Coalition Contributions to Countering the
Islamic State
Kathleen J. McInnis
Analyst in International Security
August 4, 2015
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R44135
Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State
Contents
The Global Campaign to Counter the Islamic State ........................................................................ 1
Military Aspects of the Coalition ..................................................................................................... 2
Challenges to Coalition Coherence .................................................................................................. 3
Figures
Figure 1. Country Participation at Training and Capacity Building Bases in Iraq .......................... 6
Tables
Table 1. Contributions to the Military Coalition to Defeat IS, by Country and Capability ............ 3
Contacts
Author Contact Information............................................................................................................. 6
Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................................... 6
Congressional Research Service
Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State
The Global Campaign to Counter the Islamic State1
On September 10, 2014, President Obama announced the formation of a global coalition to
“degrade and ultimately defeat” the Islamic State (IS, aka the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant, ISIL/ISIS or the Arabic acronym Daesh).2 Subsequently, some 60 nations and partner
organizations agreed to participate, contributing either military forces or resources (or both) to the
campaign. In Brussels in December 2014, these sixty partners agreed to organize themselves
along five “lines of effort,”3 (by contrast, the U.S. strategy involves nine lines of effort), with at
least two countries in the lead for each:4
• Supporting military operations, capacity building, and training (led by the United
States and Iraq);
• Stopping the flow of foreign terrorist fighters (led by The Netherlands and
Turkey);
• Cutting off IS access to financing and funding (led by Italy, the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia and the United States);
• Addressing associated humanitarian relief and crises (led by Germany and the
United Arab Emirates); and
• Exposing IS’ true nature (led by the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom,
and the United States).
According to the U.S. State Department, participants in the coalition include: Albania, the Arab
League, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada,
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, the European Union, Finland,
France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kosovo,
Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco,
The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of
Korea, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, Spain, Sweden,
Taiwan, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States.5
Each nation is contributing to the coalition in a manner commensurate with its national interests
and comparative advantage, although reporting on nonmilitary contributions tends to be sporadic.
Some illustrative examples of the kinds of counter-IS assistance countries provided as the
coalition was being formed in September 2014 include: Switzerland’s donation $9 million in aid
to Iraq, Belgium’s contribution of 13 tons of aid to Iraq generally, Italy’s contribution of $2.5
million of weaponry (including machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades and a million rounds of
ammunition), and Japan’s granting of $6 million in emergency aid to specifically help displaced
people in Northern Iraq.6
1 For more information on the status of efforts to defeat IS, see CRS Report R43612, The “Islamic State” Crisis and
U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard et al.
2 Testimony from Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, House Armed Services Committee, June 17, 2015.
3 U.S. Department of State, “Joint statement issued by partners at the Counter-ISIL Coalition Meeting,” December 3,
2014. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/12/234627.htm
4 Remarks by General John Allen, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter-ISIL, Doha, Qatar,
June 3, 2015. http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2015/06/01-2015-us-islamic-world-
forum/060315brookingsdoha.pdf.
5 U.S. Department of State, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL webpage,
http://www.state.gov/s/seci/.
6 Sebastian Payne, “What the 60-plus members of the anti-Islamic State coalition are doing,” The Washington Post,
(continued...)
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Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State
Military Aspects of the Coalition
Operation Inherent Resolve, the military component of the global coalition to defeat IS, began on
August 8, 2014. Subsequently, according to United States Central Command and open source
reporting, some 22 nations have joined the military coalition. The military campaign has two
primary elements - airstrikes and training and equipping of local forces—both of which are
designed to empower Iraqis and Syrians to take on the Islamic State while minimizing the number
of U.S. and coalition “boots on the ground.” According to the Department of Defense, the
coalition has conducted upwards of 5,000 airstrikes,7 destroyed 7,655 targets, and as of July 15,
2015, the United States spent $3.21 billion on counter-IS operations.8 Of note, in July 2015,
Turkey expanded its participation in the coalition by taking direct military action in Syria and
allowing other coalition planes to utilize Turkish airspace and bases to conduct strikes on the
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. On 31 July, at the request of the Iraqi government, NATO agreed
to launch a military assistance program for Iraq which will be based out of Jordan and Turkey,
and “includes measures of support in seven priority areas: advice on security sector reform;
countering improvised explosive devices, explosive ordnance disposal and de-mining; civil
military planning; cyber defense; military medicine and medical assistance; military training; and
civil emergency planning.”9
In terms of the legal basis for the coalition, several United Nations Security Council
Resolutions—in particular, 2170, 2178 and 2199—call on U.N. member states to take a variety of
steps (to include coalition activities such as countering terrorist financing, assisting with
humanitarian relief, countering IS messaging and assisting with stabilization support), although
these fall short of explicitly authorizing the use of military force against the Islamic State. Some
coalition participants have cited the Iraqi Government’s letter to the United Nations Security
Council requesting defense assistance and stating that Iraq faces threats from IS safe havens in
Syria as a further legal basis for participating in the military coalition. With respect to the U.S.
contribution to the military campaign, some observers have argued that a new authorization for
the use of military force (AUMF) is required;10 the Obama Administration maintains that it
already has the necessary legal basis to prosecute the campaign through the (2001 AUMF; P.L.
107-40), and the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (2002
AUMF; P.L. 107-243).11 Even so, U.S. Administration officials underscore that the military
campaign is only one part of the overall effort to counter IS, asserting that success depends upon
the ability to make progress in nonmilitary areas.12
(...continued)
September 25, 2014.
7 Jim Garamone, “Wormuth Stresses Whole-of-Government Approach to ISIL,” DoD News, July 13, 2015.
8 U.S. Department of Defense, “Operation Inherent Resolve: Targeted Operations against ISIL Terrorists,” available at:
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2014/0814_iraq/. Accessed July 27, 2015.
9 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO Secretary General Statement on Defense Capacity Building Package for
Iraq,” July 31, 2015.
10 See, for example, Richard Fontaine & Vance Serchuk, “Can We Finally Get An AUMF Right? As Congress debates
the war authorization against Islamic State, it should learn from past mistakes” Politico, February 15, 2015; Paul Kane,
“Congress Split Over Ways to Face the Islamic State,” The Washington Post, February 22, 2015.
11 For more information, see CRS Report R43760, A New Authorization for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic
State: Issues and Current Proposals in Brief, by Matthew C. Weed.
12 Jim Garamone, “Wormuth Stresses Whole-of-Government Approach to ISIL,” DoD News, July 13, 2015.
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Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State
Challenges to Coalition Coherence
Organizing and prosecuting a coalition campaign presents a variety of challenges in addition to
the military task of defeating an opponent. In the first instance, without a single authority
responsible for prioritizing and adjudicating between different multinational civilian and military
lines of effort, different actors often work at cross-purposes without intending to do so. These
coalition coordination challenges were demonstrated in recent military campaigns (and
particularly in Afghanistan). Exacerbating matters, other actors in the region—some of whom are
coalition partners—have different, and often conflicting, longer-term regional geopolitical
interests from those of the United States or other coalition members. This, in turn, may lead
nations participating in the coalition to advance their goals and objectives in ways that might
contradict each other. Finally, different participants in the coalition have different tolerances for
risk, and therefore will determine “rules of engagement” (ROE), or “caveats” that can constrain
the ability of military commanders from employing military force as they see fit. While
navigable, all these factors can make it considerably more difficult to consolidate gains and
achieve campaign success.
This brief report offers two figures. The first is a chart depicting participants in the military
campaign, and what specifically each country is contributing in terms of military forces,
according to open source data compiled by CRS and information provided by United States
Central Command at the time of writing. The second maps the training and capacity building
bases across Iraq, and key nations operating out of those bases as reported by United States
Central Command and supplemented with open source reporting.
This report will be updated quarterly, or as significant changes occur regarding the coalition’s
composition.
Table 1. Contributions to the Military Coalition to Defeat IS,
by Country and Capability
TRAINING
MISSION
AIRSTRIKE
CONTRIBUTIONS
CONTRIBUTIONS
FOR
FOR
COUNTRY
IRAQ
SYRIA
FOR IRAQ
FOR SYRIA
Australia
500a
N/A
6 hornet fighters, a
N/A
tanker aircraft, and
airborne control
plane
Bahrain
N/A N/A
N/A
Unspecified
number
of planes
Belgium
35 N/A
Mission
discontinuedb N/A
Canada
69
N/A
530 personnel; 6 CF-188 Hornet fighter jets,
1 CC 150 Polaris Air Transport, 2 CP-140
Aurora surveillance aircraft
Denmark
140
N/A
7 F-16 aircraft
N/A
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Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State
TRAINING
MISSION
AIRSTRIKE
CONTRIBUTIONS
CONTRIBUTIONS
FOR
FOR
COUNTRY
IRAQ
SYRIA
FOR IRAQ
FOR SYRIA
France
200
N/A
6 Dassault Rafale M
N/A
multi role fighters,
6 Mirage 2000D
aircraft, 1
Ravitailement C135
aircraft, and 1
Atlantic 2 Maritime
Patrol aircraft
Finland
47 N/A
N/A
N/A
Great Britain
275 N/A
630
personnel; Unspecified number
unspecified number
of planesc
of Royal Air Force
Tornado GR4
Aircraft
Germany
100 N/A
N/A
N/A
Italy
280 N/A
N/A
N/A
Jordan
N/A Training
Unspecified
number 20 F-16 aircraftd
grounds
of planes
NATO
Unspecified N/A
N/A
N/A
number of
troops
New Zealand
143 N/A
N/A
N/A
Netherlands
130 N/A
250
personnel,
N/A
6 F-16 aircraft (plus 2
reserve aircraft)e
Norway
120 N/A
N/A
N/A
Portugal
30 N/A
N/A
N/A
Qatar
N/A Training
N/A
Unspecified
number
grounds
of planes
Saudi Arabia
N/A Training
N/A
Unspecified
number
grounds
of planes
Spain
300 N/A
N/A
N/A
Sweden
35f N/A
N/A
N/A
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Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State
TRAINING
MISSION
AIRSTRIKE
CONTRIBUTIONS
CONTRIBUTIONS
FOR
FOR
COUNTRY
IRAQ
SYRIA
FOR IRAQ
FOR SYRIA
Turkey
N/A Training
N/A
Long-range
artillery,
grounds
unspecified number
of planesg
United Arab
N/A
N/A
N/A
8 F-16 aircrafth
Emirates
United States
3,550 700i
Unspecified, but largest number of aircraft
and personnel
Total:
5,954j 700
Sources: United States Central Command data, augmented by data gathered through open source reports.
Notes: Country contributions are approximate due to rotations in and out of theater. These numbers are
subject to rapid change based on changing circumstances.
a. Australia recently announced that it would send 330 extra troops on a two year mission to train Iraqi
soldiers, with about 200 soldiers in Iraq prior to that announcement.
b. Belgium’s contribution to the airstrikes against ISIL ended June 30, 2015, due to financial constraints. Six
Belgian F-16 fighters spent nine months in Jordan.
c. On Friday, July 17 2015, the Ministry of Defense confirmed that British pilots had taken part in military
strikes in Syria, despite the fact that Parliament voted two years ago against military action there.
d. Up to 20 F-16 aircraft participated in airstrikes against ISIL in response to the killing of a Jordanian pilot. It is
unclear if this many F-16’s participate in regular airstrikes against ISIL.
e. It is unclear if all of these aircraft are for combat sorties against ISIL or if they are force protection for
Dutch ground forces.
f.
The Swedish Parliament approved 35 troops to be sent to Iraq, but have stated that they are willing to raise
that number to 120.
g. Based on a recent agreement struck between the United States and Turkey on July 23, 2015.
h. The number of F-16’s is based off of press photos of the UAE squadron deployed in Jordan.
i.
The United States has pledged 400 to 700 troops to train Syrian forces. It is unclear how many forces are
currently in place.
j.
Based off of the data in this chart; not including the unspecified number of troops contributed by NATO.
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Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State
Figure 1. Country Participation at Training and Capacity Building Bases in Iraq
Source: United States Central Command and Open Source Reporting.
Author Contact Information
Kathleen J. McInnis
Analyst in International Security
kmcinnis@crs.loc.gov, 7-1416
Acknowledgments
David Tramonte, CRS Research Associate, contributed to this report.
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