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Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress

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Summary

The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) is being developed by the Army and the Marine Corps as a successor to the High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), which has been in service since 1985. On October 28, 2008, awards were made for the JLTV Technology Development (TD) Phase to three industry teams: (1) BAE Systems, (2) the team of Lockheed Martin and General Tactical Vehicle, and (3) AM General and General Dynamics Land Systems.

On January 26, 2012, the Army issued the Request for Proposal (RFP) for the JLTV's EMD phase. Up to three EMD contracts could be awarded, and contract award was scheduled for June 2012. The period of performance for EMD contracts is 27 months, with the overall EMD phase scheduled to last 33 months. Vendors would be required to provide 22 JLTV prototypes for testing 12 months after contract award. The target cost for the base vehicle is \$250,000 excluding add-on armor and other kits.

On August 22, 2012, the Army announced the award of three firm-fixed price JLTV EMD contracts totaling approximately \$185 million. The three companies awarded the EMD contracts were AM General, LLC (South Bend, IN); Lockheed Martin Corporation (Grand Prairie, TX); and Oshkosh Corporation (Oshkosh, WI).

On September 3, 2013, the Army began JLTV testing at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, MD; Yuma, AZ; and Redstone Arsenal, AL. The Army planned to select a single vendor by 2015, with the first Army brigade being equipped with JLTVs by 2018. FY2015 program plans anticipated a Milestone C (Production and Deployment Phase Approval) decision in the fourth quarter of FY2015, followed by Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP).

In June 2014, the Army issued a draft RFP for the JLTV Full-Rate Production Phase and plans to select a contract winner in July 2015. The Office of the Secretary of Defense conducted an interim review of the JLTV program and found it is likely to meet all eight key performance parameters. Three companies who were picked in 2012 to build prototypes—Oshkosh, Lockheed Martin, and AM General—submitted their bids for the LRIP contract by the February 10, 2015, deadline.

On August 25, 2015, it was announced the Army had awarded Oshkosh a \$6.7 billion low rate initial production (LRIP) contract with eight options to procure the initial 16,901 vehicles for the Army and Marines. The JLTV are to be produced in Oshkosh, WI, and deliveries are scheduled to begin in June 2016.

On September 8, 2015, it was reported Lockheed Martin would file a protest with GAO, but AM General reportedly did not file a protest with the GAO. The formal protest was later filed with GAO on September 10, 2015, and on that day the Army reportedly issued a stop work order to Oshkosh until the GAO protest was resolved.

The President's FY2016 budget request called for \$456.9 million for Army and Marine RDT&E and Procurement funding for the JLTV. The FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act Conference approved the FY2016 presidential budget request for both JLTV RDT&E and Procurement funding for the Army and Marine Corps.

A potential issue for Congress is the possible impact of a year-long continuing resolution on Army and Marine Corps JLTV procurement. This report will be updated.

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Background¹

The JLTV is an Army-led, multi-service initiative to develop a family of future light tactical vehicles to replace many of the HMMWVs used by the armed services today. HMMWVs, which first entered service in 1985, were developed during the Cold War when improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other anti-vehicle explosive devices were not a major factor in military planning. The HMMWV's demonstrated vulnerability to IEDs and the difficulties and costs experienced in "up-armoring" HMMWVs already in the inventory have led to renewed emphasis on vehicle survivability. DOD officials have emphasized that JLTVs are not intended to replace HMMWVs "one for one."²

JLTV Program

What Is the JLTV?³

The JLTV program is a joint Army/Marine Corps effort to develop and produce both vehicles and associated trailers. Originally, there were three variants, but now there are two planned JLTV variants: a four-passenger Combat Tactical Vehicle (CTV) and a two-passenger Combat Support Vehicle (CSV). As planned, JLTVs would be more mechanically reliable, maintainable (with on-board diagnostics), all-terrain mobile, and equipped to link into current and future tactical data nets. Survivability and strategic and operational transportability by ship and aircraft are also key JLTV design requirements.

Program Structure⁴

The JLTV is an Acquisition Category (ACAT) 1D program.⁵ The Army bears the overall responsibility for developing the JLTV through its Joint Program Office, which reports to the Program Executive Office (PEO) for Combat Support & Combat Service Support (PEO CS&CSS) in Warren, MI, which reports to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ASA[AL&T]). Marine participation is centered on a program office under the supervision of the Program Executive Officer Land Systems (PEO LS) Marine Corps at Quantico, VA.

¹ Alan L. Gropman, "Combat Vehicle Sector Could be Headed for Turbulent Times," *National Defense*, April 25, 2008, and James P. Miller, "Race is On to Replace Humvee," *Chicago Tribune*, June 21, 2008.

² Kris Osborn, "DOD's JLTV Becoming an International Effort," *Defense News*, August 4, 2008. Headquarters, Department of the Army, "Army Truck Program (Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Acquisition Strategy) Report to the Congress," June 2010, p. 5.

³ Information in this section is taken from the Army Product Manager, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle website, <http://peocss.tacom.army.mil/pmJLTV.html>, last visited March 2, 2011, and Marine Corps PEO Land Systems Joint Light Tactical Vehicle website, <http://www.marcorsyscom.usmc.mil/peolandssystems/jltv.aspx>, last visited March 2, 2011, and Tony Bertuca, "PMs: JLTV Still Too Heavy, Changing Schedule and Losing Six-Man Variant," *InsideDefense.com*, February 11, 2011.

⁴ CRS Report RL34026, *Defense Acquisitions: How DOD Acquires Weapon Systems and Recent Efforts to Reform the Process*, by Moshe Schwartz, provides an extensive discussion of the defense acquisition process.

⁵ The 12th Edition of the *Defense Acquisition University Glossary*, July 2005, defines an ACAT 1D program as "a Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) which is estimated by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) (USD (AT&L)) to require the eventual expenditure for Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) of more than \$365 million (FY2000 constant dollars) or the procurement of more than \$2.19 billion (FY2000 constant dollars)."

Program History

In November 2006, the Joint Chief of Staff's Joint Requirement Oversight Council (JROC) approved the JLTV program. On December 22, 2007, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics USD (AT&L) signed an Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) directing the JLTV Program to move from the Concept Refinement Phase into the Technology Development (TD) Phase of the DOD System Acquisition Process. The Army and Marines had intended to issue a Request for Proposal (RFP) for Technology Development Phase as early as October 2007. Concerned with funding adequacy, technical maturity, and shifting requirements, the Pentagon's acquisition executive, John Young, disapproved the issuance of the RFP and directed the Army and Marines to "go back to the drawing board and develop a robust technology development phase."⁶ On February 5, 2008, an RFP for Technology Development Phase was issued to industry.⁷ The RFP stated the government desired to award three contracts for the JLTV Technology Development Phase. The RFP stipulated that proposals would be due April 7, 2008, and the TD Phase would last 27 months. Contractors would build four test sub-configurations during the first 15 months, followed by 12 months of testing.

Technology Development Contracts Awarded⁸

On October 28, 2008, three awards were made for the JLTV TD Phase for a total of \$166 million. The three industry teams were (1) BAE Systems Land and Armaments, Ground Systems Division, Santa Clara, CA, and NAVISTAR Defense, Warrenville, IL; (2) General Tactical Vehicles, Sterling Heights, MI—a joint venture between General Dynamics Land Systems and AM General; and (3) Lockheed Martin Systems Integration, Oswego, NY, BAE Systems, Alcoa Defense, Pittsburgh, PA, and JWF Defense Systems, Johnstown, PA.

JLTV Contracts Protested

On November 7 and November 12, 2008, protests were filed with the Government Accountability Office (GAO) against the TD contract awards by the Northrop Grumman-Oshkosh team and the Textron-Boeing-SAIC team alleging there were "unintended discrepancies" in how the government rated bids in terms of the criteria of systems maturity, logistics, and costs.⁹ As a result of the protest, work on the JLTV program by the three winning teams was suspended. On February 17, 2009, GAO rejected the JLTV protests and the stop work orders were lifted.

⁶ Jason Sherman, "Pentagon Halts JLTV Competition, Directs Revised Strategy," *InsideDefense.com*, September 24, 2007.

⁷ JLTV Request for Proposal, W56HZV-08-R-0210, February 5, 2008, and Marjorie Censer, "JLTV Solicitation Calls for Three Contractors: Officials Say More are Possible," *InsideDefense.com*, February 5, 2008.

⁸ Unless otherwise noted, information in this section is taken from TACOM's JLTV Program website, <http://contracting.tacom.army.mil/MAJORSYS/JLTV/jltv.htm>, accessed March 2, 2011, and the Marine Corps PEO Land Systems JLTV website, <https://www.marcorsyscom.usmc.mil/peolandsystems/jltv.aspx>, accessed March 2, 2011.

⁹ Marjorie Censer, "Following Northrop's Lead, Boeing-Textron Team Files JLTV Protest," *InsideDefense.com*, November 12, 2008 and Ann Roosevelt, "Textron-Team Protests Army JLTV Awards," *Defense Daily*, November 13, 2008; and Daniel Wasserbly, "U.S. GAO Rejects JLTV Protests," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, February 25, 2009, p. 12.

Change in Requirements, Program Schedule, and Variants¹⁰

In February 2011, the JLTV Program Office announced the award of the EMD contract would be delayed until January or February 2012 because the Army changed requirements for the JLTV to have the same level of under body protection as the Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected All-Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV). DOD had planned to award two contracts for the EMD phase, which was scheduled to last 24 months,¹¹ but instead opted for a 48-month-long EMD phase before awarding Production and Deployment contracts in the second quarter of FY2016. In addition, the Category B variant was eliminated because it proved to be too heavy to meet the required weight of approximately 15,639 pounds to make it transportable by Army CH-47F and Marine Corps CH-53K helicopters. Now there will be two variants—a Combat Tactical Vehicle (CTV), which can transport four passengers and carry 3,500 pounds, and a Combat Support Vehicle (CSV), which can transport two passengers and carry 5,100 pounds.

Army Issues RFP for EMD Phase¹²

On January 26, 2012, the Army issued the RFP for the JLTV's EMD Phase. Industry proposals for the EMD contract were to have been filed with the Army by March 13, 2012. The RFP stipulated that up to three EMD contracts could be awarded, and contract award occurred in June 2012. These contracts will be capped at \$65 million per contract. The duration of the EMD performance period would be 27 months starting with contract award. Vendors would be required to provide 22 prototypes for testing 12 months after contract award, and the target cost for the base vehicle configuration was \$250,000 (FY2011 constant dollars), excluding add-on armor kits and other kits identified in the RFP.

Revised Acquisition Quantities¹³

According to DOD's May 2013 JLTV Selective Acquisition Report (SAR), the Army plans to procure 49,909 JLTVs from FY2015 to FY2040 and the Marines 5,500 JLTVs from FY2015 to FY2021. The SAR also notes no JLTVs are planned for under Foreign Military Sales (FMS).

Foreign Participation in JLTV Program

As previously noted, the JLTV SAR indicates that no Foreign Military Sales are currently planned for JLTV, despite previous program participation from Australia and interest from Canada, Great Britain, and Israel. When the JLTV Joint Program Office (JPO) was asked to clarify foreign participation in the JLTV program, the following response was provided:

International cooperation in acquisition programs can substantially improve U.S. operations, and the JLTV program is no different. This important work increases military effectiveness by improving interoperability and partnership with our allies, reducing overall acquisition costs, and strengthening key relationships. Australia did participate in the Technology Demonstration phase of the JLTV program, but no international partners

¹⁰ Information in this section, unless otherwise noted is taken from a briefing from the Project Manager Joint Combat Support Systems on the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle given on February 7 and 8, 2011 and Tony Bertuca, "PMs: JLTV Still Too Heavy, Changing Schedule and Losing Six-Man Variant," *InsideDefense.com*, February 11, 2011.

¹¹ DOD Briefing: "JLTV EMD Industry Day," April 26, 2010.

¹² Solicitation, Offer, and Award, Number W56HZV-11-R-0329, U.S. Army Contracting Command, January 26, 2012.

¹³ Department of Defense Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), May 21, 2013.

are currently and actively participating in the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase. International participation or purchase remains possible and an area JPO JLTV would pursue as appropriate with interested allies and partners.¹⁴

This suggests there is no longer any foreign participation in the JLTV program. Congress might wish to examine why these countries are no longer interested in the JLTV program, as foreign participation in these types of programs not only increases interoperability but can also benefit these programs from a cost perspective.

Program Activities

JLTV EMD Contracts Awarded

On August 22, 2012, the Army announced the award of three firm-fixed price JLTV EMD contracts totaling approximately \$185 million.¹⁵ The three companies awarded the EMD contracts were AM General, LLC (South Bend, IN); Lockheed Martin Corporation (Grand Prairie, TX); and Oshkosh Corporation (Oshkosh, WI). The period of performance is for 27 months, with each contractor receiving initial funding between \$28 million to \$36 million per contractor, with the balance of funding up to the full contract amount being provided in FY2013 and FY2014. In 12 months, each team will be required to deliver 22 full-up prototypes and contractor support for a 14-month comprehensive government testing program, which will include blast, automotive, and user evaluation testing. The overall EMD Phase is scheduled to last 33 months. According to the Army, “the EMD Phase is designed to test and prepare the next-generation vehicles for a Limited User Test, Capabilities Production Document and Milestone C procurement decision in FY 2015.”¹⁶

Unsuccessful bidders, Navistar Defense, BAE Systems, and General Tactical Vehicles (a team of General Dynamics and AM General), are permitted to continue developing JLTV candidate vehicles at their own risk and expense, if they notify the government within 30 days of the EMD contract award.¹⁷ Reports suggest some bidders might consider continuing development of JLTV candidates for submission for production source selection.¹⁸

Army Releases Final RFP for JLTV Full-Rate Production¹⁹

On December 12, 2014, the Army reportedly released the final RFP for JLTV low-rate initial production and full-rate production and gave competitors until February 10, 2016, to refine and submit their bids. The Army—on behalf of itself and the Marines—planned to select a winner and issue a single contract award in the late summer of 2015.

¹⁴ Email to CRS from JLTV JPO, June 11, 2013.

¹⁵ Information in this section is from U.S. Army Message, “Army Awards Three Joint Light Tactical Vehicle Engineering & Manufacturing Development Phase Contracts,” Warren, Michigan, August 22, 2012.

¹⁶ Kris Osborn, Office of the Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology, “JLTV Program Moves into EMD Phase,” *Army News Service*, October 18, 2012.

¹⁷ Tony Bertuca, “Three JLTV Winners Announced; Losing Companies Still May Have a Shot,” *InsideDefense.com*, August 23, 2012.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Information in this section is taken from Megan Eckstein, “Army Releases Final RFP for JLTV; Bids Due Feb. 10,” *Defense Daily*, December 15, 2014.

The winning contractor would build approximately 17,000 JLTVs for the Army and Marines during three years of low-rate initial production, followed by five years of full-rate production. The first Army unit would be equipped with JLTVs in FY2018, and the Army's complete acquisition of JLTVs would be completed in 2040. The Marines would begin acquiring their 5,500 JLTVs at the beginning of production and would be completed by FY2022.

Bids Submitted for JLTV Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP)²⁰

It was reported that the three companies who were picked in 2012 to build prototypes—Oshkosh, Lockheed Martin, and AM General—submitted their bids for the LRIP contract by the February 10, 2015, deadline. It was also reported that none of the three competitors have said publically if they included in their proposals an option for the Army to purchase a technical data package for their vehicles. If the Army acquired the technical data package, theoretically the Army could use that data for future production runs, which could enhance competition and possibly result in better prices for the government.

Army Awards JLTV Contract²¹

On August 25, 2015, it was announced the Army had awarded Oshkosh a \$6.7 billion low rate initial production (LRIP) contract with eight options to procure the initial 16,901 vehicles for the Army and Marines. The JLTV are to be produced in Oshkosh, WI, and deliveries are scheduled to begin in June 2016. A full rate production decision is planned for FY2018, and plans call for the production of 49,100 JLTVs for the Army and 5,500 for the Marine Corps.

Lockheed Martin Files Protest with the Government Accountability Office (GAO)²²

On September 8, 2015, it was reported Lockheed Martin planned a protest with GAO, with a program spokesman stating:

After evaluating the data provided at our debrief, Lockheed Martin has filed a protest of the award decision on the JLTV program. We firmly believe we offered the most capable and affordable solution for the program. Lockheed Martin does not take protests lightly, but we are protesting to address our concerns regarding the evaluation of Lockheed Martin's offer.²³

The formal protest was later filed with GAO on September 10, 2015. Under the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), all losing bidders of government contracts have the ability to protest contract awards to GAO lawyers if they believe their offer did not get fair consideration during source-selection proceedings.

AM General reportedly did not file a protest with the GAO, stating a decision to do so "would result in a distraction from the company's current growth business areas,"²⁴ which likely is a

²⁰ Information in this section is taken from Sebastian Sprenger, "Companies Submit Bids for Joint Light Tactical Vehicle," *InsideDefense.com*, February 10, 2015.

²¹ Joe Gould, "Oshkosh Wins JLTV Award," *Defense News*, August 25, 2015.

²² Lee Hudson and Justin Doubleday, "Lockheed To File GAO Bid Protest After Losing JLTV Contract," *InsideDefense.com*, September 9, 2015.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*

reference to the ongoing role the company plays in the upgrading and modernization of the HMMWV fleet of vehicles.

GAO has until December 17, 2015—100 days from the submission of the protest—to rule on Lockheed Martin’s protest.

Army Stops Work on the JLTV Contract²⁵

On September 10, 2015, the Army reportedly issued a stop work order to Oshkosh, with a GAO spokesman noting, “the Federal Acquisition Regulation requires contracting officers to automatically suspend performance on an awarded contract, following appropriate notification of a protest from GAO.”²⁶

Budgetary Issues

FY2016 President’s Budget Request²⁷

The President’s FY2016 budget request for the JLTV is as follows:

Table I. FY2016 JLTV Budget Request

FY2015	\$ Millions	Quantity
RDT&E—Army	32.5	—
RDT&E—Marines	36.7	—
Procurement—Army	308.3	450
Procurement—Marines	79.4	109
Total	456.9	559

Source: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Request, Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System, February 2015, p. 3-2.

H.R. 1735, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016

Funding²⁸

The House authorized the FY2016 presidential budget request for both JLTV RDT&E and Procurement funding for the Army and Marine Corps.

²⁵ Sebastian Sprenger, “Newly Awarded JLTV Work Comes To A Halt Amid Auditors’ Review,” *InsideDefense.com*, September 10, 2015.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request, Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System, February 2015, p. 3-2.

²⁸ H.Rept. 114-102, Report of the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives on H.R. 1735, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, May 5, 2015, pp. 458,464,409,431.

S. 1376, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016

Funding²⁹

The Senate authorized the FY2016 presidential budget request for both JLTV RDT&E and Procurement funding for the Army and Marine Corps.

H.R. 2685, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2016

Funding³⁰

The House approved the FY2016 presidential budget request for both JLTV RDT&E and Procurement funding for the Army and Marine Corps, with the following exception:

- For Marine Corps JLTV procurement, a decrease of \$9.177 million for a \$27.479 recommended appropriation attributed to support engineering excess growth.

S. 1558, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2016

Funding³¹

The Senate approved the FY2016 presidential budget request for both JLTV RDT&E and Procurement funding for the Army and Marine Corps.

Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 1735, National Defense Authorization Act for FY2016

Funding³²

The conference authorized the FY2016 presidential budget request for both JLTV RDT&E and Procurement funding for the Army and Marine Corps.

²⁹ S.Rept. 114-49, Report to Accompany S. 1376, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, May 19, 2015, pp. 400, 407, 350, 372.

³⁰ H.Rept. 114-139, Report of the Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2016, June 5, 2015, pp. 132, 174, 215, 228, 236.

³¹ S.Rept. 114-63, Report of the Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2016, June 11, 2015, pp. 78, 115, 152, 159.

³² Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 1735, National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2016, Sept 22, 2015, pp. 7, 13, 25.

Potential Issue for Congress

A Possible Year-Long Continuing Resolution and JLTV Procurement³³

With the possibility of operating under a year-long continuing resolution (CR), the Army contends it would lose approximately \$6.6 billion in obligation authority and purchasing power. As part of this loss of funding, the Army stated it would decrease JLTV production from 450 to 184 vehicles.³⁴ The Navy states it would lose almost \$7 billion in obligation authority but did not provide specifics on how this would affect the Marine's initial JLTV procurement, although it is not unrealistic to assume that the CR could affect Marine JLTV procurement.

Given this possible reduction in procurement, Congress might chose to review with the Services the following potential issues:

- Will the reduction in JLTV procurement as a result of a year-long CR result in an overall program budget increase?
- In a similar manner, will it result in a per-unit cost increase?
- Will the JLTV program procurement and fielding timelines be extended due to the CR?
- If funding is provided, is there industrial capacity to “catch up” to account for decreased production in FY2016?
- What is the operational impact to the Army and Marines if fewer JLTVs are procured in FY2016?

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³³ Ellen Mitchell, “Yearlong Continuing Resolution to Cause \$6.6 Billion Blow to Army,” *InsideDefense.com*, October 2, 2015; Army Paper: FY16 Impacts of a Long Term Continuing Resolution, September 18, 2015; and Navy: FY 2016 DON Continuing Resolution (CR) Impact, September 2015.

³⁴ *Ibid.*