Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations
Emma Chanlett-Avery
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Ben Dolven
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Wil Mackey
Research Associate
July 29, 2015
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL32593
Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations
Summary
Thailand is a long-time military ally and a significant trade and economic partner for the United
States. For many years, Thailand was seen as a model democracy in Southeast Asia, although this
image, along with U.S.-Thai relations, has been complicated by deep political and economic
instability in the wake of two military coups in the past nine years.
The first, in 2006, displaced Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, a popular but polarizing figure
who is currently living in exile. The second, in 2014, deposed an acting prime minister after
Thaksin’s sister, Yingluck Shinawatra, was ousted from the premiership by a Constitutional Court
decision that many saw as politically motivated. After the 2014 coup, the military installed
General Army Commander Prayuth Chan-ocha as Prime Minister. He remains head of the Thai
government. The junta is drafting a new constitution, and elections are unlikely before 2017.
Thai politics has been contentious for more than a decade, mainly because of the rivalry between
Thaksin’s supporters and opponents. Many of Thaksin’s supporters hail from the poorer, more
rural areas of northern Thailand, and they have benefited from populist policies launched by
Thaksin and his supporters. Parties loyal to Thaksin have won the last six nationwide elections
including several that took place after the 2006 coup, but a series of prime ministers have been
removed, either via coup or court action. Thaksin’s opponents—a mix of conservative royalists,
military figures, and Bangkok elites—have refused to accept the results of these elections. Both
Thaskin’s opponents (loosely known as “Yellow Shirts”) and his supporters (“Red Shirts”) have
staged large-scale protests, which have become violent at times. In 2010, demonstrations led to
riots in Bangkok and other cities, and the worst street violence in Thailand in decades.
Following the 2014 coup, Thailand faces numerous political challenges and risks to internal
stability. Thaksin’s supporters, analysts warn, feel increasingly disenfranchised, and they may
resort to violence to express their political grievances in the future. Concerns also surround the
health of Thailand’s widely revered King Bhumiphol Adulyadej and uncertainty about the royal
succession process. The royal palace is one of Thailand’s most powerful institutions, and in the
past, the King has intervened in periods of internal conflict. Thailand’s government also must
contend with a low-level insurgency in the country’s southern, Muslim-majority provinces.
The 2014 coup threatens to derail the traditionally strong U.S.-Thai security relationship and
could disrupt trade and investment links as well. In the past, military-to-military cooperation has
been robust in terms of security assistance, training, and military exercises. After the 2014 coup,
the United States suspended security assistance funds to Thailand, and the rationale for an
ongoing military relationship is challenged, given that the Thai military has overthrown several
democratically elected governments. Nevertheless, some analysts say that maintaining the U.S.-
Thai relationship is vital. They warn that, without it, the U.S. may lose access to Thailand’s
strategically located military facilities and that China may become even more influential in the
region. Dozens of other U.S. agencies also base their regional headquarters in Thailand, and some
officials worry that political tension with Bangkok could threaten those operations as well.
The United States and the international community have raised other concerns about Thailand,
mainly having to do with human trafficking, the large refugee population living within the
country’s borders, and human rights and democracy conditions.
This report will be updated periodically.
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Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations
Contents
Overview of U.S.–Thailand Relations. ............................................................................................ 1
Political Crisis and Military Coup in 2013-2014 ............................................................................. 2
U.S. Response to Coup .............................................................................................................. 2
Thailand Politics and Government .................................................................................................. 3
Historical Background ............................................................................................................... 3
Social Divisions and the Thai Political Landscape .................................................................... 4
Role of the Palace ................................................................................................................ 5
U.S.-Thailand Security Relations .................................................................................................... 5
Historical Background ............................................................................................................... 6
Bilateral Security Cooperation .................................................................................................. 7
Security Assistance .............................................................................................................. 7
Military Exercises ............................................................................................................... 7
Training ............................................................................................................................... 7
Intelligence .......................................................................................................................... 8
Law Enforcement ................................................................................................................ 8
Counter-Narcotics ............................................................................................................... 8
U.S.-Thailand Trade and Economic Relations ................................................................................. 9
Thailand in Asia ............................................................................................................................. 10
Thailand-China Ties ................................................................................................................ 11
Thailand-Burma Ties ............................................................................................................... 11
ASEAN Relations .................................................................................................................... 12
Violence in the Southern Provinces ............................................................................................... 13
Background to the Current Conflict ........................................................................................ 14
Leadership of Insurgency Unclear ........................................................................................... 14
Human Rights and Democracy Concerns ...................................................................................... 15
Trafficking in Persons (TIP) .................................................................................................... 15
Refugees in Thailand ............................................................................................................... 16
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Thailand ............................................................................................................. 18
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Thailand 2007-2014 ........................................................................... 17
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 19
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Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations
Overview of U.S.–Thailand Relations.
An American treaty ally since 1954, Thailand was for years praised as an economic and
democratic success story. The U.S.-Thai relationship, solidified during the Cold War, expanded
on the basis of shared economic and security interests. Thailand is a large trade and investment
partner for the United States, and U.S. access to Thai military facilities and sustained military-to-
military cooperation make Thailand an important element of the U.S. strategic presence in the
Asia-Pacific region. Over 50 U.S. government agencies, with regional operations, also are based
in Thailand. They implement a wide range of programs, including infectious diseases research,
healthcare provision, and law enforcement training.
Bangkok’s political turmoil over the past decade has hurt the bilateral relationship. Thailand’s two
military coups, in 2006 and 2014, triggered U.S. suspension of some forms of assistance. With
Bangkok consumed with its own political crisis, analysts believe Thailand’s ability to help with
regional initiatives, including those supported by the United States, is highly limited. This raises
opportunity costs given its central geographical location, broad-based economy, and relatively
advanced infrastructure. Many have hoped that Thailand could play a larger role as a partner in
the Obama Administration’s strategic rebalance to Asia.
Thailand’s struggles are almost entirely domestic and in general not destabilizing for the region,
but because of them Bangkok lacks the capacity to be a more productive force. While Thailand
has played helpful roles in encouraging Myanmar’s democratic transition and coordinating talks
between the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian nations (ASEAN) and China on a Code
of Conduct in the South China Sea, it has not claimed as much of a leadership role of ASEAN as
it might if its own politics were more stable.
With the prospect that the military may hold on to power for an extended period, possibly until
the royal succession unfolds over several years, U.S. policy makers must judge how stringently to
advocate democratic principles in its relations with Bangkok.In the past, many analysts say
Thailand has demonstrated a remarkable ability to “muddle through” its crises; despite periodic
bouts of violence and political discord, accommodations have been made to allow Thailand’s
government and economy to move forward. Many experts say this time may be different and that
Thailand is convulsing through a historic transition. The current monarch has been in place for
over 65 years. Many analysts believe the inevitable royal succession, when it comes, could
reshape the role the palace plays within Thailand’s political structure.
Many critical questions about Thailand’s future remain: Without representative government, how
will Thailand’s disenfranchised majority respond? Is civil war possible? What are the possible
succession scenarios? How could they affect the country’s stability? What role will Thaksin and
his supporters play? Will foreign investors shy away from Thailand given the uncertainties? Will
the country continue to lead regional initiatives, including those supported by the United States?
How stringently should the U.S. advocate democratic principles, particularly when doing so may
strengthen the Sino-Thai relationship? If Thailand is under a military government for an extended
period, what are the implications for U.S. relations with one of its Asian treaty allies and for U.S.
policy in the region?
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Political Crisis and Military Coup in 2013-2014
Thai politics, in turmoil for several years, was thrown into crisis when the Royal Thai military
declared martial law on May 20, 2014. Two days later, the military ousted the civilian
government, and Army Commander Prayuth Chan-ocha seized power. The military dissolved
Parliament, detained political leaders and academics, imposed a curfew, and restricted media
outlets. Former Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra was placed under house arrest. (She was
later released.) There was no widespread bloodshed associated with the coup. However, sporadic
violence in the months prior left 28 people dead.1
After seizing power, Prayuth announced that a group of senior military leaders, known as the
National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), would govern Thailand. The NCPO created a new
National Legislative Assembly (NLA), and selected the Assembly’s members. On August 21,
2014, the new body elected Prayuth as Prime Minister. Prayuth has not set a date for a transition
to civilian rule, and he has been reluctant to hold popular elections. After the coup, he said that
elections might be held in early 2016 but later announced they would be would be pushed back to
August-September 2016. The NCPO also created a Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) to
draw up a new constitution. While the process is on-going, a preliminary version grants immunity
to individuals involved in the coup and allows the prime minister to be selected, rather than
popularly elected, if he or she receives two-thirds approval of the house. 2
In April 2015, Prayuth lifted martial law. However, afterwards, he invoked Article 44 of the
interim constitution, granting his government the authority to curb “acts deemed harmful to
national peace and stability.” Human rights groups immediately condemned the move. It was yet
another sign, according to Human Rights Watch, of Thailand’s “deepening descent into
dictatorship.”3
U.S. Response to Coup
In response to the 2014 coup, the United States immediately suspended $4.7 million in foreign
assistance to Thailand, cancelled a series of military exercises and Thai military officers’ visits,
and urged a quick return to civilian rule and early elections. 4 “There is no justification for this
coup ... I urge the restoration of civilian government immediately, a return to democracy, and
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, such as press freedoms,” Secretary of State
1 Before the coup, Thai politics had been dysfunctional since October 2013, when the ruling party tabled a general
amnesty bill that would have cleared Thaksin from his corruption conviction (as well as several opposition leaders from
charges related to earlier protests). Large-scale opposition demonstrations erupted in the streets of Bangkok. The
protestors, reported to be up to 200,000 at their peak, occupied several government compounds and created gridlock in
areas of the capital city. Protest leaders called for the end of the “Thaksin regime” and demanded that a “people’s
council” reporting to the King replace Parliament. New elections were held in February 2014, but the opposition
Democrat Party boycotted the polls, and the courts later ruled that the election results were invalid. Until her removal
by court order in early May, Yingluck remained the head of a “caretaker” government as demonstrations continued in
Bangkok.
2 Niyomat, Aukkarapon, “Draft Thai constitution complete, but strife seen ahead,” Reuters, April 17, 2015.
3 Campbell, Charlie, “The Thai Junta Has Replaced Martial Law With an Equally Draconian Security Order,” Time,
April 2, 2015.
4 Daily State Department Press Briefing, May 22, 2014, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2014/05/
226556.htm#THAILAND;
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John Kerry said in a statement. “While we value our long friendship with the Thai people, this act
will have negative implications for the U.S.-Thai relationship, especially for our relationship with
the Thai military. We are reviewing our military and other assistance and engagements, consistent
with U.S. law”5
The Administration did have some latitude in determining how much assistance to suspend to
Thailand.6 Aid that could continue because of “notwithstanding” clauses was generally
humanitarian in nature—for instance, emergency food aid, international disaster assistance, and
migration and refugee aid. Military assistance programs, however, were suspended. Immediately
following the coup, the U.S. cut off $3.5 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and
$85,000 in International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds. (In recent years,
Thailand has received approximately $1.3 million in IMET annually.7)
However, the U.S. still participated in Thailand’s Cobra Gold military exercise in February 2015.
The exercise—which is one of the largest in the Asia Pacific—involved 13,000 troops from 24
Asian-Pacific countries. However, fewer U.S. troops participated than in previous years—3,600
in 2015 compared to 4,300 in 2014. According to the Administration, U.S. participation will
remain limited in 2016 as well.
Several years ago, after the 2006 coup, many observers saw the U.S. response as relatively mild.
Funding for development assistance and military financing and training programs was cut off.
Yet, U.S. assistance for a range of other programs—including law enforcement training,
counterterrorism and nonproliferation efforts, global health programs, and the Peace Corps—
remained in place.
Thailand Politics and Government
Historical Background
The Kingdom of Thailand, a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary form of government,
is distinct from its neighbors in one important aspect: it is the only county in Southeast Asia that
the Europeans never colonized. (It was briefly occupied by Japan during World War II.) Thailand
5 See http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/05/226446.htm
6 The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (P.L. 113-76), at Division K, provides the Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2014, and the general provisions within that Act provides, at
128 Stat. 494, the coup foreign aid cut-off language, as follows:
Sec. 7008. None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available pursuant to titles III through
VI of this Act shall be obligated or expended to finance directly any assistance to the government
of any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup d'etat or decree
or, after the date of enactment of this Act, a coup d'etat or decree in which the military plays a
decisive role: Provided, That assistance may be resumed to such government if the President
determines and certifies to the Committees on Appropriations that subsequent to the termination of
assistance a democratically elected government has taken office: Provided further, That the
provisions of this section shall not apply to assistance to promote democratic elections or public
participation in democratic processes: Provided further, That funds made available pursuant to the
previous provisos shall be subject to the regular notification procedures of the Committees on
Appropriations.
7 Daily State Department Press Briefing, May 28, 2014.
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also avoided the wave of communist revolutions that led to communist governments in
Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s.
Thailand followed a troubled path to democracy. Thailand became a constitutional monarchy in
1932, but it was ruled primarily by military dictatorships until the early 1990s. During that period,
a military and bureaucratic elite controlled Thai politics. They did not allow civilian democratic
institutions to develop. However, there were brief periods of democracy in the 1970s and 1980s,
but they ended with reassertions of military rule. After Thai soldiers killed at least 50 people in
May 1992, a wave of demonstrations broke out, demanding an end to the military’s control of the
government. Eventually, bowing to both domestic and international pressures, the military ceded
control, and allowed elections to take place in September. The 2006 coup was the first in 15
years.
Thailand’s government is composed of an executive branch (prime minister as head of the
government and the king as chief of state), a bicameral National Assembly, and a judicial branch
of three court systems. In the years immediately preceding Thaksin’s election in 2001, the
Democrat Party dominated Thai politics by instituting a series of reforms that enhanced
transparency, decentralized power from the urban centers, tackled corruption, and introduced a
broad range of constitutional rights. Thaksin’s 2001-2006 tenure as Prime Minister was marked
by an unprecedented centralization of power in the Prime Minister’s office, as well as the
implementation of populist economic policies such as the public subsidy of health care. Some of
these developments, analysts note, set the context for the military’s decision to oust Thaksin in
2006.
Social Divisions and the Thai Political Landscape
The political turmoil in Thailand underscores a growing divide between the rural, mostly poor
population and the urban middle class, largely based in Bangkok. By stoking Thai nationalism
and providing inexpensive health care and other support to rural communities, Thaksin
galvanized a populist movement in Thailand, leading to emphatic electoral victories for his Thai
Rak Thai Party. Even after the Thai Rak Thai Party was banned—following the coup against
Thaksin in 2006—its successor parties, the People’s Power Party and the Puea Thai Party,
continued to win national elections. This success threatened the traditional model of governance
and the “old guard,” a combination of elite bureaucrats, the Thai military, and the royal family.
Thaksin’s rise and fall—and the role he continues to play in Thai politics—did much to expose
and exacerbate the country’s regional and class-based rifts.
The confrontation is not as simple as a conflict between mostly poor, rural Thaksin supporters and
the elite, although those disparities remain significant and motivate many of the participants. The
fight also involves regional rivalries. Most of Thaksin’s supporters hail from the northeastern part
of Thailand and resent the control emanating from the richer governing class in Bangkok. The
political divisions are also exploited by politicians who are motivated by their own self-interest.
Many Puea Thai politicians aligned themselves with Thaksin to win votes but come from the
same privileged—and often corrupt—club of powerbrokers as members of the opposition party.
When demonstrations have occurred, they have usually been between two main groups: the
“yellow shirts” (with sub-groups such as the People’s Alliance for Democracy and the People’s
Democratic Reform Committee) and the “red shirts” (sometimes known as the United Front for
Democracy Against Dictatorship).The yellow shirts are a mix of the military, royalists, the
bureaucracy, and largely urban and middle class citizens. The red shirts are mostly Thaksin
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loyalists who supported his populist policies that benefited the poor, rural regions of Thailand. A
fundamental divide between the two groups centers on the electoral process, with the yellow
shirts arguing that ethical imperatives trump the polls, while the red shirts believe that governance
should be determined entirely by the popular vote.
During the last several years, both sides have held massive protests to air their grievances, and at
times the demonstrations have turned violent. The worst violence in modern Thai history
occurred in the spring of 2010 when the Democratic Party was in power. Anti-government
protestors—at that time, the Red Shirts—occupied parts of Bangkok for nine weeks. The
demonstrations, while initially peaceful, became increasingly aggressive, as did the security
forces’ response. Eventually, the tit-for-tat violence spiraled into urban warfare. On May 19,
2010, armored vehicles and infantry troops stormed the protestors’ encampments. At least 90
people were killed. 2,000 were wounded, and several protest leaders surrendered. Splinter groups
emerged within all of the major institutions, including the government, the military, and the
police, and rogue elements—from both the security forces and the protestors—may have been
responsible for the most egregious violence and damage that occurred during the stand-off.
(Yellow shirt protestors organized massive rallies in Bangkok in 2008 and 2013-2014, both times
shutting down parts of the city.)
Role of the Palace
The ailing King Bhumiphol Adulyadej has remained largely disengaged from the ongoing
political crisis. In the past, the King was an important source of stability, mainly because of his
popularity, and when demonstrations became violent, the King would often intercede, preventing
further bloodshed. However, many analysts say that the King’s failing health has exacerbated
political tensions in the country. There is no other arbiter of the King’s status—pointing to the
weakness of Thailand’s other political institutions—and the succession process is unclear.
Different political factions are jockeying for power, trying to prepare themselves for potential
succession scenarios.
However, these scenarios are rarely discussed in public, only adding to the sense of uncertainty.
Due to stringent lèse-majesté laws, it is a crime—punishable with a prison term of up to 15
years—to “criticize, insult or threaten” the King, Queen, royal heir apparent, or regent. According
to news reports, the use of these legal provisions has soared in recent years. Thousands of
websites have also been blocked.8 In 2011, an American was arrested for lèse-majesté, drawing
complaints from the U.S. embassy in Bangkok.
U.S.-Thailand Security Relations
In many ways, the military-to-military connection has been the strongest pillar of the U.S.-Thai
relationship. In November 2012, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta and Thai Defense
Minister Sukampol Suwannathat signed the 2012 Joint Vision Statement for the Thai-U.S.
Defense Alliance. The document celebrated 180 years of cooperation and updated the goals of the
alliance, putting a particular emphasis on building regional security partnerships.9
8“Review Thailand’s Lese Majeste Laws,” TODAY (Singapore), July 22, 2011.
9 The Thai military, for instance, convened a trilateral meeting—between the United States, Thailand, and long-isolated
(continued...)
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However, the recent coups threaten military-to-military relations. The United States has a
statutory obligation to withhold aid to militaries involved in coups against democratically elected
governments, and after the 2014 coup, the U.S. cut off military assistance and training exercises
with Thailand, chilling relations. Prior to the 2014 coup, U.S. military funding to Thailand had
just recovered to pre-2006 coup levels, and U.S. military leaders touted the alliance as apolitical
and praised the Thai armed forces for exhibiting restraint amidst the competing protests and
political turmoil. However, the 2014 coup put the Thai army at the center of politics, repudiating
years of U.S. training about the importance of civilian control of the military.
Yet, the strategic value of the alliance remains high. U.S. access to Thailand’s military facilities,
particularly the strategically located and well-equipped Utapao airbase, is considered invaluable.
Utapao has been suggested as a permanent Southeast Asian Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster
Relief (HADR) hub. It can receive large aircraft (including C-17s and C-130s) it is close to a deep
seaport; and it has infrastructure capable of handling command and control systems. The U.S.
military used Utapao for refueling efforts during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in the 2000s,
as well as for multinational relief efforts after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and April 2015
Nepal earthquake. Thailand hosts the annual Cobra Gold exercises, the largest multilateral
military exercise in Asia. The 2015 exercises proceeded with U.S. participation despite the coup,
and the United States has said it will also proceed with the 2016 exercises.
Historical Background
The U.S.-Thai security relationship has a long history. In 1954, both countries signed the Manila
Pact, which created the (now defunct) Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Even now,
after SEATO dissolved, Article IV (1) of the Manila Pact—which calls for signatories to “act to
meet the common danger” in the event of an attack—remains in force. In 1962, the United States
and Thailand also agreed to the Thanat-Rusk communiqué, providing a further basis for the U.S.-
Thai security relationship. Thailand still is considered one of the major U.S. security allies in East
Asia, along with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and non-treaty partner Singapore.
Ties were strengthened by joint efforts in the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and in both Iraq
wars. Thailand sent more than 6,500 troops to serve in the United Nations Command during the
Korean War, where the Thai force suffered over 1,250 casualties.10 A decade later, the United
States staged bombing raids and rescue missions over North Vietnam and Laos from Thailand.
During the Vietnam War, up to 50,000 U.S. troops were based on Thai soil, and U.S. assistance
poured into the country to help Thailand fight its own domestic communist insurgency.11 Thailand
also sent troops to South Vietnam and Laos to aid U.S. efforts. The close security ties continued
throughout the Cold War, with Thailand serving as a solid anti-Communist ally in the region.
More recently, Thai ports and airfields played a crucial role in maintaining the flow of troops,
equipment, and supplies in both the 1991 and 2003 Iraq wars. In 2003, President George W. Bush
designated Thailand as a “major non-NATO ally,” a distinction which allows Thailand to receive
(...continued)
Burma—about humanitarian assistance in the region. Walton, Des, “The Importance of U.S.-Thai Security Cooperation
Pre-Coup, Post-Coup, & Beyond, CSIS: cogitASIA, July 13, 2015.
10 See http://korea50.army.mil/history/factsheets/allied.shtml (official public access website for Department of Defense
Commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Korean War).
11 The Eagle and the Elephant: Thai-American Relations Since 1833 (Bangkok: U.S. Agency for International
Development, 1997).
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more U.S. foreign aid and military assistance, including credit guarantees for major weapons
purchases.12
Bilateral Security Cooperation
Security Assistance
The United States has provided funds for the purchase of weapons and equipment to the Thai
military through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program (see Table 1 at end of report). As
a “major non-NATO ally”, Thailand also qualifies for the Excess Defense Articles (EDA)
program, which allows for the transfer of used U.S. naval ships and aircraft. The United States
faces stiff competitors in the foreign military sales market in Thailand, particularly because other
countries are more willing to engage in barter trade for agricultural products. When the 2014 coup
triggered a suspension of FMF funds, the Thais were upgrading their F-16 fighter aircraft fleet
and had agreed to purchase UH-72 Lakotas, the first international customer for the helicopters.
Military Exercises
The United States and Thailand hold numerous joint military exercises. They are, according to
many military analysts, invaluable, and foster a strong working relationship between the armed
forces of both countries. Before the coup, Thailand and the United States were conducting over
50 joint military exercises a year, including Cobra Gold. For the February 2015 exercise, over
13,000 military personnel participated.13 The fully participating nations include Thailand, the
United States, Singapore, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia and Malaysia, along with observers from
several other Asian nations, including, for the second time, military officials from Burma. China
also participated, albeit in a limited capacity. It only took part in non-combat exercises, such as
humanitarian-assistance missions.14
Training
Tens of thousands of Thai military officers, including many of those in top leadership positions
throughout the services and in the civilian agencies, have received U.S. training under the
International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. Designed to enhance the
professionalism of foreign militaries as well as improve defense cooperation with the United
States, the program is regarded by many as a relatively low-cost, highly effective means to
achieve U.S. national security goals. In 2013, over 100 Thai officers received training in the
United States. IMET funding was suspended following both the 2006 and 2014 coups.
12 Under Section 517 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the President can designate a non-North Atlantic Treaty
Organization state as a major ally for the purposes of the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act.
13 “Thai-US Military Exercise Launched Amid Tensions Over Coup” The Associated Press, February 9, 2015.
14 Whitlock, Craig, “U.S. military to participate in major exercise in Thailand despite coup,” Washington Post, Februay
7, 2015.
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Intelligence
Intelligence cooperation between Thailand and the United States reportedly increased markedly
after the September 11, 2001, attacks, culminating in the establishment of the Counter Terrorism
Intelligence Center (known as the CTIC) in 2001. The CTIC, which combines personnel from
Thailand’s intelligence agency and specialized branches of the military and armed forces,
provides a forum for CIA personnel to work closely with their Thai counterparts, sharing facilities
and information daily, according to reports from Thai security officials.15 Close cooperation in
tracking Al Qaeda operatives who passed through Thailand reportedly intensified into active
pursuit of suspected terrorists following the 9/11 strikes.16 The most public result of enhanced
coordination was the arrest of suspected Jemaah Islamiyah leader Hambali, outside of Bangkok in
August 2003. The CIA also maintained at least one black site—a place where terrorist suspects
can be held outside of U.S. jurisdiction—in Thailand.17 Other intelligence cooperation efforts
focus on counter-narcotics.
Law Enforcement
In 1998, the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) Bangkok was established.18 It is
open to government officials from all Southeast Asian countries. At the Academy, the officials
receive law enforcement and legal training, and are encouraged to cooperate on cross-border
issues like human trafficking and gang suppression. Instruction for the courses is provided largely
by the Royal Thai Police, the Thai Office of the Narcotics Control Board, and various U.S.
agencies, including the Diplomatic Security Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the Department of Homeland Security, and the Internal
Revenue Service.19
The arrest of Victor Bout, an international arms dealer, in Bangkok in 2008 was a highlight of
U.S. and Thai law enforcement coordination, although the drawn-out extradition process also
became an irritant to bilateral relations until his transfer to the United States in 2010.
Counter-Narcotics
Counter-narcotics cooperation between Thailand and the United States has been extensive and
pre-dates the foundation of ILEA-Bangkok. Coordination between the DEA and Thailand’s law
enforcement agencies, in conjunction with a mutual legal assistance treaty and an extradition
treaty, has led to many arrests of international drug traffickers. Specialized programs include the
15 Crispin, Shawn, and Leslie Lopez, “U.S. and Thai Agents Collaborate in Secret—Cold-War-Style Alliance Strikes
Jemaah Islamiyah Where It Least Expects It.” Asian Wall Street Journal, October 1, 2003.
16 Ibid.
17 Nazaryan, Alexander, “CIA Torture Report’s Abu Zubaydah Surprised the Truth Came Out, Newsweek, Dec. 16,
2014; Miller, Greg and Adam Goldman, “Rise and flal of CIA’s overseas prisons traced in Senate report on
interrogations, Washington Post, December 11, 2014.
18 ILEA-Bangkok is one of five ILEAs in the world. The others are located in Budapest, San Salvador, Gaborone, and
Roswell, New Mexico.
19 Course information from http://www.ileabangkok.com.
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establishment of Task Force 399, in which U.S. special forces train Thai units in narcotics
interdiction tactics.20
U.S.-Thailand Trade and Economic Relations
Thailand is Southeast Asia’s second largest economy. One of the region’s more developed and
open economies, it has been for many years one of the region’s largest destinations for foreign
direct investment. According to the World Bank, Thailand became an upper middle income
economy in 2011. In recent years, the Thai economy has performed strongly, despite the political
turmoil. However, after the 2014 coup, the economy grew only 0.7%, the slowest rate in three
years. In 2015 the World Bank expects economic growth to increase to 3.5%.21
According to the U.S. Trade Representative, Thailand is the 25th largest market for U.S. goods
exports. Two-way trade with Thailand totaled $47.4 billion in 2014 and the overall U.S. trade
deficit with Thailand was $15.3 billion. Major exports from the United States include integrated
circuits, computer parts, semi-conductors, cotton, aircraft parts, electronics, soybeans, and oil.
Major imports to the United States include electronics, jewelry, seafood, clothing, furniture,
natural rubber, auto parts, and rice.22 U.S. companies have substantial investments in Thailand.
U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Thailand was $14.4 billion in 2013, led by investments in
the manufacturing sector. Thailand also receives substantial investment from other countries,
notably Japan, China, and South Korea.
According to the U.S. Trade Representative, some of the largest barriers to trade in Thailand are
high tariff rates in selected industries, particularly in agriculture; a lack of transparency in
customs policy where Customs Department officials have “significant discretionary authority”;
the use of price controls or import license requirements in some industries; and poor protection of
intellectual property rights. (Thailand was on the USTR’s Priority Watch List for intellectual
property theft in 2013 and 2014.23)
However, observers are not only concerned about Thailand’s trade barriers. They also are worried
about the country’s lack of human capital. Thailand’s education system is consistently ranked
below some other Southeast Asian nations. While Thailand spends a huge percentage of its GDP
on education—a higher percentage than Germany does—the results have been disappointing, and
according to analysts that is unlikely to change in the near term, particularly if the country’s
schools keep emphasizing rote learning and do not attract better teachers.
Thailand is not a member of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade negotiations, the Obama
Administration’s signature economic initiative in Asia. As Prime Minister, Yingluck Shinawatra
expressed interest in joining the TPP negotiations in 2012. Yet Thailand has taken no further steps
since then toward joining the talks.
20 Chambers, Paul, “U.S.-Thai Relations After 9/11: A New Era in Cooperation?” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.
26, Issue 3. December 2004.
21 Blake, Chris, “Draft Thai Constitution Aims to Put Brakes on Political Parties,” Bloomberg Business, April 17, 2015.
22 Office of Commercial Thailand Affairs, Royal Thailand Embassy, 2007.
23 Office of the United States Trade Representative, “2014 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers,”
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2014%20NTE%20Report%20on%20FTB%20Thailand.pdf.
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The United States and Thailand initiated negotiations for an FTA in 2004. In 2006, the talks were
suspended following the military coup, and no new ones have occurred since then. However,
Thailand has aggressively pursued FTAs with other countries. It has signed trade agreements with
Bahrain, China, Peru, Australia, Japan, India, and New Zealand. Further deals are possible with
South Korea, Chile, and the European Union (EU). Thailand has championed ASEAN
regionalism, seeing the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA, among ASEAN countries only) and the
planned ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) as vehicles for investment-driven integration
which will benefit Thailand’s outward-oriented growth strategy.24 However, debates over
economic policy have become increasingly contentious in Thailand, mirroring the growing
political divisions in the country.
As noted above, Thaksin pursued large-scale populist measures as Prime Minister, including
subsidizing low-cost health care and transferring substantial revenues from the central
government to states and townships. His sister, Yingluck, also implemented populist policies.
While Prime Minister, her government announced a rice-subsidy plan in 2012 that would buy rice
from Thai farmers at prices around 50% above market rates and stockpile it before selling it on
the open market. Many observers criticized the plan as fiscally unsustainable. Thailand’s public
debt rose from 41% of GDP in 2011 to 46% in early 2014, and many observers argue that the
2013 economic slowdown was at least partially caused by the fiscal burden of subsidizing rice
farmers.25 Amidst the political turmoil, Yingluck’s opponents filed an impeachment charge
against her for the policy—the motion was still pending when she was ousted by the
Constitutional Court. When Prayuth came to power, the Thai government ended the subsidy.
Thailand in Asia
Thailand is important to the region because of its large economy, its working relationships with
numerous neighbors including Burma and China, and, until the coups, its relatively long-standing
democratic rule. Its years of political turmoil raise concerns among its neighbors that Thailand
appears increasingly unable to take a leadership role in regional initiatives. That, many argue, has
implications for issues such as ASEAN’s diplomacy with China over maritime disputes in the
South China Sea, regional efforts to combat human trafficking, and regional economic integration
under a planned ASEAN Economic Community (AEC).
According to some U.S. analysts, Southeast Asia is a key arena of competition between the
United States and China. They worry that China is gaining more leverage in Thailand—
particularly given the chill in U.S.-Thai relations. Another concern relates to the Obama
administration’s “strategic rebalancing”—or “pivot”—to Asia. Without a strong U.S.-Thai
relationship, analysts warn that it will be increasingly difficult to strengthen treaty alliances and
regional multilateral organizations such as ASEAN. However, according to other analysts, such
concerns are overblown. They say that the United States and Thailand have strong and enduring
ties. Thailand, they add, is reluctant to become overly dependent on China.
24 Chirathivat, Suthiphand, and Sothitorn Mallikamas, “Thailand’s FTA Strategy: Current Developments and Future
Challenges,” ASEAN Economic Bulletin, vol. 21, no. 1 (April 2004).
25 Bangkok Post, “Six Years to Settle Rice Debt,” June 9, 2014.
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Thailand-China Ties
Historically, Sino-Thai ties have been quite close, particularly when compared to China’s
relations with most other Southeast Asian states. After the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam,
Thailand pursued a strategic alignment with China in order to contain Vietnamese influence in
neighboring Cambodia. Thailand also restored diplomatic ties with Beijing in 1975, long before
other Southeast Asian nations did. Over the past decade, Sino-Thai relations have become even
stronger.
There is a sizeable ethnic Chinese population in Thailand, and they have assimilated relatively
easily into Thai society. They have become a strong presence in the country’s business and
political worlds, and they were some of the largest—and earliest—investors in China following
its economic opening in 1979.
Thailand has no territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea unlike Vietnam, the
Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei. In 2013 and 2014, Thailand coordinated discussions between
ASEAN and China over a potential Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. It was an attempt to
restart negotiations after several years of stasis. However, the talks have failed to make
substantial progress in the wake of rising tensions between China and the other claimants, and
Singapore became their formal coordinator in 2015.
Bilateral trade between Thailand and China has boomed under the China-ASEAN Free Trade
Agreement, which entered into force in 2010. That same year, China replaced the United States as
Thailand’s largest trading partner. Thai-China trade grew 42% between 2010 and 2014. Thai-U.S.
trade, by comparison, grew only 27% during the same period. In 2014, overall Thai-China trade
was 66% larger than Thai-U.S. trade. 26 Thailand also has signed agreements with China on
infrastructure development, environmental protection, and strategic cooperation.
Sino-Thai military ties have increased as well. Starting in the 1980s—when both China and
Thailand opposed Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia—China began selling Thailand advanced
weapons and equipment. Thailand still purchases military hardware from China—most recently
submarines—and in 2015 both countries agreed to conduct more joint military exercises.27
Already, China and Thailand conduct joint patrols. In October 2011, a Burmese minority group
operating in a Thai-controlled portion of the Mekong River killed 13 Chinese soldiers. The
incident spurred greater Sino-Thai military cooperation, and in December 2011 they began
conducting patrols together—eventually including Laotian and Burmese forces as well—along
the Mekong River.28
Thailand-Burma Ties
Historically, Thailand has had an uneasy, albeit peaceful, relationship with Burma—both in the
past when Burma was controlled by the military and now when the military is ceding some
26 See http://www2.bot.or.th/statistics/ReportPage.aspx?reportID=743&language=eng
27 See http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/did-china-just-boost-military-ties-with-thailand/
28 It is worth noting that the Mekong is increasingly used for trans-border trade. “China Deploys Patrols Along the
Mekong,” Wall Street Journal, December 11, 2011.
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control to the country’s civilian politicians. The boundary between the two countries stretches
1,800 kilometers, and on the Burma side ethnic-minority militias—several of which are opposed
to the Burmese central government—control most of the territory along the border. In the absence
of government control, narcotics, militants, and migrants—including refugees and victims of
human trafficking—move across the border with relative impunity. Thailand wants to improve its
border protections, and that has become one of the country’s main foreign policy priorities.
Until the Obama Administration began pursuing an opening with the Burmese military regime,
Bangkok’s approach toward Burma was seen as conflicting with U.S. policy. While the United
States pursued strict economic and diplomatic sanctions against the regime, Thailand led
ASEAN’s “constructive engagement” initiative, which favored integration and incentives to coax
Burma to reform. A Thai energy company, known by its acronym PTT, also made substantial
investments in Burma’s natural gas sector, making Thailand one of the largest investors in the
country. From Thailand’s perspective, engagement served to expand opportunities for Thai
business. Thai-Burma trade totaled $7.4 billion in 2013, according to the Bank of Thailand.29
Previously, when the Burmese government was largely isolated, Thailand had more access to the
regime than other nations. After Cyclone Nargis hit in 2008, the Burmese government did not
allow international groups to provide humanitarian relief in the country. Yet Thai assistance and
aid workers were allowed in. In the wake of recent reforms in Burma, Thailand, like much of the
region, is assessing whether Burmese reforms are real and sustainable, and is seeking to build
relationships in the country and encourage the continuation of those political reforms. In 2013,
Thailand invited two Burmese Army officers to Cobra Gold, and some observers argue that
Thailand could take a leadership role in bringing the Burmese military into other regional security
initiatives.
Some congressional leaders have criticized Bangkok for its treatment of Burmese refugees,
migrant workers, and political dissidents living in Thailand. Backed by human rights groups’
reports, some U.S. lawmakers charged Thai security forces with arresting and intimidating
Burmese political activists, as well as repatriating Burmese migrants seeking political asylum.30
In the past, Congress has passed legislation that provides money to refugees who fled Burma,
particularly those in Thailand.31
ASEAN Relations
Thailand’s “local” foreign policy with fellow ASEAN members (Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore, Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, Laos, Burma, and Cambodia) is
complicated. Thailand is considered one of ASEAN’s leaders, or at least it was prior to the 2014
coup. It is one of the largest and most economically developed ASEAN countries, and it has
promoted ASEAN’s significance in global affairs—an attempt, according to analysts, to increase
the country’s own international clout.
29 See http://www2.bot.or.th/statistics/ReportPage.aspx?reportID=743&language=eng
30 See Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Thai Policy Toward Burmese Refugees and Migrants, Human Rights Watch Report,
released February 2004. Also Abandoned on Arrival, Senate Foreign Relations Committee report on the treatment of
Burmese refugees in Malaysia and Thailand.
31 H.R. 4818, Foreign Operations Appropriations, Section II, Bilateral Assistance.
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Bangkok has developed strong relations with its mainland Southeast Asian neighbors through
infrastructure assistance and other aid. In turn, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia provide raw
materials, inexpensive manufacturing, and expanding markets for Thailand. Despite cooperative
elements, Bangkok’s relations with its neighbors are often characterized by tension and
diplomatic spats. Intermittent tension with Cambodia re-ignited in 2008 over competing territorial
claims to Preah Vihear, a temple situated along the Thai-Cambodian border. In February 2011,
several consecutive days of shelling around the temple left at least 10 people dead, and Cambodia
eventually called on the United Nations to intervene. In November 2013, the International Court
of Justice ruled that the temple and the area immediately surrounding it were Cambodia’s
territory. Though Thai and Cambodian troops remain in the area, the ruling has been greeted
peacefully.
Relations with Malaysia have been complicated by the insurgency in Thailand’s majority-Muslim
southern provinces, which border Malaysia (see next section). Many Thai Muslims are ethnically
Malay and speak Yawi, a Malay dialect, and at times the Malaysian public has grown angry at the
perceived violence against Muslims in Thailand. Thailand and Malaysia have cooperated
periodically on efforts to hold talks with separatist groups in the South. However, many separatist
leaders reside in northern Malaysia—a point of contention between Thai and Malaysian
authorities.
Violence in the Southern Provinces
Thailand has endured a persistent separatist insurgency in its majority-Muslim southern
provinces, which include the provinces of Yala, Narathiwat, Pattani, and—to a lesser extent—
Songhkla. Since January 2004, violence between the insurgents and security forces has left
around 6,000 people dead, and over 11,000 wounded, according to press reports. However, since
2013, violence levels have declined—the result, according to analysts, of the NCPO’s “enhanced
counter-insurgency measures,” including creating District Protection Units drawn from local
volunteers.32
The groups fighting the government are generally poorly understood, and their motives are
difficult to characterize. Many analysts believe that the groups are mostly focused on local
autonomy, but even the Thai government has a poor understanding of the various factions active
in the south. Many experts characterize the movement as a confluence of different groups: local
separatists, Islamic radicals, organized crime, and corrupt police forces.
Most regional observers stress that there is has been no convincing evidence of serious Jemaah
Islamiyah (JI, a regional Al Qaeda affiliate) involvement in the attacks in the southern provinces,
and that the overall long-term goal of the movement in the south remains the creation of an
independent state with Islamic governance. Some of the older insurgent organizations, which
previously were linked to JI, have reportedly received financial support from foreign Islamic
groups, and have leaders who have trained in camps in Libya and Afghanistan. The insurgency
has, at times, heightened tensions between Thailand and Malaysia, since many of the insurgents’
leaders are thought to cross the border fairly easily. Despite these links, foreign elements do not
appear to have engaged significantly in the violence.
32 “Southern Thailand: Dialogue in Doubt”, International Crisis Group Asia Report No. 270, July 8, 2015.
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Background to the Current Conflict
Thai Muslims have long complained about discrimination and about the fact that their provinces
lag behind the rest of Thailand in terms of economic development. Since the 1960s, a separatist
insurgency has been active in southern Thailand, although it was thought to have mostly died out
in the early 1990s. The dead include suspected separatists killed by security forces, as well as
victims of the insurgents, including police and military forces. The overwhelming majority of
casualties, however, are civilian: both Buddhist Thais, particularly monks and teachers, and local
Muslims.
After a series of apparently coordinated attacks by the insurgents in early 2004, the central
government declared martial law in the region. Since then, a pattern of violence has developed—
usually small-scale shootings or bombings carried out by the insurgents, followed by
counterattacks from the security forces. The 11-year insurgency has become the deadliest conflict
in the Asia-Pacific region. Security forces sometimes engage in extra-judicial killings, and the
insurgents employ improvised explosive devices (IEDs), drive-by shootings, arson attacks, and,
occasionally, beheadings.33
The region remains under martial law—even after the government invoked Article 44 of the
interim constitution in the rest of the country—and security forces are allowed to arrest suspects
without warrants and detain them for up to 30 days. Since June 2007, a more concentrated
counter-insurgency campaign known as “Operation Southern Protection” has led to far more
arrests, but many analysts say the mass detentions are fueling local resentment. Human rights
groups have continued to criticize the military for its mistreatment of Muslim suspects.
Since the 2014 coup, the military has implemented several new counter-insurgency measures, and
violence in the south has declined even further. The Thai generals deployed more troops to restive
provinces. They created self-defense units—drawn from local civilians—and they installed
security cameras and alarm systems around educational facilities—which often are targeted by
the insurgents.34
Leadership of Insurgency Unclear
Identifying the groups directing the insurgency has been challenging, but most analysis suggests
that there is no one organization with authority over the others. The government’s inability to
establish an authority with whom to negotiate has limited its ability to resolve the conflict
peacefully. In February 2013, Yingluck’s government made an effort in this regard, announcing
that it would initiate peace talks with the Barisan Revolusi National (BRN), a group whose
leaders largely reside outside Thailand. BRN reportedly suspended the talks in August 2013. Had
the effort been successful, it is unclear how it would have influenced the actions of groups on the
ground.35 The NCPO recognizes the importance of talks as well and has, at times, signaled its
willingness to negotiate with the insurgent groups. Yet, so far, no official talks have been held.
33 Zach Abuza, “After the Coup: Grim Prospects for Peace in Thailand’s Restive South,” The Indo-Pacific Review, June
9, 2014.
34 “Southern Thailand: Dialogue in Doubt”, International Crisis Group Asia Report No. 270, July 8, 2015.
35 International Crisis Group. Talking and Killing in Southern Thailand. August 9, 2013.
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Human Rights and Democracy Concerns
International observers, along with some members of Congress, have criticized Thailand’s record
on human rights. Alleged abuses include extra-judicial killings, bloody suppression of civilian
demonstrations, and the curtailment of the press and non-governmental groups. Also, the Thai
government has a poor record on combating human trafficking, and its security forces have been
accused of human rights violations in the southern provinces throughout the country’s various
administrations.
For years, many observers have been concerned about Thailand’s democracy. Previously, they
had reason for optimism. In 1997, a new constitution was drafted. It entrenched the country’s
democratic institutions. It created a system of checks and balances, and provided greater human
rights protections.36 However, after the 2006 coup, a new constitution was drafted. According to
some, it moved away from the ideals of the 1997 document, raising questions about whether
established power centers had truly accepted the democratic system. Those questions have
persisted, and the imposition of martial law by the military in 2014 only deepened observers’
concerns.
Trafficking in Persons (TIP)
Thailand is surrounded by considerably poorer countries, and many economic migrants—
particularly from neighboring Burma—illegally cross into Thailand. Once they arrive, they are
often exploited. Many become forced laborers in garment factories and in seafood-related
industries. Some work as domestic helpers. Others, including children, are victims of sex
trafficking, and they become involved in the country’s sex-tourism industry. In the south, some
insurgent groups even recruit children. According to reports, the children then become foot
soldiers, carrying out attacks against Thai government facilities.
In 2014, Thailand was downgraded to Tier-3 status—the lowest ranking—in the State
Department’s Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report, released in July 2015. The country, the report
concluded, “does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of
trafficking.”37 While Thailand has improved its trafficking data collection efforts, the country has
not substantially improved its law enforcement capabilities, and corruption remains a major
problem.
Some observers thought that Thailand should have been downgraded earlier. They noted that
Thailand had been on the Tier 2 Watch List for four years, and that the country had received two
waivers, delaying the downgrade. The United States, they alleged, had not dropped Thailand to
Tier-3 status, because U.S. policymakers were worried about angering an ally. Other observers,
though, said that Thailand should be given more time. According to them, collecting trafficking
data is incredibly difficult, especially when there are dramatic regional differences in trafficking
patterns, as there are in Thailand.
36 Kurlantzick, Joshua, “Thailand: Political and Economic Lessons from Democratic Transitions,” Council on Foreign
Relations, June 18, 2013.
37 See http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/countries/2014/226832.htm
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Prior to the 2014 report, Thailand tried to prevent the downgrade. The government submitted a
report to the State Department, detailing substantial declines in the numbers of trafficked persons
in 2013 and increasing budgets for the government’s anti-trafficking efforts. Despite the reported
improvements, some NGOs said Thailand’s report considerably understated trafficking of non-
Thai citizens, who have traditionally made up a large proportion of Thailand’s trafficking
victims.38
In 2013 and 2014, media reports alleged that Thai government and military personnel were
involved in trafficking Rohingya migrants, a persecuted Muslim minority group in Burma. A
report from the Reuters news service described direct military involvement in sending tens of
thousands of Rohingya refugees into trafficking networks. (The report later won a 2013 Pulitzer
Prize for international reporting.)39 Thailand argues that many cross-border issues, including the
plight of the Rohingya in Thailand, involve human smuggling rather than human trafficking.
Although there is a distinction (smuggling involves illegal, but voluntary, cross-border
movements), undocumented migrants are often vulnerable to trafficking-type exploitation by
smugglers.40
Refugees in Thailand
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), over half a million
“stateless” people from 40 different nationalities currently live in Thailand.41 Ethnic minorities,
who face discrimination in their home countries, often seek refuge in Thailand. The immigration
controls are relatively loose, and the Thai authorities have a reputation for being lenient. Recently,
North Korean asylum-seekers have been heading to Thailand—in part because of Thailand’s
tolerance, but also because of anti-refugee crackdowns in other countries. A strong network of
international humanitarian organizations exists in Thailand to provide assistance to refugees.
The Burmese are, by far, the largest refugee group in Thailand, and most of those Burmese are
Rohingya Muslims. In 2014, UNHCR estimated that around 120,000 Burmese refugees lived in
nine camps along the Thai-Burmese border.42 About 40,000 of them were not registered with the
Thai government. Thailand has, in general, tried to accommodate these refugees. Yet, successive
Thai governments have become increasingly frustrated with the number of asylum seekers within
Thailand’s borders. The camps, Thai officials say, were meant to be temporary, not permanent.
The United States has tried to lessen some of the pressure on Thailand, and has resettled more
than 73,000 Burmese in the United States since 2005.43
However, still more Rohingya are heading toward Thailand. In early-mid 2015, thousands of
Rohingya refugees fled Burma. Many paid human traffickers to take them by boat to Malaysia or
38 Andrew R.C. Marshall and Amy Sawitta Lefevre, “Special Report: Flaws Found in Thailand’s Human Trafficking
Crackdown,” Reuters, April 10, 2014.
39 Jason Szep and Andrew R.C. Marshall, “Special Report: Thailand Secretly Dumps Myanmar Refugees into
Trafficking Rings,” Reuters, December 25, 2013.
40 Joshua Kurlantzick, Should Thailand be Downgraded to Tier 3 in Trafficking in Persons Report? Council on Foreign
Relations, March 7, 2014; Sam Derbali, “Trafficking in Thailand: What the Tip Doesn’t Say,” The Guardian, June 27,
2013.
41 Thailand 2015 UNHCR Country Operations Profile, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e489646.html
42 See http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e489646.html
43 “US Wraps Up Group Resettlement for Myanmar Refugees in Thailand,” News Stories, UNHCR. January 29, 2014.
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Thailand. However, many of those smugglers abandoned their boats, leaving the refugees adrift in
the Andaman Sea. Thailand, along with other regional governments, was reluctant to grant the
stranded refugees asylum. Yet, the Thai navy reportedly did provide some of the Rohingya with
food and water.
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Thailand 2007-2014
(thousands of dol ars)
Account FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013
FY2014
DA
0
0 4,500 6,151 5,051 5,051 4,826 4,000
ESF
990
0 2,500 2,500
0
0
0
0
FMF
0 423 1,600 1,600 1,568 1,187 1,424
0
GH
1,400 1,492 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500
0
0
IMET
0 1,202 1,459 1,500 1,568 1,318
1,319 713
INCLE
900 1,686 1,400 1,740 1,740 1,740 1,740 1,466
NADR
2,100 2,483 2,700 1,850 1,541 1,450 1,152 1,320
Peace
Corps
2,438 2,404 2,815 3,295 3,300 3,000 3,100 2,400
Totals
7,828
9,690
18,474
20,136
16268
15,246
13,561
9,899
Sources: U.S. Department of State; USAID.
Notes: DA = Development Assistance; ESF = Economic Support Funds; FMF = Foreign Military Sales Financing;
GH = Global Health; IMET = International Military Education and Training; INCLE = International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, & Related.
These programs were suspended on September 28, 2006, under Section 508 of the Foreign
Operations Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-102) and resumed on February 6, 2008.
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Figure 1. Map of Thailand
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS
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Author Contact Information
Emma Chanlett-Avery
Wil Mackey
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Research Associate
echanlettavery@crs.loc.gov, 7-7748
wmackey@crs.loc.gov, 7-5050
Ben Dolven
Specialist in Asian Affairs
bdolven@crs.loc.gov, 7-7626
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