



**Congressional  
Research Service**

Informing the legislative debate since 1914

---

# Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State

**name redacted**

Analyst in International Security

April 13, 2016

**Congressional Research Service**

7-....

[www.crs.gov](http://www.crs.gov)

R44135

## Contents

The Global Campaign to Counter the Islamic State .....	1
Counter-IS Coalition Mandate .....	2
Military Aspects of the Coalition .....	2
Russia .....	4
Turkey .....	5
Challenges to Coalition Coherence .....	5

## Figures

Figure 1. Operation Inherent Resolve: Average U.S. Daily Costs, by Month .....	3
Figure 2. Country Participation at Training and Capacity Building Bases in Iraq .....	6

## Tables

Table 1. Military Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State .....	7
---	---

## Contacts

Author Contact Information .....	12
----------------------------------	----

## The Global Campaign to Counter the Islamic State<sup>1</sup>

On September 10, 2014, President Obama announced the formation of a global coalition to “degrade and ultimately defeat” the Islamic State (IS, aka the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL/ISIS or the Arabic acronym *Da'esh*).<sup>2</sup> Subsequently, over 60 nations and partner organizations agreed to participate, contributing either military forces or resources (or both) to the campaign. In Brussels in December 2014, 60 of these partners agreed to organize themselves along five “lines of effort,”<sup>3</sup> (by contrast, the United States strategy involves nine lines of effort), with at least two countries in the lead for each:<sup>4</sup>

- supporting military operations, capacity building, and training (led by the United States and Iraq);
- stopping the flow of foreign terrorist fighters (led by The Netherlands and Turkey);
- cutting off IS access to financing and funding (led by Italy, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States);
- addressing associated humanitarian relief and crises (led by Germany and the United Arab Emirates); and
- exposing IS’ true nature (led by the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States).

According to the U.S. State Department, there are currently 66 participants in the coalition, including Afghanistan, Albania, the Arab League, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, the European Union, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malaysia, Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States.<sup>5</sup>

Each country is contributing to the coalition in a manner commensurate with its national interests and comparative advantage. Contributions include both military and non-military assistance, although reporting on non-military contributions tends to be sporadic, as many countries donate humanitarian assistance directly to local governments or non-governmental organizations operating on the ground. Still, some illustrative examples of the kinds of bilateral counter-IS assistance countries provided as the coalition was being formed in September 2014 include: Switzerland’s donation of \$9 million in aid to Iraq, Belgium’s contribution of 13 tons of aid to

---

<sup>1</sup> For more information on the status of efforts to defeat the Islamic State, see CRS Report R43612, *The Islamic State and U.S. Policy*, by (name redacted) and (name redacted)

<sup>2</sup> Testimony from Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, House Armed Services Committee, June 17, 2015.

<sup>3</sup> Subsequent to the Brussels meeting, other nations joined the coalition. U.S. Department of State, “Joint statement issued by partners at the Counter-ISIL Coalition Meeting,” December 3, 2014. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/12/234627.htm>.

<sup>4</sup> Remarks by General John Allen, then Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter-ISIL, Doha, Qatar, June 3, 2015. <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/events/2015/06/01-2015-us-islamic-world-forum/060315brookingsdoha.pdf>.

<sup>5</sup> U.S. Department of State, then Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL webpage, <http://www.state.gov/s/seci/>.

Iraq generally, Italy's contribution of \$2.5 million worth of weaponry (including machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, and 1 million rounds of ammunition), and Japan's granting of \$6 million in emergency aid to specifically help displaced people in Northern Iraq.<sup>6</sup>

## Counter-IS Coalition Mandate

In terms of the legal basis for the coalition, several United Nations Security Council Resolutions—in particular, 2170, 2178 and 2199—call on UN member states to take a variety of steps (to include coalition activities such as countering terrorist financing, assisting with humanitarian relief, countering IS messaging and assisting with stabilization support), although these fall short of explicitly authorizing the use of military force against the Islamic State. Some coalition participants have cited the Iraqi Government's letter to the United Nations Security Council requesting defense assistance and stating that Iraq faces threats from IS safe havens in Syria as a further legal basis for participating in the military coalition. With respect to the U.S. contribution to the military campaign, some observers have argued that a new authorization for the use of military force (AUMF) is required;<sup>7</sup> the Obama Administration maintains that it already has the necessary legal basis to prosecute the campaign through the 2001 AUMF (P.L. 107-40), and the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (2002 AUMF; P.L. 107-243).<sup>8</sup> Even so, U.S. Administration officials underscore that the military campaign is only one part of the overall effort to counter the Islamic State, asserting that success depends upon the ability to make progress in non-military areas.<sup>9</sup>

## Military Aspects of the Coalition

Operation Inherent Resolve, the military component of the global coalition to defeat the Islamic State, began on August 8, 2014. Subsequently, according to United States Central Command and open source reporting, some 22 nations have joined the military component of the coalition. The current objectives of the coalition campaign are “destroying ISIL's parent tumor in Iraq and Syria, combating its worldwide spread, and protecting all homelands.”<sup>10</sup> Accordingly, the campaign currently has three primary military components: coordinated air strikes, training and equipping local security forces, and targeted special operations, some based out of Northern Iraq while others apparently dedicated to operations in Syria.<sup>11</sup> The philosophy underpinning the campaign appears to be that fighting the Islamic State requires a long-term campaign for which Iraqis and their neighbors should take the lead; thus, in its view, U.S. and coalition forces should therefore

---

<sup>6</sup> Sebastian Payne, “What the 60-plus members of the anti-Islamic State coalition are doing,” *The Washington Post*, September 25, 2014.

<sup>7</sup> See, for example, Richard Fontaine & Vance Serchuk, “Can We Finally Get An AUMF Right? As Congress debates the war authorization against Islamic State, it should learn from past mistakes” *Politico*, February 15, 2015; Paul Kane, “Congress Split Over Ways to Face the Islamic State,” *The Washington Post*, February 22, 2015.

<sup>8</sup> For more information, see CRS Report R43760, *A New Authorization for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State: Issues and Current Proposals*, by [name redacted].

<sup>9</sup> Jim Garamone, “Wormuth Stresses Whole-of-Government Approach to ISIL,” *DoD News*, July 13, 2015.

<sup>10</sup> Terri Moon Cronk, “Carter: Counter-ISIL Defense Ministers Unanimously Support Objectives,” *DOD News*, February 11, 2016, <http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/655155/carter-counter-isil-defense-ministers-unanimously-support-objectives>.

<sup>11</sup> Barbara Starr, *Army's Delta Force Begins to Target ISIS in Iraq*, *CNN.com*, February 29, 2016, <http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/29/politics/pentagon-army-target-isis-iraq/>.


focus on supporting Iraqis, Syrians, and others rather than taking on significant ground combat roles themselves.

According to the Department of Defense (DOD), as of March 15, 2016, the coalition conducted 10,962 airstrikes; 7,336 of those in Iraq and the balance (3,626) in Syria.<sup>12</sup> By March 17, 2016, 22,779 targets were destroyed.<sup>13</sup> The United States has spent \$6.4 billion on counter-IS military operations since August 8, 2014, with an average daily cost of \$11.5 million.<sup>14</sup> **Figure 1** illustrates the average daily cost of operations, by month, since August 2015:

Towards the end of 2015, the campaign to counter the Islamic State experienced several notable setbacks. First, despite the expenditure of upwards of \$500 million, the Department of Defense proved unable to field more than a “handful” of anti-IS troops in the Syrian battle space. Second, the Islamic State demonstrated a degree of strategic-level reach by inspiring (and in some cases coordinating) attacks in Western cities, notably Paris, Brussels, and San Bernardino, and expanding to other countries, including Libya.<sup>15</sup> As a result of these and other developments, the Obama Administration determined it should alter its military campaign plan,<sup>16</sup> shifting away from its “Iraq First” approach to sequencing the campaign and targeting the Islamic State more directly while “accelerating”<sup>17</sup> its overall anti-IS operations.

Reflecting this decision, Secretary Carter announced that the U.S. would send an Expeditionary Targeting Force (ETF) of around 200 soldiers to the Iraqi theater. While the precise tasks of the ETF are classified, it is generally believed that it conducts raids and other operations, and collects intelligence.<sup>18</sup> Carter also announced a 50% increase in DOD’s budget request for operations and capabilities associated with countering the Islamic State, for a total of \$7.5 billion. The request includes \$1.8 billion to purchase 45,000 GPS-guided smart bombs and laser-guided rockets, as well as an investment in maintaining 4<sup>th</sup> generation fighter and attack jets, including the A-10.

**Figure 1. Operation Inherent Resolve: Average U.S. Daily Costs, by Month**



**Source:** U.S. Department of Defense.

**Note:** In millions of dollars.

<sup>12</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, “Operation Inherent Resolve: Targeted Operations against ISIL Terrorists,” [http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814\\_Inherent-Resolve](http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve), accessed March 18, 2016.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Eric Schmitt, “Obama Is Pressed To Open Military Front Against ISIS In Libya,” *The New York Times*, February 4, 2016.

<sup>16</sup> Andrew Tilghman, “This Is The Pentagon’s New Strategy To Fight ISIS,” *Military Times*, January 14, 2016.

<sup>17</sup> Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, “Remarks Previewing the FY 17 Defense Budget At The Economic Club of Washington,” February 2, 2016.

<sup>18</sup> Dan Lamothe, “The Fight Against The Islamic State Just Entered a New Phase – And It Could Grow Soon,” *Washington Post*, January 20, 2016.

In February of 2016, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter expressed his frustration that military coalition partners were not doing enough to shoulder the military burden of countering the Islamic State.<sup>19</sup> Shortly thereafter, Secretary Carter met with his counterparts from a number of the coalition contributing nations at NATO Headquarters in Brussels to generate additional contributions to the campaign and brief other nations on the United States' updated concept of operations for OIR. The latter was unanimously agreed upon. In terms of force generation, Secretary Carter noted, "[i]n sum, nearly 90 percent of the countries participating in the coalition's military campaign have stepped up to do more in the last months and days."<sup>20</sup> According to public sources, contributions from coalition participants included extending air operations to Syria, training police, stabilizing, assisting in recovery, and providing more trainers, critical logistic support and materiel to local partners on the ground.<sup>21</sup>

On April 6, 2016, Pentagon officials stated that the coalition has "degraded the enemy's ability to move freely on the battlefield while regaining significant amounts of territory and degrading [IS] leadership and resources."<sup>22</sup>

## Russia<sup>23</sup>

Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on March 14, 2016, that Russia would begin withdrawing the "main part" of its forces in Syria.<sup>24</sup> Observers subsequently noted that this did not indicate a full withdrawal from Syria. As some observers note, "what is happening on the ground is a drawdown of forces that were surged to Syria in the aftermath of the shootdown of a Russian Su-24 by Turkey in November 2015 and the intensified fighting over the winter."<sup>25</sup> Russia has retained a number of its aircraft in Syria, its naval basing at Tartous, as well as its S-400 air defense system in Latakia. Russia initially built up its military presence at Latakia in September 2015 and launched an air campaign on September 30.

In part because of Moscow's long history and relationship with the Asad regime, Russia's strategic priorities in Syria appear to fundamentally differ from those of the U.S.-led counter-IS coalition, which has generally argued that Asad could not remain in power as a result of any settlement arrangements. These strategic differences manifested in Russia's military targeting priorities. Through mid-November, Russia had largely struck what it referred to as "terrorist" elements opposed to the Asad regime, including – but not limited to – the Islamic State.<sup>26</sup> A cessation of hostilities agreement had largely frozen fighting between pro-Asad forces and select

---

<sup>19</sup> Aaron Mehta, "Carter Again Slams Anti-ISIS Partners on Lack of Assistance," *Defense News*, February 2, 2016, <http://www.defensenews.com/story/war-in-syria/2016/02/02/carter-slams-isis-coalition-isil-syria-iraq-fight/79698804/>.

<sup>20</sup> Terri Moon Cronk, "Carter: Counter-ISIL Defense Ministers Unanimously Support Objectives," *DOD News*, February 11, 2016, <http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/655155/carter-counter-isil-defense-ministers-unanimously-support-objectives>.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>22</sup> Terri Moon Cronk, "Counter-ISIL Campaign Shows Strong Progress, Admiral Says," *DOD News*, April 6, 2016, <http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/714995/counter-isil-campaign-shows-strong-progress-admiral-says>.

<sup>23</sup> For more information, see CRS Insight IN10360, *Russian Deployments in Syria Complicate U.S. Policy*, by (name red acted) et al.

<sup>24</sup> Denis Dyomkin and Suleiman Al-Khalidi, "Putin Says Russians To Start Withdrawing From Syria, As Peace Talks Resume," *Reuters*, March 15, 2016.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>26</sup> Michael Kofman, "The Russian Intervention in Syria: Policy Options and Exit Strategies" *War on the Rocks*, October 21, 2015.

opposition forces as of early April, but reports suggested that Russian-supported Syrian military operations against Islamic State targets were ongoing.

## Turkey<sup>27</sup>

Before the initial publication of this report, in July 2015, Turkey expanded its participation in the coalition by taking direct military action in Syria and allowing other coalition planes to utilize Turkish airspace and bases to conduct strikes on the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Shortly after Turkey commenced military strikes against the Islamic State in Syria in late July, Turkey resumed hostilities with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), ending a cease fire that had been in place since March 2013. As Prime Minister Davutoglu said in September 2015, "by mounting operations against [the Islamic State] and the PKK at the same time, we also prevented the PKK from legitimizing itself." Turkey is reportedly worried about recent gains by the Syria-Based People's Protection Units (Kurdish acronym YPG), and about increased YPG closeness with the United States because of the YPG's emergence as arguably the most capable anti-IS ground force in Syria. Some observers speculate that Turkey is more concerned about containing Kurdish political aspirations (with their potential cross-border implications) than countering Islamist extremism at and within its borders.<sup>28</sup>

## Challenges to Coalition Coherence


Organizing and prosecuting a coalition campaign presents a variety of challenges in addition to the military task of defeating an opponent. In the first instance, without a single authority responsible for prioritizing and adjudicating between different multinational civilian and military lines of effort, various actors often work at cross-purposes without intending to do so. These coalition coordination challenges were demonstrated in recent military campaigns (particularly in Afghanistan). Exacerbating matters, other actors in the region—some of whom are coalition partners—have different, and often conflicting, longer-term regional geopolitical interests from those of the United States or other coalition members. This, in turn, may lead nations participating in the coalition to advance their goals and objectives in ways that might contradict each other. Finally, participants in the coalition have different tolerances for risk, and therefore will determine "rules of engagement" (ROE), or "caveats" that can constrain the ability of military commanders from employing military force as they see fit. While navigable, all these factors can make it considerably more difficult to consolidate gains and achieve campaign success.

This brief report offers several figures. The first is a map of the training and capacity building bases across Iraq, and key nations operating out of those bases as reported by United States Central Command and supplemented with open source reporting. The second is a table depicting participants in the military campaign, and what specifically each country is contributing in terms of military forces, according to open source data compiled by CRS and information provided by United States Central Command at the time of writing. This report update reflects significant changes regarding the coalition's composition up until March 25, 2016.

<sup>27</sup> For more information, see CRS Report R41368, *Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations*, by (name redacted) and CRS Report R44000, *Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief*, by (name redacted)

<sup>28</sup> Orhan Coskun and Dasha Afanasieva, "Turkey stages first air strikes on Islamic State in Syria," *Reuters*, July 24, 2015.

**Figure 2. Country Participation at Training and Capacity Building Bases in Iraq**














**Source:** United States Central Command and Open Source Reporting, as of March 25, 2016.
















**Table 1. Military Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State**

As of early March 2016, approximately 10,300 personnel from the U.S. and partner nations were deployed in support of counter-ISIL coalition operations

COUNTRY	TRAINING AND ADVISING MISSION CONTRIBUTIONS	AIRSTRIKE CONTRIBUTIONS	OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS
 <b>Australia</b>	Approx. 380 personnel, chiefly in Iraq, including 80 special forces personnel advising Iraqi counterterrorist units <sup>a</sup>	Strike operations in Iraq and Syria; 6 F/A-18 Hornet fighters, a tanker aircraft, and an airborne control aircraft	Approx. 400 personnel in support of missions that include air-combat and air-combat support
 <b>Bahrain</b>	N/A	Strike operations in Syria; unspecified number of aircraft	N/A
 <b>Belgium</b>	Approx. 35 personnel	Strike operations in Iraq; airstrike mission discontinued <sup>b</sup>	N/A
 <b>Canada</b>	Approx. 207 personnel, chiefly in Iraq, including an unspecified number of medical personnel to train Iraqi security forces <sup>c</sup>	Strike operations in Iraq and Syria; airstrike mission discontinued on February 15, 2016 <sup>d</sup> 1 CC-150 Polaris transport aircraft and 2 CP-140 Aurora surveillance aircraft remain in theater	Approx. 623 personnel in support of missions that include air-to-air refueling and aerial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
 <b>Denmark</b>	Approx. 120 personnel, chiefly in Iraq	Strike operations in Iraq; airstrike mission is currently non-operational <sup>e</sup>	Approx. 20 staff officers at coalition regional headquarters
 <b>Finland</b>	Approx. 50 personnel, chiefly in Iraq <sup>f</sup>	N/A	N/A

COUNTRY	TRAINING AND ADVISING MISSION CONTRIBUTIONS	AIRSTRIKE CONTRIBUTIONS	OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS
 <b>France</b>	Unspecified number of approx. 1,000 total personnel in theater <sup>h</sup>	Strike operations in Iraq and Syria; at least 6 Dassault Rafale M multi-role fighters and 8 Dassault Mirage 2000D fighters; support aircraft that include at least 1 C-135FR tankers and 1 Breguet Atlantique 2 maritime patrol aircraft; and sea-based operations that include 1 <i>La Fayette</i> -class frigate <sup>g</sup>	Unspecified number of approx. 1,000 total personnel in theater in support of missions that include air-combat and air-combat support
 <b>Germany</b>	Approx. 150 personnel, chiefly in Iraq	N/A	Maximum of 1,200 personnel based in locations including Turkey, Qatar and Kuwait in support of missions that include air-to-air refueling and aerial ISR; additional platforms and systems including 6 Panavia Tornado ECR reconnaissance aircraft, 1 Airbus A310 MRTT tanker; and 1 F122 <i>Bremen</i> -class frigate <sup>i</sup>
 <b>Hungary</b>	Up to 150 personnel in Iraq authorized; currently deployed approx. 120 troops, chiefly providing force protection at various Coalition training facilities		Hungary has also donated 250 tons of ammunition to the Government of Iraq and the Kurdish Regional Government <sup>u</sup>
 <b>Italy</b>	Approx. 300 personnel, chiefly in Iraq, including approx. 90 <i>Carabinieri</i> military police personnel providing training for the Iraqi Police <sup>i</sup>	N/A	Approx. 260 personnel in support of missions that include air-to-air refueling and aerial ISR; additional platforms and systems including 4 Panavia Tornado IDS fighters (flying aerial ISR missions), 1 Boeing KC-767A, and 2 MQ-1 Predator UAVs  Approx. 450 personnel as a protective force for Italian contractors performing maintenance and repair work on the Mosul Dam
 <b>Jordan</b>	Training grounds	Strike operations in Iraq and Syria; unspecified number of aircraft that include at least 20 F-16 fighters and 8 UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters <sup>k</sup>	Unspecified number of additional personnel in support of missions that include air-combat and air-combat support

COUNTRY	TRAINING AND ADVISING MISSION CONTRIBUTIONS	AIRSTRIKE CONTRIBUTIONS	OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS
 <b>NATO</b>	Unspecified number of personnel, chiefly in support of training Iraqi Security Forces personnel	N/A	In February 2016, the NATO Defence Ministers agreed to deploy NATO-operated Boeing E-3 Sentry AWACS aircraft to backfill national AWACS capabilities as needed <sup>l</sup>
 <b>New Zealand</b>	Approx. 145 personnel, chiefly in Iraq	N/A	N/A
 <b>Netherlands</b>	Approx. 130 personnel, chiefly in Iraq	Strike operations in Iraq and Syria; at least 6 F-16 fighters and 2 reserve F-16s <sup>m</sup>	Approx. 250 personnel in support of missions that include air-combat and air-combat support
 <b>Norway</b>	Approx. 120 personnel, chiefly in Iraq	N/A	N/A
 <b>Portugal</b>	Approx. 30 personnel	N/A	N/A
 <b>Qatar</b>	Training grounds	Unspecified number of aircraft	Provision of in-country basing and overflight authorizations for U.S. forces
 <b>Saudi Arabia</b>	Training grounds; unspecified number of personnel to train Iraqi Security Forces	Strike operations in Syria; unspecified number of aircraft, including at least 4 F-15 fighters	Announcement of plans to form a 34-nation Islamic military alliance to combat terrorism in December 2015
 <b>Spain</b>	Approx. 300 personnel	N/A	N/A

COUNTRY	TRAINING AND ADVISING MISSION CONTRIBUTIONS	AIRSTRIKE CONTRIBUTIONS	OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS
 Sweden	Approx. 35 personnel, chiefly in Iraq <sup>n</sup>	N/A	N/A
 Turkey <sup>o</sup>	Training grounds	Strike operations in Syria; unspecified number of aircraft <sup>p</sup>	Long-range artillery strikes in northern Iraq and Syria
 United Arab Emirates	Unspecified number of personnel to be deployed in Iraq; unspecified number of special forces personnel to be deployed in Syria	Strike operations in Syria; at least 8 F-16 fighters <sup>q</sup>	N/A
 United Kingdom	Approx. 275 personnel	Strike operations in Iraq and Syria; unspecified number of Tornado GR4 aircraft and Typhoon FGR4s <sup>r</sup> .	Approx. 630 personnel in support of missions that include air-combat and air-combat support
 United States	Unspecified number of approx. 3,550 personnel in Iraq; approx. 700 personnel in Syria <sup>s</sup>	Strike operations in Iraq and Syria; unspecified number of aircraft—largest contributor of material and personnel resources to the coalition	Cyber operations against Islamic State targets <sup>t</sup>

**Sources:** Open source reporting as of 25 March 2016. CRS requested, but did not receive, DOD review of these figures.

**Notes:** Country personnel and material contributions are approximate due to rotations in and out of theater, and are subject to rapid fluctuations based on changing operational circumstances.

- a. Australian Defence Force, “Global Operations: Operation OKRA,” at <http://www.defence.gov.au/Operations/Okra/>. Accessed March 10, 2016.
- b. Belgium’s contribution to the airstrikes against ISIL ended June 30, 2015, due to financial constraints. Six Belgian F-16 fighters spent nine months in Jordan. In a joint press conference with Secretary of State John Kerry on March 25, 2016 Belgian Prime Minister Charles Michel indicated that Belgian F-16s may resume airstrike operations against Islamic State targets in the coming months.
- c. Canadian Armed Forces, “Operation IMPACT,” at <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-current/op-impact.page>. Accessed March 10, 2016.
- d. 6 Canadian Armed Forces CF-18 Hornets conducted 1,378 sorties between October 2014 and February 2016. See also Government of Canada, “Canadian Armed Forces cease airstrike operations in Iraq and Syria,” February 17, 2016.
- e. 7 Danish F-16 fighter aircraft were redeployed to Denmark for refitting and refurbishment in late August 2015. In early March 2016, the Danish Ministry of Defense submitted a proposal to the Danish Parliament that would authorize the re-deployment of F-16s for airstrike operations in Iraq and Syria, deploy a C-130J transport

aircraft, and add a new personnel contingent that would include approximately 60 special forces personnel to train and advise Iraqi Security Forces personnel. Approximately 170 personnel would be deployed in air-combat and air-transport roles.

- f. On February 26, 2016, the Finnish government announced that as of September 1, 2016, approximately 50 additional personnel would be deployed in support of existing training and advising missions in Northern Iraq, for a total of 100 trainers and military advisers.
- g. France began conducting ground-based airstrikes against Syrian targets in September 2015. France's capacity to conduct airstrikes increased during December 2015-February 2016, when the aircraft carrier *Charles de Gaulle*, together with France's carrier battle group (Groupe Aéronaval or GAN) arrived in theater and took command of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command's Task Force 50.
- h. Ministère de la Défense (France), "Operation Chammal 2016," at <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/irak-syrie/cartes/cartes>. Accessed March 29, 2016.
- i. German Bundeswehr, "Syrien: Kampf gegen den IS" and "Irak: Ausbildung für den Kampf gegen den IS," at <http://www.bundeswehr.de/>. Accessed March 10, 2016.
- j. Italian Ministry of Defense, "Prima Parthica: Contributo nazionale," at <http://www.difesa.it/OperazioniMilitari/>. Accessed March 11, 2016.
- k. Open sources indicate that up to 20 Jordanian F-16 aircraft participated in airstrikes against ISIL carried out in in early 2015, but do not indicate approximate numbers of F-16s that may participate in regular Jordanian airstrikes against ISIL.
- l. NATO, "Secretary General in Baghdad: NATO stands with Iraq in the fight against extremism," at [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news\\_128720.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_128720.htm). Accessed March 11, 2016.
- m. Open sources do not indicate if all of these aircraft are flown in combat sorties against ISIL or if they provide force protection for Dutch ground forces.
- n. In early 2015, the Swedish Parliament approved 35 trainers to be sent to Iraq, with an additional 85 personnel available if necessary for reinforcement or evacuation operations.
- o. On or around December 3, 2015, Turkey deployed "hundreds" of personnel to northern Iraq as part of a "routine rotation" of its train-and-assist mission. The Iraqi Government disputed the legality of the deployment. While Turkey maintains that this action was undertaken with the "full knowledge" of the counter-ISIL coalition, this deployment appears to be a bilateral move independent of the U.S.-led military campaign. Open source reports from February 2016 indicate that Turkish personnel may still be conducting operations in the region.
- p. Based on a recent agreement struck between the United States and Turkey on July 23, 2015.
- q. Estimated number of F-16s derived from press photos of the UAE squadron deployed in Jordan.
- r. The United Kingdom House of Commons voted on December 2, 2015 to authorize airstrikes against IS targets in Syria—Royal Air Force airstrikes against IS targets in Iraq have been ongoing since October 2014.
- s. The United States has pledged 400 to 700 troops to train Syrian forces. It is unclear how many forces are currently in place. The U.S. is also deploying 50 Special Operations Forces plus an "expeditionary targeting force" of approximately 100 soldiers to Northern Iraq, who may conduct operations in Syria if operational circumstances dictate.
- t. Transcript, "Department of Defense Press Briefing by Secretary Carter and Gen. Dunford in the Pentagon Briefing Room," February 29, 2016.
- u. Information on the Hungarian contribution to the counter-IS coalition was obtained through the Defense Attaché Office of Hungary, Washington, DC.

## **Author Contact Information**

(name redacted)  
Analyst in International Security  
(redacted)@crs.loc.gov , 7-....

# EveryCRSReport.com

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) is a federal legislative branch agency, housed inside the Library of Congress, charged with providing the United States Congress non-partisan advice on issues that may come before Congress.

EveryCRSReport.com republishes CRS reports that are available to all Congressional staff. The reports are not classified, and Members of Congress routinely make individual reports available to the public.

Prior to our republication, we redacted names, phone numbers and email addresses of analysts who produced the reports. We also added this page to the report. We have not intentionally made any other changes to any report published on EveryCRSReport.com.

CRS reports, as a work of the United States government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Information in a CRS report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to members of Congress in connection with CRS' institutional role.

EveryCRSReport.com is not a government website and is not affiliated with CRS. We do not claim copyright on any CRS report we have republished.