, including the
expressed their commitment to the global jihad movement,
capital, Mogadishu, in the late 2000s, until the U.N.-
although there is some question as to how committed some
authorized African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
Somali foot soldiers are to this aspect of its agenda.
gained momentum against the insurgency through a series
The group has justified its attacks outside Somalia as
of military offensives in 2011-2012. Al Shabaab continues
retaliation for participation in, or support for, AMISOM
to wage an asymmetric campaign against the Somali
and/or as retribution for alleged abuses against Muslims in
government, AMISOM, and international targets in
Somalia and the broader region. Its operations in Kenya
Somalia. It has killed thousands of Somali civilians.
appear focused on sowing internal dissent and fear and on
While Al Shabaab has primarily focused on its agenda in
fomenting a domestic insurgency. Its April 2015 attack on a
Somalia, it has also threatened the countries contributing
university in the northeast town of Garissa reportedly
troops to AMISOM and successfully conducted deadly
targeted non-Muslims specifically. The U.N. Monitoring
terrorist attacks in Djibouti, Kenya, and Uganda. Its activity
Group on Somalia has stated that Al Shabaab has “both the
in Kenya has increased since Kenya’s 2011 military
capability to carry out another such attack and a self-
intervention in Somalia against the group. Al Shabaab
proclaimed motive with regard to targeting countries
attacks have killed hundreds in Kenya. The group’s April
contributing troops to AMISOM.” Al Shabaab uses a
2015 assault on a university in northeast Kenya, which
variety of propaganda tools to spread its message, including
killed at least 147 people, was Kenya’s deadliest terrorist
social media, online forum posts, and an English and
attack since the 1998 U.S. embassy bombing by Al Qaeda.
Swahili magazine, Gaidi Mtaani (“Terrorist on the Street”).
In some areas of Somalia, Al Shabaab capitalizes on
Al Shabaab’s ability to recruit abroad, including among
grievances and distrust of the government and fills local
U.S. citizens, has been of concern to U.S. policymakers. Its
governance roles, providing services and resolving disputes.
ties with other terrorist groups, most notably Al Qaeda
Areas of Operation
(AQ) and its Yemen affiliate, and its threats against
international targets also elevate its profile among extremist
While Al Shabaab’s base of operations remains in Somalia,
groups in Africa. Reports suggest that some foreign fighters
it has increasingly conducted attacks in Kenya since 2011
may have deserted or left for other jihadist theaters in recent
and has demonstrated an ability to strike targets in Uganda
years. Others, including Kenyan recruits, may be trained in
and Djibouti. Reported attempts to attack Ethiopia have
Somalia and deployed for attacks elsewhere in East Africa.
been, to date, unsuccessful. Regional militaries’ offensives
in 2011-2012 pushed the group from Mogadishu and other
Leadership
major southern cities and ports, and subsequent offensives
Al Shabaab’s former emir, Ahmed Abdi Godane (aka Abu
against the group reclaimed additional key towns, including
Zubeyr), was killed in a U.S. airstrike on September 1,
the port city of Barawe, a key militant base until October
2014. His predecessor, Aden Hashi Ayro, was killed in a
2014. Al Shabaab maintains the ability to conduct attacks in
2008 U.S. missile strike. The group suffered infighting in
the capital and other areas, however, and continues to
its senior ranks under Godane, who consolidated power by
control territory in some rural parts of south-central
neutralizing his rivals within the movement in 2012-2013.
Somalia. AMISOM and the Somali forces have struggled to
American jihadist and Al Shabaab member Omar
provide security in reclaimed areas and along supply routes.
Hammami was among Godane’s most vocal critics before
Al Shabaab is also operational in parts of northern Somalia
the Al Shabaab leader reportedly had him killed in 2013.
and reportedly maintains cells and/or relationships with
Godane’s highly centralized leadership style and strategic
affiliated groups in Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda.
approach led several prominent leaders to leave the group
A small Al Shabaab faction in the Somali state of Puntland
or surrender to local authorities in exchange for amnesty.
led by Abdulqadir Mumin broke away in late 2015 and
Some additional defections have occurred since his death.
pledged allegiance to the Islamic State.
Al Shabaab announced Ahmed Diriye (aka Abu Ubaidah),
one of Godane’s inner circle, as his successor and
reaffirmed their allegiance to Al Qaeda leader Ayman al
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Al Shabaab
Attacks Against U.S. Interests
Relationship with Al Qaeda
Al Shabaab leaders have issued threats against U.S. and
In a late 2016, the Obama Administration described Al
Western targets in East Africa and called for strikes against
Shabaab as an “associated force” of Al Qaeda, in the
the United States. In 2015, the group released a video
context of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military
encouraging attacks in Kenya and abroad, naming several
Force. Some of Al Shabaab’s founding members fought
shopping malls in Europe and the United States as potential
with Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and senior AQ operatives in
targets, including Minnesota’s Mall of America. Al
East Africa, including Fazul Mohammed—the now-dead
Shabaab threats have led the State Department to issue
mastermind of the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya
travel warnings and tighten security at U.S. embassies in
and Tanzania—have been associated with the group. After
East Africa. The July 2010 bombings in Kampala, Uganda,
multiple expressions of allegiance to Al Qaeda in Al
killed more than 70 people, including one American. In
Shabaab’s early years, the groups announced formal
total, more than ten U.S. citizens have been killed in attacks
alliance in 2012. While Al Shabaab’s leaders appear to
in East Africa. More than 50 U.S. citizens were in Nairobi’s
broadly share Al Qaeda’s transnational agenda, Al Shabaab
upscale Westgate Mall when Al Shabaab attacked it in
operates independently. It maintains ties with other AQ
September 2013. Six were injured. In October 2017, Al
affiliates, notably Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
Shabaab carried out a bombing in Mogadishu that killed
over 350 people, including three Somali Americans.
There was concern in 2015 that Al Shabaab might shift
allegiance to the Islamic State. Its leadership, however,
U.S. officials cited Ahmed Godane’s oversight of “plots
rejected calls from some factions to align with the group
targeting Westerners, including U.S. persons in East
and launched a deadly crackdown against IS supporters.
Africa,” in acknowledging the strike against him, which
Outlook
was described responding to an “imminent threat” to U.S.
interests in the region. U.S. forces have, since 2016,
While Al Shabaab has been weakened by AMISOM
engaged in “advise, assist, and accompany” missions with
operations and international air strikes, it remains a major
Somali and regional forces in Somalia. The tempo of U.S.
threat in Somalia and the broader region. In 2016, the U.N.
air strikes there, sometimes premised on protecting U.S.
Monitoring Group contended it was unclear “what long-
military advisors, has increased in recent years. In March,
term impact the ongoing policy of targeting the Al-Shabaab
President Trump expanded U.S. military operations in the
leadership will have on degrading the group’s capabilities.”
country, authorizing offensive air strikes and designating
The Somali government faces serious challenges in
parts of Somalia as an “area of active hostilities.” A U.S.
extending its authority, and its security forces appear unable
Navy SEAL who died in May was the first U.S. combat
to secure territory without AMISOM support. AMISOM
death in Somalia since the early 1990s.
forces have suffered heavy losses in recent years as a result
of assaults on their forward bases.
Size, Financing, and Capabilities
The State Department has estimated Al Shabaab to have
Al Shabaab’s operational reach beyond Somalia remains a
several thousand members, including a few hundred foreign
significant concern to many. The group has demonstrated
fighters. The group has recruited Americans—some of
resilience and flexibility in its operational evolution and,
Somali descent—and citizens of other Western countries.
while internal disputes and military strikes may weaken it,
The Somali government has offered amnesty to Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab’s defeat does not appear imminent. A challenge
members who turn themselves in and renounce violence. In
for U.S. policymakers is calibrating the response—
mid-2017, the United States removed a $5 million bounty
determining how the United States, directly or through
for former Al Shabaab deputy leader Mukhtar Robow Abu
partners, can most effectively counter the group without
Mansur, who has since defected to the Somali government.
playing into its narratives and fueling radicalization
Recruitment in Kenya remains a serious concern.
For more information, see CRS Report IF10155, Somalia.
While Al Shabaab’s loss of Mogadishu and other strategic
Figure 1. Al Shabaab Logo and Imagery
port cities deprived it of valuable revenue sources, the
group continues to profit from road checkpoints in areas
under its control and from taxation on sugar and livestock.
It also taxed charcoal production in southern Somalia
despite a U.N. embargo on the Somali charcoal trade,
though activity in this sector has declined in recent years.
Foreign donations contribute to its financing. The United
States and others have sought to sanction several Kenyan
clerics, for example, who are alleged to raise funds and
recruit for the group. The United States has prosecuted
several U.S. citizens for fundraising on behalf of the group.
Al Shabaab is capable of large-scale raids and increasingly
Source: U.S. Government Open Source Center
complex vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices
(VBIEDs). In early 2016, an Al Shabaab suicide bomber
Lauren Ploch Blanchard,
onboard a Somali airliner detonated a bomb concealed in a
Katherine Z. Terrell, Fellow in African Affairs
laptop computer. (It detonated before the plane reached
IF10170
cruising altitude and did not destroy the aircraft.)
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Al Shabaab
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10170 · VERSION 6 · UPDATED