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# Tanzania: Current Issues and U.S. Policy

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## Summary

Tanzania is an East African country comprising a union of Tanganyika, the mainland territory, and the semi-autonomous Zanzibar archipelago. The United States has long considered Tanzania a partner in economic development and, increasingly, in regional security efforts. With nearly 50 million people, Tanzania is one of the largest countries in Africa by population and is endowed with substantial natural resource wealth and agricultural potential. Over the past decade, it has experienced robust economic growth based largely on favorably high gold prices and tourism; growth has averaged nearly 7% annually. The ongoing development of large reserves of offshore natural gas discovered in 2010 has raised the prospect of substantial foreign investment inflows and export revenue. Nevertheless, corruption and poor service delivery have hindered efforts to curb widespread poverty, and extensive development challenges remain.

Since independence in 1964, Tanzanian politics have been dominated by the ruling *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM, Party of the Revolution), created through the merger of the ruling parties of the mainland and Zanzibar. Political pluralism is weak and opposition parties face periodic harassment and de facto restrictions on their activities. The government is led by President John Magufuli of the CCM, who was elected in late October 2015. His predecessor was Jakaya Kikwete, also of the CCM, who assumed power in 2005 and won reelection in 2010, but was constitutionally barred from running for a third term. The upcoming election, scheduled for October 25, 2015, has featured a close contest between the CCM and a coalition of the leading opposition parties.

Tanzania is generally stable and peaceful, but has seen periodic threats to state and public security. There have been periodic attacks on tourists in Zanzibar attributed to Islamist radicals as well as several unattributed armed attacks on police. There have also occasionally been bombings of Christian churches that analysts have speculatively attributed to Islamic radicals. Tanzania has occasionally arrested suspected Islamic extremists, as in April 2015, when a group of 10 alleged members of the Somali al Qaeda-linked terrorist group al-Shabaab were taken into custody.

U.S.-Tanzanian relations are friendly and growing. President Kikwete was the first African head of state to meet with President Obama after the latter took office, and President Obama has stated that a “shared commitment to the development and the dignity of the people of Tanzania” underpin bilateral ties. Tanzania also maintains close economic and political ties with China.

U.S. assistance to Tanzania focuses primarily on health, food security, agricultural development, and infrastructure, largely under multiple major presidential initiatives, as well as the Administration’s relatively new African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP). Tanzania is eligible for trade benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and, in September 2013, completed a \$698 million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Compact focused on poverty reduction and economic growth. In late 2014, the MCC agreed to provide additional funding to support feasibility studies in preparation for a possible second Compact, which would be focused on the power sector, although MCC officials have expressed concern about corruption. U.S. security assistance has increased since the 1998 Al Qaeda bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam, but is modest compared to that provided to Tanzania’s East African neighbors. U.S. counterterrorism aid is provided through the State Department-led, multi-country Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT), and complements aid focused on strengthening border security, improving police capacity, and supporting professionalization in the military, notably with respect to peacekeeping. Tanzania actively participates in international peace and security efforts and is a troop contributor to United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping operations in multiple African countries and Lebanon.

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## Introduction

The United Republic of Tanzania, which held national elections in late October 2015, is an East African country about twice as large as California with nearly 50 million people. It is the 28<sup>th</sup> poorest country globally when ranked by per capita gross domestic product (GDP), according to International Monetary Fund data. However, the country has substantial natural resource wealth and agricultural potential, and multiple socioeconomic development indicators have generally improved in recent years. Its relative political stability and government reforms have attracted substantial official development aid, although there are abiding concerns regarding corruption and a sometimes-difficult business climate. Despite such challenges, some sectors of the Tanzanian economy, most notably the extractive industry, are attracting private investment.

U.S.-Tanzanian ties, which are friendly and have expanded in recent years, focus primarily on U.S.-funded bilateral development cooperation. In July 2013, President Obama visited Tanzania, highlighting its improving governance and economic development and its growing U.S. trade and investment ties. In recent years, Tanzania has ranked as the third largest recipient of U.S. State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) bilateral development aid in sub-Saharan Africa. Much of this aid is provided under Obama Administration U.S. presidential development initiatives, including Feed the Future (FTF), the Global Health Initiative, the Global Climate Change Initiative, Power Africa, and Trade Africa.<sup>1</sup> It is also a Partnership for Growth (PFG) country, one of four worldwide,<sup>2</sup> and in 2014 was announced as one of six initial partner countries under the Obama Administration's African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP).

In September 2013, Tanzania also completed a \$698 million, five-year Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Compact.<sup>3</sup> Awarded in 2008, the Compact sought to reduce poverty and stimulate economic growth through targeted investments in roads and access to electrical services and potable water. In late 2014, the MCC agreed to provide an additional \$9.78 million to support further feasibility studies and other work linked to the development of a second Compact focused on the power sector.<sup>4</sup> While that work continues, in June 2015 the MCC Board stated that a second Compact “will not be considered for approval until, among other pending items,” Tanzania’s government “makes progress on energy sector reform commitments made in 2014. Once the Compact is ready, the MCC will scrutinize the government’s track record on good

<sup>1</sup> On these initiatives, see CRS Report R44216, *The Obama Administration’s Feed the Future Initiative*, by (name redacted), (name redacted), and (name redacted); CRS Report R43115, *U.S. Global Health Assistance: FY2001-FY2016*, by (name redacted); CRS Report R41845, *The Global Climate Change Initiative (GCCII): Budget Authority and Request, FY2010-FY2016*, by (name redacted); CRS Report R43593, *Powering Africa: Challenges of and U.S. Aid for Electrification in Africa*, by (name redacted) et al. and CRS Insight IN10015, *Trade Africa Initiative*, by (name redacted) and (name redacted).

<sup>2</sup> PFG seeks to increase bilateral cooperation with selected countries, through a mix of aid, public-private partnership, and private sector investment, to spur sustainable, broad-based economic growth. In 2012 Tanzania and the United States signed a PFG Joint Country Action Plan prioritizing joint efforts to develop national electrical capacities and rural roads.

<sup>3</sup> The MCC is a U.S. development agency that funds and monitors recipient country-designed and implemented “Compacts.” These development plan agreements focus on a limited number of high impact development outcomes, such as farm to market infrastructure, or the power sector. Most Compacts are five-year undertakings funded in the several hundred million-dollar range. See CRS Report RL32427, *Millennium Challenge Corporation*, by (name redacted).

<sup>4</sup> MCC, “MCC Provides Funding to Tanzania to Develop Compact Focused on the Power Sector,” November 14, 2014, and “Tanzania II Compact,” Quarterly Status Report, December 2014.

governance, including control of corruption and freedom of expression.”<sup>5</sup> While most U.S. assistance is focused on investments in health and economic growth, bilateral military cooperation and assistance has also increased. Tanzania is a top African contributor of troops and police to international peacekeeping operations.

While there is little Tanzania-focused congressional activity, Members of Congress occasionally travel to the country, and periodically host visits from Tanzanian leaders, such as that of former President Jakaya Kikwete during the August 2014 U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit. Some Members have sponsored legislation advocating protections for albinos, who are the target of attacks, as discussed below.

## Background

Tanzania is a union formed in 1964 of Tanganyika, the mainland territory, which gained independence from Britain in 1961, and the Zanzibar archipelago. Zanzibar, which gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1963, remains semi-autonomous, with its own government. Julius Nyerere, Tanzania’s president from 1964 until 1985, remained influential until his death in 1999. Under Nyerere, Tanzania was governed as a socialist state, but maintained cordial, albeit sometimes tepid relations with the West. Nyerere advanced a set of national social policies known collectively as *ujamaa* (“socialism” in Swahili, the lingua franca), which centered on rural, collective village-based collectivism and self-reliance and the nationalization of key industries.

*Ujamaa* had a decidedly mixed record. At a national level, central state control of economic policy failed to spur transformative growth and industrialization and inhibited market-based economic transaction efficiencies and private sector growth, while at the village level, collectivization faced increasing resistance. Such factors, together with a range of global ones (e.g., the oil crisis of the 1970s and poor commodity prices for Tanzania’s core agricultural exports) led the country to seek credit and technical cooperation with international financial institutions in the mid-1980s, leading to a gradual liberalization of the economy and later of the state. Nyerere’s policies are, however, widely seen as having united an ethnically and religiously diverse population under a strong shared national identity. His leadership, by many accounts, spared the mainland from the ethnic tensions that have inhibited national unity or destabilized some other African countries. Predominantly Muslim Zanzibar, however, has experienced internal ethnic and religious frictions.

Since the mid-1990s, successive governments have taken steps to liberalize the economy, but Tanzania’s business environment remains challenging, which is, in part, an enduring effect of state-centric policies and bureaucratization during the socialist period. A 2015 State Department assessment observed that the “U.S. investors have commented that while the business climate has generally improved over the past decade, in certain sectors the legacy of socialist attitudes has not fully dissipated, sometimes resulting in suspicion of foreign investors and slow decision making.”<sup>6</sup> Despite its stated commitment to reform, corruption and poor service delivery have hampered Tanzania’s efforts to curb widespread poverty (43.5% of Tanzania’s population lives on less than \$1.25 per day) and reduce widespread reliance on subsistence agriculture. As is common

<sup>5</sup> MCC, “Readout of the June 2015 MCC Board of Directors Meeting,” June 19, 2015.

<sup>6</sup> State Department, *2015 Investment Climate Statement - Tanzania*, May 2015.

Figure I. Tanzania



#### TANZANIA AT-A-GLANCE

**Population/Population growth rate:** 51 million/2.8%

**Youth (Persons Aged 0-24 as a Percent of Total Population of):** 63.9%

**Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Total/Per Capita** \$46.2 billion/\$969

**External Debt Total/Public Debt as Proportion of GDP:** \$15.35 billion/43.8% (2014)

**Ethnic Groups:** Over 120 ethnic groups, the largest of which are the Sukuma and related groups

**Languages:** Kiswahili (official), Kiunguja (Zanzibari Kiswahili), English (official, primary commercial, administrative, and higher education language), Arabic (in Zanzibar); about 120 local languages, some very small and endangered.

**Religions:** Mainland: Christian 30%, Muslim 35%, local beliefs 35%; Zanzibar: About 99% Muslim (religious estimates vary widely)

**Literacy:** Male: 75.9%; Female: 65.4%

**Under-5 Mortality rate:** 49 deaths/1,000 live births

**HIV/AIDS (adult prevalence rate):** 5.3% (2013)

**Life Expectancy:** Male, 60.3 years; Female, 63.1 years

**Source:** CIA World Factbook; International Monetary Fund; Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS); *Ethnologue*. Data from 2015 unless otherwise indicated. Map created by CRS.

in the region, Tanzania's aging infrastructure has suffered from chronic underinvestment. Nevertheless, the Obama Administration views the Tanzanian government as committed to

development and governance reform, and substantial U.S. resources are devoted toward helping to spur progress in these areas, including infrastructure enhancement.<sup>7</sup>

Tanzania also actively contributes to regional and international peace and security efforts. In addition to being a troop contributor to United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping operations, with personnel deployed in multiple African countries and Lebanon, Tanzania has hosted large numbers of refugees from the region, including from Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, which tries Rwandan genocide suspects, is located in the northern Tanzanian city of Arusha, as is the African Union's African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (AfCHPR), a continental court with a mandate to ensure human and peoples' rights protections.

## Politics and Governance

Tanzania's ruling party, *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM, Swahili for Party of the Revolution), was created by Nyerere in 1977 through the merger of the ruling parties of the mainland and Zanzibar. It has dominated Tanzanian politics since its inception, a key point of criticism by opposition parties. In the first multi-party elections in 1995, the CCM won a landslide victory in voting marred by irregularities. The party has continued to enjoy considerable electoral success on the mainland, in part due to the powers of incumbency, but opposition parties have won a growing share of legislative seats in successive elections. Still, opposition parties reportedly face periodic harassment and de facto restrictions on their activities. Increased political pluralism may distribute political power more widely, but it may also hold the potential to spur increasing ethnic, regional, and religious divisions, which the CCM long sought to avert.

The CCM faced its most serious national electoral challenge to date in the 2010 elections, which saw the first substantial challenge from an opposition party, albeit amidst record-low voter turnout. Then-incumbent President Jakaya Kikwete, in office since 2005, won around 60% of the vote against 26% for Wilbrod Slaa of Chadema (*Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo*, the Party for Democracy and Progress), formed prior to the 2000 elections. Despite some opposition charges of vote rigging and poor electoral administration, the State Department has characterized those elections as "largely free and fair" in annual human rights reports on Tanzania, and some other observers viewed them as an improvement over previous polls.

Recent tensions between the CCM and opposition parties have revolved around ongoing efforts to replace the constitution, which was adopted in 1977, when the country was still under one-party rule. In April 2014, opposition parties boycotted the process of drafting of a new constitution, claiming the CCM had refused to incorporate the opposition's proposals to limit the power of the executive and establish a federal system of government.<sup>8</sup> The remaining CCM-dominated legislature passed a draft shortly thereafter and scheduled a nationwide referendum for April 30, 2015, but the government postponed them indefinitely, putatively due to administrative delays in

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<sup>7</sup> U.S. and Tanzania Governments, *Partnership for Growth: Tanzania 2012-2016*, Joint Country Action Plan, April 23, 2012, based partly on a 2011 PFG "growth diagnostic" highlighting such findings; and various comments by officials (e.g., remarks by MCC Chief Executive Officer Daniel W. Yohannes, Center for Strategic and International Studies, "A Country Transformed: A New Agenda for Tanzania," May 17, 2012).

<sup>8</sup> The proposed federal government would have consisted of a federal union government and separate national governments on the mainland and in Zanzibar.



voter registration. Opposition parties had called on voters to boycott the referendum and sought legal action to block the charter.<sup>9</sup>

Rivalry between UKAWA (an alliance of Chadema, the Civic United Front, and two smaller parties<sup>10</sup>) and the CCM remains a key focus of politics. In July 2015, the CCM-dominated parliament overwhelmingly passed an oil and gas development and regulation bill after the speaker of the parliament suspended 40 opposition MPs for shouting during an earlier debate on the matter. The bill was controversial because it has important implications for future revenue earnings, state-corporate relations, and the role of the sector in helping to spur development, and transparency advocates had said its passage was rushed without adequate public scrutiny.<sup>11</sup> Energy policy decisions are a key issue as Tanzania seeks to develop its offshore gas reserves. These resources, which include a reported 55 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, are slated to be used to supply electricity generating stations, potentially vastly increasing Tanzania's limited supply of power. The manner in which the oil and gas bill was enacted may raise questions among some analysts regarding whether Tanzania has adequately developed a governance capacity, as may its record of implementing its Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) commitments. While Tanzania is listed as a "compliant" country under the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), it was suspended by the EITI Board on September 2, 2015 for not issuing a 2012/13 EITI transparency report by June 30 2015.<sup>12</sup>

### Zanzibar

**Background:** Zanzibar is comprised of three islands, Unguja (also known as Zanzibar island), Pemba, Mafia, and several islets. Its 1.3 million people mainly speak Kiswahili and are predominately Muslim. The islands offer protected anchorages just off the East African coast, making them a strategic location along the historic trading routes of the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea. Zanzibar was a British protectorate from 1890 until independence in 1963. Shortly thereafter, Zanzibar's black African majority (known as Shirazis) revolted against the Arab-dominated government. A new socialist-oriented government, led by the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), then joined with the head of the ruling party of mainland to form the United Republic of Tanzania, which helped protect the ASP against a counter-revolution. Zanzibar remains a semi-autonomous part of Tanzania, electing its own local affairs government. The first Zanzibari multiparty elections in 1995, in contrast to simultaneous one on the mainland, were contentious and accompanied by violence. Nonetheless, CCM received a slim majority of the vote in the Zanzibari legislative and presidential polls, and won more substantial victories in the 2000 elections, amidst voting irregularities and the violent suppression of post-election protests. In 2001, the CCM and opposition Civil United Front (CUF) signed a peace accord aimed at stemming politically-motivated violence. The agreement led to changes in the Zanzibari constitution, electoral law, and election commission. These were apparent factors in international observer assessments suggesting that the 2005 elections were administered better than past ones, although excessive use of force by security forces remained a problem.

In mid-2010, after years of negotiations, Zanzibari voters approved a constitutional amendment providing for firmer recognition of Zanzibari autonomy and accommodations for the opposition, setting the conditions for more peaceful elections in October 2010, which the current president, Ali Mohamed Shein, won in a close race. Under the 2010 unity agreement, the majority party holds the post of first vice president and the partisan makeup of the cabinet is proportional to party representation in the legislature. Five of the 81 members of Zanzibar's House of

<sup>9</sup> Fumbuka Ng'Wanakilala, "Tanzania opposition calls for boycott of constitutional referendum," *Reuters*, February 27, 2015; and *Africa Confidential*, "Unfinished constitutional business," July 22, 2015.

<sup>10</sup> UKAWA is an acronym for the group's Swahili name, Umoja wa Katiba ya Wananchi, roughly Union for a Citizens' Constitution.

<sup>11</sup> Under the law, which was signed into statute by President Kikwete in August 2015, energy firms are to pay a 12.5% royalty for onshore oil and gas production and 7.5% for offshore gas output, while the state would realize between 60% and 85% of the natural gas production profits.

<sup>12</sup> Tanzania is a member of EITI, an international effort to foster transparent and accountable governance in resource-rich countries through the public release of government revenues from extractive industry firm payments. On its suspension, see EITI, "Tanzania," as of November 13, 2015.



Representatives are elected to serve in Tanzania's National Assembly. Zanzibaris also vote in national presidential and parliamentary elections; although only 3% of Tanzanians are from Zanzibar, the 1964 constitution guarantees it over 15% of seats in the Union Parliament. Communal relations in Zanzibar remain tense. Several church burnings since 2011 and periodic clashes between authorities and an Islamist who seek secession from the mainland have highlighted discord between the mostly Muslim population and small, often proselytizing Christian groups. Zanzibar is a focus of some U.S. military regional counterterrorism efforts. These include activities undertaken by the U.S. Africa Command's Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), based in Djibouti, which has conducted civil-military and humanitarian assistance projects in the region.

**Recent Developments.** In mid-July 2015, Zanzibar's President Shein won the CCM nomination to run for a second term in office. He faced no CCM rivals, but was viewed as facing fierce competition in the general election, given his slim victory in the 2010 elections (50.1% against 49.1% for the Civic United Front (CUF) candidate). CCM-CUF tensions over an allegedly flawed voter registration process and a lockout from the parliament of the CUF leader preceded the October 2015 elections (see below).<sup>13</sup>

## The 2015 Elections

Tanzania held national and Zanzibari elections on October 25, 2015. Key electoral issues included access to land, poverty and unemployment, state service provision, corruption, and political dominance of the state by the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), as well as the prospective development of the energy sector. Then-President Kikwete was constitutionally barred from running for a third term, but his CCM party was widely tipped to win the polls, given its power of incumbency. The opposition, however, mounted a strong challenge, resulting in the closest presidential election in Tanzania's history. The CCM candidate, Dr. John Magufuli, won a 58.5% vote share to 40% for that of the UKAWA coalition candidate, of the Chadema party, Edward Lowassa. After the highly controversial annulment of the Zanzibar elections during the vote tallying process (see textbox), the situation in Zanzibar remained fluid and potentially volatile as of early November. As of November 5, unofficial results for 220 of the 239 directly elected seats in the National Assembly, or Bunge, indicated that the CCM had won 152 seats (69.1% of seats), while CHADEMA won 34 (15.5%), CUF 32 (14.5%), and the NCCR-Mageuzi and ACT one seat each (0.5% each).<sup>14</sup>

## Election Controversies and Assessments

The CCM internal party contest for the post was intense and controversial, as it reportedly featured a non-transparent selection process.<sup>15</sup> The process sparked dissent within the CCM, as the party leadership did not shortlist Lowassa, 61, a major CCM figure and former prime minister who had resigned in 2008 over energy corruption allegations, which he denied.<sup>16</sup> In what was

<sup>13</sup> EIU, "Zanzibar's presidential election is a rerun of 2010," July 13, 2015.

<sup>14</sup> An additional 107 seats are indirectly elected; these include 102 women elected by political parties proportional to their share of the national vote; and five members from Zanzibar, two of whom must be female. A further 10 seats are appointed, and one seat is reserved for the Attorney General. Unofficial results from *The Citizen* newspaper; official results had not been released as of November 5. On the parliamentary system, see Inter-Parliamentary Union, "United Republic of Tanzania (Bunge)," *Parline*.

<sup>15</sup> An initial slate of 34 contenders was winnowed down by a CCM's Central Committee to a list of five, three of whom the CCM Executive Council next selected as final candidate. Magufuli then won an 87% victory in an internal party nomination vote.

<sup>16</sup> The allegations pertained to payments made under an emergency power generation contract between the Tanzania Electric Supply Company Ltd (TANESCO), a public utility, and a putative U.S. firm, Richmond Company—which may have been a fictitious entity—for allegedly low- or non-performing service delivery. The incident earned Lowassa the nickname "Lorushwa" ("rushwa" meaning bribe in Swahili). *Tanzanian Affairs*, "Report on Richmond Scandal," May 1, 2008, among other sources.

seen as a major development in Tanzanian politics, Lowassa—asserting that the CCM had “lost its direction” and was “undemocratic, oppressive and witch-hunting”—left the party late July 2015 and accepted the nomination of Chadema to run as its presidential candidate and, days later, that of UKAWA.<sup>17</sup> There are reportedly few, if any, credible nonpartisan polls in Tanzania, but Lowassa drew large crowds of supporters, which was seen as an indicator of his relative popularity. His challenge to the CCM was seen by some observers as energizing the electorate, especially among the large youth population, and as providing a credible threat to the CCM. The closeness of the election raised tensions among elements of the 23 million-person electorate, notably militant youth wings of the major parties. There was some limited campaign-period violence, notably in Zanzibar, where opposition supporters were the reported subjects of intimidation efforts. Opposition parties also complained of a few instances of police interference or limitations on assembly.

An October 27, 2015, European Union Election Observation Mission (EUEOM) characterized the election as “largely well administered” but asserted that “insufficient efforts at transparency meant that both the National Electoral Commission (NEC) and the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) did not enjoy the full confidence of all parties.”<sup>18</sup> However, a unilateral ad hoc decision on October 28 by the ZEC chairman to nullify the Zanzibar elections during the vote-counting process raised the prospect of electoral violence in Zanzibar and questions over the credibility of the Zanzibari vote. His action came after soldiers reportedly “stormed the collation centre” and evicted journalists and observers, and two days after CUF candidate Seif Sharif Hamad had announced that he had won the presidential vote.<sup>19</sup> A string of small bombings using homemade devices occurred days after the annulment, along with some youth protests. In early November, the U.N. mission in Tanzania was reported hosted talks between CUF presidential candidate Hamad and the Zanzibar government to resolve the electoral dispute.<sup>20</sup> In early November, the Commonwealth Group reportedly appointed former Nigeria President Goodluck Jonathan, who had earlier led an election monitoring Commonwealth Observer Group (COG), to mediate the dispute over the electoral outcome in Zanzibar. Meanwhile, Zanzibar’s CUF leader continued to assert his claim to have won the election.<sup>21</sup>

The ZEC’s actions also cast a shadow over the Union elections, since the latter took place in concert with the Zanzibar polls. Tanzania’s NEC, however, discounted the nullification in its vote tallies, and counted Zanzibari votes in determining the outcome of the presidential election. The

<sup>17</sup> He also alleged that the CCM was “infested with leaders who are dictators, undemocratic and surrounded with greedy power mongers.” Reuters, “Ex-Tanzanian PM joins opposition to challenge ruling party in polls,” July 29, 2015; and AFP, “Tanzanian ex-prime minister joins opposition ahead of poll,” July 28, 2015.

<sup>18</sup> East African Community observers largely concurred, but noted some technical “inadequacies in the electoral process.” EAC Election Observation Mission, “Preliminary Statement,” October 27, 2015; and EUEOM, “Highly competitive, generally well organised elections, but with insufficient efforts at transparency from the election administrations,” October 27, 2015.

<sup>19</sup> BBC, “Tanzania election: Government ministers suffer shock defeat,” October 27, 2015; and Andrea Schmidt, “Why Is Tanzania’s Peaceful Election Suddenly Unravelling?,” Deutsche Welle, October 30, 2015.

<sup>20</sup> Six smaller Zanzibari opposition parties had also submitted a letter to the head of the U.N. mission characterizing the annulment as illegal under specific provisions of the Zanzibar Election Act and seeking U.N. assistance to redress the electoral situation. Willy Lowry and Jeffrey Gettleman, “Blasts on Tanzania Island Could Be Tied to Election,” *New York Times*, November 2, 2015; and David Kisanga, “UN talks on Zanzibar going on well - Hamad,” November 2, 2015, and “Six parties write UN over Zanzibar presidential poll,” November 4, 2015, *The Guardian* (Tanzania).

<sup>21</sup> *The Citizen* (Tanzania), “Tanzania: Goodluck to Help Resolve Zanzibar Deadlock,” November 8, 2015; Emma Ujah, “Commonwealth appoints Jonathan mediator in Tanzanian election stalemate,” *Vanguard* (Nigeria), November 10, 2015; and Hassan Ali, “Tanzania: Seif Picks New Cabinet, Says CCM Has Nothing to Fear,” *The Citizen* (Tanzania), November 9, 2015.

NEC decision also came despite opposition calls for a recount of the Union presidential vote, based on alleged voting irregularities and vote-tallying fraud. While the NEC's Union decision did not draw international concern, the ZEC's nullification did, along with criticism and calls for its reversal.<sup>22</sup> Such calls dovetailed with statements by the Tanzania's Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance and a former Zanzibar Attorney General indicating that they view the nullification as illegal.<sup>23</sup>

## New Administration

Newly-elected President Magufuli, 55, is a former public works minister, a role in which he acquired the nickname the "Bulldozer." Benson Bana, a University of Dar es Salaam political scientist, has characterized Magufuli as a "no-nonsense kind of person" with substantial public support based on a 20-year track record of public service. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) contends that he is known primarily for a positive record on road building and as a loyal, mainstream party member not allied to any particular factions, rather than as a charismatic leader.<sup>24</sup> Magufuli's running mate, Samia Hassan Suluhu, 55, a minister of state in the vice president's office, became Tanzania's first female vice-president.

## National Governance Challenges

Corruption, long a problem in Tanzania, persists. A 2012 public audit revealed widespread corruption in several ministries and state entities, and six cabinet ministers resigned in connection with the controversy that year. Other scandals have arisen since, including, notably, the illicit diversion to overseas accounts of \$122 million in central bank funds, ostensibly to pay for energy contracts, by senior government officials, a finding which led international donors to suspend \$490 million in budget support in October 2014, pending an investigation and led to the resignation of three government ministers.<sup>25</sup> Tanzania's ranking in Transparency International's (TI) *Corruption Perception Index* (CPI, which presents composite scores for countries derived from 13 regularly published corruption surveys and assessments) has slipped for several years in a row (from 100<sup>th</sup> in 2011 to 119<sup>th</sup> in 2014). Tanzania also has a mixed record on civil liberties. Freedom House rates it as "partly free" due to various legal restrictions on the press and

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<sup>22</sup> A U.S. statement said that the nullification "gravely alarmed" the U.S. government and "halted an orderly and peaceful election," and contained a U.S. "call for this announcement to be recalled." State Department, "U.S. Embassy Statement on Elections in Zanzibar," October 28, 2015. For international views, see joint EUEOM, Commonwealth, the Southern African Development Community, and African Union electoral mission statement "International observers express concern at the situation in Zanzibar, and call for transparency in the electoral process," October 29, 2015. The EAC issued a similar statement.

<sup>23</sup> Open Source Center, "Tanzania: Zanzibar Ex-Attorney General Alleges Annulment of Election Unconstitutional," transcript of BBC Focus on Africa program interview with former Zanzibar Attorney General Othman Masudi Othman, October 30, 2015. See also *Africa Confidential*, "Zanzibar faces poll re-run 6th November 2015," November 6, 2015.

<sup>24</sup> Magufuli, whose full name is John Pombe Joseph Magufuli, was born in 1959. He holds several university chemistry degrees, including a PhD from the University of Dar es Salaam. He is a three-term member of Parliament and has also served two separate terms as the public works minister, and as Minister of Lands and Human Settlements and Minister of Livestock and Fisheries Development, and in capacities in the World Road Congress and U.N.-HABITAT. Parliamentary Online Information System, "Hon. Dr. John Pombe Joseph Magufuli," *Member of Parliament's Profile*, Parliament of Tanzania; AP, "Tanzania ruling party names candidate for Oct. elections," July 12, 2015; and EIU, "John Magufuli selected as the CCM's presidential candidate," July 16, 2015.

<sup>25</sup> Mark Anderson, "UK and international donors suspend Tanzania aid after corruption claims," *The Guardian*, October 13, 2014; and Fumbuka Ng'wanakilala, "Tanzania announces cabinet reshuffle after energy minister resigns," Reuters, January 24, 2015.

nongovernmental organization operations, media bias favoring the CCM, and crackdowns on opposition protests.

## Security Challenges and Human Rights Trends

While Tanzania is generally stable and peaceful, there are periodic, usually relatively minor threats to state and public security. There have been sporadic attacks on tourists in Zanzibar attributed to Islamist radicals, and there have been several unattributed armed attacks on police stations in which weapons have been looted, as in early July 2015.<sup>26</sup> There have also been occasional bombings of Christian churches, among other targets, that analysts have speculatively attributed to Islamic radicals. Tanzania has occasionally arrested Islamic extremists, including 10 alleged members of the Somali al Qaeda-linked terrorist group al-Shabaab, who were arrested in April 2015. In May 2015, Tanzanian authorities also arrested Jamil Mukulu, the leader of an anti-Ugandan government rebel group, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), which is made up of Islamist extremists, whom Uganda claims have ties with Al Shabaab, allied with other anti-Ugandan government elements. In July 2015, Tanzania extradited Mukulu—who is also wanted in the DRC, where the ADF is currently based—to Uganda.

Like many African countries, Tanzania has a mixed human rights record, largely due to lack of capacity and institutional weakness in providing access to justice, as well as the conduct of security and law enforcement agencies, according to Tanzania’s independent, nonprofit Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) and other sources. The U.S. State Department, in its 2014 *Country Report on Human Rights* on Tanzania stated:

Three of the most widespread human rights problems in the country were security force use of excessive force resulting in deaths and injuries; mob killings and injuries; and gender-based violence, including rape, domestic violence, and female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C). Other major human rights problems included harsh and life-threatening prison conditions, lengthy pretrial detention, some restrictions on religious freedom, restrictions on the movement of refugees, official corruption, restrictions on political expression, child abuse, discrimination based on sexual orientation, and societal violence against persons with albinism. Trafficking in persons, both internal and international, as well as child labor were also problems.

The State Department also reported that in some instances “the government took steps to investigate and prosecute officials who committed abuses, but generally impunity in the police and security forces was widespread,” and that “security forces reported to civilian authorities, but there were instances in which elements of the security forces acted independently of civilian control.”<sup>27</sup> A particular human rights challenge faced by Tanzania are witchcraft-related killings and mutilation; the State Department reports that there were at least 320 such killings during the first half of 2014. Albinos are a particular target of such acts by attackers who reportedly harvest their body parts for use or sale in traditional witchcraft rites. There have been multiple reports of such albino murders in recent years.<sup>28</sup> The problem has attracted the attention of some Members of Congress supportive of efforts to end such acts.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>26</sup> Reuters, “Gunmen kill seven in attack on Tanzanian police station,” July 13, 2015.

<sup>27</sup> State Department, “Tanzania,” *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2014*.

<sup>28</sup> BBC News, “In pictures: Hope for Tanzania’s albino attack survivors,” October 8, 2015; Kizito Makoye, “Four sentenced to death in Tanzania for killing albino teenager,” Thomson Reuters Foundation, July 1, 2015; Fumbuka Ng’wanakilala, “Tanzania arrests 32 witch doctors over albino murders,” Reuters, March 7, 2015; Dan Gilgoff, “As Tanzania’s Albino Killings Continue, Unanswered Questions Raise Fears,” *National Geographic Daily News*, October 11, 2013; International Federation of Red Cross, *Through Albino Eyes: The Plight of Albino People in Africa’s Great* (continued...)

## The Economy

Tanzania's GDP stood at about \$47.9 billion in 2014, and has grown at about 7% annually on average over the past decade, based largely on favorably high (but now lower) gold prices and tourism—which has steadily increased and is a key source of hard currency—as well as traditional exports, such as coffee, tea, and cotton. Gradual diversification into manufactured goods exports is occurring, and development of uranium and gemstone mining is under way. Tanzania also has coal, iron, and nickel resources. The communications, transport, financial services, construction, manufacturing, and retail sectors are also growing rapidly. The benefits of growth, however, often have not reached the large rural population or been evenly distributed. About 80% of households engage in agriculture, which accounts for 27% of GDP and a large share of exports, but agricultural production has grown relatively slowly (e.g., 4.2% in 2013).

Tanzania is eligible for trade preferences, including apparel benefits, under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA, Title I, P.L. 106-200, as amended) and is a member of the East African Community (EAC) along with Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda. The EAC has taken several steps to promote regional integration: a customs union was formed in 2005, followed by a common market in 2010 and, in 2013, an agreement to establish a monetary union within the next decade. The bloc seeks to adopt a single currency by 2024.

## Energy Sector

Since late 2010, the discovery of large reserves of natural gas off the southern coast, in a region near far larger reserves in Mozambican territory, has increased foreign investment inflows and raised the prospect of export revenue. The government estimates that the country has 55 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves, and may also have additional onshore resources. Key firms, among a range of smaller ones, that have been active in exploring and/or developing Tanzania's reserves have included U.S.-based Exxon Mobil and several European firms, including Statoil (Norway), Eni (Italy), and BG Group (United Kingdom).<sup>30</sup> Many Tanzanians have welcomed the discoveries, but there have been sometimes violent protests against a new natural gas pipeline in the southern port city of Mtwara, due to local fears that gas revenues from the Mnazi Bay gas field along the shore zones south of the city may not benefit the gas-rich region.

More broadly, many Tanzanians are likely to benefit from gas development once gas-fueled electricity generation begins. Transmission of gas has begun along a newly constructed, 330-mile natural gas pipeline run by Tanzania's state-run Petroleum Development Corp (TPDC). The line links the Mnazi Bay gas production to the commercial capital, Dar es Salaam, where three new gas power plants have begun operations, but have faced technical problems and are not operating at capacity. Tanzania is also expanding its use of significant national coal reserves to fuel power

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(...continued)

*Lakes Region and a Red Cross Response*, 2009; and United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, *Persons with Albinism*, A/HRC/24/57, September 12, 2013.

<sup>29</sup> See, for instance, H.Res. 406, "Recognizing the progress made and challenges still faced by people living with albinism in East Africa," introduced July 31, 2015, by Representative Mo Brooks; H.Res. 1088 (111th Congress), "Recognizing the plight of people with albinism in East Africa and condemning their murder and mutilation," introduced by Representative Connolly and passed by the House in 2010; and various statements in the *Congressional Record*.

<sup>30</sup> Nicholas Bariyo, "Tanzania Says Gas Reserves Rise 18% to Reach 55 Trillion Cubic Feet," *Frontiers* (Wall Street Journal blog), June 8, 2015.



production. The initiation of gas-fueled and expanded coal-fired power generation is timely, as Tanzania is currently very badly affected by drought, a periodical phenomenon that regularly leads to power shortages caused by dips in Tanzania's hydroelectric generation capacity. As of early October 2015, all of Tanzania's hydroelectric plants, which provide a reported 35% of power supplies, were shut down. Tanzania could also host prospective Uganda oil exports. In October 2015, the two countries agreed to jointly study the potential for a pipeline that would carry Ugandan oil to a Tanzanian port.

## Foreign Relations

### Region

Lake Malawi, on Tanzania's southwest border, could also contain oil and gas reserves, but is the source of a territorial dispute with Malawi, which claims the entire lake as its own; this has led to increased tensions between the neighbors. The dispute has been mediated by former Mozambican president Joaquim Chisano and former South African president Thabo Mbeki, who have proposed that the parties enter an economic integration-focused resource-sharing accord to resolve their dispute.<sup>31</sup>

Tanzania has also hosted refugees from various conflicts and political crises in the region, some for extended periods, and has played a mediational role in attempts to resolve such challenges. In 2014, Tanzania also naturalized a large number of refugees from Burundi, and has more recently faced a renewed influx of refugees from Burundi following a highly contested and controversial July 2015 election in that country and an attendant, ongoing political and security crisis.<sup>32</sup> The Burundi crisis is expected by some observers to draw the increased attention, of the new Tanzanian government.<sup>33</sup>

### China

China and Tanzania have a long history of warm political relations and close trade and economic development cooperation.<sup>34</sup> China is also a key security partner for Tanzania; the two militaries share long ties and retain a close relationship. After Chinese President Xi Jinping took office in 2013, Tanzania was the first country he visited.

China is Tanzania's largest trading partner, and Chinese firms are active within Tanzania as well. The natural gas pipeline project noted above was financed by a \$1.23 billion Chinese loan.<sup>35</sup> Construction was also recently initiated on a \$10 billion mega-project at Bagamoyo, former President Kikwete's home town, which includes a multi-purpose deep water port, special economic zone, and linked railway. The multi-year project is financed by China Merchants

<sup>31</sup> *Nyasa Times*, "Lake Malawi now negotiable on resource sharing: Tanzania and Malawi," March 29, 2015.

<sup>32</sup> AFP, "Tanzania to grant citizenship to 200,000 Burundi refugees," October 14, 2014; and *The Guardian* (Tanzania) via IPP Media, "UNHCR asks Tanzania to give more land for refugees," July 18, 2015. On Burundi, see CRS Report R44018, *Burundi's Political Crisis: In Brief*, by (name redacted)

<sup>33</sup> *OSC Brief*, "Tanzania: Public Focus on Burundi Crisis Likely To Grow Following Elections," October 20, 2015.

<sup>34</sup> See, e.g., *Dar es Salaam Daily News Online*, "Tanzania, China sign five memorandums of understanding," October 18, 2013; Chinese Embassy in Tanzania, "A Cooperative Relationship with Mutual Benefit, A Traditional Friendship in New Era, March 27, 2014; and Deborah Bräutigam and Xiaoyang Tang, *An Overview of Chinese Agricultural and Rural Engagement in Tanzania*, IFPRI Discussion Paper 01214, October 2012.

<sup>35</sup> Reuters, "Tanzania gas pipeline to begin trial operation this month," July 6, 2015.



Holdings-International (CMHI), China's largest port operator, and Oman's State General Reserve Fund. CMHI is slated to manage the construction work and, according to some reports, may have multi-decade concession rights to the facility. The Bagamoyo development—with a planned annual 20 million container throughput capacity—is projected to dwarf ports in Dar es Salaam and Mombasa, Kenya and provide access to multiple countries in East and Southern Africa. Other major deals in recent years include a 2013 \$500 million housing project between Tanzania's SOE National Housing Corporation (NHC) and China Railway Jianchang Engineering; several power project deals signed in 2013 worth more than \$828 million; an integrated coal mine and power plant project; and an integrated iron ore mine and steel mill project worth up to a total investment of up to \$3 billion. While Chinese-Tanzanian economic ties have generally been positive, they have periodically prompted acrimonious responses by Tanzanians negatively affected by Chinese business, such as communities displaced during large construction projects or Tanzanian traders hurt by direct competition from Chinese retail rivals.<sup>36</sup> Tanzanian-Chinese bilateral trade reached a reported \$3.7 billion in 2013. U.S.-Tanzanian trade is far more modest, with U.S. exports to Tanzania in 2014 totaling \$303 million and, while imports totaled about \$86 million.

### Focus on Wildlife Trafficking and Alleged Chinese Involvement

The problem of wildlife trafficking—an increasing focus of U.S. concern in Africa—poses key threats to Tanzania, both with respect to its environmental conservation efforts and to its crucial wildlife-centered tourism industry, and has worsened in recent years. Chinese actors have been implicated in such trade; the reported involvement of Chinese nationals in illegal ivory trafficking from Tanzania has also introduced some tension into Chinese-Tanzanian relations. In June 2015, the Tanzanian government reported that its elephant population had dropped by more than 60% in the past five years, from 109,051 animals in 2009 to 43,330 at the end of 2014. Within Africa, Tanzania, which has for many years hosted some of the largest elephant populations in Africa, is both a key ivory source country and trafficking export exit point.<sup>37</sup>

In 2014, the environmental UK-based advocacy group Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) alleged that members of a delegation accompanying Chinese President Xi Jinping during a 2013 visit purchased illicit ivory, driving up the domestic black-market price of ivory prior to and during the visit. The Chinese government has rejected the allegation.<sup>38</sup> In response to increasing international pressure to crack down on illicit ivory imports from Africa, in early 2015 the Chinese government imposed a year-long ban on ivory imports, and in September, President Xi Jinping promised to halt commercial ivory sales in China during a visit to the United States. Later, in October, China imposed a year-long ban on imports of African hunting trophy ivory.<sup>39</sup> Also in October, a Chinese businesswoman active in Tanzania was charged with large-scale trafficking and illicit purchases of elephant ivory, allegedly in collaboration with well-placed Tanzanians, reportedly worth millions of dollars.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>36</sup> Beibei Yin, “Chinese investment in Tanzania bears bitter fruit,” *Guardian*, March 2, 2012; Kizito Makoye, “Tanzanian Traders Seek Rescue From Chinese,” *Inter-Press Service*, August 15 2013; Palash Ghosh, “Opinion: Tanzania’s expulsion of Chinese traders from Dar es Salaam underscores resentment of Asians in Africa,” *International Business Times*, January 13 2011.

<sup>37</sup> Karl Mathiesen, “Tanzania Elephant Population Declined by 60% in Five Years, Census Reveals,” *The Guardian (UK)*, June 2, 2015; and Samuel Wasser et al., “Genetic Assignment of Large Seizures of Elephant Ivory Reveals Africa’s Major Poaching Hotspots,” *Science* (349: 6243), July 3, 2015, among other sources.

<sup>38</sup> A similar phenomenon reportedly occurred during a 2009 visit by former Chinese President Hu Jintao. Ilya Gridneff and Aipeng Soo, “Chinese Accused of Smuggling Tanzania Ivory in State Visit,” *Bloomberg News*, November 6, 2014; and EIA, *Vanishing Point: Criminality, Corruption and the Devastation of Tanzania’s Elephants*, November 2014.

<sup>39</sup> Associated Press, “China seizes 804kg of ivory along with rhino horn, bear paws,” October 12, 2015; and Reuters, “China slaps one-year ban on imports of African ivory hunting trophies,” October 15, 2015.

<sup>40</sup> Kevin Sieff, “Prosecutors say this 66-year-old Chinese woman is one of Africa’s most notorious smugglers,” *Washington Post*, October 8, 2015.

## U.S. Policy

U.S.-Tanzanian ties are robust and growing. The State Department portrays the bilateral relationship as “a deep partnership characterized by mutual respect, mutual interest, shared values, and aspirations for a more peaceful and prosperous future.” Tanzania is a U.S. Partnership for Growth (PFG) country, one of four worldwide,<sup>41</sup> and former President Kikwete was the first African head of state to meet with President Obama after Obama took office in 2009. President Obama later visited Tanzania in mid-2013, following high-profile visits by then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2011 and former President George W. Bush in 2008. In August 2014, then-Kikwete, along with other African leaders, met with President Obama at the August 2014 U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit. Despite the often positive tone of U.S. characterizations of Tanzania, MCC officials have raised concerns about governance, notably in reference to control of corruption and freedom of expression. U.S. assistance to build government accountability institutions in Tanzania may be interpreted by some as implying that U.S. officials see a need for improved performance in this area. Some observers may also view the potential for more robust U.S. security sector cooperation as being inhibited by Tanzania’s long tradition of security cooperation with China. President Obama also announced in 2014 that Tanzania would be one of six initial partner countries under his Administration's new African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP).<sup>42</sup>

This engagement followed a 2013 trip to Tanzania by President Obama, during which he stated that a “long relationship” and a “shared commitment to the development and the dignity of the people of Tanzania” underpin U.S.-Tanzanian ties. While in Tanzania, he also announced several new regional initiatives. One, Power Africa, aims to double access to electricity in Africa, initially focusing on selected countries, including Tanzania. Trade Africa, a partnership to increase trade focusing between the United States and Africa and among African countries, beginning with the East African Community was another.<sup>43</sup> A third was increased aid to Africa to combat wildlife trafficking.<sup>44</sup> In 2012, U.S. and EAC officials agreed to pursue a trade and investment partnership under which they will explore a potential U.S.-EAC Investment Treaty and discuss a possible Trade Facilitation Agreement and a U.S.-EAC commercial dialogue, among other ends. The U.S. Department of Commerce opened a new office in Tanzania in 2014. Between 120 and 180 U.S. Peace Corps volunteers work in Tanzania, primarily on education, environment and health

<sup>41</sup> PFG seeks to increase bilateral cooperation with selected countries, through a mix of aid, public-private partnership, and private sector investment, to spur sustainable, broad-based economic growth. In April 2012 Tanzania and the United States signed a PFG Joint Country Action Plan that prioritizes joint efforts to develop national electrical capacities and rural roads.

<sup>42</sup> Under APRRP, the Administration plans to provide targeted assistance to enhance the international peacekeeping deployment capacity of selected African countries seen as possessing relatively high-level military capabilities and with a record of contributing to international peacekeeping operations. Examples of capabilities targeted for improvement may include military logistics, airlift, field hospital operation, and formed police units. Equipment transfers may comprise another key APRRP aid component. Other APRRP countries include Senegal, Ghana, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Uganda. White House, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Support for Peacekeeping in Africa,” August 06, 2014, and “Fact Sheet: U.S. Support for Peace, Security, and Countering Violent Extremism in Africa,” July 27, 2015, among other sources.

<sup>43</sup> See CRS Insight IN10015, *Trade Africa Initiative*, by (name redacted) and (name redacted).

<sup>44</sup> In 2013, President Obama issued Executive Order (EO) 13648 on “Combating Wildlife Trafficking” and pledged to provide an additional \$10 million in regional and bilateral training and technical assistance in Africa to combat wildlife trafficking. EO 13648 established an inter-agency Presidential Task Force on Wildlife Trafficking and a non-governmental Advisory Council on Wildlife Trafficking, and issuance of a National Strategy for Combating Wildlife Trafficking, which was issued in February 2014. A year later, the Presidential Task Force released a Strategy implementation plan.

initiatives, as well as HIV/AIDS prevention.<sup>45</sup> Tanzania is also a participant in the President's Young African Leaders initiative (YALI),<sup>46</sup> along with several other exchange programs (e.g., Fulbright, Humphrey, and English language higher education grant programs, and other learning exchanges for artists, journalists, authors, civil servants, and students).

## Assistance

U.S. assistance to Tanzania focuses primarily on health, food security and agricultural development, and infrastructure, largely under major presidential initiatives. In addition to a substantial MCC Compact (see below), the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have administered significant amounts of aid in Tanzania in recent years. Such aid totaled about \$591.5 million in FY2014. The FY2015 total is estimated at \$644 million (compared to a FY2015 request of \$590 million), while more than \$590 million was requested in FY2016. Health funding, largely devoted to fighting HIV/AIDS and malaria (primarily under the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief and the President's Malaria Initiative), constitutes about 84% (\$475 million) of the FY2016 State Department/USAID aid request for Tanzania. Tanzania is also a partner country under the Administration's Global Health Security Agenda (GHSa), under which countries cooperate through assistance projects and mutual collaboration to prevent, rapidly detect and transparently report, and mitigate the impact of pathogenic outbreaks.<sup>47</sup>

Agriculture, at nearly 12% of the FY2016 aid request for the country (\$70 million), would be the second-largest focus of aid.<sup>48</sup> The Tanzania program for Feed the Future, a major global U.S. global food security and agricultural economic growth initiative, focuses on improving agricultural productivity; increasing rural infrastructure, including roads; bolstering "value chain efficiency"; improving nutrition for children and mothers; and building private and public sector capacity "to address policy constraints."<sup>49</sup> Feed the Future activities involve collaboration with U.S. global health programs. Tanzania is also a participant in the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, a Feed the Future-supported, G8-led global initiative in Africa, and is a planned recipient of U.S. assistance under the Scaling Seeds & Other Technologies Partnership. The latter is a project under another international initiative, the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa.

Aid also focuses on strengthening good governance, and expanding civic participation and transparency; infrastructure (roads, power, water, and sanitation); sustainable, inclusive economic growth; better primary education; law enforcement capacity-building; and biodiversity preservation. In addition, the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) Bureau of International Labor

<sup>45</sup> The Peace Corps FY2016 agency budget request states that in FY2015, a \$3.6 million country budget is funding 120 volunteers. The agency requested \$4.5 million for 180 volunteers in FY2015.

<sup>46</sup> YALI, a presidential initiative begun in 2010, fosters the development of emergent young African business, civic, and public management leaders through exchange-based fellowships and follow-up support. The State Department primarily administers the U.S.-based portion, while USAID implements most Africa-based activities. Under YALI, USAID provides online information on networking, professional opportunities, and sources of seed funding and mentoring support for community service for Fellows, including through regional leadership centers.

<sup>47</sup> For background, see CRS In Focus IF10022, *The Global Health Security Agenda and International Health Regulations*, by (name redacted).

<sup>48</sup> Aid in this area centers on irrigation and rural road infrastructure; staple foods and horticulture value chain production; agricultural finance; research and development; leadership training; agriculture and water management-focused climate change adaptation; reducing malnutrition; and enhanced private sector agriculture investment policies, among other goals.

<sup>49</sup> Feed the Future, Country Profile: Tanzania, at <http://www.feedthefuture.gov/country/tanzania>.

Affairs programs fund projects aimed at combatting child labor in Tanzania, particularly in agricultural and domestic service contexts.<sup>50</sup>

In September 2013, Tanzania completed a \$698 million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Compact, and a second is under consideration but, as discussed above, its prospects will depend on Tanzanian efforts to address MCC Board concerns over energy sector reform and transparency commitments.

U.S. security cooperation and assistance has grown since the 1998 Al Qaeda bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam, but it remains limited compared to that pursued with Tanzania's East African neighbors. Peacekeeping support is the main focus of military cooperation and aid ties, and is slated to rise under APRRP. Tanzanian troops have received training under the U.S. Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) and its train-and-equip African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program, which seek to increase available international peacekeeping troops. Under APRRP, Tanzania will receive capacity building assistance to improve command, control, communications and information systems; deployment logistics and mission sustainment; and pre-deployment readiness. Such assistance is complemented by a U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, which supports military professionalization and institutional reform in the Tanzanian military.

Tanzania receives some counterterrorism assistance through the State Department-led, multi-country Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PRACT). It also hosts the regional East and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group, on which the United States has observer status, and receives U.S. regional funding to combat terrorist financing. Smaller U.S. security aid programs center on strengthening border security and improving police capacity to deter crime and terrorism.

## Outlook

Tanzania is likely to remain a generally stable but poor developing country for the foreseeable future. Increasing multi-party competition may contribute to gradual growth in demand for political change, democratic accountability, and improved governance and greater political pluralism—but potentially also to increased political tension. Growing access to information, notably via mobile phones, may spur similar trends by increasing exposure to information on current events, global social and governance norms. It may also contribute to market growth through increased information to pricing data and improved social services.<sup>51</sup> Such changes, along with continuing infusions of foreign assistance, including from the United States, and gradually improving public infrastructure and government services, appear likely to spur increasing economic activity, production, and trade, thus improving quality of life for the Tanzanian people. The United States, while expressing periodic concern over issues such as corruption, appears likely—as suggested by bilateral relations trends and aid levels in recent years—to continue to support the strengthening of Tanzania's democratic system and the socioeconomic development of its people, and to look to Tanzania as a key development partner in East and Southern Africa.

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<sup>50</sup> See DOL Bureau of International Labor Affairs, "ILAB in Tanzania," <http://www.dol.gov/ilab/map/countries/tanzania.htm>.

<sup>51</sup> Thomson Reuters Foundation/Kizito Makoye, "Mobile phones a boon for Tanzanian women in business, banking: researchers," October 5, 2015, and "Tanzania rolls out birth registrations by mobile phone," October 13, 2015.

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