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Summary

In *Carcieri v. Salazar*, 555 U.S. 379 (2009), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a 1934 statute provides no authority for the Secretary of the Interior (SOI) to take land into trust for the Narragansett Indian Tribe (Tribe) because the statute applies only to tribes under federal jurisdiction when that law was enacted. The reach of the decision may be broad because it relies on the major statute under which the SOI acquires land in trust for the benefit of Indians. The decision appears to call into question the ability of the SOI to take land into trust for any recently recognized tribe unless the trust acquisition has been authorized by legislation other than the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) or the tribe can show that it was “under Federal jurisdiction” in 1934. A June 2012 Supreme Court decision, *Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak*, increases the possible effect that the *Carcieri* decision is likely to have in Indian country. In that case, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of a plaintiff seeking to bring a suit to undo a trust acquisition by showing that the tribe for whom the land was taken into trust was not under federal jurisdiction in 1934. The decision has prompted the Bureau of Indian Affairs to revise the land acquisition regulations to specify that, once there is final agency action, land is to be taken into trust immediately without a 30-day waiting period.

*Carcieri* involves a parcel of land which the SOI had agreed to take into trust for the benefit of the Narragansett Tribe, thereby presumably subjecting it to federal and tribal jurisdiction and possibly opening the way for gaming under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. The land is outside the Tribe’s current reservation, which is subject to the civil and criminal laws of Rhode Island according to the terms of the Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1974 (RIICSA). RIICSA does not explicitly address the possibility that lands other than the “settlement lands” could be placed in trust; nor does it specify what jurisdictional arrangement should apply should that occur. The issues before the Supreme Court were (1) whether the authority under which the SOI has agreed to acquire the land, 25 U.S.C. §465, a provision of the IRA of 1934, covers trust acquisitions by a tribe that was neither federally recognized nor under federal jurisdiction in 1934, and (2) whether the trust acquisition violated the terms of RIICSA. The Supreme Court’s decision is predicated on the Court’s finding that the definitions of “Indians” and “Indian tribe” in the 1934 legislation unambiguously restrict the beneficiaries for whom the SOI may take land into trust to tribes that, in 1934, were “under Federal jurisdiction.” The Court also held that the Narragansett Indian Tribe was not “under Federal jurisdiction” in 1934. It, therefore, ruled that the trust was not authorized by the statute and reversed the lower court.

Two developments in recent cases suggest the possibility that the SOI may be able to continue to take land into trust for tribes not officially recognized in 1934. The DOI has developed standards for determining that tribes not officially recognized until after 1934 may be found to be “under Federal jurisdiction” in 1934. It was explicated in a Solicitor of the Interior Memorandum on “The Meaning of ‘Under Federal Jurisdiction’ for Purposes of the Indian Reorganization Act,” issued on March 12, 2014. Two federal district courts have upheld the application of these standards in recent cases. One case, *The Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Community of Oregon v. Jewell*, involved land acquisition for a tribe that was not officially acknowledged as an Indian tribe until 2002. Moreover, the three-judge panel decision in *Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California*, 741 F. 3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2014), which raises questions on the validity of past trust acquisitions, is being reconsidered by an *en banc* panel of the Ninth Circuit.

In the 114th Congress, S. 1879, the Interior Improvement Act, introduced by Senator John Barrasso, chairman of the Senate Indian Affairs Committee, joins three other bills, S. 732/H.R. 732, and H.R. 249, which have been introduced to amend the Indian Reorganization Act to permit trust land acquisitions for all federally recognized Indian tribes.
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From Carcieri to Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak

On February 24, 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Carcieri v. Salazar (No. 07-526), 1 ruled that the Secretary of the Interior (SOI) did not have authority to take land into trust for the Narragansett Indian Tribe (Tribe) under 25 U.S.C. §465, a provision of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA). 2 Although the facts of the case involve only a small parcel of land in Rhode Island, the reach of the decision may be much broader because it rests on the major statute under which the SOI acquires land in trust for the benefit of Indians and Indian tribes and restricts its coverage with respect to Indian tribes receiving federal recognition after 1934.

The extent to which the holding in Carcieri with respect to the SOI’s authority to take land into trust for newly recognized tribes may foster other litigation is not yet known. 3 A June 2012 Supreme Court decision, Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 4 and a January 21, 2014, appellate court decision, Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California, 5 are likely to encourage more suits seeking to set aside SOI decisions to take land into trust for Indian tribes. Both cases involve challenges to a secretarial acquisition of land on the theory that because the tribe was not federally recognized in 1934, the trust land acquisition was without authority. The Supreme Court case involved a case brought under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act within the six-year period covered by the applicable statute of limitations. The appellate ruling involved a claim that a tribe could not require a state to negotiate for gaming under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act on a tract of land taken into trust in 1994 for a tribe not federally recognized in 1934, or possibly even existing in 1934.

The Supreme Court ruled that the suit directly challenging the DOI and its decision to acquire the land in trust could go forward, refuting a long-held assumption that U.S. sovereign immunity under the Quiet Title Act 6 barred challenges to any decision of the Secretary to take land into trust.

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1 555 U.S. 379 (2009).

2 Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). According to Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law 86 (2005 ed.), the IRA was “the crowning achievement” and “key to the New Deal’s attempt to encourage economic development, self-determination, cultural pluralism, and the revival of tribalism,” which was “designed to improve the economic status of Indians by ending the alienation of tribal land and facilitating tribes’ acquisition of additional acreage and repurchase of former tribal domains.”


5 741 F. 3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2014).

6 The Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C §2409a, authorizes the federal courts “to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the United States claims an interest,” but not with respect to “trust or restricted Indian lands.” In State of South Dakota v. U.S. Department of the Interior, 69 F. 3d 878 (8th Cir. 1995), a federal circuit court made such an assumption, prompting the Department of the Interior (DOI) to issue a regulation requiring a 30-day waiting period between the date of the final determination to take land into trust and the actual trust acquisition. 61 Fed. Reg. 18082 (April 24, 1996). In revising the Land Acquisition regulation, 25 C.F.R. Part 151 on November 13, 2013, the DOI’s Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) deleted the 30-day waiting period. 78 Fed. Reg. 67928. https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2013/11/13/2013-26844/land-acquisitions-appeals-of-land-acquisition-decisions.
once title has passed to the United States. Under the decision, plaintiffs who can meet the standing requirements under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act\(^7\) may bring a suit within six years of final agency action, provided they are not seeking to quiet title (i.e., claim title for themselves).\(^8\)

**Response to Patchak: Revised Regulations Issued on November 13, 2013**

In response to the decision, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) of the Department of the Interior (DOI) has revised its Land Acquisition regulations, 25 C.F.R., Part 151.\(^9\) The regulations now specify how parties seeking judicial review of land-into-trust decisions may discern when final agency action occurs for the two kinds of decisions possible for land-into-trust applications. Decisions by the SOI or the Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Indian Affairs (AS-IA) are final agency actions. When the SOI or the AS-IA issues a decision to take land into trust, the DOI must publish a notice of the decision “promptly” in the Federal Register and take the land into trust “[i]nmediately.”\(^10\) In contrast, land-into-trust decisions by Bureau of Indian Affairs officials (BIA-level decisions) are not final agency action and do not require Federal Register notice. They require notice in “a newspaper of general circulation serving the affected area of the decision” as well as notice to state and local officials with “regulatory jurisdiction over the land to be acquired” and to “interested parties who have made themselves known, in writing, to the official prior to the decision.”\(^11\) Land may not be taken into trust pursuant to BIA-level decisions “until administrative remedies are exhausted ... or ... the time for filing a notice of appeal has expired and no administrative appeal has been filed.”\(^12\) Once a BIA-level decision has become final, the land is to be acquired in trust “[i]nmediately.”\(^13\)

**Carcieri Background**

The Narragansett Indian Tribe’s history in Rhode Island predates colonial settlement and includes a continuing relationship with the state of Rhode Island. The Tribe’s formal relationship with the federal government, however, was found by the Court to have been established in 1983, after

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\(^7\) 5 U.S.C. §702.


\(^13\) The regulations specify that the SOI shall “[i]nmediately acquire the land in trust under § 151.14 upon expiration of the time for filing a notice of appeal or upon exhaustion of administrative remedies ... and upon the fulfillment of the requirements of § 151.13 [pertaining to title examination] and any other Departmental requirements.” 25 C.F.R. §151.12(d)(2)(iv), 78 Fed. Reg. 67928, at 67938. https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2013/11/13/2013-26844/land-acquisitions-appeals-of-land-acquisition-decisions.
enactment of the Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1978 (RIICSA).\textsuperscript{14} Federal recognition of the Tribe occurred with the approval\textsuperscript{15} of the Tribe’s petition for inclusion on the (DOI) “List of Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible To Receive Services From the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs”\textsuperscript{16} under the DOI “Procedures for Establishing that an American Indian Group Exists as an Indian Tribe.”\textsuperscript{17} Thereafter, the Tribe succeeded in having the SOI place in trust the tribal lands that RIICSA designated as “settlement lands,” subject to the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the state of Rhode Island (State)\textsuperscript{18} rather than under the laws which apply under the “Indian country” jurisdiction of the United States.\textsuperscript{19}

The dispute with the State began in 1991 when the Tribe’s housing authority purchased 31 acres adjacent to the “settlement lands” and asserted that the land was free of state jurisdiction. After losing on that claim,\textsuperscript{20} the Tribe applied to the SOI to have the land taken into trust and received a favorable determination, which has been upheld by the Interior Board of Indian Appeals\textsuperscript{21} and by both the federal trial\textsuperscript{22} and appellate\textsuperscript{23} courts. A sharply divided U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, sitting en banc, ruled in favor of the trust acquisition, with the majority relying predominantly on statutory construction of RIICSA.\textsuperscript{24} Dissents, however, criticized this method of resolving the case as mechanical and emphasized the fact that permitting the trust acquisition and the consequent elimination of Rhode Island jurisdiction over the land would directly conflict with the overriding purpose of RIICSA and the State’s bargained-for-objective in agreeing to the settlement—ending all Indian claims to sovereign authority in Rhode Island.

The case represents the latest in a series of cases\textsuperscript{25} in which the state of Rhode Island and the Narragansett Indian Tribe have contested jurisdiction over tribal lands. The Tribe’s current reservation consists of lands designated as “settlement lands” under RIICSA. Under the terms of RIICSA, these “settlement lands” are subject to Rhode Island civil and criminal jurisdiction and, therefore, not available for gaming under Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.\textsuperscript{26} The Supreme Court

\textsuperscript{16} See 73 Fed. Reg. 18553 (April 4, 2008) for the most recently promulgated list.
\textsuperscript{17} 25 C.F.R., Part 83.
\textsuperscript{18} 25 U.S.C. §§1702(f) and 1708.
\textsuperscript{20} Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 89 F. 3d 908 (1st Cir. 1996).
\textsuperscript{21} Town of Charlestown, Rhode Island v. Eastern Area Director, Bureau of Indian Affairs, 35 IBIA 93 (2000).
\textsuperscript{23} Carcieri v. Kempthorne, 497 F. 3d 15 (1st Cir. (en banc) 2007).
\textsuperscript{24} Id.
\textsuperscript{25} State of Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F. 3d 685 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 919 (holding that because RIICSA left the Tribe with some governmental authority over tribal lands designated as “settlement lands” and subsequently taken into trust, gaming under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) was available to the Tribe even though RIICSA subjected the Tribe’s “settlement lands” to Rhode Island civil and criminal jurisdiction); and Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Rhode Island, 449 F. 3d 16 (1st Cir. 2006) (upholding Rhode Island’s execution of a search warrant on settlement land to enforce state cigarette tax laws).
agreed to review the ruling of the appellate court\(^{27}\) on the basis of two issues: (1) whether the IRA provision covers trust acquisitions by a tribe not recognized by DOI in 1934 or under federal jurisdiction at that time, and (2) whether the trust acquisition violated the terms of RIICSA.

The case involves the interaction of two federal statutes: (1) RIICSA, which settled land claims of the Tribe, and (2) 25 U.S.C. §465, a provision of the IRA of 1934. RIICSA embodies the terms of the Joint Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Settlement of the Rhode Island Indian Land Claims (JMOU)\(^{28}\) executed on February 28, 1978, by the Tribe, the state of Rhode Island, and private landowners; it ratifies the settlement ending a lawsuit brought by the Tribe claiming land in Charlestown, RI.\(^{29}\) The Tribe had asserted that land transfers covering hundreds of pieces of property and dating to 1880 violated the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. §177, which requires federal approval for any land conveyance by an Indian tribe. RIICSA required tribal relinquishment of land claims; federal ratification of earlier land transactions; establishment by the state of an Indian-owned, non-business corporation, the “Narragansett Tribe of Indians”; a settlement fund with which private lands were to be purchased and transferred to the corporation; the transfer of 900 acres of state land to the corporation for the Tribe; designation of the transferred lands as “settlement lands”; and a jurisdictional provision providing for state jurisdiction on the “settlement lands.”\(^{30}\) The Settlement Act was the necessary federal ratification of the JMOU. Under the federal legislation,\(^{31}\) Rhode Island was to set up a corporation to hold the land initially, for the Tribe’s benefit, with the possibility that subsequently the Tribe would gain recognition as an Indian tribe through the DOI federal acknowledgment process.\(^{32}\) The Settlement Act contained language extinguishing all Indian claims to land in Rhode Island once the State had enacted legislation creating the Indian corporation and conveying to that corporation settlement lands.\(^{33}\) RIICSA did not provide federal recognition for the Tribe, that is, establish it as an Indian Tribe entitled to federal services for Indians. It did, however, envision the possibility that tribal status would be acknowledged administratively by the SOI.\(^{34}\) Nonetheless, it contains no explicit provision as to the ability of the Tribe, following recognition by the SOI, to acquire further trust land in Rhode Island. Essentially, it makes no express reference to Section 465 or to the Secretary’s authority to take land into trust. After the Tribe received federal recognition in 1983,\(^{35}\) it successfully sought to have the settlement lands transferred from the corporation to the Tribe,\(^{36}\) and taken into trust pursuant to 25 U.S.C. §465\(^{37}\) and proclaimed an Indian reservation under 25 U.S.C. §467.\(^{38}\)

\(^{27}\) 76 U.S.L.W. 3454 (U.S. February 25, 2008) (No. 07-526).


\(^{32}\) 25 C.F.R., Part 83, “Procedures for Establishing that an American Indian Group Exists as an Indian Tribe.”


\(^{34}\) Section 1708(c) of Title 25, U.S.C., reads, in pertinent part: “… if the Secretary subsequently acknowledges the existence of the Narragansett Tribe of Indians, then the settlement lands may not be sold, granted, or otherwise conveyed or leased to anyone other than the Indian Corporation, and no such disposition of the settlement lands shall be of any validity in law or equity, unless the same is approved by the Secretary...” See also Joint Memorandum of Understanding (JMOU), §16, H. Rept. 95-1453, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 27 (1978); 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1948, 1964.

\(^{35}\) 48 Fed Reg. 6177.


\(^{37}\) Once the trust acquisition has been completed and title to the land passes to the United States in trust for the benefit of an Indian tribe, in the absence of contrary federal law, the land becomes Indian country, subject to the Indian country (continued...)
The central issue in the litigation is the IRA definitions of “Indians” and “tribe.” Under Section 465, the SOI is authorized to take land into trust “for the purpose of providing land for Indians.” “Indians” is defined in another IRA section to “include all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction, and all persons who are descendants of such members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within the present boundaries of any Indian reservation, and ... all other persons of one-half or more Indian blood.” That same provision, 25 U.S.C. §479, states that “tribe” is to “be construed to refer to any Indian tribe, organized band, pueblo, or the Indians residing on one reservation.”

The district court upheld the SOI’s decision to take the 31-acre tract into trust. The court ruled that the SOI had authority under the IRA to take the land into trust for the Tribe. It read the reference in the IRA to “members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction” as covering the Narragansett Indian Tribe by finding the Tribe to have been under federal jurisdiction in 1934 even though it was not formally recognized until 1983. The court reasoned that because the Tribe’s existence from 1614 was not in doubt, whether or not it was recognized, it was a tribe and, thus, under federal supervision.

Appellate Court Rulings

There are three decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, two of which have been withdrawn but are worth attention for their reasoning. A three-judge panel, in an opinion subsequently withdrawn, ruled in favor of the trust acquisition. The panel found that Section 465 provided the SOI with authority to take land into trust for the Tribe in spite of the fact that the Tribe had not been federally recognized in 1934. It rejected Rhode Island’s arguments that, for Section 465 to apply, a tribe must have been both recognized and subject to federal jurisdiction in...
1934. The opinion focused on the interaction between Section 465, which authorizes the SOI to take land into trust “for Indians,” and Section 479, which defines “Indians” as “all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction.” The court chose to defer to DOI’s “longstanding interpretation of the term ‘now’” as meaning “today” rather than “1934.” It viewed this interpretation as in accord with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the statute in United States v. John and buttressed by the Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act and a 1994 amendment to the IRA.

On rehearing, the panel reiterated its earlier rationale on the IRA issue and squarely addressed the jurisdictional issue. A majority of the panel, relying on a principle of statutory construction sometimes used to interpret Indian affairs legislation, rejected Rhode Island’s arguments that, taken together, certain provisions of the Settlement Act precluded any tribe from exercising sovereignty over land in Rhode Island except to the extent specified in RIICSA. The majority of the panel read RIICSA as crystal clear in settling claims related to prior land transactions but ambiguous in failing to mention future land transfers. The majority, relying on the canon of construction, resolved this ambiguity in favor of the Narragansetts: “Once the tribe received federal recognition in 1983 ... it gained the same benefits as other Indian tribes, including the right to apply to have land taken into trust pursuant to § 465.”

In a dissent, however, Circuit Judge Howard took the view that the intent of the parties to the Settlement Act was that Rhode Island laws should apply throughout Rhode Island and that the language in the JMOU and in RIICSA could fairly be interpreted to that end.

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45 Emphasis added.
46 Id., at 30.
47 437 U.S. 634 (1978). In this case the Court ruled that the IRA applied to the Mississippi Choctaws, whose tribal existence had been extinguished in 1831 by treaty, because they met the other prong of the IRA test—having one-half Indian blood. In reaching this decision, however, the Court inserted in brackets [in 1934] as a substitution for “now” when it quoted from the definition of Indians in the IRA. Id., at 650. Rhode Island has characterized this as “the applicable statutory test necessary for a tribe, such as the Narragansetts, to be included in the IRA absent a later act of Congress.” Carcieri v. Kempthorne (07-526), Petition for Writ of Certiorari 15.
48 P.L. 103-454, 108 Stat. 4791 (1994), requiring SOI to maintain a list of federally recognized tribes “eligible for the special programs and services provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as Indians.” 25 U.S.C. §479a-1(a).
49 P.L. 103-263, 107 Stat. 707, 25 U.S.C. §476(f). This statute forbids federal departments or agencies from issuing any regulation which “classifies, enhances, or diminishes the privileges and immunities available to the Indian tribe relative to other federally recognized tribes by virtue of their status as Indian tribes.”
51 This principle requires that “statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit.” Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 93-94 (2001); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912).
52 423 F. 3d. 45, at 62.
53 According to the dissent, it is not surprising that the Settlement Act does not refer explicitly to the preservation of State jurisdiction outside of the Settlement Lands. As sovereign, Rhode Island already had jurisdiction outside of the Settlement Lands, and the Settlement Act extinguished any potential competing ‘Indian’ claims to that land. The only land about which there might have been doubt was the Settlement Lands, and as to that land, State jurisdiction was expressly preserved.

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In the circumstances of this case, holding that Rhode Island is divested of our jurisdiction by the Secretary taking into trust the adjacent parcel that was part of the original disputed lands upsets the
On rehearing, en banc, a divided First Circuit ruled on both the IRA and jurisdictional issues. It found that the definition of Indian in 25 U.S.C. §479, with its use of the phrase “now under Federal jurisdiction,” is “sufficiently ambiguous” to implicate what is known as the Chevron test. This involves a two-part examination of statutory language: (1) If Congress has directly spoken on the precise question at issue and its intent is clear and unambiguous, courts must defer to that interpretation of the law; (2) If the meaning or intent of a statute is silent or ambiguous, courts must give deference to the agency’s interpretation of the law if it is based on a permissible and reasonable construction. The court found, by examining text and context, that the IRA is ambiguous on the question of whether trust acquisitions are available for tribes not recognized in 1934. It, therefore, moved to the second prong of the Chevron test and found the Secretary’s interpretation to be reasonable and consistent with the statute.

On the jurisdictional issue, the en banc majority ruled against the State’s basic arguments principally by characterizing them as requiring a finding that RIICSA implicitly repealed the Secretary’s authority to take land into trust for the Tribe. It cited Supreme Court authority requiring a high standard for repeals by implication. It found “nothing in the text of the Settlement Act that clearly indicates an intent to repeal the Secretary’s trust acquisition powers under IRA, or that is fundamentally inconsistent with those powers.” The opinion also identified support for its position in the existence of other statutes settling Indian land claims which did have provisions clearly limiting SOI trust acquisition authority. From this it reasoned, Congress knew how to preclude future trust acquisitions and clearly did not choose to use this approach in RIICSA.

The court turned down as not within its power the State’s request that, if the court were to uphold the trust acquisition, it should require the SOI to limit the Tribe’s jurisdiction to that specified for the settlement lands, that is, with Rhode Island retaining civil and criminal jurisdiction. The court acknowledged that such a directive would preserve what the State, in good faith, believed to have been the essential component of its bargain in agreeing to the JMOU and to RIICSA, that is, maintaining State sovereignty. It suggested, however that the power to limit jurisdiction over the newly acquired land was the prerogative of Congress, not the courts or the SOI.

(...) continued)

fairly expressed expectations of the parties. It also produces an unwarranted anomalous relationship between the Settlement Lands and the after acquired parcel. 423 F. 3d 45, 72-73 (Howard, J., dissenting).

54 The test was articulated by the Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
55 Id., at 843.
56 497 F. 3d 15, 26 (“there is ambiguity as to whether to view the term ‘now’ as operating at the moment Congress enacted it or at the moment the Secretary invokes it.”). The court also raised the question of whether the word “now” was meant to restrict the applicability of IRA temporally to individual Indians who were under federal supervision in 1934, rather than tribes.
57 In this context, the court rejected Rhode Island’s arguments that the SOI had changed position on the issue over the years, noting that no application for trust acquisition had been rejected because the applicant tribe had not been recognized in 1934. 497 F. 3d 15, 31.
59 497 F. 3d. 15, 37.
60 The Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act (MICSA), for example, provides that “[e]xcept for the provisions of the [MICSA], the United States shall have no other authority to acquire lands or natural resources in trust for the benefit of Indians ... in ... Maine.” 25 U.S.C. §1724(e).
The two dissenting opinions raised arguments based on RIICSA. Circuit Judge Howard would have found that (1) the parties to the JMOU and Congress, in enacting RIICSA, intended to resolve all Indian claims in Rhode Island past, present, and future; (2) RIICSA contains broad language which may be fairly interpreted as impliedly and partially repealing SOI authority under the IRA to take land into trust for the Tribe; (3) the fact that other settlement acts included provisions limiting jurisdiction, should there be subsequent approvals of trust acquisitions, is irrelevant because RIICSA clearly contemplated that there would be no trust acquisition other than that of the settlement lands; and (4) to read RIICSA as if it did not preclude subsequent jurisdictional adjustments outside of the settlement lands would be “antithetical to Congress’ intent” and “absurd.”

Senior Circuit Judge Selya’s dissent characterizes the majority’s construction of the RIICSA as “wooden” and “too narrow,” and the result, “absurd.” Judge Selya argued that RIICSA must not be divorced from its historical context.

Supreme Court Decision

The Court found that the SOI had no authority under the IRA to take land into trust for the Tribe; it, therefore, did not address the RIICSA issue. Six Justices concurred in the opinion of the Court, one of which identified certain qualifications; two other Justices concurred in part and dissented in part. The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Thomas, found that the 1934 legislation unambiguously restricted beneficiaries for whom the SOI may take land into trust under this statute to “Indians” and “Indian tribe[s]” as defined in the statute. Because the IRA defines “Indian” in terms of persons “now under Federal jurisdiction” and includes the word “Indian” in its definition of “tribe,” the Court reasoned that the meaning of “now” was critical to interpreting the reach of the SOI’s authority to take land into trust. Rhode Island had argued that “now” meant “at the time of enactment of the IRA.” The SOI had urged the Court to find the meaning of “now” ambiguous and, therefore, under the Chevron doctrine, amenable to a reasonable explication of its meaning by DOI as the agency charged with interpreting it.

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61 497 F. 3d. 15, 49-50 (Howard, Circuit J., dissenting).
62 497 F. 3d 15, 51-5 (Selya, J., dissenting).
63 “The Settlement Act, when taken together with the extinguishment of all Indian claims referable to lands in Rhode Island, the Tribe’s surrender of its right to an autonomous enclave, and the waiver of much of its sovereign immunity ..., suggests with unmistakable clarity that the parties intended to fashion a broad arrangement that preserved the State’s civil, criminal, and regulatory jurisdiction over any and all lands within its borders.” Id., at 51.
64 The opinion of the Court was written by Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Alito and Breyer. Justice Breyer filed a separate concurring opinion identifying three ways in which he would qualify the opinion of the Court. Justice Souter wrote a separate opinion, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concurring in part and dissenting in part; and Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion.
65 Justice Breyer’s separate concurring opinion identified ways in which he would depart from the opinion of the Court: (1) he would not rely completely on the statutory language, which he finds to be ambiguous with a legislative history indicating that Congress did not intend for DOI to interpret it; (2) he would find that “now” means “1934” not only for the reasons given by the Court but also based on legislative history; and (3) he asserts that interpreting “now” as “1934” leaves room for finding that some tribes may have been under federal jurisdiction without have been formally identified as such and other tribes may consist of members who satisfy the definition of “Indian.” 555 U.S. 396-400 (Breyer, J., concurring).
66 Justice Souter, who would join with Justice Breyer, and, thus, with the opinion of the Court, dissents on one point. He would evaluate “jurisdiction” and “recognition” separately and, thus, would remand the case to provide “the Secretary and the Narragansett Tribe an opportunity to advocate a construction of the ‘jurisdiction’ phrase that might favor their position here.” Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S., at 400-401. (Souter, J, concurring in part, dissenting in part).
The decision focuses on Section 5 of the IRA, 25 U.S.C. §465, the statute under which the trust acquisition was approved by the SOI, and the definitions provided for “Indian” and “Indian tribe” in Section 19 of the IRA, 25 U.S.C. §479. Section 5 authorizes the SOI “to acquire, through purchase, relinquishment, gift, exchange, or assignment, any interest in lands, water rights, or surface rights to lands, within or without existing reservations, including trust or otherwise restricted allotments, whether the allottee be living or deceased, for the purpose of providing land for Indians.”67 Section 5 further provides that “[t]itle to any lands or rights acquired ... shall be taken in the name of the United States in trust for the Indian tribe or individual Indian for which the land is acquired and such lands or rights shall be exempt from State and local taxation.”68

Section 19 supplies definitions of “Indian” and “tribe” for various sections of the IRA, including Section 5. It reads, in pertinent part:

[t]he term “Indian” as used in sections ... 465 ... and 479 of this title shall include all persons of Indian descent now under Federal jurisdiction who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction, and all persons who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within the present boundaries of any Indian reservation, and shall further include all other persons of one-half or more Indian blood. For the purposes of said sections, Eskimos and other aboriginal peoples of Alaska shall be considered Indians. The term “tribe” wherever used in said sections shall be construed to refer to any Indian tribe, organized band, pueblo, or the Indians residing on one reservation.69

The Court’s opinion rests squarely on statutory construction. It looked first to see if the statutory language was “plain and unambiguous” on the question of “whether the Narragansetts are members of a recognized Indian Tribe now under Federal jurisdiction.”70 This led the Court to examine whether “now under Federal jurisdiction” means the date of the trust acquisition or 1934. By examining the language71 and context72 of the terms “Indian” and “tribe” and construing them in harmony with one another,73 the Court ruled that trust acquisitions may be undertaken only for tribes that, in 1934, were “under Federal jurisdiction.” Because it relied on the plain meaning of the statute, the Court did not address in any detail the legislative history. According to

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68 Id.
70 555 U.S., at 388.
71 The Court’s examination of the language of the statute led it to examining the 1934 dictionary meanings of “now” and Supreme Court cases interpreting the word in other contexts. It found, for example, that 1934 edition of Webster’s New International Dictionary included as its first meaning of “now,” “[a]t the present time; at this moment; at the time of speaking.” The Court also quoted the 1933 edition of Black’s Law Dictionary as stating that “now” in statutes “ordinarily refers to the date of its taking effect.” 555 U.S., at 388 (citations omitted; emphasis in original). Two Supreme Court cases were cited: Franklin v. United States, 216 U.S. 559 (1910) (criminal statute referring to punishment “now” provided under state law) and Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308 (1961) (granting citizenship to foreign-born children of persons who are “now” citizens of the United States). 555 U.S., at 388-389.
72 For example, the Court noted that elsewhere in the IRA, “Congress expressly drew into the statute contemporaneous and future events by using the phrase ‘now or hereafter.’” Id., at 9, citing 25 U.S.C §§468 and 472. For the Court, this was “further textual support for the conclusion that the term refers solely to events contemporaneous with the Act’s enactment.” 555 U.S., at 389. citing Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 452 (2002).
73 The SOI had argued that the definition of “tribe” in 25 U.S.C. §479 had left a gap for DOI to fill because it used the term “shall include.” The Court disagreed, finding that only the three categories of “Indians,” defined elsewhere in 25 U.S.C. §479, could be considered as satisfying the requirements for meeting the definition of “tribe.” 555 U.S., at 391-392. The Court buttressed this interpretation by citing instances, following the enactment of the IRA, of specific legislation making IRA applicable “to particular Indian tribes not necessarily encompassed within the definitions of ‘Indian’ set forth in § 479.” Statutes cited included 25 U.S.C. §§473a (Alaska); 1041e(a) (Shawnee Tribe); 1300b-14(a) (Texas Band of Kickapoo Indians); and 1300g-2(a) (Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo). 555 U.S., at 392, n. 6.
the Court, “although § 465 authorizes the United States to take land in trust for an Indian tribe, § 465 limits the Secretary’s exercise of that authority ‘for the purpose of providing land for Indians.’ There simply is no legitimate way to circumvent the definition of ‘Indian’ in delineating the Secretary’s authority under §§ 465 and 479.”

The Court also rebutted an argument that 25 U.S.C. §2202 authorizes trust acquisitions for the Narragansett Tribe and, by extension, other tribes not “under Federal jurisdiction” in 1934. Section 2202 provides that “The provisions of section 465 of this title shall apply to all tribes notwithstanding the provisions of section 478 of this title: Provided, That nothing in this section is intended to supersede any other provision of Federal law which authorizes, prohibits, or restricts the acquisition of land for Indians with respect to any specific tribe, reservation, or state(s).”

According to the Court’s analysis of the language of §2202, this statute does not alter the terms of §465; it merely “ensures that tribes may benefit from § 465 even if they opted out of the IRA pursuant to § 478, which allowed tribal members to reject the application of the IRA to their tribe.”

Rather than remand the case for further exploration on the issue of whether the Narragansetts were “under Federal jurisdiction” at the time of enactment of the IRA, the Court resolved that question itself. In doing so, it cited undisputed evidence, contemporaneous with enactment of the IRA, that was included in the record of the case. For example, there was a letter, written in 1937, by John Collier, who was then Commissioner of Indian Affairs and a driving force behind the IRA, stating forthrightly that the federal government had no jurisdiction over the Narragansett Indian Tribe of Rhode Island. The Court, therefore, found that the Narragansett Indian Tribe was not “under Federal jurisdiction” in 1934 and ruled that the trust acquisition was contrary to the statute and reversed the lower court.

Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, also relying on the plain meaning of the 1934 legislation. Unlike the majority, he did not incorporate the IRA’s definition of “Indian” in his interpretation of “tribe.” He would read the two separately and would find that the SOI had authority delegated under the IRA to confine the meaning of “tribe” to those “recognized” by DOI. To support his conclusion, he draws upon the structure of the IRA in providing separate benefits for tribes and individual Indians and the long-time administrative practice of the SOI in taking land into trust under Section 465 only for federally recognized tribes, whether recognized before or after 1934. He also criticizes the majority for ignoring one of the canons of statutory

74 555 U.S., at 410-411.
75 This argument had been advanced in an amicus brief submitted by the National Congress of American Indians.
76 555 U.S., at 394.
77 555 U.S., at 390, n. 5, citing United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 221, n. 21 (1983). There was also correspondence between 1927 and 1937 showing requests from tribal members for BIA assistance that had been denied on the grounds that the tribal members were under state jurisdiction. 555 U.S., at 384.
78 “The Act’s language could not be clearer: To effectuate the Act’s broad mandate to revitalize tribal development and cultural self-determination, the Secretary can take land into trust for a tribe or he can take land into trust for an individual Indian.” 555 U.S., at 401 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79 Justice Stevens points out that the IRA had need of separate definitions. Unlike Section 465, which applies both to tribes and individual Indians, other sections—471, 472, 476, and 470—apply only to individual Indians. 555 U.S. 405-406.
80 The opinion cites a 1937 DOI Solicitor memorandum advising the SOI that to take land into trust for the Mole Lake Chippewa Indians, the SOI should either provide tribal recognition to the group or take the land into trust for the Indians of one-half or more Indian blood. It also cites subsequent administrative decisions providing federal recognition (continued...)
construction often employed when courts are interpreting statutes enacted for the benefit of Indians.81

Potential Impact

In General

Although the Court found that the Narragansetts were not “under Federal jurisdiction” in 1934, it did not rely on the 1983 date of official SOI recognition. It examined the Tribe’s situation at the time of enactment of the IRA, looking for indicia that it was “under Federal jurisdiction” even if not officially included in DOI lists of Indian tribes. The decision appears to call into question the ability of the SOI to take land into trust for any tribe added to DOI’s list of federally recognized tribes since 1934 unless the trust acquisition has been authorized under legislation other than the 1934 Act. The Court’s decision means that the SOI may not take land into trust under the IRA for any tribe that cannot clearly show that it was among those tribes under federal jurisdiction in 1934 or that is unable to cite another statute as providing authority for trust acquisitions.82

DOI Solicitor’s Memorandum Indicates How a Tribe May Demonstrate That It Was “Under Federal Jurisdiction” in 1934

The DOI released a memorandum, on March 12, 2014, in which the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior interprets “The Meaning of ‘Under Federal Jurisdiction’ for the Purposes of the Indian Reorganization Act” (Memorandum).83 In it, the Solicitor concludes that the Supreme Court’s Carcieri decision leaves room for a tribe officially recognized post-1934 to establish that it was “under Federal jurisdiction” in 1934 and, thus, eligible for having land taken into trust under the IRA. This conclusion was drawn from an analysis of Carcieri. According to the Solicitor, not only were the components of jurisdiction not addressed by the Court’s majority

(...continued)
to tribes which had previously been denied recognition and subsequently taking land into trust for them. According to Justice Stevens, these decisions demonstrate that “[f]ederal recognition, regardless of when it is conferred, is the necessary condition that triggers a tribe’s eligibility to receive trust land.” 555 U.S., at 407. Justice Stevens stated: “[t]he consequences of the majority’s reading are both curious and harsh: curious because it turns ‘now’ into the most important word in the IRA, limiting not only some individuals’ eligibility for federal benefits but also a tribe’s; harsh because it would result in the unsupported conclusion that, despite its 1983 recognition, the Narragansett Tribe is not an Indian tribe under the IRA.” 555 U.S., at 409.


82 For example, the Graton Rancheria Restoration Act, 25 U.S.C. §§1300n- 1300n-6, enacted in 2000, restores the Indians of the Graton Rancheria of California to federal recognition. One of its provisions, 25 U.S.C §1300n-3, mandates that the SOI “shall accept into trust for the benefit of the Tribe any real property located in Marin or Sonoma County California, for the benefit of the Tribe after the property is conveyed or otherwise transferred to the Secretary and if, at the time of such conveyance or transfer, there are no adverse legal claims to such property, including liens, mortgages, or taxes.” 25 U.S.C. §1300n-3(a).

opinion in Carcieri, but the possibility that some tribes would be able to present evidence of pre-1934 dealings with the federal government sufficient to establish that they were actually under federal jurisdiction in 1934 appears to have been recognized by three justices (two dissenters and Justice Breyer in his concurring opinion).

Before it focuses on the kinds of evidence that might be probative of a tribe’s being “under Federal jurisdiction,” the Memorandum examines the phrase “now under Federal jurisdiction” to determine how to construe it, looking to dictionary meanings, legislative history, and offering several disparate possible constructions. Then, it concludes that the phrase is ambiguous and fails to establish clearly a standard to determine which tribes qualify as being “under Federal jurisdiction” in 1934. This leads the Solicitor to assume that the question must be analyzed under the two-pronged test applicable to agency interpretations of statutes used by the Supreme Court in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council. Under that analysis, courts are to determine whether a statute speaks directly to an issue; and, if not (i.e., if the statutory language is ambiguous), they are to defer to a reasonable construction of the statute by the agency charged by Congress with interpreting it. The implication is that the Solicitor is endeavoring to provide such an interpretation—a reasonable construction of an ambiguous statute.

According to the memorandum, the DOI’s examination—of the question of how to interpret “under Federal jurisdiction”—necessarily requires an exploration of the backdrop against which Congress enacted the IRA, which involves not only the contemporaneous legislative purposes, debates, and hearings, but also the role of the various periodic shifts in federal Indian policy. After reviewing the history of the IRA and the evolution of federal Indian policy, the memorandum contemplates the impact of the vast range of powers over Indian affairs conferred on and traditionally exercised by Congress and the executive branch under the U.S. Constitution. Finally, before drawing inferences as to what types of evidence might show a tribe to have been “under Federal jurisdiction” in 1934, the Solicitor points out the unique statutory construction tools that the courts have employed when construing federal Indian statutes. Under these “canons of construction” traditionally employed by the courts, Indian treaties and statutes are to be liberally interpreted with ambiguities resolved in favor of Indians.

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84 Justices Souter and Ginsburg would have reversed and remanded Carcieri to give the DOI the opportunity to determine whether the Narragansett Tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934.

85 Justice Breyer raised this point in a concurring opinion. He stated that “a tribe may have been ‘under Federal jurisdiction’ in 1934 even though the Federal Government did not believe so at the time.” Carcieri v. Salazar (Breyer, J. concurring, 555 U.S., at 397). Among the types of situations in which this might be true, according to Justice Breyer, are (1) maintaining treaty rights despite not having been included on a DOI list of recognized tribes (Stillaguamish Tribe); (2) DOI’s erroneous conclusion that a tribe had dissolved and subsequently to have opined that it has had a continuous existence since colonial times (Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians); and (3) reliance on an erroneous anthropological study concluding that a tribe no longer existed and subsequently finding that the study was wrong (Mole Lake Tribe). 555 U.S., at 398.


87 Solicitor’s Memorandum, at 5, states that “[u]nder these canons, statutory silence or ambiguity is not to be interpreted to the detriment of Indians Instead, statutes establishing Indian rights and privileges are to be construed liberally in favor of Indians, with any ambiguities to be resolved in their favor.” See also, Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, §2.02, n. 7 (2012 ed.), which reads: “County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 269 (1992) (‘When we are faced with these two possible constructions [of a statute], our choice between them must be dictated by a principle deeply rooted in this Court’s Indian jurisprudence: “Statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit.”’); Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 767-68 (1985); Rincon Band of Luiseno Indians v. Schwarzenegger, 602 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2010) (statutes must be construed ‘most favorably toward tribal interests’); Citizens Exposing the Truth About Casinos v. Kempthorne, 492 F.3d 460, 471 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (‘[A]s IGRA is designed to promote the economic viability of Indian Tribes, the Indian canon of statutory construction requires the (continued...)
Drawing upon inferences made from its exposition of federal Indian policy, the memorandum sets out to determine what “under Federal jurisdiction” in 1934 means and how it is to be proven. In general, according to the memorandum “under Federal jurisdiction,” in 1934, meant more than that a tribe or group was generally subject to the Indian power of the federal government. It “meant that the recognized Indian tribe was subject to the Indian Affairs’ authority of the United States, either expressly or implicitly.” The basic requirement, therefore, according to the Solicitor is that there be a showing that the federal government exercised jurisdiction before 1934 and that the jurisdictional status remained in 1934. This, in turn, requires a showing that “the tribe’s history prior to 1934, [shows] an action or series of actions—through a course of dealings—that are sufficient to establish ... federal obligations, duties, responsibility for or authority over the tribe by the Federal Government.” It further requires “indicia of the tribe having retained its jurisdictional status in 1934.”

This memorandum is consistent with the 2010 DOI decision to accept land into trust for gaming for the Cowlitz Tribe of Indians in Clark County, Washington. That decision indicates that there will not be an automatic dismissal of applications from newly recognized tribes, but that the department will review such applications thoroughly, collaborating with the Solicitor’s Office, to determine whether the history of the tribe as presented in the petition meets the legal standard. In general, however, the decision appears to mean that some tribes administratively acknowledged since 1934 under the SOI’s administrative process may not acquire trust land without further legislation.

(...continued)

court to resolve any doubt in favor of the Band.’); see also McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 176 (1973).”

88 Solicitor’s Memorandum, at 18 (emphasis supplied).

89 According to the Memorandum, tribes holding votes between 1934 to 1936 on whether to adopt an IRA constitution need offer no further proof that they were “under Federal jurisdiction” in 1934. Id., at 20.

90 Id., at 19.

91 Id., at 19.


On January 21, 2014, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California,93 issued an opinion, which is now under review by an en banc panel of the court. It has raised issues of the validity of trust acquisitions for many newly recognized tribes. The case involves a tract of land taken into trust in 1994 for the Big Lagoon Rancheria of California (Big Lagoon). The Big Lagoon was not known to the DOI in 1934; it first appeared on the list of “Indian Tribal Entities That Have a Government-to-government Relationship With the United States” in 1979.94 The dispute with California was precipitated by a breakdown in negotiations for a tribal-state gaming compact under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA)95 when California objected to the site preferred by the tribe for its gaming operation. On the basis of the Carcieri decision, the state claimed that the site had not been validly taken into trust. It, therefore, asserted that the state was under no obligation to negotiate in good faith for tribal gaming on a tract of trust land that did not meet IGRA’s definition of “Indian lands,”96 and, thus, was not eligible for IGRA gaming.

The three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit agreed with California. It found that “[t]here was no family or other group on what is now the Big Lagoon Rancheria in 1934”; that Big Lagoon was not a tribe under federal jurisdiction in 1934; and, therefore, that the DOI had no authority under the IRA to take land into trust for Big Lagoon. According to the court, Big Lagoon could not rely on the DOI’s action in taking the particular land into trust to assert tribal jurisdiction over it for IGRA purposes. There was a dissent that argued that the Federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which has a six-year statute of limitation, was the only avenue to challenge a land-into-trust decision. The court, however, rejected this argument, and ruled that the APA covered only challenges involving procedural violations. Quoting from an earlier case, the court reasoned that “‘[t]he government should not be permitted to avoid all challenges to its action, even if ultra vires, simply because the agency took the action long before anyone discovered the true state of affairs.’”97 It, therefore, held that the land was not “Indian lands” for IGRA purposes. According to the court, California could contest the validity of the trust acquisition as a defense to a claim that it was not negotiating in good faith because, with respect to “contests [of] the substance of an agency decision as exceeding constitutional or statutory authority,” a “challenger may ... [raise such a challenge] later than six years following the decision by filing a complaint for review of the adverse application of the decision to the particular challenger.”98

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93 741 F. 3d 1032, reh’g granted, 758 F. 3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2014).
96 The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) defines “Indian lands” as follows: “[t]he term “Indian lands” means- (A) all lands within the limits of any Indian reservation; and (B) any lands title to which is either held in trust by the United States for the benefit of any Indian tribe or individual or held by any Indian tribe or individual subject to restriction by the United States against alienation and over which an Indian tribe exercises governmental power” 25 U.S.C. §2703(4).
97 741 F. 3d 1032, 1043, quoting Wind River Mining Corp. v. United States, 946-710 (9th Cir. 1991).
98 Id., at 710
The *Big Lagoon* decision involved a collateral attack on the *ultra vires* action, which was raised as a defense by California. As the court’s opinion noted, the case does not involve an agency’s attempt to enforce an *ultra vires* ruling long after the APA limitations period. The fact situation in the case is merely analogous to the decisions on which the court relied in reaching its conclusion. Moreover, there is a dissent that provides a different interpretation of the applicability of the APA statute of limitations. The case does not involve the court’s ordering the land to be taken out of trust. Nonetheless, unless the *en banc* panel reverses it, the decision may rightfully prompt tribes in similar situations to prepare themselves for challenges to virtually any actions they take with respect to exerting jurisdiction over their trust lands. The *en banc* panel heard oral arguments in September 2014; its decision could come at any time.

**Judicial Treatment of SOI Post Carcieri Land Acquisition Determinations**

Two recent federal district court decisions indicate that there are likely to be challenges to many land-into-trust determinations based on *Carcieri*, whether or not a tribe is newly recognized. These two cases have essentially upheld the SOI’s process of determining whether a tribe qualifies for taking land into trust under the IRA. They both have agreed with the SOI that the IRA’s reference to “under Federal jurisdiction” and “any recognized Indian tribe” is ambiguous. They have further found the SOI’s interpretations of the phrases to be reasonable and have upheld trust land applications at issue. One case involves a tribe that was not formally recognized until 2002; the second, a tribe that dates to colonial times.

**D.C. District Court Upholds Trust Land Acquisition for Gaming as an Initial Reservation for a Tribe Recognized in 2002**

On December 12, 2014, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, in *The Confederate Tribes of the Grand Ronde Community of Oregon v. Jewell*, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia upheld a decision by the SOI to take land into trust for gaming for a tribe, the Cowlitz Indian Tribe, which had not been officially acknowledged to be an Indian tribe until a 2002 DOI administrative ruling. The plaintiffs included a neighboring Indian tribe, local government entities, nearby homeowners, and local businesses. They alleged that the trust acquisition would be injurious to them and that it should be set aside as arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. They argued that the decision to take the land into trust was defective because the tribe was not eligible for land acquisition under the plain language of the IRA. They also argued that, even if the tribe were eligible to have land taken into...

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100 ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2014 WL 701207 (D.D.C.). For further information, see CRS Legal Sidebar entry, “D.C. District Court Upholds Interior’s Interpretation of Sections 5 and 19 of the Indian Reorganization Act after the Supreme Court’s Carcieri Decision,” by (name redacted) (Mar. 5, 2015).

101 The court upheld the determination that the land qualified for gaming as an “initial reservation under 25 U.S.C. §2819(b)(1)(B) and the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ implementing regulations, 25 C.F.R. §292.6, on the basis of “significant historical connections” to the land, which was in the vicinity of the area which the tribe had used or occupied.


trust, the land was not eligible for gaming under IGRA as an “initial reservation.” They lost on both counts.

The court agreed with the SOI’s interpretation of the statutory language as ambiguous and, thus, looked to see if the agency’s interpretation of it is a reasonable one. It began with the statutory language of Section 19 of the IRA which authorizes the SOI to acquire trust land for “members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction.” It found the language ambiguous with respect to whether it was limited to tribes that were recognized in 1934 and under federal jurisdiction in 1934 or whether it could apply to a tribe that could be found to be under federal jurisdiction in 1934 but not recognized formally until after 1934. It reached this conclusion after it had examined legislative history and statutory context, not finding any clear indication that the language applied only to tribes that were recognized in 1934. It agreed with the SOI both in terms of the language being ambiguous and the reasonableness of concluding that recognition need not have been operative in 1934.

The court then evaluated whether the SOI’s test to determine whether a tribe was “under Federal jurisdiction” in 1934 was reasonable and found that it was a reasonable test and that, as applied to the Cowlitz Indian Tribe, it warranted deference by the court. The court buttressed its conclusion by referring to Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Carcieri, which had identified factors that could be used to show that a tribe, not formally recognized in 1934, was “under Federal jurisdiction” at that time. The court rejected various claims brought by the plaintiffs challenging components of the SOI’s test as applied to the Cowlitz Indian tribe, including the claim that the DOI should not rely on failed treaty negotiations with a tribe as a factor in establishing federal jurisdiction. The SOI’s test consists of two parts and is based on the Solicitor’s March 12, 2014, memorandum, on “The Meaning of ‘Under Federal Jurisdiction’ for the Purposes of the Indian Reorganization Act.” The two-part test looks at (1) whether a tribe can show “that Federal Government officials undertook guardian-like action on behalf of the tribe” and (2) the absence of any “probative evidence” terminating that jurisdictional status before 1934. Among the factors relied on to determine that the Cowlitz Indian Tribe met the IRA’s “under Federal jurisdiction” test were the following: (1) 1855 failed treaty negotiations; (2) various dealings between the Cowlitz Indian Tribe and federal officials from the mid-1850s until 1934; (3) provision of medical and educational resources for the Cowlitz Indians during the period; (4) representation of Cowlitz Indian tribal fishing rights by the BIA’s Taholah Agency in 1927; (5) issuance of allotments to individual Cowlitz Indians in the late 19th and early 20th centuries; and (6) approval by the DOI of an attorney contract for the Cowlitz Indian Tribe in 1932.

N.Y. District Court Defers to SOI Interpretation of IRA Jurisdictional and Recognition Requirements in Taking Land Into Trust for the Oneida Nation of New York

On March 26, 2015, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York, in Central New York Fair Business Association v. Jewell, applied the framework employed by the Supreme Court in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council (Chevron), and found that the SOI’s interpretation of “under Federal jurisdiction” warranted judicial deference.

The case involved a challenge to a trust acquisition of 17,370 acres in Madison and Oneida Counties, New York, for the Oneida Nation of New York. The case involved a tribe that conducted a vote in 1934 under a provision of the IRA and that has had a relation with the federal government that began with a 1794 treaty. Despite this long history, the plaintiffs claimed that the Oneidas were not under federal jurisdiction in 1934. For this assertion, the plaintiffs claimed that the Oneidas were under state jurisdiction,\textsuperscript{108} that 19th century legislation had terminated their reservation,\textsuperscript{109} and that the vote that they held under the IRA was not proof of their being under federal jurisdiction at the time. The court refuted the plaintiffs’ assertions. In upholding the SOI’s decision, the court noted with approval the SOI’s determination that the IRA language—“now under Federal jurisdiction” and “recognized Indian tribe”—was ambiguous and found the SOI’s interpretation of it to be reasonable and worthy of \textit{Chevron} deference. In reaching this conclusion, the court elaborated on how the SOI had interpreted the recognition requirement in the IRA:

Having found ... that DOI’s interpretation that there is no time limit upon recognition is reasonable, the Court agrees that recognition is not limited to the mechanism in the [administrative process under [25 C.F.R., Part 83] ... regulations, and that DOI’s interpretation of recognition as entailing a cognitive and a formal sense is reasonable.”

\textbf{Congressional Activity}

\textit{111\textsuperscript{th} Congress}

The 111\textsuperscript{th} Congress explored the ramifications of the decision. The House Committee on Natural Resources held a hearing on April 1, 2009, to take testimony on how well the Supreme Court had explicated the legislative history of the IRA and how “now under federal jurisdiction” is to be interpreted. Witnesses testified to widespread concerns about potential litigation based on the Court’s interpretation of \textit{Carcieri} that will go beyond the question of further land-into-trust acquisitions for tribes recognized after 1934.\textsuperscript{110} Representative Nick Rahall, chairman of the committee, noted that “[P]lacing land into trust for an Indian tribe is an essential component of combating the situations experienced by Indian tribes as a result of their treatment by the United States. Even beyond the legal responsibility, the Federal government has a moral responsibility to rectify this situation.”\textsuperscript{111}

On May 21, 2009, the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs held a hearing to examine executive branch authority to acquire trust lands for Indian tribes.\textsuperscript{112} Testifying at the hearing, Edward P. Lazarus made suggestions for legislative and administrative approaches and cautioned that

\textsuperscript{108} The court found that the fact that New York had ceded its rights over Indian lands in the state to the federal government when the U.S. Constitution supplanted the Articles of Confederation.

\textsuperscript{109} The court noted that a series of recent cases including Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Sherrill, N.Y., 337 F. 3d 139 (2d Cir. 2003), had ruled that there was no clear congressional intent to disestablish the Oneida Reservation.

\textsuperscript{110} One witness stated that \textit{Carcieri} “threatens to eliminate” “all the benefits that Congress has subsequently tied to the IRA.” Prepared Statement of Colette Routel, Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Michigan Law School; Assistant Professor, William Mitchell College of Law, on \textit{Carcieri} v. Salazar, Before the U.S. House Committee on Natural Resources, at 1 (April 1, 2009). http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_house_hearings&docid=f:48414.wais.


\textsuperscript{112} http://www.indian.senate.gov/public/_files/May212009.pdf.
anything short of legislation would likely result in protracted and costly litigation. He suggested two possible legislative approaches: (1) amending the IRA to remove “now” from “now under Federal jurisdiction” and (2) ratifying any pre-\textit{Carcieri} land-into-trust administrative determinations under the IRA for tribes not recognized in 1934. According to Mr. Lazarus, after \textit{Carcieri}, when DOI is presented with a request to take land into trust under the IRA, for a tribe recognized after 1934, it is now obliged to make a legal determination as to whether the tribe was “under Federal jurisdiction” in 1934. He expressed his own opinion that Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in \textit{Carcieri} identified some of the factors that would be involved in such a determination (e.g., whether there were treaty obligations, appropriations, enrollment duties, or written records of continuous existence). He pointed out that each tribe qualifying for federal acknowledgement since 1978 under the DOI regulations, 25 C.F.R., Part 83, has established that it has “been identified as an American Indian entity on a substantially continuous basis since 1900,” and argued that each of these tribes has, therefore, established that it has been “under Federal jurisdiction” since 1934. He also suggested that it would be legally supportable, if unwise because it would provoke costly litigation, for DOI formally to embrace its once-held position distinguishing formal recognition of a tribe from a tribe’s being “under Federal jurisdiction” despite the fact that the Solicitor General had rejected the distinction in oral argument in \textit{Carcieri}. Mr. Lazarus also mentioned other possible but perhaps more limited means of providing trust status or similar protection for lands of tribes recognized since 1934: (1) making use of a statutory provision authorizing the transfer of excess federal real property to tribes, and (2) exploring whether there exists some inherent presidential authority to provide some form of protection for fee lands held by Indian tribes.

At the same hearing, W. Ron Allen, Secretary of the National Congress of American Indians, provided draft language for an amendment to the IRA to remove the word “now” from “now under federal jurisdiction” and to protect pre-\textit{Carcieri} decisions by the Secretary to take land into trust from judicial invalidation based on a tribe’s not having been recognized in 1934. He indicated that although an administrative solution to the potential effects of \textit{Carcieri} is possible, anything other than legislation is likely to result in wasteful and protracted litigation. Another witness, Lawrence E. Long, Attorney General of South Dakota, and chair of the Conference of Western Attorneys General, recommended a general review of the trust acquisition policy, including its overall goals and the criteria that DOI uses in making determinations to take land into trust.

\begin{itemize}
\item [113]25 C.F.R. §83.7(a).
\item [115]Under 40 U.S.C. §523, the General Services Administration is authorized to set up procedures to transfer to the SOI excess federal real property within a tribe’s reservation to be taken into trust for the benefit of the tribe.
\item [117]Testimony of Lawrence E. Long, Attorney General, State of South Dakota, Chair, Conference of Western Attorneys General Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Indian Affairs (May 21, 2009). http://indian.senate.gov/hearings/ hearing.cfm?hearingid=3867&witnessid=8593.
\item See also “Statement of the California State Association of Counties for the Record of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Natural Resources for its November 4, 2009, on H.R. 3742 (Kildee) and H.R. 3697 (Cole)” 1 (November 4, 2009) (“Do not advance an immediate Congressional response to \textit{Carcieri}, which allows the Secretary of the Interior to return to the flawed fee to trust process. Rather, carefully examine, with oversight and other hearings which include participation by tribal, state and local governments, what reforms are necessary to ‘fix’ the fee to trust process and refine the definition of Indian lands under IGRA.”), and “Testimony of Attorney General Richard (continued...)”
\end{itemize}
In the 111th Congress, there were several bills introduced to extend authority to the Secretary to take land into trust for all federally recognized tribes; none, however, were enacted. Of the three introduced bills, H.R. 3697, H.R. 3742, and S. 1703, only S. 1703 was reported out of committee.  

S. 1703 as Reported by the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs

On December 17, 2009, the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs approved an amended version of S. 1703. Both versions received the endorsement of the SOI. The reported version of S. 1703 included an amendment offered by Senator Tom Coburn which would have required DOI to study the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision and provide Congress with a list of affected tribes and lands. There was also a provision in the reported version of S. 1703, which, according to the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, “clarifies that the legislation does not affect any law other than the Indian Reorganization Act or limit the authority of the Secretary of the Interior under any federal law or regulation other than the Indian Reorganization Act.” Otherwise, the legislation paralleled H.R. 3697 and H.R. 3742, as introduced. It would have amended the IRA as of its date of enactment, June 18, 1934. It would have changed the IRA definition of “Indian” to refer to members of “any federal recognition Indian tribe” instead of members of “any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction.” This legislation, therefore, would have removed the language which led the Supreme Court to hold that the Secretary’s authority to take land into trust under 25 U.S.C. §465 was limited to acquisitions for tribes under federal jurisdiction in 1934. In addition, it would have specified that “In this section, the term ‘Indian tribe’ means any Indian or Alaska Native tribe, band, nation, pueblo, village, or community that the Secretary of the Interior acknowledges to exist as an Indian tribe.”

It would have substituted that definition for the following language defining “tribe” for IRA purposes: “The term ‘tribe’ wherever used in said sections shall be construed to refer to any Indian tribe, organized band, pueblo, or Indians residing on one reservation.”

(...continued)

Blumenthal Before the House Committee on Natural Resources,” November 4, 2009, 1 (2009), (“Congress should either reform the administrative process in order to achieve fair and equitable decisions regarding trust lands for these tribes or repeal the [Indian Reorganization] Act, thereby establishing for pre-1934 tribes the same Congressional trust approval as [is available for] post-1934 tribes.” Available, August 19, 2010, on the website of the House Committee on Natural Resources. http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_house_hearings&docid=f:53253.wais.

120 S.Rept. 111-247, at 10. The provision reads:

(1) IN GENERAL.—Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act affects—
(A) the application or effect of any Federal law other than the Act of June 18, 1934 (25 U.S.C. 461 et seq.) (as amended by subsection (a)); or (B) any limitation on the authority of the Secretary of the Interior under any Federal law or regulation other than the Act of June 18, 1934 (25 U.S.C. 461 et seq.) (as so amended). (2) REFERENCES IN OTHER LAWS.—An express reference to the Act of June 18, 1934 (25 U.S.C. 461 et seq.), contained in any other Federal law shall be considered to be a reference to that Act as amended by subsection (a).

124 The word “sections” refers to 25 U.S.C. §§461 (ending allotments on Indian reservations), 462 (continuing existing (continued...)
The Senate Committee on Indian Affairs characterized the legislation as a means of correcting a judicial decision that runs contrary to longstanding and settled practice of the Department of the Interior regarding trust land acquisitions; invites disparate treatment of federally recognized tribes contrary to previous Acts of Congress; creates uncertainty about the scope of the Secretary’s authority; and threatens unnecessary and burdensome administrative proceedings and litigation for both the United States and the tribes on matters that Congress long ago intended to resolve.125

This view is consistent with that of Senator Dorgan, who indicated, in introducing the legislation, that the Supreme Court’s decision in Carcieri v. Salazar prompted a need for Congress to act to avoid the creation of “two classes of Indian tribes—those who were recognized as of 1934, for whom land may be taken into trust, and those recognized after 1934 that would be unable to have land taken into trust status.”126 He stated: “The legislation I’m introducing today is necessary to reaffirm the Secretary’s authority to take lands into trust for Indian tribes, regardless of when they were recognized by the federal government. The amendment ratifies the prior trust acquisitions of the Secretary, who for the past 75 years has been exercising his authority to take lands into trust, as intended by the Indian Reorganization Act.”127

Section 2727 of H.R. 3082, the Continuing Appropriations, 2011

In addition to S. 1703, there was, however, another legislative vehicle in which language appeared that would have amended the IRA to cover “any federally recognized Indian tribe.” This was Section 2727 of H.R. 3082, the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, which was passed by the House on December 8, 2010, but not acted upon by the Senate thereafter. It contained provisions directed at ratifying past land-into-trust acquisitions by the Secretary and clarifying how the IRA amendment interacted with other laws.128

(...continued)

(continued...)
112th Congress

In the 112th Congress, none of the bills relating to Carcieri were enacted. Three bills were introduced to extend authority to the Secretary to take land into trust for all federally recognized tribes: H.R. 1234, H.R. 1291, and S. 676. One, S. 676, was amended and reported out of committee—by the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs on April 7, 2011. It contains language which parallels that of Section 2727 of H.R. 3082 of the 111th Congress. Like that bill, it retroactively amends the IRA to cover “any federally recognized Indian tribe,” and contains provisions directed at ratifying past land-into-trust acquisitions by the Secretary as well as language designed to clarify its interaction with other law.129

S. 676 also includes a provision that requires DOI to study the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision and provide Congress with a list of affected tribes and lands.130 In reporting out the bill, the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs criticized the Departments of Justice and of the Interior’s handling of Carcieri before the Supreme Court by failing to contest the assertion that the tribe was not under federal jurisdiction in 1934 and by failing to show the array of statutes by which Congress sought to eliminate any disparate treatment of tribes based on recognition date.131 Moreover, in the report, the committee characterized the Carcieri decision as impacting all tribes by “threaten[ing] public safety and tribal law enforcement”; creating “a barrier to economic development”; “freez[ing] access to capital”; and, “increas[ing] Federal litigation over settled Federal policy and practice.”132 H.R. 1234 also contains language similar to that of Section 2727 of H.R. 3082, of the 111th Congress, as it was passed by the House of Representatives on December 8, 2010. H.R. 1291 would apply the IRA retroactively to “any federally recognized Indian tribe,” but would specify that the Secretary’s authority under Section 19 of the IRA, 25 U.S.C. §465, to take land into trust does not extend to Alaska.

(...continued)


(b) Ratification and Confirmation of Actions- Any action taken by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to the Act of June 18, 1934 (commonly known as the ‘Indian Reorganization Act’) (25 U.S.C. 461 et seq.) for any Indian tribe that was federally recognized on the date of the action is ratified and confirmed, to the extent such action is subjected to challenge based on whether the Indian tribe was federally recognized or under Federal jurisdiction on June 18, 1934, ratified and confirmed as fully to all intents and purposes as if the action had, by prior act of Congress, been specifically authorized and directed.

(c) Effect on Other Laws-

(1) IN GENERAL- Nothing in this section or the amendments made by this section affects—

(A) the application or effect of any Federal law other than the Act of June 18, 1934 (25 U.S.C. 461 et seq.) (as amended by subsection (a)); or

(B) any limitation on the authority of the Secretary of the Interior under any Federal law or regulation other than the Act of June 18, 1934 (25 U.S.C. 461 et seq.) (as so amended).

(2) REFERENCES IN OTHER LAWS- An express reference to the Act of June 18, 1934 (25 U.S.C. 461 et seq.) contained in any other Federal law shall be considered to be a reference to that Act as amended by subsection (a).

129 For text of Section 2727 of H.R. 3082, 111th Cong., see supra, n. 94.

130 This provision is the result of an amendment offered by Senator John Barrasso during the Senate Indian Affairs Committee’s consideration of the bill.


132 Id., at 24-36.
In the 112th Congress, there was also legislation to compensate local governments for lost revenue associated with taking land into trust: S. 988, H.R. 1851, and H.R. 1882. These bills share the same title: the Land-In-Trust Schools and Local Governments Equitable Compensation Act. Under these bills, when lands are taken into trust for an Indian tribe or an individual Indian after October 1, 2008, there will be compensation from the U.S. Treasury’s general fund for lost tax revenue unless the Secretary of the Interior negotiates waiver agreements. Eligible entities include local education agencies or units of local government and states that suffer loss of tax revenue as a result of the trust acquisition. Payment of compensation requires no further appropriation.

113th Congress

In the 113th Congress, one bill, S. 1603, the Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act, was enacted into law. It reaffirms the DOI’s May 15, 2005, trust acquisition of the land at issue in Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak and requires that any federal court action relating to that land be dismissed.

There was an Indian Affairs Committee hearing, “Carcieri: Bringing Certainty to Trust Land Acquisitions.” At that hearing, Kevin K. Washburn, Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Indian Affairs, stated that the Obama Administration’s “practical solution” for this issue is language, included in the President’s budget request, that would amend the IRA as follows:

Effective beginning on June 18, 1934, the term “Indian” as used in this Act shall include all persons of Indian descent who are members of any federally recognized Indian tribe, and all persons who are descendants of such members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within the present boundaries of any Indian reservation, and shall further include all other persons of one-half or more Indian blood.

H.R. 279 would have amended the IRA retroactively to define “Indian” to mean “any federally recognized Indian tribe.” It would also strike the following sentence: “The term ‘tribe’ wherever used in this Act shall be construed to refer to any Indian tribe, organized band, pueblo, or Indians residing on one reservation,” and substitute: “In said sections, the term ‘Indian tribe’ means any Indian or Alaska Native tribe, band, nation, pueblo, village, or community that the Secretary of the Interior acknowledges to exist as an Indian tribe.”

H.R. 666 / S. 2188 would have amended the IRA retroactively to define “Indian” to mean “any federally recognized Indian tribe.” These bills also contain provisions aimed at insulating past land-into-trust acquisitions for tribes recognized at the time of the acquisition against challenges.


135 In Akiachak Native Community v. Jewell, ___ F. Supp. ___, 2013 WL 528741 (D.D.C. 2013), a federal district court ordered the Secretary of the Interior to sever the provision in 25 C.F.R. §151.1 that makes all Alaska Native entities other than the Metlakatla Indian Community ineligible for land-into-trust application on the grounds that such discrimination is prohibited by 25 U.S.C. §476(g). That subsection of the statute reads: “[a]ny regulation or administrative decision or determination of a department or agency of the United States that is in existence or effect on May 31, 1994, and that classifies, enhances, or diminishes the privileges and immunities available to a federally recognized Indian tribe relative to the privileges and immunities available to other federally recognized tribes by virtue of their status as Indian tribes shall have no force or effect.”
based on the tribe’s not having been federally recognized as of June 18, 1934. The bills also include a disclaimer with respect to effect on laws other than IRA or laws limiting the authority of the SOI.

114th Congress

S. 1879

On July 28, 2015, Senator John Barrasso, chairman of the Senate Indian Affairs Committee, introduced S. 1879, the Interior Improvement Act. It would amend the Indian Reorganization Act to declare that “[e]ffective beginning on June 18, 1934, the term ‘Indian’ as used in this Act shall include all persons of Indian descent who are members of any federally recognized Indian tribe.” It would also provide procedures and standards for applications from Indian tribes and individual Indians to have off-reservation land taken into trust for their benefit. It includes provisions contemplating cooperative agreements with nearby local and tribal governments respecting the mitigation of the economic impact of proposed land-into-trust applications.

Specifically, S. 1879 would amend Section 5 of the IRA, 25 U.S.C. §465, to read as follows:

Effective beginning on June 18, 1934, the term “Indian” as used in this Act shall include all persons of Indian descent who are members of any federally recognized Indian tribe and all persons who are descendants of such members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within the present boundaries of any Indian reservation, and shall further include all other persons of one-half or more Indian blood. For the purposes of this Act, Eskimos and other aboriginal peoples of Alaska shall be considered Indians. The term “tribe” wherever used in this Act shall be construed to refer to any Indian tribe, organized band, pueblo, or the Indians residing on one reservation. The words “adult Indians” wherever used in this Act shall be construed to refer to Indians who have attained the age of twenty-one years.

The bill would ratify and confirm any trust acquisition challenged on the basis of the tribe’s not being under federal jurisdiction in 1934. The legislation also states that it does not impact other federal Indian land determinations; that nothing in it “affects ... the application or effect of any Federal law” other than the Indian Reorganization Act; and that nothing in it “affects ... any limitation on the authority” of the Secretary of the Interior (SOI) under any other law.

S. 1879 would establish a land-into-trust acquisition application process for tribes or individual Indians seeking to have off-reservation land taken into trust by the SOI. It includes certain definitions for this purpose. It defines “contiguous” to mean “2 parcels of land having a common boundary, notwithstanding the existence of non-navigable waters or a public road or right-of-way.” It defines “contiguous jurisdiction” as “any county, county equivalent, or Indian tribe with authority and control over the land contiguous to the land under consideration in an application.” It defines “county and county equivalent” as “the largest territorial division for local government within a State with the authority to enter into enforceable cooperative agreements with Indian tribes or individual Indians, as appropriate.” It defines “economic impact” as “any anticipated costs associated with the development of or activity on the land under consideration in an application, including associated costs to a contiguous jurisdiction for utilities, public works, public safety, roads, maintenance, and other public service costs.”

Under the legislation, off-reservation land acquisition applications must include, in addition to other requirements imposed by the SOI, descriptions of the need for and the purpose of the proposed acquisition; a business plan for managing the land to be acquired; verification of current ownership; and “a copy of any cooperative agreement between the applicant and a contiguous jurisdiction.” The bill includes requirements for the SOI to provide notice to contiguous jurisdictions when applications are received, updated, modified, or withdrawn, and to provide public notice of completed applications and final decisions. It includes timetables for receipt of comments from contiguous jurisdictions and for publication of notices.

The bill contains a provision requiring the SOI to encourage applicants to enter into cooperative agreements with contiguous jurisdictions. Under the legislation, the SOI is to “give weight and preference to an application with a cooperative agreement.” Cooperative agreements “may include terms relating to mitigation, changes in land use, dispute resolution, fees, and other terms determined by the parties.” If a completed application includes a cooperative agreement, the SOI’s decision would be subject to a specified timeline, which takes into account various requirements such as the review process under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.137 If the SOI fails to meet that timeline, the application is to be deemed approved. If an application is not accompanied by a cooperative agreement, under the legislation the SOI would be required to make a written determination describing the extent that economic impacts on contiguous jurisdictions have been mitigated. Such a determination would be required to include consideration of how the acquisition might impact the economy of contiguous jurisdictions and whether the lack of a cooperative agreement is attributable to “failure of any contiguous jurisdiction to work in good faith to reach an agreement.” The legislation specifies that failure to submit a cooperative agreement would not prejudice an application if the Secretary determines it attributable to “failure by any contiguous jurisdiction to work in good faith to reach an agreement.” The legislation would require the SOI to encourage contiguous jurisdictions to “engage in local cooperation through reciprocal notice and comment procedures, particularly with regard to changes in land use.”

Before conducting a notice and comment rulemaking to implement the legislation, the SOI would be required to consult with Indian tribes and publish a summary of consultation in the Federal Register within 180 days of completing the consultation.

Other Bills

S. 732/H.R. 407138 would amend the Indian Reorganization Act to declare that, “[e]ffective beginning on June 18, 1934, the term ‘Indian’ as used in this Act shall include all persons of Indian descent who are members of any federally recognized Indian tribe.” It contains a provision ratifying previous SOI acquisitions for tribes federally recognized on the date that acquisition was confirmed and ratified and a provision preserving limitations on the SOI’s authority to take land into trust in laws other than the Indian Reorganization Act.

H.R. 249139 would amend the Indian Reorganization Act to declare that, “[e]ffective beginning on June 18, 1934, the term ‘Indian’ as used in this Act shall include all persons of Indian descent who are members of any federally recognized Indian tribe.” It would strike the following language found in 25 U.S.C. §479: “The term ‘tribe’ wherever used in this Act shall be construed to refer to any Indian tribe, organized band, pueblo, or the Indians residing on one reservation.” It

137 42 U.S.C. §4321 et seq.
would substitute for it the following language: “In said sections, the term ‘Indian tribe’ means any Indian or Alaska Native tribe, band, nation, pueblo, village, or community that the Secretary of the Interior acknowledges to exist as an Indian tribe.”

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