Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive
Vincent L. Morelli
Section Research Manager
September 10, 2015
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41136


Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive

Summary
As 2015 began, Cyprus entered its 51st year as a politically separated nation and its 41st year as a
physically divided country with a permanent solution to end the divisions far from being
achieved. Attempts to resolve the Cyprus problem and unify the two communities have
undergone various levels of negotiation and missed opportunities over this period, and thus far a
succession of Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders, although often insisting “convergences” had
been reached on the major issues, have been unable to reach a comprehensive solution acceptable
to both sides. Throughout this period the two sides have been unable to find enough common
ground on the difficult issues of territory, property, governance, security guarantees, and now
resources, in order to achieve a permanent solution.
Long under the auspices of the United Nations, the talks entered a period of frequent and often
intense negotiations in 2008. However, by the beginning of 2012, the talks had reached a
stalemate, and in May 2012 the talks were suspended for a variety of political reasons. For most
of 2013 and into early 2014, both the Greek Cypriot leader, Nicos Anastasiades, and the Turkish
Cypriot leader, Dervis Eroglu, hardly met, but when they did they spent a good deal of time
arguing over how to restart the talks. Although the stalemate was broken and talks resumed in
February 2014 when an agreement was reached, with the aid of the United States, on the language
of a “joint declaration,” the talks quickly reached another stalemate by the summer of 2014,
which extended into 2015.
All of the pessimism surrounding the negotiations seemed to disappear on April 26, 2015, when
in a second round of voting, Mustafa Akinci of the small, center-left, Communal Democratic
Party (TDA) won the election to become the new leader of the Turkish Cypriots, defeating Dervis
Eroglu. Akinci immediately announced that the negotiations would resume as soon as possible in
May, a declaration Greek Cypriot President Anastasiades quickly confirmed. Akinci also declared
his intention to reach a settlement by the end of 2015 so that a referendum on the agreement could
be held on the island by the spring of 2016, perhaps before the Greek Cypriot parliamentary
elections.
In addition, both sides stated that they would pursue positive confidence-building measures as a
sign of a renewed commitment to a successful settlement. Some of those measures have since
gone into effect. By the end of May 2015, negotiations were back on track, and after a short break
in August, the two sides resumed the talks on September 1, 2015. The atmospherics surrounding
the meetings of the two leaders thus far have been described as positive, and assessments of the
talks to this point seem to indicate real progress has been made. A period of “cautious optimism”
appears to have settled into the negotiation process.
The U.S. Government and Congress have long maintained interest in a resolution of the Cyprus
issue. Visits to Cyprus by Vice President Biden and others in 2014, quick congratulations to
Akinci on his election, upbeat comments in a June 2015 speech on Cyprus to a conference in
Washington by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Amanda Sloat, the speedy nomination of a
new U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus in the early summer, and an early September 2015 visit to the
island by Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia, Victoria Nuland, seemed to suggest
a reenergized U.S. interest in having the negotiations move forward.
The lack of a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus issue, however, continues to affect relations
between Turkey and the European Union (EU), Turkey and Greece, and the EU and NATO. The
situation also warrants attention because of U.S. interest in a strong relationship with Turkey,
especially as both countries confront the threat from the Islamic State, and because of the
prospects that the Eastern Mediterranean could play an important role in energy development and
Congressional Research Service

Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive

supply. In the 113th Congress, legislation (H.Res. 187) was introduced supporting the Republic of
Cyprus, and letters regarding the settlement talks were sent to the White House and others by
Members of Congress sympathetic to both Greek and Turkish Cypriot views of the problem. The
114th Congress has thus far continued a modest level of interest.
This report provides a brief overview of the history of the negotiations, a review of the
negotiations since 2008, and a description of some of the issues involved in the talks.
Congressional Research Service

Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive

Contents
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Annan Plan ................................................................................................................................ 2
The Christofias-Talat Negotiations: 2008-2010 ........................................................................ 3
A New Era: Christofias and Eroglu ........................................................................................... 5
New Year, Continued Stalemate, End of the Talks .................................................................... 7
Elections 2013: The Anastasiades Government and New Talks ............................................... 9
Elections 2015: Akinci and the Resumption of the Negotiations ............................................ 13
Issues ................................................................................................................................. 14
Assessment .............................................................................................................................. 18

Figures
Figure 1. Map of Cyprus ................................................................................................................. 2

Contacts
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 22

Congressional Research Service

Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive

Background1
The island republic of Cyprus gained its independence from Great Britain in 1960. At the time,
the population living on the island was approximately 77% of Greek ethnic origin and roughly
18% of Turkish ethnic origin. (This figure has changed over the years as an influx of mainland
Turks have settled in the north.) Maronite Christians, Armenians, and others constitute the
remainder. At independence, the republic’s constitution defined elaborate power-sharing
arrangements between the two main groups. It required a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish
Cypriot vice president, each elected by his own community. Simultaneously, a Treaty of
Guarantee signed by Britain, Greece, and Turkey ensured the new republic’s territorial integrity,
and a Treaty of Alliance among the republic, Greece, and Turkey provided for Greek and Turkish
soldiers to help defend the island. However, at that time, the two major communities aspired to
different futures for Cyprus: Most Greek Cypriots favored union of the entire island with Greece
(enosis), while Turkish Cypriots preferred to partition the island (taksim) and possibly unite the
Turkish Cypriot zone with Turkey.
Cyprus’s success as a stable, new republic lasted from 1960 to 1963. After President (and Greek
Orthodox Archbishop) Makarios III proposed constitutional modifications that favored the
majority Greek Cypriot community in 1963, relations between the two communities deteriorated,
with Turkish Cypriots increasingly consolidating into enclaves in larger towns for safety. In 1964,
Turkish Cypriots withdrew from most national institutions and began to administer their own
affairs. Intercommunal violence occurred between 1963 and 1964 and again in 1967. On both
occasions, outside mediation and pressure, including by the United States, appeared to prevent
Turkey from intervening militarily on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots. On March 4, 1964, the
United Nations authorized the establishment of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
(UNFICYP) to control the violence and act as a buffer between the two communities. It became
operational on March 27, 1964, and still carries out its mission today.
In 1974, the military junta in Athens supported a coup against President Makarios, replacing him
with a more hard-line supporter of enosis. In July 1974, Turkey, citing the 1960 Treaty of
Guarantee as a legal basis for its move, deployed its military forces in two separate actions to the
island and by August 25, 1974, had taken control of more than one-third of the island. This
military intervention2 had many ramifications. Foremost was the widespread dislocation of both
the Greek and Turkish Cypriot population and related governance, refugee, and property
problems.
After the conflict subsided and a fragile peace took root, Turkish Cypriots pursued a solution to
the conflict that would keep the two communities separate in two sovereign states or two states in
a loose confederation. In February 1975, the Turkish Cypriots declared their government the
“Turkish Federated State of Cyprus” (TFSC). In 1983, Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash
declared the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC)—a move considered by some to be
a unilateral declaration of independence. At the time, Denktash argued that creation of an
independent state was a necessary precondition for a federation with the Greek Cypriots.

1 Parts of this report are drawn from a more comprehensive history of the Cyprus negotiations included in an archived
CRS Report RL33497, Cyprus: Status of U.N. Negotiations and Related Issues, by Carol Migdalovitz.
2 Turkey officially refers to its action as a “peace operation.” The Greek Cypriots and much of the international
community refer to it as an “invasion.” Unofficial estimates indicate that Turkish military forces currently deployed in
northern Cyprus range from 20,000 to 30,000.
Congressional Research Service
1


Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive

However, he ruled out a merger with Turkey and pledged cooperation with United Nations–
brokered settlement efforts. Thirty-two years later, only Turkey has recognized the TRNC.
Between 1974 and 2002, there were numerous, unsuccessful rounds of U.N.-sponsored direct and
indirect negotiations to achieve a settlement. Negotiations focused on reconciling the two sides’
interests and reestablishing a central government. They foundered on definitions of goals and
ways to implement a federal solution. Turkish Cypriots emphasized bi-zonality and the political
equality of the two communities, preferring two nearly autonomous societies with limited contact.
Greek Cypriots emphasized the freedoms of movement, property, and settlement throughout the
island. The two parties also differed on the means of achieving a federation: Greek Cypriots
wanted their internationally recognized national government to devolve power to the Turkish
Cypriots, who would then join a Cypriot republic. For the Turkish Cypriots, two entities would
join, for the first time, in a new federation. These differences in views also affected the resolution
of issues such as property claims, citizenship of mainland Turks who had settled on the island,
and other legal issues. These differences in views continue to plague the negotiations even today.
Figure 1. Map of Cyprus

Source: Adapted by CRS.
Annan Plan
Negotiations for a final solution to the Cyprus issue appeared to take a dramatic and positive step
forward when on November 11, 2002, then U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan presented a draft
of “The Basis for Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem,” commonly
Congressional Research Service
2

Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive

referred to as the Annan Plan. The plan called for, among many provisions, a “common state”
government with a single international legal personality that would participate in foreign and
European Union relations. Two politically equal component states would address much of the
daily responsibilities of government in their respective communities. The Annan Plan was a
comprehensive approach and of necessity addressed highly controversial issues for both sides.
Over the course of the next 16 months, difficult negotiations ensued. Turkish Cypriot leader
Denktash was replaced as chief negotiator by a more pro-settlement figure, newly elected “prime
minister” Mehmet Ali Talat. Republic of Cyprus President Glafkos Clerides was replaced through
an election with, according to some observers, a more skeptical president, Tassos Papadopoulos.
The Annan Plan itself was revised several times in an attempt to reach compromises demanded by
both sides. Complicating the matter even more, on April 16, 2003, the Republic of Cyprus signed
an accession treaty with the European Union (EU) to become a member of the EU on May 1,
2004, whether or not there was a settlement and a reunited Cyprus.
Finally, after numerous meetings and negotiations and despite a lack of a firm agreement, but
sensing that further negotiations would produce little else, on March 29, 2004, Secretary-General
Annan released his “final revised plan” and announced that the plan would be put to referenda
simultaneously in both north and south Cyprus on April 24, 2004. The Turkish Cypriot leadership
split, with Denktash urging rejection and Talat urging support. Greek Cypriot President
Papadopoulos, to the dismay of the U.N., EU, and United States, but for reasons he argued were
legitimate concerns of the Greek Cypriot community, urged the Greek Cypriots to reject the
referenda. On April 24, what remaining hope existed for a solution to the crisis on Cyprus was
dashed as 76% of Greek Cypriot voters rejected the plan, while 65% of Turkish Cypriot voters
accepted it. In his May 28, 2004, report following the vote, Annan said that “the Greek Cypriots’
vote must be respected, but they need to demonstrate willingness to resolve the Cyprus problem
through a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation and to articulate their concerns about security and
implementation of the Plan with ‘clarity and finality.’”
The Christofias-Talat Negotiations: 2008-2010
As early as 2004, Talat, as Turkish Cypriot “prime minister,” was credited with helping convince
the Turkish Cypriots to support the Annan Plan and had been seen as perhaps the one Turkish
Cypriot leader who could move the Greek Cypriots toward a more acceptable solution for both
sides. For his efforts at the time, Talat, on April 17, 2005, was elected “president” of the
unrecognized TRNC over the National Unity Party’s (UBP) Dr. Dervis Eroglu, receiving 55.6%
of the vote in a field of nine.
For roughly the next four years, to little avail, Cyprus muddled through a series of offers and
counter-offers to restart serious negotiations even as the Greek Cypriots solidified their new
status as a member of the EU, a status not extended to the Turkish Cypriots despite an EU pledge
to try to help end the isolation of the north.
On February 24, 2008, 61-year-old Demetris Christofias of the Progressive Party of Working
People (AKEL) was elected to a five-year term as president of the Republic of Cyprus.
Christofias was educated in the Soviet Union and is a fluent Russian speaker. He joined the
communist-rooted AKEL party at the age of 14 and rose through its ranks to become leader in
1988. Christofias was elected president of the Cypriot House of Representatives in 2001 and won
reelection in 2006.
Christofias’s election had the backing of the Democratic (DIKO) Party and the Socialist (EDEK)
Party. Christofias, in part, tailored his campaign to opposing what he believed was an
uncompromising approach toward the Turkish Cypriots by his opponent, incumbent President
Congressional Research Service
3

Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive

Papadopoulos, and the stagnation in the attempt to reach a just settlement of the Cyprus problem.
Although serious differences existed between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides over a
final settlement, Christofias took the outcome of the vote as a sign that Greek Cypriots wanted to
try once again for an end to the division of the island. In his inaugural address, President
Christofias expressed the hope of achieving a “just, viable, and functional solution” to the Cyprus
problem. He said that he sought to restore the unity of the island as a federal, bi-zonal, bi-
communal republic; to exclude any rights of military intervention; and to provide for the
withdrawal of Turkish troops and, ultimately, the demilitarization of the island. Christofias also
reaffirmed that the 2004 Annan Plan, which he himself opposed at the time, was null and void
and could not be the basis for a future settlement.
After Christofias’s election, Turkish Cypriot leader Talat, a long-time acquaintance of Christofias,
declared that “a solution in Cyprus is possible by the end of 2008.”3 He also declared that “the
goal is to establish a new partnership state in Cyprus, based on the political equality of the two
peoples and the equal status of two constituent states.”4 While the negotiations between
Christofias and Talat appeared to get off to a fast start, the differences in positions quickly
became apparent, and the talks, although held on a regular basis, soon began to bog down. Talat
wanted to pursue negotiations on the basis of the provisions of the old Annan Plan, while
Christofias, mindful of the Greek Cypriot rejection of that plan, was keen to avoid references to
it. Old differences quickly resurfaced. As the negotiations dragged on well into 2009, it appeared
that impatience, frustration, and uncertainty were beginning to mount against both Christofias in
the south and Talat in the north.
By the end of 2009, perspectives on both sides of the island began to change. Some suggested
that the Greek Cypriots sensed that the talks would not produce a desired outcome before the
April 2010 elections in the north, in which Talat, running for reelection, was trailing in the polls
to Eroglu. If Talat lost, it was argued, the negotiations were likely to have to begin anew with an
entirely different Turkish Cypriot leadership. Under that scenario, many Greek Cypriots,
including members within the political parties of the governing coalition, seemed leery of
weakening their hand by offering further concessions. Some Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand,
appeared to think that the Greek Cypriot side would not offer Talat a negotiated settlement,
betting from the opinion polls in the north that Eroglu would win the April elections and would
pull back from serious negotiations, at least for a while as he consolidated his new government
and reordered Turkish Cypriot strategy. The Greek Cypriots could then blame the anticipated
hard-liners in the north and their presumed patrons in Ankara if the talks collapsed.
As the negotiations entered 2010, it appeared that the window of opportunity to reach a final
settlement, at least between Christofias and Talat, was closing fast. Despite the fact that the two
sides had been in negotiations for almost 18 months and in close to 60 meetings, they appeared to
have had very little to show for their efforts. In his New Year message to the Greek Cypriots,
Christofias suggested that while some progress had been made in a few areas, the two sides were
not close to a settlement. The intensive dialogue between Christofias and Talat resumed on
January 11, 2010, but after three sessions the talks seemed to have reached a standstill, with the
gap between the respective positions of President Christofias and Talat on many of the tougher
issues seeming to be insurmountable.

3 Anatolia, “I Am Hopeful About a Solution, TRNC President Talat,” February 25, 2008, BBC Monitoring European,
February 26, 2008.
4 Mehmet Ali Talat, letter to the editor, Financial Times, March 5, 2008.
Congressional Research Service
4

Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive

The last formal negotiating session between Christofias and Talat concluded on March 30, 2010,
with no new developments. In the run-up to the final session there was some speculation that both
sides would issue a joint statement assessing the negotiations up to that point and perhaps even
announcing some of the areas in which “convergences” between Christofias and Talat had been
achieved. Speculation was that Talat had wanted something positive to take into the final days of
the election campaign and had presented Christofias a report summarizing what the Turkish
Cypriots understood to have been achieved. Christofias, however, was already under pressure
from his coalition partner, DIKO, and former coalition partner, EDEK, not to issue such a
statement, which could have been interpreted as an interim agreement.
On March 30, 2010, Christofias and Talat issued a short statement suggesting that they had indeed
made some progress in governance and power sharing, EU matters, and the economy, but they did
not go beyond that. On April 1, Talat, feeling he needed to say more to his Turkish Cypriot
constituents about the negotiations, held a press conference at which he outlined his
understandings of what he and Christofias had achieved to that point. Christofias would neither
confirm nor deny what Talat had presented.
A New Era: Christofias and Eroglu
On April 18, 2010, Talat lost his reelection bid to his rival Dervis Eroglu of the UBP. Observers
believe Talat’s defeat was due to a combination of his failure to secure a settlement of the Cyprus
problem after almost two years and his inability to convince the EU and others to help end what
the Turkish Cypriots believed was the economic isolation of the north. Some observers also noted
that an overwhelming number of mainland Turks who had settled in the north and who continued
to identify more with mainland Turkey had little interest in unification with Greek Cyprus and
voted for Eroglu because they believed his views were consistent with theirs.
Eroglu, then a 72-year-old physician and long-time politician, won the election with just over
50% of the vote. Eroglu was seen as having a style and harder-line views similar to former
Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash, particularly in seeking more autonomy for each
community. Eroglu also headed a party in which some of its followers had advocated a
permanently divided island and international recognition for the TRNC. It was reported that
during the campaign Eroglu may have suggested that perhaps Cyprus should consider a kind of
“soft divorce” similar to what the Slovaks and Czechs did when they separated. During the
campaign, Eroglu also criticized Talat for what he thought were too many concessions to the
Greek Cypriot side, including the agreement that a reunited Cyprus would hold a single
sovereignty through which both sides would reunite. Nevertheless, even while criticizing Talat’s
positions, Eroglu insisted that negotiations would continue under his presidency. Upon assuming
his new office, Eroglu wrote a letter to U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon expressing his
willingness to resume the negotiations under the good offices of the U.N. and at the point where
the negotiations between Talat and Christofias had left off. Despite Eroglu’s position regarding
the resumption of talks, most political elements on the Greek Cypriot side saw Eroglu’s election
as a negative development and expressed their skepticism as to what the future would hold.
On May 26, 2010, President Christofias and Turkish Cypriot leader Eroglu held their first formal
negotiating session. The meeting was held under the auspices of the U.N. Secretary-General’s
special advisor on Cyprus, Alexander Downer. Almost immediately, a controversy arose when it
was reported that Downer read a statement from U.N. Secretary-General Ban congratulating the
parties for starting the talks again from where they left off (including the confirmation of existing
“convergences” agreed to by Christofias and Talat), for agreeing to abide by U.N. Security
Council resolutions on Cyprus, and for suggesting that a final agreement could be reached in the
coming months.
Congressional Research Service
5

Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive

Downer’s statement immediately drew criticism from several of the Greek Cypriot political
parties that were concerned that the references to the “convergences” arrived at by Christofias and
Talat were being considered as agreements by the U.N., a position not shared by the Greek
Cypriots. On the other hand, apparently after the May 26 meeting, Eroglu made a statement that
the Turkish Cypriots would not be bound by the statement of the U.N. Secretary-General,
especially with regard to previous U.N. Security Council resolutions, some of which did include
calls for Turkey to withdraw its troops from Cyprus. While Eroglu was trying to clarify that he
accepted U.N. resolutions on the parameters of the negotiations, some in the Greek Cypriot
leadership seem to question whether Eroglu was trying to redefine the basis under which he
would proceed with the negotiations.
When the talks resumed in May 2010, Christofias and Eroglu, along with several technical
committees and working groups with representatives from both sides, met regularly but made no
apparent progress. In September, in an interview with Greek Cypriot press, Eroglu expressed his
frustration with the process and accused the Greek Cypriots of treating Turkish Cypriot positions
with contempt. He apparently suggested that Christofias needed to inform the Greek Cypriot
people that any final solution would involve pain on both sides but also had to minimize social
upheaval, especially among the Turkish Cypriot community. When asked what pain Eroglu was
prepared to accept, however, he stated that it would not include giving up the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus or its flag or sending mainland Turks who settled in the north back to Turkey.5
In October 2010, Turkish press reported that Eroglu appeared so frustrated with the negotiations
that he suggested that Turkish Cypriots had become fed up and no longer believed in the
possibility of a mutually agreeable settlement. “As time passes,” he said, “the willingness of the
two communities to live together is diminishing.”6 For his part, Christofias told the U.N.
Secretary-General in September 2010 that both sides were not coming closer to a settlement and
that Turkey, given its own domestic and regional problems, “was not ready to solve the Cyprus
problem.”7
Although assessments of the negotiations appeared to grow more pessimistic, additional sessions
were held through the end of December. Talks were then suspended while Eroglu tended to
medical problems. While both sides continued to talk and continued to pledge to seek a solution,
neither side had indicated whether progress was being made or that any compromises were
possible. On January 1, 2011, Christofias declared his disappointment over the passing of another
year without a settlement and accused Turkey of not making any effort to promote a solution to
the Cyprus issue.
In mid-April 2011, the Republic of Cyprus entered into a parliamentary election period that
concluded on May 22. The outcome of the elections did not seem to suggest that the negotiating
position of Christofias would require changes. Although opposition to what was perceived to be
Christofias’s concessions to the north was voiced during the campaign, none of the three parties
with the most hard-line views—EDEK, the pro-Europe EVROKO party, and DIKO—increased
its vote share. The impact of the elections would later prove problematic for the negotiations.
Similarly, in national elections held in Turkey in June, Cyprus was barely an issue among the
competing parties. After the election there was some speculation that Turkish Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, having won another five-year term, might have been prepared to inject
some positive new energy into the Cyprus negotiations in order to help Turkey’s flagging

5 Cyprus Mail, “Eroglu: ‘Treated with Contempt,’” September 19, 2010.
6 Hurriyet Daily News, “Turkish Cypriot Leader Ready for Tripartite New York Meeting,” October 22, 2010.
7 Cyprus Mail, “Christofias: Two Sides Not Getting Closer,” September 12, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
6

Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive

accession negotiations with the EU. Later this seemed to have been a misreading of the prime
minister’s intentions.
New Year, Continued Stalemate, End of the Talks
Throughout 2011, Christofias and Eroglu continued their futile negotiations, which also included
two meetings with U.N. Secretary-General Ban in another attempt by the U.N. to boost
momentum for the talks. Ban insisted that the negotiations be stepped up and that the three would
meet on October 30 to assess what progress had been achieved. The U.N. would then be prepared
to organize an international conference to discuss security-related issues as Turkey suggested.
This would be followed by plans to hold referenda on a final solution in both the north and south
by the spring of 2012. The hope among some was that by intensifying the negotiations and
reaching a solution by the end of 2011, a potentially reunified Cyprus would be prepared to
assume the rotating presidency of the EU on July 1, 2012. By the fall of 2011, both sides seemed
to have lost a clear urgency to achieve a final solution. Trying to reach a negotiated settlement by
the end of October became impractical.
As 2011 ended, pessimism abounded, with many feeling that what had not been accomplished in
the previous two years could become very difficult to achieve in 2012 as the Republic of Cyprus
entered into full preparation for its EU presidency. Many felt that unless there was a major
breakthrough in the negotiations by early 2012, the talks would become even more stalemated
and could culminate in a potential dramatic turn of events by the summer.
Doubts about the prospects of a solution acceptable to both sides were also raised with the release
of a public opinion poll that apparently found a growing negative climate and public discontent
on the island, an increased ambivalence on the part of Turkish Cypriots, and a possible shift
toward a no vote for reunification among Greek Cypriots. The poll also found that society on both
sides needed to begin a very public discussion of the parameters of the negotiations and that
confidence-building measures were needed to be implemented to increase the levels of trust in the
peace process.8
As 2012 began, both sides were again preparing to travel to New York for a fifth meeting with
Ban to assess the progress of the negotiations. Ban had asked both Christofias and Eroglu to come
to New York on January 22-24 with significant offers in the areas of governance, economy, and
EU affairs so that the “Greentree 2” meeting could facilitate a final deal that would allow the
U.N. to convene an international conference in the spring to resolve security-related issues and
allow referenda on a final agreement in both the north and south by early summer of 2012.
It appeared, however, that even before arriving in New York, neither Christofias nor Eroglu was
willing or able to make necessary concessions on the difficult issues of property rights, security,
territory, mainland Turks who had “settled” in the north, or citizenship—areas where both sides
had long-held and very different positions. The uncertainty of what could be achieved prompted
Christofias to question whether the meeting should take place at all. The lack of any progress to
that point led some in the Greek Cypriot opposition to suggest the meeting be cancelled and
warned Christofias not to accept any deadlines or U.N. arbitration or agree to an international
conference without explicit agreements on internal issues.
Nevertheless, Greentree 2 took place, and it was reported that both sides had submitted to Ban
extensive proposals that each felt could provide the basis for a solution. The Greentree meetings
concluded without any new agreement to end the stalemate and led an apparently frustrated Ban

8 Interpeace, “Latest Cyprus Poll Findings: Greek and Turkish Leadership Must Take Bold Action Now,” July 5, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
7

Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive

to say that he would wait until he received a progress report from his special advisor at the end of
March 2012 before deciding whether to convene an international conference, despite Christofias’s
opposition to any such decision.
Christofias and Eroglu resumed their direct negotiations in mid-February, but it appeared unlikely
that the stalemate could be broken at that point and that the potential for any agreement looked to
be delayed—not only until after the EU presidency in the latter half of 2012, but also until after
the February 2013 national elections in the republic. In early April, it was reported that the
Turkish Cypriot side had suggested that the U.N.-sponsored talks be terminated once the republic
assumed the EU presidency on July 1, 2012. This prompted President Christofias to respond that
Turkish Cypriots were no longer interested in a solution, even though, as Christofias suggested,
the talks could continue during the EU presidency, as the two issues were not related.9
In May 2012, and with the EU presidency fast approaching, Christofias understood that the talks
could not have achieved anything positive, and although he insisted that the negotiations could
have continued during the EU presidency, the U.N. did not. U.N. special envoy Alexander
Downer then announced that Ban had decided not to call for an international conference on
Cyprus due to the lack of agreement on core domestic issues and further stated that the U.N.
would no longer host the leaders’ “unproductive” talks. Downer said that the U.N. would
reconvene the meetings “when there was a clear indication that both sides had something
substantial to conclude.”10
By mid-2012, the convergence of several factors led to the suspension of the talks. One factor
was Christofias’s intent to make the republic’s presidency of the EU a success. Christofias clearly
did not want a divisive debate over what would have probably been an unpopular agreement—
even if he and Eroglu could have negotiated a settlement—to detract or ultimately overshadow
the Cyprus EU presidency. Eroglu’s pronouncement that he would not meet directly with
President Christofias during the six-month EU presidency, despite the fact that the settlement
negotiations were not part of the presidency’s mandate, was also a factor. The emergence of the
fiscal and budget crisis in Cyprus brought on in the aftermath of the larger Eurozone crisis also
contributed to the demise of the negotiations. Christofias realized that managing a serious fiscal
crisis and the presidency of the EU simultaneously would leave, in reality, little time for him to
continue any regular negotiations with Eroglu.
On May 14, 2012, recognizing his own internal political realities and reverting back to an earlier
statement that he would not seek reelection if he was not able to resolve the Cyprus problem,
President Christofias announced that he would not seek reelection in 2013, stating that “there are
no reasonable hopes for a solution to the Cyprus problem or for substantial further progress in the
remaining months of our presidency.”11
By the end of May 2012, the U.N.-sponsored talks, having essentially reached a stalemate, were
formally suspended. Neither Christofias nor Eroglu strongly objected to the U.N. decision. While
both sides blamed the other for a lack of progress on an agreement, the reaction to the
downgrading of the talks appeared to be muted among both the political leaders and the general
publics in both communities.

9 Famagusta Gazette, “Eroglu Seeks Termination of U.N. Talks on Cyprus, President Says,” April 12, 2012.
10 Cyprus Mail, “U.N. Decides to Take a Back Seat,” April 28, 2012.
11 Cyprus Mail, “Christofias Bows Out,” May 15, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
8

Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive

In early June, Kudret Ozersay, then the chief advisor to Eroglu for the negotiations, resigned,
further signaling that the talks, even at the technical level, would not continue at the same pace.
However, Ozersay was soon replaced by Osman Ertuğ as chief negotiator.
Elections 2013: The Anastasiades Government and New Talks
In January 2013, the Republic of Cyprus entered a period of national elections. With Christofias
out of the picture, Nicos Anastasiades of the center-right, democratic DISY party, with the
backing of the conservative DIKO and EVROKO parties, emerged as the leader in early public
opinion polls. DIKO had been part of the previous Christofias-led government but withdrew from
the coalition in disagreement over some of the positions Christofias took in the negotiations with
the Turkish Cypriots. Anastasiades’s closest challenge came from the AKEL party itself, led by
Stavros Malas. Although Anastasiades took the largest number of first round votes, he was forced
into a runoff with Malas but eventually emerged victorious. During the campaign, neither
candidate offered many concrete proposals regarding the negotiations with the Turkish Cypriots,
as the fiscal and budget crisis took center stage.
Anastasiades, who had backed the 2004 Annan Plan for a Cyprus settlement, appeared cautious
about his intentions other than calling for a settlement, perhaps not wanting to cause a public rift
with his DIKO and EVROKO allies, who had opposed the Annan Plan. While foreclosing new
discussions based on the old Annan Plan, Anastasiades had suggested that the basis of future talks
would have to be broad understandings reached in 1977 and 1979 between the Greek and Turkish
Cypriot leadership at the time as well as a 2006 set of principles agreed to by former Cypriot
leaders. He also suggested that as president he would not be directly involved in the day-to-day
negotiations but would, in time, appoint someone as his representative and principal negotiator.
Upon being sworn in as president, Anastasiades did reach out to the Turkish Cypriots, referring to
them as citizens of Cyprus but not giving any clear signal as to his timetable for restarting the
negotiations. On the other hand, Yiannakis Omirou, leader of the parliament, stated that a new
national policy was necessary: “We need to denounce the Turkish stance to the international and
European community and redefine the Cyprus problem as a problem of invasion, occupation and
violation of international law.” The new policy, Omirou went on, “must set out the framework for
a Cyprus solution and use Cyprus’s EU membership and Turkey’s EU prospects to exert pressure
on Ankara to terminate the island’s occupation and accept a solution, in accordance with
international and European law.”12
Initially, the Turkish Cypriots appeared cautious about which negotiating partner they expected to
see across the table if and when the talks resumed. Would it be Anastasiades, who earlier was
sympathetic to many of the provisions of the Annan Plan, or a different negotiator, who was
critical of the previous government’s negotiating positions and had teamed with what the Turkish
Cypriots believed to be hard-line partners who either withdrew from the previous government
coalition in part because of the reported “concessions” being offered by Christofias or were
consistently critical of the previous government’s approach? The Turkish Cypriots had also
seemed to set a new standard regarding their own status as a prelude for resuming the talks.
Eroglu had stated that the talks could not resume automatically from where they left off and had
begun referring to the two “states,” a “new dynamic,” a “new negotiating table,” and a timetable
for concluding whatever talks did resume.

12 Famagusta Gazette, “House President: A New Policy on the Cyprus Problem Needed,” March 2, 2013.
Congressional Research Service
9

Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive

Even as Anastasiades was being inaugurated, he had to turn his attention to the serious domestic
banking and fiscal crises facing the republic. At the same time, Turkish Cypriot and Turkish
leadership began to publicly pressure Anastasiades to restart the settlement talks as soon as
possible, although it appeared that the Turkish Cypriot side was not proposing any significant
compromises or new ideas that would move the talks forward. This prompted Anastasiades to
respond that he would not be forced to the bargaining table during this period of economic
turmoil and was committed to first addressing the government’s fiscal crisis.
In mid-May, Foreign Minister Ioannis Kasoulides traveled to New York and Washington to assure
everyone that the leadership of the republic was indeed interested in resuming the negotiations
but that they needed time to get a handle on the economic crisis on the island. He also made it
clear that the Anastasiades Administration would not be bound by any previous “convergences”
discussed between his predecessor Christofias and Eroglu and would not agree to any definitive
timetable to conclude the talks. Kasoulides also floated the old idea, previously rejected by the
Turkish Cypriots (and opposed by some Greek Cypriots who wanted a comprehensive
agreement), that as a confidence-building measure on the part of Turkey, the abandoned town of
Verosha should be returned to “its rightful owners.” In exchange, the Turkish Cypriots could be
permitted to use the port of Famagusta for direct trade with Europe under the supervision of the
EU. Turkish Cypriots also traveled to Washington with a more upbeat message that 2014 would
be a good year to reach an agreement.
The Turkish Cypriots, however, rejected the return of Verosha and began speaking more publicly
and more often of “the realities on the island,” referring to two separate co-equal states as well as
timetables for concluding the talks. Eroglu had stated that “while there is a Greek Cypriot
administration in the South, there is the TRNC state in the North.” Ankara, for its part, had
already suggested that while it was ready to say “yes” to a negotiated solution, a two-state option
was viable if talks could not restart and produce a solution in a timely fashion.
Eroglu stated in December 2012 that “the Cyprus problem cannot be solved under existing
conditions” and that “a possible settlement of the Cyprus issue could be viable only if it is based
on the existing realities on the island,” which acknowledges that “there were two different people
having two separate languages, religions, nationality and origin and two different states” and that
“certainly it was possible to find a solution to make these two people live together, however
people should bear in mind, it is [not] realistic to establish one state from two separate states.”13
In late May 2013, Anastasiades and Eroglu finally met, and Anastasiades restated his support for
the resumption of the talks but again indicated that the talks could not restart until perhaps
October 2013. In July, the Greek Cypriot National Council took the day-to-day responsibility for
the negotiations out of the hands of the president, as had been the practice since 2008, and
appointed Ambassador Andreas Mavroyiannis of the Foreign Ministry as the Greek Cypriot
negotiator. This action increased speculation that the Greek Cypriots were close to proposing that
preliminary discussions begin with the goal of resuming the formal negotiations.
Throughout the remainder of 2013 and into the beginning of 2014, both sides repeatedly argued
over how to restart the talks despite repeated assurances from both sides that they remained
committed to restarting the negotiations. Through that period, neither side had been willing to
reach agreement on the language of what the Greek Cypriots insisted should be a “joint
statement” redefining a set of negotiating goals or outcomes that both sides would strive to
achieve. The Turkish Cypriots initially rejected the idea that such an opening statement was

13 Statements made by Turkish Cypriot leader Eroglu on various occasions in December 2012 as provided to CRS by
the Turkish Cypriots.
Congressional Research Service
10

Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive

necessary but then decided to negotiate language they could be comfortable with. Negotiations
between Mavroyiannis and Osman Ertuğ took almost six months to conclude.
On February 8, 2014, after what appeared to be a significant intervention by the United States, the
Cyprus press reported that an agreement on the language of a “joint declaration” had been
reached and that Anastasiades and Eroglu would meet right away to relaunch the negotiations.
This was further confirmed when the “joint statement” was released to the public a few days
later.14 The Declaration, which to some became the most comprehensive agreed document since
the High Level Agreements of 1977 and 1979 or the Annan Plan of 2004, on the Cyprus question
now serves the basis of the current negotiations.
The agreement on the language of the joint statement, however, did not come without a political
price for Anastasiades. On February 27, the leader of the government’s coalition partner, DIKO,
Nicolas Papadopoulos, announced that it was leaving the government in disagreement over the
way President Anastasiades was handling the negotiations, much as they did when they quit the
Christofias government.15 It appeared that Papadopoulos—whose father, former President Tassos
Papadopoulos, had opposed the Annan Plan—was concerned that Anastasiades had tacitly
accepted some of the past “convergences” that DIKO had opposed. The fact that the joint
statement referred only to a “united” Cyprus and not the Republic of Cyprus may have again
suggested to DIKO that Anastasiades had come too close to accepting an autonomous Turkish
Cypriot state over which the Greek Cypriots would have little or no authority or jurisdiction.
Curiously, Ertuğ left his post as negotiator after the Declaration was announced but continued to
serve as Eroğlu’s spokesperson. The Turkish Cypriots then reappointed former negotiator Kudret
Ozersay, one seen as more willing to seek accommodation, as their representative to the talks.
Negotiations resumed between Mavroyiannis and Ozersay, with Anastasiades and Eroglu meeting
periodically. It remained unclear exactly where the starting point for each of the “chapters” of
issues to be negotiated had been set. Both sides had earlier insisted that they would not be bound
by past “convergences” thought to have been achieved in previous negotiations. However, the
February joint statement referred to the fact that only “unresolved” issues would be on the table,
suggesting that perhaps some previous agreements had, in fact, been accepted.
Such a long disagreement first over the need for, and then the language of, the joint statement
indicated to many observers that it would continue to be difficult to reach a final solution,
particularly in 2014, which marked the 40th anniversary of the 1974 deployment of Turkish
military forces to the island and the 10th anniversary of the Greek Cypriot vote against the Annan
Plan, events that would be observed in very different ways on each side of the island. The
pessimism surrounding the potential continuation of the stalemate prompted one well-respected
Washington think tank to suggest that a permanent separation of the two sides might become
inevitable and that serious consideration should be given to such a possible outcome.16
The talks did resume in 2014, with Anastasiades and Eroglu meeting several times. In early July,
Eroglu was said to have submitted a “roadmap” toward a settlement, which included a national
referendum to be held by the end of 2014. This was apparently rejected by Anastasiades. Later in
July it was reported that the Greek Cypriots had tabled a 17-point plan addressing their positions
on issues for a future agreement while the Turkish Cypriots submitted a 15-point counter-

14 For text of the statement, see Cyprus Mail, “Joint Declaration Final Version as Agreed Between the Two Leaders,”
February 11, 2014.
15 Famagusta Gazette, “DIKO Decides to Leave Cyprus Government Coalition,” February 27, 2014.
16 International Crisis Group, “Divided Cyprus: Coming to Terms on an Imperfect Reality,” Europe Report 229, March
2014.
Congressional Research Service
11

Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive

proposal. Both proposals were apparently rejected. Not only was there disagreement on how to go
forward, but there had been reports that both sides had actually backtracked on several issues (see
below). These and other reported roadblocks to the negotiations prompted Greek Prime Minister
Antonis Samaras to say in July that no “significant progress” had been made17 and the Turkish
Cypriot official for foreign affairs, Ozdil Nami, to suggest “the peace talks were finished.”18
The last meeting between Anastasiades and Eroglu before a break for the summer was held on
July 26 and was reportedly a somewhat tense session, with Anastasiades expressing his frustration
with the Turkish Cypriot side. In late August, the United Nations named Norwegian diplomat
Espen Barth Eide as the Secretary-General’s new special advisor on Cyprus. The talks, hosted by
Eide, resumed in September, and when Anastasiades and Eroglu renewed their meetings on
September 21, Turkish Cypriot negotiator Kudret Ozersay stated that he felt that “real
negotiations are starting now.”19 Unfortunately, Ozersay’s optimism did not last very long. Near
the end of September, Turkey, sensing an increased interaction among the Republic of Cyprus,
Greece, Israel, and Egypt over energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean, decided, in what
was seen as a provocative act, to move its own seismic exploration vessel into the Republic of
Cyprus’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) off the southern coast of the island. Turkey then issued
what is referred to as a “navigational telex” (NAVTEX) stating that the seismic operations could
last until April 2015 unless the Turkish Cypriots were given more of a role in decisions regarding
the island’s natural resources, specifically energy. Reacting to Turkey’s decision to establish a
presence in the Cypriot EEZ, President Anastasiades announced in October that he was
withdrawing from the settlement negotiations and declared that the talks would not resume until
the Turkish seismic vessel was withdrawn from Cyprus’s EEZ and the NAVTEX was rescinded.
By March 2015, the seismic ship had moved to the port of Famagusta, but the NAVTEX had not
been withdrawn.
Although the Greek Cypriots insisted that all of the island would eventually benefit from any
resources exploited in the waters off the coast, they pointed out that energy, under the provisions
of the joint statement agreed to earlier, would be considered a “federal-level” issue and would
become part of the dialogue once an agreement was reached. The Turkish Cypriots, for their part,
demanded that energy issues become part of the formal settlement negotiations once they
resumed. In late October, with the negotiations suspended, Turkish Cypriot negotiator Ozersay
was replaced by Ergun Olgun.
Through the first four months of 2015, the talks remained in suspension, with Anastasiades
continuing to hold that Turkey would have to withdraw its seismic ship, rescind the NAVTEX
issued in January, and stop threatening existing energy exploration activities off the southern
coast of Cyprus. Some believed that political pressure from what would be his normal domestic
political allies had forced Anastasiades into a corner, preventing him from backing down from
this demand despite some domestic and international pressure to do so. Others believed he was
under pressure to hold off on the talks until the national elections in the north, scheduled for April
19, were concluded.
By mid-April 2015, Turkey had removed its seismic vessel from Cyprus and did not renew the
NAVTEX. However, the election campaign in the north had begun, and both sides accepted the
fact that the negotiations would not resume until after the elections.

17 Famagusta Gazette, “No “Significant Progress” in Cyprus Talks—Greek PM,” July 28, 2014.
18 “Cyprus Peace Talks Are Finished, Claims Ozdil Nami,” Turkish Cypriot TV as reported in the Famagusta Gazette,
July 18, 2014.
19 Interview with Kudret Ozersay on Ada TV, September 2014.
Congressional Research Service
12

Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive

Elections 2015: Akinci and the Resumption of the Negotiations
On April 19, Turkish Cypriots went to the polls to elect a new “president.” Seven candidates were
on the ballot. The incumbent, Dervis Ergolu, emerged with a thin margin of votes over the runner
up, Mustafa Akinci, but did not win enough to avoid a second round of voting. On April 26, in the
second round of voting, Mustafa Akinci of the small, center-left, Communal Democratic Party
(TDA) won the election to become the new leader of the Turkish Cypriots, defeating Eroglu with
60% of the votes. Akinci, a three-time “mayor” of the Turkish Cypriot-administered half of
Nicosia, immediately announced that the negotiations would resume as soon as possible in May
and that it was his intention to conclude a settlement agreement by the end of 2015. In
congratulating Akinci on his election, Anastasiades confirmed that he, too, looked forward to
restarting the negotiations as soon as possible.
It did not take long for the two sides to meet. On May 11, 2015 the U.N. Special Envoy hosted a
dinner for the two leaders in what was described as a relaxed and positive setting. Akinci quickly
named Ozdil Nami, the former “foreign minister” in the Eroglu government, as the new
negotiator for the Turkish Cypriot side, and on May 17 Anastasiades and Akinci held their first
formal negotiating session. On May 23, the two leaders took the unprecedented step of walking
together down Ledra Street, the symbolic dividing line of the island, in a show of solidarity and
hope that this time things would be different. This was the first time that a president of the
republic stepped on to territory normally referred to as “occupied” land. Since then, the two
leaders have met several additional times.
Akinci led a small political party that played little, if any role, in the past negotiation process, and
his candidacy was criticized by some as inexperienced. For some, he entered the negotiations
unencumbered with any preconditions for the talks or for a settlement. Although he did initially
meet with all of the other Turkish Cypriot political parties, he seemed determined to rely on the
business and NGO communities to help develop and articulate his negotiating positions.
The reaction to Akinci among the Greek Cypriots, although not all, appears to be positive but
restrained, with a somewhat upbeat “wait-and-see” attitude prevailing. Many appear to be
relieved that Eroglu and his hardline approach to the negotiations are gone, and, with little in the
way of determined political opponents acting as a restraint on his negotiating strategy, some feel
Akinci has been more willing to compromise on some of the issues Eroglu would not budge on.
On the other hand, not knowing where his support for a final deal would actually come from,
some were not sure exactly what Akinci could compromise on. In August of 2015, Akinici began
a round of visits and discussions with the political parties, NGOs, and the business community
apparently to assess exactly how much leeway he had for compromise.
Turkey was another factor for Akinci. Akinci was not seen as a favorite of Ankara during the
elections, and Ankara was likely surprised with the margin of his victory. The government in
Ankara offered the obligatory congratulations to Akinci, and Turkey’s president Erdogan visited
the island to meet with the new leader. Erdogan was reportedly irked by some comments made by
Akinci regarding relations between Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, and at the time, it was not
known just how well he was actually perceived in Ankara. In an interview in early August with
Emine Colak, the Turkish Cypriot “foreign minister,” Colak indicated that Turkey was not trying
to manipulate the peace talks and seemed, for the moment, content to let the Turkish Cypriots
negotiate their own agreement.20 Some observers attributed this “hands-off” approach by Turkey

20 “Turkey Not Manipulating Cyprus Peace Talks,” Hurriyet Daily News, August 2, 2015.
Congressional Research Service
13

Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive

as a reason why a positive atmosphere has surrounded the talks and why some concrete progress
seems to have been made.
Over the summer of 2015, as the negotiations continued on a regular pace, several new
“confidence-building” measures have been initiated. The two leaders have agreed on the opening
of a new border crossing at Deryneia, and for the first time in 40 years, electricity connections
between the two sides have been reestablished. Returning Verosha to the Greek Cypriots
continues to be a measure Anastaiades endorses.
Despite the current level of optimism being displayed by the leaders of the two sides, many recall
a similarly hopeful atmosphere prevalent in early 2008, after Christofias was elected president on
a campaign filled with commitments of a quick conclusion to the negotiations. At that time,
Turkish Cypriot leader, Ali Talat declared that because he and Christofias shared the same vision
of a future for Cyprus, the two could overcome years of disagreement and mistrust and that the
negotiations could conclude within six months. Akinci’s declarations regarding a quick settlement
have raised expectations again, but only time will tell whether Anastasiades and Akinci can
overcome traditional barriers to a settlement that have failed to secure an agreement in the past.
For now, the mood seems to be as positive and constructive as it has ever been.
Issues
As intensely as the Cyprus negotiations have been followed in the press and by outside political
observers, it has always been difficult to determine with any specificity exactly what either side
means by the term “convergences” when referring to the issues under negotiation. And although
both Anastasiades and Eroglu had indicated that neither would be bound by any of the past
convergences, some of the language in their February 2014 joint statement seemed to have
suggested that some past agreements had been adopted. However, during the course of the
negotiations over the summer of 2014, the status of these past convergences seemed to have
become more uncertain, with both sides sending mixed signals over whether they had agreed to
anything.
It is relatively early in the Akinci era, and he and Anastasiades have not indicated specifically
what the starting point of the negotiations had been beyond the “joint statement” issued in 2014.
Eroglu apparently drew some pretty strong “red” lines around some issues, and Akinci has not
appeared, at least publically, to have adopted or refuted any particular positions advocated by
Eroglu, although many expect that to happen on some issues. So at the moment a look back at the
issues at stake will refer to pre-Akinci discussions with any new developments noted.
In his April 1, 2010, press conference, former Turkish Cypriot leader Talat stated that 31 “joint
documents” had been prepared addressing a range of issues. Talat suggested that the new federal
government would have powers over external relations, EU policies, citizenship, budget matters,
and economic coordination. These also appeared to be the “convergences” often referred to by
Christofias and Eroglu. They were also reference points included in the language of the 2014
“joint statement” between Anastasiades and Ergolu. Another understanding suggested that one
side would hold the portfolio of the foreign minister and the other the EU portfolio. Still another
had the equal constituent states covering most of the remainder of the governance issues, which
again seems to have been written into the joint statement. Talat also suggested that the two sides
had agreed on a Senate, equally represented, and a House proportionally based on population.
There was also reportedly a “convergence” on a new judicial court that would have equal Turkish
and Greek Cypriot representation and that Cyprus would be represented in the European
Parliament by four Greek and two Turkish Cypriot Ministers of Parliament. A federal supreme
court was also identified in the joint statement.
Congressional Research Service
14

Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive

When former President Christofias and Eroglu began their negotiations, neither side
acknowledged the Christofias/Talat “convergences” as anything more than unofficial
understandings, as both sides adhered to the idea that “nothing is agreed until everything is
agreed,” a position again stated in the joint statement. What did appear clear, however, were the
issues on which little agreement had been reached or in fact had been the subject of some
backtracking by both sides.
For instance, both sides continued to differ over how a new united Cyprus would be created. The
Greek Cypriots assumed that the new unified state would evolve from the existing Republic of
Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriots wanted the new state to be based on two equal “founding states,” as
Eroglu had stated he was not prepared to give up the TRNC. The Turkish Cypriots also wanted
the new entity referred to as something other than the “Republic of Cyprus.” The joint statement
agreed to by Anastasiades and Eroglu in 2014 simply referred to a “united” Cyprus, not a united
“Republic of Cyprus,” and seemed to suggest two relatively separate “constituent states” united
under a federal government that would have limited authority relative to the power of the two
states. The Anastasiades/Akinci talks seem to suggest that the new entity could be referred to
something like the Federal Republic of Cyprus, but it is unclear how the two sides get there.
Christofias reportedly proposed the direct election of a president and vice president for a six-year
term on the same ticket with weighted cross-community voting. The president would be a Greek
Cypriot for four years, and the vice president would be a Turkish Cypriot; they would then rotate
offices, with the Turkish Cypriot becoming president for two years. Turkish Cypriots initially
proposed that the executive have two alternating presidents elected by the Senate. Turkish
Cypriots were opposed to a single list of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot candidates to be
elected by all of the people of Cyprus principally because Greek Cypriots, by virtue of their
majority, would in effect elect the Turkish Cypriot candidate. At some point, Talat seemed to have
made a significant concession in agreeing to accept the Greek position for the election of a
president and vice president even though he continued to have doubts about direct popular voting.
Although the idea of a rotating presidency was not new, opposition to the proposal was, and
continued to be, vocal on the Greek Cypriot side, as many Greek Cypriots apparently could not
accept the idea of being governed by a representative of the Turkish Cypriot minority.21 On the
other hand, Eroglu seemed to want to pursue that option. It had been reported that in July 2014,
Anastasiades retreated on the notion of a rotating presidency, proposing the old idea that future
presidents be Greek Cypriots and future vice presidents be Turkish Cypriots elected directly by all
voters. The Turkish Cypriots rejected the proposal. Akinci in early August apparently suggested
that a rotating presidency was a must in order to have political equality.
The thorny and emotional issue of property had been the focus of a significant debate between
Christofias and Eroglu and has been addressed early by Anastasiades and Akinci. As a result of
the ethnic strife of the 1960s and the deployment of Turkish military forces on the island in 1974,
it was estimated that over 150,000 Greek Cypriots living in the north were forced south and close
to 50,000 Turkish Cypriots living in the south fled to the north, with both communities leaving
behind massive amounts of vacated property. Greek Cypriots had long insisted that the original
and legal owners who lost properties in the north must have the right to decide how to deal with
their property, whether through recovery, exchange, or compensation. Turkish Cypriots believe
that the current inhabitant of a property must have priority and that the issue should be resolved
through compensation, exchange of alternate property, or restitution. To try to help resolve some
of the property issues, the Turkish Cypriots established the Immovable Property Commission

21 According to a poll conducted by the EDEK party in the spring of 2010, over 70% of Greek Cypriots polled
expressed opposition to a rotating presidency.
Congressional Research Service
15

Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive

(IPC) to hear cases related to Greek Cypriot property claims in the north. The Greek Cypriots
initially rejected the IPC. Only a few private Greek property owners have filed claims for
compensation with the IPC. Although the gap in the respective Cypriot positions on property has
been wide, it now appears that positive movement has been achieved. In July 2015, Anastasiades
and Akinci agreed to create a new independent property commission with both sides agreeing that
former property owners would be offered various choices regarding their claims that would allow
all involved to be fairly compensated.
The question of overall territory that would come under the jurisdiction of the two equal states
remains in dispute. The Turkish Cypriot side of the “green line” includes approximately 37% of
the island and includes several areas that had been inhabited almost entirely by Greek Cypriots
before the 1974 division, such as Varosha, Morphou, and Karpas. Greek Cypriots want that
territory returned, which would leave the Turkish Cypriot side controlling about 29% of the
territory. At the time, Christofias resurrected an older proposal that would have the Turkish side
return the uninhabited city of Varosha to Greek Cyprus in exchange for opening the seaport of
Famagusta for use by the Turkish Cypriots to conduct international trade. The port would be
operated by the EU and a joint Greek/Turkish Cypriot administration, thus allowing direct trade
between northern Cyprus and the EU. Eroglu, perhaps banking on a proposal at the time
submitted by the EU Commission to the EU parliament to open direct trade with the north,
rejected the Varosha/Famagusta proposal, although some speculated that Ankara was opposed to
such a deal because it then would have placed pressure on Turkey to comply with its obligations
under the Ankara Protocol to open its ports to Cypriot commerce. The European Parliament
declined to consider the commission’s initiative on technical grounds, but its 2011 report on
Turkey’s EU accession progress (introduced in Parliament in 2012) called for that very trade-off
Christofias offered.
After the 2013 Greek Cypriot elections, President Anastasiades resurrected the proposal in the
form of a “confidence-building” measure to test the sincerity of the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey
to move forward in the negotiations. Eroglu stated that territory was a key bargaining chip for the
Turkish Cypriots, suggesting he would not accept any Greek Cypriot proposal on Varosha or
other areas. In early August 2014, it was reported that Anastasiades had upped the ante by
suggesting that no agreement could be reached unless the town of Morphou was also returned to
the republic. The Turkish Cypriots quickly rejected the idea, saying the town would not be
returned.22 After newly elected Turkish Cypriot leader Mustafa Akinci took office, Anastasiades
again included the Varosha/Famagusta option as a confidence-building measure. Thus far, the
Turkish Cypriot side does not appear ready to go much beyond inspecting the city to determine
whether it actually could be re-inhabited.
On another issue, in July 2010, President Christofias, seeking to unlock the stalemate, tabled a
proposal that would have linked the property and territory issues into one agreement, which also
included Christofias’s earlier offer to allow 50,000 mainland Turks who had settled in the north to
remain in the north. Eroglu had indicated that any final solution could not result in significant
social upheaval in north Cyprus, meaning that significant numbers of citizens of the north,
whether from the mainland or not, could not be forced to leave, and only a small number of Greek
Cypriots would be permitted to return to property in the north. Eroglu rejected the offer from
Christofias and had held that “no one on Cyprus is any longer a refugee” and that sending
mainland Turkish settlers back to Turkey was not something he could agree to. Eroglu had also
reiterated in his talks with Anastasiades that the number of mainland Turks who had settled in the

22 Famagusta Gazette, “No Solution to the Cyprus Problem Without Return of Morphou, President Says,” August 14,
2014.
Congressional Research Service
16

Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive

north and would be allowed to remain on the island would have to be higher than previously
discussed.23
After the joint statement was agreed to in February 2014, Turkish Cypriot representatives were
reported to have stated that no citizens of the north would be required to leave the country.24 In a
talk given at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC, on February 28, 2014, the Cyprus
ambassador to the United States speculated that a resolution of the Cyprus problem could
conceivably allow for mainland Turks, who came to the island as long ago as 40 years and had
established clear roots in the north, to remain on the island. Greek Cypriot political parties, other
than perhaps AKEL, appear to remain opposed to any agreement that would allow a large number
of “settlers” to remain on the island. Akinci, perhaps not wishing to antagonize what is now a
larger segment of the population in the north, seems to have stayed away from this issue for now,
although it appears that both sides may have agreed to at least set population sizes in both of the
“constituent” states that would emerge as part of an agreement.
Next to the property issue, the issue of security guarantees continues to be one of the most
difficult bridges to cross. The Greek Cypriots have long argued that all Turkish military forces
would have to leave the island. They argued that the EU can offer security guarantees to all of its
citizens in its member states. Therefore, once the entire island became part of the EU, they saw no
reason for guarantees from third countries, such as Turkey, Greece, or the United Kingdom.25
Turkish Cypriots and Turkey maintain that the 1960 Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance must be
reaffirmed in any settlement, and Turkish security guarantees should not be lifted until Turkey
joins the EU, because, without guarantees, the Turkish Cypriots would feel insecure based on
their history with ethnic violence on the island in the 1960s. Eroglu had stated on several past
occasions that “the security guarantees with Motherland Turkey could not be changed.”26 After
the February 2014 joint statement was agreed to, it was reported that Eroglu had again stated that
Turkish troops would not leave the island.27 In late April, it was reported that the Greek foreign
minister suggested that no final agreement on Cyprus could be achieved until all Turkish military
forces agreed to leave the island. It was unclear whether Akinci had even raised this issue for
discussion at this point, not wanting to antagonize Turkey or even give Ankara a reason to
reengage in the talks. However, in an early visit to North Cyprus, Turkish Foreign Minister
Feriden Hadi Sinirlioglu may have repeated the Turkish position that security for the north was
important and that the “guarantor” nations would have to be included in the negotiations at some
point.
Raising the ante on the negotiations was the introduction of a new issue, energy resources, that
had served to help stall the negotiations altogether. The exploration of energy resources in the
Eastern Mediterranean—an issue many observers believed (some still do) would serve to unite
the two sides and enhance the prospects for a negotiated settlement—had actually served to
separate the two sides even further. Although the Greek Cypriots have stated that the entire island
would share in the potential wealth once a settlement is reached, neither the Turkish Cypriots nor
Ankara seemed convinced. Early on, both Ankara and the Turkish Cypriots had proposed that a
joint Greek and Turkish Cypriot energy committee be created outside of the parameters of the

23 Cyprus Mail, “The Most Blatant Mockery of Negotiations,” July 27, 2014.
24 Famagusta Gazette, “Jittery Turkish Settlers Seek Clarifications as Cyprus Talks Resume,” February 19, 2014.
25 Cyprus News Agency, “Cypriot FM: No Derogations from Acquis During a Solution,” November 14, 2008, BBC
Monitoring European, November 17, 2008.
26 Comments from the speech of Turkish Cypriot leader Dervis Eroglu commemorating the Turkish intervention in
Cyprus, July 20, 2011.
27 Cyprus Mail, “AKEL: Pay No Heed to Eroglu’s Rhetoric,” February 22, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
17

Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive

settlement negotiations to address the equitable exploration and exploitation of the island’s
natural resources irrespective of the negotiations. Under Eroglu, the Turkish Cypriots argued that
energy issues must be a part of the negotiations. The Greek Cypriots rejected such a proposal,
stating that energy issues would be dealt with under any new “federal” system agreed to in the
negotiations. Turkey’s actions in the republic’s EEZ, supported by the Turkish Cypriots, hardened
both sides and could have much deeper and unanticipated consequences if future drilling carried
out on behalf of the republic continues and proves successful in locating new gas deposits and if
Turkey presses its past pronouncements that it will not allow the republic to exploit the natural
resources without Turkish Cypriot participation. Akinci seems reluctant to press this issue for the
moment, apparently accepting Anastasiades’ promises that energy wealth will be shared by both
sides.
Assessment
The election of Christofias in 2008 together with sitting Turkish Cypriot leader Talat ushered in a
period of higher expectations for a settlement than at any time since 2004, when both Cypriot
communities considered the Annan Plan. The personal relationship between Christofias and Talat
and their public commitments to finding a solution to the Cyprus problem suggested that if these
two leaders could not achieve a negotiated settlement, then it might take a long time before two
like-minded leaders would again find themselves in a position to unify the people of Cyprus. With
the April 2015 election of Mustafa Akinci as leader of the Turkish Cypriots, many believe that
time has arrived.
Despite the strong commitment, good intentions, and warm relations between Christofias and
Talat, progress in the talks fell victim to the harsh realities of four decades of separation, mistrust,
misunderstanding, and in some cases indifference to the need for a final settlement and
unification of the island. Similarly, Christofias and Eroglu were unable to find enough common
ground or make critically necessary concessions to craft an acceptable accommodation despite
regular leadership meetings, technical level discussions, and five meetings with U.N. Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon.
The 2013 presidential elections in the republic did offer the possibility that with at least one new
negotiator in the person of Anastasiades, some level of new energy might have been injected into
the negotiations. After the presidential elections, however, many observers became disappointed
that the resumption of the negotiations appeared to have become a much lesser priority than
expected for either leader, even though they understood the need for Anastasiades to address the
economic crisis that had engulfed the Greek Cypriot side and Ergolu’s previous expressions of
frustration with the process. In the end, Anastasiades and Ergolu fared no better and actually
appeared to have made even less progress toward a solution.
With the agreement on the “joint statement” in early 2014, there appeared a glimmer of hope that
the window of opportunity to reach an agreed solution had reopened even as opposition on the
Greek Cypriot side began to emerge. The subsequent negotiations had proven otherwise. Turkish
Cypriot negotiator Ozersay’s comments after the September 21, 2014, meeting between
Anastasiades and Eroglu that “real negotiations are starting now” left many wondering what
Ozersay felt had taken place over the previous six years and what had now changed. The issues
that had continued to separate the two communities and have prevented a solution for over 40
years have long been clearly defined—they had not changed significantly since the Annan Plan in
2004—and the positions and proposed solutions each side had taken on them have been
thoroughly presented, debated, and rejected by each side over and over.
Congressional Research Service
18

Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive

The injection of the energy resource issue into the negotiations resulted in yet another
complication in the talks. This led to accusations, threats, and further distrust among the republic,
the Turkish Cypriots, and Ankara. While some observers thought that the energy issue could have
become a rallying point for stepped up and hopefully successful negotiations in which both sides
would enjoy the economic benefits of the newly found resources, the atmosphere was quickly
poisoned and had become, for some, another lost opportunity. Some felt Turkey could have
quickly resolved the dispute by withdrawing its seismic ship and rescinding the NAVTEX with
both Cypriot sides then agreeing to decouple energy from the settlement negotiations, possibly by
creating a separate, private-sector-led negotiation on resources. Greek Cypriots, however, seemed
to feel decoupling the issue at that time in favor of separate negotiations would have taken away
an important incentive to keep the Turkish Cypriots at the negotiating table.
The suspension of the talks, precipitated for some by an unnecessary action and a possible
overreaction, again raised serious doubts regarding the commitment of both sides to achieve a
solution that left one former British foreign secretary stating that “the international community
should accept the reality that there is division and that you have partition.”28
The April 2015 election of Mustafa Akinci has reopened the window of opportunity for a
permanent settlement of the Cyprus problem. As “mayor” of the Turkish Cypriot portion of
Nicosia, Akinci had been praised for working cooperatively with his Greek Cypriot counterparts
on a number of infrastructure projects, leading some to hold a positive view of the possibilities of
a settlement solution with Akinci.
Akinci, immediately after his election, spoke of resuming the negotiations as soon as possible, an
action that has been achieved. And, both sides raised the idea of the need for a few “confidence
building” measures similar to what Anastasiades had proposed, including the opening of several
new “green line” crossing points as well as a Verosha/Famagusta agreement, which Eroglu had
consistently rejected.
While the political environment on both sides of the island immediately after the election, and
since then, has taken on a positive air, with congratulations and predictions that the negotiations
could conclude quickly, the scene reminds Cyprus observers of the 2008 election of Dimitris
Christofias and the almost giddy atmosphere that arose over a possible quick solution to the
division of the island. After Christofias’s election, Turkish Cypriot leader Ali Talat, a long-time
acquaintance of Christofias, and a supporter of the 2004 Annan Plan, declared that a solution in
Cyprus was possible by the end of 2008. Akinci, like Talat, has declared that he and Anastasiades
were of the same generation and could possibly relate more easily to each other and could better
understand the measures that both sides would have to take to achieve a solution. Akinci’s
declarations regarding a settlement have raised a deja vu feeling of “been-there-said-that” all over
again. The relationship between the two leaders has thus far been an improvement over the
Anastasiades/Eroglu relationship, but, as was the case between Christofias and Talat, things can
change quickly. While the negotiations between Christofias and Talat appeared to get off to a fast
start, the differences in positions quickly became apparent, and the talks, although held on a
regular basis, soon began to bog down. The first few months of the Anastasiades/Akinci era seem
to have gone well. However, in order to meet Akinci’s timetable for a settlement, the next few
months of the talks will be critical and will show whether both sides can overcome traditional
barriers to a settlement more effectively than previous attempts by Cypriot leaders.

28 “Straw Calls for Acceptance of Cyprus Division,” reported by the Famagusta Gazette, from an interview between
former British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw and the Anadolu Agency, November 26, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
19

Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive

There are two areas worth watching closely as the new era continues. One is the perception in the
republic of Anastasiades’s enthusiasm in the negotiations and commitment to reach a solution.
Christofias’s apparent good relations with Talat quickly ran afoul of the Greek Cypriot
opposition, which became suspicious that Christofias was willing to make too many concessions
just to get a deal. Similarly, after the 2014 “joint statement” was agreed to by Anastasiades, the
DIKO party quit the coalition over perceived concessions in the language by Anastasiades that
could portend problems for the negotiations. As the talks moved on, Anastasiades sought quick
joint agreements on some of confidence-building measures and had achieved several without
much internal debate or objection from the opposition. However, on June 15, 2015, the socialist
party, EDEK, took the decision to officially reject the notion of a bi-zonal, bi-communal
federation as a part of the solution to the Cyprus problem. Other than the EDEK action,
Anastasiades appeared to be keeping his potential political foes at bay by keeping them informed
of the talks, thus avoiding public controversy and criticism of the negotiations.29 However, in
early September 2015 when Anastasiades and his team briefed the leadership of the political
parties, several of them voiced dissatisfaction with the level of information they were receiving.
Anastasiades facing looming legislative elections in May 2016 could be seeing the opening
rounds of opposition statements that could impact the negotiations in different ways.
Similarly, Akinci was not seen as the preferred choice of Ankara, who may have been more
comfortable with another five years of Eroglu. In fact, it was reported in the Turkish press that
Akinci and Turkish President Erdogan had exchanged some unpleasant words immediately after
the election. In his victory statement, Akinci reiterated his campaign position that the status of the
relationship between Turkey and Turkish Cyprus should change. “It should be a relationship of
brothers/sisters, not a relationship of a motherland and her child,” he had said.30 This provoked a
somewhat angry response from Erdogan and led the Turkish press to question the future of
Turkey’s support for the negotiations. In an editorial in the April 28 edition of the Hurriyet Daily
News
, the author suggested that
Akıncı has been away from active politics for more than a decade. His team is mostly
composed of young people unaware of the delicacies and history of the Cyprus problem.
Anastasiades might try to score an easy victory. If the Cyprus talks between the “novice”
Akıncı team and a ravenous Anastasiades team somehow agree on a deal that favored the
demands of the Greek Cypriots, Akinci could dangerously risk fundamental demands of
the Turkish Cypriots, forcing the whole process to be derailed in a manner very difficult
to revive with extreme effort.31
Although congratulated by Erdogan and others in Ankara, some observers felt Akinci would have
to tread lightly in the opening rounds of the negotiations lest he draw the ire of a wary Turkey.
However, with the stalemate in Turkey over the composition of a new government now leading to
new national elections and with Turkey’s attention focused more than ever on the situation in
Syria involving the Islamic State (IS), Akinci appears to have taken the opportunity to move
quickly to test the waters of what both the Greek Cypriots were willing to accept as part of a final
solution to the Cyprus problem.
The concern for some in the Greek Cypriot political leadership now appears to be that any
potential settlement arrived at between Anastasiades and Akinci would inevitably enshrine the
“two-state” concept with their authority over the northern part of the island forever limited to

29 “EDEK Back Sizopoulos in Rejection of BBF,” Cyprusmail, June 15, 2015.
30 “Erdogan Engages in War of Words with New Turkish Cypriot Leader,” Hurriyet Daily News, April 26, 2015.
31 “Akinci Won, Now What,” Hurriyet Daily News, April 28, 2015.
Congressional Research Service
20

Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive

what weak governing powers an overlapping “federal” government structure would provide. On
the other hand, many Greek Cypriots may now believe that if a final settlement would not affect
the benefits enjoyed by the people of the Greek Cypriot community—who are already members
of the European Union—or would impose new Turkish Cypriot authority over the south, it may
be the time to reach a settlement. Those in the north with closer ties to Ankara—some suggest
mostly from within the community of Turks who have settled in the north—who do not wish to
be governed in any way by Greek Cypriots and who would not give Akinci much support if they
sensed he was making too many concessions to Anastasiades, may now also feel the time for a
settlement is here. In its 2009 report on the Cyprus issue, the International Crisis Group pointed
out that there appeared to be a growing younger generation on both sides of the island who have
never interacted with the other and saw no reason to, did not have as much of a stake in the
property issue, and did not wish to face the uncertainties and potential problems that a settlement
neither side likes could create. On the other hand, that same generation of younger Cypriots may
now relish the opportunity to rid the island of much of the current-day tension and to reintroduce
themselves as one Cypriot community.
Another dimension to the Cyprus problem comes in the form of the EU itself. Of all of the
problems currently confronting the EU, few have been as enduring or as perplexing as the failure
to resolve the political division of Cyprus after all these years of negotiations. While hardly as
critical an issue for the future of the EU as others, the Cyprus problem has, nevertheless, become
one of those thorns in the EU’s side that has caused continued frustration in Brussels on several
counts. The inability to achieve a mutually acceptable solution to Cyprus has stalled the full
integration of the Turkish Cypriot community into the union, periodically raising complaints of
international political and economic isolation by the Turkish Cypriots and demands for the EU to
address the problem, particularly through enhanced trade opportunities for the Turkish Cypriots.
The lack of a solution has also created an embarrassing political status issue for the EU in that,
while the EU considers all of the island having entered the union in 1974 an international
organization, the United Nations must provide security along what should be an internal EU
border, if any border at all. In addition, a reported 30,000 foreign troops are stationed on what
Brussels, at least, considers EU territory. The lack of a resolution has also complicated the EU’s
on-again-off-again efforts to move forward on closer relations between the Union and Turkey and
perhaps even Turkey’s accession to the union. Finally, the Cyprus problem has posed major
problems for the EU and the republic itself as they continue to face the increasing possibility of a
permanently divided island and increasing, long-term tensions with Ankara over Turkey’s role in
the north. More recently the dispute over the exploitation of hydrocarbons off the southern coast
of Cyprus has further exacerbated EU-Turkey relations. Despite these “issues” for the EU,
Brussels seems unsure how or little inclined to step up its role in trying to unify what is a divided
EU member state.
Despite the long period of stalemate and suspension in the negotiations between Anastasiades and
Eroglu, many observers believe the election of Akinci in the north, and the positive nature of the
early comments and progress made by both leaders regarding a possible solution since, will
indeed allow the negotiations to refresh with a renewed sense of optimism that agreements can be
reached. However, the compromises and concessions each side will still have to make in order to
reach a final solution, at the moment, do not appear any closer to being achieved, and thus
reaching that final elusive settlement will still not prove to be any easier.

Congressional Research Service
21

Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive

Author Contact Information

Vincent L. Morelli

Section Research Manager
vmorelli@crs.loc.gov, 7-8051

Congressional Research Service
22