The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle
(AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
October 28, 2015
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R43240
The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
Summary
The Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) is the Army’s proposed replacement for the
Vietnam-era M-113 personnel carriers, which are still in service in a variety of support capacities
in Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs). While M-113s no longer serve as infantry fighting
vehicles, five variants of the M-113 are used as command and control vehicles, general purpose
vehicles, mortar carriers, and medical treatment and evacuation vehicles. An estimated 3,000 of
these M-113 variants are currently in service with the Army.
The AMPV is intended to be a “vehicle integration” or non-developmental program (candidate
vehicles will be either existing vehicles or modified existing vehicles—not vehicles that are
specially designed and not currently in service). Some suggest that a non-developmental vehicle
might make it easier for the Army to eventually field this system to the force, as most of the
Army’s most recent developmental programs, such as the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV), the
Future Combat System (FCS), the Crusader self-propelled artillery system, and the Comanche
helicopter, were cancelled before they could be fully developed and fielded.
On November 26, 2013, the Army issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the AMPV. This RFP
stipulated the Army planned to award a five-year EMD contract in May 2014 worth $458 million
to a single contractor for 29 prototypes. While the March 2013 RFP established an Average Unit
Manufacturing Cost Ceiling for each AMPV at $1.8 million, this was rescinded to permit vendors
greater flexibility. The EMD phase is scheduled to run between FY2015 and FY2019, followed
by three years of low-rate initial production (LRIP) starting in 2020. The Army currently plans to
procure 2,907 AMPVs to replace M-113s in ABCTs at an estimated program cost of $10.233
billion. The Army also has plans to replace 1,922 M-113s at Echelons Above Brigade (EAB), but
requirements for these vehicles have not yet been established. While the Army would like a pure
fleet of AMPVs, others support a mixed fleet of wheeled and tracked AMPV variants.
On December 23, 2014, the Army announced it had selected BAE Systems Land and Armaments
L.P. as the winner of the EMD contract. The initial award is for 52 months, valued at about $382
million. In addition, the award provides for an optional Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP)
phase. If this phase is awarded, BAE would produce an additional 289 vehicles for a total contract
value of $1.2 billion. This EMD contract does not include EAB AMPV variants.
The FY2016 President’s budget request for the AMPV is $230.2 million in RDT&E funding. This
$137.9 million increase from FY2015 funds final prototype designs and integration of
components into the AMPV chassis. The conference report to accompany H.R. 1735, the National
Defense Authorization Act for FY2016, recommended fully funding the FY2016 budget request.
The FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act authorized full funding for the AMPV but
limited funding to 80% until the Secretary of the Army provided congressional defense
committees a report on the Army’s plans to replace all EAB M-113s, as well as examining the
feasibility of using wheeled AMPV medical variants in ABCTs. In March 2015, the Army
provided Congress the report required by the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act, and
findings suggest a wheeled AMPV medical variant would result in a number of unacceptable risks
to both casualty survival and combat effectiveness.
Potential issues for Congress include the continuing AMPV pure versus mixed fleet debate and
program cost growth between FY2015 and FY2016.
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The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
Contents
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1
The Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) ............................................................................... 1
The Army’s AMPV Requirements ................................................................................................... 1
AMPVs at Echelons Above Brigade (EAB) .................................................................................... 2
Program Overview .......................................................................................................................... 2
Department of Defense (DOD) Approves AMPV Program ............................................................ 3
Army Issues AMPV Draft Request for Proposal (RFP) .................................................................. 3
Projected ABCT AMPV Production Quantities .............................................................................. 3
Revised Projected ABCT AMPV Production Quantities ................................................................. 4
2014 Projected Total Program Costs ............................................................................................... 4
2015 Projected Total Program Costs ............................................................................................... 5
Recent Program Activities ............................................................................................................... 5
Army Awards ABCT AMPV Contract to BAE ......................................................................... 5
EMD Contract Does Not Include EAB AMPVs ................................................................. 5
Budgetary Issues .............................................................................................................................. 5
FY2016 ...................................................................................................................................... 5
FY2016 President’s Budget Request .................................................................................. 5
H.R. 1735, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 ...................................... 6
Funding ............................................................................................................................... 6
S. 1376, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 .......................................... 6
Funding ............................................................................................................................... 6
H.R. 2685, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2016 ................................................. 6
Funding ............................................................................................................................... 6
S. 1558, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2016 ..................................................... 6
Funding ............................................................................................................................... 6
Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 1735, National Defense Authorization Act for
FY2016 .................................................................................................................................. 6
Funding ............................................................................................................................... 6
Potential Issues for Congress........................................................................................................... 7
Mixed AMPV Fleet Debate ....................................................................................................... 7
The Army’s AMPV Report to Congress ............................................................................. 8
Total Program Cost Growth Between FY2015 and FY2016 .................................................... 8
Tables
Table 1. M-113 Distribution in ABCTs, by Variant ......................................................................... 2
Table 2. 2013 Projected ABCT AMPV Production, by Variant ....................................................... 4
Contacts
Author Contact Information ............................................................................................................ 9
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The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
Background
In early 1956, the Army began the development of an air-transportable, armored multi-purpose
vehicle family intended to provide a lightweight, amphibious armored personnel carrier for armor
and mechanized infantry units.1 Known as the M-113, it entered production in 1960 and saw
extensive wartime service in Vietnam. Considered a reliable and versatile vehicle, a number of
different variations of the M-113 were produced to fulfill such roles as a command and control
vehicle, mortar carrier, and armored ambulance, to name but a few. The Army began replacing the
M-113 infantry carrier version in the early 1980s with the M-2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle,
but many non-infantry carrier versions of the M-113 were retained in service. According to
reports, about 3,000 M-113 variants are currently still in use.2
The Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV)3
According to the Army:
The Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) is the proposed United States Army
program for replacement of the M-113 Family of Vehicles (FOV) to mitigate current and
future capability gaps in force protection, mobility, reliability, and interoperability by
mission role variant within the Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) [now known as the
Armored Brigade Combat Team – ABCT]. The AMPV will have multiple variants
tailored to specific mission roles within HBCT. Mission roles are as follows: General
Purpose, Medical Evacuation, Medical Treatment, Mortar Carrier, and Mission
Command. AMPV is a vehicle integration program.
The Army’s AMPV Requirements4
Regarding the decision to replace remaining M-113s, the Army notes:
The M-113 lacks the force protection and mobility needed to operate as part of
combined arms teams within complex operational environments. For example,
“commanders will not allow them to leave Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) or
enter contested areas without extensive mission protection and route clearance.”5
The use of other vehicles for M-113 mission sets (casualty evacuations, for
example) reduces unit combat effectiveness.
The majority of the Army’s M-113s are found in Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs),
where they comprise 32% of the tracked armored vehicles organic to that organization. The 114
M-113 variants in the ABCT are distributed as follows:
1 Information in this section is taken from Christopher F. Foss, Jane’s Armour and Artillery, 2011-2012, 32nd Edition,
pp. 470-478.
2 Tony Bertuca, “Optimism Emerges for the AMPV Program, Though Pre-RFP Work Remains,” InsideDefense.com,
August 16, 2013.
3 From the Army’s AMPV Program website, https://contracting.tacom.army.mil/majorsys/ampv/ampv.htm, accessed
September 13, 2013.
4 Information in this section is taken from an Army briefing: “AMPV Industry Day,” April 23, 2013.
5 Ibid., p. 13.
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The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
Table 1. M-113 Distribution in ABCTs, by Variant
M-113 Variant Type
Number of M-113s
M-113A3 General Purpose (GP)
19
M-1068A3 Mission Command (MCmd)
41
M-1064 Mortar Carrier (MC)
15
M-113A3 Medical Evacuation (ME)
31
M-577 Medical Treatment (MT)
8
Source: Information in this table is taken from an Army briefing: “AMPV Industry Day,” April 23, 2013, p. 13.
AMPVs at Echelons Above Brigade (EAB)6
In addition to the AMPV requirement in the ABCTs, the Army also plans on procuring an
additional 1,922 AMPVs to replace M-113s in echelons above brigade (EAB).7 The Army notes
that these AMPVs might have different requirements than the ABCT AMPVs, and the Army is
currently assessing these requirements. Currently, no contract awards have been made for EAB
AMPVs.
Program Overview8
According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), in March 2012, the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD, AT&L) approved a materiel
development decision for AMPV and authorized the Army’s entry into the materiel solution
analysis phase. The Army completed the AMPV analysis of alternatives (AoA) in July 2012 and
proposed a non-developmental vehicle (the candidate vehicle will be either an existing vehicle or
a modified existing vehicle—not a vehicle that is specially designed and not in current service).
Because the AMPV is to be a non-developmental vehicle, DOD decided the program would start
at Milestone B, Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) Phase and skip the
Milestone A, Technology Development Phase.
The Army planned for a full and open competition and will award one industry bidder a 42-
month EMD contract to develop all five AMPV variants. A draft Request for Proposal (RFP)
released in March 2013 stated the EMD contract would be worth $1.46 billion, including $388
million for 29 EMD prototypes for testing between 2014 and 2017 and $1.08 billion for 289 low-
rate initial production (LRIP) models between 2018 and 2020. The Army had planned on
releasing the formal RFP in June 2013 but instead slipped the date until mid-September 2013,
citing a delayed Defense Acquisition Board review attributed in part to Department of Defense
6 Information in this section is from PEO Ground Combat Systems, AMPV Program’s EMD Contract Awarded to
BAE, December 24, 2014.
7 Echelon Above Brigade (EAB) refers to Army combat units larger than brigades—generally division and corps
sized—as well as non-ABCT support brigades. Examples of EAB units that have M-113s that will be replaced with
AMPVs include Armored Division and Corps headquarters and Combat Engineer Brigades.
8 Information in this section is taken from the United States Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions:
Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-13-294SP, March 2013, p. 133, and an Army briefing: “AMPV
Industry Day,” April 23, 2013 and Tony Bertuca, “Optimism Emerges for AMPV Program Though Pre-RFP Work
Remains,” InsideDefense.com, August 16, 2013.
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The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
civilian furloughs.9 The EMD contract award was originally planned for late 2014. The Army is
also planning for an average unit manufacturing cost (AUMC) of $1.8 million per vehicle.
Department of Defense (DOD) Approves
AMPV Program10
On November 26, 2013, DOD issued an acquisition decision memorandum (ADM) officially
approving the Army’s entry into the Milestone B, Engineering and Manufacturing Development
(EMD) Phase. The ADM directed the Army to impose an Average Procurement Unit Cost less
than or equal to $3.2 million at a production rate of not less than 180 vehicles per year. In
addition, operations and sustainment costs were to be less than or equal to $400,000 per vehicle
per year. The Army was also directed to down select to a single prime contractor at the
completion of Milestone B.
Army Issues AMPV Draft Request for Proposal
(RFP)11
Also on November 26, 2013, the Army issued a new draft Request for Proposal (RFP) for the
AMPV. This RFP stipulated the Army planned to award a five-year EMD contract in May 2014
worth $458 million to a single contractor for 29 prototypes. While the March 2013 RFP
established an Average Unit Manufacturing Cost Ceiling for each AMPV at $1.8 million, this was
rescinded to permit vendors greater flexibility. The EMD phase was scheduled to run between
FY2015 and FY2019, followed by three years of low-rate initial production (LRIP) starting in
2020.
Projected ABCT AMPV Production Quantities12
Under 2013 plans and projected force structure, the Army planned to start full rate production of
the ABCT AMPV in FY2020 at the rate of two to three ABCTs per year. Total vehicle production
by variant is depicted in the following table:
9 Tony Bertuca, “Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle RFP Scheduled for Mid-September,” InsideDefense.com,
August 9, 2013.
10 Information in this section is taken from Department of Defense, “Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle Pre-Engineering
and Manufacturing Development Request for Proposals Acquisition Decision Memorandum,” November 26, 2013 and
Tony Bertuca, “DOD Officially OKs Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle Program; RFP Hits the Street,”
InsideDefense.com, November 26, 2013.
11 Information in this section is taken from Solicitation, Offer, and Award: Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle, Number:
W56HZV-13-R-0022, November 26, 2013 and Tony Bertuca, “DOD Officially OKs Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose
Vehicle Program; RFP Hits the Street,” InsideDefense.com, November 26, 2013.
12 Information in this section is taken from an Army briefing: “AMPV Industry Day,” April 23, 2013.
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The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
Table 2. 2013 Projected ABCT AMPV Production, by Variant
Training and Doctrine
Variant to Be
Command and Testing
Total Vehicles by
Replaced
ABCT Total
(See Notes)
Quantity
M-113A3 General Purpose
462
58
520
(GP)
M-1068A3 Mission
899
92
991
Command (MCmd)
M-1064 Mortar Carrier
348
36
384
(MC)
M-113A3 Medical
736
52
788
Evacuation (ME)
M-577 Medical Treatment
194
20
214
(MT)
Totals
2,639
258
2,897
Source: Information in this table is taken from an Army briefing: “AMPV Industry Day,” April 23, 2013, p. 23.
Notes: Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the Army command responsible for training the force,
would use AMPVs at its various schools and courses for training soldiers. Testing AMPV quantities would be
allocated to various Army and Department of Defense organizations responsible for testing vehicles.
Revised Projected ABCT AMPV Production
Quantities13
GAO’s March 2014 Assessment of Selected Weapons Programs report notes the new production
quantity for the ABCT AMPV is 2,907 vehicles—a 10 vehicle increase over 2013 quantities.
Discussions with the AMPV Program Manager revealed the 10 extra vehicles would be used for
testing purposes.14
2014 Projected Total Program Costs15
For a 2,907 vehicle procurement, GAO estimated total program costs as follows (FY2014
dollars):
Research and Development: $779.9 million.
Procurement: $9.443 billion.
Estimated Total Program Cost: $10.223 billion.
13 United States Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs,
GAO-14-340SP, March 2014, p. 129.
14 CRS Meeting with AMPV Program Manager May 20, 2014.
15 Ibid.
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The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
2015 Projected Total Program Costs16
In its FY2016 budget request, the Army reportedly revised its total program costs for 2,907
AMPVs:
Research and Development: $ 1 billion.
Procurement: $ 11.8 billion.
Estimated Total Program Cost: $12.8 billion.
The Army did not provide details regarding the almost $2.6 billion dollars cost growth for the
program.
Recent Program Activities
Army Awards ABCT AMPV Contract to BAE17
On December 23, 2014, the Army announced it had selected BAE Systems Land and Armaments
L.P. as the winner of the EMD contract. The initial award was for 52 months valued at about $382
million. During this period of performance, BAE was to produce 29 vehicles, which would be put
through “rigorous developmental and operational testing.” In addition, the award provides for an
optional Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) phase award in the future. If this phase is awarded,
BAE would produce an additional 289 vehicles for a total contract value of $1.2 billion.
EMD Contract Does Not Include EAB AMPVs18
The Army, in its announcement, emphasized the BAE EMD contract did not pertain to the 1,922
EAB AMPVs. As previously noted, these AMPVs might have different requirements than the
ABCT AMPVs, and the Army is currently assessing these requirements. The Army did not say
when it envisioned making a contract award for EAB AMPVs.
Budgetary Issues
FY2016
FY2016 President’s Budget Request19
The FY2016 President’s budget request for the AMPV was $230.2 million in RDT&E funding.
This $137.9 million increase from FY2015 funds final prototype designs and integration of
components into the AMPV chassis.
16 Jason Sherman, “Army Forecasts $12.8 Billion Tab for AMPV (Updated),” InsideDefense.com, February 17, 2015.
17 Information in this section is from PEO Ground Combat Systems, AMPV Program’s EMD Contract Awarded to
BAE, December 24, 2014.
18 Ibid.
19 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, United States Department of
Defense Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request, Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System, February 2015, p. 3-3.
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The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
H.R. 1735, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 201620
Funding
The House authorized the FY2016 presidential budget request for the AMPV.
S. 1376, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 201621
Funding
The Senate authorized the FY2016 presidential budget request for the AMPV.
H.R. 2685, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 201622
Funding
The House approved the FY2016 presidential budget request for the AMPV.
S. 1558, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 201623
Funding
The Senate approved $219,259 million of the FY2016 presidential budget request for the AMPV
and recommended the following decrements:
A decrease of $4 million to restore acquisition accountability (program
management growth).
A decrease of $6.951 million to improve funds management (test funding ahead
of need).
Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 1735, National Defense
Authorization Act for FY201624
Funding
The conference authorized the FY2016 presidential budget request for the AMPV.
20 H.Rept. 114-102, Report of the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives on H.R. 1735, National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, May 5, 2015, p. 457.
21 S.Rept. 114-49, Report to Accompany S. 1376, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, May 19,
2015, p. 400.
22 H.Rept. 114-139, Report of the Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2016,
June 5, 2015, p. 215.
23 H.Rept. 114-63, Report of the Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2016, June
11, 2015, pp. 152 and 155.
24 Conference report to accompany H.R. 1735, National Defense Authorization Act for FY2016, September 2015.
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The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress
Potential Issues for Congress
Mixed AMPV Fleet Debate
Some Members have expressed concerns with the Army’s current AMPV RFP. They propose the
current RFP, which stipulates the selection of a single vendor, be modified so a mixed fleet (both
tracked and wheeled) of AMPVs can be acquired. This could essentially make the AMPV
procurement a multi-vendor effort. The Members supporting this course of action contend a
mixed fleet is “sensible, sustainable, cost effective for the taxpayer, and most importantly, best for
the warfighter.”25
In December 2014, a number of Members sent letters to Army and DOD leadership requesting the
Army delay awarding the AMPV ambulance variant contract until after congressional defense
committees have had adequate time to review congressionally mandated reports.26
Other Members reportedly support continuing the pure AMPV fleet approach, noting “any
changes to the AMPV acquisition will result in delays and increase costs to the program for the
Army” and that “our priority is to ensure a timely procurement of a more survivable and more
mobile personnel carrier for our soldiers.”27
FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act legislative language28 calls for, among other things,
further examination of the use of wheeled AMPV variants at both Echelons Above Brigade
(EAB) as well as for medical evacuation purposes.
25 Letter to Secretary Frank Kendall, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics, from
Rep. Mike Rogers et al., April 3, 2014.
26 Tony Bertuca, “Lawmakers Push Pentagon to Delay AMPV Award,” InsideDefense.com, December 5, 2014.
27 Tony Bertuca, “Two More Senators Support BAE in AMPV Letter to Senate Appropriators,” InsideDefense.com,
June 27, 2014.
28 Rules Committee Print 113-58, House Amendment to the Text of S. 1847, [Showing the text of the Carl Levin and
Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015], December 2, 2014. Complete
language is cited in the following passage:
SEC. 216. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR ARMORED MULTI-PURPOSE VEHICLE
PROGRAM.
(a) LIMITATION.—Of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year
2015 for research, development, test, and evaluation, Army, for the armored multi-purpose vehicle program, not more
than 80 percent may be obligated or expended until the date on which the Secretary of the Army submits to the
congressional defense committees the report under subsection (b)(1).
(b) REPORT.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than March 1, 2015, the Secretary of the Army shall submit to the congressional defense
committees a report on the armored multi-purpose vehicle program.
(2) MATTERS INCLUDED.—The report under paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(A) An identification of the existing capability gaps of the M–113 family of vehicles assigned, as of the date of the
report, to units outside of combat brigades.
(B) An identification of the mission roles that are in common between—
(i) such vehicles assigned to units outside of combat brigades; and
(ii) the vehicles examined in the armor brigade combat team during the armored multi-purpose vehicle analysis of
alternatives.
(C) The estimated timeline and the rough order of magnitude of funding requirements associated with complete M–113
family of vehicles divestiture within the units outside of combat brigades and the risk associated with delaying the
replacement of such vehicles.
(continued...)
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The Army’s AMPV Report to Congress29
In response to the FY2015 NDAA, the Army published its report to Congress on March 10,
2015.30 The Army’s findings included the following:
Wheeled medical vehicles are unsuitable for ABCTs due to the inability to
maneuver with highly mobile combat vehicles and provide protection against the
challenging threats that the ABCTs are designed to fight against (page 2).
Because the medical evacuation vehicle operates in close proximity to ABCT
combat vehicles (Bradley fighting vehicles and Abrams tanks), it must be capable
of maneuvering across challenging terrain while protecting crew and casualties
from the challenging threats an ABCT encounters (page 10).
[Regrading wheeled medical vehicles] The lack of mobility and force
protection could result in the Commander using Bradley fighting vehicles to
conduct evacuation of casualties; increasing the evacuation timeline (due to the
re-tasking) and increasing casualty “died of wounds rates” (due to lack of
medical equipment). Simultaneously, the loss of combat vehicles [Bradleys used
for casualty evacuation] in contact with the enemy reduces combat power and
could lead to a mission halt, or complete mission failure (page 11).
The Army’s report to Congress suggests they would not be receptive to developing and fielding a
wheeled medical AMPV variant. It is not known if this issue of a mixed AMPV fleet has been
resolved as a result of the Army’s report or if Congress will wish to further examine this option.
Furthermore, it is not known how the Army’s report and possible congressional response could
affect the eventual award of the EAB AMPV contract.
Total Program Cost Growth Between FY2015 and FY2016
As previously noted, the Army did not provide details regarding the almost $2.6 billion dollars
total cost growth for the program between FY2015 and FY2016. Congress might choose to
examine the specific circumstances that led to this total cost growth, as these details are not
evident in FY2016 budget request documentation available to the public.
(...continued)
(D) A description of the requirements for force protection, mobility, and size, weight, power, and cooling capacity for
the mission roles of M–113 family of vehicles assigned to units outside of combat brigades.
(E) A discussion of the mission roles of the M–113 family of vehicles assigned to units outside of combat brigades that
are comparable to the mission roles of the M–113 family of vehicles assigned to armor brigade combat teams.
(F) A discussion of whether a one-for-one replacement of the M–113 family of vehicles assigned to units outside of
combat brigades is likely.
(G) With respect to mission roles, a discussion of any substantive distinctions that exist in the capabilities of the M–113
family of vehicles that are needed based on the level of the unit to which the vehicle is assigned (not including combat
brigades).
(H) A discussion of the relative priority of fielding among the mission roles.
(I) An assessment for the feasibility of incorporating medical wheeled variants within the armor brigade combat teams.
29 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle Program: Report to Congress, 2015.
30 Tony Bertuca, “Army Finds Wheeled Medical Vehicles Unsuitable to Support ABCTs,” InsideDefense.com, March
6, 2015.
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Author Contact Information
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
afeickert@crs.loc.gov, 7-7673
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