

U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and
the Caribbean: Recent Trends and FY2016
Appropriations
Peter J. Meyer
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
July 21, 2015
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R44113
Summary
Geographic proximity has forged strong linkages between the United States and the nations of
Latin America and the Caribbean, with critical U.S. interests encompassing economic, political,
and security concerns. U.S. policymakers have emphasized different strategic interests in the
region at different times, from combating Soviet influence during the Cold War to advancing
democracy and open markets since the 1990s. Current U.S. policy is designed to promote
economic and social opportunity, ensure the safety of the region’s citizens, strengthen effective
democratic institutions, and secure a clean energy future. As part of broader efforts to advance
these priorities, the United States provides Latin American and Caribbean nations with substantial
amounts of foreign assistance.
Trends in Assistance
Since 1946, the United States has provided nearly $161 billion of assistance to the region in
constant 2012 dollars (or nearly $77 billion in historical, non-inflation-adjusted, dollars). Funding
levels have fluctuated over time, however, according to regional trends and U.S. policy
initiatives. U.S. assistance spiked during the 1960s under President Kennedy’s Alliance for
Progress, and then declined in the 1970s before spiking again during the Central American
conflicts of the 1980s. After another decline during the 1990s, assistance remained on a generally
upward trajectory through the first decade of this century, reaching its most recent peak in the
aftermath of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. Aid levels for Latin America and the Caribbean
declined in each of the four fiscal years between FY2011 and FY2014, however, as Congress has
sought to trim the foreign aid budget and the Administration has determined that some countries
require less assistance.
FY2016 Obama Administration Request
The Obama Administration’s FY2016 foreign aid budget request would reverse the recent
downward trend in assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean. The Administration has
requested nearly $2 billion to be provided through the State Department and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), which is a 35% increase over the FY2014 level (FY2015
country and regional allocations are not yet available). The requested increase in assistance is
almost entirely the result of the Administration’s proposal to provide over $1 billion in aid to
Central America to promote prosperity, security, and good governance and to address the root
causes of migration from the sub-region. Under the request, the balance of U.S. assistance would
shift toward development aid and away from security aid, as three of the four major U.S. security
initiatives in the region would see cuts. Aid levels for Colombia, Haiti, and Mexico would
decline, but those countries would continue to be among the top recipients in the region,
accounting for over a third of U.S. assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean.
Congressional Action
In recent years, the annual Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
appropriations measure has been the primary legislative vehicle through which Congress reviews
U.S. assistance and influences executive branch policy. The House and Senate Appropriations
Committees reported out their bills (H.R. 2772 and S. 1725) on June 11 and July 9, 2015,
respectively. H.R. 2772 includes 6.1% less funding than the Administration requested for bilateral
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economic assistance and international security assistance globally, and S. 1725 includes 5.9% less
funding than was requested for such programs.
It is unclear how much foreign assistance would be appropriated for Latin America and the
Caribbean in the two bills, however, since, for the most part, appropriations levels for individual
countries and programs are not specified in the bills or the accompanying reports (H.Rept. 114-
154 and S.Rept. 114-79). Nevertheless, congressional priorities appear to differ from those of the
Administration in several respects. Neither bill appears to fully fund the Administration’s $1
billion request for Central America; H.Rept. 114-154 recommends providing at least $296.5
million and S. 1725 provides up to $675.3 million for the sub-region. There are also considerable
disagreements regarding security assistance programs in Colombia, Mexico, and the Caribbean.
While H.Rept. 114-154 recommends providing more funding than was requested for such
programs, S.Rept. 114-79 recommends providing less funding.
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Contents
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Trends in U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean ...................................................... 2
FY2016 Foreign Assistance Request for Latin America and the Caribbean .................................... 4
Foreign Aid Categories and Accounts ....................................................................................... 4
Major Country and Regional Programs ..................................................................................... 6
Legislative Action ............................................................................................................................ 9
Looking Ahead ............................................................................................................................... 11
Figures
Figure 1. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY1946-FY2012 ......................... 3
Figure 2. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean by Aid Category: FY2011-
FY2016 ......................................................................................................................................... 6
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean by Foreign Aid Account:
FY2011-FY2016 ........................................................................................................................... 5
Table 2. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean by Country or Regional
Program: FY2011-FY2016 ........................................................................................................... 8
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 12
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Introduction
Foreign assistance is one of the tools the United States has employed to advance U.S. interests in
Latin America and the Caribbean, with the focus and funding levels of aid programs changing
along with broader U.S. policy goals.1 Current aid programs reflect the diversity of the countries
in the region. Some countries receive the full range of U.S. assistance as they continue to struggle
with political, socioeconomic, and security challenges. Others, which have made major strides in
democratic governance and economic and social development, no longer receive traditional U.S.
development assistance but continue to receive some support for security challenges, such as
combating transnational organized crime. Although U.S. relations with the nations of Latin
America and the Caribbean have increasingly become less defined by the provision of assistance
as a result of this progress, foreign aid continues to play an important role in advancing U.S.
policy in the region.
Congress authorizes and appropriates foreign assistance to the region and conducts oversight of
aid programs and the executive branch agencies charged with managing them. Current efforts to
reduce budget deficits in the aftermath of the recent global financial crisis and U.S. recession
have triggered closer examination of competing budget priorities. Congress has identified foreign
assistance as a potential area for spending cuts, placing greater scrutiny on the efficiency and
effectiveness of U.S. aid programs.
This report, which will be updated to track legislative developments, provides an overview of
U.S. assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean. It examines historical and recent trends in aid
to the region as well as the Obama Administration’s FY2016 request for State Department and
U.S Agency for International Development (USAID)-administered assistance. It also tracks
congressional action on foreign aid appropriations for Latin America and the Caribbean in
FY2016, and raises questions Congress may consider as it appropriates funding for the region.
Report Notes
In order to more accurately compare the Administration’s FY2016 foreign assistance request to previous years’
appropriations, aid figures in this report (except where otherwise indicated) refer only to bilateral assistance that is
managed by the State Department or USAID and is requested for individual countries or regional programs. While
this represents the majority of U.S. assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean, it is important to note that there
are several other sources of U.S. aid to the region. Some countries in Latin America and the Caribbean receive U.S.
assistance through State Department and USAID-managed foreign aid accounts, such as International Disaster
Assistance (IDA), Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA), and Transition Initiatives (TI). Likewise, some nations
receive assistance from U.S. agencies such as the Department of Defense, the Inter-American Foundation, the
Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the Peace Corps. Since foreign assistance provided through these accounts
and agencies is not requested for individual countries, and country-level figures are not publicly available until after
the fiscal year has passed, these accounts and agencies are excluded from this analysis.
1 For more information on U.S. policy in the region, see CRS Report R43882, Latin America and the Caribbean: Key
Issues for the 114th Congress, coordinated by Mark P. Sullivan.
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Trends in U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the
Caribbean
The United States has long been a major contributor of foreign assistance to countries in Latin
America and the Caribbean and provided the region nearly $161 billion in constant 2012 dollars
(or nearly $77 billion in historical, non-inflation-adjusted, dollars) between 1946 and 2012.2 U.S.
assistance to the region spiked in the early 1960s following the introduction of President
Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress, an anti-poverty initiative that sought to counter Soviet and
Cuban influence in the aftermath of Fidel Castro’s 1959 seizure of power in Cuba. After a period
of decline, U.S. assistance to the region increased again following the 1979 assumption of power
by the leftist Sandinistas in Nicaragua. Throughout the 1980s, the United States provided
considerable support to the Contras, who sought to overthrow the Sandinista government, and to
Central American governments battling leftist insurgencies. U.S. aid flows declined in the mid-
1990s following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Central American conflicts
(see Figure 1).
U.S. foreign assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean began to increase once again in the
late 1990s and remained on a generally upward trajectory through the past decade. The higher
levels of assistance were partially the result of increased spending on humanitarian and
development assistance. In the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in 1998, the United States provided
extensive humanitarian and reconstruction aid to several countries in Central America. The
establishment of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in 2003 and the
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) in 2004 provided a number of countries in the region
with new sources of U.S. assistance.3 More recently, the United States provided significant
amounts of assistance to Haiti in the aftermath of a massive January 2010 earthquake.
Increased funding for counternarcotics and security programs also contributed to the rise in U.S.
assistance through 2010. Beginning with President Clinton and the 106th Congress in FY2000,
successive Administrations and Congresses have provided substantial amounts of foreign aid to
Colombia and its Andean neighbors in support of “Plan Colombia”—a Colombian government
initiative to combat drug trafficking, end its long-running internal armed conflict, and foster
development. Spending on counternarcotics and security assistance received another boost in
FY2008 when President George W. Bush joined with his Mexican counterpart to announce the
Mérida Initiative, a package of U.S. counterdrug and anticrime assistance for Mexico and Central
America. In FY2010, Congress and the Obama Administration split the Central America portion
of the Mérida Initiative into a separate Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and
created a similar program for the countries of the Caribbean known as the Caribbean Basin
Security Initiative (CBSI).
2 These figures include aid obligations from all U.S. government agencies. U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID), U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945–September 30, 2012,
accessed in June 2015. Obligation data for FY2013 and FY2014 are not yet available.
3 For more information on PEPFAR and the MCC, see CRS Report R42776, The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS
Relief (PEPFAR): Funding Issues After a Decade of Implementation, FY2004-FY2013, by Tiaji Salaam-Blyther; and
CRS Report RL32427, Millennium Challenge Corporation, by Curt Tarnoff.
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Figure 1. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY1946-FY2012
Obligations in bil ions of constant 2012 U.S. dol ars
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Military Assistance
Economic Assistance
Source: USAID, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945–September 30,
2012, accessed in June 2015.
Notes: Includes aid obligations from all U.S. government agencies.
After more than a decade of generally increasing aid levels, U.S. assistance to Latin America and
the Caribbean began to decline in FY2011. This was partially the result of reductions in the
overall U.S. foreign assistance budget. The Obama Administration and Congress have sought to
reduce budget deficits in the aftermath of the recent global financial crisis and U.S. recession and
have identified foreign assistance as a potential area for spending cuts. U.S. assistance to Latin
America and the Caribbean has decreased each year since FY2010, and spending caps and across-
the-board cuts that were included in the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25), as amended,
could place downward pressure on the aid budget for the foreseeable future.4
The recent decline in U.S. assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean also reflects changes in
the region. As a result of stronger economic growth and the implementation of more effective
social policies, the percentage of people living in poverty in Latin America fell from 44% in 2002
to 28% in 2013.5 Likewise, electoral democracy has been consolidated in the region; every
country except Cuba now has a democratically elected government (although some elections have
been controversial). These changes have allowed the U.S. government to concentrate its resources
4 For more information, see CRS Report R42994, The Budget Control Act, Sequestration, and the Foreign Affairs
Budget: Background and Possible Impacts, by Susan B. Epstein.
5 U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Social Panorama of Latin America, December
2014.
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in fewer countries and sectors. For example, USAID closed its mission in Panama in 2012
following the country’s graduation from foreign assistance, and the agency has largely
transitioned out of providing support for family planning and elections administration as
governments throughout the region have demonstrated their ability to finance and carry out such
activities on their own.6 Some Latin American nations, such as Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and
Uruguay, have even begun providing foreign aid to other countries. The United States has
partnered with these nations through so-called “trilateral cooperation” initiatives to jointly plan
and fund development and security assistance efforts in third countries. Other countries, such as
Bolivia and Ecuador, have demonstrated less interest in working with the United States, leading
to significant reductions in U.S. assistance and the closure of USAID missions. As a result of
these developments in the region and competing U.S. foreign policy priorities elsewhere in the
world, U.S. assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean as a proportion of total U.S. foreign
assistance dropped from 12% in FY2004 to 7% in FY2014.7
FY2016 Foreign Assistance Request for Latin
America and the Caribbean8
The Obama Administration’s FY2016 budget request would reverse the recent downward trend in
aid to the region. It includes nearly $2 billion for Latin America and the Caribbean, a 35%
increase over the FY2014 level (see Table 1). The requested increase in assistance is almost
entirely the result of the Administration’s intention to allocate over $1 billion in aid to Central
America to promote prosperity, security, and good governance and to address the root causes of
migration from the region.
Foreign Aid Categories and Accounts9
The Administration’s FY2016 foreign aid request for Latin America and the Caribbean would
shift the emphasis of U.S. assistance efforts toward development and humanitarian assistance
programs (see Figure 2). More than $842 million (about 42%) of the request for the region would
go toward such programs. Development assistance seeks to foster sustainable broad-based
economic progress and social stability in developing nations. Such funding is often used for long-
term projects in the areas of democracy promotion, economic reform, basic education, human
health, and environmental protection. This assistance is provided primarily through the
Development Assistance (DA) and Global Health Programs (GHP) accounts, which would
receive $615 million and $214 million, respectively, under the Administration’s FY2016 request.
In terms of humanitarian assistance, the Administration has requested $13 million through the
Food for Peace (P.L. 480) account to address immediate food security needs in the region. While
funding provided through the GHP accounts would remain relatively stable, the FY2016 request
6 Mark Feierstein, “A New Approach for a Changing Hemisphere,” USAID Frontlines, March/April 2012.
7 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Years FY2006 and
FY2015.
8 Unless otherwise noted, data and information in this section are drawn from U.S. Department of State, Congressional
Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 3, Fiscal Year 2016, February 27, 2015, http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/238222.pdf.
9 For more information on the various foreign aid accounts and the programs they fund, see CRS Report R40213,
Foreign Aid: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy, by Curt Tarnoff and Marian L. Lawson.
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includes nearly $401 million more DA funding than the United States provided to the region in
FY2014. The vast majority of the additional DA funding would be used to support development
efforts in Central America.
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean by Foreign Aid Account:
FY2011-FY2016
Appropriations in thousands of U.S. dol ars
% Change
FY2015
FY2014-
Account FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 FY2014 (request)
FY2016
FY2016
DA
361,463 333,785 305,945 214,399 282,390 615,041 +187%
GHP
130,977 104,509 78,948 63,063 65,541 65,541
+4%
(USAID)
GHP
203,323 182,236 173,496 157,368 167,444 148,444
-6%
(State)
P.L.
480 94,951 38,173 40,526 29,067 13,000 13,000
-55%
ESF
435,130 465,541 447,503 459,280 392,876 597,461
+30%
INCLE 506,220 593,270 550,942 467,131 332,000 464,000
-1%
NADR 25,200 20,530 14,992 14,485 12,563 9,070
-37%
IMET
14,458 14,597 12,892 13,503 13,770 12,905
-4%
FMF
84,477 70,885 59,226 59,315 47,100 64,665
+9%
Total
1,856,199 1,823,526 1,684,470 1,477,611 1,326,684 1,990,127
+35%
Source: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Years 2013-2015.
Notes: DA=Development Assistance; GHP=Global Health Programs; P.L. 480=Food For Peace; ESF=Economic
Support Fund; INCLE=International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR=Nonproliferation Anti-
terrorism, Demining, and Related programs; IMET=International Military Education and Training; and
FMF=Foreign Military Financing.
Another $597 million (30%) of the Administration’s FY2016 request for the region would be
provided through the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account, which has as its primary purpose
the promotion of special U.S. political, economic, or security interests. In practice, the ESF
account generally funds programs that are designed to promote political and economic stability
and are often indistinguishable from those funded through the regular development and
humanitarian assistance accounts. The Administration’s FY2016 request for the region includes
$138 million more ESF assistance than was provided in FY2014. Most of the additional ESF
would be provided to Central America.
The remaining $551 million (28%) of the Administration’s FY2016 request for Latin America and
the Caribbean would support security assistance programs. This includes $464 million under the
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account, which supports
counternarcotics and civilian law enforcement efforts as well as projects designed to strengthen
judicial institutions. It also includes $9 million requested under the Nonproliferation, Anti-
terrorism, De-mining, and Related programs (NADR) account, which funds efforts to counter
global threats, such as terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Additionally,
$78 million has been requested under the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International
Military Education and Training (IMET) accounts to provide equipment and personnel training to
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Latin American and Caribbean militaries. Total security funding for the region would decline by
about $4 million, with a slight increase in FMF aid offset by slight decreases in INCLE, NADR,
and IMET assistance. While INCLE aid for Central America, provided through the Central
America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), would increase by $105 million, INCLE aid for
Colombia and Mexico would be cut by $32 million and $68 million, respectively.
Figure 2. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean by Aid Category:
FY2011-FY2016
As a percentage of total U.S. assistance appropriated for the region
100%
Military
90%
80%
Civilian Security
70%
60%
50%
Political/Strategic
40%
Humanitarian
30%
20%
Development
10%
0%
FY2011
FY2012
FY2013
FY2014
FY2015 (req.)
FY2016 (req.)
Source: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Years 2013-2015.
Notes: “Military” includes FMF & IMET; “Civilian Security” includes INCLE & NADR; “Political/Strategic”
includes ESF; “Humanitarian” includes P.L. 480; and “Development” includes DA & GHP.
Major Country and Regional Programs10
Following a sharp increase in the number of unaccompanied children and other migrants from
Central America arriving at the U.S. border in FY2014, the Administration announced a whole-
of-government “U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America” that is designed to
promote prosperity, security, and good governance in the sub-region. More than $1 billion (51%)
of the Administration’s FY2016 aid request for Latin America and the Caribbean would be
allocated to Central America, with the majority of those funds concentrated in the “northern
triangle” countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Compared to FY2014, bilateral
10 For detailed information on the programs funded by U.S. assistance in each Latin American and Caribbean country,
see U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 3, Fiscal Year 2016,
February 27, 2015, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/238222.pdf.
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aid for El Salvador would increase from $22 million to $119 million, bilateral aid for Guatemala
would increase from $65 million to $226 million, and bilateral aid for Honduras would increase
from $42 million to $163 million. As noted above, nearly all of the increased bilateral aid would
be provided through the DA account.
About half of the Administration’s $1 billion aid request for Central America would be provided
through regional programs. Assistance provided through the Central America Regional Security
Initiative (CARSI), which has been the principal component of U.S. engagement with Central
America in recent years and has yielded mixed results, would increase from $162 million in
FY2014 to $287 million in FY2016. Assistance provided through USAID’s Central America
Regional program would increase from $34 million to $65 million. The request also includes an
additional $137 million that would be provided through the State Department’s Western
Hemisphere Regional program in support of the new Central America strategy. Although it is
unclear how much funding from the regional programs would go to each country, the majority
likely would be allocated to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.11
Colombia would continue to be the single largest recipient of U.S. assistance in Latin America
under the Administration’s FY2016 request, though aid for the country would fall from $331
million in FY2014 to $289 million in FY2016. Colombia has received significant amounts of
U.S. assistance to support counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts since FY2000, but
funding levels have declined in recent years as the security situation in Colombia has improved,
the Colombian government has taken ownership of programs, and the United States has shifted
the emphasis of its aid away from costly military equipment toward economic and social
development efforts. According to the FY2016 request, U.S. assistance would support the
Colombian government’s efforts to eradicate and interdict coca, expand its institutional presence
in conflict zones, demobilize and reintegrate ex-combatants, carry out land restitution, implement
justice sector reforms, and provide humanitarian aid to conflict victims and vulnerable
populations. U.S. assistance would also support the implementation of a potential peace
agreement to end Colombia’s 50-year internal conflict.12
Haiti, which has received high levels of aid for many years as a result of its significant
development challenges, would once again be the second-largest recipient of U.S. assistance in
the region in FY2016. U.S. assistance increased significantly after Haiti was struck by a massive
earthquake in January 2010 but has gradually declined from those elevated levels. The
Administration’s FY2016 request would provide $242 million to support the Post-Earthquake
U.S. Government Strategy for Haiti, which includes four strategic pillars: infrastructure and
energy, food and economic security, health and other basic services, and governance and rule of
law. This would be a 20% reduction compared to the FY2014 level of $301 million.
U.S. assistance to Mexico would significantly decline under the Administration’s FY2016
request. Mexico traditionally has not been a major recipient of U.S. assistance given its status as
an upper middle income economy, but it began receiving large amounts of aid through the
anticrime and counterdrug program known as the Mérida Initiative in FY2008. The
11 For more information, see CRS Report IN10237, President Obama’s $1 Billion Foreign Aid Request for Central
America, by Peter J. Meyer and Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS Report R43702, Unaccompanied Children from Central
America: Foreign Policy Considerations, coordinated by Peter J. Meyer; and CRS Report R41731, Central America
Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress, by Peter J. Meyer and Clare Ribando Seelke.
12 For more information on Colombia and the peace process, see CRS Report R42982, Peace Talks in Colombia, by
June S. Beittel.
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Administration’s FY2016 request would provide $142 million for Mexico, a 31% reduction
compared to FY2014. FY2016 aid would be used to support the Mexican government’s efforts to
combat transnational crime, reform rule of law institutions, protect human rights, strengthen
border security, provide educational and vocational opportunities for at-risk youth, and carry out
conservation and clean energy initiatives.13
U.S. assistance provided through the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) would also
decline under the Administration’s FY2016 request.14 CBSI funding supports efforts to increase
citizen security and address the root causes of crime and violence in the Caribbean. The FY2016
request would provide $54.5 million to implement community-based policing programs, support
police and justice sector reforms, provide equipment and training to partner nation security
forces, and offer vocational training and other opportunities to at-risk youth. Compared to the
FY2014 funding level, assistance provided through the CBSI would decline by nearly 16% ($10
million) in FY2016.
Table 2. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean by Country or Regional
Program: FY2011-FY2016
(In thousands of U.S. dollars)
% Change
FY2015
FY2016
FY2014-
FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 FY2014 (request)
(request)
FY2016
Argentina
897
1,038 765 589 590 550 -7%
Bahamas
201 190 164 172 200 200 +16%
Belize
410 687 1,012 1,234 1,005 1,250
+1%
Bolivia 41,915
28,827
5,171
0
0
0
—
Brazil
23,321 18,038 15,185 13,858 3,365 1,365
-90%
Chile
1,321 1,155 1,038 1,082 1,050 700
-35%
Colombia
453,218 384,288 359,754 330,601 280,626 288,726
-13%
Costa
Rica
743 1,112 1,624 1,731 1,600 1,825
+5%
Cuba
20,000 20,000 19,283 20,000 20,000 20,000
—
Dominican
36,996 23,129 26,407 23,248 25,708 24,409
+5%
Republic
Ecuador 24,254
22,869
18,846
2,000
360
2,000 —
El
Salvador
29,778 29,183 27,566 21,631 27,600 119,222 +451%
Guatemala 110,161 84,474 80,779 65,278 77,107 225,600 +246%
Guyana
16,911 10,864 9,150 6,904 6,936 6,886
-1%
Haiti
380,261 351,829 332,540 300,796 274,313 241,668
-20%
Honduras
56,017 57,040 51,980 41,847 48,176 162,950 +289%
13 For more information on U.S. policy in Mexico, see CRS Report R41349, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The
Mérida Initiative and Beyond, by Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin Finklea.
14 For more information, see CRS Report R41731, Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and
Policy Issues for Congress, by Peter J. Meyer and Clare Ribando Seelke.
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% Change
FY2015
FY2016
FY2014-
FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 FY2014 (request)
(request)
FY2016
Jamaica
7,589 6,700 7,061 6,670 6,100 5,600
-16%
Mexico
178,145 329,680 265,064 206,768 136,910 142,160
-31%
Nicaragua
24,065 12,301 8,599 8,400 8,200 18,150 +116%
Panama
2,984 3,252 3,449 2,986 4,015 3,325 +11%
Paraguay
6,806 3,773 6,041 7,528 8,433 9,460 +26%
Peru
96,581 79,129 98,634 82,649 93,555 95,985
+16%
Suriname
251 239 213 212 200 215 +1%
Trinidad and
253 175 167 179 200 325 +82%
Tobago
Uruguay
989 539 427 725 500 500 -31%
Venezuela
5,000 6,000 5,786 4,298 5,000 5,500 +28%
Barbados and
32,337 33,176 32,248 16,734 32,981 29,047
+74%
Eastern
Caribbean
USAID Central
28,562 32,089 33,065 33,492 31,992 64,492
+93%
America
Regional
USAID South
9,819 16,000 13,072 16,500 5,500 4,777
-71%
America
Regional
USAID Latin
52,835 44,900 38,089 29,050 34,524 32,420
+12%
America and
Caribbean
Regional
State Western
213,579 220,850 221,291 230,449 189,938 480,820
+109%
Hemisphere
Regional
[CARSI]
[101,508]
[135,000]
[145,619]
[161,500]
[130,000]
[286,500]
+77%
[CBSI]
[77,367]
[64,000]
[60,296] [63,500] [56,500] [53,500]
-16%
Total
1,856,199 2,022,526 1,890,385 1,477,611 1,513,184 1,990,127
+35%
Source: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Years 2013-2016.
Notes: CARSI and CBSI are funded through the State Western Hemisphere Regional program.
Legislative Action
Congress has begun considering the Administration’s FY2016 foreign aid request. Since Congress
has not enacted a comprehensive foreign assistance authorization measure since FY1985, annual
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations bills tend to serve
as the primary legislative vehicles through which Congress reviews U.S. assistance and
influences executive branch foreign policy. The House Committee on Appropriations reported its
bill (H.R. 2772) on June 15, 2015. It includes $30.07 billion for bilateral economic assistance and
international security assistance globally, which is $1.94 billion (6.1%) below the
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Administration’s request. The Senate Committee on Appropriations reported its bill (S. 1725) on
July 9, 2015. It includes $30.13 billion for bilateral economic assistance and international security
assistance globally, which is $1.87 billion (5.9%) below the Administration’s request.15
It is unclear how much assistance the measures would provide for Latin America and the
Caribbean since, for the most part, appropriations levels for individual countries and programs are
not specified in the bills or the accompanying reports (H.Rept. 114-154 and S.Rept. 114-79).
Nevertheless, congressional priorities appear to differ from those of the Administration in several
respects.
Neither bill appears to fully fund the Administration’s $1 billion request to support the “U.S.
Strategy for Engagement in Central America,” and both bills place significant conditions on
aid to the sub-region. According to H.Rept. 114-154, the House Appropriations Committee
recommends providing $296.5 million to Central America through the Central America Regional
Security Initiative (CARSI). H.R. 2772 states that the funds are to be used to improve border
security, counter criminal organizations, combat human smuggling, and receive and reintegrate
migrants from the United States. The bill directs the State Department to develop a multi-year
assistance strategy for Central America that includes a clear mission statement, achievable
objectives and associated benchmarks and timelines, a spending plan that describes how
appropriated funds will be used to achieve the objectives, and a description of host country
commitments. It also directs the State Department to suspend aid to Central American countries if
their governments fail to work with U.S. agencies and each other to improve border security,
prevent illegal emigration, and receive and reintegrate deportees. While the committee’s decision
to only include a specific funding recommendation for the CARSI portion of the Central America
request does not preclude the Administration from dedicating additional aid to the sub-region,
doing so would be difficult given the overall funding levels in the bill and competing budget
priorities.
S. 1725 appears to fund a larger portion of the Administration’s request for Central America. It
provides “up to” $675.3 million to implement the new Central America strategy. This includes up
to $72.3 million in bilateral aid for El Salvador, up to $136.7 million for Guatemala, up to $97.8
million for Honduras, and up to $231.5 million for the sub-region through CARSI. Prior to
obligating the funds, the State Department is required to develop a multi-year spending plan that
specifies the programs to be funded and includes objectives, indicators, and a timeline for
implementing the strategy. The bill also requires 75% of funds for the “central governments of El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras” to be withheld until the Secretary of State certifies those
governments are taking a variety of steps, such as combating corruption, reforming police and
justice sector institutions, protecting human rights, raising domestic revenues, and resolving
commercial disputes with U.S. entities. The bill directs the Secretary of State to evaluate the
progress Central American governments are making on those issues every 120 days following
enactment, and directs the Secretary to suspend assistance if progress is insufficient.
There are also considerable differences regarding funding for security assistance programs in
Colombia, Mexico, and the Caribbean. H.Rept. 114-154 states “the Committee believes it is
critical to continue robust support for counternarcotics and law enforcement efforts, as well as
assistance for rule of law and judicial reform activities in [Latin America and the Caribbean], in
15 For more information, see CRS Report R43901, State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2016 Budget
and Appropriations, by Susan B. Epstein, Marian L. Lawson, and Alex Tiersky.
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order to fight drug trafficking and violent crime before it reaches the borders of the United
States.” Accordingly, the House Appropriations Committee recommends providing $28 million
above the request in INCLE assistance for Colombia, $30 million above the request in INCLE
assistance for Mexico, and $8 million above the request in INCLE assistance for the Caribbean
CBSI. S.Rept. 114-79, on the other hand, recommends providing $14 million less INCLE
assistance than was requested for Colombia, $2 million less FMF assistance than was requested
for Mexico, and $9 million less INCLE assistance than was requested through CBSI. Both bills
recommend providing $8 million less ESF aid for Colombia than was requested.
Other differences involve funding for democracy and conservation programs in the region. H.R.
2772 provides $10 million above the Administration’s request for democracy promotion in Cuba
and forbids any of the funds from being used for business promotion, economic reform, or
entrepreneurship.16 According to H.Rept. 114-154, it also provides $10 million above the request
for democracy promotion activities in Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Ecuador. S. 1725
fully funds the Administration’s $20 million request for programs in Cuba, including $5 million
to support Cuban entrepreneurs, and fully funds the Administration’s $5.5 million request for
democracy promotion in Venezuela. While the request did not include any funding to support
environmental programs in Brazil, H.Rept. 114-154 and S.Rept. 114-79 both recommend
providing $10.5 million for such programs.
Looking Ahead
At this juncture, it is uncertain if Congress will proceed with a freestanding FY2016 foreign aid
appropriations measure, or whether such legislation, for example, would be rolled into an
omnibus appropriations measure that combines several appropriations bills, as Congress has done
frequently in recent years. For FY2015, for example, the House and Senate Appropriations
Committees both reported out individual State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs appropriations bills, but the bills were never considered or approved in either chamber
before such appropriations were included in the Consolidated and Further Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235). FY2006 was the last time State Department and foreign
operations appropriations were enacted as freestanding bills. If similar action is taken for
FY2016, it would continue the pattern of reduced opportunities for Members that are not on the
Appropriations Committees to consider and debate foreign aid legislation, including assistance to
Latin America and the Caribbean.17
As Members of Congress continue to consider FY2016 foreign assistance appropriations for Latin
American and Caribbean countries, they might consider questions such as:
• How do U.S. policy priorities in the Western Hemisphere compare to U.S.
priorities elsewhere in the world, and are U.S. priorities properly reflected in the
FY2016 foreign aid budget?
16 For more information, see CRS Report R43926, Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan.
17 For more information, see CRS Report R43751, Department of State and Foreign Operations Appropriations: A
Fact Sheet on Legislation, FY1995-FY2015, by Susan B. Epstein.
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• To what extent do socioeconomic and security conditions in Latin America and
the Caribbean affect the United States, and what would be the likely results of not
fully funding the Administration’s FY2016 request for the region?
• How many years and what levels of U.S. assistance will be necessary to achieve
U.S. objectives in the region?
• How has the 20% decline in annual U.S. assistance appropriations for Latin
American and the Caribbean between FY2011 and FY2014 affected U.S.
influence in the region?
• What other forms of engagement could the U.S. government use to advance its
policy priorities in Latin America and the Caribbean as U.S. relations with the
region become less defined by the provision of foreign assistance?
Author Contact Information
Peter J. Meyer
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
pmeyer@crs.loc.gov, 7-5474
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