July 9, 2015
U.S. Relations with Burma: Key Issues for 2015
2014 was a mixed year for U.S. relations with Burma
Ceasefire Negotiations and Ongoing
(Myanmar). During his visit to Burma in November 2014,
Low-Intensity Conflict
President Obama praised President Thein Sein for the
release of child soldiers and political prisoners, and stated
The Thein Sein government, the Burmese military
that the democratization process in Burma was both “real”
(Tatmadaw), and representatives of 16 ethnic groups agreed
and “incomplete.” In a letter to President Obama, however,
on a draft nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA) on March
41 Members of the House questioned administration
31, 2015. The NCA’s conclusion awaits its formal approval
decisions to undertake new initiatives in Burma while
by the various participants in the negotiations.
reforms appear to have stalled or even reversed.
The draft NCA resolved many issues, but does not address
Burma is scheduled to hold nationwide parliamentary
some of the more controversial issues, such as the terms of
elections on November 8, the results of which many
post-ceasefire political dialogue, the status of the ethnic
analysts see as a bellwether for the prospects for further
militias, and the ceasefire’s code of conduct for the
political reforms. Efforts to conclude a nationwide ceasefire
Tatmadaw and the ethnic militias.
agreement (NCA) to end nearly six decades of low-grade
civil war have run into problems. Given the current refugee
Leaders of the 16 ethnic groups met in early May and again
and migrant crisis in the Andaman Sea, the Thein Sein
in early June, when they proposed 15 amendments to the
government may try to address the continuing ethnic crisis
draft NCA. In addition, the ethnic groups appointed a new
in Rakhine State. Other pressing issues for Burma are the
negotiating team to continue negotiations with the Thein
continued arrest and detention of political prisoners and the
Sein government and the Tatmadaw. The new negotiating
incomplete fulfillment of President Thein Sein’s “11
team met with the Thein Sein government’s chief negotiator
commitments” made during Obama’s first visit in 2012.
Aung Min in early July. Aung Min reiterated his side’s
opposition to any changes in the draft NCA.
The 113th Congress authorized new military-to-military
programs in Burma that are likely to begin after the
Meanwhile, low-intensity conflict continues in Kachin,
parliamentary elections, depending on how the elections are
Mon, and Shan states. Fighting between the Burmese Army
conducted and their results.
and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army
(MNDAA) in the Kokang region of Shan State is
Parliamentary Elections and
particularly intense. Although the MNDAA is a party to the
Constitutional Reform
NCA negotiations, the Thein Sein government does not
recognize the organization as a legitimate party to the talks.
Many observers anticipate that Aung San Suu Kyi’s
National League for Democracy (NLD) party will emerge
The Plight of the Rohingyas
as the largest party in the new parliament, if they participate
in the election. Proposed changes in Burma’s 2008
During the first quarter of 2015, an estimated 25,000
constitution backed by the NLD and other opposition
Rohingyas and Bangladeshis boarded boats in the Andaman
parties—including one that would allow Aung San Suu Kyi
Sea, heading primarily to Indonesia and Malaysia to escape
to be eligible to become president—were rejected by the
persecution by the Thein Sein government. The Thein Sein
Union Parliament in July. In addition, Burma’s Union
government initially denied these people were from Burma.
Election Commission (UEC), which runs the elections, has
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand refused to allow them to
placed some restrictions on campaigning that may hinder
disembark in their territories. In response to international
the prospects of the opposition parties and favor the ruling
pressure, however, all four nations then offered to provide
Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). In
temporary assistance to address the crisis.
contrast to the 2010 parliamentary elections, Burma has
In 2012, hundreds of Arakans (or Rakhines), a
said it will allow international observers in 2015.
predominately Buddhist minority in Burma’s western
The State Department and the U.S. Agency for International
Rakhine State, attacked Rohnigyas, members of a largely
Development (USAID) are working with the Thein Sein
Muslim minority, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of
government, the Union Parliament, and the UEC in hopes
Arakans and Rohingyas and the internal displacement of an
that the 2015 elections will be “credible, transparent, and
estimated 140,000 people, mostly Rohingyas. More than
inclusive.” U.S. election assistance to Burma has in part
two years later, over 100,000 displaced people remain in
been allocated to International Republican Institute (IRI)
camps, with limited access to international assistance,
and the National Democratic Institute (NDI).
education, or employment. In addition, Burma’s Union
Parliament has passed legislation that restricts the marriage
and child-bearing rights of the Rohingyas.
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U.S. Relations with Burma: Key Issues for 2015
The Thein Sein government insists that the Rohingyas be
not fulfilled 3. The status of the last commitment—arms
called “Bengalis” because the government considers most
trade with North Korea—is uncertain.
of them to be illegal immigrants from Bangladesh. In July
2014, the Thein Sein government announced a Rakhine
Obama’s New Initiatives
State Action Plan (RSAP) that would allow some of the
Rohingyas citizenship, but would resettle the majority of
The White House announced two new initiatives during the
the Rohingyas into permanent “resettlement camps.” The
President’s November 2014 visit to Burma—the opening of
RSAP has been criticized by the United Nations and
a Peace Corps program in Burma and a joint program
various international organizations for violating
involving Denmark, Japan, and the International Labour
international human rights agreements.
Organization (ILO), to improve Burma’s system of labor
administration and improve worker-management relations.
Political Prisoners
Military-to-Military Relations
When Burma’s ruling military junta handed power to the
Thein Sein government in April 2011, approximately 2,000
The Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National
political prisoners were imprisoned in Burma. Between
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (P.L. 113-
April 2011 and December 2013, President Thein Sein
291) authorized Defense Department funding for
pardoned over 1,100 political prisoners to fulfill a pledge to
“consultation, education, and training” in Burma on the
release all political prisoners by the end of 2013. However,
laws of armed conflict, civilian control of the military,
the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma)
defense institution reform, humanitarian and disaster
asserts that as of July 3, 2015, at least 138 political
assistance, and improvements in medical and health
prisoners remain in jail, along with 452 activists currently
standards. The Consolidated and Further Continuing
awaiting trial for political actions. The termination of some
Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235) prohibits use of
U.S. sanctions on Burma is contingent on the unconditional
State Department funding for certain forms of military
release of all political prisoners in Burma.
assistance to Burma, including International Military
Education and Training (IMET) and the Foreign Military
Finance (FMF) program.
Thein Sein’s “11 Commitments” of 2012
1. Allow the International Committee of the Red Cross access
President Thein Sein has reportedly pressed the United
to prisons.
States to enhance its engagement with the Tatmadaw. On
June 25, 2014, the United Nationalities Federal Council of
2. Establish U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Office
Burma (UNFC), a coalition of ethnic organizations with
in Burma.
armed militias, wrote to Secretary of State John Kerry and
3. Allow “blacklisted” people to enter or leave Burma.
ex-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel opposing any
4. Initiate a process to assess the criminality of alleged political
military-to-military training programs in Burma. Aung San
prisoners.
Suu Kyi reportedly also urged President Obama not to
5. Establish a ceasefire in Kachin State and a sustainable political
pursue greater military engagement until after the 2015
solution of differences with ethnic minorities.
parliamentary elections. U.S. engagement with the
Tatmadaw is also controversial in part because of ongoing
6. Address the ethnic problems in Rakhine State.
reports of serious human rights abuses by the Tatmadaw.
7. Allow international humanitarian assistance into conflict-
affected areas.
Implications for Congress
8. Sign the Additional Protocol to the U.N.’s Comprehensive
Safeguards Agreement.
Within 180 days of the enactment of the NDAA, the
Secretary of Defense was to have provided Congress with a
9. Stop arms trade with North Korea.
“report on military-to-military engagement between the
10. Combat human trafficking.
United States Armed Forces and the Burmese military.”
11. Make government more open and accountable.
P.L. 113-235 required that the Secretary of State provide a
report to Congress within 90 days of enactment “detailing
steps taken by the United States and other international
Thein Sein’s “11 Commitments”
donors to protect human rights and address conflict in
Rakhine State.” Neither report has yet been submitted to
During President Obama’s first visit to Burma in November
Congress. Congress may also choose to press the Obama
2012, President Thein Sein made “11 commitments” (see
Administration for progress reports on Thein Sein’s “11
shaded box). In a September 2014 Fact Sheet, the State
commitments,” the status of political prisoners, and the
Department stated, “In a May 2013 visit to the United
prospects for free and fair parliamentary elections in 2015.
States, President Thein Sein and his senior ministers
reaffirmed their intention to uphold these commitments,
Michael F. Martin, mfmartin@crs.loc.gov, 7-2199
though as of August 2014, many of them remain only

partially fulfilled.” Assessments of progress in fulfilling the
commitments vary, but according to one advocacy NGO,
IF10235
Thein Sein has fulfilled only 1 of the 11 commitments
(signing the Additional Protocol), partially fulfilled 6, and
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