Iran’s Foreign Policy
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
June 30, 2015
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R44017
Iran’s Foreign Policy
Summary
Iran’s foreign policy is product of many, and sometimes competing, factors: the ideology of Iran’s
Islamic revolution; Iranian leadership’s perception of threats to the regime and to the country;
long-standing Iranian national interests; and the interaction of the Iranian regime’s various
factions and constituencies. Some experts assert that Iran seeks to overturn a power structure in
the Middle East that Iran asserts favors the United States, Israel, and Sunni Muslim Arab regimes;
such observers interpret Iran’s foreign policy in this light. Others interpret Iran’s foreign policy as
far more practical than ideological—an attempt to protect Iran from U.S. or other efforts to
invade or intimidate Iran or to change its regime. Iran characterizes its support for Shiite and
other Islamist movements as support for an “oppressed” underclass.
Iran employs a number of different tools in pursuing its foreign policy. Some Iranian policy tools
are similar to those used by the United States and its allies—traditional diplomacy, the promotion
of Iran’s values and interests in international meetings, and supporting the election or political
prospects of leaders and groups friendly toward Iran.
Other tools Tehran uses are more problematic to U.S. officials. Iran provides direct material
support to armed groups operating in the Middle East and, to a lesser extent, elsewhere. Some of
these armed groups oppose Arab governments with which Iran is at odds, while other Iran-
supported groups use terrorist tactics and armed action to intimidate or retaliate against Israel or
other regional opponents of Iran. Iran also provides armed support to Shiite-dominated allied
governments, such as those of Syria and Iraq, that face challenges from Sunni insurgent groups.
Iran’s foreign policy addresses all regions of the world, but Iran overwhelmingly focuses on the
Near East region, including on U.S. operations, allies, and activities in that region. It is the Near
East where all the various components of Iran’s foreign policy interact. Iran’s foreign policy also
seems to be directed at influencing the policies and actions of big powers, such as those in Europe
as well as Russia, that are active in the Near East—either as partners or antagonists of U.S.
interests in that region. Much of Iran’s foreign policy also appears intended to thwart or at least
mitigate the effects of international sanctions imposed on Iran.
Some aspects of Iran’s foreign policy might shift if the April 2, 2015, framework agreement
between Iran and the United States and its partner negotiating countries to limit Iran’s nuclear
program is finalized. An agreement would result in the removal of many of the international
sanctions that have hobbled Iran’s economy, and sanctions relief could open the way to a number
of joint regional energy and transportation projects that have failed to advance. A finalized
nuclear agreement could also provide Iran with additional incentive to temper its foreign policy
so as not to trigger the reimposition of any international sanctions. However, some experts and
officials argue that sanctions relief will provide Iran with more financial resources to fund
policies and factions that most challenge the interests of the United States and its allies.
Congressional Research Service
Iran’s Foreign Policy
Contents
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Iran’s Policy Motivators................................................................................................................... 1
Threat Perception ....................................................................................................................... 1
Ideology ..................................................................................................................................... 2
National Interests ....................................................................................................................... 2
Factional Interests ...................................................................................................................... 3
Instruments of Iranian Foreign Policy ............................................................................................. 4
Financial and Military Support to Allied Regimes and Groups ................................................ 4
Other Political Action ................................................................................................................ 5
Diplomacy ................................................................................................................................. 6
Near East Region ............................................................................................................................. 7
The Arab States of the Persian Gulf .......................................................................................... 7
Saudi Arabia ........................................................................................................................ 8
United Arab Emirates (UAE) .............................................................................................. 8
Qatar .................................................................................................................................... 9
Bahrain ................................................................................................................................ 9
Kuwait ............................................................................................................................... 10
Oman ................................................................................................................................. 10
Iranian Policy in Iraq and Syria: Islamic State Crisis .............................................................. 11
Iraq .................................................................................................................................... 11
Syria .................................................................................................................................. 12
Israel: Iran’s Support for Hamas and Hezbollah...................................................................... 12
Hamas ................................................................................................................................ 13
Hezbollah .......................................................................................................................... 14
Yemen ...................................................................................................................................... 15
Turkey ...................................................................................................................................... 16
South and Central Asia Region ...................................................................................................... 17
The South Caucasus: Azerbaijan ............................................................................................. 17
Central Asia ............................................................................................................................. 18
Turkmenistan ..................................................................................................................... 19
Tajikistan ........................................................................................................................... 19
Kazakhstan ........................................................................................................................ 20
Uzbekistan ......................................................................................................................... 20
South Asia ................................................................................................................................ 21
Afghanistan ....................................................................................................................... 21
Pakistan ............................................................................................................................. 22
India ................................................................................................................................... 23
Sri Lanka ........................................................................................................................... 24
Europe ............................................................................................................................................ 24
Russia ............................................................................................................................................. 25
East Asia ........................................................................................................................................ 26
China ....................................................................................................................................... 26
Japan and South Korea ............................................................................................................ 27
North Korea ............................................................................................................................. 28
Congressional Research Service
Iran’s Foreign Policy
Latin America ................................................................................................................................ 29
Venezuela ................................................................................................................................. 30
Argentina ................................................................................................................................. 30
Africa ............................................................................................................................................. 31
Sudan ....................................................................................................................................... 31
Prospects and Alternative Scenarios .............................................................................................. 32
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Near East .............................................................................................................. 7
Figure 2. South and Central Asia Region ...................................................................................... 17
Figure 3. Latin America ................................................................................................................. 29
Figure 4. Sudan .............................................................................................................................. 31
Tables
Table 1. Major Iran or Iran-Related Terrorism Attacks or Plots ...................................................... 5
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 34
Congressional Research Service
Iran’s Foreign Policy
Introduction
This report provides an overview of Iran’s foreign policy, which has been a subject of numerous
congressional hearings and of sanctions and other legislation for many years. The report analyzes
Iranian foreign policy as a whole and by region. The regional analysis discusses those countries
where Iranian policy is of U.S. concern. The report contains some specific information on Iran’s
relations with these countries, but refers to other CRS reports for more detail, particularly on the
views of individual countries towards Iran. The report also makes reference to Iran’s efforts to
utilize its ties to various countries to try to mitigate the effects of U.S. sanctions, but that issue is
analyzed in greater depth in: CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman.
This report does not examine Iran’s broader policy toward the United States, but identifies Iran’s
actions against U.S. interests as a constant theme. Iran’s perceptions of the United States are
discussed in the “policy motivators” sections below. U.S.-Iran relations, including the potential
for renewed diplomatic relations, are specifically addressed in CRS Report RL32048, Iran, Gulf
Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman, which also discusses the issues surrounding
negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear agreement between Iran and the “P5+1” countries
(United States, Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany). This report does not address how a
potential Iranian nuclear weapon factors into Iran’s foreign policy.
Iran’s Policy Motivators
Iran’s foreign policy is a product of overlapping, and sometimes contradictory, motivations. In
describing the tension between some of these motivations, one expert has said that Iran faces
constant decisions about whether it is a “nation or a cause.”1 Iranian leaders appear to constantly
weigh the relative imperatives of their government’s revolutionary and religious ideology against
the demands of Iran’s interests as a country. Some of the factors that affect Iran’s foreign policy
actions are discussed below.
Threat Perception
Iran’s leaders are apparently motivated, at least to some extent, by the perception of threat to their
regime and their national interests posed by the United States and its allies.
• In spite of statements by U.S. officials that the United States does not seek
regime change in Iran, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i has repeatedly
stated that the United States has never accepted the Islamic revolution and seeks
to overturn it through various actions such as support for domestic opposition to
the regime, imposition of strict economic sanctions, or support for armed or other
action by Iran’s regional adversaries.2
• Iran’s leaders assert that the U.S. maintenance of a large military presence in the
Persian Gulf region and in other countries around Iran could reflect U.S.
1 Foreign Policy Association. “A Candid Discussion with Karim Sadjadpour.” May 6, 2013.
http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/05/06/a-candid-discussion-with-karim-sadjadpour/.
2 Khamene’i: “U.S. Would Overthrow Iranian Government If It Could—Media.” Reuters, February 8, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
1
Iran’s Foreign Policy
intention to attack Iran if Iran pursues policies the United States finds inimical, or
could cause military miscalculation that leads to conflict.3
• Some Iranian official media have asserted that the United States not only
supports Sunni Arab regimes and movements that criticize or actively oppose
Iran, but that the United States has created or empowered radical Sunni Islamist
extremist factions such as the Islamic State organization.4
Ideology
The ideology of Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution continues to influence Iran’s foreign policy. The
revolution overthrew a secular authoritarian leader, the Shah of Iran, who the leaders of the
revolution asserted had suppressed Islam and its clergy. It established a clerical regime in which
ultimate power is invested in a “Supreme Guide,” or Supreme Leader, who combines political
and religious authority.
• In the early years after the revolution, Iran attempted to “export” its revolution to
nearby Muslim states, but as of the late 1990s muted those goals succeeded only
in producing resistance to Iran in the region.5
• Iran’s leaders assert that the political and economic structures of the Middle East
are heavily weighted against “oppressed” peoples and in favor of the United
States and its allies, particularly Israel. Iranian leaders generally include in their
definition of the oppressed the Palestinians, who do not have a state of their own,
and Shiite Muslims, who are minorities in many countries of the region and are
generally underrepresented politically and disadvantaged economically.
• Iran claims that the region’s politics and economics have been distorted by
Western intervention and economic domination, and that this perceived
domination must be ended. Iranian officials typically cite the creation of Israel as
a manifestation of Western intervention that, according to Iran, deprived the
Palestinians of legitimate rights.
National Interests
Iran’s national interests also shape its foreign policy, sometimes intersecting with and
complicating Iran’s ideology.
• Iran’s leaders claim a right to be recognized as a major power in the Persian Gulf
and, to a lesser extent, in Central Asia. Iranian leaders stress Iran’s well-
developed civilization and independence. This is often contrasted with the
histories of the six Persian Gulf monarchy states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United
3 Erik Slavin. “Iran Emphasizes Nuclear Reconciliation, Criticizes U.S. Military Posture in Persian Gulf.” Stars and
Stripes, March 5, 2014. http://www.stripes.com/news/iran-emphasizes-nuclear-reconciliation-criticizes-us-military-
posture-in-persian-gulf-1.271204.
4 Ramin Mostaghim. “Iranians Rally to Support Iraq; Some Blame U.S. for Sunni Insurgency. Los Angeles Times, June
24, 2014. http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-iran-volunteers-militants-iraq-20140624-story.html.
5 Soner Cagaptay, James F. Jeffrey, and Mehdi Khalaji. “Iran Won’t Give Up on Its Revolution.” New York Times, op-
ed. April 26, 2015.
Congressional Research Service
2
Iran’s Foreign Policy
Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman) that make up the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC), several of which gained independence in the early 1970s. On this
point, the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran make many of the foreign
policy assertions and undertake many of the same actions that were undertaken
by the former Shah of Iran and Iranian dynasties prior to that.
• In some cases, Iran has appeared willing to temper its commitment to aid other
Shiites to promote its geopolitical interests. For example, it has supported mostly
Christian-inhabited Armenia, rather than Shiite-inhabited Azerbaijan, in part to
thwart cross-border Azeri nationalism among Iran’s large Azeri minority. Iran
also has generally refrained from backing Islamist movements in the Central
Asian countries, reportedly in part to avoid offending Russia, its most important
arms and technology supplier.
• Even though Iranian leaders accuse U.S. allies of contributing to U.S. efforts to
structure the Middle East to the advantage of the United States and Israel, Iranian
officials have sought to engage with and benefit from transactions with U.S.
allies to try to thwart international sanctions.
Factional Interests
Iran’s foreign policy often appears to reflect differing approaches and outlooks among key
players and interests groups.
• By all accounts, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i, has final say
over all major foreign policy decisions. Khamene’i is widely considered an
ideological hardliner who expresses deep-seated mistrust of U.S. intentions
toward Iran. His consistent refrain, and the title of a book widely available in
Iran, is “I am a revolutionary, not a diplomat.”6 Leaders of Iran’s Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a military and internal security institution
created after the Islamic revolution, consistently express support for Khamene’i
and ideology-based foreign policy decisions.
• Nevertheless, more moderate Iranian leaders and factions, such as President
Hassan Rouhani and the still influential former President Ali Akbar Hashemi-
Rafsanjani, argue that Iran should not have any “permanent enemies” and that a
pragmatic foreign policy could result in easing of international sanctions and
increased support for Iran’s views on the Middle East. These views have drawn
support from Iran’s youth and intellectuals who argue that Iran should adopt a
foreign policy that avoids isolation and achieves greater integration with the
international community.
• Some Iranian figures, including the elected president during 1997-2005
Mohammad Khatemi, are considered reformists. They have argued for significant
domestic reform, particularly a relaxation of restrictions on freedom of
expression. Other reformist figures, such as former Prime Minister Mir Hosein
Musavi, have remained in detention since the 2009 political uprising in Iran that
protested alleged fraud in the 2009 reelection of president Mahmoud
6 http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/21/world/middleeast/iran-us-nuclear-talks.html?_r=0.
Congressional Research Service
3
Iran’s Foreign Policy
Ahmadinejad. However, even during his presidency, Khatemi was unable to alter
Iran’s foreign policy significantly because of the constraints on his authority
imposed by the Supreme Leader.
Instruments of Iranian Foreign Policy
Financial and Military Support to Allied Regimes and Groups
As an instrument of its foreign policy, Iran provides arms, training, and military advisers in
support of allied government as well as armed factions. Some of the governments, such as Syria,
are named by the State Department as “state sponsors of terrorism,” and some of the groups Iran
supports are named as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) by the United States. Iran was
placed on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism (“terrorism list”) in January 1984. The State
Department report on international terrorism for 2014,7 released June 19, 2015, stated that in
2014 Iran “continued its terrorist-related activity, including for Palestinian terrorist groups in
Gaza, Lebanese Hezbollah, and various groups in Iraq and throughout the Middle East.”
Iran’s operations in support of its allies—which generally includes arms shipments, provision of
advisers, training, and funding—is carried out by the Qods (Jerusalem) Force of the IRGC
(IRGC-QF). The IRGC-QF is headed by IRGC Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani, who is said to report
directly to Khamene’i.8 Some IRGC-QF advisers have been reported to sometimes engage in
direct combat, particularly in the Syrian civil conflict.
The range of armed factions that Iran supports are discussed in the regional sections below.
• Some Iranian-supported factions are opposition movements, while others are
militia forces supporting governments that are allied to Iran, such as that of
President Bashar Al Asad of Syria and Prime Minister Haydar Al Abbadi of Iraq.
• Some armed factions that Iran supports have not been named as FTOs and have
no record of committing acts of international terrorism. Such groups include the
Houthi (“Ansar Allah”) movement in Yemen (composed of Zaidi Shiite Muslims)
and some Shiite opposition factions in Bahrain.
• Iran opposes—or declines to actively support—some Islamist armed groups if the
groups work against Iran’s core interests. For example, Al Qaeda and the Islamic
State organization are orthodox Sunni Muslim organizations that Iran apparently
perceives as significant threats.9 Over the past few years, Iran has expelled some
Al Qaeda activists who sought refuge there after the September 11, 2001, attacks
against the United States. Iran is actively working against the Islamic State
organization, which opposes Asad of Syria and the Abbadi government in Iraq.
One Sunni FTO, Hamas, has received Iranian support in part because it is an
antagonist of Israel.
7 The text of the section on Iran can be found at: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/index.htm.
8 http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2013/09/30/130930fa_fact_filkins?printable=true¤tPage=all.
9 http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/iranians-are-terrified-irans-isis-nightmare-10856.
Congressional Research Service
4
Iran’s Foreign Policy
Table 1. Major Iran or Iran-Related Terrorism Attacks or Plots
Date
Incident/Event Likely/Claimed
Perpetrator
April 18, 1983
Truck bombing of U.S. Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon.
Factions that eventually formed
63 dead, including 17 U.S. citizens.
Lebanese Hezbol ah claimed
responsibility.
October 23, 1983
Truck bombing of U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut.
Same as above
241 Marines killed.
December 12,
Bombings of U.S. and French embassies in Kuwait
Da’wa Party of Iraq—Iran-
1983
City. 5 fatalities.
supported Iraqi Shiite militant
group. 17 Da’wa activists charged
and imprisoned in Kuwait
September 20,
Truck bombing of U.S. embassy annex in Beirut.
Factions that eventually formed
1984
23 killed.
Lebanese Hezbol ah
May 25, 1985
Bombing of Amir of Kuwait’s motorcade
Da’wa Party of Iraq
June 14, 1985
Hijacking of TWA Flight 847. One fatality, Navy
Lebanese Hezbol ah
diver Robert Stetham
April 5, 1988
Hijacking of Kuwait Air passenger plane. Two killed.
Lebanese Hezbollah, seeking
release of 17 Da’wa prisoners in
Kuwait.
March 17, 1992
Bombing of Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires.
Lebanese Hezbol ah, assisted by
29 killed.
Iranian intelligence/diplomats.
July 18, 1994
Bombing of Argentine-Jewish Mutual Association
Same as above
(AMIA) building in Buenos Aires.
June 25, 1996
Bombing of Khobar Towers housing complex near
Saudi Hezbollah, a Saudi Shi te
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. 19 U.S. Air Force personnel
organization active in eastern
killed.
Saudi Arabia and supported by
Iran. Some assessments point to
involvement of Al Qaeda.
October 11, 2011
U.S. Justice Dept. unveiled discovery of al eged plot
IRGC-QF reportedly working
involving at least one IRGC-QF officer, to assassinate with U.S.-based confederate
Saudi Ambasador in Washington, DC.
February 13, 2012
Wife of Israeli diplomat wounded in Delhi, India
Lebanese Hezbol ah
July 19, 2012
Bombing in Bulgaria killed five Israeli tourists.
Lebanese Hezbollah
Source: Recent State Department Country Reports on Terrorism, various press.
Other Political Action
• Iran’s foreign policy is not limited to militarily supporting allied governments
and armed factions. A wide range of observers report that Iran has provided
funding to political candidates in neighboring Iraq and Afghanistan in an effort to
build political allies in those countries.10
10 See, for example. http://www.newsweek.com/what-are-iranians-doing-iraq-303107. Also reported in author
conversations with U.S. and Iraq and Afghan officials, 2009-2015.
Congressional Research Service
5
Iran’s Foreign Policy
• Iran has reportedly provided direct payments to leaders of neighboring states in
an effort to gain and maintain their support. For example, in 2010 then-President
of Afghanistan Hamid Karzai publicly acknowledged that his office had accepted
direct cash payments from Iran. 11
• Iran has established some training and education programs that bring young
Muslims to study in Iran. One such program, headed by Iranian cleric Mohsen
Rabbani, is focused on Latin America, even though the percentage of Muslims
there is low.12
Diplomacy
At the same time that it funds and trains armed factions in the region, Iran also uses traditional
diplomatic tools.
• Iran has an active Foreign Ministry and maintains embassies in almost all major
countries with which it has formal diplomatic relations. Iran’s Supreme Leader
Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i rarely travels outside Iran, but Iran’s elected
presidents, including the current President Hassan Rouhani travel frequently, and
particularly within Iran’s immediate neighborhood.
• Iran actively participates in or seeks to join many different international
organizations, including those that are dominated by members opposed to Iran’s
ideology and/or critical of its domestic human rights practices. For example Iran
has sought to join the U.S. and Europe-dominated World Trade Organization
(WTO). It has also sought to join such regional organizations as the South Asian
Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) that groups Central Asian states with Russia and China.
• Iran participates actively in multilateral organizations that tend to support some
aspects of Iranian ideology, such as its criticism of great power influence over
developing states. From August 2012 until August 2015, Iran holds the
presidency of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which has about 120 member
states and 17 observer countries. Iran hosted a summit of the movement in
August 2012, when it took over the rotating leadership, which it will yield in
2015.
• Even though it is a major proliferation concern to the United States, Iran is a
party to all major nonproliferation conventions, including the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Iran
uses its presence in these conventions to refute international allegations of its
purported proliferation activities.
• During 2003-2005, Iran negotiated limits on its nuclear program with three
European Union countries—Britain, France and Germany (“EU-3”). In 2006, the
negotiating powers expanded to include the United States and the two other
Permanent Members of the U.N. Security Council, Russia and China, to form the
11 http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/oct/26/iran-cash-payments-to-afghanistan.
12 http://www.crethiplethi.com/subversion-and-exporting-the-islamic-revolution-in-latin-america/islamic-countries/
iran-islamic-countries/2012/.
Congressional Research Service
6
Iran’s Foreign Policy
“P5+1.” The P5+1 and Iran reached an interim nuclear agreement in November
2013 (“Joint Plan of Action,” or JPA) and a framework of a comprehensive
nuclear accord on April 2, 2015. The P5+1 and Iran set a deadline of June 30,
2015, to reach finalize an accord.
Near East Region
The overwhelming focus of Iranian foreign policy is on the Near East region, as demonstrated by
Iran’s employment of all the various instruments of its foreign policy, including deployment of
the IRGC-Qods Force in several locations in the region. All the various motivations of Iran’s
foreign policy appear to be at work in its actions in the region, including its efforts to empower
Shiite communities that fuel sectarian responses. Iranian steps to aid Shiites in Sunni-dominated
countries often fuel responses by those governments, thus aggravating sectarian tensions.13
The Arab States of the Persian Gulf
Iran has a 1,100-mile coastline on the Persian
Figure 1. Map of Near East
Gulf and Gulf of Oman. The Persian Gulf
monarchy states (Gulf Cooperation Council,
GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar,
Oman, and the United Arab Emirates) have
always been a key focus of Iran’s foreign
policy. These states, all controlled by Sunni-
led governments, cooperate extensively with
U.S. policy toward Iran, including by hosting
significant numbers of U.S. forces at their
military facilities and procuring U.S. military
equipment, including missile defense
technology. GCC facilities would be critical
to any U.S. air operations against Iran in the
event of a regional conflict, and GCC hosting
of these facilities presumable serves as a
deterrent to any direct Iranian aggression
against the GCC countries. U.S.-GCC defense
cooperation with respect to Iran, and GCC
views of the potential ramifications of a P5+1
Source: Created by CRS.
– Iran nuclear agreement, are analyzed in:
CRS Report RL32048, Iran, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
At the same time, the GCC states generally do not try to openly antagonize Iran and, although all
the GCC states enforce international sanctions against Iran, they also all maintain relatively
normal trading relations with Iran.
13 Statement for the Record. U.S. Director for National Intelligence James Clapper. Senate Armed Services Committee,
February 2015, p. 14.
Congressional Research Service
7
Iran’s Foreign Policy
The following sections analyze the main outlines of Iran’s policy toward each GCC state.
Although Saudi Arabia’s positions are often taken to represent those of all GCC states toward
Iran, there are some distinct differences within the GCC on Iran policy, as discussed below.
Saudi Arabia14
Iran and Saudi Arabia have long represented opposing interests in the region. Iranian leaders
assert that Saudi Arabia seeks hegemony for its brand of Sunni Islam and that Saudi Arabia is
working with the United States to deny Shiite Muslim governments and factions influence in the
region. Saudi Arabia has used the claim of an Iranian quest for regional hegemony to justify
military intervention in Bahrain in 2011 and in Yemen in 2015. Some of the region’s conflicts are
often described as “proxy wars” between Saudi Arabia and Iran because of each country’s
tendency to back rival sides. The one exception might be Iraq, where both Iran and Saudi Arabia
back the Shiite-dominated government, although Iran does so much more directly and
substantially. Each country has tended to exaggerate the influence of the other, leading to actions
that have fueled the apparently expanding Sunni-Shiite conflict in the region.
The Saudis also repeatedly cite past Iran-inspired actions as a reason for distrusting Iran; these
actions include encouraging violent demonstrations at some Hajj pilgrimages in Mecca in the
1980s and 1990s, which caused a break in relations from 1987 to 1991. Some Saudis accuse Iran
of supporting Shiite protesters and armed groups active in the Kingdom’s restive Shiite-populated
Eastern Province. Since the JPA was agreed in late 2013, the Saudi and Iranian government had
some high level meetings. However, Iranian-Saudi relations subsequently worsened again
primarily over the Yemen issue, discussed below, forestalling further rapprochement.
United Arab Emirates (UAE)15
Like Saudi Arabia, the UAE tends to take hardline positions on Iran. However, unlike Saudi
Arabia, the UAE has a large population of Iranian expatriates in Dubai emirate, historically close
business ties to Iran’s large trading companies, and territorial disputes over the Persian Gulf
islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunb islands. The Tunbs were seized by the Shah
of Iran in 1971, and the Islamic Republic took full control of Abu Musa in 1992, appearing to
violate a 1971 UAE-Iran agreement to share control of that island. The UAE has sought to refer
the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), but Iran has insisted on resolving the issue
bilaterally. (ICJ referral requires concurrence from both parties to a dispute.) In the aftermath of
the 2013 JPA and a visit to Iran by the UAE’s Foreign Minister, the two countries reportedly
made progress toward resolving the islands dispute and Iran reportedly removed some military
equipment from them.16 No progress has been announced since.
The UAE and Iran maintain relatively normal trade and diplomatic ties, and Iranian-origin
residents of Dubai number about 300,000. In accordance with long-standing traditions, many
14 For detailed information on Saudi Arabia’s policy toward Iran, see CRS Report RL33533, Saudi Arabia: Background
and U.S. Relations, by Christopher M. Blanchard
15 For detailed information on Iran-UAE relations, see CRS Report RS21852, The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues
for U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman
16 http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20140115/DEFREG04/301150034/Source-UAE-Iran-Reach-Accord-
Disputed-Hormuz-Islands.
Congressional Research Service
8
Iran’s Foreign Policy
Iranian-owned businesses are located in Dubai emirate (including branch offices of large trading
companies based in Tehran and elsewhere in Iran). These relationships have often triggered U.S.
concerns about the apparent re-exportation of some U.S. technology to Iran,17 although the UAE
has said it has taken extensive steps, in cooperation with the United States, to reduce such
leakage.
Qatar18
Qatar appears to occupy a “middle ground” between the anti-Iran animosity of Saudi Arabia, the
UAE, and Bahrain, and the intensive high-level engagement with Iran exhibited by Oman. Qatar
invariably joins GCC consensus statements on Iran, many of which are critical of Iran’s regional
policies. However, Qatari officials reportedly tend not to urge the United States to take hardline
stances on Iran. Qatar maintains high level contact with Iran; the speaker of Iran’s Majles
(parliament) visited Qatar in March 2015 and the Qatari government allowed him to meet with
Hamas leaders who are in exile in Qatar. But, unlike Oman and Kuwait, Qatar has not exchanged
leadership level visits with Iran. And, Qatar has played a significant role, as has Saudi Arabia, in
providing arms and funds to factions in Syria that are fighting to oust Syrian President Bashar Al
Asad, who is a key Iranian ally that Iran is supporting extensively in that civil conflict.
Unlike the UAE, Qatar does not have any active territorial disputes with Iran. Yet, Qatari officials
reportedly remain wary that Iran could try to encroach on the large natural gas field it shares with
Iran, fueled by occasional Iranian statements such as one in April 2004 by Iran’s deputy oil
minister that Qatar is probably producing more gas than “her right share” from the field. He
added that Iran “will not allow” its wealth to be used by others.
Bahrain19
Bahrain is a core member of the hardline camp within the GCC on Iran issues. Bahrain is about
60% Shiite-inhabited, and many Bahraini Shiites are of Persian origin, but the government is
dominated by the Sunni Muslim Al Khalifa family. In 1981 and again in 1996, Bahrain publicly
accused Iran of supporting Bahraini Shiite dissidents in efforts to overthrow the ruling Al Khalifa
family. Bahrain has consistently accused Iran of supporting radical Shiite factions that are part of
a broader and mostly peaceful uprising begun in 2011 by mostly Shiite demonstrators.20 The State
Department report on international terrorism for 2013 stated that Iran has attempted to provide
arms and other aid to Shiite militants in Bahrain. However, the State Department report for 2014,
released June 19, 2015, did not specifically repeat that assertion. 21However, some outside
observers—including a government-appointed commission of international experts called the
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry—have suggested that Iran’s support for the Shiite
uprising has been minimal.22 On several earlier occasions, tensions had flared over Iranian
17 http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/02/washington/02UAE.html?pagewanted=print.
18 For detailed information on Iran-Qatar relations, see CRS Report RL31718, Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations,
by Christopher M. Blanchard.
19 For detailed information on Iran-Bahrain relations, see CRS Report 95-1013, Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S.
Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
20 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/01/bahrain-accuses-iran-training-rebels-
201413144049814960.html.
21 http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/index.htm.
22 http://middleeastvoices.voanews.com/2011/11/bici-report-iran-not-linked-to-bahrain-protests/.
Congressional Research Service
9
Iran’s Foreign Policy
attempts to question the legitimacy of a 1970 U.N.-run referendum in which Bahrainis opted for
independence rather than for affiliation with Iran.
Kuwait23
Kuwait’s position on Iran is similar to that of Qatar; Kuwait cooperates with GCC efforts to
contain Iranian power, but does not demonstrate enthusiasm for military or other forms of action
against Iran’s regional interests. Unlike Qatar, Kuwait does exchange leadership-level visits with
Iran; Kuwait’s Amir Sabah al-Ahmad Al Sabah visited Iran in June 2014, meeting not only with
President Hassan Rouhani but also Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i. In part, Kuwait might view
Iran as a helpful actor in stabilizing Iraq, which occupies a central place in Kuwait’s foreign
policy because of the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Kuwait cooperates extensively with the
Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad despite Saudi and other GCC criticism of the
government’s marginalizing Sunni Iraqis.
Kuwait appears to remain unconcerned about Iran’s potential to destabilize Kuwait. About 25% of
Kuwaitis are Shiite Muslims, but Kuwait’s Shiites are extensively integrated into the political
process and Kuwait’s economy, and do not constitute a restive, anti-government minority. Iran
was unsuccessfully in supporting Shiite radical groups in Kuwait in the 1980s as a means to try to
pressure Kuwait not to support the Iraqi war effort in the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). After
Saddam Hussein’s regime invaded Kuwait in August 1990, Kuwait pursued ties to Iran as a
counterweight to Saddam. Kuwait’s concerns about Saddam remained so great that it hosted the
U.S.-led force that invaded Iraq in 2003.
Oman24
Of the GCC states, the Sultanate of Oman is closest politically to Iran. Oman officials assert that
Oman remains grateful for the Shah’s sending of troops to help the Sultan suppress rebellion in
the Dhofar region in the 1970s, and that the gratitude has transcended the change in regime in
Iran.25 Sultan Qaboos made a state visit to Iran in August 2009, coinciding with protests against
alleged fraud in the reelection of then-President Mahmud Ahmadinejad. The visit appeared to
tacitly align Sultan Qaboos with Iran’s regime and against the protesters in Iran. Qaboos visited
again in August 2013, reportedly to explore concepts for improved U.S.-Iran relations and to
facilitate U.S.-Iran talks that led to the JPA. It has subsequently hosted P5+1 - Iran nuclear
negotiations and its banks serve as a financial channel for the permitted transfer of hard currency
oil sales proceeds to Iran under the JPA.26In March 2014, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani
visited Oman, the only GCC state he has visited since taking office.
Omani reluctance to damage relations with Iran has manifested itself in several ways. Unlike
Saudi Arabia and some other GCC states, Oman reportedly has not materially supported any
23 For detailed information on Iran-Kuwait relations, see CRS Report RS21513, Kuwait: Governance, Security, and
U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
24 For detailed information on Iran-Oman relations, see CRS Report RS21534, Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S.
Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
25 As reported in author conversations in Oman and with Omani officials, 1988-2015.
26 Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Julia Frifeld. Letter to Senator Bob Corker, Chairman Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations. June 17, 2015. Enclosure to letter: Department of State. Determination and
Certification pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act of FY2012. Undated.
Congressional Research Service
10
Iran’s Foreign Policy
factions fighting against the Asad regime in Syria. Nor did Oman join the Saudi-led Arab
intervention against the rebel Zaidi Shiite Houthi movement in Yemen that began in March 2014.
Iranian Policy in Iraq and Syria: Islamic State Crisis27
Iran’s policy has been to support the Shiite-led government in Iraq and the Alawite-led, pro-
Iranian government in Syria. That policy has come under strong challenge from the Islamic State
organization, which threatens the Iraqi government as well as that of Iran’s close ally President
Bashar Al Asad. The United States and Iran have worked in parallel, although separately, to assist
the Iraqi government against the Islamic State organization. However, the United States and Iran
hold opposing positions on the regime of Asad in Syria.
Iraq28
In Iraq, the U.S. military ousting of Saddam Hussein in 2003 benefitted Iran strategically by
removing a long-time antagonist and producing governments led by Shiite Islamists who have
long-standing ties to Iran. Iran was a strong backer of the government of Prime Minister Nuri al-
Maliki, a Shiite Islamist who Tehran viewed as loyal and pliable. Maliki supported most of Iran’s
regional goals; for instance, Maliki allowed Iran to overfly Iraqi airspace to supply the Syrian
military fighting rebels there.29 The June 2014 offensive led by the Islamic State organization
threatened Iraq’s government and Iran responded quickly by supplying—to both the Baghdad
government and the peshmerga force of the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government
(KRG)—IRGC-Qods Force advisers, intelligence drone surveillance, weapons shipments, and
other direct military assistance.30 Iranian leaders supported U.S. efforts to help a more inclusive
government take office in 2014 by backing the appointment of Abbadi as Prime Minister and thus
abandoning their longtime ally, Maliki, who the United States insisted not be given a third term.31
U.S. officials, including Secretary of State John Kerry, have said that Iran’s targeting of the
Islamic State generally contributes positively to U.S. efforts to assist the Iraqi government.
Still, many aspects of Iranian policy in Iraq reportedly trouble U.S. policymakers. Iran helped
establish many of the Shiite militias that fought the United States during 2003-2011. During
2011-2014, the Shiite militia evolved into political organizations, but Iran has helped reactivate
and empower some of them to support the Iraq Security Forces (ISF) against the Islamic State.
The militias that Iran works most closely with in Iraq include As’aib Ahl Al Haq (League of the
Righteous), Kata’ib Hezbollah (Hezbollah Brigades), and the Badr Organization. The Mahdi
Army of Moqtada Al Sadr (renamed the Peace Brigades in 2014) was supported extensively by
Iran during the 2003-2011 U.S. intervention in Iraq but has sought to distance itself from Iran in
the more recent campaigns against the Islamic State. Kata’ib Hezbollah is designated a Foreign
Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the United States. The participation of some Shiite militias has
increased tensions with some of Iraq’s Sunnis because some of these militia fighters have carried
out reprisals against Sunnis after recapturing Sunni-inhabited territory from the Islamic State.
27 For information, see CRS Report R43612, The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard
et al.
28 For more information, see CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
29 Michael Gordon, “Iran Supplying Syrian Military Via Iraqi Airspace,” New York Times, September 5, 2012.
30 “Iran News Agency Reports Death of Iranian Pilot in Iraq.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. July 5, 2014.
31 Babak Dehghanpisheh. “Iran Dramatically Shifts Iraq Policy to Confront Islamic State.” Reuters, September 2, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
11
Iran’s Foreign Policy
Syria32
On Syria, the United States has stated that President Bashar Al Asad should leave office as part of
a negotiated political solution to the conflict. Iran’s policy is to try to keep Asad in power because
he has been Iran’s closest Arab ally and because Syria is the main transit point for Iranian
weapons shipments to Hezbollah. Both Iran and Syria have used Hezbollah as leverage against
Israel to try to achieve regional and territorial aims. However, the United States is conducting
airstrikes against Islamic State positions in Syria; that group is against Asad and attacking it could
potentially help Asad in some areas of the Syria battlefield. Iran is assisting Asad against not only
U.S. and GCC-backed rebels but also against the Islamic State.
U.S. officials and reports assert that, to try to prevent Asad’s downfall, Iran is providing
substantial amounts of material support to the Syrian regime, including funds, weapons, IRGC-
QF advisors, and recruitment of Hezbollah and other non-Syrian Shiite militia fighters.33 Some
experts say the Iranian direct intervention has, at least at times, gone beyond QF personnel to
include an unknown number of IRGC ground forces as well.34
At the same time, some experts assess that Iran might be willing to abandon Asad, as it
abandoned Maliki in Iraq, if a relatively pro-Iranian figure can be identified to replace Asad.35 In
December 2012, Iran announced a six-point plan for a peaceful transition in Syria that would
culminate in free, multiparty elections; the plan was rejected by Syrian rebels because it provided
for Asad to compete in 2014 elections, which he ultimately won under conditions that the
international community called neither free nor fair.
Israel: Iran’s Support for Hamas and Hezbollah36
Iran opposes Israel as what it asserts is an illegitimate creation of the West and an oppressor of
the Palestinian people and other Arab Muslims. The position of Iran’s current regime differs
dramatically from that of the pre-1979 regime of the Shah of Iran. Israel and the Shah’s regime
had relatively normal relations, including embassies in each other’s capitals and an extensive
network of economic ties.
Supreme Leader Khamene’i has repeatedly called Israel a “cancerous tumor” that should be
removed from the region. Iran’s open hostility to Israel—manifested in part by its support for
groups that undertake armed action against Israel—fuels assertions by Israeli leaders that a
nuclear armed Iran would constitute an “existential threat” to the State of Israel. Iran’s support for
armed factions on Israel’s borders could represent an Iranian attempt to acquire leverage over
Israel. More broadly, Iran might be attempting to disrupt prosperity, morale, and perceptions of
32 For more information on the conflicts in Syria, see CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and
U.S. Response, coordinated by Christopher M. Blanchard.
33 Details and analysis on the full spectrum of Iranian assistance to Asad is provided by the Institute for the Study of
War. “Iranian Strategy in Syria,” by Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, and Sam Wyer. May 2013.
34 Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, and Sam Wyer, “Iranian Strategy in Syria,” Institute for the Study of War, May 2013.
35 As reported in author conversations with European and U.S. experts on Iran and Syria in Washington, DC,
2014-2015.
36 For more information, see CRS Report R42816, Lebanon: Background and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M.
Blanchard; CRS Report R41514, Hamas: Background and Issues for Congress, by Jim Zanotti; and CRS Report
RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
Congressional Research Service
12
Iran’s Foreign Policy
security among Israel’s population in a way that undermines the country’s appeal to those who
have options to live elsewhere. The formal position of the Iranian Foreign Ministry is that Iran
would not seek to block an Israeli-Palestinian settlement but that the process is too weighted
toward Israel to yield a fair result.
Iran’s leaders routinely state that Israel presents a serious threat to Iran and that the international
community applies a “double standard” to Iran as compared to Israel’s presumed nuclear arsenal.
Iranian diplomats point out in international meetings that, despite apparently being the only
Middle Eastern country to possess nuclear weapons and not being a party to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, Israel does not face internationally imposed penalties as a consequence. In
identifying Israel as a threat, Iran’s leaders cite Israeli official statements that Israel retains the
option to unilaterally strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Iran also asserts that Israel’s purported
nuclear arsenal is a main obstacle to achieving support for a weapons-of-mass-destruction
(WMD) free zone in the Middle East.
Iran’s material support for militant anti-Israel groups has long concerned U.S. Administrations.
For at least a decade, the annual State Department report on international terrorism has repeated
its claim that Iran provides funding, weapons, and training to Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad—
Shiqaqi Faction (PIJ), the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (a militant offshoot of the dominant
Palestinian faction Fatah), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General
Command (PFLP-GC). All are named as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) by the State
Department. Iran has long supported Lebanese Hezbollah, which is an FTO and which portrays
itself as the vanguard of resistance to Israel. In November 2014, a senior IRGC commander said
that Iran had provided Hezbollah and Hamas with training and Fateh-class missiles, which enable
the groups to attack targets in Israel.37
Hamas38
The annual State Department report on terrorism has consistently stated that Iran gives Hamas
funds, weapons, and training. Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip in 2007 and now
administers that territory. Although it formally ceded authority over Gaza in June 2014 to a
consensus Palestinian Authority government, Hamas retains de-facto security control over that
territory. Its terrorist attacks using operatives within Israel have significantly diminished in
number since 2005, but Hamas continues to occasionally engage in armed action against Israel,
using rockets and other weaponry supplied by Iran. Israel and Hamas came into conflict in late
2008-early 2009; in November 2012; and during July and August, 2014.
The Iran-Hamas relationship was forged in the 1990s as part of an apparent attempt to disrupt the
Israeli-Palestinian peace process through Hamas’s suicide bombings and other attacks on buses,
restaurants, and other civilian targets inside Israel. However, Hamas’s position on the ongoing
Syria conflict caused the Iran-Hamas relationship to falter. Largely out of sectarian sympathy
with the mostly Sunni protesters and rebels in Syria, Hamas opposed the efforts by Asad, backed
by Iran, to defeat the rebellion militarily. The rift apparently contributed to a lessening of Iran’s
support to Hamas in its 2014 conflict with Israel as compared to previous Hamas-Israel conflicts
in which Iran backed Hamas extensively. Since the latest Hamas-Israel conflict, Iran has
37 “Iranian General: Palestinians Have Longer-Range Missiles.” The Times of Israel, November 12, 2014.
38 For more information, see CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
Congressional Research Service
13
Iran’s Foreign Policy
apparently sought to rebuild the relationship with Hamas by providing missile technology that
Hamas used to construct its own rockets and by helping it rebuild tunnels destroyed in the conflict
with Israel.39 Some Hamas leaders have reportedly welcomed rebuilding the group’s relations
with Iran, perhaps because of financial difficulties the organization has faced since the military
leadership in Egypt began closing smuggling tunnels at the Gaza-Sinai border in 2013.
Hezbollah40
Lebanese Hezbollah is arguably Iran’s most cherished ally in the region. Hezbollah has acted in
support of its own as well as Iranian interests on numerous occasions and in many forms,
including through acts of terrorism and other armed action. The Iran-Hezbollah relationship
began when Lebanese Shiite clerics of the pro-Iranian Lebanese Da’wa (Islamic Call) Party
began to organize in 1982 into what later was unveiled in 1985 as Hezbollah. As Hezbollah was
forming the IRGC sent advisory forces to help develop Hezbollah’s military wing, and these
IRGC forces subsequently became the core of what is now the IRGC-QF.41 Iran’s political,
financial, and military aid to Hezbollah has helped it become a major force in Lebanon’s politics.
According to several of the annual State Department terrorism reports, Iran has provided
hundreds of millions of dollars in support of Hezbollah and has trained thousands of Hezbollah
fighters at camps in Iran. The 2014 U.S. intelligence community worldwide threat assessment
stated that Hezbollah “has increased its global terrorist activity in recent years to a level that we
have not seen since the 1990s,” but the 2015 worldwide threat assessment, delivered in February
2015, did not repeat that assertion. A January 2015 press report detailed U.S. intelligence
involvement in a primarily Israeli operation that killed Imad Mughniyah, the leader of
Hezbollah’s terrorism wing, in 2008.42
Hezbollah’s attacks on Israeli forces in southern Lebanon contributed to an Israeli withdrawal in
May 2000, and Hezbollah subsequently maintained military forces along the border. Hezbollah
fired Iranian-supplied rockets on Israel’s northern towns during a July–August 2006 war with
Israel, including at the Israeli city of Haifa (30 miles from the border)43 and in July 2006 hit an
Israeli warship with a C-802 sea-skimming missile. Iran bought the C-802 from China in the
1990s and almost certainly was the supplier of the weapon to Hezbollah. Hezbollah was
perceived in the Arab world as a victor in the war for holding out against Israel. Since that
conflict, Iran has resupplied Hezbollah to the point where it has, according to Israeli sources, as
many as 100,000 rockets and missiles, some capable of reaching Tel Aviv from south Lebanon, as
well as upgraded artillery, anti-ship, anti-tank, and anti-aircraft capabilities.44 In the context of the
conflict in Syria, Israel has carried out occasional air strikes inside Syria against Hezbollah
commanders and purported arms shipments via Syria to Hezbollah. In January 2015, Hezbollah
attacked an Israeli military convoy near the Lebanon-Israel-Syria tri-border area, killing two
39 Stuart Winer. “Iran Boasts of Rocket Aid to Palestinians, Hezbollah.” The Times of Israel, February 3, 2015; and,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-rekindles-relations-with-hamas-1429658562.
40 CRS Report R41446, Hezbollah: Background and Issues for Congress, by Casey L. Addis and Christopher M.
Blanchard.
41 Kenneth Katzman. “The Warriors of Islam: Iran’s Revolutionary Guard.” Westview Press, 1993.
42 http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-and-mossad-killed-senior-hezbollah-figure-in-car-
bombing/2015/01/30/ebb88682-968a-11e4-8005-1924ede3e54a_story.html.
43 “Israel’s Peres Says Iran Arming Hizbollah,” Reuters, February 4, 2002.
44 IAF Chief: Israel Will Destroy Hezbollah Bases in Lebanon, Even Ones in Residential Areas.” Reuters/Jerusalem
Post, January 29, 2015.
Congressional Research Service
14
Iran’s Foreign Policy
Israeli soldiers and making it the deadliest Hezbollah attack on Israeli territory since 2006.
However, these incidents have not, to date, escalated into a broader Israel-Hezbollah conflict.
In part as a consequence of its military strength, Hezbollah now plays a major role in decision-
making and leadership selections in Lebanon. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) rarely acts
against Hezbollah’s forces or interests. However, there has been vocal criticism of Hezbollah
within and outside Lebanon for its active supports for its other key patron, Asad, against the
Sunni-led rebellion in Syria. That involvement, reportedly urged and assisted by Iran, has diluted
Hezbollah’s image as a steadfast opponent of Israel by embroiling it in a war against fellow
Muslims.
Yemen45
Yemen’s elected leaders have long claimed that Iran is trying to take advantage of Yemen’s
instability by supporting Shiite rebels in Yemen—a Zaydi Shiite revivalist movement known as
the “Houthis”—with arms and other aid. Yemen has been unstable since the 2011 “Arab Spring”
uprisings, which included Yemen and which forced longtime President Ali Abdullah Saleh to
resign in January 2012. In September 2014, the Houthis and their allies seized key locations in the
capital, Sana’a, and took control of major government locations in January 2015, forcing Saleh’s
successor, Abd Rabu Mansur Al Hadi, to flee to Aden. The Houthis and their allies subsequently
advanced on Aden, prompting Saudi Arabia to assemble a ten-country Arab coalition, with
logistical help from the United States, to undertake military action to stop the Houthi advance.46
Saudi officials have explained their military action as an effort to restore the elected government
and, as a by-product, to stop Iran from expanding its influence in the region.
There is debate over the extent to which the Houthi advance is a priority of Iranian policy. Iran
has not denied aiding the Houthis, but has sought to minimize its involvement in Yemen. A senior
Iranian official reportedly told journalists in December 2014 that the Qods Force has a “few
hundred” personnel in Yemen training Houthi fighters.47 Iran reportedly has shipped unknown
quantities of arms to the Houthis, as has been reported by a panel of U.N. experts assigned to
monitor Iran’s compliance with U.N. restrictions on its sales of arms abroad. Nonetheless, Iran’s
aid to the Houthis appears less systematic or large-scale than is Iran’s support to the government
of Iraq or to Asad of Syria. Observers describe Iran’s influence over the Houthis as limited and
assert that the Houthi military action against President Hadi was not instigated by Iran. On April
20, National Security Council spokesperson Bernadette Meehan told reporters that, “It remains
our assessment that Iran does not exert command and control over the Houthis in Yemen,” and an
unnamed U.S. intelligence official reportedly said, “It is wrong to think of the Houthis as a proxy
force for Iran.”48
Iran might have increased its aid to the Houthis as a counter to the Saudi military campaign,
which began in April 2015, against the Houthi advance. Iran appears to be seeking to frustrate
Saudi foreign policy.49 The United States augmented its naval presence off the coast of Yemen
45 For more information, see CRS Report R43960, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
46 Ali al-Mujahed and Hugh Naylor. “Yemen Rebels Defy Saudi-led Attacks.” Washington Post, March 28, 2015.
47 “Iranian Support Seen Crucial for Yemen’s Houthis.” Reuters, December 15, 2014.
48 Ali Watkins, Ryan Grim, and Akbar Shahid Ahmed, “Iran Warned Houthis Against Yemen Takeover,” Huffington
Post, April 20, 2015.
49 Michael Shear and Matthew Rosenberg. “Warning Iran, U.S. Sends Two More Ships to Yemen.” New York Times,
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
15
Iran’s Foreign Policy
with an aircraft carrier in mid-April 2015, in part to try to prevent any additional Iranian weapons
shipments to Iran. The Iranian ship convoy turned around rather than confront the U.S. Navy, and
the U.S. presence appears to have deterred further Iranian efforts to arm the Houthis by ship.
Turkey50
Iran shares a short border with Turkey, but the two have extensive political and economic
relations. Turkey is a member of NATO, and Iran has sought to limit Turkey’s cooperation with
its NATO partners in any U.S.-backed efforts to emplace even defensive equipment, such as
missile defense technology, near Iran’s borders. Iran is a major supplier of both oil and natural gas
to Turkey, through a joint pipeline that began operations in the late 1990s and has since been
supplemented by an additional line. Iran and Turkey also agreed in 2011 to cooperate to try to halt
cross border attacks by Kurdish groups that oppose the governments of Turkey (Kurdistan
Workers’ Party, PKK) and of Iran (Free Life Party, PJAK), and which enjoy a measure of safe
have in northern Iraq. Turkey has also been supportive of P5+1 – Iran negotiations on Iran’s
nuclear program, perhaps in the hopes that a lifting of sanctions on Iran will remove constraints
on Iran-Turkey trade.
On the other hand, the two countries have disputes on some regional issues, possibly caused by
the sectarian differences between Sunni-inhabited Turkey and Shiite Iran. Turkey has been a key
advocate of Syrian President Asad leaving office as part of a possible solution for conflict-torn
Syria. Iran, as has been noted, is a key factor in Asad’s ability to remain in power despite four
years of civil war. In the 1990s and early 2000s, Iran and Turkey were at odds over the strategic
engagement of Turkey’s then leaders with Israel. The Iran – Turkey dissonance on the issue has
faded since the Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in Turkey
about a decade ago. Since then Turkey has realigned its foreign policy somewhat and has been a
significant supporter of Hamas, which also enjoys Iran’s support, and other Islamist movements.
(...continued)
April 21, 2015.
50 For analysis on Turkey’s foreign policy and U.S. relations, see: CRS Report R44000, Turkey: Background and U.S.
Relations in Brief, by Jim Zanotti.
Congressional Research Service
16
Iran’s Foreign Policy
South and Central Asia Region
Iran’s relations with countries in the
Figure 2. South and Central Asia Region
Caucasus, Central Asia, and South Asia vary
significantly, from close relations with
Afghanistan to animosity with Azerbaijan.
Regardless of any differences, most countries
in these regions conduct relatively normal
trade and diplomacy with Iran. Some
countries in these regions, such as Uzbekistan
and Pakistan, face significant domestic threats
from radical Sunni Islamist extremist
movements similar to those that Iran
characterizes as a threat to regional stability.
Such common interests create an additional
basis for Central and South Asian cooperation
with Iran.
Most of the countries in Central Asia are
relatively stable and are governed by
authoritarian leaders, offering Iran little
opportunity to exert influence by supporting
Source: Created by CRS.
opposition factions. Afghanistan, by contrast,
is a weak state supported by international forces, and Iran has substantial influence over several
major factions and regions of the country. Some countries in the region, particularly India,
apparently seek greater integration with the United States and other world powers and have
sought to limit or downplay cooperation with Iran and to comply with sanctions against Iran. The
following sections cover those countries in the Caucasus and South and Central Asia that have
significant economic and political relationships with Iran.
The South Caucasus: Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan is, like Iran, mostly Shiite Muslim-inhabited. However, Azerbaijan is ethnically
Turkic and its leadership is secular; moreover, Iran and Azerbaijan have territorial differences
over boundaries in the Caspian Sea. Iran also asserts that Azeri nationalist movements might
stoke separatism among Iran’s large Azeri Turkic population, which has sometimes been restive.
In July 2001, Iranian warships and combat aircraft threatened a BP ship on contract to Azerbaijan
out of an area of the Caspian that Iran claims as its territorial waters. The United States called the
incident inconsistent with diplomatic processes under way to determine Caspian boundaries,51
among which are negotiations that regional officials say might resolve the issue at a planned 2016
regional summit meeting in Astana, Kazakhstan. Largely as a result of these differences, Iran has
generally tilted toward Armenia, which is Christian, in Armenia’s disputes with Azerbaijan. In
this context, Azerbaijan has entered into substantial strategic cooperation with the United States,
directed not only against Iran but also against Russia. The U.S.-Azerbaijan cooperation has
51 http://usembassy-israel.org.il/publish/peace/archives/2001/july/0725a.html.
Congressional Research Service
17
Iran’s Foreign Policy
extended to Azerbaijan’s deployments of troops to and facilitation of supply routes to
Afghanistan,52 as well as counter-terrorism cooperation.
Israel also is apparently looking to Azerbaijan to counter Iran, announcing in February 2012 a
major sale of about $1.6 billion worth of defense equipment, including unmanned aerial
vehicles.53 In March 2012, Azerbaijan arrested 22 persons it said were Iranian agents plotting
attacks against Israeli and Western targets there.
Azerbaijan has been a key component of U.S. efforts to structure oil and gas routes in the region
to bypass Iran. In the 1990s, the United States successfully backed construction of the Baku-
Tblisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, intended in part to provide non-Iranian and non-Russian export routes.
On the other hand, the United States has apparently accepted Azerbaijan’s assertions that it needs
to deal with Iran on some major regional energy projects. U.S. sanctions laws have excluded
long-standing joint natural gas projects that involve some Iranian firms—particularly the Shah
Deniz natural gas field and pipeline in the Caspian Sea. The project is run by a consortium in
which Iran’s Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO) holds a passive 10% share. (The other
significant partners are BP, Azerbaijan’s national energy firm SOCAR, and Russia’s Lukoil.)
Central Asia
Iran has generally sought positive relations with the leaderships of the Central Asian states, even
though most of these leaderships are secular. All of the Central Asian states are inhabited in the
majority by Sunnis, and several have active Sunni Islamist opposition movements. The Central
Asian states have long been wary that Iran might try to promote Islamic movements in Central
Asia, but more recently the Central Asian leaders have seen Iran as an ally against the Sunni
movements that are active in Central Asia, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).54
The rise of the Islamic State organization is a source of collective regional concern because the
group has recruited fighters from Central Asia to help fill its combat ranks in Iraq and Syria.55
These fighters could return to their countries of origin to conduct terrorist attacks against the
Central Asian governments. Almost all of the Central Asian states share a common language and
culture with Turkey; Tajikistan is alone among them in sharing a language with Iran. The Central
Asian states cooperate extensively to try to prevent narcotics trafficking emanating from
Afghanistan.
Iran and the Central Asian states carry on normal economic relations. In December 2014, a new
railway was inaugurated through Iran, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, providing a link from the
Persian Gulf to Central Asia.56
52 http://foreignpolicynews.org/2014/04/10/azerbaijans-strategic-relations-united-states/.
53 http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/azerbaijans-cooperation-with-israel-goes-beyond-iran-
tensions.
54 Sebastien Peyrouse. “Iran’s Growing Role in Central Asia? Geopolitical, Economic, and Political Profit and Loss
Account. Al Jazeera Center for Studies. April 6, 2014. http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/dossiers/2014/04/
2014416940377354.html.
55 Stratfor. “Re-Examining the Threat of Central Asian Militancy” January 21, 2015. http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/
re-examining-threat-central-asian-militancy#axzz3PTRMU0el.
56 http://www.railwaygazette.com/news/news/asia/single-view/view/iran-turkmenistan-kazakhstan-rail-link-
inaugurated.html.
Congressional Research Service
18
Iran’s Foreign Policy
Along with India and Pakistan, Iran has been given observer status in a Central Asian security
grouping called the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO—Russia, China, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan). In April 2008, Iran applied for full membership in the
organization. Apparently in an effort to cooperate with international efforts to pressure Iran, in
June 2010, the SCO barred admission to Iran on the grounds that it is under U.N. Security
Council sanctions.57
Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan and Iran have a land border in Iran’s northeast. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Grand
Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i, is of Turkic origin; his family has close ties to the Iranian city of
Mashhad, capital of Khorasan Province, which borders Turkmenistan. The two countries are also
both rich in natural gas reserves. A natural gas pipeline from Iran to Turkey, fed with
Turkmenistan’s gas, began operations in 1997, and a second pipeline was completed in 2010. In
2003, then President of Turkmenistan, Saparmurad Niyazov, signed a 25-year accord with Russia
to sell most of Turkmenistan’s natural gas to Russia. However, China is its largest natural gas
customer and Turkmenistan still exports some natural gas through the Iran-Turkey gas pipeline as
well. Perhaps in an attempt to diversify gas export routes, Niyazov’s successor, President
Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, signaled in 2007 that Turkmenistan sought to develop a trans-
Caspian gas pipeline. That project has not proceeded, to date.
Another potential project favored by Turkmenistan and the United States would likely reduce
interest in pipelines that transit Iran. President Berdymukhamedov has revived Niyazov’s 1996
proposal to build a gas pipeline through Afghanistan to Pakistan and India (termed the
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India, or “TAPI” pipeline). Some preliminary memoranda of
understanding among the leaders of the nations involved have been signed. U.S. officials have
expressed strong support for the project as “a very positive step forward and sort of a key
example of what we're seeking with our New Silk Road Initiative, which aims at regional
integration to lift all boats and create prosperity across the region.”58 However, doubts remain that
the pipeline will actually be constructed.
Tajikistan
Iran and Tajikistan share a common Persian language, as well as literary and cultural ties. Despite
the similar ethnicity, the two do not share a border and the population of Tajikistan is mostly
Sunni, not Shiite. In March 2013, President Imamali Rakhmonov warned that since Tajikistan had
become independent, the country and the world have experienced increased dangers from “arms
races, international terrorism, political extremism, fundamentalism, separatism, drug trafficking,
transnational organized crime, [and] the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.” These are
threats that Iranian leaders claim to share. Rakhmonov also stated that close ties with neighboring
and regional states were a priority, to be based on “friendship, good-neighborliness, [and] non-
interference in each other’s internal affairs,” and to involve the peaceful settlement of disputes,
such as over border, water, and energy issues.59 He stated that relations with Iran would be
57 Substantially more detail on Iran’s activities in Afghanistan is contained in CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan:
Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
58 U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, May 23, 2012.
59 Center for Effective Dispute Resolution (CEDR), March 16, 2013, Doc. No. CEL-54015758.
Congressional Research Service
19
Iran’s Foreign Policy
expanded. Tajikistan is largely dependent on its energy rich neighbors and has not announced any
significant energy-related projects with Iran.
Some Sunni Islamist extremist groups that pose a threat to Tajikistan are allied with Sunni
extremist groups, such as Al Qaeda, that Iranian leaders have publicly identified as threats to Iran
and to the broader Islamic world. The Tajikistan government has detained members of Jundallah
(Warriors of Allah)—a Pakistan-based Islamic extremist group that has conducted bombings and
attacks against Iranian security personnel and mosques in Sunni areas of eastern Iran. In part
because the group attacked some civilian targets in Iran, in November 2010, the State Department
named the group an FTO—an action praised by Iran. In July 2013, Tajik police detained alleged
operatives of the IMU, which is active in Uzbekistan and which also operates in Afghanistan.
Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan is an important power in Central Asia by virtue of its geographic location, large
territory, ample natural resources, and economic growth. Kazakhstan possesses 30 billion barrels
of proven oil reserves (about 2% of world reserves) and 45.7 trillion cubic feet of proven gas
reserves (less than 1% of world reserves). There are five major onshore oil fields—Tengiz,
Karachaganak, Aktobe, Mangistau, and Uzen—which account for about half of the proven
reserves. There are two major offshore oil fields in Kazakhstan’s sector of the Caspian Sea—
Kashagan and Kurmangazy—which are estimated to contain at least 14 billion barrels of
recoverable reserves. However, Iran and Kazakhstan do not have any joint energy ventures in the
Caspian or elsewhere.
In September 2014, Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev held talks with Iran’s President
Hassan Rouhani. In his welcoming speech, Nazarbayev said that Iran’s decision on its nuclear
program will play an important role in the development of bilateral relations: “Kazakhstan views
Iran as an important partner in the world and a good neighbor in the Caspian region. We are
confident that you will achieve successful solution on the biggest challenge in Iran—the nuclear
program. It will influence the development of the Iranian economy and our relations.”60 The
bilateral meeting reportedly included a broad agenda, including oil and gas, agriculture, and
infrastructure issues.
Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan and Iran do not share a common border, or significant language or cultural links.
Since its independence in 1991, Uzbekistan, which has the largest military of the Central Asian
states, has tended to see Iran as a potential regional rival and as a supporter of Islamist
movements in the region. Over the past year, Uzbekistan and Iran have moved somewhat closer
together over shared stated concerns about Sunni Islamist extremist movements such as the
Islamic State and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The Islamic State was an offshoot
of Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Iraq and the IMU remains an Al Qaeda affiliate. The IMU, which has a
reported presence in Afghanistan, has not claimed responsibility for any terrorist attacks in Iran
and appears focused primarily on activities against the governments of Afghanistan and
Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan has substantial natural gas resources but the two countries do not have
60 http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13930618000811.
Congressional Research Service
20
Iran’s Foreign Policy
joint energy-related ventures. Most of Uzbekistan’s natural gas production is for domestic
consumption.
Uzbekistan’s intense focus on the IMU began in February 1999 when, according to various
reports, six bomb blasts in Tashkent’s governmental area killed more than 20 people.
Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov had been expected to attend a high-level meeting in that
area when the bombings took place, and the act was widely viewed as an effort to decapitate the
Uzbek government. The government alleged that an exiled opposition figure led the plot, assisted
by Afghanistan’s Taliban and IMU co-leaders Tahir Yuldashev and Juma Namangani. The Taliban
were, at that time, in power in Afghanistan and granting safe haven to Osama bin Laden and other
Al Qaeda leaders. In September 2000, the State Department designated the IMU as an FTO,
stating that the IMU resorts to terrorism in pursuit of its main goal of toppling the government in
Uzbekistan, including taking foreign hostages.61 During U.S.-led major combat operations in
Afghanistan during 2001-2003, IMU forces assisted the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and IMU co-head
Namangani was probably killed at that time.62
South Asia
The countries in South Asia face an even greater degree of threat from Sunni Islamic extremist
groups than do the countries of Central Asia, and on that basis share significant common interests
with Iran. The governments in South Asia are elected governments and thus tend to be more
constrained by domestic laws and customs in their efforts to defeat extremist groups than are the
Central Asian states. Iran apparently looks to some countries in South Asia as potential allies to
help parry U.S. and European economic pressure. This section focuses on several countries in
South Asia that have substantial interaction with Iran.
Afghanistan
In Afghanistan, Iran is apparently pursuing a multi-track strategy by helping develop Afghanistan
economically, engaging the central government, and supporting pro-Iranian groups and anti-U.S.
militants. A long-term Iranian goal appears to be to restore some of its traditional sway in eastern,
central, and northern Afghanistan, where “Dari”-speaking (Dari is akin to Persian) supporters of
the “Northern Alliance” grouping of non-Pashtun Afghan minorities predominate. Iran has also
sought to use its influence in Afghanistan to try to blunt the effects of international sanctions
against Iran.63 The two countries are said to be cooperating effectively in their shared struggle
against narcotics trafficking from Afghanistan into Iran; Iranian border forces take consistent
heavy losses in operations to try to prevent this trafficking.
Iran has sought influence in Afghanistan in part by supporting the Afghan government. President
Hamid Karzai was replaced in September 2014 by Ashraf Ghani: both are Sunni Muslims and
ethnic Pashtuns. On October 26, 2010, Karzai admitted that Iran was providing cash payments
(about $2 million per year) to his government, through his chief of staff.64 Iran’s close ally, Dr.
61 http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2001/html/10252.htm#imu.
62 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, April 2004.
63 Matthew Rosenberg and Annie Lowry, “Iranian Currency Traders Find a Haven in Afghanistan,” New York Times,
August 18, 2012.
64 Dexter Filkins. “Iran Is Said to Give Top Karzai Aide Cash by the Bagful.” New York Times, October 23, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
21
Iran’s Foreign Policy
Abdullah Abdullah, a Persian-speaking Afghan who is partly of Tajik origin, is “Chief Executive
Officer” of the Afghan government under a power-sharing arrangement that resolved a dispute
over the most recent election.
Reflecting apparent concern about the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, Iran reportedly tried
to derail the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) that Ghani’s government signed on September
30, 2014. The BSA allows the United States to maintain troops in Afghanistan after 2014 but
prohibits the United States from using Afghanistan as a base from which to launch military action
against other countries. The two countries appear to have overcome differences over the BSA;
President Ghani visited Tehran during April 19-20, 2015, and held discussions with Iranian
leaders that reportedly focused on ways the two governments could cooperate against the Islamic
State organization, which has developed affiliates inside Afghanistan.65
Even though it engages the Afghan government, Tehran has in the recent past sought leverage
against U.S. forces in Afghanistan that are supporting that government. Past State Department
reports on international terrorism have accused Iran of providing materiel support, including
107mm rockets, to select Taliban and other militants in Afghanistan, and of training Taliban
fighters in small unit tactics, small arms use, explosives, and indirect weapons fire.66 The State
Department terrorism reports also assert that Iran has supplied militants in Qandahar, which is a
Pashtun-inhabited province in southern Afghanistan, and that this demonstrates that Iran is not
limiting its assistance to militants near its borders. The support Iran provides to Afghan insurgents
gives Iran potential leverage in any Taliban-government political settlement in Afghanistan. In
July 2012, Iran reportedly allowed the Taliban to open an office in Zahedan, in eastern Iran.67
Pakistan68
Relations between Iran and Pakistan have fluctuated over the past several decades. Pakistan
supported Iran in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, and Iran and Pakistan engaged in substantial military
cooperation in the early 1990s. It has been widely reported that the founder of Pakistan’s nuclear
weapons program, A.Q. Khan, sold nuclear technology and designs to Iran.69
However, several factors divide the two countries. During the 1990s, Pakistan supported the
Taliban in Afghanistan, whereas Iran supported the Persian-speaking and Shiite Muslim
minorities there. The Taliban allegedly committed atrocities against Shiite Afghans (Hazara
tribes) while seizing control of Persian-speaking areas of western and northern Afghanistan.
Taliban fighters killed nine Iranian diplomats at Iran’s consulate in Mazar-e-Sharif in August
1998, prompting Iran to mobilize ground forces to the Afghan border. Afghan Taliban factions
have a measure of safe-haven in Pakistan, and Iran reportedly is concerned that Pakistan might
still harbor the ambition of returning the Taliban to power in Afghanistan.70 In addition, two
65 “Afghanistan, Iran to Work together Against “Macabre” IS Threat.” RFE/RL, April 22, 2015.
66 State Department. Country Reports on International Terrorism: 2011. http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/
195547.htm.
67 Maria Abi-Habib, “Tehran Builds On Outreach to Taliban,” Wall Street Journal, August 1, 2012.
68 For detail on Pakistan’s foreign policy and relations with the United States, see CRS Report R41832, Pakistan-U.S.
Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt.
69 John Lancaster and Kamran Khan, “Pakistanis Say Nuclear Scientists Aided Iran,” Washington Post, January 24,
2004.
70 Author conversations with experts in Washington, DC, who consult with Iranian government officials. 2013-15.
Congressional Research Service
22
Iran’s Foreign Policy
Iranian Sunni Muslim militant opposition groups - Jundullah (named by the United States as an
FTO) and Jaysh al-Adl - operate from western Pakistan. These groups have conducted a number
of attacks on Iranian regime targets.
An additional factor distancing Iran and Pakistan is that Pakistan has always had strategic
relations with Iran’s strategic adversary, Saudi Arabia. In March 2015, Saudi Arabia requested
Pakistan’s participation in a Saudi-led coalition to try to turn back the advance in Yemen by the
Iranian-backed Houthis (see above). Pakistan’s government is abiding by an April 2015 vote of its
parliament not to enter the conflict, on the grounds that Pakistan could become embroiled in
conflict far from its borders. The decisions has complicated Pakistan’s relations with the GCC
states but been applauded by Iran.71 Experts also have long speculated that if Saudi Arabia sought
to counter Iran’s nuclear program with one of its own, the prime source of technology for the
Saudi program would be Pakistan.
Despite these differences, Iran and Pakistan conduct low-level military cooperation, including
joint naval exercises in April 2014. The two nations’ bilateral agenda has increasingly focused on
completing a major gas pipeline project that would link the two countries. Pakistan asserts that
the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline could help alleviate Pakistan’s energy shortages, while the project
would provide Iran an additional customer for its large natural gas reserves. Then-president of
Iran Ahmadinejad and Pakistan’s then-President Asif Ali Zardari formally inaugurated the project
in March 2013. Iran has completed the line on its side of the border, but Pakistan has had
persistent trouble financing the project on its side of the border. That roadblock might have been
cleared by an agreement by China, reported on April 9, 2015, to build the pipeline at a cost of
about $2 billion.72 The United States opposes the project as providing a benefit to Iran’s energy
sector and U.S. officials say that the project could be subject to U.S. sanctions under the Iran
Sanctions Act.73 As originally conceived, the line would continue on to India, but India has
withdrawn from the project.
India74
India and Iran have overlapping histories, civilizations, and interests, aligning on numerous
issues; for example, both countries have strongly supported minority factions based in the north
and west of Afghanistan. India also is home to tens of millions of Shiite Muslims. As U.S. and
international sanctions on Iran increased in 2010-2012, India sought to preserve its long-standing
ties with Iran while still cooperating with U.S. and international sanctions on Iran. In 2010,
India’s central bank ceased using a Tehran-based regional body, the Asian Clearing Union, to
handle transactions with Iran. In January 2012, Iran agreed to accept India’s local currency, the
rupee, to settle nearly half of its sales to India; that rupee account funds the sale to Iran of Indian
wheat, pharmaceuticals, rice, sugar, soybeans, auto parts, and other products. Over the past three
years, India has cut its purchases of Iranian oil at some cost to its own development, and has
received from the U.S. Administration the authorized exemptions from U.S. sanctions for doing
so. By mid-2013, Iran was only supplying about 6% of India’s oil imports (down from over 16%
71 http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2015/04/10/6dc494fc-df62-11e4-a500-1c5bb1d8ff6a_story.html.
72 http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/china-to-build-pakistan-iran-gas-pipeline-
pakistan-government/articleshow/46867932.cms.
73 http://www.thenational.ae/business/energy/big-powers-block-iran-pakistan-gas-pipeline-plans.
74 For detail on India’s foreign policy and relations with the United States, see CRS Report R42823, India-U.S. Security
Relations: Current Engagement, by K. Alan Kronstadt and Sonia Pinto.
Congressional Research Service
23
Iran’s Foreign Policy
in 2008)—reflecting significant investment to retrofit refineries that were handling Iranian crude.
India’s private sector has come to view Iran as a “controversial market”—a term used by many
international firms to describe markets that entail reputational and financial risks. As a result,
investment in Iran by Indian firms, including in Iran’s energy sector, has been largely dormant
over the past four years.
Still, India apparently seeks to preserve ties to Iran in support of India’s own strategic interests.
India has long sought to develop Iran’s Chabahar port, which would give India direct access to
Afghanistan and Central Asia without relying on transit routes through Pakistan. India had
hesitated to move forward on that project because of U.S. opposition to projects that benefit Iran.
After the JPA, India announced it would proceed with the project, but there has been little actual
construction done at the port.75
In 2009, India dissociated itself from the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project. India publicly based
its withdrawal on concerns about the security of the pipeline, the location at which the gas would
be transferred to India, pricing of the gas, and transit tariffs. However, the long-standing distrust
and enmity between India and Pakistan likely played a significant role in the Indian pullout.
During economic talks in July 2010, Iranian and Indian officials reportedly raised the issue of
constructing a subsea natural gas pipeline, which would bypass Pakistani territory.76 However, an
undersea pipeline would be much more expensive.
During the late 1990s, U.S. officials expressed concern about India-Iran military-to-military ties.
The relationship included visits to India by Iranian naval personnel, although India said these
exchanges involved junior personnel and focused mainly on promoting interpersonal relations
and not on India’s provision to Iran of military expertise. The military relationship between the
countries has withered in recent years.
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka was a buyer of small amounts of Iranian oil until 2012, when U.S. sanctions were
imposed on countries that fail to reduce purchases of Iranian oil. Shortly thereafter, Sri Lanka
ended its oil purchases from Iran and in June 2012, the country received an exemption from U.S.
sanctions.
Europe
U.S. and European approaches on Iran have converged since 2002, when Iran was found to be
developing a uranium enrichment capability. Previously, European countries had appeared less
concerned than the United States about Iranian policies and were reluctant to sanction Iran. Since
the passage of Resolution 1929 in June 2010, European Union (EU) sanctions on Iran have
become nearly as extensive as those of the United States.77 Among its most significant actions, in
2012 the EU banned imports of Iranian crude oil and natural gas. The EU is a party to the JPA and
75 Author conversations with Indian diplomats in Washington, DC, March 2015.
76 http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/iran-backs-deepsea-gas-pipeline-to-india/article5466999.ece.
77 For information on EU sanctions in place on Iran, see http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/iran/eu_iran/
restrictive_measures/index_en.htm.
Congressional Research Service
24
Iran’s Foreign Policy
the April 2, 2015, framework nuclear agreement, and three EU states—Britain, France, and
Germany—are part of the P5+1.
Still, the EU countries generally conduct normal trade relations in civilian goods that are not the
subject of any U.S., EU, or U.N. sanctions. Iran also has maintained full diplomatic relations with
all the EU countries, with the exception of occasional interruptions caused by Iranian
assassinations of Iranian dissidents in Europe or attacks by Iranian militants on EU country
diplomatic property in Iran. There are daily scheduled flights from several European countries to
Iran, and many Iranian students attend European universities. Iran did not break relations with the
EU or with any EU countries when, in July 2013, the EU designated the military wing of
Lebanese Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, an action that followed the attack on Israeli
tourists in Bulgaria in 2012 (see table above).
During the 1990s, U.S. and European policies toward Iran were in sharp contrast. The United
States had no formal dialogue with Iran; however, EU countries maintained a policy of “critical
dialogue” and refused to join the 1995 U.S. trade and investment ban on Iran. The EU-Iran
dialogue was suspended in April 1997 in response to the German terrorism trial (“Mykonos trial”)
that found high-level Iranian involvement in killing Iranian dissidents in Germany, but it resumed
in May 1998 during Mohammad Khatemi’s presidency of Iran. In the 1990s, European and
Japanese creditors bucked U.S. objections and rescheduled about $16 billion in Iranian debt
bilaterally, in spite of Paris Club rules that call for multilateral rescheduling. During 2002-2005,
there were active negotiations between the European Union and Iran on a “Trade and Cooperation
Agreement” (TCA) that would have lowered the tariffs or increased quotas for Iranian exports to
the EU countries.78 Negotiations were discontinued in late 2005 after Iran abrogated an agreement
with several EU countries to suspend uranium enrichment. Also, although the U.S. Administration
ceased blocking Iran from applying for World Trade Organization (WTO) membership in May
2005, there has thus far been insufficient international support to grant Iran WTO membership.
Russia
Iran appears to attach significant weight to its relations with Russia, which is a permanent
member of the U.N. Security Council and a member of the P5+1 that Iran considers amenable to
accepting some of Iran’s arguments in the nuclear talks. Russia has been Iran’s main supplier of
conventional weaponry and a significant supplier of missile-related technology. Russia also built
and still supplies fuel for Iran’s only operating civilian nuclear power reactor at Bushehr, a project
from which Russia earns significant revenues. Russia and Iran reportedly are negotiating for
Russia to build at least two additional nuclear power plants in Iran. Russia has tended to argue
within the Security Council for relatively lighter sanctions than those supported by the United
States, France, and Britain,79 perhaps in part to protect its commercial interests in Iran. Russia
might also seek to ensure that Iran does not align itself with the West.80
78 During the active period of talks, which began in December 2002, there were working groups focused not only on the
TCA terms and proliferation issues but also on Iran’s human rights record, Iran’s efforts to derail the Middle East peace
process, Iranian-sponsored terrorism, counter-narcotics, refugees, migration issues, and the Iranian opposition PMOI.
79 Anna Boshchevskaya. “How Russia Views the Iran Nuclear Talks.” Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
March 12, 2015.
80 Karoun Demirjian. “Russia’s Preemptive Strike as Iran Warms to West.” Washington Post, April 19, 2015.
Congressional Research Service
25
Iran’s Foreign Policy
Despite its commercial and military involvement with Iran, Russia has abided by all U.N.
sanctions, even to the point of initially cancelling a contract to sell Iran the advanced S-300 air
defense system after Resolution 1929 banning arms exports to Iran was adopted—even though
the resolution did not specifically ban the sale of defensive systems. In January 2015, Iran and
Russia signed a memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation, including military
drills.81 After the April 2, 2015, framework nuclear accord was announced, Russia lifted its ban
on the S-300 sale, although by all accounts the system has not been delivered to date. Some
reports suggest that in 2015 a Russian defense firm might also have offered to sell Iran the
advanced Antey-2500 air defense system.82
Since 2014, Iran and Russia have apparently both seen themselves as targets of Western sanctions
(over the Ukraine issue, in the case of Russia). Iran and Russia have also separately accused the
United States and Saudi Arabia of colluding to lower world oil prices in order to pressure Iran and
Russia economically. In August 2014, Russia and Iran reportedly agreed to a broad trade and
energy deal which might include an exchange of Iranian oil (500,000 barrels per day) for Russian
goods83—a deal that presumably would go into effect if sanctions on Iran were lifted. Russia is an
oil exporter, but Iranian oil that Russia might buy under this arrangement would presumably free
up additional Russian oil for export. Iran and Russia reaffirmed this accord in April 2015.
Some argue that Iran has largely refrained from supporting Islamist movements in Central Asia
not only because they are Sunni movements but also to avoid antagonizing Russia. Russia has
faced attacks inside Russia by Sunni Islamist extremist movements and Russia appears to view
Iran as a de-facto ally in combating such movements. These common interests might explain why
Iran and Russia are each assisting the Asad regime against the armed insurgency it faces from
Sunni extremist and other rebel groups.
East Asia
The countries of East Asia include the largest buyers of Iranian crude oil. Because of the demand
of Asian countries for Iranian oil, Iran’s leaders appear to view them primarily as economic
partners and as potential advocates against adding international sanctions on Iran. The countries
in Asia have sometimes joined multilateral peacekeeping operations in the Middle East but have
not directly intervened militarily or politically in the region in the way the United States and its
European allies have. Countries in Asia have rarely been a target of official Iranian criticism.
China84
China, a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council and one of the P5+1 countries that is
negotiating Iran’s nuclear program, remains Iran’s largest oil customer. China has also been a
supplier of advanced conventional arms to Iran, including fast patrol boats that Iran operates in
the Persian Gulf. Until 2010, there were reports that some Chinese firms were supplying missile
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 “Iran, Russia Negotiating Big Oil-for-Goods Deal.” Reuters, January 10, 2014.
84 CRS Report IF10029, China, U.S. Leadership, and Geopolitical Challenges in Asia, by Susan V. Lawrence.
Congressional Research Service
26
Iran’s Foreign Policy
guidance and other weapons-related technology to Iran.85 As with Russia, China has reportedly
tended to argue for less stringent sanctions and for more deference to Iran’s positions within the
U.N. Security Council and within the P5+1 negotiations with Iran, than have the United States,
France, Britain, and Germany.
China’s compliance with U.S. sanctions has been pivotal to U.S. efforts to reduce Iran’s revenue
from oil sales. China has cut its buys of Iranian oil from about 550,000 bpd at the end of 2011 to
about 400,000 bpd by mid-2013. Because China is the largest buyer of Iranian oil, cuts by China
have had a large impact in reducing Iran’s oil sales. Several Chinese energy firms have invested
in Iran’s energy sector, but some of these projects have been given to Iranian or other country
firms or show little evidence of actual development work. These investments are discussed in
detail in CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions.
A U.S. sanction requiring that Iran be paid in local currency accounts, which went into effect
February 6, 2013, caused Iran to increase importation of clothing and household appliances from
China in order to avoid drawing on any hard currency accounts. Even before that sanction was
imposed, China had begun to settle much of its trade balance with Iran with goods rather than
hard currency, in part because doing so is highly favorable to China. Press reports indicated that
Iran’s automotive sector obtains a significant proportion of its parts from China, and two Chinese
companies, Geelran, affiliated with China-based Geely and Chery, produce cars in Iran. These
exports were reduced substantially during 2013 because of U.S. sanctions, but recovered
significantly as a consequence of the JPA, which eased sanctions on Iran’s automotive sector.
Japan and South Korea
Iran’s primary interest in Japan and South Korea has been to maintain commercial relations and
evade U.S. sanctions. However, both countries are close allies and large trading partners of the
United States and their firms have been unwilling to risk their positions in the U.S. market by
violating any U.S. sanctions.
Since 2010, in part in deference to their alliances with the United States, Japan and South Korea
have imposed trade, banking, and energy sanctions on Iran—similar to those of the EU. Iran has
tried to use the oil import dependency of the two countries as leverage; however both countries
have cut imports of Iranian oil sharply since 2011. In 2010, Japan withdrew from an investment
in a large Iranian oil field, Azadegan, in cooperation with U.S. efforts to discourage foreign
investment in Iran’s energy sector.
The U.S. sanction requiring oil buyers to pay Iran in local accounts has not affected Japan and
South Korea’s trading patterns with Iran significantly. South Korea has always generally paid
Iran’s Central Bank through local currency accounts at its Industrial Bank of Korea and Woori
Bank, and it exports to Iran mainly iron, steel, consumer electronics, and appliances. Japan
exports to Iran significant amounts of chemical and rubber products, as well as consumer
electronics. These exports have continued. The two countries also have comprised a large portion
of the $700 million per month in direct hard currency payments to Iran for oil, as provided for by
the JPA.
85 CRS Report RL31555, China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues, by
Shirley A. Kan
Congressional Research Service
27
Iran’s Foreign Policy
North Korea
Iran and North Korea have generally been allies. Because of their separate nuclear programs and
perceived threats to stability in their respective regions, both have been considered “outcasts” or
“pariah states” subject to wide-ranging international sanctions. Even though the economic
benefits to Iran of a relationship with North Korea are minimal, the relationship offers Iran some
strategic gains. North Korea is one of the few countries with which Iran has military-to-military
relations. The two countries have cooperated on a wide range of military and WMD-related
ventures. The two have, by many accounts, cooperated in the development of missile technology.
In the past, Iran reportedly funded and assisted in the re-transfer of missile and possibly nuclear
technology from North Korea to Syria.86
North Korea has made no public commitment to comply with international sanctions against Iran,
but its economy is too small to significantly help Iran. According to some observers, a portion of
China’s purchases of oil from Iran and other suppliers is reexported to North Korea, but Iran is
paid with Chinese goods rather than any hard currency or major products from North Korea.
Press reports in April 2013 said that Iran might supply oil directly to North Korea, but it has not
been reported that any such arrangement was finalized.
86 http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303763804579183231117914364.
Congressional Research Service
28
Iran’s Foreign Policy
Latin America87
Some U.S. officials and some in Congress
Figure 3. Latin America
have expressed concern about Iran’s relations
with certain countries and leaders in Latin
America that share Iran’s distrust of the
United States and might be willing to help
Iran circumvent some international sanctions.
Some experts and U.S. officials have asserted
that Iran, primarily through its ally,
Hezbollah, has sought to position IRGC-QF
and other agents in Latin America with the
potential to carry out terrorist attacks against
Israeli targets in the region or even in the
United States itself.88 Some U.S. officials
have also asserted that Iran and Hezbollah’s
activities in Latin America include money
laundering and trafficking in drugs and
counterfeit goods.89 In contrast to his
predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,
however, President Rouhani has expressed
minimal interest in further expanding ties in
Source: Created by CRS.
Latin America. During the Ahmadinejad
presidency, Iran reportedly expanded its relations with all of those countries, as well as in
Mexico. In Ahmadinejad’s visits to the region, some economic agreements were reached but few
were implemented, by all accounts.
In the 112th Congress, the “Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act,” requiring the
Administration to develop within 180 days of enactment a strategy to counter Iran’s influence in
Latin America, passed both chambers and was signed on December 28, 2012 (H.R. 3783, P.L.
112-220). The required Administration report was provided to Congress in June 2013; the
unclassified portion asserted that “Iranian influence in Latin America and the Caribbean is
waning” in part because of U.S. efforts to cause Latin American countries to assess the costs and
benefits of closer relations with Iran.90
Observers have directed particular attention to Iran’s relationship with Venezuela (an OPEC
member, as is Iran) and Argentina. U.S. counterterrorism officials also have stated that the tri-
border area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay is a “nexus” of arms, narcotics and human
trafficking, counterfeiting, and other potential funding sources for terrorist organizations,
including Hezbollah.
87 For more information on the issues discussed in this section, see CRS Report RS21049, Latin America: Terrorism
Issues, by Mark P. Sullivan and June S. Beittel.
88 Ilan Berman. “Iran Courts Latin America.” Middle East Quarterly, Summer 2012. http://www.meforum.org/3297/
iran-latin-america.
89 Posture Statement of General John F. Kelly, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, before the 114th Congress,
Senate Armed Services Committee, March 12, 2015.
90 Department of State, “Annex A: Unclassified Summary of Policy Recommendations,” June 2013.
Congressional Research Service
29
Iran’s Foreign Policy
Venezuela91
During Ahmadinejad’s presidency, Iran had particularly close relations with Venezuela and its
president, Hugo Chavez, who died in office in March 2013. Neither Rouhani nor Chavez’s
successor, Nicolas Maduro, have expressed the enthusiasm for the relationship that Chavez and
Ahmadinejad did. However, even during Chavez’s presidency, the United States did not
necessarily perceive a threat from the Iran-Venezuela relationship. In July 2012, President Obama
stated that Iran-Venezuela ties have not had “a serious national security impact on the United
States.”92
Only a few of the economic agreements between Iran and Venezuela during the Ahmadinejad and
Chavez presidencies were implemented. A direct air link was established but then suspended in
2010 for lack of sufficient customer interest. It was reportedly restarted by President Maduro in
January 2015 in order to try to promote tourism between the two countries.93 A deal for Petroleos
de Venezuela to supply Iran with gasoline was signed in September 2009, apparently in a joint
effort to circumvent U.S. sanctions on sales of gasoline to Iran, and Petroleos was therefore
sanctioned under the Iran Sanctions Act in May 2011.94
Argentina95
Argentina is the one country in Latin America in which there is substantial evidence that Iran and
Hezbollah have carried out acts of terrorism, in this case against Israeli and Jewish targets.
The two major attacks in Buenos Aires—the 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy and the 1994
bombing of a Jewish community center (Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association, AMIA)—still
affect the Argentine political system. Based on indictments and the copious investigative
information that has been revealed, there is a broad consensus that these attacks were carried out
by Hezbollah operatives, assisted by Iranian diplomats and their access to diplomatic privileges.
Many in Argentina’s Jewish community opposed a January 2013 Iran-Argentina memorandum of
understanding to investigate the 1994 bombing by forming a “truth commission,” rather than to
aggressively prosecute the Iranians involved. Opponents of that agreement assert that it
undermined Argentina’s efforts to prosecute the Iranians involved. In May 2013, the Argentine
prosecutor in the AMIA bombing case, Alberto Nisman, issued a 500-page report alleging that
Iran has been working for decades in Latin America, setting up intelligence stations in the region
by utilizing embassies, cultural organizations, and even mosques as a source of recruitment. In
January 2015, Nisman was found dead of a gunshot wound, prompting turmoil in Argentina amid
reports that he was to request indictment of Argentina’s president for allegedly conspiring with
Iran to bury the AMIA bombing issue.
The Buenos Aires attacks took place more than 20 years ago and there have not been any recent
public indications that Iran and/or Hezbollah are planning attacks in Argentina. However, in
February 2015, Uruguay stated that an Iranian diplomat posted there had left the country before
91 For more information, see CRS Report R43239, Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations, by Mark P. Sullivan
92 Comments by President Barack Obama on “CNN: The Situation Room,” July 11, 2012.
93 http://panampost.com/sabrina-martin/2015/04/06/iran-takes-venezuelan-money-passes-on-deliveries/.
94 http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/24/us-iran-usa-sanctions-idUSTRE74N47R20110524.
95 For more information, see CRS Report R43816, Argentina: Background and U.S. Relations, by Mark P. Sullivan and
Rebecca M. Nelson.
Congressional Research Service
30
Iran’s Foreign Policy
Uruguay issued a formal complaint that the diplomat had tested the security measures of Israel’s
embassy in the capital, Montevideo.96
Africa
With few exceptions, Sub-Saharan Africa has
Figure 4. Sudan
not generally been a focus of Iranian foreign
policy—perhaps because of the relatively
small size of most African economies and the
limited influence of African countries on
multilateral efforts to limit Iran’s nuclear
program or contain its strategic capabilities.
Former President Ahmadinejad tried to enlist
the support of some African leaders to reduce
Iran’s international isolation, but most African
countries did not want to risk their economic
and political relationships with the United
States by undertaking substantial dealings
with Iran. Joint venture agreements between
Iran and African countries were generally not
implemented. Rouhani has made few
statements on relations with countries in
Africa and has not made the continent a
priority. Still, the increase in activity by
Islamic State and Al Qaeda-affiliated Sunni
Source: Created by CRS.
extremist movements could cause Iran to
increase its focus on politics and security issues in Africa.
Iran is positioned to intervene more actively in Africa if it chooses to do so. The IRGC-QF has
established a presence in some countries in Africa (including Nigeria, Senegal, and Kenya),
possibly to secure arms-supply routes for pro-Iranian movements in the Middle East. Iran might
also be seeking ways to retaliate against the United States or its allies if military action is taken
against Iran’s nuclear facilities. On May 2, 2013, a court in Kenya found two Iranian men guilty
of planning to carry out bombings in Kenya, apparently against Israeli targets. In September
2014, Kenya detained two Iranian men on suspicion of intent to carry out a terrorist attack there.
The only country in Africa in which Iran has appeared to invest substantial strategic resources and
attention is Sudan.
Sudan
Iran’s closest relationship in sub-Saharan Africa has been with the government of Sudan, which,
like Iran, is identified by the United States as a state sponsor of terrorism. Iran’s relations with
Sudan give Iran leverage against Egypt, a U.S. ally that has a peace treaty with Israel, and a
96 “Questions Swirl Over Incident Involving Iranian Diplomat in Uruguay.” LatinNews Daily, February 9, 2015.
Congressional Research Service
31
Iran’s Foreign Policy
channel to supply weapons to Hamas and other pro-Iranian groups in the Gaza Strip.97 The
relationship began in the 1990s when Islamist leaders in Sudan, who came to power in 1989,
welcomed international Islamist movements to train and organize there. Iran began supplying
Sudan with weapons it used on its various fronts, such as the one with South Sudan, and the QF
reportedly has armed and trained Sudanese forces, including the Popular Defense Force militia.98
Some observers say Iranian pilots have assisted Sudan’s air force, and Iran’s naval forces have
periodically visited Port Sudan.
For Iran, the key to the relationship with Sudan has been its role in transshipping Iranian weapons
to Hamas. Israel has repeatedly accused Iran of shipping weapons bound for Gaza through Sudan
and,99 in October 2012, Israel bombed a weapons factory in Khartoum, purportedly a source of
Iranian weapons supplies for Hamas. In March 2014, Israel intercepted an Iranian shipment of
rockets that were headed to Port Sudan.100
However, Sudan is inhabited by Sunni Arabs and has always been considered by experts as
susceptible to overtures from Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries to distance itself from Iran.
Apparent Saudi pressure on Sudan, coupled with apparent Saudi offers of generous economic
assistance and investment, led to a downturn in the Iran-Sudan relationship. In September 2014,
the Sudan government closed all Iranian cultural centers in Sudan and expelled the cultural
attaché and other Iranian diplomats. Sudan’s press speculated that the Sudanese government
perceived that Iran was using its facilities and personnel in Sudan to promote Shiite Islam.101 In
March 2015, Sudan joined the Saudi-led Arab coalition against the Houthis in Yemen, appearing
to confirm that Sudan has significantly downgraded its strategic relations with Iran.
Prospects and Alternative Scenarios
There are a number of factors that could cause Iran’s foreign policy to shift. An uprising in Iran or
other event that changes the composition of the regime could precipitate a shift in policy,
presumably in favor of greater integration with the international community. Were Supreme
Leader Khamene’i to leave the scene unexpectedly, Iran’s foreign policy could change sharply if
his successor’s views differ from his or if a successor is unable to consolidate authority. Other
factors that could force a shift could include the expansion of a Saudi-led coalition of Arab Sunni
states that might succeed in its goal of defeating movements and governments backed by Iran.
Another variable that could cause an alteration in Iran’s foreign policy would be the finalization
of a comprehensive nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1. Some experts and officials,
including Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, argue that the broad sanctions relief
envisioned by the tentative nuclear deal will provide Iran more financial and other resources with
97 Michael Lipin. “Sudan’s Iran Alliance Under Scrutiny.” VOANews, October 31, 2012. http://www.voanews.com/
content/article/1536472.html.
98 http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/terrorism-security/2012/1025/Did-Israel-just-blow-up-an-Iranian-
weapons-factory-in-Sudan.
99 “Were the Israelis Behind the ‘Mystery’ Air Strike in Sudan?” Time, April 6, 2011; “Car Blast in E. Sudan,
Khartoum Points to Israel,” Reuters, May 22, 2012; “Rockets and Meetings,” Africa Confidential, May 25,
2012.Weapons Documented in South Kordofan,” Small Arms Survey, April 2012.
100 http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Israel-Navy-intercepts-Gaza-bound-Iranian-rocket-ship-near-Port-Sudan-344369.
101 Sudan Expels Iranian Diplomats and Closes Cultural Centers. The Guardian, September 2, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
32
Iran’s Foreign Policy
which to fund and arm regional factions who are acting against U.S. and allied interests. Other
experts argue that Iran might seek to demonstrate that a nuclear agreement has not caused Iran to
abandon its ideology and that Iran might try to increase its influence in the region.102 Some also
maintain that a nuclear deal could provide Iran with greater legitimacy and a degree of influence
on U.S. policy that Iran has not had since the 1979 Islamic revolution.103 Those who support these
arguments assert that Iran’s foreign policy would become even more challenging for the United
States and its allies than it is without a nuclear agreement. As examples:
• Sanctions relief could enable Iran to acquire, licitly or illicitly, technology to
enhance the accuracy of rockets and short-range missiles it has supplied to
Hezbollah and Hamas.
• Sanctions relief could enable Iran to modernize its armed forces, potentially to
the point where it has increased ability to move ground forces across waterways
such as the Strait of Hormuz—and thereby further intimidate the GCC states.
• Iran could decide to increase its assistance to hardline opposition factions in
Bahrain, who have thus far made little headway in challenging the government’s
control of the country.104
• Iran might be able to use extra funds to recruit additional Shiite fighters from
around the Muslim world to fight on behalf of Asad. Such efforts might assist
Asad against rebels that are backed by the United States and its allies, as well as
against the Islamic State forces in Syria.
• Iran might decide to transfer or fund heavy weaponry to the Houthi rebels in
Yemen, potentially enabling the Houthis to expand their control in Yemen or
succeed in their efforts to make incursions into Saudi Arabia itself.
• Iran’s reintegration into the international community could enable Iran to expand
its relationships with countries in Latin America or Africa that have thus far been
hesitant to broaden their relations with Iran.
A counterargument is that a nuclear agreement would give Iran incentive to avoid actions that
could provoke calls among U.S. allies for the reimposition or addition of international
sanctions.105 President Obama has argued that Iran has a strong national interest in avoiding
reimposition of sanctions or of U.S. military action as a potential consequence of pursuing
“expansionist ambitions.”106 A nuclear agreement also could strengthen Iranian moderates who
seek to improve Iran’s international reputation.107 An agreement may lead to increased U.S.-
Iranian cooperation on regional issues. Domestic political and economic pressures might also
somewhat limit or even largely constrain Iranian leaders from directing expected financial
benefits of a nuclear deal toward controversial foreign policy efforts.Some examples of possible
102 Kenneth Pollack. “Iran’s Regional Policy After a Nuclear Deal” Brookings Institution, March 2, 2015.
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/03/02-iran-after-a-nuclear-deal-pollack.
103 “Public Saudi Welcome for Iran Nuclear Deal Masks Private Unease.” Reuters, April 3, 2015.
104 Ibid.
105 “David Kirkpatrick. “Saudis Make Own Moves as U.S. and Iran Talk.” New York Times, March 31, 2015.
106 “President Obama Interview with Jeffrey Goldberg,” The Atlantic, May 21, 2015.
107 See the President’s own comments on this matter in, “Transcript: President Obama's Full NPR Interview On Iran
Nuclear Deal,” National Public Radio, April 7, 2015.
Congressional Research Service
33
Iran’s Foreign Policy
Iranian foreign policy outcomes—and other possible shifts—in the event a nuclear deal is
finalized are discussed below.
• Iran and the United States might cooperate directly against Islamic State forces in
Iraq, and Iran might reduce its support for Asad of Syria and support a political
solution that explicitly includes his departure from office.
• Iran might curtail its delivery of rockets and short-range missiles to Hezbollah
and Hamas, although Iran is unlikely under any circumstances to reduce its
political support for Hezbollah.
• Depending on the Saudi perception of a post-nuclear agreement threat from Iran,
Saudi Arabia and Iran might potentially cooperate on a political solution in
Yemen. Iran and Saudi Arabia might also decide to cooperate within OPEC to try
to lift world oil prices.
• Iran and the UAE might resolve their territorial dispute over Abu Musa and the
two Tunbs islands in the Persian Gulf.
• Iran might obtain admission to the WTO.
• A lifting of U.S. sanctions could cause Iran, Azerbaijan, and international energy
firms to expand joint projects to develop the energy fields in the Caspian Sea.
U.S.-Azerbaijan strategic cooperation might diminish as their shared perception
of the Iran threat recedes.
• Easing of sanctions could enable planned separate gas pipeline linkages between
Iran and Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman to proceed.
• China and other members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization might drop
their objections to Iran’s full membership in the organization because Iran would
no longer be under strict multilateral sanctions.
• The United States might drop its opposition to additional gas pipelines that transit
Iran, potentially undermining the competing TAPI pipeline project that does not
include Iran.
• The planned Iran-Pakistan natural gas pipeline might proceed to completion with
the threat of U.S. sanctions on firms involved in the project removed.
• India likely would intensify its efforts to develop Iran’s Chahbahar port as U.S.
opposition to the project diminishes.
• Both India and Pakistan might expand their separate military cooperation with
Iran.
Author Contact Information
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612
Congressional Research Service
34