Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
August 6, 2015
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21534
Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy
Summary
The Sultanate of Oman has been a strategic ally of the United States since 1980 when it became
the first Persian Gulf state to sign a formal agreement with the United States allowing U.S. use of
its military facilities. It hosted U.S. forces during every U.S. military operation in and around the
Gulf since 1980 and has become a significant buyer of U.S. military equipment, moving away
from its prior reliance on British military advice and equipment. Oman is a partner in U.S. efforts
to counter the movement of terrorists and pirates in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, and it has
consistently supported U.S. Middle East peacemaking efforts by publicly endorsing peace
agreements reached and by occasionally hosting Israeli leadership visits. It was partly in
appreciation for this alliance that the United States entered into a free trade agreement (FTA) with
Oman, which is also intended to help Oman diversify its economy to compensate for its relatively
small reserves of crude oil. Oman’s ties to the United States are unlikely to loosen if its ailing
leader, Sultan Qaboos bin Sa’id Al Said, leaves the scene in the near term. He returned to Oman
in late March 2015 after undergoing nearly a year of treatment in Germany, purportedly for
cancer.
Unlike most of the other Persian Gulf monarchies, Oman asserts that openly confronting Iran is
not the optimal strategy to address the potential threat from that country. Sultan Qaboos has
consistently maintained ties to Iran’s leaders and has discussed large energy sector ventures such
as a natural gas pipeline that would link Oman and Iran. Successive U.S. Administrations have
generally refrained from criticizing the Iran-Oman relationship, perhaps in part because Oman
has been useful as an intermediary between the United States and Iran. An August 2013 visit to
Iran by Qaboos, which followed months and possibly years of quiet U.S.-Iran diplomacy
brokered by Oman, helped pave the way for the November 24, 2013, interim nuclear agreement
between Iran and the international community. Some of the talks that led to the July 14, 2015,
“Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” (JCPOA) with Iran were held in Oman. Earlier, Oman
played the role of broker between Iran and the United States in the September 2011 release of two
U.S. hikers from Iran after two years in jail there, and it reportedly is involved in efforts to obtain
the release of other U.S. citizens imprisoned in Iran or in territory under Iran’s control.
Oman’s ties to Iran are an example of the Sultanate’s largely independent foreign policy that
sometimes differs with that of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE,
Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman) leader Saudi Arabia. Oman opposes a Saudi effort to promote greater
political unity among the six GCC states. Oman also differs with the other Gulf states in
refraining from any intervention in the Syria civil war. Oman has publicly joined the U.S.-led
coalition against the Islamic State organization but Oman is apparently not participating militarily
in those efforts. Oman has not joined the Saudi-led coalition that is undertaking military action
against the Zaidi Shiite “Houthi” rebels in Yemen.
Prior to the wave of Middle East unrest that began in 2011, the United States repeatedly praised
Sultan Qaboos for gradually opening the political process without evident public pressure to do
so. The liberalization allowed Omanis a measure of representation, but did not significantly limit
Qaboos’s role as paramount decisionmaker. The modest reforms—as well as the country’s
economic performance—apparently did not satisfy some Omanis because unprecedented protests
took place in several Omani cities for much of 2011. The apparent domestic popularity of
Qaboos, coupled with additional economic and political reforms as well as repression of protest
actions, caused the unrest to subside by early 2012.
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Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Democratization, Human Rights, and Unrest .................................................................................. 2
Representative Institutions and Election History ...................................................................... 4
2011 Unrest: Dissatisfaction but Not Hunger for a New Regime ....................................... 4
2011 and 2012 Elections Held Amid Unrest ....................................................................... 5
Broader Human Rights Issues ................................................................................................... 6
Freedom of Expression/Media ............................................................................................ 7
Labor Rights ....................................................................................................................... 7
Religious Freedom .............................................................................................................. 7
Advancement of Women ..................................................................................................... 7
Trafficking in Persons ......................................................................................................... 8
Defense and Security Issues ............................................................................................................ 8
U.S. Arms Sales and other Security Assistance to Oman .......................................................... 9
Cooperation against Terrorism/”NADR” Funding ................................................................... 11
Foreign Policy/Regional Issues ............................................................................................... 12
Cooperation Against the Islamic State Organization/Syria and Iraq ................................. 13
Policies on Other Regional Uprisings ............................................................................... 13
Iran .................................................................................................................................... 14
Afghanistan ....................................................................................................................... 16
Israeli-Palestinian Dispute and Related Issues .................................................................. 16
Yemen ............................................................................................................................... 17
Economic and Trade Issues ........................................................................................................... 18
Economic Aid ................................................................................................................... 19
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Oman ................................................................................................................... 2
Tables
Table 1. Some Key Facts on Oman ................................................................................................. 1
Table 2. Recent U.S. Aid to Oman ................................................................................................. 11
Contacts
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 19
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Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy
Introduction
Oman is located along the Arabian Sea, on the southern approaches to the Strait of Hormuz,
across from Iran. Except for a brief period of Persian rule, Omanis have remained independent
since expelling the Portuguese in 1650. The Al Said monarchy began in 1744, extending Omani
influence into Zanzibar and other parts of East Africa until 1861. A long-term rebellion led by the
imam of Oman, leader of the Ibadhi sect (neither Sunni nor Shiite and widely considered
“moderate conservative”) ended in 1959. Oman’s population is 75% Ibadhi—a moderate form of
Islam that is closer in philosophy to Sunni Islam than to Shiism. Sultan Qaboos bin Sa’id Al Said,
born in November 1940, is the eighth in the line of the monarchy; he became sultan in July 1970
when, with British support, he forced his father, Sultan Said bin Taymur Al Said, to abdicate.
The United States signed a Treaty of Amity and Commerce with Oman in 1833, one of the first of
its kind with an Arab state. This treaty was replaced by the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations,
and Consular Rights signed at Salalah on December 20, 1958. Oman sent an official envoy to the
United States in 1840. A U.S. consulate was maintained in Muscat during 1880-1915, a U.S.
embassy was opened in 1972, and the first resident U.S. Ambassador arrived in July 1974. Oman
opened its embassy in Washington in 1973. Sultan Qaboos was accorded a formal state visit in
April 1983 by President Reagan. He had previously had a U.S. state visit in 1974. President
Clinton visited in March 2000.
Table 1. Some Key Facts on Oman
Population
3.22 mil ion, which includes about 1 mil ion non-citizens
Religions
Ibadhi Muslim (neither Sunni nor Shi te), 75%. Other religions: 25% (includes Sunni
Muslim, Shi te Muslim, Hindu)
GDP (purchasing power
$95 bil ion (2013)
parity, PPP)
GDP per capita (PPP)
$30,000 (2013)
GDP Real Growth Rate
5% (2013)
Unemployment Rate
15%
Inflation Rate
1.5% (2013)
Oil Production
863,000 barrels per day
Oil Reserves
5 bil ion-5.5 bil ion barrels
Oil Exports
750,000 barrels per day (bpd)
Natural Gas Production
875 bil ion cubic feet/yr
Natural Gas Reserves
30 tril ion cubic feet
Natural Gas Exports
407 bil ion cubic feet/yr
Foreign Exchange and
$17.7 bil ion (end of 2013)
Gold Reserves
Energy Structure
Petroleum Development Oman (PDO) controls most oil and natural gas resources.
PDO is a partnership between the Omani government (60%), Royal Dutch Shell
(34%), Total (4%), and Partx (2%). Oman Oil Company is the investment arm of the
Ministry of Petroleum.
Sources: CIA, The World Factbook, information posted as of March 2015.
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Figure 1. Map of Oman
Source: CRS.
Democratization, Human Rights, and Unrest
Oman remains a monarchy in which decisionmaking still is largely concentrated with Sultan
Qaboos, even though he has repeatedly demonstrated immense popularity among Omanis.
Qaboos himself holds the formal position of Prime Minister, as well as the positions of Foreign
Minister, Defense Minister, Finance Minister, and Central Bank Governor. His government, and
Omani society, reflects the diverse backgrounds of the Omani population, many of whom have
long-standing family connections to parts of East Africa that Oman once controlled, and to the
Indian subcontinent.
Along with political reform issues, the question of succession has long been central to observers
of Oman. Qaboos’s brief marriage in the 1970s produced no children, and the sultan, who was
born in November 1940, has no heir apparent. According to Omani officials, succession would be
decided by a “Ruling Family Council” of his relatively small Al Said family (about 50 male
members). If the family council cannot reach agreement within three days, it is to base its
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succession decision on a sealed Qaboos letter to be opened upon his death; there are no confirmed
accounts of whom Qaboos has recommended. The succession issue has come to the fore since
mid-2014 when he left Oman to undergo medical treatment in Germany, reportedly for colon
cancer.1 He appeared gaunt and weak in a video message to the Omani people, broadcast from
Germany, on the occasion of Oman’s national day in November 2014. Secretary of State John
Kerry met with Qaboos in Germany in January 2015. The Sultan returned to Oman in late March
2015, but has not since attended leadership-level Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar) meetings such as the U.S.-GCC summit at Camp
David in May 2015.
Should Qaboos leave the scene, reported front-runners are three brothers who are cousins of the
sultan. They are Minister of Heritage and Culture Sayyid Haythim bin Tariq Al Said, whom some
assess indecisive; Asad bin Tariq Al Said, a former military officer who now holds the title of
“Representative of the Sultan”; and Shihab bin Tariq Al Said, a former high-ranking military
officer. Some say that another potential choice is deputy Prime Minister for Cabinet Affairs Fahd
bin Mahmud Al Said,2 who is referred to by many Omani officials as “Prime Minister,” even
though Qaboos has long resisted advice from senior advisers to formally establish that post. Fahd
bin Mahmoud represented Oman at the December 2014 summit of leaders of the GCC and at the
May 2015 Camp David summit.
Those who advocate establishing a post of Prime Minister have been strengthened by Qaboos’s
uncertain prognosis. Those who argue for a prime ministership assert that such a figure is needed
to organize the functions of the government and render the head of state better able to focus on
larger strategic decisions. Those opposed argue that Qaboos already delegates extensively; for
example, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Yusuf bin Alawi bin Abdullah performs virtually
all the functions of Foreign Minister. As possible candidates for a post of Prime Minister, some
suggest, in addition to Fahd bin Mahmud, the secretary general of the Foreign Ministry, Sayyid
Badr bin Hamad Albusaidi. Albusaidi is said to be efficient and effective,3 and he has recently
raised his profile in speeches publicly articulating Omani foreign policy. Another figure
considered effective is economic adviser to the Sultan Salim bin Nasir al-Ismaily, a businessman
and philanthropist who reportedly was entrusted with brokering some of the U.S.-Iran exchanges
discussed later in this report.4
Despite the three-decade-long opening of the political process discussed below, some Omanis—
particularly younger, well-educated professionals—say they consider the pace of liberalization
too slow. Many older Omanis, on the other hand, tend to compare the existing degree of “political
space” favorably with that during the reign of Qaboos’s father—an era in which Omanis needed
the sultan’s approval even to wear spectacles or to import cement, for example. Some experts
argue that Sultan Said bin Taymur kept Oman isolated in an effort to insulate it from leftist
extremism that gained strength in the region during the 1960s. Evidence that many were
dissatisfied with the pace of change was demonstrated in 2011-2012 in the form of protest in
several Omani cities at a time of the so-called “Arab Spring” unrest.
1 Simon Henderson. “Oman Ruler’s Failing Health Could Affect U.S. Iran Policy.” Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, November 7, 2014.
2 Author conversations with Omani officials in Washington, DC, June 2013.
3 Author conversation with Omani Foreign Ministry consultant and unofficial envoy. May 5, 2011. Sayyid Badr’s name
is nearly identical to that of the Minister of State for Defense, but they are two different persons.
4 “Oman Stands in U.S.’s Corner on Iran Deal.” Wall Street Journal, December 29, 2013.
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Representative Institutions and Election History
Many Omanis, U.S. officials, and international observers repeatedly praised Sultan Qaboos for
establishing consultative institutions and an election process long before there was any evident
public pressure to do so, even though the process was gradual. Under a 1996 “Basic Law,”
Qaboos created a bicameral “legislature” called the Oman Council. The Oman Council consists of
the Consultative Council (Majlis As Shura), which was established in November 1991, and an
appointed State Council (Majlis Ad Dawla), formed after the promulgation of the Basic Law. The
Consultative Council replaced a 10-year-old all-appointed advisory council. However, even after
implementation of a March 2011 Sultan’s decree expanding its powers to question some ministers
and review government-drafted legislation, the Oman Council’s overall scope of authority still
does not approach that of a Western-style legislature. It does not have the power to draft
legislation or to overturn the Sultan’s decrees or government regulations. Some Omanis have said
in interviews that the lack of substantial expansion of the Oman Council’s powers had caused
Oman to lag several other Gulf states on political liberalization—a perception that might have
contributed to the 2011-2012 unrest in Oman. As in the other Gulf states, formal political parties
are not allowed and, unlike Bahrain or Kuwait, there are not well-defined “political societies” (de
facto parties) in Oman that compete within or outside the electoral process.
Oman Council’s Elected Component: The Consultative Council. The Consultative Council was
initially chosen through a selection process in which the government had substantially influence
over the body’s composition, but this process was gradually altered to a full popular election.
When it was formed in 1991, the body had 59 seats, and was expanded in stages to its current size
of 84 elected members. The sultan appoints the Consultative Council president from among the
membership, and the Consultative Council chooses two vice presidents. The electorate for the
Consultative Council has gradually expanded. In the 1994 and 1997 selection cycles for the
council, “notables” in each of Oman’s districts chose up to three nominees, with Qaboos making
a final selection for the council.
The first direct elections were held in September 2000 (then a three-year term), but the electorate
was limited (25% of all citizens over 21 years old). In November 2002, Qaboos extended voting
rights to all citizens, male and female, over 21 years of age, applicable for the October 4, 2003,
election. About 195,000 Omanis voted in that election (74% turnout), but the vote produced a
council similar to that elected in 2000, including the election of the same two women as in the
previous election (out of 15 women candidates). In the October 27, 2007, election (after changing
to a four-year term), Qaboos allowed public campaigning. Turnout among 388,000 registered
voters was 63%, including enthusiastic participation by women, but none of the 21 female
candidates (out of 631 candidates) won. Each province with a population of more than 30,000
elects two members, whereas a province with fewer than that elects one.
Appointed State Council. The State Council, which had 53 members at inception, has been
expanded to 83 members, but it remains an all-appointed body. By law, the appointed State
Council cannot have a membership that exceeds the number of elected members of the
Consultative Council. The State Council appointees are former high-ranking government officials
(such as ambassadors), military officials, tribal leaders, and other notables. The government
apparently sees the State Council as a check and balance on the elected Consultative Council.
2011 Unrest: Dissatisfaction but Not Hunger for a New Regime
Evidence mounted in 2010 and particularly in 2011 that many Omanis were dissatisfied with the
pace of political change and the country’s economic performance. In July 2010, 50 prominent
Omanis petitioned Sultan Qabooos for a “contractual constitution”—one that would guarantee
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basic rights and provide for a fully elected legislature. In February 2011, after protests in Egypt
toppled President Hosni Mubarak, protests broke out in the northern industrial town of Sohar,
Oman. On February 27, 2011, several hundred demonstrators there demanded better pay and
more job opportunities; one was killed when security forces fired rubber bullets. Protests
expanded in Sohar over the next few days, and spread to the capital, Muscat. Although most
protesters asserted that their protests were motivated primarily by economic factors, some echoed
the calls of the July 2010 petition for a fully elected legislature. Few demonstrators called for
Qaboos to step down and many reportedly carried posters lauding the Sultan.
The government calmed some of the unrest through a series of measures, including clearing
protesters from Sohar; expanding the powers of the Oman Council appointments of several
members of the Consultative Council as ministers; and the naming of an additional female
minister (Madiha bint Ahmad bin Nasser as education minister). The Sultan also ordered that
50,000 new public sector jobs be created immediately, raised the minimum wage by about one-
third (to about $520 per month), and gave $400 to unemployed job seekers. Sultan Qaboos
decreed that the office of public prosecutor will have independence from government control, and
that there will be new consumer protections.
Even though protests largely ended by mid-2012, during that year, at least 50 journalists,
bloggers, and other activists were jailed for “defaming the Sultan,” “illegal gathering,” or
violating the country’s cyber laws. Twenty-four of them went on a hunger strike in February 2013
to draw attention to their incarceration and in the hopes of persuading Oman’s Supreme Court to
hear appeals of their cases. On March 21, 2013, the Sultan pardoned 35 of them, an action praised
by international human rights groups and held up as a contrast with continued incarcerations of
social media critics in the other GCC states. Fourteen who remained in jail went on a hunger
strike in March 2013 and were pardoned on July 23, 2013. Many Omanis who had been
dismissed from public and private sector jobs for participating in unrest were ordered reinstated.
Some experts forecast that unrest might reignite if Qaboos leaves the scene in the near term and
no successor is selected immediately. However, other experts assert that there is no tradition of
violent or prolonged succession struggles in Oman—or even in the other GCC states more
broadly—and that Oman is likely to remain stable throughout a leadership transition.
The U.S. reaction to the unrest in Oman was muted, possibly because Oman is a key ally of the
United States and perhaps because the unrest appeared minor relative to the rest of the region. On
June 1, 2011, then U.S. Ambassador Richard Schmierer told an Omani paper: “The entire region,
including Oman, has witnessed enormous change in an extremely brief period of time. Sultan
Qaboos was quick to recognize and respond to the needs of Omanis. The way in which he
responded to the concerns of the Omani people is a testament to his wise leadership.”5 At her
confirmation hearings on July 18, 2012, then Ambassador-Designate to Oman Greta Holz
(subsequently confirmed) said “If confirmed, I will encourage Oman, our friend and partner, to
continue to respond to the hopes and aspirations of its people.” In July 2015, career diplomat
Marc Sievers was nominated as her successor.
2011 and 2012 Elections Held Amid Unrest
The October 2011 Consultative Council elections went forward despite the unrest. The
enhancement of the Oman Council’s powers raised the stakes for candidates and voters in the
Consultative Council elections and State Council appointments, because the next Oman Council
5 http://oman.usembassy.gov/pr-06012011.html.
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would presumably have increased influence on policy. The election date was set as October 15,
2011. Attracted by the enhanced powers of the Oman Council, a total of 1,330 candidates
announced their candidacies—a 70% increase from the number of candidates in the 2007 vote. A
record 77 women filed candidacies, compared to the 21 that filed in the 2007 vote. The
government did not permit outside election monitoring.
Of the 520,000 Omanis who registered to vote, about 300,000 voted—the turnout of about 60%
(about the same as in the 2007 election) appeared to refute those who felt that the citizenry would
shun the political process following the months of unrest. Hopes among many Omanis that at
least several women would win were dashed—only one was elected, a candidate from Seeb
(suburb of the capital, Muscat). Some reformists were heartened by the election victory of two
political activists—Salim bin Abdullah Al Oufi, and Talib Al Maamari. There was a vibrant
contest for the speakership of the Consultative Council, and Khalid al-Mawali, a relatively young
entrepreneur, was selected. In the State Council appointments that followed the Consultative
Council elections, the sultan appointed 15 women, bringing the total female participation in the
Oman Council to 16 out of 154 total seats—just over 10%.
In its efforts to reduce unrest the government also began a separate electoral process for
provincial councils. The councils are empowered to make recommendations to the government on
development projects, but not to make final funding decisions. Previously, only one such council
had been established, for the capital region, and it was all appointed. On November 15, 2012, the
government announced that it would hold the first-ever elections for councils in all 11
provinces—to take place on December 22, 2012. The total number of seats up for election was
192. More than 1,600 candidates registered to run, including 48 women. About 546,000 citizens
voted. Four women were elected.
Next Elections
Oman is to hold the next Consultative Council elections in 2015; the election day is tentatively set
for October 31. The Council is being expanded by one seat, to 85. As of the end of candidate
registration in July 2015, 674 candidates will compete, after about 175 who sought to run were
rule out for various reasons, and campaigns have begun. Of the final candidate list, 21 are
women. A call for a quota of females elected to the Council was not adopted.
Broader Human Rights Issues6
According to the State Department report on human rights for 2014, the principal human rights
problems were the inability of citizens to change their government peacefully; limits on freedom
of speech, assembly, and association, including restrictions on citizens and civil society from
associating with foreign governments; and societal discrimination against women. Other concerns
included lack of independent inspections of prisons and detention centers, restrictions on press
freedom, instances of domestic violence, infringements on independent civil society, and
instances of foreign citizen laborers placed in conditions of forced labor or abuse. Security
personnel and other government officials generally are held accountable for their actions. The
government conducted extensive action against corruption in the early part of the year, with
multiple cases going through the court system.
6 Much of this section is from the State Department’s country report on human rights practices for 2014 and other State
Department reports on international religious freedom and on trafficking in persons. Human rights report for 2014:
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper. Trafficking in Persons report for 2015:
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/245365.pdf.
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U.S. funds from the Middle East Partnership Initiative and the Near East Regional Democracy
account (both State Department accounts) have been used to fund civil society and political
process strengthening, judicial reform, election management, media independence, and women’s
empowerment. In 2011, Oman established a scholarship program through which at least 500
Omanis have enrolled in higher education in the United States. Some MEPI funds are also used in
conjunction with the U.S. Commerce Department to improve Oman’s legislative and regulatory
frameworks for business activity.
Freedom of Expression/Media
According to the recent State Department human rights reports, Omani law provides for limited
freedom of speech and press, but the government generally does not respect these rights. Press
criticism of the government is tolerated, but criticism of the sultan (and by extension, government
officials) is not. Private ownership of radio and television stations is not prohibited, but there are
few privately owned stations, including Majan TV, and three radio stations: HiFM, HalaFM, and
Wisal. Availability of satellite dishes has made foreign broadcasts accessible to the public. There
are some legal and practical restrictions to Internet usage, and only about 15% of the population
has subscriptions to Internet service. Many Internet sites are blocked, primarily for offering
sexual content, but many Omanis are able to bypass restrictions by accessing their Internet over
cell phones. Some bloggers and other activists who use social media have been prosecuted as part
of the government’s effort to reduce public unrest.
Labor Rights
Omani workers have the right to form unions and to strike. However, only one federation of trade
unions is allowed, and the calling of a strike requires an absolute majority of workers in an
enterprise. The labor laws permit collective bargaining and prohibit employers from firing or
penalizing workers for union activity. Labor rights are regulated by the Ministry of Manpower.
Religious Freedom
The 1996 Basic Law affirmed Islam as the state religion, but provides for freedom to practice
religious rites as long as doing so does not disrupt public order. Recent State Department religious
freedom reports have noted no reports of societal abuses or discrimination based on religious
affiliation, belief, or practice. Non-Muslims are free to worship at temples and churches built on
land donated by the government, but there are some limitations on non-Muslims’ proselytizing
and on religious gatherings in other than government-approved houses of worship.
All religious organizations must be registered with the Ministry of Endowments and Religious
Affairs (MERA). Among non-Muslim sponsors recognized by MERA are the Protestant Church
of Oman; the Catholic Diocese of Oman; the al Amana Center (interdenominational Christian);
the Hindu Mahajan Temple; and the Anwar al-Ghubairia Trading Co. Muscat (for the Sikh
community). The government agrees in principle to allow Buddhists to hold meetings if they can
find a corporate sponsor. Members of all religions and sects are free to maintain links with
coreligionists abroad and travel outside Oman for religious purposes. Private media have
occasionally published anti-Semitic editorial cartoons.
Advancement of Women
Sultan Qaboos has spoken regularly on the equality of women and their importance in national
development, and they now constitute over 30% of the workforce. The first woman of ministerial
rank in Oman was appointed in March 2003, and since 2004, there have been several women of
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that rank in each cabinet. There are two female ministers in the 29-member cabinet. Oman’s
ambassadors to the United States and to the United Nations are women. There are 15 women in
the 2012-2016 State Council, up from 14 in the previous council and 9 in the 2003-2007 council.
One woman was elected to the Consultative Council in the 2011 election, following a four-year
period (2007-2011) in which no females served in the elected body. As noted above, a campaign
by Omani women’s groups to establish a minimum number of women elected to the Consultative
Council, beginning with the fall 2015 elections, was not adopted.
Below the elite level, however, Omani women continue to face social discrimination, often as a
result of the interpretation of Islamic law. Allegations of spousal abuse and domestic violence are
fairly common, with women finding protection primarily through their families. Omani
nationality can be passed on only by a male Omani parent.
Trafficking in Persons
In October 2008, President Bush directed (Presidential Determination 2009-5) that Oman be
moved from “Tier 3” on trafficking in persons (worst level, assigned in the June 2008 State
Department Trafficking in Persons report) to “Tier 2/Watch List” based on Omani pledges to
increase efforts to counter trafficking in persons. Oman’s rating was improved to Tier 2 in the
2009 Trafficking in Persons report, and has remained there since, including in the report for 2015,
released on July 27, 2015.7 The Tier 2 ranking is based on an assessment that Oman is making
significant efforts to comply with minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and on its
prosecutions for those trafficking in persons. Still, Oman is considered a destination and transit
country for men and women primarily from South and East Asia, in conditions indicative of
forced labor.
Defense and Security Issues
Sultan Qaboos, who is Sandhurst-educated and is respected by his fellow Gulf rulers as a defense
strategist, has long seen the United States as the key security guarantor of the region. Oman’s
approximately 45,000-person armed force is the third largest of the GCC states and widely
considered one of the best trained. However, in large part because of Oman’s limited funds, it is
one of the least well equipped of the GCC countries. Because of his historic ties to the British
military, Qaboos early on relied on seconded British officers to command Omani military services
and Oman bought British weaponry. Over the past two decades, British officers have become
mostly advisory and Oman has shifted its arsenal of major combat systems mostly to U.S.-made
systems.
Qaboos has consistently advocated expanded intra-GCC defense cooperation. Oman was the first
Gulf state to formalize defense relations with the United States after the Persian Gulf region was
shaken by Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution by signing an agreement to allow U.S. forces access to
Omani military facilities on April 21, 1980. Days later, the United States used Oman’s Masirah
Island air base to launch the failed attempt to rescue the U.S. Embassy hostages in Iran—although
Omani officials assert they were not informed of that operation in advance. Oman served as an
intermediary between the United States and Iran for the return of Iranians captured in clashes
with U.S. naval forces in the Gulf during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War.
7 http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/245365.pdf
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Under the U.S.-Oman facilities access agreement, which was renewed in 1985, 1990, 2000, and
2010, the United States reportedly can use—with advance notice and for specified purposes—
Oman’s military airfields in Muscat (the capital), Thumrait, and Masirah Island. Some U.S. Air
Force equipment, including lethal munitions, is reportedly stored at these bases.8 In conjunction
with the renewal in 2000, the United States funded a $120 million upgrade of a fourth air base
(Khasab) at Musnanah (50 miles from Muscat).9 The Defense Authorization Act for FY2011 (P.L.
111-383, signed January 7, 2011) authorized $69 million in additional military construction
funding for that Musnanah facility.
Oman’s facilities contributed to U.S. major combat operations in Afghanistan (Operation
Enduring Freedom, OEF) and, to a lesser extent, Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom, OIF), even
though Omani leaders said that invading Iraq could “incite revenge” against the United States in
the Arab world. According to the Defense Department, during OEF there were about 4,300 U.S.
personnel in Oman, mostly Air Force, and U.S. B-1 bombers, indicating that the Omani facilities
were used extensively for strikes during OEF. The U.S. military presence in Oman fell to 3,750
during OIF because facilities in Gulf states closer to Iraq were used more extensively. Since 2004,
Omani facilities reportedly have not been used for air support operations in either Afghanistan or
Iraq, and the numbers of U.S. military personnel in Oman have fallen to a few hundred, mostly
Air Force.10 Unlike Bahrain or UAE, Oman did not send military or police forces to Afghanistan.
U.S. Arms Sales and other Security Assistance to Oman11
Using U.S. assistance and national funds, Oman is trying to expand and modernize its arsenal
primarily with purchases from the United States. However, Oman is one of the least wealthy GCC
states and does not have the national funds to buy U.S. arms as easily as the wealthier GCC states
such as Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar are able to.
F-16s: In October 2001, Oman purchased (with its own funds) 12 U.S.-made F-
16 C/D aircraft. Along with associated weapons (Harpoon and AIM missiles), a
podded reconnaissance system, and training, the sale was valued at about $825
million; deliveries were completed in 2006. Oman made the purchase in part to
keep pace with the other GCC states that bought U.S.-made combat aircraft. In
2010, the United States approved a sale to Oman of 18 additional F-16s, with a
value (including associated support) of up to $3.5 billion.12 Oman signed a
contract with Lockheed Martin for 12 of the aircraft in December 2011, with a
contract for an additional 6 still possible. The first of the aircraft was delivered in
July 2014 and the deliveries are to be completed by December 2016. Oman has
also bought associated weapons systems, including Advanced Medium-Range
Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMs), 162 GBU laser-guided bombs, AIM
“Sidewinder” air-to-air missiles, and other weaponry and equipment.
8 Hajjar, Sami. U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects. U.S. Army War College, Strategic
Studies Institute, p. 27. The State and Defense Departments have not released public information recently on the
duration of the 2010 renewal of the agreements or modifications to the agreements, if any.
9 Finnegan, Philip. “Oman Seeks U.S. Base Upgrades.” Defense News, April 12, 1999.
10 Contingency Tracking System Deployment File, provided to CRS by the Department of Defense.
11 Section 564 of Title V, Part C of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1994 and FY1995 (P.L. 103-236)
banned U.S. arms transfers to countries that maintain the Arab boycott of Israel during those fiscal years. As applied to
the GCC states, this provision was waived on the grounds that doing so was in the national interest.
12 Andrea Shalal-Esa. “Lockheed Hopes to Finalize F-16 Sales to Iraq, Oman.” Reuters, May 16, 2011.
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Countermeasures for Head of State Aircraft. In November 2010, DSCA notified
Congress of a possible sale of up to $76 million worth of countermeasures
equipment and training to protect the C-130J that Oman bought under a June
2009 commercial contract. The prime manufacturer of the equipment is Northrop
Grumman. Another sale of $100 million worth of countermeasures equipment—
in this case for aircraft that fly Sultan Qaboos—was notified on May 15, 2013.
Surface-to-Air and Air-to-Air Missiles. On October 19, 2011, DSCA notified
Congress of a potential sale to Oman of AVENGER and Stinger air defense
systems, asserted as helping Oman develop a layered air defense system.
Missile Defense. On May 21, 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry visited Oman
reportedly in part to help finalize a sale to Oman of the THAAD (Theater High
Altitude Area Defense system), the most sophisticated missile defense system the
United States exports. The deal for the system, made by Raytheon, was
announced on May 27, 2013, with an estimated value of $2.1 billion, but subject
to further negotiations between Oman and Raytheon. DSCA has not, to date,
made a notification to Congress about the potential sale. The THAAD has been
sold to the UAE and will reportedly also be bought by Qatar and Saudi Arabia.
Oman’s potential buy of the system indicates Oman is cooperating with U.S.
efforts to construct a Gulf-wide missile defense network.
Tanks as Excess Defense Articles. Oman is eligible for grant U.S. excess defense
articles (EDA) under Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act. It received 30
U.S.-made M-60A3 tanks in September 1996 on a “no rent” lease basis (later
receiving title outright). In 2004, it turned down a U.S. offer of EDA U.S.-made
M1A1 tanks, but Oman is believed to still need new armor to supplement the 38
British-made Challenger 2 tanks and 80 British-made Piranha armored personnel
carriers it bought in the mid-1990s.
Border/Maritime Security and Anti-Terrorism Equipment and Training. FMF has
been used to help Oman purchase several other types of equipment that help
Oman secure its borders, operate alongside U.S. forces, and combat terrorism.
FMF has helped Oman buy U.S.-made coastal patrol boats (“Mark V”) for anti-
narcotics, anti-smuggling, and anti-piracy missions, as well as aircraft munitions,
night-vision goggles, upgrades to coastal surveillance systems, communications
equipment, and de-mining equipment. The minor EDA grants since 2000 have
gone primarily to help Oman monitor its borders and waters and to improve
inter-operability with U.S. forces. In FY2011, DOD funds (“Section 1206”
funds) were to be used to help Oman’s military develop its counterterrorism
capability through deployment of biometric data collection devices. However,
Oman decided not to take delivery of the system and the devices were redirected
to Bahrain.13 For FY2016, some U.S. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) is to be
used to help promote the professionalization of Oman’s armed forces and build
its ability to address emerging threats to the coalition that is combatting the
Islamic State organization.14
13 Information from DOD in response to questions from the House of Representatives on the use of 1206 funding.
September 4, 2013.
14 State Department Congressional Budget Justification for FY2016.
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Regarding purchases from other countries, Oman has continued to buy some British equipment,
such as patrol boats. Oman’s air force possesses 12 Eurofighter “Typhoon” fighter aircraft as
well. Oman has also bought some Chinese-made armored carriers and other gear.
IMET Program
The International Military Education and Training program (IMET) program is used to promote
U.S. standards of human rights and civilian control of military and security forces, as well as to
fund English language instruction, and promote inter-operability with U.S. forces.
Table 2. Recent U.S. Aid to Oman
(In millions of dollars)
FY07
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
FY12
FY13
FY14
FY15 (est)
FY16 (req)
IMET
1.11
1.43
1.45
1.525
1.622
1.638
1.935
2.01
1.9
2.0
FMF
13.49
4.712
7.0
8.85
13.0
8.0
7.6
8.0
4.0
2.0
NADR
1.28
1.593
0.95
1.655
1.5
1.5
1.475
1.5
1.5
1.5
1206
0.948
Notes: IMET is International Military Education and Training; FMF is Foreign Military Financing; NADR is
Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De-Mining and Related Programs, and includes ATA (Anti-Terrorism
Assistance); EXBS (Export Control and Related Border Security); and TIP (Terrorism Interdiction Program).
Cooperation against Terrorism/”NADR” Funding
Since September 11, 2001, Oman has cooperated with U.S. legal, intelligence, and financial
efforts against terrorist groups including Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP,
headquartered in neighboring Yemen), and more recently the Islamic State organization. No
Omani nationals were part of the September 11, 2001, attacks and no Omanis have been publicly
identified as senior members of the Al Qaeda organization. According to the State Department
report on global terrorism for 2014, the U.S. Export Control and Related Border Security engaged
with the Royal Oman Police Coast Guard, the Directorate General of Customs, and the Royal
Army of Oman to deliver numerous training programs designed to assist Omani personnel in
enhancing interdiction capabilities at official Ports of Entry on land and at sea ports, and along
land and maritime borders.15 Oman also is assessed by the State Department report as actively
involved in preventing members of these and other terrorist groups from conducting attacks and
using the country for safe haven or transport.
The United States provides funding—Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related
(NADR)—to help Oman counter terrorist and related activity. NADR funding falls into three
categories: Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) funds, Anti-Terrorism Assistance
(ATA) funds, and Terrorism Interdiction Program funding. For FY2016, $1.0 million of the $1.5
million NADR request is for EXBS to provide law enforcement training to Omani border security
officers to detect illicit trafficking of WMD or advanced conventional weapons technology. On
November 22, 2005, Oman joined the U.S. “Container Security Initiative,” agreeing to pre-
15 http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239407.htm
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screening of U.S.-bound cargo from its port of Salalah to prevent smuggling of nuclear material,
terrorists, and weapons. The other NADR category, ATA funds ($0.5 million of the FY2016
request), if appropriated, is to be used in FY2016 to help Oman build capacity for border security.
The border threats emanate primarily from factions, including AQAP, fighting a major internal
conflict in neighboring Yemen, and from the Islamic State in nearby Iraq and Syria.
There are no Omani nationals held in the U.S. prison for suspected terrorists in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba. In January 2015, Oman accepted the transfer of three non-Omani nationals from
Guantanamo Bay as part of an effort to support U.S. efforts to close the facility.
Oman is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENA-
FATF). Recent State Department terrorism reports credit Oman with transparency regarding its
anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing enforcement efforts and say that it has the
lowest risk for terrorism financing or money laundering of any of the GCC countries.16 Oman
does not permit the use of hawalas, or traditional money exchanges, in the financial services
sector and Oman has on some occasions shuttered hawala operations entirely. A 2010 Royal
Decree is Oman’s main legislation on anti-money laundering and combatting terrorism financing.
Foreign Policy/Regional Issues
Under Sultan Qaboos Oman has pursued a relatively independent foreign policy, even at times to
some extent acting against policies of most of the other GCC countries. Oman has differed with
most of the other GCC states, including de facto GCC leader Saudi Arabia, on the issue of how to
address the perceived threat from Iran. Omani leaders assert that dialogue and engagement, and
not open confrontation, is the appropriate policy for minimizing the perceived threat from Iran.
Oman’s differences with other GCC states have erupted periodically, but particularly at a GCC
leadership meeting on May 14, 2012, in which Saudi Arabia advanced a plan for political unity
among the GCC states as a signal of GCC solidarity against Iran. The plan was not adopted due to
concerns among the other GCC leaders about surrendering some of their sovereignty, and
observers say that Oman was among the most vociferous opponents of the Saudi plan.17 Saudi
Arabia revived the proposal in advance of the December 10-11, 2013, GCC summit in Kuwait—
intended this time to signal GCC solidarity in the face of a potential U.S.-Iran rapprochement. At
an international security conference in Bahrain on December 7, 2013 (“Manama Dialogue,”
sponsored by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, IISS), Oman again objected to the
Saudi plan to the point of threatening to withdraw from the GCC entirely if the plan were
adopted. The proposal was not adopted, according to the final communique of the December 10-
11, 2013, GCC summit, but Oman backed the communique’s provision to form a joint GCC
military command, subject to further study. And, Oman has not joined the Saudi-led Arab
coalition that is combatting the Houthi rebels in Yemen, as discussed further below.
In 2007, Oman was virtually alone within the GCC in balking at a plan to form a monetary union.
Lingering border disputes also have plagued Oman-UAE relations; the two finalized their borders
in 2008, nearly a decade after a tentative border settlement in 1999.
Yet, Oman remains solidly within the GCC consensus on some issues. Along with the other GCC
states, Oman fully backs the Al Khalifa regime in Bahrain in its confrontation with mostly Shiite
protests that have been taking place since early 2011. Oman supported the GCC consensus to
16 Full text of the report is at http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239407.htm
17 Comments to the author by a visiting GCC official. May 2012.
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send forces from the GCC joint “Peninsula Shield” unit into Bahrain on March 14, 2011, to
provide backing to the regime’s beleaguered security forces, although Oman did not deploy any
forces itself. The GCC countries also decided, in March 2011, to set up a $20 billion fund to help
both Bahrain and Oman cope with popular unrest, to be used to create jobs and take other steps to
ease protester anger. Oman has joined the other GCC states’ efforts against the Islamic State.
Cooperation Against the Islamic State Organization/Syria and Iraq
Oman is aligned with the other GCC states in asserting that the Islamic State is a major threat to
the region. At a meeting in Jeddah on September 11, 2014, Oman and the other GCC countries
formally joined the U.S.-led coalition to defeat the Islamic State organization. However, unlike
fellow GCC states Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain, Oman has not joined in U.S.-led airstrikes
against Islamic State positions in Syria. Oman reportedly offered the use of its air bases for the
coalition, but Oman’s bases are further from the areas of operations than are similar facilities in
the other GCC countries and Oman is likely not used much, if at all, for the strikes.
Oman’s refusal to undertake direct military action against the Islamic State matches Oman’s
overall reluctance to intervene directly in the civil war in Syria. This stance could be a product of
Oman’s apparent intent not to confront Iran, which is Syrian President Bashar Al Assad’s main
backer. Unlike Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and UAE, Oman is not reported to have provided any funds
or arms to anti-Assad rebel groups in Syria. In November 2011, Oman voted to suspend Syria’s
membership in the Arab League and, in concert with the other GCC states, subsequently closed
its embassy in Damascus. On August 6, 2015, after a period of battlefield setbacks for the Assad
regime, Oman hosted Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem for talks on possible political
solutions to the Syria conflict. The Syrian government appears to see Oman as a credible potential
mediator because it has stayed out of direct involvement in the internal Syria crisis and because of
Oman’s ties to Iran.
No GCC state is participating in air strikes against the Islamic State fighters in Iraq. All of the
GCC states expressed dismay that Shiite factions achieved preponderant authority in post-
Saddam Iraq and, with the exception of Kuwait, have been hesitant to support Baghdad. Oman
opened an embassy in post-Saddam Iraq but then closed it for several years following a shooting
outside it in November 2005 that wounded four, including an embassy employee. The embassy
reopened in 2007 but Oman’s Ambassador to Iraq, appointed in March 2012, is resident in Jordan,
where he serves concurrently. Oman provided about $3 million to Iraq’s post-Saddam
reconstruction, a relatively small amount reflecting Oman’s limited available resources.
Policies on Other Regional Uprisings
Libya. Oman did not play as active a role in supporting the Libya uprising as did fellow GCC
states Qatar and UAE. Oman did not supply weapons or advice to rebel forces or fly any strike
missions against Qadhafi forces. Oman did recognize the opposition Transitional National
Council as the government of Libya after Tripoli fell on August 21, 2011. In March 2013, Oman
granted asylum to the widow of slain, ousted Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi and their
daughter, Aisha, and sons Mohammad and Hannibal18 who reportedly had entered Oman in
October 2012. Aisha and Hannibal are wanted by Interpol pursuant to a request from the
recognized Libyan government, but Libya has not asked for their extradition. Omani officials said
they were granted asylum on the grounds that they not engage in any political activities.
18 “Muammar Gaddafi’s Family Granted Asylum in Oman.” Reuters, March 25, 2013.
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Egypt. The GCC is divided on post-Mubarak Egypt. Qatar supported the elected presidency of
Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohammad Morsi, but Saudi Arabia and the UAE oppose the
Brotherhood and supported the Egyptian military ouster of Morsi in July 2013. The divisions
contributed to a decision by Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain to close their embassies in Qatar in
March 2014. Omani media (Times of Oman) has criticized the Egyptian military for a crackdown
against Morsi supporters,19 but Oman has also joined most of the other GCC states in building ties
to the government of former military leader and now elected President Abdel Fatah El Sisi.
Iran
Oman has closer ties to Iran than does any other GCC state. Omani leaders assert that
engagement with Iran better mitigates the potential threat from that country than does
belligerence towards it. There are residual positive sentiments among the Omani leadership for
the Shah of Iran’s provision of troops to help Oman end the leftist revolt in Oman’s Dhofar
Province during 1964-1975. Oman has no sizable Shiite Muslim community with which Iran
could meddle in Oman. Others attribute Oman’s position on Iran to its larger concerns that Saudi
Arabia has sought to spread its Wahhabi form of Islam into Oman. In an action criticized in the
United States and the GCC, Sultan Qaboos visited Tehran in August 2009, despite protests in Iran
over alleged governmental fraud in declaring the reelection of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
in the June 2009 election.
Sultan Qaboos has long maintained that Oman’s alliance with the United States and its friendship
with Iran are not mutually exclusive. Successive Administrations have refrained from criticizing
the Omani position, and have used the Oman-Iran relationship not only to resolve some U.S.-Iran
disputes but also to develop informal ties to Iranian officials. Oman was an intermediary through
which the United States returned Iranian prisoners captured during U.S.-Iran skirmishes in the
Persian Gulf in 1987-1988. A U.S. State Department spokesman publicly confirmed that Oman
had played a brokering role in the September 2010 release from Iran of U.S. hiker Sara Shourd,
reportedly including paying her $500,000 bail to Iranian authorities. Oman similarly helped
broker the release one year later of her two hiking companions, Josh Fattal and Shane Bauer. It
was subsequently reported that a State Department official on Iran affairs had coordinated with
Oman and with Switzerland (which represents U.S. interests in Iran) to achieve their release.20 In
April 2013, Omani mediation resulted in the release to Iran of an Iranian scientist, Mojtaba
Atarodi, imprisoned in the United States in 2011 for attempting to procure nuclear equipment for
Iran. During his May 2013 visit to Oman, Secretary Kerry reportedly discussed with Qaboos
possible Omani help in obtaining the release from Iran of ex-Marine Amir Hekmati, a dual citizen
jailed in Iran in August 2011, and retired FBI agent Robert Levinson, who disappeared after
visiting Iran’s Kish Island in 2006 and is believed held by groups under Iranian control.
Oman’s role as an intermediary between the United States and Iran has been highlighted in the
context of the November 24, 2013, interim nuclear deal (“Joint Plan of Action”) between Iran and
the “P5+1” countries (United States, Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany). Press reports
indicate that Qaboos had tried to broker U.S.-Iran rapprochement for several years, and that then
Deputy Secretary of State William Burns and other U.S. officials had begun meeting with Iranian
officials in early 2013 to explore the possibility of a nuclear deal. These meetings took place well
before the moderate Hassan Rouhani was elected Iran’s president in June 2013. These talks
reportedly accelerated after Rouhani took office in August 2013 and, coupled with Sultan
19 Times of Oman website in English. August 18, 2013.
20 Dennis Hevesi. “Philo Dibble, Diplomat and Iran Expert, Dies At 60.” New York Times, October 13, 2011.
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Qaboos’s August 25-27, 2013, visit to Iran, helped pave the way for U.S.-Iran diplomatic
overtures in September 201321 and the JPA. Omani banks have played a role in implementing
some of the financial arrangements of the JPA, such as the allowance for Iran to receive $700
million per month in hard currency proceeds from oil sales. Omani banks have a waiver from
U.S. sanctions laws to permit the transfers of funds to Iran’s Central Bank.22
Oman saw the JPA as an affirmation of its long-standing advocacy of engagement with Iran.
Oman, as did the other GCC states aside from Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, welcomed a visit by
Iranian foreign policy officials in the aftermath of the JPA. In mid-March 2014, Rouhani visited
Oman—the only Gulf state he has visited since taking office. Oman reportedly has played a key
role in muting GCC and other Arab public opposition to the U.S. diplomacy with Iran.23
Oman’s pivotal role as an intermediary continued during talks to achieve the July 14, 2015, Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran and the P5+1. During November 9-10,
2014, Secretary of State John Kerry met with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif in
Muscat to try to accelerate progress in the negotiations. Their meeting was followed one day later
by a meeting in Muscat between the entire P5+1 and Iranian negotiators. Secretary Kerry’s
meeting with the ailing Qaboos in Germany in January 2015 reportedly represented a gesture of
appreciation for Oman’s role in facilitating talks with Iran.24 An additional round of talks was
held in Oman subsequently, and the JCPOA was finalized in Vienna on July 14.
Some experts and GCC officials argue that Oman-Iran relations, particularly their security
cooperation, are undermining GCC defense solidarity. On August 4, 2010, Oman signed a
security pact with Iran, which reportedly commits the two to hold joint military exercises.25 That
agreement followed a 2009 Iran-Oman agreement to cooperate against smuggling across the Gulf
of Oman, which separates the two countries. The two countries have held a few joint exercises
under the 2010 pact, including an April 7, 2014, joint search and rescue naval exercise. None of
the security ties with Iran have come at the expense of Oman’s cooperation with the United
States.
Economically, the two conduct formal trade, supplemented by the informal trading relations that
have long characterized the Gulf region. Oman’s government is said to turn a blind eye to the
smuggling of a wide variety of goods to Iran from Oman’s Musandam Peninsula territory. The
trade is illegal in Iran because the smugglers avoid paying taxes in Iran, but Oman’s local
government collects taxes on the goods shipped.26
Oman-Iran Energy Ventures. Iran and Oman have jointly developed the Hengham oilfield in the
Persian Gulf, and the field came on stream officially on July 11, 2013, producing 22,000 barrels
of oil per day. That rate is expected to rise to 30,000 barrels per day. The investment is estimated
at $450 million, although the exact share of the costs between Iran and Oman is not known. The
21 Paul Richter. “Oman Sultan’s Visit Reportedly a Mediation Bid Between Iran and U.S.” Los Angeles Times, August
30, 2013; Shashank Bengali. “U.S.-Iran Thaw Began with Months of Secret Meetings.” Los Angeles Times, November
24, 2013.
22 Primarily Section 1245(d)(5) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (P.L. 112-81). For text
of the waiver, see a June 17, 2015 letter from Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Julia Frifield to Senate
Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Corker, containing text of the “determination of waiver.”
23 “Oman Stands in U.S.’s Corner on Iran Deal.” op. cit.
24 Carol Morello. “Kerry Meets with Oman’s Ailing Sultan at His Estate in Germany.” Washington Post, January 11,
2015.
25 Iran, Oman Ink Agreement of Defensive Cooperation. Tehran Fars News Agency, August 4, 2010.
26 Ibid.
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field also produces natural gas, and it is expected to total 80 million cubic feet per day when fully
producing.
The two countries have also discussed potential investments to further develop Iranian offshore
natural gas fields that adjoin Oman’s West Bukha oil and gas field in the Strait of Hormuz. The
Omani field began producing oil and gas in February 2009. During the Rouhani visit to Oman in
March 2014, the two countries signed a deal to build a $1 billion pipeline to bring Iranian natural
gas to Oman beginning as early as 2017. The gas would flow from Iran’s Hormuzegan Province
to Sohar in Oman, and then likely be re-exported to neighboring countries.27 The existing Iran-
Oman energy projects appear to constitute violations of the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA), but the
United States has not sanctioned them or otherwise accused Oman of any violations. At her
confirmation hearings on July 18, 2012, Ambassador Holz said that Oman is “compliant and
supportive of the international sanctions on Iran.” The application of the Iran Sanctions Act is to
end if the JCPOA is implemented. (See CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, for a discussion of
ISA and its provisions.)
At times, Oman’s attempts to steer a middle ground between Iran and the United States have
caused problems for Oman. For example, in April 1980, within days of signing the agreement
allowing the United States military to use several Omani air bases, the United States used these
facilities—reportedly without prior notification to Oman—to launch the abortive mission to
rescue the U.S. Embassy hostages seized by Iran in November 1979.28 Oman complained to the
United States about the lack of prior notification of the mission.
Afghanistan
As noted above, Oman has not sent forces or trainers to Afghanistan, although its facilities have
been used by U.S. forces to support operations there. Still, Oman has been engaged on the issue.
On February 24, 2011, Oman hosted then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael
Mullen for meetings with Omani senior defense leaders and discussions there on Afghanistan and
Pakistan with Mullen’s chief Pakistani counterpart, Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Kayani.29
Israeli-Palestinian Dispute and Related Issues
Taking a stand supportive of U.S. policy, Oman was the one of the few Arab countries not to
break relations with Egypt after the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 1979. All the
GCC states participated in the multilateral peace talks established by the 1991 U.S.-sponsored
Madrid peace process, but only Oman, Bahrain, and Qatar hosted working group sessions of the
multilaterals. Oman hosted an April 1994 session of the working group on water and, as a result
of those talks, a Middle East Desalination Research Center was established in Oman. Participants
in the Desalination Center include Israel, the Palestinian Authority, the United States, Japan,
Jordan, the Netherlands, South Korea, and Qatar.
In September 1994, Oman and the other GCC states renounced the secondary and tertiary Arab
boycott of Israel. In December 1994, it became the first Gulf state to officially host a visit by an
Israeli prime minister (Yitzhak Rabin), and it hosted then Prime Minister Shimon Peres in April
1996. In October 1995, Oman exchanged trade offices with Israel, essentially renouncing the
27 Dana El Baltaji. “Oman Fights Saudi Bid for Gulf Hegemony with Iran Pipeline Plan.” Bloomberg News, April 21,
2014.
28 CRS conversations with U.S. Embassy officials in Oman. 1995-2003.
29 “Mullen, Mattis Meet With Omani Counterparts.” American Forces Press Service. February 24, 2011.
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primary boycott of Israel. However, there was no move to establish diplomatic relations. The
trade offices closed following the September 2000 Palestinian uprising.
Oman has expressed an openness to renewing trade ties with Israel if there is progress on Israeli-
Palestinian issues. In an April 2008 meeting in Qatar, de facto Foreign Minister Yusuf bin Alawi
bin Abdullah informed his then Israeli counterpart, Tzipi Livni, that the Israeli trade office in
Oman would remain closed until agreement was reached on a Palestinian state. Still, the meeting
represented a degree of diplomatic outreach by Oman to Israel. Several Israeli officials reportedly
visited Oman in November 2009 to attend the annual conference of the Desalination Center, and
the Israeli delegation held talks with Omani officials on the margins of the conference.30 Oman
reiterated its offer to resume trade contacts with Israel if Israel agrees to at least a temporary halt
in Israeli settlement construction in the West Bank. Israel has not consistently maintained such a
suspension and Israel and Oman have not reopened trade offices. Oman supports the Palestinian
Authority (PA) drive for full U.N. recognition and the Omani official press refers to the PA-run
territories as the “State of Palestine.”
Yemen
Oman’s relations with neighboring Yemen have historically been troubled, and Oman’s apparent
fears of spillover of Yemen’s instability have increased since 2014 as central authority has
collapsed. As a result, AQAP is under reduced pressure and the pro-Iranian “Houthi” Shiite rebels
took over Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, in January 2015. In response to the fighting, Oman has built
some refugee camps near the border to accommodate refugees, built a 180 mile fence along their
border, and redeployed additional security assets to the border with Yemen. A GCC initiative,
which Oman joined, had helped organize a peaceful transition from the rule of Ali Abdullah Saleh
in 2011-2012, but that effort largely failed as Saleh’s successor, Abdu Rabu Mansur Al Hadi, has
been driven out of Sanaa, but continues to attempt to reconstitute his government. In keeping with
its general policy of avoiding direct military involvement in the region, Oman is the only GCC
state that has not joined the Saudi-led Arab coalition that is conducting military action against the
Houthi forces. That relative neutrality, coupled with Oman’s ties to Iran, has enabled international
governments to turn to Oman as a mediator in the Yemen conflict. It has hosted talks between
U.S. diplomats and Houthi representatives. Oman reportedly helped broker the release of a
French hostage held in Yemen in August 2015.
The instability in Yemen builds on earlier schisms in Oman-Yemen relations. The former People’s
Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), considered Marxist and pro-Soviet, supported Oman’s
Dhofar rebellion. Oman-PDRY relations were normalized in 1983, but the two engaged in
occasional border clashes later in that decade. Relations improved after 1990, when PDRY
merged with North Yemen to form the Republic of Yemen. In May 2009, Oman signaled support
for Yemen’s integrity and the government of then President Ali Abdullah Saleh by withdrawing
the Omani citizenship of southern Yemeni politician Ali Salim Al Bidh, an advocate of separatism
in south Yemen.
30 Ravid, Barak. “Top Israeli Diplomat Holds Secret Talks in Oman.” Haaretz, November 25, 2009.
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1130242.html.
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Economic and Trade Issues31
Despite Omani efforts to diversify its economy, oil exports generate about 60% of government
revenues. Oman has a relatively small 5.5 billion barrels (maximum estimate) of proven oil
reserves, enough for about 15 years at current production rates—although analysts say production
at some Omani fields is declining.32 In part because it is a relatively small producer, Oman is not
a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Recognizing that its
crude oil fields are aging, Oman is trying to privatize its economy, diversify its sources of
revenue, and develop its liquid natural gas (LNG) sector, for which Oman has identified large
markets in Asia and elsewhere. Oman is part of the “Dolphin project,” under which Qatar is
exporting natural gas to UAE and Oman through undersea pipelines; it began operations in 2007.
The natural gas supplies to Oman from Dolphin (or from Iran, if those proposed projects come to
fruition) free up other Omani natural gas supplies for sale to its customers. In December 2013,
Oman signed a $16 billion agreement for energy major BP to develop Oman’s own natural gas
reserves.
Recognizing its budgetary limitations, the government is attempting to address a perception in the
public that encourages public sector employment. In a November 12, 2012, speech to open the
fall session of the Oman Council, Sultan Qaboos said “The state, with all its civil, security, and
military institutions, cannot continue to be the main source of employment.... The citizens have to
understand that the private sector is the real source of employment in the long run.” In February
2014, it took further steps to address citizen unemployment by requiring that more than 100,000
jobs now performed by expatriates be transferred to Omani nationals, with the intention of
reducing the proportion of expatriate private sector employment from 39% to 33%.
Oman is also trying to position itself as a trading hub, asserting that ships that offload in its
Salalah port pay lower insurance rates than those that have to transit the Persian Gulf to offload in
Dubai or Bahrain.33 The government reportedly is also trying to raise $60 billion to build a large
transit hub at Duqm (see map)—including a refinery, a container port, a dry dock, and other
facilities for transportation of petrochemicals. The planned transit hub would link to the other
GCC states by rail and enable them to access the Indian Ocean directly, bypassing the Persian
Gulf.34
The United States is Oman’s fourth-largest trading partner, and there was over $2.5 billion in
bilateral trade in 2013, down about $500 million from 2012. In 2013, the United States exported
$1.57 billion in goods to Oman, and imported $1.022 billion in goods from Oman. Of U.S.
exports to Oman, the largest product categories are automobiles, aircraft (including military) and
related parts, drilling and other oilfield equipment, and other machinery. Of the imports, about
60% consist of crude oil and oil by-products such as plastics.
Oman was admitted to the WTO in September 2000. The U.S.-Oman Free Trade Agreement was
signed on January 19, 2006, and ratified by Congress (P.L. 109-283, signed September 26, 2006).
According to the U.S. Embassy in Muscat, the FTA has led to increased partnerships between
Omani and U.S. companies. General Cables and Dura-Line Middle East are two successful
31 For more information on Oman’s economy and U.S.-Oman trade, see CRS Report RL33328, U.S.-Oman Free Trade
Agreement, by Mary Jane Bolle.
32 Gerth, Jeff and Stephen Labaton. “Oman’s Oil Yield Long in Decline, Shell Data Show.” New York Times, April 8,
2004.
33 Author conversation with Omani officials. September 2013.
34 Hugh Eakin. “In the Heart of Mysterious Oman.” New York Review of Books, August 14, 2014.
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examples of joint ventures between American and Omani firms. These two ventures are not
focused on hydrocarbons, suggesting the U.S.-Oman trade relationship is not focused only on oil.
Economic Aid
The United States phased out development assistance to Oman in 1996. At the height of that
development assistance program in the 1980s, the United States was giving Oman about $15
million per year in Economic Support Funds (ESF) in loans and grants, mostly for conservation
and management of Omani fisheries and water resources.
Author Contact Information
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612
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