A Shift in the International Security
Environment: Potential Implications for
Defense—Issues for Congress
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
September 24, 2015
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R43838
A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense
Summary
World events since late 2013 have led some observers to conclude that the international security
environment has undergone a shift from the familiar post-Cold War era of the last 20-25 years,
also sometimes known as the unipolar moment (with the United States as the unipolar power), to
a new and different strategic situation that features, among other things, renewed great power
competition and challenges to elements of the U.S.-led international order that has operated since
World War II.
A previous shift in the international security environment—from the Cold War to the post-Cold
War era—prompted a broad reassessment by the Department of Defense (DOD) and Congress of
defense funding levels, strategy, and missions that led to numerous changes in DOD plans and
programs. A new shift in the international security environment could similarly have a number of
implications for U.S. defense plans and programs. Of perhaps the greatest potential significance,
such a shift could lead to a change in the current overall terms of debate over U.S. defense plans
and programs. Russia’s seizure and annexation of Crimea, as well as subsequent Russian actions
in eastern Ukraine and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, have already led to a renewed focus among
policymakers on U.S. and NATO military capabilities in Europe, and on how to counter Russia’s
so-called hybrid warfare tactics. China’s actions in the East and South China Seas have prompted
a focus among policymakers on how to counter China’s so-called salami-slicing tactics in those
areas. A shift in the international security environment may also be generating implications for
areas such as nuclear weapons, submarines and antisubmarine warfare, and DOD reliance on
Russian-made components.
Policy and oversight issues for Congress include the following:
Shift in strategic situations. Has there been a shift in the international security
environment, and if so, what features characterize the new environment?
Reassessment of U.S. defense funding levels, strategy, and missions. Should
there be a reassessment of U.S. defense funding levels, strategy, and missions?
Congressional role in reassessment. If there is to be such a reassessment, how
should it be done, and what role should Congress play?
Potential effect on plans and programs. How might such a reassessment affect
the current terms of debate on U.S. defense? What might be the potential
implications for U.S. defense plans and programs?
Congressional Research Service
A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense
Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Shift in International Security Environment ............................................................................. 1
Overview ............................................................................................................................. 1
Cold War Era ....................................................................................................................... 2
Post-Cold War Era .............................................................................................................. 3
The New Situation .............................................................................................................. 3
Congressional Participation in Reassessment of U.S. Defense During Previous Shift ............. 7
Potential or Emerging Implications for Defense ....................................................................... 9
Terms of Debate over U.S. Defense .................................................................................... 9
U.S. and NATO Military Capabilities in Europe .............................................................. 10
New Forms of Aggression and Assertiveness .................................................................... 11
Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Deterrence ....................................................................... 12
Submarines and Antisubmarine Warfare ........................................................................... 12
Reliance on Components and Materials from Russia and China ...................................... 13
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 13
Legislative Activity in 2015 .......................................................................................................... 14
FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1735/S. 1376) ........................................ 14
House (Committee Report) ............................................................................................... 14
House (Floor Action) ........................................................................................................ 19
Senate ................................................................................................................................ 20
FY2016 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 2685/S. 1558) ......................................................... 32
House ................................................................................................................................ 32
Senate ................................................................................................................................ 33
Contacts
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 34
Congressional Research Service
A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense
Introduction
World events since late 2013 have led some observers to conclude that the international security
environment has undergone a shift from the familiar post-Cold War era of the last 20-25 years to
a new and different strategic situation that features, among other things, renewed great power
competition and challenges to elements of the U.S.-led international order that has operated since
World War II.1
A previous shift in the international security environment—from the Cold War to the post-Cold
War era—prompted a broad reassessment by the Department of Defense (DOD) and Congress of
defense funding levels, strategy, and missions that led to numerous changes in DOD plans and
programs. A new shift in the international security environment could similarly have a number of
implications for U.S. defense plans and programs.
The issue for Congress is whether a shift in the international security environment has occurred,
and if so, how to respond to that shift. This report briefly describes the shift in the international
security environment that some observers believe has occurred, and identifies some defense-
related issues for Congress that could arise from it. Congress’s decisions on these issues could
have significant implications for U.S. defense capabilities and funding requirements.
This report focuses on defense-related issues and does not discuss potential implications of a shift
in the international security environment for other policy areas, such as foreign policy and
diplomacy, trade and finance, energy, and foreign assistance. Future CRS reports may address the
potential implications of a shift in the international security environment for these other policy
areas or address the U.S. role in the international security environment from other analytical
perspectives.
Background
Shift in International Security Environment
Overview
World events since late 2013—including Chinese actions in the East and South China Seas since
November 20132 and Russia’s seizure and annexation of Crimea in March 20143—have led some
observers to conclude that the international security environment has undergone a shift from the
familiar post-Cold War era of the last 20-25 years, also known as the unipolar moment (with the
1 The term international order generally means the combination of laws, rules, norms, and supporting institutions that
shapes and helps govern international politics and economics. The U.S.-led international order established at the end of
World War II, also known as the liberal international order, can be characterized as one that features, among other
things, a reliance on international law rather than force or coercion as the preferred means of settling international
disputes, an emphasis on human rights, an open international trading system that attempts to evolve in the direction of
free trade, and the treatment of the world’s oceans, international airspace, outer space, and cyberspace as international
commons.
2 For discussions of these actions, see CRS Report R42784, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report R42930, Maritime Territorial
Disputes in East Asia: Issues for Congress, by Ben Dolven, Mark E. Manyin, and Shirley A. Kan.
3 For discussion Russia’s seizure and annexation of Crimea, see CRS Report RL33460, Ukraine: Current Issues and
U.S. Policy, by Steven Woehrel.
Congressional Research Service
1
A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense
United States as the unipolar power), to a new and different strategic situation that features,
among other things, renewed great power competition and challenges to elements of the U.S.-led
international order that has operated since World War II.4
In August 2014, then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel referred to “the dangerous
unpredictability of a world that is I think trying to define a new world order.... We are seeing a
new world order being built in the early 21st Century.”5 In October 2014, Hagel stated: “I think
we are living through one of these historic, defining times.... We are seeing a new world order—
post-World War II, post-Soviet implosion—being built.”6
Cold War Era
The Cold War, which is generally viewed as lasting from the late 1940s until the late 1980s/early
1990s, was generally viewed as a strongly bipolar situation featuring two superpowers—the
United States and the Soviet Union—engaged in a political, ideological, and military competition
for influence across multiple regions. The military component of that competition was often most
acutely visible in Europe, where the U.S.-led NATO alliance and the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact
alliance faced off against one another with large numbers of conventional forces and theater
nuclear weapons, backed by longer-ranged strategic nuclear weapons.
4 See, for example, Walter Russell Mead, “The End of History Ends,” The American Interest, December 2, 2013; Paul
David Miller, “Crimea Proves That Great Power Rivalry Never Left Us,” Foreign Policy, March 21, 2014; Walter
Russell Mead, “The Return of Geopolitics,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2014; Robert Kagan, “Superpowers Don’t Get
to Retire,” New Republic, May 26, 2014; James Kitfield, “The New Great Power Triangle Tilt: China, Russia Vs.
U.S.,” Breaking Defense, June 19, 2014; Lilia Shevtsova, “Putin Ends the Interregnum,” The American Interest, August
28, 2014; David E. Sanger, “Commitments on Three Fronts Test Obama’s Foreign Policy,” New York Times,
September 3, 2014; Steven Erlanger, “NATO’s Hopes for Russia Have Turned to Dismay,” New York Times,
September 12, 2014; Richard N. Haass, “The Era of Disorder,” Project Syndicate, October 27, 2014; Bruce Jones,
“What Strategic Environment Does the Transatlantic Community Confront?” German Marshall Fund of the United
States, Policy Brief, January 15, 2015, 5 pp.; Chester A Crocker, “The Strategic Dilemma of a World Adrift,” Survival,
February-March 2015: 7-30; Robert Kagan, “The United States Must Resist A Return to Spheres of Interest in in the
International System,” Brookings Institution, February 19, 2015; Richard Fontaine, “Salvaging Global Order,” The
National Interest, March 10, 2015; Barry Pavel and Peter Engelke with Alex Ward, Dynamic Stability, US Strategy for
a World in Transition, Washington, Atlantic Council, April 2015, 57 pp.; Stewart Patrick and Isabella Bennett,
“Geopolitics Is Back—and Global Governance Is Out,” The National Interest, May 12, 2015; “Rise of the Regional
Hegemons,” Wall Street Journal, May 25, 2015; Frank G. Hoffman and Ryan Neuhard, “Is the World Getting Safer—
or Not?” Foreign Policy Research Institute, June 2015; James Kitfield, “Requiem For The Obama Doctrine,” Breaking
Defense, July 6, 2015; Mathew Burrows and Robert A. Manning, “ America’s Worst Nightmare: Russia and China Are
Getting Closer,” National Interest, August 24, 2015; Robert Farley, “Yes, America’s Military Supremacy Is Fading
(And We Should Not Panic),” National Interest, September 21, 2015.
Some other observers see the emergence of a medieval- or feudal-like situation. See, for example, Brad Allenby, “The
Return to Medievalism,” Slate, March 18, 2015; Steven Metz, “Emerging Neo-Feudal World Leaving U.S., Global
Security Behind,” World Politics Review, May 29, 2015. See also Matt Thompson, “UN’s Purpose Questioned in a
‘Post-Nation’ World,” Defense One, July 1, 2015.
5 As quoted in Chris Uhlmann, “US Secretary of Defense Says ‘New World Order Being Built,’” Australian
Broadcasting Corporation, August 11, 2014.
6 As quoted in David A. Graham, “Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel: Get Used to Endless War,” The Atlantic, October
29, 2014. See also Department of Defense news transcript, “Deputy Secretary of Defense Work Delivers Remarks at
the Council on Foreign Relations,” September 30, 2014, accessed October 31, 2014, at http://www.defense.gov/
Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5509.
Congressional Research Service
2
A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense
Post-Cold War Era
The post-Cold War era, which is generally viewed as having begun in the early 1990s, tended
toward a unipolar situation, with the United States as the world’s sole superpower. The Warsaw
Pact had disbanded, the Soviet Union had dissolved into Russia and the former Soviet republics,
and neither Russia, China, nor any other country was viewed as posing a significant challenge to
either the United States’ status as the world’s sole superpower or the U.S.-led international order.
Compared to the Cold War, the post-Cold War era generally featured reduced levels of overt
political, ideological, and military competition among major states. Following 9/11, the post-Cold
War era was additionally characterized by a strong focus (at least from a U.S. perspective) on
countering transnational terrorist organizations that had emerged as significant non-state actors,
particularly Al Qaeda.
The New Situation
Some Emerging Features
Observers who conclude that the international security environment has shifted to a new strategic
situation generally view the new period not as a bipolar situation (like the Cold War) or a unipolar
situation (like the post-Cold War era), but as a multipolar situation characterized by renewed
competition among three major world powers—the United States, China, and Russia. Other
emerging characteristics of the new international security situation as viewed by these observers
include the following:
renewed ideological competition, this time against 21st-century forms of
authoritarianism in Russia, China, and other countries;7
the promotion in China and Russia through their state-controlled media of
nationalistic historical narratives emphasizing assertions of prior humiliation or
victimization by Western powers, and the use of those narratives to support
revanchist or irredentist foreign policy aims;
the use by Russia and China of new forms of aggressive or assertive military and
paramilitary operations—called hybrid warfare or ambiguous warfare, among
other terms, in the case of Russia’s actions, and called salami-slicing tactics or
gray-zone warfare, among other terms, in the case of China’s actions—to gain
greater degrees of control of areas on their peripheries;
challenges by Russia and China to key elements of the U.S.-led international
order, including the principle that force or threat of force should not be used as a
routine or first-resort measure for settling disputes between countries, and the
principle of freedom of the seas (i.e., that the world’s oceans are to be treated as
an international commons); and
alongside the above features, continued regional security challenges from
countries such as Iran and North Korea, and a continuation of the post-Cold War
era’s focus (at least from a U.S. perspective) on countering transnational terrorist
7 See, for example, Gideon Rachman, “The West Has Lost Intellectual Self-Confidence,” Financial Times, January 5,
2015; Garry Kasparov, “The Global War on Modernity,” Wall Street Journal, January 20, 2015; Anna Borshchevskaya,
“Moral Clarity Is Needed In Countering Anti-Western Propaganda,” Forbes, March 14, 2015; Ellen Bork, “Democracy
in Retreat,” World Affairs Journal, May 11, 2015; Christopher Walker, “The New Containment: Undermining
Democracy,” World Affairs Journal, May/June 2015.
Congressional Research Service
3
A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense
organizations that have emerged as significant non-state actors (now including
the Islamic State organization, among other groups).
The June 2015 National Military Strategy released by the Department of Defense (DOD) states:
Since the last National Military Strategy was published in 2011, global disorder has
significantly increased while some of our comparative military advantage has begun to
erode. We now face multiple, simultaneous security challenges from traditional state
actors and transregional networks of sub-state groups—all taking advantage of rapid
technological change. Future conflicts will come more rapidly, last longer, and take place
on a much more technically challenging battlefield. They will have increasing
implications to the U.S. homeland....
Complexity and rapid change characterize today’s strategic environment, driven by
globalization, the diffusion of technology, and demographic shifts....
Despite these changes, states remain the international system’s dominant actors. They are
preeminent in their capability to harness power, focus human endeavors, and provide
security. Most states today — led by the United States, its allies, and partners — support
the established institutions and processes dedicated to preventing conflict, respecting
sovereignty, and furthering human rights. Some states, however, are attempting to revise
key aspects of the international order and are acting in a manner that threatens our
national security interests.
While Russia has contributed in select security areas, such as counternarcotics and
counterterrorism, it also has repeatedly demonstrated that it does not respect the
sovereignty of its neighbors and it is willing to use force to achieve its goals. Russia’s
military actions are undermining regional security directly and through proxy forces.
These actions violate numerous agreements that Russia has signed in which it committed
to act in accordance with international norms, including the UN Charter, Helsinki
Accords, Russia-NATO Founding Act, Budapest Memorandum, and the Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.
Iran also poses strategic challenges to the international community. It is pursuing nuclear
and missile delivery technologies despite repeated United Nations Security Council
resolutions demanding that it cease such efforts. It is a state-sponsor of terrorism that has
undermined stability in many nations, including Israel, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.
Iran’s actions have destabilized the region and brought misery to countless people while
denying the Iranian people the prospect of a prosperous future.
North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technologies also
contradicts repeated demands by the international community to cease such efforts. These
capabilities directly threaten its neighbors, especially the Republic of Korea and Japan. In
time, they will threaten the U.S. homeland as well. North Korea also has conducted cyber
attacks, including causing major damage to a U.S. corporation.
We support China’s rise and encourage it to become a partner for greater international
security. However, China’s actions are adding tension to the Asia-Pacific region. For
example, its claims to nearly the entire South China Sea are inconsistent with
international law. The international community continues to call on China to settle such
issues cooperatively and without coercion. China has responded with aggressive land
reclamation efforts that will allow it to position military forces astride vital international
sea lanes.
None of these nations are believed to be seeking direct military conflict with the United
States or our allies. Nonetheless, they each pose serious security concerns which the
international community is working to collectively address by way of common policies,
shared messages, and coordinated action....
Congressional Research Service
4
A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense
For the past decade, our military campaigns primarily have consisted of operations
against violent extremist networks. But today, and into the foreseeable future, we must
pay greater attention to challenges posed by state actors. They increasingly have the
capability to contest regional freedom of movement and threaten our homeland. Of
particular concern are the proliferation of ballistic missiles, precision strike technologies,
unmanned systems, space and cyber capabilities, and weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) – technologies designed to counter U.S. military advantages and curtail access to
the global commons....
Today, the probability of U.S. involvement in interstate war with a major power is
assessed to be low but growing. Should one occur, however, the consequences would be
immense. VEOs [violent extremist organizations], in contrast, pose an immediate threat
to transregional security by coupling readily available technologies with extremist
ideologies. Overlapping state and non-state violence, there exists an area of conflict
where actors blend techniques, capabilities, and resources to achieve their objectives.
Such “hybrid” conflicts may consist of military forces assuming a non-state identity, as
Russia did in the Crimea, or involve a VEO fielding rudimentary combined arms
capabilities, as ISIL has demonstrated in Iraq and Syria. Hybrid conflicts also may be
comprised of state and non-state actors working together toward shared objectives,
employing a wide range of weapons such as we have witnessed in eastern Ukraine.
Hybrid conflicts serve to increase ambiguity, complicate decision-making, and slow the
coordination of effective responses. Due to these advantages to the aggressor, it is likely
that this form of conflict will persist well into the future.8
Markers of the Shift to the New Situation
For observers who conclude that the international security environment has shifted to a new
strategic situation, the sharpest single marker of the shift arguably was Russia’s seizure and
annexation of Crimea in March 2014, which represented the first forcible seizure and annexation
of one country’s territory by another country in Europe since World War II. Other markers of the
shift, such as Russia’s actions in eastern Ukraine and elsewhere in Eastern Europe since March
2014, China’s economic growth and military modernization over the last several years, and
China’s actions in the East and South China Seas over the last several years, have been more
gradual and cumulative.
Some observers trace the beginnings of the argued shift in strategic situations back to 2008. In
that year, Russia invaded and occupied part of the former Soviet republic of Georgia without
provoking a strong cost-imposing response from the United States and its allies. Also in that year,
the financial crisis and resulting deep recessions in the United States and Europe, combined with
China’s ability to weather that crisis and its successful staging of the 2008 Summer Olympics, are
seen by observers as having contributed to a perception in China of the United States as a
declining power, and to a Chinese sense of self-confidence or triumphalism.9 China’s assertive
actions in the East and South China Seas can be viewed as having begun (or accelerated) soon
thereafter. Other observers trace the roots of the end of the post-Cold War era further, to years
prior to 2008.10
8 Department of Defense, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015, The United States
Military’s Contribution To National Security, June 2015, pp. i, 1-4.
9 See, for example, Howard W. French, “China’s Dangerous Game,” The Atlantic, October 13, 2014.
10 See, for example, Walter Russell Mead, “Who’s to Blame for a World in Flames?” The American Interest, October 6,
2014.
Congressional Research Service
5
A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense
Comparisons to Earlier Periods
Each strategic situation features a unique combination of major actors, dimensions of competition
and cooperation among those actors, and military and other technologies available to them. A new
strategic situation can have some similarities to previous ones, but it will also have differences,
including, potentially, one or more features not present in any previous strategic situation. In the
early years of a new strategic situation, some of its features may be unclear, in dispute, or not yet
apparent. In attempting to understand a new strategic situation, comparisons to earlier ones are
potentially helpful in identifying avenues of investigation. If applied too rigidly, however, such
comparisons can act as intellectual straightjackets, making it more difficult to achieve a full
understanding of a new strategic situation’s characteristic features, particularly those that
differentiate it from previous ones.
Some observers have stated that the world is entering a new Cold War. That term may have some
utility in referring specifically to U.S.-Russian relations, because the new strategic situation that
some observers have identified features competition and tension with Russia. Considered more
broadly, however, the Cold War was a bipolar situation, while the new environment appears to be
a multipolar situation that also includes China as a major competing power. The bipolarity of the
Cold War, moreover, was reinforced by the opposing NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances, whereas
in contrast, Russia today does not lead an equivalent of the Warsaw Pact. And while terrorists
were a concern during the Cold War, the U.S. focus on countering transnational terrorist groups
was not nearly as significant during the Cold War as it has been since 9/11.
Other observers, viewing the emerging multipolar situation, have drawn comparisons to the
multipolar situation that existed in the 19th century and the years prior to World War I. Still others,
observing both multipolarity and the promotion in China and Russia of nationalistic historical
narratives supporting revanchist or irredentist foreign policy aims, have drawn comparisons to the
1930s. Those two earlier situations, however, did not feature a strong focus on countering
globally significant transnational terrorist groups, and the military and other technologies
available then differ vastly from those available today. The new strategic situation that some
observers have identified may be similar in some respects to previous strategic situations, but it
also differs from previous situations in certain respects, and might be best understood by direct
observation and identification of its key features.
Renewed Emphasis on Grand Strategy and Geopolitics
The discussion of the shift in the international security environment that some observers have
identified has led to a renewed emphasis in discussions of U.S. security and foreign policy on
grand strategy and geopolitics.11 From a U.S. perspective, grand strategy can be understood as
11 See, for example, William C. Martel, “Why America Needs a Grand Strategy,” The Diplomat, June 18, 2012; Aaron
David Miller, “The Naiveté of Distance,” Foreign Policy, March 31, 2014; Robert Kaplan, “The Gift of American
Power,” Real Clear World, May 15, 2014; William C. Martel, “America’s Grand Strategy Disaster,” The National
Interest, June 9, 2014; Adam Garfinkle, “The Silent Death of American Grand Strategy,” American Review, 2014;
Christopher A. Ford, “Ending the Strategic Holiday: U.S. Grand Strategy and a ‘Rising’ China,” Asia Policy, Number
18 (July 2014): 181-189; William Ruger, “A Realist’s Guide to Grand Strategy,” The American Conservative, August
26, 2014; Barry R. Posen, Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy, Cornell University Press, 2014, 256
pp. (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs); R. D. Hooker, The Grand Strategy of the United States, Washington, National
Defense University Press, October 2014, 35 pp. (INSS Strategic Monograph, Institute for National Strategic Studies);
F.G. Hoffman, “Grand Strategy: The Fundamental Considerations,” Orbis, Volume 58, Issue 4 (Fall 2014), 2014: 472–
485; Michael Page, “Is ‘Restraint’ a Realistic Grand Strategy?” Cicero Magazine, October 21, 2014; Bryan McGrath,
“Unconstrained Grand Strategy,” War on the Rocks October 28, 2014; Joseph Sarkisian, “American Grand Strategy or
Grand Illusion?” Cicero, December 1, 2014; Chris Miller, “State of Disunion: America’s Lack of Strategy is its Own
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
6
A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense
strategy considered at a global or interregional level, as opposed to strategies for specific
countries, regions, or issues. Geopolitics refers to the influence on international relations and
strategy of basic world geographic features such as the size and location of continents, oceans,
and individual countries.
From a U.S. perspective on grand strategy and geopolitics, it can be noted that most of the
world’s people, resources, and economic activity are located not in the Western Hemisphere, but
in the other hemisphere, particularly Eurasia. In response to this basic feature of world geography,
U.S. policymakers for the last several decades have chosen to pursue, as a key element of U.S.
national strategy, a goal of preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon in one part of Eurasia
or another, on the grounds that such a hegemon could represent a concentration of power strong
enough to threaten core U.S. interests by, for example, denying the United States access to some
of the other hemisphere’s resources and economic activity. Although U.S. policymakers have not
often stated this key national strategic goal explicitly in public, U.S. military (and diplomatic)
operations in recent decades—both wartime operations and day-to-day operations—can be
viewed as having been carried out in no small part in support of this key goal.
The U.S. goal of preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon in one part of Eurasia or
another is a major reason why the U.S. military is structured with force elements that enable it to
cross broad expanses of ocean and air space and then conduct sustained, large-scale military
operations upon arrival. Force elements associated with this goal include, among other things, an
Air Force with significant numbers of long-range bombers, long-range surveillance aircraft, long-
range airlift aircraft, and aerial refueling tankers, and a Navy with significant numbers of aircraft
carriers, nuclear-powered attack submarines, large surface combatants, large amphibious ships,
and underway replenishment ships.
Congressional Participation in Reassessment of U.S. Defense
During Previous Shift
A previous shift in the international security environment—from the Cold War to the post-Cold
War era—prompted a broad reassessment of defense funding levels, strategy, and missions that
led to numerous changes in DOD plans and programs. Many of these changes were articulated in
the 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR),12 a reassessment of U.S. defense plans and programs whose
very name conveyed the fundamental nature of the reassessment that had occurred.13 In general,
(...continued)
Greatest Threat, Cicero, January 27, 2015; Jerry Hendrix, Avoiding Trivia: A Strategy for Sustainment and Fiscal
Responsibility, Center for a New American Security, February 2015, 36 pp.; Jim Mattis, “A New American Grand
Strategy,” Hoover Institution, February 26, 2015; Stewart Patrick and Isabella Bennett, “Geopolitics Is Back—and
Global Governance Is Out,” The National Interest, May 12, 2015; Alfred McCoy, “The Geopolitics of American
Global Decline,” Real Clear World, June 8, 2015; Steve LeVine, “How China Is Building the Biggest Commercial-
Military Empire in History,” Defense One, June 9, 2015; Thomas Vien, “The Grand Design of China’s New Trade
Routes,” Stratfor, June 24, 2015; John R. Deni, “General Dunford Is Right About Russia, But Not Because of Their
Nukes,” War on the Rocks, July 13, 2015.
12 See Department of Defense, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, October 1993, 109
pp.
13 Secretary of Defense Les Aspin’s introduction to DOD’s report on the 1993 BUR states:
In March 1993, I initiated a comprehensive review of the nation’s defense strategy, force structure,
modernization, infrastructure, and foundations. I felt that a department-wide review needed to be
conducted “from the bottom up” because of the dramatic changes that have occurred in the world as
a result of the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. These changes in the
international security environment have fundamentally altered America’s security needs. Thus, the
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
7
A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense
the BUR reshaped the U.S. military into a force that was smaller than the Cold War U.S. military,
and oriented toward a planning scenario being able to conduct two major regional contingencies
(MRCs) rather than the Cold War planning scenario of a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict.14
Through both committee activities and the efforts of individual Members, Congress played a
significant role in the reassessment of defense funding levels, strategy, and missions that was
prompted by the end of the Cold War. In terms of committee activities, the question of how to
change U.S. defense plans and programs in response to the end of the Cold War was, for example,
a major focus for the House and Senate Armed Services Committees in holding hearings and
marking up annual national defense authorization acts in the early 1990s.15
In terms of efforts by individual Members, some Members put forth their own proposals for how
much to reduce defense spending from the levels of the final years of the Cold War,16 while others
put forth detailed proposals for future U.S. defense strategy, plans, programs, and spending.
Senator John McCain, for example, issued a detailed, 32-page policy paper in November 1991
(...continued)
underlying premise of the Bottom-Up Review was that we needed to reassess all of our defense
concepts, plans, and programs from the ground up.
(Department of Defense, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense,
October 1993, p. iii.)
14 For additional discussion of the results of the BUR, see CRS Report 93-839 F, Defense Department Bottom-Up
Review: Results and Issues, October 6, 1993, 6 pp., by Edward F. Bruner, and CRS Report 93-627 F, Defense
Department Bottom-Up Review: The Process, July 2, 1993, 9 pp., by Cedric W. Tarr, Jr. [both nondistributable and
available from the author of this report].
15 See, for example:
the House Armed Services Committee’s report on the FY1991 National Defense Authorization Act (H.Rept.
101-665 of August 3, 1990, on H.R. 4739), pp. 7-14;
the Senate Armed Services Committee’s report on the FY1991 National Defense Authorization Act (S.Rept.
101-384 of July 20 (legislative day, July 10), 1990, on S. 2884), pp. 8-36;
the House Armed Services Committee’s report on the FY1992 and FY1993 National Defense Authorization
Act (H.Rept. 102-60 of May 13, 1991, on H.R. 2100), pp. 8 and 13;
the Senate Armed Services Committee’s report on the FY1992 and FY1993 National Defense Authorization
Act (S.Rept. 102-113 of July 19 (legislative day, July 8), 1991, on S. 1507), pp. 8-9;
the House Armed Services Committee’s report on the FY1993 National Defense Authorization Act (H.Rept.
102-527 of May 19, 1992, on H.R. 5006), pp. 8-10, 14-15, and 22;
the Senate Armed Services Committee’s report on the FY1993 National Defense Authorization Act (S.Rept.
102-352 of July 31 (legislative day, July 23), 1992, on S. 3114), pp. 7-12;
the House Armed Services Committee’s report on the FY1994 National Defense Authorization Act (H.Rept.
103-200 of July 30, 1993, on H.R. 2401), pp. 8-9 and 18-19;
the House Armed Services Committee’s report on the FY1995 National Defense Authorization Act (H.Rept.
103-499 of May 10, 1994, on H.R. 4301), pp. 7 and 9;
the Senate Armed Services Committee’s report on the FY1995 National Defense Authorization Act (S.Rept.
103-282 of June 14 (legislative day, June 7), 1994, on S. 2182), pp. 8-9; and
the House Armed Services Committee’s report on the FY1996 National Defense Authorization Act (H.Rept.
104-131 of June 1, 1995, on H.R. 1530), pp. 6-7 and 11-12.
16 See, for example, Clifford Krauss, “New Proposal for Military Cut,” New York Times, January 7, 1992: A11
[discussing a proposal by Senator Phil Gramm for reducing defense spending by a certain amount]; “Sen. Mitchell
Proposes $100 Billion Cut in Defense,” Aerospace Daily, January 17, 1992: 87; John Lancaster, “Nunn Proposes 5-
Year Defense Cut of $85 Billion,” Washington Post, March 25, 1992: A4.
Congressional Research Service
8
A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense
presenting his proposals for defense spending, missions, force structure, and weapon acquisition
programs.17
Perhaps the most extensive individual effort by a Member to participate in the reassessment of
U.S. defense following the end of the Cold War was the one carried out by Representative Les
Aspin, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. In early 1992, Aspin, supported by
members of the committee’s staff, devised a force-sizing construct and potential force levels and
associated defense spending levels U.S. defense for the new post-Cold War era. A principal aim
of Aspin’s effort was to create an alternative to the “Base Force” plan for U.S. defense in the post-
Cold War era that had been developed by the George H. W. Bush Administration.18 Aspin’s effort
included a series of policy papers in January and February 199219 that were augmented by press
releases and speeches. Aspin’s policy paper of February 25, 1992, served as the basis for his
testimony that same day at a hearing on future defense spending before the House Budget
Committee. Although DOD and some other observers (including some Members of Congress)
criticized Aspin’s analysis and proposals on various grounds,20 the effort arguably proved
consequential the following year, when Aspin became Secretary of Defense in the new Clinton
Administration. Aspin’s 1992 effort helped inform his participation in DOD’s 1993 BUR. The
1993 BUR in turn created a precedent for the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) process that
remains in place today.
Potential or Emerging Implications for Defense
The shift in strategic situations that some observers have identified could have a number of
implications for U.S. defense plans and programs, including those discussed briefly below.
Terms of Debate over U.S. Defense
Of perhaps the greatest potential significance, a shift from the post-Cold War era to a new
strategic situation could lead to a change in the current overall terms of debate over U.S. defense
17 Senator John McCain, Matching A Peace Dividend With National Security, A New Strategy For The 1990s,
November 1991, 32 pp.
18 See, for example, “Arms Panel Chief Challenges Ending Use of Threat Analysis,” Aviation Week & Space
Technology, January 13, 1992: 28; Patrick E. Tyler, “Top Congressman Seeks Deeper Cuts in Military Budget,” New
York Times, February 23, 1991: 1; Barton Gellman, “Debate on Military’s Future Crystallizes Around ‘Enemies List,’”
Washington Post, February 26, 1992: A20; Pat Towell, “Planning the Nation’s Defense,” CQ, February 29, 1992: 479.
For more on the Base Force, see CRS Report 92-493 S, National Military Strategy, The DoD Base Force, and U.S.
Unified Command Plan, June 11, 1992, 68 pp., by John M. Collins [nondistributable and available from the authors of
this report].
19 These policy papers included the following:
National Security in the 1990s: Defining a New Basis for U.S. Military Forces, Rep. Les Aspin, Chairman,
House Armed Services Committee, Before the Atlantic Council of the United States, January 6, 1992, 23 pp.;
An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces For the Post-Soviet Era, Rep. Les Aspin, Chairman,
House Armed Services Committee, January 24, 2991, 20 pp.;
Tomorrow’s Defense From Today’s Industrial Base: Finding the Right Resource Strategy For A New Era, by
Rep. Les Aspin, Chairman, House Armed Services Committee, Before the American Defense Preparedness
Association, February 12, 1992, 20 pp.; and
An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces For the Post-Soviet Era, Four Illustrative Options,
Rep. Les Aspin, Chairman, House Armed Services Committee, February 25, 1992, 27 pp.
20 See, for example, “Aspin Defense Budget Plans Rebuffed By Committee,” Defense Daily, February 24, 1992: 289;
“Pentagon Spurns Aspin’s Budget Cuts as ‘Political,’” Washington Post, February 28, 1992: A14.
Congressional Research Service
9
A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense
plans and programs. The current terms of debate are shaped by things such as the limits on
defense spending established under the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011 (S. 365/P.L. 112-25 of
August 2, 2011) as amended, the defense strategic guidance document of January 2012,21 and the
2014 Quadrennial Defense Review.22 If the current terms of debate largely reflect the features of
the post-Cold War era, they may not be responsive to features of the new strategic situation that
some observers have identified.23
Some observers, citing recent world events, have raised the question of whether defense spending
should be increased above levels set forth in the BCA, and consequently whether the BCA should
be amended or repealed.24 If policymakers judge that a shift in strategic situations of the kind
discussed here is occurring, the nature of the U.S. response to that shift could lead to defense
spending levels that are higher than, lower than, or about the same as those in the BCA.
U.S. and NATO Military Capabilities in Europe
Russia’s seizure and annexation of Ukraine and Russia’s subsequent actions in eastern Ukraine
and elsewhere in Eastern Europe have led to a renewed focus among policymakers on U.S. and
NATO military capabilities in Europe.25 In July 2014, the Administration, as part of its FY2015
funding request for the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) part of DOD’s budget,
21 Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012, 8 pp.
For additional discussion, see CRS Report R42146, Assessing the January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG): In
Brief, by Catherine Dale and Pat Towell.
22 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, 64 pp. For additional discussion, see CRS Report
R43403, The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and Defense Strategy: Issues for Congress, by Catherine Dale.
23 See, for example, David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “Addressing Tomorrow’s Challenges With Yesterday’s Budget,”
War on the Rocks, February 10, 2015; John Grady, “Think Tank Panel Tells House U,.S. Military Faces More
Challenges, Suggests Pentagon Spending Reforms,” USNI News, February 11, 2015.
24 See, for example, John T. Bennett, “Could Global Threat Picture Restore US Defense Increases?” Defense News,
August 31, 2014; Charles Lane, “The U.S. Needs To Get Serious About Defense Spending,” Washington Post,
September 3, 2014; Robert J. Samuelson, “America’s Neglected Defense,” Washington Post, September 7, 2014;
Michele Flournoy and Eric Edelman, “Cuts To Defense Spending Are Hurting Our National Security,” Washington
Post, September 19, 2014; Mackenzie Eaglen, “GOP, Dems Must Rebuild Military Readiness,” Breaking Defense,
September 26, 2014; Ron Haskins and Michael O’Hanlon, “Commentary: Stop Sequestering Defense,” Defense News,
October 13, 2014; Merrill D’Arezzo, “Experts Call For National Debate On U.S. Military Priorities,” Military Times,
October 23, 2104; Martin Matishak and Rebecca Shabad, “Defense Hopes For Sequester Relief,” The Hill, October 26,
2014; James Jay Carafano, “Is America’s Defense Budget Too Small?” The National Interest, October 31, 2014;
Thomas Donnelly and Gary Schmitt, “AWOL on the Defense Budget,” The Weekly Standard, March 30, 2015; Dakota
L. Wood, “An Epic Congressional Failure of Defense,” War on the Rocks, May 13, 2015; Fred Hiatt, “Real World
military Funding,” Washington Post, May 17, 2015.
25 See, for example, Julia Ioffe, “Exclusive: The Pentagon Is Preparing New War Plans for a Baltic Battle Against
Russia,” Foreign Policy, September 18, 2015; Julian E. Barnes, “U.S. Army Crosses Danube in Hungary in Show of
Force,” Real Time Brussels (Wall Street Journal), September 17, 2015; Lara Seligman, “USAFE Chief Calls For An F-
22 Base in Europe,” Defense News, September 16, 2015; Anthony Capaccio, “Russia’s Assertive Moves Weigh on
Pentagon Plans for 2017 Budget,” Bloomberg News, September 15, 2015; Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “Russians ‘Closed
The Gap’ For A2/AD: Air Force Gen. Gorenc,” Breaking Defense, September 14, 2015; Agence France-Presse,
“NATO Paratroopers Mount Exercise In Germany,” Defense News, August 26, 2015; James K. San Born, “U.S. Troops
To Participate in Massive NATO Exercise,” Marine Corps Times, August 25, 2015; Agence France-Presse, “US
Launches Biggest Allied Airborne Drills Since Cold War,” Defense News, August 18, 2015; Nancy A. Youssef,
“Pentagon Fears It’s ot Ready for a War With Putin,” The Daily Beast, August 14, 2015; Brendan McGarry, “US Army
May Deploy More Soldiers to Europe,” Military.com, August 13, 2015; Kristin Wong, “Top US General: Russia Is
Most Dangerous Threat,” The Hill, August 12, 2015; Phillip Swarts, “12 More A-10s to Deploy to Eastern Europe,” Air
Force Times, August 11, 2015; Adrian Croft, “Tensions With Russia Could Prompt NATO Strategy Rethink,” Reuters,
July 6, 20156; Agence France-Presse, “Commanders: NATO Navies Should Beef Up Against Russia,” Defense News,
July 1, 2015.
Congressional Research Service
10
A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense
requested $1 billion for a European Reassurance Initiative, of which $925 million would be for
DOD to carry out several force deployments and operations in Europe.26 At the September 4-5,
2014, NATO summit in Wales, NATO leaders announced a series of initiatives for refocusing
NATO away from “out of area” (i.e., beyond-Europe) operations, and back toward a focus on
territorial defense and deterrence in Europe itself.27 In December 2014, Russia issued a new
military doctrine that, among other things, calls for a more assertive approach toward NATO.28 In
June 2015, Russia stated that it would respond to the placement of additional U.S. military
equipment in Eastern Europe by deploying additional forces along its own western border.29
The increased attention that U.S. policymakers are paying to the security situation in Europe,
combined with U.S. military operations in the Middle East against the Islamic State organization
and similar groups, has intensified preexisting questions among some observers about whether
the United States will be able to fully implement the military component of the U.S. strategic
rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region that was formally announced in the January 2012 defense
strategic guidance document.
New Forms of Aggression and Assertiveness
Russia’s seizure and annexation of Crimea, as well as subsequent Russian actions in eastern
Ukraine and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, have already led to a renewed focus among
policymakers on how to counter Russia’s hybrid warfare or ambiguous warfare tactics.30 China’s
26 Prepared Statement of the Honorable Robert O. Work, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Admiral James A.
Winnefeld, Jr., USN, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Before the House Armed Services Committee on the
FY2015 Overseas Contingency Operations Budget Request for the Department of Defense, Wednesday, July 16, 2014,
pp. 2, 4-5.
27 For additional discussion, see CRS Report R43698, NATO’s Wales Summit: Outcomes and Key Challenges, by Paul
Belkin.
28 See, for example, Jaroslaw Adamowski, “Russia Overhauls Military Doctrine,” Defense News, January 10, 2015.
29 Karoun Demirjian, “Russia Says It Would Match Any U.S. Military Buildup in Eastern Europe,” Washington Post,
June 15, 2015.
30 See, for example, Tim Starks, “New House Armed Services Chairman Plans Focus on Unconventional Warfare,”
Roll Call, January 14, 2015; Edgar Buckley and Ioan Pascu, “Report Warms Russia’s ‘Hybrid Warfare’ In Ukraine
Could Inspire Others,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, February 18, 2015; “NATO’s Article 5 and Russian Hybrid
Warfare,” Atlantic Council, March 17, 2015; Agence France-Presse, “NATO Allies Brace for Russia’s ‘Hybrid
Warfare,’” Defense News, March 18, 2015; Agence France-Presse, “NATO Allies Brace for Russia’s ‘Hybrid
Warfare,’” Defense News, March 18, 2015; Andreas Jacobs and Guillaume Lasconjarias, “NATO’s Hybrid Flanks,
Handling Unconventional Warfare in the South and East,” NATO Defense College, April 2015, 12 pp.; Nadia
Schadlow, “The Problem With Hybrid Warfare,” War on the Rocks, April 2, 2015; Phillip Lohaus, “Short of War: How
America’s Competitors Chip Away at Its Traditional Military Might,” The National Interest, May 11, 2015; Agence
France-Presse, “NATO, EU To Work Against ‘Hybrid Warfare,’” Defense News, May 14, 2015; Tod Lindberg, “The
Answer to ‘Hybrid Warfare,’” The Weekly Standard, May 18, 2015; David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “Fighting and
Winning in the ‘Gray Zone,’” War on the Rocks, May 19, 2015; Octavian Manea, “Post Crimea Europe: NATO In the
Age of Limited Wars,” Small Wars Journal, June 2, 2015; Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “United States to NATO: Ditch the
‘Cold War Playbook,’” Washington Post, June 21, 2015; Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “The ‘New’ Type of War That Finally
Has The Pentagon’s Attention,” Washington Post, July 3, 2015, Mark Galeotti, “Time to Think About ‘Hybrid
Defense,’” War on the Rocks, July 30, 2015; A. Wess Mitchell, “The Case for Deterrence by Denial,” American
Interest, August 12, 2015; Audrey Kurth Cronin, “The Changing Face Of War In The 21st Century,” Real Clear
Defense, August 18, 2015; Aapo Cederberg and Pasi Eronen, “Wake Up, West! The Era of Hyrbid Warfare Is Upon
Us,” Overt Action, August 25, 2015; Marcus Weisgerber, “Now NATO’s Prepping for Hybrid War,” Defense One,
August 27, 2015; Maria Snegovaya, Putin’s Information Warfare in Ukraine, Washington, Institute for the Study of
War, September 2015, 26 pp.
Congressional Research Service
11
A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense
actions in the East and South China Seas have prompted a focus among policymakers on how to
counter China’s so-called salami-slicing tactics in those areas.31
Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Deterrence
Russia’s reassertion of its status as a major world power has included, among other things,
references by Russian officials to nuclear weapons and Russia’s status as a major nuclear weapon
power.32 This has led to an increased emphasis in discussions of U.S. defense and security on
nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence33—a development that comes at a time when DOD is in
the early stages of a multi-year plan to spend scores of billions of dollars to modernize U.S.
strategic nuclear deterrent forces.34 DOD, for example, currently has plans to acquire a new class
of ballistic missile submarines35 and a new long-range bomber.36
Submarines and Antisubmarine Warfare
The growing capabilities and operations of China’s submarine fleet,37 combined with a stated
intention by Russia to rebuild its navy (including its submarine force) and renewed Russian
submarine operations (including suspected Russian submarine operations in Swedish and Finnish
waters and near Scotland), have led to a renewed focus in discussions of U.S. defense and
security on the value of the U.S. attack submarine force for preserving U.S. command of the seas
31 See CRS Report R42784, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China:
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. See also Benjamin David Baker, “Hybrid Warfare With Chinese
Characteristics,” The Diplomat, September 23, 2015.
32 See, for example, Jeffrey Tayler, “Putin’s Nuclear Option,” Foreign Policy, September 4, 2014; Alexei Anishchuk,
“Putin Warns U.S. Spay Over Ukraine Threatens Global Stability,” Reuters, October 15, 2014; Adrian Croft, “UK
Concerned Over ‘Threatening’ Russian Nuclear Strategy,” Reuters, February 6, 2015; Paul Sonne, “As Tensions With
West Rise, Russia Increasingly Rattles Nuclear Saber,” Wall Street Journal, April 5, 2015; Zachary Keck, “Russia
Threatens to Build More Nuclear Weapons,” The National Interest, May 18, 2015; Zachary Keck, “Russia Threatens to
Deploy Nuclear Weapons in Crimea,” The National Interest, June 1, 2015; Keith B. Payne, “Putin Wields the Nuclear
Threat—And Plays with Fire,” National Review, June 30, 2015; “Russia Pledges Measures If U.S. Upgrades Nukes in
Germany,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, September 23, 2015.
33 See, for example, Destiny Albritton, “Report: U.S. Must Modernize, Update Nuclear Strategy for New Century,”
Washington Free Beacon, June 23, 2015; Naftali Bendavid, “NATO to Weigh Nuclear Threats From Russia,” Wall
Street Journal, June 23, 2015; Steven Pifer, “Russia’s Rising Military: Should the U.S. Send More Nuclear Weapons to
Europe?” The National Interest, July 21, 2015; Michaela Dodge, Russian Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces: What
They Mean for the United States, Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder #3028, July 30, 2015; Kingston Reif, “A New
Missile Gap?” Real Clear Defense, August 12, 2015; Kristina Wong, “Pentagon Chief: Russia Is A ‘Very Significant
Threat,’” The Hill, August 20, 2015; Matthew R. Costlow, “Number One Priority: Nuclear Deterrence,” Real Clear
Defense, August 25, 2015; Michael Auslin, “Reviving America’s Nucler Culture,” City Journal, September 3, 2015;
John Grady, “Panel: Moves from Putin Administration Ending ‘Strategic Holiday’ for U.S. NATO,” USNI News,
September 8, 2015; Bill Gertz, “U.S. Nuclear Missile Submarine Surfaces in Scotland,” Washington Free Beacon,
September 17, 2015; Mike Eckel, “Impasse Over U.S.-Russia Nuclear Treaty Hardens As Washington Threatens
‘Countermeasures,’” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, September 27, 2015.
34 See, for example, William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “U.S. Ramping Up Major Renewal in Nuclear Arms,” New
York Times, September 21, 2014; CRS Report RL33640, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments,
and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf, and Congressional Budget Office, Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2015 to 2024
January 2015, 7 pp.
35 CRS Report R41129, Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
36 CRS Report R43049, U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress,
by Jeremiah Gertler.
37 For a discussion of China’s submarine fleet, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for
U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Congressional Research Service
12
A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense
on a global basis, and on U.S. and allied antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities.38 This could
lead to an increased focus on the procurement of Virginia-class submarines39 and ASW platforms
and equipment, including (to cite just two examples), P-8 Poseidon multi-mission aircraft and
ASW equipment for Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs).40
Reliance on Components and Materials from Russia and China
Increased tensions with Russia have led to an interest in eliminating instances of being dependent
on Russian-made military systems and components for U.S. military systems. A current case in
point concerns the Russian-made RD-180 rocket engine, which is incorporated into U.S. space
launch rockets, including rockets used by DOD to put military payloads into orbit.41 Concerns
over Chinese cyber activities or potential Chinese actions to limit exports of certain materials
(such as rare earth elements) might similarly lead to concerns over the use of certain Chinese-
made components (such as electronic components) or Chinese-origin materials (such as rare earth
elements) for U.S. military systems.42
Issues for Congress
Potential policy and oversight issues for Congress include the following:
Shift in strategic situation. Has there been a shift in the international security
environment, and if so, what features characterize the new environment?
Reassessment of U.S. defense funding levels, strategy, and missions. Should
there be a reassessment of U.S. defense funding levels, strategy, and missions?
Congressional role in reassessment. If there is to be such a reassessment, how
should it be done, and what role should Congress play? Should Congress conduct
the reassessment itself, through committee activities? Should Congress establish
the terms of reference for a reassessment to be conducted by the executive branch
or by an independent, third-party entity (such as a blue ribbon panel)? Should
some combination of these approaches be employed?
38 See, for example, Jeffrey Lewis, “Led Zeppelin Comes to Washington,” Foreign Policy, January 5, 2015; Jamie
Merrill, “MoD Asks for American Help in Searching For Russian Submarine Near Scotland,” The Independent,
January 8, 2015; Tony Osborne, “Sweden Acknowledges Second Submarine Hunt,” Aerospace Daily & Defense
Report, January 16, 2015: 3; Marcus Weisgerber, “Pentagon Moves Money to Counter Russia,” Defense One, July 8,
2015; Anthony Capaccio, “U.S. Navy Seeks Better Underseas Sub-Hunting to Counter Putin,” Bloomberg News,
August 18, 2015; Lucas Tomlinson, “Russian Spy Ship Spotted Near US Sub Base,” Fox News, September 3, 2015;
Bill Gertz, “U.S. Shadowing Russian Ship in Atlantic Near Nuclear Submarine Areas,” Washington Free Beacon,
September 3, 2015; David Axe, “U.S. Sub Takes On Russia in Santa’s Backyard,” The Daily Beast, September 3, 2015;
Bill Gertz, “Russian Spy Ship makes Port Call in Caribbean,” Washington Free Beacon, September 22, 2015.
39 For a discussion of the Virginia-class program, see CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack
Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
40 For a discussion of the LCS program, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)/Frigate
Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
41 For a discussion, see CRS Report IN10069, Russian Sanctions Reprisal Against the RD-180 Rocket Engine: Paths
Ahead for U.S. National Security Space Launch, by Steven A. Hildreth. See also Austin Wright, “Air Force Offers Plan
to Move Off Russian Rocket Engines,” Politico Pro, September 14, 2015.
42 For more on China and rare earth elements, see CRS Report R43864, China’s Mineral Industry and U.S. Access to
Strategic and Critical Minerals: Issues for Congress, by Marc Humphries, and CRS Report R41744, Rare Earth
Elements in National Defense: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress, by Valerie Bailey Grasso.
Congressional Research Service
13
A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense
Potential effect on plans and programs. How might such a reassessment affect
the current terms of debate on U.S. defense? What might be the potential
implications for U.S. defense plans and programs?
U.S. and NATO military capabilities in Europe. Are the United States and its
NATO allies taking appropriate steps regarding U.S. and NATO military
capabilities and operations in Europe? What potential impacts would a
strengthened U.S. military presence in Europe have on total U.S. military force
structure requirements? What impact would it have on DOD’s ability to
implement the military component of the U.S. strategic rebalancing toward the
Asia-Pacific region?
New forms of aggression and assertiveness. Do the United States and its allies
and partners have an adequate strategy for countering Russia’s so-called hybrid
warfare in eastern Ukraine and China’s so-called salami-slicing tactics in the East
and South China Seas?
Nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence. Are current DOD plans for
modernizing U.S. strategic nuclear weapons, and for numbers and basing of non-
strategic (i.e., theater-range) nuclear weapons aligned with the needs of the new
strategic situation?
Submarines and antisubmarine warfare. Are current Navy plans for numbers
and capabilities of attack submarines, and ASW capabilities, aligned with the
needs of the new strategic situation?
Reliance on Russian-made components. Aside from the Russian-made RD-180
rocket engine, what other Russian-made components, if any, are incorporated
into DOD equipment? What are DOD’s plans regarding reliance on Russian-
made components for DOD equipment?
Legislative Activity in 2015
The Administration’s proposed FY2016 defense budget was submitted to Congress on February
2, 2015.
FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1735/S. 1376)
House (Committee Report)
Section 1088 of H.R. 1735 as reported by the House Armed Services Committee (H.Rept. 114-
102 of May 5, 2015) states:
SEC. 1088. Department of Defense strategy for countering unconventional warfare.
(a) Strategy required.—The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the President and
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall develop a strategy for the Department of
Defense to counter unconventional warfare threats posed by adversarial state and non-
state actors.
(b) Elements.—The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include each of the
following:
(1) An articulation of the activities that constitute unconventional warfare being waged
upon the United States and allies.
Congressional Research Service
14
A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense
(2) A clarification of the roles and responsibilities of the Department of Defense in
providing indications and warning of, and protection against, acts of unconventional
warfare.
(3) The current status of authorities and command structures related to countering
unconventional warfare.
(4) An articulation of the goals and objectives of the Department of Defense with respect
to countering unconventional warfare threats.
(5) An articulation of related or required interagency capabilities and whole-of-
Government activities required by the Department of Defense to support a counter-
unconventional warfare strategy.
(6) Recommendations for improving the counter-unconventional warfare capabilities,
authorities, and command structures of the Department of Defense.
(7) Recommendations for improving interagency coordination and support mechanisms
with respect to countering unconventional warfare threats.
(8) Recommendations for the establishment of joint doctrine to support counter-
unconventional warfare capabilities within the Department of Defense.
(9) Any other matters the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff determine necessary.
(c) Submittal to Congress.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees the
strategy required by subsection (a). The strategy shall be submitted in unclassified form,
but may include a classified annex.
(d) Definition of unconventional warfare.—In this section, the term “unconventional
warfare” means activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to
coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or
with an underground, auxiliary, or guerrilla force in a denied area.
Section 1531 of H.R. 1735 as reported by the committee states:
SEC. 1531. Statement of policy regarding European Reassurance Initiative.
(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:
(1) In February 2015, Lieutenant General James Clapper (retired), Director of National
Intelligence, testified to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate that “Russian
dominance over the former Soviet space is Russia’s highest foreign policy goal”.
(2) Russia, under the direction of President Vladimir Putin, has demonstrated its intent to
expand its sphere of influence beyond its borders and limit Western influence in the
region.
(3) The Russian military is aggressively postured on the Ukrainian boarder and continues
its buildup of military personnel and material. These aggressive and unwarranted actions
serve to intimidate, with a show of force, the Ukrainian people as well as the other
nations in the region including Georgia, the Baltic States, and the Balkan States.
(4) In December 2014, Congress enacted the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014
(Public Law 113–272), which gives the President the authority to expand assistance to
Ukraine, increase economic sanctions on Russia, and provide equipment to counter
offensive weapons.
(5) In February 2015, the Atlantic Council, the Brookings Institute, and the Chicago
Council on Global Affairs published a report entitled “Preserving Ukraine’s
Independence, Resisting Russian Aggression: What the United States and NATO Must
Congressional Research Service
15
A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense
Do” advocating for increased United States assistance to Ukraine with nonlethal and
lethal defensive equipment.
(6) Despite Russia signing the February 2015 Minsk Agreement, it has continued to
violate the terms of the agreement, as noted by Assistant Secretary of State for European
and Eurasian Affairs, Victoria Nuland, at the German Marshall Fund Brussels Forum in
March 2015: “We’ve seen month on month, more lethal weaponry of a higher
caliber...poured into Ukraine by the separatist Russian allies...the number one thing is for
Russia to stop sending arms over the border so we can have real politics.”.
(7) The military of the Russian Federation continues to increase their show of force
globally, including frequent international military flights, frequent snap exercises of
thousands of Russian troops, increased global naval presence, and the threat of the use of
nuclear weapons in defense of the annexation of Crimea in March 2014.
(8) The Government of the Russian Federation continues to exert and increase undue
influence on the free will of sovereign nations and people with intimidation tactics, covert
operations, cyber warfare, and other unconventional methods.
(9) In testimony to the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives in
February 2015, Commander of European Command, General Philip Breedlove, United
States Air Force, stated that “Russia has employed ‘hybrid warfare’...to illegally seize
Crimea, foment separatist fever in several sovereign nations, and maintain frozen
conflicts within its so-called ‘sphere of influence’ or ‘near abroad’”.
(10) The use of unconventional methods of warfare by Russia presents challenges to the
United States and its partners and allies in addressing the threat.
(11) An enhanced United States military presence and readiness posture and the provision
of security assistance in Europe are key elements to deterring further Russian aggression
and reassuring United States allies and partners.
(12) In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Public Law 113–
291), Congress authorized and appropriated $1 billion for the European Reassurance
Initiative, which supports Operation Atlantic Resolve of the United States Armed Forces.
(13) The European Reassurance Initiative expands United States military presence in
Europe, through—
(A) bolstered and continual United States military presence;
(B) bilateral and multilateral exercises with partners and allies;
(C) improved infrastructure;
(D) increased prepositioning of United States equipment throughout Europe; and
(E) building partnership capacity for allies and partners.
(14) The European Reassurance Initiative has served as a valuable tool in strengthening
the partnerships with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as well as
partnerships with non-member allies in the region.
(15) As a result of the NATO 2014 Summit in Wales, NATO has initiated a Readiness
Action Plan to increase partner nation funding and resourcing to combat Russian
aggression. NATO’s efforts with the Readiness Action Plan and United States investment
in regional security through the European Reassurance Initiative will serve to continue
and reinforce the strength and fortitude of the alliance against nefarious actors.
(16) The President’s Budget Request for fiscal year 2016 includes $789.3 million to
continue the European Reassurance Initiative focus on increased United States military
troop rotations in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve, maintaining and further
expanding increasing regional exercises, and building partnership capacity.
Congressional Research Service
16
A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense
(b) Statement of policy.—It is the policy of the United States to continue and expand its
efforts in Europe to reassure United States allies and partners and deter further aggression
and intimidation by the Russian Government, in order to enhance security and stability in
the region. This policy shall include—
(1) continued use of conventional methods, including increased United States military
presence in Europe, exercises and training with allies and partners, increasing
infrastructure, prepositioning of United States military equipment in Europe, and building
partnership capacity;
(2) increased emphasis on countering unconventional warfare methods in areas such as
cyber warfare, economic warfare, information operations, and intelligence operations,
including increased efforts in the development of strategy, operational concepts,
capabilities, and technologies; and
(3) increased security assistance to allies and partners in Europe, including the provision
of both non-lethal equipment and lethal equipment of a defensive nature to Ukraine.
Section 1610 of H.R. 1735 as reported by the committee states:
SEC. 1610. Prohibition on reliance on China and Russia for space-based weather data.
(a) Prohibition.—The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the Department of Defense
does not rely on, or in the future plan to rely on, space-based weather data provided by
the Government of China, the Government of Russia, or an entity owned or controlled by
the Government of China or the Government of Russia for national security purposes.
(b) Certification.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees a certification that the
Secretary is in compliance with the prohibition under subsection (a).
H.Rept. 114-102 states:
Russian Unconventional Warfare
Tactics employed by the Russian Federation in its aggression against Ukraine are not
unique. However, Russia has combined them in new, effective, and troubling ways. It has
fomented and taken advantage of ethnic disputes to train, build, and equip a separatist
army in Ukraine under Russian direction. It has combined this line of effort with
propaganda, diplomatic, and economic measures to try to reduce the effectiveness of
Ukraine’s response, as well as the response of the United States and Europe, and to
preserve and extend its perceived sphere of influence.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the most successful military alliance
in history, defending the security interests of its members against external threats for over
60 years. The committee supports the NATO alliance and believes that it can successfully
continue to serve as a bedrock for U.S. and European security. However, the committee
notes that the methods currently being used by Russia in Ukraine pose a challenge to the
NATO system.
The core of the NATO alliance is provided by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which
enshrines the principle of collective selfdefense: ‘‘The Parties agree that an armed attack
against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack
against them all . . .’’ In the wake of Russian actions in Ukraine, both the United States,
in a series of bilateral actions referred to as the European Reassurance Initiative, and
NATO collectively, in the Readiness Action Plan, have taken steps to ensure that all
parties are postured to respond to any new aggression. The committee is concerned,
however, that these steps may not sufficiently address the challenges posed by Russian
tactics.
Congressional Research Service
17
A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense
At its core, collective self-defense requires that the parties to the treaty agree that one of
the members is under attack. This implies that such aggression can be correctly attributed
to some actor outside the alliance. Russia’s actions have been designed to be deniable
and difficult to attribute directly to Russian government activity. Should similar tactics,
or even more covert methods, be applied to NATO member states that border Russia, it
may be difficult to attribute them to Russian activity and therefore difficult to trigger a
collective NATO response. It is likely that some NATO members will have different
views on the degree of Russian involvement. In addition, it is possible that Russia would
perceive NATO may have difficulty in coming to an agreement about a collective
response, which could undermine NATO’s ability to deter Russia from engaging in
attempts to intervene in sovereign issues of NATO members.
The committee believes that the Department of Defense, and NATO, should fully explore
how the United States, NATO, and member states can, as necessary, establish deterrence
mechanisms against activities such as those undertaken by the Russian government in
Ukraine. The committee directs the Secretary of Defense, acting through the Office of
Net Assessment or other such organization as the Secretary considers appropriate, to
undertake a study exploring various strategies for deterring external efforts to interfere
with the internal workings of NATO member states by Russia, or any other actor utilizing
tactics such as propaganda in media, economic warfare, cyber warfare, criminal acts, and
intelligence operations, similar to those being used by Russia in Ukraine. The committee
expects the Secretary to deliver a report to the congressional defense committees
containing the findings of such study not later than March 31, 2016.
This study would complement a provision contained elsewhere in this Act requiring the
Secretary of Defense to develop a strategy for the Department of Defense to counter
unconventional warfare threats posed by adversarial state and non-state actors. (Pages
257-258)
H.Rept. 114-102 also states:
Funding and Support for the European Reassurance Initiative
The budget request included $789.3 million for the European Reassurance Initiative
(ERI). The committee supports the policy and activities contained in the ERI, which was
originally proposed as part of the budget request for fiscal year 2015. However, the
committee observes that these initiatives are largely focused on conventional reassurance
and deterrence activities. The committee also recognizes that the Russian Federation has
employed unconventional warfare methods in areas such as cyber warfare, economic
warfare, information operations, and intelligence operations, and believes the Department
of Defense should increase its focus on countering such methods.
The committee believes that ERI funds for fiscal year 2016 should be allocated for
continued conventional reassurance and deterrence activities, as outlined in section 1535
of the Carl Levin and Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2015 (Public Law 113–291), as well as countering unconventional threats.
Therefore, elsewhere in this Act, the committee includes a provision that would: (1) lay
out a statement of policy regarding ERI; (2) require a Department of Defense strategy to
address unconventional warfare methods; and (3) authorize increased funding for U.S.
intelligence and warning capabilities related to the European theater, technologies
supporting U.S. information operations and strategic communications activities, the
Javelin weapon system, and Stryker combat vehicle upgrades to meet U.S. Army Europe
operational needs.
The committee further believes that, as part of the U.S. effort to increase security
assistance to allies and partners in Europe, ERI funds should be allocated to provide both
nonlethal equipment and lethal equipment of a defensive nature to Ukraine. Therefore,
elsewhere in this Act, the committee includes a provision that would authorize
Congressional Research Service
18
A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense
appropriations to provide sustainment and assistance to the military and national security
forces of Ukraine.
The committee believes that all of these U.S. efforts taken in combination are vital to
address regional security and to deter and counter continued Russian aggression. The
committee further believes that these efforts should be enduring and must be sustained as
core activities of the Department of Defense in Europe. (Pages 281-282)
House (Floor Action)
On May 15, 2015, as part of its consideration of H.R. 1735, the House agreed by voice vote to
H.Amdt. 229, an en bloc amendment that included, among other things, an amendment that was
number 59 in H.Rept. 114-112 of May 13, 2015, on H.Res. 260, providing for the further
consideration of H.R. 1735. Amendment number 59 in H.Rept. 115-102 states:
Page 227, after line 19, insert the following new section:
SEC. 569. REPORT ON CIVILIAN AND MILITARY EDUCATION TO RESPOND
TO FUTURE THREATS.
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than June 1, 2016, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to
the congressional defense committees a report describing both civilian and military
education requirements necessary to meet any threats anticipated in the future security
environment as described in the quadrennial defense review. Such report shall include—
(1) an assessment of the learning outcomes required of future members of the Armed
Forces and senior military leaders to meet such threats;
(2) an assessment of the shortfalls in current professional military education requirements
in meeting such threats;
(3) an assessment of successful professional military education programs that further the
ability of the Department of Defense to meet such threats;
(4) recommendations of subjects to be covered by civilian elementary and secondary
schools in order to better prepare students for potential military service;
(5) recommendations of subjects to be included in professional military education
programs;
(6) recommendations on whether partnerships between the Department of Defense and
private institutions of higher education (as defined in section 101(a) of the Higher
Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001(a))) would help meet such threats; and
(7) an identification of opportunities for the United States to strengthen its leadership role
in the future security environment and a description of how the recommendations made
in this report contribute to capitalizing on such opportunities.
(b) UPDATED REPORTS.—Not later than 10 months after date of the publication of
each subsequent quadrennial defense review, the Secretary of Defense shall update the
report described under subsection (a) and shall submit such report to the congressional
defense committees.
The above section became Section 570 of H.R. 1735 as passed by the House on May 15, 2015.
Also on May 15, 2015, as part of its consideration of H.R. 1735, the House agreed by voice vote
to H.Amdt. 236, an en bloc amendment that included, among other things, an amendment that
was number 115 in H.Rept. 114-112 of May 13, 2015, on H.Res. 260, providing for the further
consideration of H.R. 1735. Amendment number 115 in H.Rept. 115-102 states:
At the end of subtitle G of title XII (page 622, after line 22), add the following:
Congressional Research Service
19
A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense
SEC. 12xx. REPORT ON IMPACT OF ANY SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN
UNITED STATES TROOP LEVELS OR MATERIEL IN EUROPE ON NATO’S
ABILITY TO CREDIBLY ADDRESS EXTERNAL THREATS TO ANY NATO
MEMBER STATE.
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—(1) in order to
demonstrate United States commitment to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
allies, especially those NATO allies under pressure on the Eastern flank of the Alliance,
and to enhance the United States deterrent presence and resolve to countering threats to
NATO’s collective security, United States Armed Forces stationed and deployed in
Europe should be increased in number and combat power; and (2) the ‘‘current and
foreseeable security environment’’, as referenced in paragraph 12 of Section IV on
Political-Military Matters of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and
Security between NATO and the Russian Federation (NATO-Russia Founding Act), has
changed significantly since the signing of such Act in 1997 and thus such Act should not
be read, interpreted, or implemented so as to constrain or in any way limit additional
permanent stationing of substantial combat forces anywhere on the territory of any
NATO member State in furtherance of NATO’s core mission of collective defense and
other missions.
(b) REPORT.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—In order to ensure that the United States contribution to NATO’s
core mission of collective defense remains robust and ready to meet any future
challenges, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report on the impact of any significant reduction in United States troop
levels or materiel in Europe on NATO’s ability to credibly deter, resist, and, if necessary,
repel external threats to any NATO member State.
(2) DEADLINE.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted not later
than 30 days prior to the date on which any significant reduction described in paragraph
(1) is scheduled to take place.
(3) FORM.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified
form, but may contain a classified annex if necessary to protect the national security
interests of the United States.
(4) DEFINITION.—In this subsection, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’
means—
(A) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives.
The above section became Section 1274 of H.R. 1735 as passed by the House on May 15, 2015.
Senate
Section 212 of S. 1376 as reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee (S.Rept. 114-49 of
May 19, 2015) states:
SEC. 212. Department of Defense technology offset program to build and maintain the
military technological superiority of the United States.
(a) Program established.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense shall establish a technology offset
program to build and maintain the military technological superiority of the United States
by—
Congressional Research Service
20
A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense
(A) accelerating the fielding of offset technologies that would help counter technological
advantages of potential adversaries of the United States, including directed energy, low-
cost, high-speed munitions, autonomous systems, undersea warfare, cyber technology,
and intelligence data analytics, developed using Department of Defense research funding
and accelerating the commercialization of such technologies; and
(B) developing and implementing new policies and acquisition and business practices.
(2) GUIDELINES.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Secretary shall issue guidelines for the operation of the program, including—
(A) criteria for an application for funding by a military department, defense agency, or a
combatant command;
(B) the purposes for which such a department, agency, or command may apply for funds
and appropriate requirements for technology development or commercialization to be
supported using program funds;
(C) the priorities, if any, to be provided to field or commercialize offset technologies
developed by certain types of Department research funding; and
(D) criteria for evaluation of an application for funding or changes to policies or
acquisition and business practices by a department, agency, or command for purposes of
the program.
(b) Development of directed energy strategy.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Secretary, in consultation with such officials and third-party experts as the Secretary
considers appropriate, shall develop a directed energy strategy to ensure that the United
States directed energy technologies are being developed and deployed at an accelerated
pace.
(2) COMPONENTS OF STRATEGY.—The strategy required by paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(A) A technology roadmap for directed energy that can be used to manage and assess
investments and policies of the Department in this high priority technology area.
(B) Proposals for legislative and administrative action to improve the ability of the
Department to develop and deploy technologies and capabilities consistent with the
directed energy strategy.
(C) An approach to program management that is designed to accelerate operational
prototyping of directed energy technologies and develop cost-effective, real-world
military applications for such technologies.
(3) BIENNIAL REVISIONS.—Not less frequently than once every 2 years, the Secretary
shall revise the strategy required by paragraph (1).
(4) SUBMITTAL TO CONGRESS.—(A) Not later than 90 days after the date on which
the Secretary completes the development of the strategy required by paragraph (1) and
not later than 90 days after the date on which the Secretary completes a revision to such
strategy under paragraph (3), the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Armed
Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives a copy of such strategy.
(B) The strategy submitted under subparagraph (A) shall be submitted in unclassified
form, but may include a classified annex.
(c) Applications for funding.—
Congressional Research Service
21
A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense
(1) IN GENERAL.—Under the program, the Secretary shall, not less frequently than
annually, solicit from the heads of the military departments, the defense agencies, and the
combatant commands applications for funding to be used to enter into contracts,
cooperative agreements, or other transaction agreements entered into pursuant to section
845 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103–
160; 10 U.S.C. 2371 note) with appropriate entities for the fielding or commercialization
of technologies.
(2) TREATMENT PURSUANT TO CERTAIN CONGRESSIONAL RULES.—Nothing
in this section shall be interpreted to require any official of the Department of Defense to
provide funding under this section to any earmark as defined pursuant to House Rule
XXI, clause 9, or any congressionally directed spending item as defined pursuant to
Senate Rule XLIV, paragraph 5.
(d) Funding.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to the availability of appropriations for such purpose, of the
amounts authorized to be appropriated for research, development, test, and evaluation,
Defense-wide for fiscal year 2016, not more than $400,000,000 may be used for any such
fiscal year for the program established under subsection (a).
(2) AMOUNT FOR DIRECTED ENERGY.—Of this amount, not more than
$200,000,000 may be used for activities in the field of directed energy.
(e) Transfer authority.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary may transfer funds available for the program to the
research, development, test, and evaluation accounts of a military department, defense
agency, or a combatant command pursuant to an application, or any part of an
application, that the Secretary determines would support the purposes of the program.
(2) SUPPLEMENT NOT SUPPLANT.—The transfer authority provided in this
subsection is in addition to any other transfer authority available to the Department of
Defense.
(f) Termination.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The authority to carry out a program under this section shall
terminate on September 30, 2020.
(2) TRANSFER AFTER TERMINATION.—Any amounts made available for the
program that remain available for obligation on the date the program terminates may be
transferred under subsection (e) during the 180-day period beginning on the date of the
termination of the program.
Regarding Section 212, S.Rept. 114-49 states:
Department of Defense technology offset program to build and maintain the
military technological superiority of the United States (sec. 212)
The committee notes with concern that the United States has not faced a more diverse
and complex array of crises since the end of World War II, and that taken together, they
constitute the greatest challenge in a generation to the integrity of the liberal world order,
which has consistently been underwritten by U.S. military technological superiority. At
the same time, the committee is alarmed by the apparent erosion in recent years of this
technological advantage, which is in danger of disappearing altogether. To prevent such a
scenario and to maintain the country’s global military technological edge, the committee
recommends a provision that would establish a new $400.0 million initiative.
Congressional Research Service
22
A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense
In doing so, the committee notes that the Defense Department is facing an emerging
innovation gap. Commercial research and development in the United States now
represents 80 percent of the national total, and the top four U.S. defense contractors
combined spend only one-quarter of what the single biggest internet company does on
research and development. Furthermore, global research and development is now more
than twice that of the United States. The committee also notes that defense innovation is
moving too slowly—in cycles that can last up to 18 years, whereas commercial
innovation can be measured in cycles of 18 months or less.
The committee understands that accessing sources of innovation beyond the Defense
Department is critical for national security, particularly in the areas of directed energy,
low-cost high-speed munitions, cyber capabilities, autonomous systems, undersea
warfare, and intelligence data analytics. However, there are currently too many barriers
that limit cooperation with U.S. allies and global commercial firms, posing a threat to the
country’s future military technological dominance.
For the past several years, U.S. adversaries have been rapidly improving their own
military capabilities to counter our unique advantages. Structural trends, such as the
diffusion of certain advanced military technologies, pose new operational challenges to
U.S. armed forces. As a result, the dominance of the United States military can no longer
be taken for granted. Consequently, the Department of Defense must remain focused on
the myriad potential threats of the future and thus maintain technological superiority
against potential adversaries.
The committee notes that since 1960, the department has invested more than $6.0 billion
in directed energy science and technology initiatives. The committee is concerned that,
despite this significant investment, the department’s directed energy initiatives are not
resourced at levels necessary to transition them to fullscale acquisition programs. The
committee is encouraged by the Navy’s demonstration a 100–150 kilowatt prototype
laser and by the Air Force’s demonstration of high-powered electromagnetic weapons
capabilities. However, the committee is concerned about the future of directed energy
technologies as a whole. The committee notes that there is no inter-service entity
dedicated to advancing promising directed energy platforms beyond the development
point towards acquisition.
The committee is encouraged that the department established a department-wide Defense
Innovation Initiative in November 2014 to pursue innovative ways to sustain and advance
our military superiority and to improve business operations throughout the department.
However, the committee is concerned by the possibility that this initiative is not being
implemented in an appropriate and expeditious manner.
In response to these factors, the committee recommends a provision that would establish
an initiative within the Department of Defense to maintain and enhance the military
technological superiority of the United States. The provision would establish a program
to accelerate the fielding of offset technologies, including, but not limited to, directed
energy, low-cost high-speed munitions, autonomous systems, undersea warfare, cyber
technology, and intelligence data analytics, developed by the department and to
accelerate the commercialization of such technologies. As part of this program, the
committee expects that the Secretary of Defense would also establish updated policies
and new acquisition and management practices that would speed the delivery of offset
technologies into operational use.
The provision would authorize $400.0 million for fiscal year 2016 for the initiative, of
which $200.0 million would be authorized specifically for directed energy technology.
Accordingly, the provision would mandate the Secretary to develop a directed energy
strategy to ensure that appropriate technologies are developed and deployed at an
accelerated pace, and update it every 2 years. The committee expects that this strategy
would include a recommendation on rationalizing the roles and authorities of the Joint
Congressional Research Service
23
A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense
Technology Office for High Energy Lasers. The provision would further direct the
Secretary to submit this strategy to the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House
Armed Services Committee no later than 90 days after completing the strategy, and
biennially thereafter.
To speed up the development of these vitally needed national security capabilities, the
committee directs that the Secretary of Defense shall consider all appropriate flexible
acquisition authorities granted in law and in this Act. These should include the
management structure and streamlined procedures for rapid prototyping outlined in
section 803 of this Act on the middle tier of acquisition for rapid prototyping and rapid
fielding, and the procedures and authorities to be considered under section 805 of this Act
on use of alternative acquisition paths to acquire critical national security capabilities to
include other transactions, rapid acquisition, and commercial item authorities.
The committee expects that the Secretary of Defense would keep the Senate Committee
on Armed Services and the House Committee on Armed Services regularly updated on
progress of activities under this technology offsets initiative. (Pages 44-46)
Section 1253 of S. 1376 as reported by the committee states:
SEC. 1253. Increased presence of United States ground forces in Eastern Europe to deter
aggression on the border of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the increased presence of United States and allied ground forces in Eastern Europe
since April 2014 has provided a level of reassurance to North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) members in the region and strengthened the capability of the
Organization to respond to any potential Russian aggression against Organization
members;
(2) at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Wales summit in September 2014 member
countries agreed on a Readiness Action Plan which is intended to improve the ability of
the Organization to respond quickly and effectively to security threats on the borders of
the Organization, including in Eastern Europe, and the challenges posed by hybrid
warfare;
(3) the capability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to respond to threats on the
eastern border of the Organization would be enhanced by a more sustained presence on
the ground of Organization forces on the territories of Organization members in Eastern
Europe; and
(4) an increased presence of United States ground forces in Eastern Europe should be
matched by an increased force presence of European allies.
(b) Report.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Secretary of Defense shall, in consultation with the Secretary of State, submit to the
congressional defense committees a report setting forth an assessment of options for
expanding the presence of United States ground forces of the size of a Brigade Combat
Team in Eastern Europe to respond, along with European allies and partners, to the
security challenges posed by Russia and increase the combat capability of forces able to
respond to unconventional or hybrid warfare tactics such as those used by the Russian
Federation in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.
(2) ELEMENTS.—The report under this subsection shall include the following:
(A) An evaluation of the optimal location or locations of the enhanced ground force
presence described in paragraph (1) that considers such factors as—
(i) proximity, suitability, and availability of maneuver and gunnery training areas;
Congressional Research Service
24
A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense
(ii) transportation capabilities;
(iii) availability of facilities, including for potential equipment storage and
prepositioning;
(iv) ability to conduct multinational training and exercises;
(v) a site or sites for prepositioning of equipment, a rotational presence or permanent
presence of troops, or a combination of options; and
(vi) costs.
(B) A description of any initiatives by other members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, or other European allies and partners, for enhancing force presence on a
permanent or rotational basis in Eastern Europe to match or exceed the potential
increased presence of United States ground forces in the region.
Regarding Section 1253, S.Rept. 114-49 states:
Increased presence of United States ground forces in Eastern Europe to deter
aggression on the border of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (sec. 1253)
The committee recommends a provision that would require a report to the congressional
defense committees, not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, by
the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, assessing options for
expanding the presence of U.S. ground forces of the size of a brigade combat team in
Eastern Europe to respond, along with European allies and partners, to the security
challenges posed by Russia and to increase the combat capability of allied forces to
respond to unconventional or hybrid warfare tactics like those used by Russia in Crimea
and eastern Ukraine. The committee believes that any increases in the presence of U.S.
ground forces in Eastern Europe should be matched by similar increases in the
commitment of ground forces by European allies and partners for these purposes. (Page
233)
Section 1254 of S. 1376 as reported by the committee states:
SEC. 1254. Sense of Congress on European defense and North Atlantic Treaty
Organization spending.
(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:
(1) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries, at the 2014 North Atlantic
Treaty Organization Summit in Wales, pledged to “reverse the trend of declining defense
budgets, to make the most effective use of our funds and to further a more balanced
sharing of costs and responsibilities”.
(2) Former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel stated on May 2, 2014, that “[t]oday,
America’s GDP is smaller than the combined GDPs of our 27 NATO allies. But
America’s defense spending is three times our Allies’ combined defense spending. Over
time, this lopsided burden threatens NATO’s integrity, cohesion, and capability, and
ultimately both European and transatlantic security”.
(3) Former North Atlantic Treaty Organization Secretary General Anders Fogh
Rasmussen stated on July 3, 2014, that “[d]uring the last five years, Russia has increased
defense spending by 50 percent, while NATO allies on average have decrease their
defense spending by 20 percent. That is not sustainable, we need more investment in
defense and security”.
(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) it is in the national security and fiscal interests of the United States that prompt efforts
should be undertaken by North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies to meet defense
Congressional Research Service
25
A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense
budget commitments made in Declaration 14 of the Wales Summit Declaration of
September 2014;
(2) the United States Government should continue efforts through the Department of
Defense and other agencies to encourage North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies
towards meeting the defense spending goals set out at the Wales Summit;
(3) some North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies have already taken positive steps to
reverse declines in defense spending and should continue to be supported in those efforts;
and
(4) thoughtful and coordinated defense investments by European allies in military
capabilities would add deterrence value to the posture of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization against Russian aggression and terrorist organizations and more
appropriately balance the share of Atlantic defense spending.
Section 1255 of S. 1376 as reported by the committee states:
SEC. 1255. Additional matters in annual report on military and security developments
involving the Russian Federation.
(a) Additional matters.—Subsection (b) of section 1245 of the Carl Levin and Howard P.
“Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Public Law
113–291) is amended—
(1) by redesignating paragraphs (4) through (15) as paragraphs (6) through (17),
respectively; and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new paragraphs (4) and (5):
“(4) An assessment of the force structure and capabilities of Russian military forces
stationed in each of the Arctic, Kaliningrad, and Crimea, including a description of any
changes to such force structure or capabilities during the one-year period ending on the
date of such report and with a particular emphasis on the anti-access and area denial
capabilities of such forces.
“(5) An assessment of Russian military strategy and objectives for the Arctic region.”.
(b) Effective date.—The amendments made by subsection (a) shall take effect on the date
of the enactment of this Act, and shall apply with respect to reports submitted under
section 1245 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 after that date.
Regarding Section 1255, S.Rept. 114-49 states:
Additional matters in annual report on military and security developments
involving the Russian Federation (sec. 1255)
The committee recommends a provision that would add a reporting requirement to
section 1245 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Public Law 113–291) requiring an assessment of
the force structure and capabilities of Russian military forces stationed in the Arctic
region, Kaliningrad, and Crimea, as well as an assessment of the Russian military
strategy in the Arctic region.
The committee is concerned about increased Russian military activity in the Arctic region
and notes that Russian activities and apparent ambitions could present challenges to
international law, norms, and agreements relating to the Arctic region. (Page 233)
Section 1256 of S. 1376 as reported by the committee states:
SEC. 1256. Report on alternative capabilities to procure and sustain nonstandard rotary
wing aircraft historically procured through Rosoboronexport.
Congressional Research Service
26
A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense
(a) Report on assessment of alternative capabilities.—Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics shall, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, submit to the congressional defense committees a report setting forth an
assessment, obtained by the Under Secretary for purposes of the report, of the feasibility
and advisability of using alternative industrial base capabilities to procure and sustain,
with parts and service, nonstandard rotary wing aircraft historically acquired through
Rosoboronexport, or nonstandard rotary wing aircraft that are in whole or in part reliant
upon Rosoboronexport for continued sustainment, in order to benefit United States
national security interests.
(b) Independent assessment.—The assessment obtained for purposes of subsection (a)
shall be conducted by a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC), or
another appropriate independent entity with expertise in the procurement and sustainment
of complex weapon systems, selected by the Under Secretary for purposes of the
assessment.
(c) Elements.—The assessment obtained for purposes of subsection (a) shall include the
following:
(1) An identification and assessment of international industrial base capabilities, other
than Rosoboronexport, to provide one or more of the following:
(A) Means of procuring nonstandard rotary wing aircraft historically procured through
Rosoboronexport.
(B) Reliable and timely supply of required and appropriate parts, spares, and
consumables of such aircraft.
(C) Certifiable maintenance of such aircraft, including major periodic overhauls, damage
repair, and modifications.
(D) Access to required reference data on such aircraft, including technical manuals and
service bulletins.
(E) Credible certification of airworthiness of such aircraft through physical inspection,
notwithstanding any current administrative requirements to the contrary.
(2) An assessment (including an assessment of associated costs and risks) of alterations to
administrative processes of the United States Government that may be required to
procure any of the capabilities specified in paragraph (1), including waivers to
Department of Defense or Department of State requirements applicable to foreign
military sales or alterations to procedures for approval of airworthiness certificates.
(3) An assessment of the potential economic impact to Rosoboronexport of procuring
nonstandard rotary wing aircraft described in paragraph (1)(A) through entities other than
Rosoboronexport.
(4) An assessment of the risks and benefits of using the entities identified pursuant to
paragraph (1)(A) to procure aircraft described in that paragraph.
(5) Such other matters as the Under Secretary considers appropriate.
(d) Use of previous studies.—The entity conducting the assessment for purposes of
subsection (a) may use and incorporate information from previous studies on matters
appropriate to the assessment.
(e) Form of report.—The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified
form, but may include a classified annex.
Regarding Section 1256, S.Rept. 114-49 states:
Congressional Research Service
27
A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense
Report on alternative capabilities to procure and sustain nonstandard rotary wing
aircraft historically procured through Rosoboronexport (sec. 1256)
The committee recommends a provision that would require an independent assessment
directed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics in
consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to report on the feasibility and
advisability of using alternative industrial base capabilities to procure and sustain
nonstandard rotary wing aircraft historically acquired through the Russian state
corporation Rosoboronexport. The assessment would include an analysis of the economic
impact as well as alterations that would be required for waivers of foreign military sales
requirements and procedures for approval of airworthiness certificates.
The committee notes that the use of alternative industrial base capability to divest
reliance on Rosoboronexport could benefit United States national security interests, deny
financial support to the Russian Federation, and could potentially benefit U.S. and
Ukrainian commercial interests. (pages 233-234)
Section 1603 of S. 1376 as reported by the committee states:
SEC. 1603. Exception to the prohibition on contracting with Russian suppliers of rocket
engines for the evolved expendable launch vehicle program.
Section 1608 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Public Law 113–291; 128 Stat. 3626; 10 U.S.C.
2271 note) is amended—
(1) in subsection (a), by striking “subsections (b) and (c)” and inserting “subsections (b),
(c), and (d)”; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
“(d) Special rule for phase 1A competitive opportunities.—
“(1) IN GENERAL.—For not more than 9 competitive opportunities described in
paragraph (2), the Secretary of Defense may award a contract—
“(A) requiring the use of a rocket engine designed or manufactured in the Russian
Federation that is eligible for a waiver under subsection (b) or an exception under
subsection (c); or
“(B) if a rocket engine described in subparagraph (A) is not available, requiring the use of
a rocket engine designed or manufactured in the Russian Federation that is not eligible
for such a waiver or exception.
“(2) COMPETITIVE OPPORTUNITIES DESCRIBED.—A competitive opportunity
described in this paragraph is—
“(A) an opportunity to compete for a contract for the procurement of property or services
for space launch activities under the evolved expendable launch vehicle program; and
“(B) one of the 9 Phase 1A competitive opportunities for fiscal years 2015 through 2017,
as specified in the budget justification materials submitted to Congress in support of the
budget of the President for fiscal year 2016 (as submitted to Congress under section
1105(a) of title 31, United States Code).”.
Regarding Section 1603, S.Rept. 114-49 states:
Exception to the prohibition on contracting with Russian suppliers of rocket engines
for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program (sec. 1603)
The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1608 of the Carl Levin
and Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2015 (Public Law 113–291; 128 Stat. 3626; 10 U.S.C. 2271 note) by adding a special
Congressional Research Service
28
A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense
rule for Phase 1A competitive opportunities. For not more than nine competitive Phase
1A launches, the special rule would allow the Secretary of Defense to award a contract
requiring the use of a rocket engine designed or manufactured in the Russian Federation
that is eligible for the existing waiver or exception requirements as specified in the
existing statute. If a circumstance arises during the Phase 1A period where a launch
provider is awarded a competitive contract and requires a rocket engine unable to meet
the waiver or exception requirements, the provision would allow for the Secretary to
waive the waiver or exception. In order to qualify for the new special rule, all engines
that meet the waiver or exception of the existing statute must first be used.
The committee notes that for the Phase 1A competitive period, this could result in as few
as zero Russian rocket engines or up to nine, depending upon the outcome of the
competitions. The committee believes that the continued use of Russian rocket engines
represents a threat to our national security and that their use should be minimized to the
greatest extent practicable.
National Security Presidential Directive 40 states that Assured Access to Space is ‘‘a
requirement for critical national security, homeland security, and civil missions and is
defined as a sufficiently robust, responsive, and resilient capability to allow continued
space operations, consistent with risk management and affordability. The Secretary of
Defense and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, as
appropriate, are responsible for assuring access to space.’’ The committee notes that
under section 1608, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is not
prohibited from procuring launches that utilize rocket engines manufactured or designed
in the Russian Federation. The committee also notes that NASA has contracts for
numerous launches that rely on Russian rocket engines for the foreseeable future. While
the committee does not condone the use of Russian rocket engines for NASA purposes,
the committee recognizes that assured access to space can still be met if a national
emergency required the use of a NASA procured launch for Department of Defense
purposes. (Pages 258-259)
S.Rept. 114-49 also states:
Committee overview
For seven decades, the U.S. military has been the most reliable guarantor of the
foundations of international order that American statesmen of both parties helped to
establish in the aftermath of World War II. The relative security and prosperity that our
nation has enjoyed, and made possible for so many others across the world, has been
painstakingly maintained through the deterrence of adversaries, the cooperation with
allies and partners, the global leadership of the United States, and the credibility and
capability of our Armed Forces.
The committee is concerned that growing threats abroad and continued limitations on
defense spending at home are increasingly harming the ability of the United States, and
its military, to play an effective leadership role in the world. Indeed, military readiness
and capabilities have deteriorated to the point where senior military leaders have warned
that we are putting at risk the lives of the men and women who serve in our Armed
Forces. There is a growing consensus that we must reverse this damage so that we can
respond adequately to a host of disturbing challenges to the international order that
adversely impact our national security.
These challenges include:
• In Ukraine, Russia has sought to redraw an international border and annex the territory
of another sovereign country through the use of military force. It continues aggressively
to destabilize Ukraine, with troubling implications for security in Europe.
Congressional Research Service
29
A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense
• A terrorist army with tens of thousands of fighters, many holding Western passports,
has taken over a vast swath of territory and declared an Islamic State in the heart of the
Middle East. Nearly 3,000 U.S. troops have returned to Iraq to combat this threat, with
U.S. aircraft flying hundreds of strike missions a month over Iraq and Syria.
• Amid negotiations over its nuclear program, Iran continues to pursue its ambitions to
challenge regional order in the Middle East by increasing its development of ballistic
missiles, support for terrorism, training and arming of pro-Iranian militant groups, and
other malign activities in places such as Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, Bahrain, and Yemen.
• Yemen has collapsed, as a Shia insurgency with ties to the Iranian regime has toppled
the U.S.-backed government in Sanaa, Al-Qaeda continues to use parts of the country to
plan attacks against the West, the U.S. Embassy has been evacuated, and a U.S.-backed
coalition of Arab nations has intervened militarily to reverse the gains of the Houthi
insurgency and to restore the previous government to power.
• Libya has become a failed state, beset by civil war and a growing presence of
transnational terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda and ISIL, similar to Afghanistan in 2001.
• North Korea, while continuing to develop its nuclear arsenal and ever-more capable
ballistic missiles, committed the most destructive cyberattack ever on U.S. territory.
• China is increasingly taking coercive actions to assert expansive territorial claims that
unilaterally change the status quo in the South and East China Seas and raise tensions
with U.S. allies and partners, all while continuing to expand and modernize its military in
ways that challenge U.S. access and freedom of movement in the Western Pacific. (Pages
2-3)
S.Rept. 114-49 also states:
Congressional Defense Review to Prepare for Future Strategic Challenges
For the past 14 years, the United States has been engaged in a long war against terrorist
and violent extremist groups. The committee believes that this conflict will persist, at one
level or another, across multiple theaters of operation, for some time to come, and that
winning this war must be a top priority of the U.S. military and the Department of
Defense (DOD).
At the same time, the committee is deeply concerned by the growth of more traditional
security threats posed by powerful states, such as China and Russia, and rogue regimes
such as Iran and North Korea. States such as these are modernizing their military
capabilities, developing advanced technologies that could undermine U.S. military
advantages—from precision-guided munitions and advanced sensors, to undersea-warfare
and unmanned systems, to offensive cyber and space capabilities—and pursuing
strategies that seek to deter the United States from achieving its national security interests
and meeting its commitments to allies and partners.
Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter captured this new military challenge well when he
said ‘‘for decades, U.S. global power projection has relied on the ships, planes, bases,
aircraft carriers, satellite networks, and other advanced capabilities that comprise our
military’s unrivaled technological edge. But today that superiority is being challenged in
unprecedented ways.’’ In short, for the first time in three decades, the United States faces
a potential turning point where our nation’s long-standing military advantages threaten to
be eroded by new shifts in the balance of military power.
Accordingly, over the coming 18 months, the committee plans to conduct a
comprehensive review of the roles, capabilities/size of the U.S. Armed Forces and DOD
in meeting, and succeeding against, these new security challenges, especially those posed
by the growing anti-access/area denial capabilities of U.S. adversaries. This review will
utilize open hearings, classified briefings, the Government Accountability Office, the
Congressional Research Service
30
A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense
Congressional Research Service, Federally Funded Research and Development Centers,
and consultation with former senior defense and military leaders and other national
security experts. Building on the series of strategy-focused hearings that the committee
has already conducted, the committee will deepen its oversight of military strategy while
also delving deeper into intelligence and threat assessments, contingency planning, force
structure and posture, joint concept development, domestic and overseas basing and
infrastructure, theater and strategic
lift requirements, munition quality and quantity, and institutional and personnel reforms.
The committee will also review civilian personnel policy, DOD infrastructure, and
acquisition policies and practices to bring them more into line with the needs of the
future.
Ultimately, the committee intends to review each of the major defense acquisition
programs and its related industrial base to determine whether they are sufficient and
appropriate to meet developing national security challenges. This review will take
nothing for granted and will evaluate each program, both qualitatively and quantitatively,
in the broader context of the roles, missions, requirements, and other capabilities of the
armed services, as well as emerging technologies that could significantly alter previous
assumptions underpinning the current programs of record. The committee’s future
budgetary decisions will be based on the outcome of this strategic review.
The committee acknowledges that for this review to be successful it will require a
sustained commitment of many years and potentially multiple chairmen. The much-
heralded ‘‘offset strategy’’ of the 1970s required a tremendous amount of intellectual
capital and research and development dollars invested over the course of a decade before
capabilities like stealth, precision-guided-munitions, and advanced sensors could be
effectively deployed. Nevertheless, it is possible to embark upon a new period of
sustained military innovation today if DOD, the military services, and industry can be
aligned towards this goal. The committee intends to use all of the resources at its disposal
to this end. (Page 214-215)
S.Rept. 114-49 also states:
Countering Russian propaganda
The committee has watched with increasing concern the proliferation and expansion of
Russian propaganda not only in Eastern Europe, but also throughout Central and Western
Europe to levels not seen since the end of the Cold War. Russian-speaking populations in
Eastern Europe in former Soviet Union nations, including North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) allies, are especially vulnerable to propaganda that could be used
to create more favorable conditions for future Russian aggression. Moreover, the
sophistication and pervasiveness of outlets such as the Russia Today (RT) television
network that broadcast in multiple languages in Western European democracies is cause
for concern.
The committee notes that Russian propaganda has promoted a false narrative on the
nature, scope, and cause of the conflict in Crimea and eastern Ukraine and has
unfortunately achieved some success with targeted audiences in obscuring attribution for
Russian-driven aggression and disregard for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and
international law.
The committee recognizes that propaganda is a critical element of Russia’s ‘‘hybrid
warfare’’ concept. The speed and reach of Russian propaganda and the ambiguity it
creates pose a challenge to NATO collective defense and the political consensus upon
which it relies.
Congressional Research Service
31
A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense
Therefore, the committee encourages the Secretary of Defense to consult with the
Secretary of State with the objective of developing a strategy, including supporting
resources, to counter Russian propaganda in Europe. (page 238)
S.Rept. 114-49 also states:
Report on capability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to respond to
unconventional or hybrid warfare tactics such as used by the Russian Federation in
Crimea and Eastern Ukraine
The committee is concerned about the capability of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) to respond to unconventional or hybrid warfare tactics such as
those used by the Russian Federation in Crimea and eastern Ukraine due to the
ambiguous nature of those tactics and the resultant challenges of attribution. As such, the
committee directs the Secretary of Defense to submit a report not later than September 1,
2016 to the congressional defense committees on recommendations for improving the
alliance’s response options, decision-making processes and implementation timelines for
addressing the use of unconventional or hybrid warfare tactics such as those used by the
Russian Federation. The report should include:
(1) An identification of the unconventional or hybrid tactics the Russian Federation may
employ against NATO nations;
(2) A consolidation of tactics identified pursuant to paragraph (1) into a set of possible
scenarios to be used to analyze potential response options by NATO;
(3) An assessment of the response options NATO could potentially pursue for each of the
scenarios identified pursuant to paragraph (2);
(4) Recommendations to improve response options, decisionmaking processes, and
implementation timelines for the scenarios identified pursuant to paragraph (2);
(5) An assessment of implementation by NATO of commitments made at the Wales
Summit regarding the Readiness Action Plan;
(6) Recommendations, if any, for exercises or mechanisms to improve the ability of
NATO to consult and reach consensus in scenarios relating to the employment of
unconventional or hybrid tactics; and
(7) Such other matters as the Secretary considers appropriate. (page 240)
FY2016 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 2685/S. 1558)
House
Section 8105 of H.R. 2685 as reported by the House Appropriations Committee (H.Rept. 114-139
of June 5, 2015) states:
Sec. 8105. (a) None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this or any
other Act may be used by the Secretary of Defense, or any other official or officer of the
Department of Defense, to enter into a contract, memorandum of understanding, or
cooperative agreement with, or make a grant to, or provide a loan or loan guarantee to
Rosoboronexport or any subsidiary of Rosoboronexport.
(b) The Secretary of Defense may waive the limitation in subsection (a) if the Secretary,
in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence,
determines that it is in the vital national security interest of the United States to do so, and
certifies in writing to the congressional defense committees that, to the best of the
Secretary's knowledge:
Congressional Research Service
32
A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense
(1) Rosoboronexport has ceased the transfer of lethal military equipment to, and the
maintenance of existing lethal military equipment for, the Government of the Syrian Arab
Republic;
(2) the armed forces of the Russian Federation have withdrawn from Crimea, other than
armed forces present on military bases subject to agreements in force between the
Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Ukraine; and
(3) agents of the Russian Federation have ceased taking active measures to destabilize the
control of the Government of Ukraine over eastern Ukraine.
(c) The Inspector General of the Department of Defense shall conduct a review of any
action involving Rosoboronexport with respect to a waiver issued by the Secretary of
Defense pursuant to subsection (b), and not later than 90 days after the date on which
such a waiver is issued by the Secretary of Defense, the Inspector General shall submit to
the congressional defense committees a report containing the results of the review
conducted with respect to such waiver.
H.Rept. 114-139 states:
EUROPEAN REASSURANCE INITIATIVE
The Committee supports efforts started in fiscal year 2015 to reassure NATO allies and
partners of the continued commitment of the United States to their security and territorial
integrity. The Committee recommends $789,300,000 for the European Reassurance
Initiative (ERI) to support increased capability, presence, readiness, and responsiveness
to deter further destabilization in central and eastern Europe. Efforts include an increased
U.S. military presence in Europe, additional bilateral and multilateral exercises and
training opportunities with allies and partners, improved infrastructure to allow for
greater responsiveness, enhanced prepositioning of equipment in Europe, and intensified
efforts to build partner capacity for new NATO members and other partners.
This funding is provided as requested in the fiscal year 2016 budget request in the
military personnel and operation and maintenance accounts at the budget activity and
sub-activity group level of detail. The Committee again directs the Secretary of Defense
to request any required fiscal year 2017 funding within the existing military personnel
and operation and maintenance accounts as part of the fiscal year 2017 budget request.
(Pages 317-318)
Senate
Section 8105 of S. 1558 as reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee (S.Rept. 114-63 of
June 11, 2015) states:
Sec. 8105. (a) None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this or any
other Act may be used by the Secretary of Defense, or any other official or officer of the
Department of Defense, to enter into a contract, memorandum of understanding, or
cooperative agreement with, or make a grant to, or provide a loan or loan guarantee to
Rosoboronexport or any subsidiary of Rosoboronexport.
(b) The Secretary of Defense may waive the limitation in subsection (a) if the Secretary,
in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence,
determines that it is in the vital national security interest of the United States to do so, and
certifies in writing to the congressional defense committees that, to the best of the
Secretary's knowledge:
(1) Rosoboronexport has ceased the transfer of lethal military equipment to, and the
maintenance of existing lethal military equipment for, the Government of the Syrian Arab
Republic;
Congressional Research Service
33
A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense
(2) The armed forces of the Russian Federation have withdrawn from Crimea, other than
armed forces present on military bases subject to agreements in force between the
Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Ukraine; and
(3) Agents of the Russian Federation have ceased taking active measures to destabilize
the control of the Government of Ukraine over eastern Ukraine.
(c) The Inspector General of the Department of Defense shall conduct a review of any
action involving Rosoboronexport with respect to a waiver issued by the Secretary of
Defense pursuant to subsection (b), and not later than 90 days after the date on which
such a waiver is issued by the Secretary of Defense, the Inspector General shall submit to
the congressional defense committees a report containing the results of the review
conducted with respect to such waiver.
Author Contact Information
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610
Congressional Research Service
34