Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
June 22, 2015
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21968
Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy
Summary
Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic divisions—muted toward the end of the 2003-2011 U.S. military
intervention in Iraq—have reemerged to fuel a major challenge to Iraq’s stability and to U.S.
policy in Iraq and the broader Middle East region. The resentment of Iraq’s Sunni Arabs toward
the Shiite-dominated central government facilitated the capture in 2014 of nearly one-third of
Iraqi territory by the Sunni Islamist extremist group called the Islamic State (also known as the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL). Iraq’s Kurds have been separately embroiled in
political and territorial disputes with Baghdad, although those differences have been downplayed
by the common struggle by the Kurds and the central government against the Islamic State.
As part of an overarching effort to defeat the Islamic State, the United States is helping the Iraqi
government try to recapture territories in Iraq that have fallen under Islamic State control. The
United States is conducting airstrikes against the group and has deployed 3,100 U.S. military
personnel to advise and training the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), the peshmerga militia of the
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and Sunni tribal fighters. Partner countries are
contributing 1,500 advisers and trainers for these purposes. The United States is also proceeding
with pre-existing foreign military sales of combat aircraft, as well as with new sales of tanks and
armored vehicles to replenish the equipment lost during the 2014 ISF partial collapse.
U.S. officials assert that defeating the Islamic State will also require the Iraqi government to gain
the loyalty of Iraq’s Sunnis and resolve differences with the KRG. This political component of
U.S. strategy began to show success in 2014 the replacement of former Prime Minister Nuri al-
Maliki with another Prime Minister, Haydar al-Abbadi. Although both men are from the Shiite
Islamist Da’wa Party, Abbadi appears more willing than was Maliki to compromise with Sunni
interests and with those of the KRG. In November 2014, Baghdad and the KRG reached a
temporary agreement on the KRG’s exportation of oil separately from Baghdad.
With one year since the Islamic State gains elapsed, U.S. strategy in Iraq has had mixed come into
question. The Defense Department asserted in mid-April 2015 that about 30% of the territory in
Iraq seized by the Islamic State had been retaken, including the key Sunni-inhabited city of Tikrit.
However, on May 18, 2015, the Islamic State captured Ramadi, the capital of the overwhelmingly
Sunni-inhabited province of Anbar, suggesting that U.S. and Iraqi efforts have not crippled the
Islamic State’s fighting ability or caused a dramatic Sunni shift back to the government. That
setback caused the United States to limit its refusal to support any Shiite militia forces to only
those militias that are advised and trained by Iran. The Shiite militias provide crucial armed
capability to the government but they have committed human rights abuses against some Sunni
communities and thereby hinder efforts to win back Sunni loyalties. In early June 2015, the
Administration announced the deployment of an additional 450 military personnel to Iraq, with
the potential to add further, as part of an initiative to have U.S. advisers and trainers work directly
with a wider array of Iraqi forces, particularly Sunni tribal fighters.
Some experts have suggested that a substantial change in U.S. strategy is required to accomplish
the stated goal of defeating the Islamic State. Still others argue that the stated goal might be
unrealistic and that an alternative approach could consist of containing the Islamic State’s area of
control within Iraq, or even accepting a de facto partition of Iraq. See also CRS Report R43612,
The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard et al.
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Contents
Brief Historical Overview ................................................................................................................ 1
The U.S. Intervention and Post-Saddam Transition......................................................................... 1
Initial Transition and Construction of the Political System ....................................................... 2
Permanent Constitution ....................................................................................................... 3
December 15, 2005, Elections Put Maliki at the Helm ....................................................... 4
2006-2011: Sectarian Conflict and U.S. “Surge” ............................................................................. 5
Governance Strengthens and Sectarian Conflict Abates............................................................ 6
Second Provincial Elections in 2009 ................................................................................... 6
The March 7, 2010 National Elections ................................................................................ 7
U.S. Involvement Winds Down: 2009-2011 .............................................................................. 8
The Post-2011 Diplomatic and Economic Relationship ...................................................... 9
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Post-Withdrawal U.S. Support .............................................. 10
Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I).................................................................... 11
Major Arms Sales 2011-2013 ............................................................................................ 11
Other Post-2011 Security Assistance and Training Programs ........................................... 12
Post-2011 Regional Reinforcement Capability ................................................................. 13
Political and Security Threats Remaining at the Time of the U.S. Withdrawal ............................. 14
Armed Sunni Groups ............................................................................................................... 14
Al Qaeda in Iraq/Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Islamic State ..................... 14
Naqshabandi Order (JRTN) and Ex-Saddam Military Commanders ................................ 15
Sunni Tribal Leaders/Sons of Iraq Fighters ....................................................................... 15
The Sadr Faction and Shiite Militias ....................................................................................... 16
Sadrist and other Shiite Militias/Popular Mobilization Forces ......................................... 16
The Kurds and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) .................................................. 18
KRG Structure/Intra-Kurdish Divisions ............................................................................ 18
KRG-Baghdad Disputes .................................................................................................... 19
KRG Oil Exports ............................................................................................................... 19
Tier Three Designations of the KDP and PUK.................................................................. 21
Post-U.S. Withdrawal Political Unraveling ................................................................................... 21
Insurrection Escalates in 2013 ................................................................................................. 21
Islamic State Challenge to Iraq’s Stability ..................................................................................... 23
Government Formation Process Amidst Security Collapse ..................................................... 24
U.S. Policy Response to the Islamic State in Iraq .......................................................................... 28
U.S. Military Involvement Since Mid-2014 ............................................................................ 29
Advice and Training .......................................................................................................... 29
Air Strikes ......................................................................................................................... 30
Weapons Resupply ............................................................................................................ 30
Funding Issues ................................................................................................................... 31
Results of the Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq and Way Forward ..................................... 31
Economic Resources and Human Rights Issues ............................................................................ 34
Economic Development and the Energy Sector ...................................................................... 34
General Human Rights Issues.................................................................................................. 35
Trafficking in Persons ....................................................................................................... 35
Media and Free Expression ............................................................................................... 36
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Corruption ......................................................................................................................... 36
Religious Freedom/Situation of Religious Minorities ....................................................... 36
Women’s Rights ................................................................................................................ 37
Mass Graves ...................................................................................................................... 38
Regional Relationships .................................................................................................................. 38
Iran ........................................................................................................................................... 38
Syria ......................................................................................................................................... 39
Turkey ...................................................................................................................................... 40
Gulf States ............................................................................................................................... 41
Tables
Table 1. Major Political Factions in Post-Saddam Iraq ................................................................... 3
Table 2. Major Coalitions in April 30, 2014, COR Elections ........................................................ 26
Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Iraq Since FY2003 ............................................................................. 42
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 43
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Brief Historical Overview
The territory that is now Iraq fell under the rule of the Ottoman Empire in the 16th Century,
divided into three provinces: Mosul Province, Baghdad Province, and Basra Province. Ottoman
rule lasted until World War I, in which that empire was defeated and its dominions in the Middle
East were taken over by the European powers that had defeated the Ottomans in the war. Britain
took over Iraq (then still called “Mesopotamia”) under a League of Nations mandate, but ruled by
Faysal I, a leader of the Hashemite family (which still rules modern-day Jordan). Iraq gained
independence in 1932, with Faysal as King. Arab nationalist military leaders led by Abd al-Qarim
Qasim overthrew the monarchy (King Faysal II) in July 1958, proclaiming a republic. Qasim
invited Kurdish leader Mullah Mustafa Barzani to return to Iraq but, beginning in 1961, he led
Kurdish forces in a significant war for autonomy from Baghdad, with the ultimate objective of
forming a separate Kurdish state. The Ba’th (“Renaissance”) Party organized against Qasim and
took power briefly in a 1963 coup, but the first Ba’thist government was ousted in late 1963 by
nationalist military leaders, who ruled until a successful second Ba’th takeover in 1968. In July
1979, Saddam Hussein ousted then-President Ahmad Hasan Al Bakr and assumed his position.
Saddam Hussein came to power in Iraq about six months after Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s
Islamic revolution ousted the U.S.-backed Shah in neighboring Iran. Saddam apparently
perceived Iran’s revolution as an existential threat for its potential to inspire a Shiite-led
revolution in Iraq, which is about 60% Shiite Arab, 20% Sunni Arab, and 18% Kurdish. In
September 1980, Saddam launched war against Iran, but the war bogged down into a rough
stalemate until the summer of 1988, when Iran accepted a ceasefire encapsulated in U.N. Security
Council Resolution 598, adopted a year prior. Perhaps seeking a broader hegemony in the Gulf, in
August 1990, Saddam ordered an invasion and occupation of Kuwait, which along with the other
Persian Gulf monarchies had underwritten Iraq’s war effort against Iran. A U.S.-led coalition
expelled Iraqi forces by the end of March 1991, and Iraq accepted an intrusive U.N.-led
inspection regime to dismantle its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, including a
nuclear program that apparently was close to producing enough fissile material for a nuclear
weapon. By the end of the 1990s, the inspection regime broke down over Iraqi objections to its
intrusiveness and stated frustrations about a worldwide economic embargo imposed on Iraq after
the Kuwait invasion. However, Iraq’s WMD program, it was later determined, had not been
revived to any meaningful extent.
The U.S. Intervention and Post-Saddam Transition
A U.S.-led military coalition that included about 250,000 U.S. troops crossed the border from
Kuwait into Iraq on March 19, 2003, to oust the regime of Saddam Hussein and eliminate
suspected WMD programs that were retained. After several weeks of combat, the regime of
Saddam Hussein fell on April 9, 2003. During the 2003-2011 presence of U.S. forces, Iraq
completed a transition from the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein to a plural political system in
which varying sects and ideological and political factions compete in elections. A series of
elections began in 2005, after a one-year occupation period and a subsequent seven-month
interim period of Iraqi self-governance that gave each community a share of power and prestige
to promote cooperation and unity. Still, disputes over the relative claim of each community on
power and economic resources permeated almost every issue in Iraq and were never fully
resolved. These unresolved differences—muted during the last years of the U.S. military
presence—reemerged in mid-2012 and have since returned Iraq to major conflict.
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After the fall of Saddam Hussein, all U.S. economic sanctions against Iraq were lifted, removing
impediments to U.S. business dealings with Iraq. During 2003-2004, Iraq was removed from the
“terrorism list,”and the Iraq Sanctions Act (Sections 586-586J of P.L. 101-513), which codified a
U.S. trade embargo imposed after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, was terminated. In subsequent years,
a series of U.N. Security Council resolutions removed most remaining “Chapter VII” U.N.
sanctions against Iraq that stemmed from the 1990 invasion of Kuwait—opening Iraq to receiving
arms from any country. Iraq still is required to comply with international proliferation regimes
that bar it from reconstituting Saddam-era weapons of mass destruction programs, and still pays
into a U.N.-run fund to compensate victims of the 1990 Kuwait invasion. On October 24, 2012,
Iraq demonstrated its commitment to compliance with proliferation restrictions by signing the
“Additional Protocol” of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Initial Transition and Construction of the Political System
After the fall of Saddam’s regime, the United States set up an occupation structure based on
concerns that immediate sovereignty would favor established Islamist and pro-Iranian factions
over nascent pro-Western secular parties. In May 2003, President Bush named Ambassador
L. Paul Bremer to head a Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which was recognized by the
United Nations as an occupation authority. In July 2003, Bremer ended Iraqi transition
negotiations and appointed a non-sovereign Iraqi advisory body, the 25-member Iraq Governing
Council (IGC). U.S. and Iraqi negotiators, advised by a wide range of international officials and
experts, drafted a Transitional Administrative Law (TAL, interim constitution), which became
effective on March 4, 2004.1
On June 28, 2004, Bremer appointed an Iraqi interim government, ending the occupation period.
The TAL also laid out a 2005 elections roadmap, based on agreement among all Iraqi factions that
elections should determine future political outcomes. The interim government was headed by a
prime minister (Iyad al-Allawi) and a president (Sunni tribalist Ghazi al-Yawar). It was heavily
populated by parties and factions that had long campaigned to oust Saddam.
In accordance with the dates specified in the TAL, the first elections process, on January 30,
2005, produced a 275-seat transitional parliament and government that supervised writing a new
constitution, held a public referendum on a new constitution, and then held elections for a full-
term government. Elections for four-year-term provincial councils in all 18 provinces (“provincial
elections”) and a Kurdistan regional assembly (111 seats) were held concurrently. The election
was conducted according to the “proportional representation/closed list” election system, in
which voters chose among “political entities” (a party, a coalition of parties, or people). The
ballot included 111 entities, nine of which were multi-party coalitions. Sunni Arabs (20% of the
overall population) boycotted and won only 17 seats in the transitional parliament. The
government included PUK leader Jalal Talabani as president and Da’wa party leader Ibrahim al-
Jafari as prime minister. Sunni Arabs held the posts of parliament speaker, deputy president, one
of the deputy prime ministers, and six ministers, including defense.
1 Text, in English, is at http://www.constitution.org/cons/iraq/TAL.html.
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Table 1. Major Political Factions in Post-Saddam Iraq
Faction Leadership/Description
Da’wa Party/State of Law
The largest faction of the Da’wa Party has been led since 2006 by Nuri al-Maliki, who
Coalition
displaced former Da’wa leader (and former Prime Minister) Ibrahim al-Jaafari. Da’wa
was active against Saddam but also had operatives in some Persian Gulf states, including
Kuwait, where they committed attacks against the ruling family during the 1980s. Da’wa
is the core of the “State of Law” political coalition. Iraq’s current Prime Minister,
Haydar al-Abbadi, is a Da’wa member.
Islamic Supreme Council
Current leader is Ammar al-Hakim, who succeeded his father Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim
of Iraq (ISCI)
upon his death in 2009. The Hakims descend from the revered late Grand Ayatol ah
Muhsin Al Hakim, who hosted Iran’s Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini when he was in exile
in Iraq during 1964-1978. Abd al-Aziz’s elder brother, Mohammad Baqr al-Hakim,
headed the movement when it was an underground armed opposition group against
Saddam, but he was killed outside a Najaf mosque shortly after returning to Iraq
following Saddam’s overthrow.
Sadrists
Thirty-two year old Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr leads a sizeable Shiite political faction.
Sadr is the son of revered Ayatollah Mohammad Sadiq Al Sadr, who was killed by
Saddam’s security forces in 1999, and a relative of Mohammad Baqr Al Sadr, a Shiite
theoretician and contemporary and colleague of Ayatol ah Khomeini. Moqtada formed a
Shiite militia cal ed the Mahdi Army during the U.S. military presence, which was
formally disbanded in 2009 but has regrouped under an alternate name to combat the
Islamic State organization. The Sadrists have competed in all Iraqi elections since 2006.
In 2014, the group competed under the “Al Ahrar” (Liberal) banner.
Kurdish Factions:
Masoud Barzani heads the KDP and is the elected President of the Kurdistan Regional
Kurdistan Democratic
Government (KRG). The PUK is led by Jalal Talabani, who was President of Iraq until
Party (KDP), Patriotic
the 2014 government section process. Iraq’s current president, Fouad Masoum, is a
Union of Kurdistan (PUK), senior PUK leader as well. Gorran (“Change”) is an offshoot of the PUK.
and Gorran
Iraqi National
Led by Iyad al-Allawi, a longtime anti-Saddam activist who was transitional Prime
Alliance/”Iraqiyya”
Minister during June 2004-February 2005. Al awi is a Shiite Muslim but most of his bloc’s
supporters are Sunnis, of which many are ex-Baath Party members. Iraqiyya bloc
fractured after the 2010 national election into blocs loyal to Allawi and to various Sunni
leaders including ex-COR peaker Osama al-Nujaifi and deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-
Mutlaq. Allawi and Nujaifi are both vice presidents in the government formed in
September 2014, and Mutlaq has retained his deputy prime ministerial post.
Iraqi Islamic Party
Sunni Islamist faction that was underground during Saddam’s rule, joined post-Saddam
politics, and was headed by then Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi. The group was part of
the Iraqiyya alliance in the 2010 election. Hashimi fled a Maliki-ordered arrest warrant
in late 2011 and has remained mostly in Turkey since.
Sources: Various press reports and author conversations with Iraq experts.
Permanent Constitution2
A 55-member drafting committee—in which Sunnis were underrepresented—produced a draft
constitution, which was adopted in a public referendum of October 15, 2005. It major provisions
are as follows:
2 Text of the Iraqi constitution is at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/
AR2005101201450.html.
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• It does not stipulate any ethnic or sectarian-based distribution of positions. An
informal agreement developed in the process of forming successive governments
in which a Shiite Muslim is Prime Minister, a Kurd is President, and a Sunni is
Speaker of the Council of Representatives (COR, parliament).
• In Article 113, it acknowledges that the three Kurdish-controlled provinces of
Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniyah constitute a legal “region” administered by the
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Legal regions are able to organize
internal security forces, legitimizing the Kurds’ fielding of their peshmerga
militia (Article 117). This continued a TAL provision. There would be a
December 31, 2007, deadline to hold a referendum on whether Kirkuk (Tamim
Province) would join the Kurdish region (Article 140).
• Any two or more provinces may join together to form a new “region,” according
to an October 2006 law on formation of regions. Holding a referendum on region
formation requires obtaining signatures of 10% of the provinces’ voters, or the
support of one-third of the members of their provincial councils.
• Islam was designated as “a main source” of legislation.
• It stipulates that a “Federation Council” (Article 62) would be formed by future
law as a second parliamentary chamber with size and powers to be determined.
the body has not been formed to date.
• It sets a 25% electoral goal for women (Article 47).
• Families are to choose which courts to use for family issues (Article 41), and
only primary education is mandatory (Article 34). Islamic law experts and civil
law judges would serve on the federal supreme court (Article 89).
• The central government is to distribute oil and gas revenues from “current fields”
in proportion to population, and “regions” will have a role in allocating revenues
from new energy discoveries (Article 109).
These provisions left many disputes unresolved, particularly the balance between central
government and regional and local authority. The TAL made approval of the constitution subject
to a veto if a two-thirds majority of voters in any three provinces voted it down. Sunnis registered
in large numbers (70%-85%) to try to defeat the constitution, despite a U.S.-mediated agreement
of October 11, 2005, to have a future vote on amendments to the constitution. The Sunni
provinces of Anbar and Salahuddin had a 97% and 82% “no” vote, respectively, but the
constitution was adopted because Nineveh Province voted 55% “no”—short of the two-thirds
“no” majority needed to vote the constitution down.
December 15, 2005, Elections Put Maliki at the Helm
The December 15, 2005, elections were for a full-term (four-year) national government (also in
line with the schedule laid out in the TAL). Each province contributed a set number of seats to a
“Council of Representatives” (COR), a formula adopted to attract Sunni participation. There were
361 political “entities,” including 19 multi-party coalitions, competing in a “closed list” voting
system (in which votes are cast only for parties and coalitions, not individual candidates). The
Shiites and Kurds again emerged dominant. The COR was inaugurated on March 16, 2006, and
Jafari was replaced with a then-obscure Da’wa figure, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, as Prime Minister.
Talabani was selected to continue as president, with deputies Adel Abd al-Mahdi (incumbent) of
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ISCI and Tariq al-Hashimi, leader of the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP). Of the 37 Cabinet posts,
there were 19 Shiites; 9 Sunnis; 8 Kurds; and 1 Christian. Four were women.
2006-2011: Sectarian Conflict and U.S. “Surge”
The election did not resolve the Sunnis’ grievances over their diminished positions in the power
structure, and subsequent events reinforced their political weakness and sense of resentment. The
bombing of a major Shiite shrine (Al Askari Mosque) in the Sunni-dominated city of Samarra
(Salahuddin Province) in February 2006 set off major Sunni-Shiite violence that became so
serious that many experts, by the end of 2006, were considering the U.S. mission as failing. The
“Iraq Study Group” concluded that U.S. policy required major change.3
In August 2006, the United States and Iraq agreed on “benchmarks” that, if implemented, might
achieve political reconciliation. Under Section 1314 of a FY2007 supplemental appropriation
(P.L. 110-28), “progress” on 18 political and security benchmarks—as assessed in Administration
reports due by July 15, 2007, and September 15, 2007—was required for the United States to
provide $1.5 billion in Economic Support Funds (ESF) to Iraq.4 In early 2007, the United States
began a “surge” of about 30,000 additional U.S. forces—bringing U.S. troop levels from their
2004-2006 levels of 138,000 to a high of about 170,000—intended to blunt insurgent momentum
and take advantage of growing Sunni Arab rejection of Islamist extremist groups. The
Administration cited as partial justification for the surge the Iraq Study Group’s recommendation
of such a step. As 2008 progressed, citing the achievement of many of the agreed benchmarks and
a dramatic drop in sectarian violence, the Bush Administration asserted that political
reconciliation was advancing. However, U.S. officials maintained that the extent and durability of
the reconciliation would depend on further compromises among ethnic groups.
United Nations Assistance Mission—Iraq (UNAMI)
The United Nations contributes to political reconciliation through its U.N. Assistance Mission—Iraq (UNAMI). The
head of UNAMI is also the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Iraq. The mandate of UNAMI was
established in 2003 and has been renewed each July since in a U.N. Security Council resolution. UNAMI’s primary
activities have been to help build civil society, assist vulnerable populations, consult on possible solutions to the Arab-
Kurd dispute over Kirkuk Province, and resolve the status of the Iranian opposition group People’s Mojahedin
Organization of Iran that remains in Iraq (see below). The first head of the office was killed in a car bombing on his
headquarters in August 2003. In February 2015, Jan Kubis, the former head of UNAMA in Afghanistan, replaced
Bulgarian diplomat Nickolay Mladenov as head of UNAMI.
3 “The Iraq Study Group Report.” Vintage Books, 2006. The Iraq Study Group was funded by the conference report on
P.L. 109-234, FY2006 supplemental, which provided $1 million to the U.S. Institute of Peace for operations of an Iraq
Study Group. The legislation did not specify the Group’s exact mandate or its composition.
4 President Bush exercised the waiver provision of that law in order to provide that aid. The law also mandated an
assessment by the Government Accountability Office, by September 1, 2007, of Iraqi performance on the benchmarks,
as well as an outside assessment of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).
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Governance Strengthens and Sectarian Conflict Abates
The passage of Iraqi laws in 2008 that were considered crucial to reconciliation, continued
reductions in violence accomplished by the U.S. surge, and the Sunni militant turn away from
violence, facilitated political stabilization. A March 2008 offensive ordered by Maliki against the
Sadr faction and other militants in Basra and environs (Operation Charge of the Knights) pacified
the city and caused many Sunnis and Kurds to see Maliki as willing to take on armed groups even
if they were Shiite. This contributed to a decision in July 2008 by several Sunni ministers to end a
one-year boycott of the Cabinet.
U.S. officials also pressed Maliki to devolve power from Baghdad, in large part to give Iraq’s
Sunnis more ownership of their own affairs and regions. Such devolution could take the form of
establishment of new “regions,” modeled along the lines of the KRG, or allowing provinces or
groups of provinces more autonomy and powers. Opponents of that proposal asserted that
devolving power from the central government would lead to the breakup of Iraq.
In part to address U.S. advice, in 2008, a “provincial powers law” (Law Number 21) was adopted
to decentralize governance by delineating substantial powers for provincial governing councils,
such as enacting provincial legislation, regulations, and procedures, and choosing the province’s
governor and two deputy governors. The provincial administrations, which serve four-year terms,
draft provincial budgets and implement federal policies. Some central government funds are
given as grants directly to provincial administrations for their use. Provinces have a greater claim
on Iraqi financial resources than do districts, and many communities support converting their
areas into provinces. The 2008 law replaced a 1969 Provinces Law (Number 159).
Law 21 has been amended on several occasions to try to accommodate restive areas of Iraq. A
June 2013 amendment gave provincial governments substantially more power, a move intended
to satisfy Sunnis. In December 2013, the central government announced it would convert the
district of Halabja into a separate province—Halabja is symbolic to the Kurds because of
Saddam’s use of chemical weapons there in 1988. In January 2014, the government announced
other districts that would undergo similar conversions: Fallujah (in Anbar Province), a hotbed of
Sunni restiveness; Tuz Khurmato (in Salahuddin Province) and Tal Affar (in Nineveh Province),
both of which have Turkmen majorities; and the Nineveh Plains (also in Nineveh), which has a
mostly Assyrian Christian population. These announcements appeared intended to keep
minorities and Sunnis on the side of the government, but have not been implemented to date.
Second Provincial Elections in 2009
The second set of provincial elections were planned for October 1, 2008, but were postponed
when Kurdish opposition caused a presidential veto of a July 2008 draft election law that would
have diluted Kurdish dominance of the Kirkuk provincial government. On September 24, 2008,
the COR adopted an election law, providing for the provincial elections by January 31, 2009, but
postponing provincial elections in Kirkuk and the three KRG provinces. About 14,500 candidates
(including 4,000 women) vied for the 440 provincial council seats in the 14 Arab-dominated
provinces of Iraq. About 17 million Iraqis (any Iraqi 18 years of age or older) were eligible for the
vote, which was run by the Iraqi Higher Election Commission (IHEC). Pre-election violence was
minimal but turnout was lower than expected at about 51%.
The certified vote totals (March 29, 2009) gave Maliki’s State of Law Coalition a very strong 126
out of the 440 seats available (28%). Its main Shiite rival, ISCI, went from 200 council seats to
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only 50, a result observers attributed to its perceived close ties to Iran. Iyad al-Allawi’s faction
won 26 seats, a gain of 8 seats, and a Sunni faction loyal to Tariq al-Hashimi won 32 seats, a loss
of 15. Sunni tribal leaders who boycotted the 2005 elections participated in the 2009 elections.
Their slate came in first in Anbar Province. Although Maliki’s State of Law coalition fared well,
his party still needed to strike bargains with rival factions to form provincial administrations.
The March 7, 2010 National Elections
With the strong showing of his slate in the provincial elections, Maliki was favored to retain his
position in the March 7, 2010 COR elections and retain his post. Yet, as 2009 progressed,
Maliki’s image as protector of law and order was tarnished by several high-profile attacks,
including major bombings in Baghdad on August 20, 2009, in which the buildings housing the
Ministry of Finance and of Foreign Affairs were heavily damaged. As Maliki’s image faded,
Shiite unity broke down and a strong rival Shiite slate took shape—the “Iraqi National Alliance
(INA)” consisting of ISCI, the Sadrists, and other Shiite figures. Sunni Arabs rallied around the
outwardly cross-sectarian but mostly Sunni “Iraq National Movement” (Iraqiyya) of former
Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi.
The election law passed by the COR in November 2009 expanded the size of the COR to 325
total seats. Of these, 310 were allocated by province, with the constituency sizes ranging from
Baghdad’s 68 seats to Muthanna’s seven. The remaining 15 seats were minority reserved seats
and “compensatory seats”—seats allocated from “leftover” votes for parties and slates that did
not meet a minimum threshold to win a seat.
Still, the goal of bringing Sunni Arabs further into the political structure was jeopardized when
the Justice and Accountability Commission (JAC, the successor to the De-Baathification
Commission that worked since the fall of Saddam to purge former Baathists from government)
invalidated the candidacies of 499 individuals (out of 6,500 candidates running) on various slates.
Appeals reinstated many of them. Maliki later named the Minister for Human Rights to also serve
as JAC chairman. The JAC continues to vet candidates.
The final candidate list contained about 6,170 total candidates spanning 85 coalitions. Total
turnout was about 62%, and certified results were announced on June 1, 2010, showing Iraqiyya
winning two seats more than did State of Law. The Iraqi constitution (Article 73) mandates that
the COR “bloc with the largest number” of members should be afforded the first opportunity to
form a government. However, on March 28, 2010, Iraq’s Supreme Court ruled that a coalition that
forms after the election could be deemed to meet that requirement. On October 1, 2010, a six-
month deadlock among major blocs over major positions broke when Maliki received the backing
of most of the 40 COR Sadrist deputies. The Obama Administration initially appeared to favor
Allawi’s efforts to form a governing coalition but, as Alawi’s effort failed, the Administration
acquiesced to a second Maliki term.
On November 10, 2010, an “Irbil Agreement” was reached in which (1) Maliki and Talabani
would serve another term; (2) Iraqiyya would be extensively represented in government—one of
its figures would become COR Speaker, another would be defense minister, and another
(presumably Allawi himself) would chair an oversight body called the “National Council for
Strategic Policies”;5 and (3) de-Baathification laws would be eased. At the November 11, 2010,
5 Fadel, Leila and Karen DeYoung. “Iraqi Leaders Crack Political Deadlock.” Washington Post, November 11, 2010.
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COR session to implement the agreement, Iraqiyya figure Usama al-Nujaifi (brother of Nineveh
Governor Atheel Nujaifi) was elected COR speaker. Several days later, Talabani was reelected
president and subsequently tapped Maliki as prime minister-designate. Maliki met the December
25, 2010 to achieve COR confirmation of a Cabinet, which divided the positions among the major
factions, but Maliki formally held the positions of Defense Minister, Interior Minister, and
Minister of State for National Security. Other officials headed these ministries on an “acting”
basis, without the full authority they would normally have as COR-approved ministers.
U.S. Involvement Winds Down: 2009-2011
As the second full term government took shape in Iraq, the United States began implementing its
long-planned military withdrawal from Iraq. A November 2008 U.S.-Iraq “Security Agreement”
(SA), which took effect on January 1, 2009, stipulated that the withdrawal was to be completed
by the end of 2011. On February 27, 2009, President Obama announced that U.S. troop levels in
Iraq would decline to 50,000 by September 2010 (from 138,000 in early 2009) and the U.S.
mission would shift from combat to training the ISF. By the formal end of the U.S. combat
mission on August 31, 2010, the size of the U.S. force was 47,000 and it declined steadily
thereafter until the last U.S. troop contingent crossed into Kuwait on December 18, 2011.
With the final withdrawal deadline approaching, fears of expanded Iranian influence and
perceived remaining deficiencies in the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) caused U.S. officials to seek
to revise the SA to keep some U.S. troops in Iraq after 2011. Some U.S. experts feared the rifts
among major ethnic and sectarian communities were still wide enough that Iraq could still
become a “failed state” unless some U.S. troops remained. U.S. officials emphasized that the ISF
remained unable to defend Iraq’s airspace and borders, and Iraqi commanders indicated that the
ISF would be unable to execute full external defense until 2020-2024.6 Renegotiating the SA to
allow for a continued U.S. troop presence required discussions with the Iraqi government and a
ratification vote of the Iraqi COR; Iraq’s constitution requires a COR vote on formal bilateral
agreements with foreign countries.
Several high-level U.S. visits and statements urged the Iraqis to consider extending the U.S. troop
presence. Maliki told Speaker of the House John Boehner during his April 16, 2011, visit to
Baghdad that Iraq would welcome U.S. training and arms after that time.7 Subsequently, Maliki
stated that a continued U.S. troops presence would require a “consensus” among political blocs
(which he later defined as at least 70% concurrence)8—an apparent effort to isolate the Sadr
faction, the most vocal opponent of a continuing U.S. presence. On August 3, 2011, most major
factions gave Maliki their backing to negotiate an SA extension, but Sadr threatened to activate
his Mahdi Army militia to oppose any extension of the U.S. presence. As U.S.-Iraq negotiations
on a post-2011 U.S. presence got underway, scenarios and proposals ranging from 3, 000 to
15,000 remaining U.S. troops were widely discussed.9
6 “Iraq General Says Forces Not Ready ‘Until 2020.’” Agence France Presse, October 30, 2011.
7 Prashant Rao. “Maliki Tells US’ Boehner Iraqi Troops Are Ready.” Agence France Presse, April 16, 2011.
8 Aaron Davis. “Maliki Seeking Consensus on Troops.” Washington Post, May 12, 2011.
9 Author conversations with Iraq experts in Washington, DC, 2011; Eric Schmitt and Steven Lee Myers. “Plan Would
Keep Military in Iraq Beyond Deadline.” September 7, 2011.
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With Sadrist opposition unyielding, on October 5, 2011, Iraq stated that it would not extend the
legal protections contained in the existing SA. That stipulation failed to meet the Defense
Department requirements that U.S. soldiers not be subject to prosecution under Iraq’s constitution
and its laws. On October 21, 2011, President Obama announced that the United States and Iraq
had agreed that, in accordance with the SA, all U.S. troops would be out of Iraq by the end of
2011. Whether the Obama Administration made substantial efforts to overcome the Iraqi
resistance remains an issue of debate. In his 2011 Iraq withdrawal announcement, President
Obama stated that, through U.S. assistance programs, the United States would be able to continue
to develop all facets of the bilateral relationship with Iraq and help strengthen its institutions.10 He
and other U.S. officials asserted that the United States would continue to help Iraq secure itself,
but using programs commonly provided for other countries. Administration officials stressed that
the U.S. political and residual security-related presence would be sufficient to ensure that Iraq
remained stable, allied to the United States, continuing to move toward full democracy, and
economically growing.
The Post-2011 Diplomatic and Economic Relationship
The cornerstone of the bilateral relationship was to be the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA),
which entered into effect at the same time as the SA. The SFA outlined long-term U.S.-Iraqi
relations with the intent of orienting Iraq’s politics and its economy toward the West and the
developed nations, and reducing its reliance on Iran or other regional states. The SFA set up a
Higher Coordination Committee (HCC) as an institutional framework for high-level U.S.-Iraq
meetings, and subordinate Joint Coordinating Committees.
The SFA provides for the following (among other provisions):
• U.S.-Iraq cooperation “based on mutual respect,” and that the United States will
not use Iraqi facilities to launch any attacks against third countries, and will not
seek permanent bases.
• U.S. support for Iraqi democracy and support for Iraq in regional and
international organizations.
• U.S.-Iraqi dialogue to increase Iraq’s economic development, including through
the Dialogue on Economic Cooperation and a Trade and Investment Framework
Agreement (TIFA). The United States and Iraq announced on March 6, 2013, that
a bilateral TIFA had been finalized.
• Promotion of Iraq’s development of its electricity, oil, and gas sector.
• U.S.-Iraq dialogue on agricultural issues and promotion of Iraqi participation in
agricultural programs run by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and USAID.
• Cultural cooperation through several exchange programs, such as the Youth
Exchange and Study Program and the International Visitor Leadership Program.
At least 1,000 Iraqi students are studying in the United States.
State Department-run aid programs, implemented mainly through Economic Support Funds
(ESF), are intended to fulfill the objectives of the SFA, according to State Department budget
10 Remarks by the President on Ending the War in Iraq. http://www.whitehouse.gov, October 21, 2011.
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documents. Most U.S. economic aid to Iraq now goes to programs to promote democracy,
adherence to international standards of human rights, rule of law, and conflict resolution.
Programs funded by the State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement (INL) focus on rule of law, moving away from previous use of INL funds for police
training. Funding continues for counterterrorism operations (NADR funds), and for anti-
corruption initiatives. U.S. officials stress that, for programs run by USAID in Iraq, Iraq matches
one-for-one the U.S. funding contribution.
The State Department became the lead U.S. agency in Iraq as of October 1, 2011, and closed its
“Office of the Iraq Transition Coordinator” in March 2012. In July 2011, as part of the transition
to State leadership in Iraq, the United States formally opened consulates in Basra, Irbil, and
Kirkuk. An embassy branch office was considered for Mosul but cost and security issues kept the
U.S. facility there limited to a diplomatic office. The Kirkuk consulate closed at the end of July
2012 in part to save costs. The State Department has planned to replace the U.S. consulate in Irbil
with a New Consulate Compound in Irbil, and the FY2014 Consolidated Appropriation, P.L. 113-
76, provided $250 million for that purpose. The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, built at a cost of about
$750 million, controlled over 16,000 personnel at the time of the 2011 U.S. withdrawal—about
half of which were contractors—a number that fell to about 5,500 at the end of 2013.11 Of the
contractors, most were on missions to protect the U.S. Embassy and consulates, and other U.S.
personnel and facilities throughout Iraq. The U.S. Ambassador in Iraq is Stuart Jones, who was
sworn in on September 17, 2014.
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Post-Withdrawal U.S. Support
At the time of the U.S. withdrawal, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) was assessed as a relatively
well-trained and disciplined force of about 800,000, of which about 350,000 were Iraqi Army and
the remainder were mostly Iraqi Police Service personnel. Of the military forces, a mostly-Shiite
Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS), of which about 4,100 are Iraqi Special Operations Forces
(ISOF), were considered highly capable but reported directly to Maliki’s “Office of the
Commander-in-Chief. The ISF ground forces were also relatively well armed, utilizing heavy
armor supplied by the United States. However, the Air Force remained limited at the time of the
withdrawal, utilizing mostly propeller-driven aircraft.
Following the 2011 U.S. withdrawal, competent commanders were in some cases replaced by
Maliki loyalists, and corruption was considered rife by all accounts. Many commanders viewed
their positions as financial and political rewards rather than tasks and responsibilities to be
managed. By many accounts, the force numbers on the payrolls far exceeded the numbers
actively serving; Iraqi investigations in 2014 found that much of the ISF personnel were “ghost”
or “no-show” forces. During his April 2014 visit to the United States, Prime Minister Haydar al-
Abbadi did not dispute assertions that the Iraqi military is about 80% Shiite Muslim—possibly
explaining why some Iraqi Sunnis say they consider the ISF an “occupation force” or an “Iranian
force.” The collapse of the ISF in northern Iraq in the face of the Islamic State offensive in 2014
might have left the Iraqi Army regular force with as few as 50,000 personnel.
11 Ernesto Londono. “U.S. Clout Wanes in Iraq.” Washington Post, March 24, 2013.
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Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I)
The Office of Security Cooperation—Iraq (OSC-I), operating under the authority of the U.S.
Ambassador to Iraq, was to be the primary Iraq-based U.S. entity tasked with interacting with the
post-2011 Iraqi military. Its primary mission is to administer the foreign military sales (FMS)
programs (U.S. arms sales to Iraq). It is funded with foreign military financing (FMF) funds,
discussed in the aid table below. Prior to the 2014 ISIL-led challenge, it worked out of the U.S.
Embassy in Baghdad and five other locations around Iraq (Kirkuk Regional Airport Base, Tikrit,
Besmaya, Umm Qasr, and Taji). It left the facility in Tikrit before the Islamic State captured that
city in June 2014, and has not returned to it despite Tikrit’s recapture in April 2015.
Total OCS-I personnel number over 3,500, most of which are security contractors. Of the staff,
about 175 are U.S. military personnel and an additional 45 are Defense Department civilians.
Some of these personnel have been seconded to the anti-Islamic State missions discussed below,
but some remain as OSC-I personnel performing the functions they have since 2012. About 46
members of the staff administer the FMS program and other security assistance programs such as
the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program.
Major Arms Sales 2011-2013
One pillar of the U.S. security effort for Iraq after the withdrawal was to continue to supply Iraq
with substantial quantities of arms. In August 2012, the United States completed delivery to Iraq
of 140 M1A1 Abrams tanks. Iraq paid for $800 million of the $860 million cost of the tanks with
national funds. In December 2012, the U.S. Navy delivered two support ships to Iraq to assist
Iraq’s fast-attack and patrol boats in securing its offshore oil platforms and other coastal
locations. The United States also sold Iraq equipment that its security forces can use to restrict the
ability of insurgent and terrorist groups to move contraband across Iraq’s borders and checkpoints
(RAPISCAN system vehicles), at a cost of about $600 million. Some refurbished air defense guns
were provided gratis as excess defense articles (EDA).
F-16s
The largest FMS case is the sale of 36 U.S.-made F-16 combat aircraft to Iraq, notified to
Congress in two equal tranches, the latest of which was made on December 12, 2011 (Transmittal
No. 11-46). The total value of the sale of 36 F-16s is up to $6.5 billion when all parts, training,
and weaponry are included. As noted above, deliveries of the aircraft began in July 2014,
although the planes are being delivered to Iraqi control at a U.S. air base in Arizona prior to
securing from the Islamic State the area around their permanent home at Balad Air Base, north of
Baghdad. The aircraft and their trained pilots are expected to deploy to Iraq later in 2015.
Apache Attack Helicopters, Air Defense Equipment, and Stingers
In 2013 Iraq requested to purchase from the United States the Integrated Air Defense System and
Apache attack helicopters.12 The sale of the Air Defense system was notified to Congress on
August 5, 2013, with a value of $2.4 billion, including 681 Stinger shoulder held units, three
Hawk anti-aircraft batteries, and other equipment. DSCA simultaneously notified about $2.3
12 John Hudson. “Iraqi Ambassador: Give Us Bigger Guns, And Then We’ll Help on Syria.” July 17, 2013.
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billion worth of additional sales to Iraq including of Stryker nuclear, chemical, and biological
equipment reconnaissance vehicles, 12 Bell helicopters, the Mobile Troposcatter Radio System,
and maintenance support.
The provision of Apaches was to involve leasing of six of the helicopters, with an estimated cost
of about $1.37 billion, and the sale of 24 more, with an estimated value of $4.8 billion. As noted
below, the provision of the Apaches was held up by some in Congress until the December 2013
Islamic State-led offensive in Anbar Province. However, Iraq subsequently allowed the deal to
lapse, possibly because of a lack of trained manpower to use the weapon effectively.13
Other Suppliers. The United States is not the only arms supplier to Iraq. In October 2012, Iraq
and Russia signed deals for Russian arms worth about $4.2 billion. In November 2013, Russia
delivered four Mi-35 attack helicopters to Iraq, and Russia quickly delivered several combat
aircraft in late June 2014 that Iraq sought to fill a gap in its air attack capabilities. In October
2012, Iraq agreed to buy 28 Czech-made military aircraft, a deal valued at about $1 billion.14 In
December 12, 2013, South Korea signed a deal to export 24 FA-50 light fighter jets to Iraq at an
estimated cost of $1.1 billion; the aircraft will be delivered between 2015 and 2016.15
Other Post-2011 Security Assistance and Training Programs
OSC-I’s mandate included training and assistance programs for the Iraq military. Because the
United States and Iraq did not conclude a long term Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that
granted legal immunities to U.S. military personnel, the 160 OSC-I personnel involved in these
programs, which focused mostly on counterterrorism and naval and air defense, were mostly
contractors. Some were embedded with Iraqi forces not only tactically, but at the institutional
level by advising Iraqi security ministries and its command structure.
As Sunni unrest increased in 2012, Iraq sought additional security cooperation with the United
States. In August 2012, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey said that
“I think [Iraqi leaders] recognize their capabilities may require yet more additional development
and I think they’re reaching out to us to see if we can help them with that.”16 Iraq reportedly
expressed to Dempsey interest in expanded U.S. training of the ISF and joint exercises.
Subsequently, a unit of Army Special Operations forces reportedly deployed to Iraq to advise on
counterterrorism and help with intelligence against AQ-I/ISIL.17 (These forces operated under a
limited SOFA or related understanding crafted for this purpose.) Other reports suggest that, in late
2012, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) paramilitary forces assumed some of the DOD mission
of helping Iraqi counter-terrorism forces (CTS) against ISIL in western Iraq,18 while also
potentially working against ISIL in Syria as well.
During December 5-6, 2012, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy James Miller and acting
Under Secretary of State for International Security Rose Gottemoeller visited Iraq and a
13 http://www.janes.com/article/43680/iraq-passes-on-apache-buy
14 Adam Schreck. “Iraq Presses US For Faster Arms Deliveries.” Yahoo.com, October 18, 2012.
15 Defense News. December 12, 2013.
16 “U.S. Hopes For Stronger Military Ties With Iraq: General.” Agence France-Presse, August 19, 2012.
17 Tim Arango. “Syrian Civil War Poses New Peril For Fragile Iraq.” New York Times, September 25, 2012.
18 Adam Entous et al. “CIA Ramps Up Role in Iraq.” Wall Street Journal, March 12, 2013.
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Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed with Iraq, appearing to address many of the
issues that were hampering OSC-I from performing its mission to its full potential. The MoU
provided for
• high level U.S.-Iraq military exchanges,
• professional military education cooperation,
• counter-terrorism cooperation,
• the development of defense intelligence capabilities, and
• joint exercises.
The concept of enhanced U.S.-Iraq cooperation gained further consideration in 2013. During his
November 1, 2013, meeting with President Obama, Maliki reportedly discussed enhanced
security cooperation, including expanded access to U.S. intelligence.19 The joint statement issued
at the conclusion of Maliki’s meeting with President Obama did not specify any U.S.
commitments to this level of cooperation, but did express a “shared assessment of al Qaida
affiliated groups threatening Iraq.”
Aside from increasing U.S. training for the ISF, the U.S. military subsequently sought to integrate
the ISF into regional security exercises. The United States arranged Iraq’s participation in the
regional Eager Lion military exercise series in Jordan. Iraq also participated in the U.S.-led
international mine countermeasures exercise off Bahrain in 2013. In July 2013, the United States
convened a strategic dialogue that includes Iraq, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt
joined the subsequent session of the dialogue the week of November 18, 2013.
Police Development Program
A separate program, the Police Development Program, was intended to maintain the proficiency
of Iraq’s police forces. It was the largest program that in 2012 transitioned from DOD to State
Department lead, using International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds. However,
Iraq’s drive to emerge from U.S. tutelage produced apparent Iraqi disinterest in the PDP. By late
2012, it consisted of only 36 advisers, about 10% of what was envisioned as an advisory force of
350, and it is being phased out entirely during 2013. Two facilities built with over $200 million in
U.S. funds (Baghdad Police College Annex and part of the U.S. consulate in Basra) were turned
over to the Iraqi government by the end of 2012. The program was later discontinued.20
Post-2011 Regional Reinforcement Capability
At the time of the U.S. withdrawal in 2011, U.S. officials asserted that the United States also
would retain a significant force in the Persian Gulf, capable of intervening in Iraq if ordered. The
United States has maintained about 35,000 military personnel in the region, including about
10,000 mostly U.S. Army forces in Kuwait, about 40% of which are combat-ready rather than
purely support forces. There is also prepositioned armor there and in Qatar. There are about 7,000
mostly Air Force personnel in Qatar; 5,000 mostly Navy personnel in Bahrain; and about 5,000
19 Michael Gordon and Eric Schmitt. “As Security Deteriorates at Home, Iraqi Leader Arrives in U.S. Seeking Aid.”
New York Times, November 1, 2013.
20 Tim Arango. “U.S. May Scrap Costly Efforts to Train Iraqi Policy.” New York Times, May 13, 2012.
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mostly Air Force and Navy in the UAE, with very small numbers in Saudi Arabia and Oman. The
rest are part of at least one aircraft carrier task force in or near the Gulf at any given time. The
forces are in the Gulf under bilateral defense cooperation agreements with all six Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) states that give the United States access to military facilities to
station forces and preposition some heavy armor.
Political and Security Threats Remaining at the
Time of the U.S. Withdrawal
Even though overall violence in Iraq was relatively low at the time of the 2011 U.S. withdrawal,
numerous armed groups remained, and the grievances that appeared to be managed or attenuated
by the U.S. military presence remained unresolved. The sections below discuss the various threats
to the political and security situation, and the positions and actions of some of the groups in
causing and responding to the Islamic State challenge to the integrity of the Iraqi state.
Armed Sunni Groups
At the time of the completion of the U.S. withdrawal, some Sunni antigovernment armed groups
were still operating, although at low levels of activity. Such groups included Baath Party and
Saddam Hussein supporters as well as hardline Islamists, some of whom were linked to Al Qaeda.
After the U.S. military departure in 2011, these groups increased their armed opposition to the
Maliki government, drawing on increasing Sunni resentment of Shiite political domination.
Al Qaeda in Iraq/Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Islamic State
Iraq’s one-time Al Qaeda affiliate constitutes the most violent component of the Sunni rebellion
that has become a major threat to Iraqi stability. Its antecedent called itself Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-
I), which was led by Jordanian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi until his death by U.S. airstrike in
2006.21 In 2013 it adopted the name Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or, alternately,
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). In June 2014, the group changed its name to the Islamic
State (IS), and declared its leader, Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi, as the “Commander of the Faithful”—a
term essentially declaring him leader of all Muslims. It also declared a caliphate in the territory it
controls in Iraq and Syria. AQ-I was an Al Qaeda affiliate, but the Islamic State has publicly
broken with Al Qaeda leaders based in Pakistan.
Baghdadi asserts a vision of an Islamic caliphate spanning the Islamic world. A major question is
whether it has ambitions to attack the U.S. homeland, U.S. facilities or personnel in or outside the
Middle East, or other non-Muslim countries. The Central Intelligence Agency estimates that the
Islamic State can “muster” between 20,000 and 31,500 fighters in both Iraq and Syria.22 In
October 2012, Jordanian authorities disrupted an alleged plot by AQ-I to bomb multiple targets in
Amman, Jordan, possibly including the U.S. Embassy there.
21 An antecedent of AQ-I was named by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in March 2004
and the designation applies to AQ-I and now the Islamic State.
22 “ISIS Can ‘Muster’ Between 20,000 and 31,500 Fighters, CIA Says.” CNN, September 12, 2014.
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Largely dormant during 2009-2012, ISIL-initiated attacks escalated significantly after an assault
on Sunni protesters in the town of Hawija on April 23, 2013. The group increased its violent
activity to about 40 mass casualty attacks per month, far more than the 10 per month of 2010, and
including attacks spanning multiple cities.23 In 2013, the group began asserting control of territory
and operating training camps close to the Syria border.24 The head of the National
Counterterrorism Center, Matt Olsen, told Congress on November 14, 2013, that ISIL was the
strongest it had been since its peak in 2006.25 Its capture of large portions of Iraqi territory since
mid-2014 is discussed below.
Naqshabandi Order (JRTN) and Ex-Saddam Military Commanders
Some insurgent groups are composed of members of the Saddam-era regime or Iraqi military.
These groups include the 1920 Revolution Brigades, the Islamic Army of Iraq, and, most
prominently, the Naqshabandi Order—known by its Arabic acronym “JRTN.”26 The JRTN, based
primarily in Nineveh Province, has been designated by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization (FTO). The groups disagree with the Islamic State’s ideology but apparently support
it as a Sunni organization opposed to the Iraqi government.
In mid-2012, JRTN attacks on U.S. facilities in northern Iraq apparently contributed to the State
Department decision to close the Kirkuk consulate. In February 2013 Sunnis linked to the JRTN
circulated praise for the protests from the highest-ranking Saddam regime figure still at large,
Izzat Ibrahim al Duri. He reportedly issued anti-Iraq government statements during the course of
the 2014 Islamic State offensive. Iraqi officials say they killed Duri during a battle in northern
Iraq in early May 2015, but that claim awaits confirmation.
Some JRTN ex-Saddam military officers operate under a separate structure called the “General
Military Council for Iraqi Revolutionaries,” which includes Sunni tribal fighters and other ex-
insurgent figures. Some of these ex-military officers reportedly are helping the Islamic State by
providing tactical and strategic military planning.
Sunni Tribal Leaders/Sons of Iraq Fighters
Approximately 100,000 Iraqi Sunnis are known as “Sons of Iraq,” also called Awakening, or
“Sahwa” fighters—gunmen who fought the U.S. military during 2003-2006 but then cooperated
with U.S. forces against AQ-I. The Iraqi government had promised all of the Sons of Iraq
integration into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) or government jobs but, by the time of the U.S.
withdrawal in 2011, only about two-thirds of the Sons had received these benefits. The remainder
continued to man checkpoints in Sunni areas and were paid about $500 per month by the
government but were not formally added to security ministry rolls. As a result, some of these
fighters became disillusioned with the Maliki government and some (numbers unknown)
reportedly joined the Islamic State offensives in 2014.
23 Michael Knights. “Rebuilding Iraq’s Counterterrorism Capabilities.” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July
31, 2013.
24 Ben Van Heuvelen. “Al Qaeda-Linked Group Gaining Ground in Iraq.” Washington Post, December 8, 2013.
25 Eileen Sullivan. “Official: Al-Qaida in Iraq Strongest Since 2006.” Associated Press, November 14, 2013.
26 The acronym stands for Jaysh al-Rijal al-Tariq al-Naqshabandi, which translated means Army of the Men of the
Naqshabandi Order.
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Many of the Sons of Iraq belong to the tribes of Anbar Province that seek a more representative
central government in Baghdad but, for the most part, oppose the Islamic State. The tribal leaders
include Ahmad Abu Risha, Ali Hatem Suleiman al-Dulaymi, and Majid al-Ali al-Sulayman al-
Dulaymi. Abu Risha is the brother of the slain tribal leader Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, who, with Ali
Hatem, were key figures in starting the Awakening movement that aligned Sunni insurgents with
the U.S. military. Anbar tribal figures generally oppose the involvement of Shiite militiamen in
Iraqi efforts to recapture Sunni-inhabited territory from the Islamic State, and instead are trying to
recruit Sunni tribal fighters to spearhead government offensives against Islamic State positions.
Some Anbar tribal leaders and other Sunni figures have visited Washington D.C. in the spring of
2015, in part requesting direct transfer of U.S. weaponry to Sunnis who oppose the Islamic State.
Some of the Sons of Iraq and their tribal recruiters support Sunni Islamist organizations, such as
the Muslim Scholars Association (MSA). The MSA is led by Harith al-Dari, who in 2006 fled
U.S. counter-insurgency operations to live in Jordan. Harith al-Dari’s son, Muthana, reportedly is
active against the government. The degree to which supporters of the MSA and the Dari clan are
supporting the Islamic State offensive, if at all, is unclear.
The Sadr Faction and Shiite Militias
The 2006-2008 period of sectarian conflict was fueled in part by Shiite militias, such as those
formed by Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr. Sadr is considered an Iraqi “nationalist,” who did not go
into exile during Saddam’s rule, and his following is particularly strong among lower class
Shiites. Sadr has sometimes tried to reach out to Sunni leaders in an effort to demonstrate
opposition to sectarianism and bolster his nationalist credentials.
Sadr’s professed nationalism in part explains his opposition to the United States for most of the
period of the large U.S. military presence in Iraq. Sadr formed his large Mahdi Army militia in
2004 to combat the U.S. military presence in Iraq, and U.S. troops fought several major battles
with the Mahdi Army and an offshoot, called the “Special Groups,” from 2004 to 2008. Sadr,
through demonstrations and threats of armed action by militias under his control, pressed for the
full U.S. withdrawal at the end of 2011.
Sadr’s campaign meshed with Iran’s policy to ensure that the United States completely withdrew
from Iraq. U.S. officials accused Shiite militias of causing an elevated level of U.S. troop deaths
in June 2011 (14 killed), and Iran of arming these militias with upgraded rocket-propelled
munitions, such as Improvised Rocket Assisted Munitions (IRAMs). The United States pressed
the Iraqi government to insist that Iran to stop aiding the militias but, until the U.S. withdrawal in
December 2011, rocket attacks continued against the U.S. consulate in Basra.
Sadrist and other Shiite Militias/Popular Mobilization Forces
The Sadrist pressure on the United States was amplified by the activities of several other Shiite
militias, some of which left Sadr’s control. These include Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH, League of the
Family of the Righteous), Khata’ib Hezbollah (Hezbollah Battalions), and the Promised Day
Brigade, the latter organization of which still answers to Sadr. In June 2009, Khata’ib Hezbollah
was designated by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). On November 8,
2012, the Treasury Department designated several Khata’ib Hezbollah operatives as terrorism
supporting entities under Executive Order 13224. AAH’s leader, Qais al-Khazali, took refuge in
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Iran in 2010 after three years in U.S. custody for his alleged role in a 2005 raid that killed five
American soldiers.
After the U.S. withdrawal in 2011, most Shiite militia activity subsided. Much of the Mahdi Army
had already been slowly integrating into the political process as a charity and employment
network called Mumahidoon (“those who pave the way”). In 2011, AAH’s leaders, including
Khazali, returned from Iran and opened political offices to recruit loyalists and set up social
service programs. The group did not compete in April 2013 provincial elections, but allied with
Maliki in the 2014 elections (Al Sadiqun, “the Friends,” slate 218).27
One major Shiite militia is not a Sadrist offshoot, and did not conduct attacks against the United
States during 2003-11. The Badr Organization was the armed wing of the Islamic Supreme
Council of Iraq, a mainstream Shiite party, headed now by Ammar al-Hakim. The Badr
Organization largely disarmed after Saddam’s fall and integrated into the political process. Its
leader is Hadi al-Amiri, an elected member of the National Assembly who is viewed as a
hardliner advocating extensive use of the Shiite militias to recapture Sunni-inhabited areas. It has
approximately 30,000 militia fighters.
All the established Shiite militias began to reactivate as unrest in the Sunni areas escalated during
2012-2014, and particularly following the 2014 Islamic State offensive. After the Islamic State
capture of Mosul, the militias mobilized were joined by Shiite “Popular Mobilization Forces”
(PMF) answering Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s call for Shiites to rally to fight the Islamic State.
Former Mahdi Army militiamen reorganized as the “Salaam (Peace) Brigade.” Some Shiite
militia forces returned from Syria, where they were protecting Shiite shrines and conducting other
combat in support of the government of Bashar Al Assad.28
The established militias—the Salaam Brigades, Badr Organization, Khata’ib Hezbollah and
Asa’ib Ahl Al Haq, and the Promised Day Brigades are considered armed and trained by Iran.
According to the State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism for 2014, released on June 19,
2015, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—Qods Force (IRGC-QF) advises, arms, and trains
these militia.29
The Popular Mobilization Forces operate under a variety of names. They are generally
commanded by ISF forces, although some might also supply manpower to the more established
militias. Some Sunni fighters are included in the PMF, for the primary purpose of freeing Sunni
inhabited areas from Islamic State rule. The United States has said as of May 2015 that it would
provide to Shiite militias that are under ISF command.
Current estimates of the total Shiite militiamen available to assist the ISF—including the Sadrist
militia, the Sadrist offshoots, the Badr Organization, and Popular Mobilization Forces operating
under various names—number about 100,000.
Lebanese Hezbollah. Hezbollah has long been involved in assisting Iraq’s Shiite militias, in part
because Hezbollah members speak Arabic, whereas Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard personnel
speak mostly Persian (although many speak Arabic as well). In February 2015, Hezbollah leader
27 Liz Sly. “Iran-Tied Group Is On Rise in Iraq.” Washington Post, February 19, 2013.
28 Abigail Hauslohner. “Iraqi Shiites Take Up the Cudgels for Syrian Government.” Washington Post, May 27, 2013.
29 Department of State. Bureau of Counterterrorism. Country Reports on Terrorism 2014. Released June 19, 2015.
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Hassan Nasrallah publicly acknowledged that Hezbollah had sent personnel to Iraq to help the
ISF and the Shiite militias to combat the Islamic State.
The Kurds and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)30
Since the end of the U.S.-led war to end Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait in early 1991, the United
States has helped ensure Iraqi Kurdish autonomy, while insisting that Iraq’s territorial integrity
not be compromised by an Iraqi Kurdish move toward independence. Iraq’s Kurds have tried to
preserve a “special relationship” with the United States and use it to their advantage. The collapse
of the ISF in northern Iraq enabled the Kurds to seize long-coveted Kirkuk and many of its
oilfields. However, the collapse of Baghdad’s forces also contributed to the advance of the
Islamic State force close to the KRG capital Irbil before U.S. airstrikes beginning on August 8,
2014, drove Islamic State fighters away from KRG-controlled territory.
KRG threats to seek outright independence had been increasing in recent years as the issues
dividing the KRG and Baghdad have expanded. A key issue dividing the KRG and the central
government has been the KRG’s assertion of the right to export oil produced in the KRG region—
which Baghdad strongly opposes. The seizure of Kirkuk gives the Kurds even more control over
economic resources, so much so that in June 2014, Kurdish leaders indicated the region might
hold a referendum on independence within a few months. However, the subsequent Islamic State
threat to KRG-controlled territory muted further public discussion of Iraqi Kurdish independence.
As permitted in the Iraqi constitution, the KRG fields its own force of peshmerga and Zeravani
ground forces, which together number about 150,000 active duty fighters. The KRG has about
350 tanks and 40 helicopter gunships, but has not been eligible to separately purchase additional
U.S. weaponry. The Kurdish militias are under the KRG’s Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs and are
paid out of the KRG budget. Prior to the June 2014 Islamic State offensive, the KRG had made
some headway in its plans to transform the peshmerga into a smaller but more professional and
well trained force, and the peshmerga is benefitting from the U.S. training discussed below.
KRG Structure/Intra-Kurdish Divisions
The Iraqi Kurds’ two main factions—the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and the Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP)—are the dominant factions in the KRG. Barzani, the son of the revered
Kurdish resistance fighter Mullah Mustafa Barzani, is not only President of the KRG but also
head of the KDP. The PUK is led by Jalal Talabani, who served two terms as Iraq’s President and
is ailing following a 2012 stroke. Masoud Barzani is President of the KRG, directly elected in
July 2009. The KRG has an elected Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA, sometimes called the
Kurdistan Parliament of Iraq, or KPI), and an appointed Prime Minister. Since January 2012, the
KRG Prime Minister has been Nechirvan Barzani (Masoud’s nephew), who replaced PUK senior
figure Barham Salih. Masoud Barzani’s son, Suroor, heads KRG security issues. On July 1, 2013,
the KNA voted to extend Barzani’s term two years, until August 19, 2015. There reportedly are
disputes within the KRG over whether to extend his term further or to hold elections for the post
after that date. The KDP, which apparently feels it would win a KRG popular election, is pushing
for an election process to choose a replacement. The PUK and Gorran, which together control
30 For more information on Kurd-Baghdad disputes, see CRS Report RS22079, The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq, by
Kenneth Katzman.
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more seats in the KNA than does the KDP, want the KNA to choose a replacement. In July 2014,
another senior PUK figure, Fouad Masoum, succeeded Talabani as Iraq’s President—continuing
the informal understanding that a PUK figure be Iraq’s President.
The KDP and PUK have sometimes clashed over territorial control and resources, and a serious
armed conflict between them flared in 1996. Since the fall of Saddam, the two parties have
generally abided by a power-sharing arrangement. However, a new faction emerged in 2005 and
has become a significant factor in Kurdish politics—Gorran (Change), a PUK breakaway. It is
headed by Neshirvan Mustafa, a longtime critic of the PUK. Aram al-Sheikh Mohammad, a
Gorran leader, became second deputy COR speaker, becoming the first Gorran leader to obtain a
senior leadership post in the central government.
The latest KNA elections were held on September 21, 2013. About 1,130 candidates registered to
run for the 111 available seats, 11 of which are reserved for minority communities such as
Yazidis, Shabaks, Assyrians, and others. Gorran continued to increase its political strength,
winning 24 seats, second to the KDP’s 38 (which was up from 30 in 2010) and ahead of the PUK
that won only 18 seats (down from 29 in the 2010 election). In part because of Gorran’s increased
representation, the Kurds did not agree on a new government for the KRG region until June 2014.
Nechirvan Barzani remained KRG prime minister. Jalal Talabani’s son, Qubad, who headed the
KRG representative office in Washington, DC, until 2012, became deputy prime minister of the
KRG. Provincial elections in the KRG-controlled provinces were held concurrent with the Iraq-
wide parliamentary elections on April 30, 2014.
KRG-Baghdad Disputes
There has been little progress in permanently resolving the various territorial disputes between
the Kurds and the central government dominated by Iraq’s Arabs. The most emotional of these is
the Kurdish insistence that Tamim/Kirkuk Province (which includes oil-rich Kirkuk city) is
“Kurdish land” and must be formally affiliated to the KRG. Most of the oil in northern Iraq is in
Kirkuk, and legal KRG control over the province would give the KRG substantial economic
leverage. However, the Kirkuk dispute may have been mooted by the Kurds’ seizure of Kirkuk in
the face of the ISF collapse in the Islamic State offensive of June 2014. Many experts assess that
the Kurds will be hesitant to yield back their positions to the central government.
Under the Iraqi constitution, there was to be a census and referendum on the affiliation of the
province by December 31, 2007 (Article 140), but the Kurds agreed to repeated delays in order to
avoid antagonizing Iraq’s Arabs. Nor has the national census that is pivotal to any such
referendum been conducted; it was scheduled for October 24, 2010, but then repeatedly
postponed by the broader political crises. On the other hand, a Property Claims Commission that
is adjudicating claims from the Saddam regime’s forced resettlement of Arabs into the KRG
region is functioning.
KRG Oil Exports
The KRG and Baghdad have been at odds over the Kurds’ insistence on being able to export oil
that is discovered and extracted in the KRG region. Baghdad terms the KRG’s separate oil
exports and energy development deals with international firms “illegal,” insisting that all KRG oil
exports go through the national oil export pipeline grid and that revenues earned under that
arrangement go to the central government. Under an agreement forged shortly after the fall of
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Saddam, a fixed 17% share of those revenues goes to the KRG. The Obama Administration has
generally sided with Baghdad’s position that all Iraqi energy projects and exports be implemented
through a unified central government.
In recent years, KRG oil exports through this system have been repeatedly suspended over KRG-
central government disputes on related issues, such as Baghdad’s arrears due to the international
firms operating Kurdish-controlled oil fields. In January 2014, the Iraqi government suspended
almost all of its payments to the KRG of about $1 billion per month on the grounds that the KRG
was not contributing oil revenue to the national coffers. In what it described as an effort to
compensate for that loss of revenue, the KRG began exporting oil through a newly constructed
pipeline to Turkey that bypasses the Iraqi national grid. The pipeline is capable of carrying
300,000 barrels per day of oil.31 Some shipments were initially not offloaded as a result of an
Iraqi government legal challenge to the KRG right to sell that oil, but eventually international
buyers bought all the exports.32
The need to cooperate against the Islamic State organization apparently paved the way for a
resolution of the oil export dispute. In November 2014, the KRG provided 150,000 barrels of oil
to Iraq’s state marketing organization (SOMO) in exchange for a one-time payment from
Baghdad to the KRG of $500 million. On December 2, the KRG and Baghdad signed a broader
deal under which the KRG would provide to SOMO 550,000 barrels per day of oil (300,000 from
the Kirkuk fields now controlled by the KRG and 250,000 barrels from fields in the KRG itself)
in exchange for a restoration of the 17% share of national revenues (which will amount to about
$600 million per month at current oil prices.)33 In addition, Baghdad will provide the KRG with
approximately $100 million per month to pay for peshmerga salaries and weapons purchases.
Baghdad also agreed to facilitate the transfer of some U.S. weapons to the peshmerga.34 The
agreement is incorporated into the 2015 Iraqi budget, adopted by the COR on January 29, 2015.
The Kurds have complained that Baghdad has been slow to remit promised payments, but press
reports indicate that payments to the KRG are being made under the pact.
KRG fields, excluding those in Kirkuk, have the potential to export 500,000 barrels per day and
are expected to eventually be able to increase exports to 1 million barrels per day.35 It appears that
the KRG would be able to separately export any amounts over the 250,000 barrels per day that
the December deal requires the KRG to transfer to Baghdad’s control. Left unresolved was the
disagreement over separate foreign firm investment deals with the KRG. Baghdad has sought to
deny energy deals with the central government to any company that signs a separate development
deal with the KRG. This dispute has affected such firms as Exxon-Mobil and Total SA of France.
31 Much of the dispute centers on differing interpretations of a 1976 Iraq-Turkey treaty, which was extended in 2010,
and which defines “Iraq” (for purposes of oil issues) as the “Ministry of Oil of the Republic of Iraq.” See “Analysis:
Iraq-Turkey Treaty Restricts Kurdistan Exports.” Iraq Oil Report, April 18, 2014.
32 Michael Knights, “Making the Iraqi Revenue-Generating Deal Work,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
December 3, 2014.
33 Ibid.
34 Tim Arango, “Iraq Government Reaches Accord with the Kurds.” New York Times, December 3, 2014.
35 Jane Arraf, “Iraq’s Unity Tested by Rising Tensions Over Oil-Rich Kurdish Region.” Christian Science Monitor,
May 4, 2012.
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Tier Three Designations of the KDP and PUK
Since 2001, U.S. immigration officials have placed the KDP and PUK in a Tier Three category
that makes it difficult for members of the parties to obtain visas to enter the United States. The
categorization is a determination that the two parties are “groups of concern”—meaning some of
their members committed acts of political violence. The designation was based on the fact that the
Kurdish parties, particularly their peshmerga, had used violence to try to overthrow Saddam. A
provision of the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 3979, P.L. 113-291) gave the
Administration authority, without judicial review, to revoke the Tier 3 designation. The
designated was subsequently removed.
Post-U.S. Withdrawal Political Unraveling
The fragile power-sharing arrangement among all Iraqi factions agreed in 2010 largely unraveled
in 2011-12, casting doubt on President Obama’s assertion, stated at the time of the final U.S.
withdrawal, that Iraq is now “sovereign, stable, and self-reliant.” On December 19, 2011, the day
after the final U.S. withdrawal (December 18, 2011)—and one week after Maliki met with
President Obama in Washington, DC, on December 12, 2011—the government announced an
arrest warrant against Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, a major Sunni figure, for allegedly
ordering his security staff to commit acts of assassination. Hashimi fled to the KRG region and
refused to return to face trial in Baghdad unless his conditions for a fair trial there were met. A
trial in absentia in Baghdad convicted him and sentenced him to death on September 9, 2012, for
the alleged killing of two Iraqis. Hashimi remains in Turkey. Maliki’s opponents also cited his
retaining the three main security portfolios for himself as an indication that he sought to
concentrate power.36
In an effort to try to restore Sunni trust in the Maliki government, U.S. officials intervened with
various political factions and obtained Maliki’s agreement to release some Baathists prisoners and
to give provinces more autonomy (discussed above). The concessions prompted Sunni COR
members and ministers to resume their duties.37 In March 2012, all factions tentatively agreed to
hold a “national conference” to try to reach a durable political solution. However, late that month
KRG President Barzani accused Maliki of a “power grab” and the conference was not held.
Maliki critics subsequently collected signatures from 176 COR deputies to request a no-
confidence vote against Maliki. Under Article 61 of the constitution, signatures of 20% of the 325
COR deputies (65 signatures) are needed to trigger a vote, but then President Talabani stated on
June 10, 2012, that there were an insufficient number of valid signatures to proceed.38
Insurrection Escalates in 2013
The disputes flared again after Talabani suffered a stroke on December 18, 2012, and left Iraq for
treatment in Germany. On December 20, 2012, Maliki moved against another major Sunni figure,
Finance Minister Rafi al-Issawi, by arresting 10 of his bodyguards. Al Issawi took refuge in
36 Sadun Dulaymi, a Sunni Arab, is acting Defense Minister; Falih al-Fayad, a Shiite, is acting Minister of State for
National Security; and Adnan al-Asadi, another Shiite, is acting Interior Minister.
37 Tim Arango. “Iraq’s Prime Minister Gains More Power After Political Crisis.” New York Times, February 28, 2012.
38 “Embattled Iraqi PM Holding On To Power for Now.” Associated Press, June 12, 2012.
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Anbar Province with Sunni tribal leaders, sparking anti-Maliki demonstrations in the Sunni cities
in several provinces and in Sunni districts of Baghdad. Demonstrators demanded the release of
prisoners; repeal of Article 4 antiterrorism laws under which many Sunnis are incarcerated;
reform or end to the de-Baathification laws that has been used against Sunnis; and improved
government services in Sunni areas.39
During January-March 2013, the use of small amounts of force against demonstrators caused the
unrest to worsen. On January 25, 2013, the ISF killed nine protesters on a day when
oppositionists killed two ISF police officers. Sunni demonstrators set up encampments in some
cities. The unrest, coupled with the U.S. departure, provided “political space” for extremist Sunni
elements such as ISIL (now called the Islamic State) to step up attacks on the ISF.
Hawijah Incident. On April 23, 2013, three days after the first group of provinces voted in
provincial elections, the ISF stormed a Sunni protest camp in the town of Hawijah and killed
about 40 civilians. In the following days, many Sunni demonstrators and tribal leaders took up
arms, and some gunmen took over government buildings in the town of Suleiman Pak. U.S.
officials reportedly pressed Maliki not to use the military to suppress Sunni protests but rather to
work with Sunni tribal leaders to appeal for calm. Maliki undertook some conciliatory gestures,
including amending (in June 2013) the 2008 provincial powers law (No. 21, see above) to give
the provinces substantially more authority, such as control over security forces (Article 31-10); to
specify a share of revenue to be given to the provinces; and to mandate that province-based
operations of central government ministries be transferred to the provincial governments.40 In
July 2013, the Cabinet approved a package of reforms easing de-Baathification laws to allow
many former Baathists to serve in government.
April 2013 Provincial Elections Occur Amid the Tensions. The escalating violence only slightly
affected the April 2013 provincial elections. The government postponed the elections in two
Sunni provinces, Anbar and Nineveh, until June 20, 2013, but the election in the remaining
provinces went forward as planned on April 20, 2013. The COR’s law to govern the election for
the 447 provincial council seats (including those in Anbar and Nineveh that voted on June 20,
2013), passed in December 2012, provided for an open list vote. A total of 50 coalitions
registered, including 261 political entities as part of those coalitions or running separately, and
comprising about 8,150 individual candidates.
With the April 20, 2013, vote being held mostly in Shiite areas, the election was largely a test of
Maliki’s popularity. Maliki’s State of Law coalition remained relatively intact, including Fadilah
(virtue) and the ISCI-offshoot the Badr Organization. It won 112 of the 447 seats up for election,
a decrease from 2009. ISCI registered its own Citizen Coalition, which won 75 seats. Sadr
registered a separate Coalition of Liberals and it won 59 seats.
Among the mostly Sunni groupings, Allawi’s Iraqiyya and 18 smaller entities ran as the Iraqi
National United Coalition. A separate United Coalition consisted of supporters of the Nujaifi
brothers (then COR speaker Osama and Nineveh governor Atheel), Vice President Tariq al-
Hashimi, and Rafi al-Issawi. A third Sunni coalition was loyal to Saleh al-Mutlaq. The two main
Kurdish parties ran under the Co-Existence and Fraternity Alliance. The June 20, 2013, election
39 Author conversations with Human Rights Watch researchers, March 2013.
40 Reidar Vissar. “Provincial Powers Revisions, Elections Results for Anbar and Nineveh: Is Iraq Headed for Complete
Disintegration?” June 27, 2013.
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in Anbar and Nineveh was primarily a contest among these blocs. In Anbar, the Nujaifis won a
slight plurality, but in Nineveh, where the Nujaifis previously held an outright majority of
provincial council seats (19 or 37), Kurds won 11 out of the province’s 39 seats and the Nujaifis
came in second with eight seats. However, Atheel Nujaifi was selected to another term as
Nineveh governor. The results suggested to some experts that many Sunnis want to avoid a return
to sectarian conflict.41
Unrest in Sunni areas escalated sharply at the end of 2013, after yet another arrest order by Maliki
against a prominent Sunni leader—parliamentarian Ahmad al-Alwani. The order, which followed
an ISIL attack that killed 17 ISF officers, prompted a gun battle with security forces that killed
Alwani’s brother and several of his bodyguards. Maliki subsequently ordered security forces to
close down a protest tent camp in Ramadi (capital of Anbar Province), prompting ISIL to attack,
and to at least temporarily, take over Ramadi, Fallujah, and some smaller Anbar cities. ISIL
fighters were joined by some Sunni protesters, defectors from the ISF, and some Sons of Iraq and
other tribal fighters.
Partly at the urging of U.S. officials, Maliki opted primarily to arm and fund loyal Sunni tribal
leaders and Sons of Iraq fighters to help them expel the ISIL fighters. By early January 2014,
these loyalists had helped the government regain most of Ramadi, but Fallujah remained in
insurgent hands. In April 2014, ISIL-led insurgents also established a presence in Abu Ghraib,
only about 10 miles from Baghdad, prompting the government to close the prison. Some ISF
officers told journalists that the ISF effort to recapture Fallujah and other opposition-controlled
areas suffered from disorganization and ineffectiveness.42
Islamic State Challenge to Iraq’s Stability
By the time the April 30, 2014, national (COR) elections were held, the ISIL-led insurrection in
Anbar appeared contained. That assessment was upended on June 10, 2014, when Islamic State
fighters—apparently assisted by large numbers of its fighters moving into Iraq from the Syria
theater—captured the large city of Mosul amid mass surrenders and desertions by the ISF. The
group later that month formally changed its name to “The Islamic State.” Apparently supported
by many Iraqi Sunni residents, Islamic State-led fighters subsequently advanced down the Tigris
River valley as far as Tikrit as well as east into Diyala Province. The offensive captured the
Mosul Dam and enabled Islamic State fighters to loot banks, free prisoners, and capture U.S.-
supplied military equipment such as Humvees, tanks, and armored personnel carriers. From
positions around Abu Ghraib, IS-led forces moved to within striking distance of Baghdad
International Airport, which is southwest of the city. The Islamic State, along with its partners,
also expanded previous gains in Anbar Province, including encroaching on the Haditha Dam.
By the end of June, Shiite militias had mobilized in large numbers to assist the ISF and the
remaining ISF regrouped to some extent. These developments, coupled with the fact that Islamic
State fighters faced resistance from any location not dominated by Sunni inhabitants, appeared to
lessen the threat to Baghdad itself. The defense of Baghdad was aided by U.S. advisers (discussed
below), as well as by Iran’s sending of military equipment as well as Islamic Revolutionary
41 Kirk Sowell. “Sunni Voters and Iraq’s Provincial Elections.” July 12, 2013.
42 Loveday Morris. “Iraqi Army Struggles in Battles Against Islamist Fighters in Anbar Province.” Washington Post,
February 27, 2014.
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Guard-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) units into Iraq. The ISF was able to prevent IS-led forces from
capturing the Baiji refinery, which produces about one-third of Iraq’s gasoline supplies.
The KRG came under major threat by August 2014 when IS-led forces advanced into territory
controlled by the peshmerga. The relatively lightly armed Kurdish forces withdrew under
pressure from numerous towns (Sinjar, Zumar, Wana, and Qaraqosh) inhabited mostly by
Christians and other Iraqi minorities, particularly the Yazidis—a Kurdish-speaking people who
practice a mix of ancient religions, including Zorastrianism, which held sway in Iran before the
advent of Islam.43 Fearing IS threats to execute them if they refused its demands that they convert
to Islam, about 35,000-50,000 Yazidis fled to Sinjar Mountain, where they were surrounded by
Islamic State forces. By August 8, 2014, IS-led fighters had advanced to within about 30 miles of
the KRG capital of Irbil, causing substantial panic among Iraq’s Kurds, who had long thought the
KRG region secure, and causing U.S. concern about the security of U.S. diplomatic and military
personnel there. The threat to the KRG and the humanitarian crisis prompted U.S. military action
that is discussed in greater detail below.
Government Formation Process Amidst Security Collapse
U.S. officials considered the outcome of the April 30, 2014, national elections as crucial to
reversing Islamic State gains by giving Sunni voters an opportunity to signal a rejection of Sunni
extremist violence. An election law to regulate the vote, passed on November 4, 2013, expanded
the COR to 328 seats (from 325). A total of 39 coalitions, comprising 275 political entities
(parties), registered. The campaign period nationwide began on April 1. Turnout on election day
was about 62%, about the same level as in the 2010 COR elections, and violence was
unexpectedly minimal. Elections for 89 total seats on the provincial councils in the three KRG
provinces were held simultaneously.
Maliki appeared positioned to secure a third term because his State of Law bloc had remained
relatively intact, whereas rival blocs had fractured. On June 17, 2014, the Independent Higher
Election Commission (IHEC) announced certified election results showing Maliki’s State of Law
winning 92 seats—three more than it won in 2010 and far more than those won by ISCI (29) or
the Sadrists (32). Major Sunni slates won a combined 53 seats—far fewer than the 91 seats they
won in 2010 as part of the Iraqiyya bloc.44 The Kurdish slates collectively won about 62 seats.
Maliki’s individual candidate vote reportedly was exceptionally strong, most notably in Baghdad
Province, which sends 69 deputies to the COR—results that had appeared to put Maliki in a
commanding position to retain his post.
Maliki’s route to a third term was upended by the June 2014 IS-led offensive. U.S. officials
largely blamed the offensive’s success on Maliki’s efforts to marginalize Sunni leaders and
citizens. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani appeared to undermine Maliki by calling for an inclusive
government that “avoids mistakes of the past.” The factions ultimately agreed to start filling some
key positions before reaching consensus on a Prime Minister. The process unfolded as follows:
• On July 15, the COR named Salim al-Jabburi, a moderate Sunni Islamist (IIP), as
speaker. The two deputy speakers selected were Aram al-Sheikh Mohammad of
43 Ishaan Tharoor. “Who Are the Yazidis?” Washington Post, August 7, 2014.
44 “Iraq: PM’s Group Is Biggest Election Winner.” Associated Press, May 19, 2014.
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the Kurdish Gorran party and Haydar al-Abbadi of Maliki’s Shiite Da’wa Party.
Jabburi is about 44 years old and worked as a law professor at the University of
Mesopotamia. He visited the United States in early June 2015.
• On July 24, the COR selected a senior PUK leader, Fouad Masoum, as Iraq’s
President. No deputy presidential slots were selected. Masoum is about 76 years
old and helped draft Iraq’s constitution. He is a close ally of Jalal Talabani.
• On August 11, Masoum tapped deputy COR speaker Abbadi as leader of the
“largest bloc” in the COR as Prime Minister-designate, giving him a 30-day
period specified by the constitution (until September 10) to achieve COR
confirmation of a government. Abbadi’s designation came after several senior
figures in the State of Law bloc abandoned Maliki—apparently bowing to
pressure from the United States, Iran, Iraq’s Sunnis and Kurds, and others. Maliki
initially called the designation “illegal” on the grounds that Masoum was
required to tap him first as Prime Minister-designate as leader of the largest bloc
elected, but U.S. officials and Iranian officials welcomed the Abbadi designation
and Maliki’s support collapsed.
The Cabinet. Abbadi obtained COR confirmation of a new government on September 8, two days
ahead of the constitutional deadline. The Cabinet appeared to satisfy U.S. and Iraqi factional
demands for inclusiveness of the Sunni Arabs and the Kurds. Factional disputes caused Abbadi to
avoid naming choices for the key security posts of Defense and Interior ministers, and agreement
on the two posts was not achieved until October 23, when the COR confirmed Mohammad Salem
al-Ghabban as Interior Minister and Khalid al-Ubaydi as Defense Minister. The selection of
Ghabban drew criticism from many Sunni figures because he is a leader of the Badr Organization,
the political arm of the Shiite militia of the same name. Badr is headed by Hadi Al-Amiri, who
many Shiites were suggesting be named Interior Minister, but who was strongly opposed by
Sunnis because of the militia’s abuses of Sunnis during the sectarian conflict of 2006-2008.
Ubaydi, a Sunni, was an aircraft engineer during the rule of Saddam Hussein, and became a
university professor after Saddam’s downfall.
A major feature of the Abbadi government is that it incorporates many senior faction leaders,
although some posts lack significant authority. Among the major government posts are:
• Maliki, Iyad al-Allawi, and Osama al-Nujaifi, all major faction leaders, became
Vice Presidents—a position that lacks authority but ensured that their views are
heard in government deliberations. Maliki reportedly has used his vice
presidential post to exert authority independently, perhaps to the detriment of
Abbadi’s authority, by holding meetings of the State of Law political bloc.
• Ex-Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari, a KDP leader whom Maliki ousted in mid-
2014 over a KRG-Baghdad rift, became deputy prime minister and Finance
Minister. The two other deputy prime ministers are Saleh al-Mutlaq (Sunni Arab,
discussed above) and Baha al-Araji, who heads the Sadrist bloc in the COR.
• Ibrahim al-Jafari, who served as transitional Prime Minister in 2005 and part of
2006, is Foreign Minister.
• A senior leader of ISCI, Adel Abdul Mahdi, is Minister of Oil.
• Hussein Shahristani, a senior member of Maliki’s State of Law bloc, is Minister
of Higher Education.
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Table 2. Major Coalitions in April 30, 2014, COR Elections
Coalition
Leaders and Components
Seats Won
State of Law (277)
Maliki and Da’wa Party; deputy P.M.
92-95
Shahristani; Badr Organization
Muwatin (Citizens Coalition) (273)
ISCI list. Includes former Interior
29
Minister Bayan Jabr Solagh; Ahmad
Chalabi; many Basra politicians
Al Ahrar (Liberals) (214)
Sadrists. Allied with ISCI in 2010 but
32
separate in 2014.
Wataniya (Nationalists) (239)
Iyad al-Al awi (ran in Baghdad),
21
Includes Allawi followers from
former Iraqiyya bloc
Mutahiddun (United Ones) (259)
COR Speaker Nujaifi (ran in
23
Nineveh). No candidates in Shiite-
dominated provinces. Was part of
Al awi Iraqiyya bloc in 2010.
Arabiyya (Arabs) (255)
Deputy P.M. Saleh al-Mutlaq (ran in
9
Baghdad) Also limited to mostly
Sunni provinces. Was part of Iraqiyya
bloc in 2010.
Kurdish parties
KDP, PUK, and Gorran ran
62 (combined)
separately in most constituencies.
Fadilah (219)
Shi te faction, was allied with ISCI in
Not available
2010 election but ran separately in
2014.
Da’wa (Jaafari) (205)
Da’wa faction of former P.M. Ibrahim
Not available
al-Jafari (who ran in Karbala). Was
allied with ISCI in 2010.
Source: Reidar Vissar, “Iraq and Gulf Analysis.”
Abbadi’s Governing Style and Policies
U.S. officials say that Abbadi is adopting policies intended to win back Sunni support, such as
ordering the ISF to cease shelling Sunni-inhabited areas that are under the control of Islamic State
forces and abolishing the “Office of the Commander-in-Chief.” In November 2014, he replaced
36 Iraqi Army commanders and 24 Interior Ministry officials. Abbadi has also sought to publicly
disclose significant instances of corruption; he announced in November 2014 that 50,000 ISF
personnel on the payrolls were not actually performing military service.
In an attempt to alter Sunni opinion, Abbadi has also announced that a “National Guard” force
would be established in which locally recruited fighters, reporting to provincial governments, to
protect their home provinces from the Islamic State. The program appears mostly intended to
blunt Islamic State influence from Sunni-inhabited areas, and appears as an attempt to revive the
concept of the earlier U.S.-led “Awakening”/Sons of Iraq program. The announced program
received Cabinet approval in February 2015 but has stalled in the COR, where the dominant
Shiite factions apparently do not want to arm Sunni fighters extensively. The program is planned
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to also apply to Shiite militias who want to secure Shiite areas.45 In February 2015, the Cabinet
approved an amendment to the “de-Baathification” laws (see above) to further re-integrate former
members of Saddam’s Baath Party into the political process and presumably reduce Sunni
resentment of the government. However, that effort, including an effort to offer amnesty to those
who served in the Saddam Hussein regime, has also been stalled by the COR and by objections
raised by Iraqi courts to whom the issue has been referred. In February 2015, Abbadi lifted the
long-standing Baghdad curfew as part of an effort to reduce the sense of Islamic State siege on
the government.
As a result of Abbadi’s efforts to promote inclusiveness, President Obama praised Abbadi in the
course of their bilateral meeting at the White House on April 14, 2015, saying:
And in a significant change from some past practices, I think both Sunni leaders and Kurdish
leaders feel that they are heard in the halls of power, that they are participating in governance
in Baghdad ... Prime Minister Abbadi has kept true to his commitments to reach out to them
and to respond to their concerns and to make sure that power is not solely concentrated
within Baghdad.... 46
On the other hand, continued Sunni mistrust of Baghdad appears to be slowing any broad Sunni
shift to cooperate with the government against the Islamic State. Abbadi’s visits to Iran (October
2014 and June 2015) continue to fuel Sunni suspicions that Abbadi is susceptible to arguments
from some Iranian leaders not to compromise with Sunni factions. The Iraqi decision in late
March 2015 to move forward with an attempt to take back the city of Tikrit with Shiite militia and
Iranian advisory help—rather than the assistance of the U.S.-led coalition—caused many experts
to assess that Abbadi remains dependent politically and militarily on the Shiite militias. Abbadi
addressed this perception in an April 3, 2015, interview in the German newspaper Spiegel by
indicating that “[the militias] are very powerful because they are ideologically motivated.
Honestly, it would be a challenge to deal with this.47
Abbadi’s attempts to address Sunni demands have also caused agitation among his core Shiite
base. Some observers report that former Prime Minister Maliki continues to seek to exert his
influence by holding meetings of the State of Law parliamentary bloc, by working with harder
line Shiite figures to undermine Abbadi, and by cultivating an image of personal affinity for and
control over Popular Mobilization Shiite militia forces that are helping counter the Islamic State
challenge. Some observers indicate that Maliki might be plotting to try to return to the prime
ministership by undermining Abbadi. These political forces benefitted—and Abbadi suffered—
from the inability of the U.S.-led coalition to prevent the Islamic State’s takeover of Ramadi in
May 2015. Activists in Basra Province, through which the majority of Iraq’s oil is exported, are
attempting to revive a 2008 effort to convert the province into an autonomous region similar to
the KRG. Those supporting forming a region assert that the province does not receive a fair share
of national revenues.
45 Loveday Morris. “Iraq’s Plans for Force to Fight Islamic State Meet Distrust.” Washington Post, September 14,
2014.
46 White House. “President Obama Holds a Media Availability with Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi. April 14,
2015.
47 Susanne Koelbl, “Interview with Iraqi Prime Minister Al-Abadi: ‘The Liberation of Tikrit Is Very Encouraging,’”
Spiegel (Hamburg), April 3, 2015.
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Prime Minister Haydar al-Abbadi
Abbadi is about 62 years old and holds a doctorate in engineering from the University of Manchester. He is from a
traditional elite family. He is a longtime Da’wa Party member but his exile during the Saddam Hussein regime was
spent mostly in London, and not in Iran or Syria. He is fluent in English language and often speaks in English in press
conferences in Western countries.
During his time as a Da’wa underground activist, he assisted the party by writing tracts and promoting its message,
and he apparently was not involved in planning or executing any of the attacks carried out by the Da’wa Party in Iraq
or Kuwait during the 1980s.48 His familiarity with Western culture and his lack of ties to senior Iranian leaders
apparently contributed to Iran’s initial reluctance to support him for the prime ministership. However, Abbadi
reportedly attracted strong support from Ayatol ah Ali al-Sistani and within Da’wa ranks, and Iran acquiesced to his
selection.
U.S. Policy Response to the Islamic State in Iraq49
The gains by the Islamic State in Iraq since June 2014 have caused the Obama Administration to
resume an active military role in Iraq, pursuant to a strategy to degrade and ultimately defeat the
Islamic State articulated by President Obama on September 10, 2014. However, there is debate
over whether the policy is succeeding in Iraq, and over potential new policy directions.
As the seriousness of the ISIL challenge became evident in late 2013, the United States increased
its efforts to assist the Iraqi government militarily. From late 2013 until the ISIL capture of Mosul
in June 2014, the United States took the following actions:
• Delivered and sold additional weaponry. The Defense Department supplied Iraq
with several hundred HELLFIRE air-to-surface missiles for use against ISIL
training camps.50 The Administration also obtained the concurrence of Congress
to release for sale and lease of the 30 Apache attack helicopters discussed
above.51 In May 2014, DSCA notified Congress of potential sales to Iraq of up to
200 Humvee armored vehicles, up to 24 propeller-driven AT-6C Texan II military
aircraft, and related equipment with a total estimated value of about $1 billion.52
• Sales of Drones. The United States sold Iraq several unmanned aerial vehicles to
perform surveillance of Islamic State camps in western Anbar Province. In early
2014, the United States provided 10 Scaneagle aerial vehicles.53
48 Adam Taylor. “Meet Haider al-Abadi, the Man Named Iraq’s New Prime Minister.” Washingtonpost.com, August
11, 2014.
49 For a comprehensive analysis of U.S. policy against the Islamic State in both Iraq and Syria, see CRS Report
R43612, The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard et al.
50 http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140106/DEFREG02/301060019/US-Speeds-Up-Drone-Missile-Deliveries-
Aid-Iraq.
51 Josh Rogin. “Congress to Iraq’s Maliki: No Arms for a Civil War.” Daily Beast, January 8, 2014.
52 DSCA notifications to Congress: Transmittal Nos. 13-79; 14-04; and 14-03. May 13, 2014.
53 “US Speeds Up Drone Missile Deliveries to Aid Iraq.” Defense News, January 6, 2014.
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140106/DEFREG02/301060019/US-Speeds-Up-Drone-Missile-Deliveries-Aid-
Iraq.
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• Additional Training. The Department of Defense increased bilateral and regional
training opportunities for Iraqi counterterrorism (CTS) units to help burnish ISF
counter-insurgency skills. By June 2014, U.S. Special Operations Forces had
conducted two sessions of training for Iraqi CT forces in Jordan.54
U.S. Military Involvement Since Mid-2014
After the Islamic State’s capture of Mosul in June 2014—and particularly after the August 2014
move by the group toward Irbil and its beheadings of two captured U.S. citizens—the U.S.
response broadened significantly. President Obama presented a multifaceted strategy to defeat the
Islamic State in a speech on September 10, 2014—after Abbadi’s accession and the formation of
the relatively inclusive government met U.S. conditions for additional assistance against the
Islamic State. The operation to defeat the Islamic State, termed “Operation Inherent Resolve,” is
run by U.S. Central Command and commanded by Lieutenant General James Terry, who leads
Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve. His headquarters is based in the Camp
Arijan facility in Kuwait that is used by the U.S. military under a bilateral accord with Kuwait.
Advice and Training
President Obama has deployed 3,100 U.S. military personnel to train and advise the ISF,
peshmerga forces, and Sunni tribal fighters; gather intelligence on the Islamic State; and protect
U.S. facilities and personnel. Of these personnel, 1,500 deployed subsequent to congressional
approval of a requested $1.6 billion in train and equip funds, to “expand our advise and assist
mission and initiate a comprehensive training effort for Iraqi forces.”55 Those funds were
authorized and appropriated by P.L. 113-291 and the FY2015 appropriations act (P.L. 113-235).
About 820 of the U.S. personnel are securing the U.S. Embassy and other U.S. facilities in
Baghdad and Irbil.
The mission of the U.S. force includes advising the ISF and peshmerga at the brigade level,
working out of two “Joint Operations Centers” (one with the ISF in Baghdad and one with the
peshmerga in Irbil). About 1,000 personnel of the U.S. force are training nine ISF brigades (about
20,000 troops) and three peshmerga brigades (about 5,000 forces). Training sites in Baghdad (two
sites), Irbil (for the peshmerga), Taji (north of Baghdad), Al Asad (in Anbar Province), and
Besmaya, south of Baghdad, reportedly were all established as of the end of February 2015 and
are currently staffed. The site at Al Asad hosts about 300 U.S. military personnel and has been
under some threat from Islamic State fire. The U.S. trainers are being joined by about 1,500
trainers from coalition partner countries including the U.K., Norway, Australia, New Zealand,
Italy, Germany, and Spain.56 The mission has trained about 9,000 ISF personnel as of late May
2015, according to press accounts, although Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter testified on June
16, 2015 that this effort will fall far short of the 24,000 that were to be trained by the fall of 2015,
in large part because Iraq has not furnished the requisite number of recruits.
54 Missy Ryan. “U.S. Renews Training of Elite Forces in Jordan.” Reuters, May 7, 2014.
55 Statement by Rear Admiral John Kirby on the Authorization to Deploy Additional Forces to Iraq, Release No: NR-
562-14, November 7, 2014.
56 Comments by Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Martin Dempsey. CNN, April 16, 2015.
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On June 10, 2015, after the fall of the city of Ramadi to Islamic State forces in May 2015, the
Administration announced that an additional 450 military personnel would deploy to Taqaddum
air base that is located near Ramadi, in large part to work with Sunni fighters who want to expel
the Islamic State from Anbar Province and other Sunni-inhabited areas. These fighters are
considered a key component of the effort because Sunni tribal fighters are supported by many
Sunni inhabitants now living under Islamic State rule.
Air Strikes
Since August 8, 2014, U.S. military action in Iraq has included airstrikes on Islamic State
positions and infrastructure. U.S. air assets also have dropped humanitarian aid to vulnerable
minorities affected by Islamic State gains. Other countries conducting air strikes in Iraq include
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and Britain. One Arab country,
Jordan, is conducting air strikes in Iraq as well, although the bulk of Jordan’s air activity is
against Islamic State forces in Syria. The U.S. mission, as currently constituted, has not included
a component that some advocate—the deployment of U.S. “forward air controllers”—spotters at
or close to the front line that would guide air strikes.
Weapons Resupply
Since mid-2014, the United States reportedly has sold Iraq at least 5,000 HELLFIRE missiles.
The F-16s and Apaches previously purchased (see above) are in the process of delivery, but the F-
16s are being delivered to Iraqi control, and training for the Iraq pilots is being provided, in the
United States (Arizona) because the key airbase at Balad is surrounded by the Islamic State. In
December 2014, the Defense Department notified to Congress potential sales to Iraq that may be
worth nearly $3 billion for 1,000 M1151AI Up-Armored High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled
Vehicles (HMMWVs) and 175 M1A1 tanks with spare parts, communications, and ammunition.
The tank sale would more than replace the tanks the ISF lost during the ISF offensive in June
2014; the ISF reportedly lost as much as half of the 140 tanks it had received from the United
States as of 2012. During his mid-April 2015 visit to Washington, DC, Prime Minister Abbadi
denied asking for additional U.S. weaponry, and no new U.S. sales were announced, but he says
he requested that delivery of purchased new weaponry be completed expeditiously. In late May
2015, after the fall of Ramadi, the United States announced it would expedite delivery of 2,000
shoulder-held anti-armor rocket launchers.
In addition to support for the ISF, the Administration also reportedly has supplied mostly lighter
weaponry and ammunition directly to the security forces (peshmerga) of the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG), through the Central Intelligence Agency.57 The Administration also has, with
Iraqi government concurrence, delivered some of the ISF’s weaponry stockpiles to the
peshmerga. A number of European countries, such as the U.K, Germany, and France, also have
been supplying weaponry to the peshmerga.
However, the Administration has been unable to date to provide U.S. weapons to the KRG or
Sunni tribal fighters, and KRG President Masoud Barzani’s visit to Washington, DC, in early May
57 That channel is a means of adapting to U.S. law and policy that requires all U.S. foreign military sales (FMS, run by
the Defense Department) to be provided to a country’s central government, and not to subnational forces. Craig
Whitlock and Greg Jaffe, “U.S. Directly Arms Kurdish Forces,” Washington Post, August 12, 2014.
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2015 focused heavily on the KRG request for an independent and direct supply of U.S. weapons.
Such direct supply would, according to the KRG, be commensurate with the leading role of the
peshmerga in pushing back Islamic State forces in the north. Under the Arms Export Control Act,
all U.S. foreign military sales (FMS) go to central governments, not sub-national forces. A
provision of the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 3979, P.L. 113-291) permits
direct U.S. provision of U.S. arms to the peshmerga for the limited purpose of training three
peshmerga brigades. A provision of the House-passed version of the FY2016 National Defense
Authorization Act (H.R. 1735) would provide broader authority for the President to directly arm
the peshmerga as well as Sunni tribal security forces “with a national security mission;” and the
yet-to-be-formed “Iraqi Sunni National Guard.”
Funding Issues
The Administration requested authority and $1.618 billion in FY2015 Overseas Contingency
Operation funding for an “Iraq Train and Equip Fund” to support the expanded training mission—
part of a broader $5.6 billion request for the anti-IS mission for FY2015.58 As noted above, the
funds were authorized and appropriated at the end of the 113th Congress. Of that $1.6 billion in
train-and-equip funding, the Administration plans to use $1.23 billion for the ISF; $354 million
for the peshmerga; and $24 million for the Sunni tribal fighters. The Administration funding
request stipulated that 40% of the requested U.S. train-and-equip funds would not be eligible to
be expended unless foreign contributions equal to 40% of the $1.618 billion are contributed (of
which half that contributed amount would come from the Iraqi government). P.L. 113-291
includes this cost-sharing provision, but would also limit the availability of funds for newly
authorized Iraq training program to 25% until the Administration submits required program and
strategy reports to Congress. That law also requires 90-day progress reporting. For FY2016, the
Administration has requested $715 million in train and equip funds for Iraq, for the same uses,
supplemented by a request for $250 million in foreign military financing for FY2016.
Results of the Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq and Way Forward
U.S. officials have asserted that Operation Inherent Resolve has, to date, halted IS fighters’
momentum, severely reduced their weapons arsenal and infrastructure, and placed them in a
largely defensive posture.59 The Department of Defense stated in March 2015 that Iraqi forces—
ISF, peshmerga, Shiite militia forces, and some Sunni tribal forces—have thus far recaptured
about 30% of the territory taken by the Islamic State. In April 2015, the key Sunni-inhabited town
of Tikrit in Salah ad-Din Province.60
The relatively optimistic U.S. assessments were dampened by the Islamic State capture of the city
of Ramadi, capital of the key Anbar Province, in late May 2015. The capture was significant to
the extent that it again called into question the commitment of the ISF to the battle; Secretary of
Defense Ashton Carter stated on May 24, 2015, that the ISF showed no “will to fight” in
58 Office of Management and Budget, memorandum from Shaun Donovan, Director of OMB, November 10, 2014,
p. 12.
59 CENTCOM Background Briefing, February 19, 2015.
60 Paul McLeary. “1,000 82nd Airborne Troops Iraq-Bound in January.” Defense News, December 19, 2014;
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/01/26/Iraq-forces-liberate-Diyala-province-from-ISIS-officer-
.html.
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abandoning their positions there even though they significantly outnumbered the Islamic State
attacking force.
The fall of Ramadi raised questions about the efficacy of U.S. strategy. Some interpreted that
battle as evidence that there has not been a noticeable major shift of Sunnis to support of the Iraqi
government. Others attributed the defeat to U.S. insistence on supporting only the ISF, and not
Shiite militia/Popular Mobilization Forces that now comprise a large part of Iraq’s overall combat
capability against the Islamic State. Some Iraqi commentators suggested that the loss was caused
by insufficient supplies of U.S. weapons and an airstrike strategy that insists on minimizing any
incidental civilian casualties. Some U.S. military officials asserted that the ISF’s poor command
and control structure contributed to the loss of Ramadi. Some experts said the significance of the
Ramadi loss has been overstated and does not affect the trajectory of the conflict.61
Potential Strategy or Tactics Changes?
Prior to the Islamic State capture of Ramadi, U.S. officials and outside experts had publicly
speculated about next steps in the Iraq campaign, based on an assumption that existing strategy
and resource levels would eventually defeat the Islamic State in Iraq. There had been a debate
over whether Iraq and the coalition should focus on liberating Mosul, or instead on expelling the
Islamic State from Anbar Province. The fall of Ramadi prompted speculation that, to accomplish
the stated objective of defeating the Islamic State, U.S. strategy and resource levels might change.
However, White House spokesman Josh Earnest indicated following a May 19, 2015, meeting of
the U.S. national security leadership team that U.S. strategy would not change.62 The following
are options being recommended by experts and some Members of Congress:
Deploy Ground Combat Units. Some recommend that the need to defeat the Islamic State is
sufficiently critical to merit reintroduction of ground combat troops to Iraq. President Obama has
repeatedly ruled out the deployment of ground combat units, maintaining that U.S. troops will not
fix the underlying political problems that facilitated or caused the IS-led insurrection.
Move U.S. Advisers Closer to the Frontline. Outgoing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Martin Dempsey acknowledged in November 2014 that as the campaign requires more complex
operations by Iraqi Security Forces, he might recommend that U.S. advisers accompany Iraqi
forces. After the fall of Ramadi, Administration officials stated that they had not adopted this
option, but the deployment of an additional 450 trainers to Taqaddum, announced on June 10,
2015, suggests possible movement toward this option. The trainers are to work with anti-Islamic
State Sunni forces at a base close enough to Ramadi to potentially position the Sunnis to
recapture that city. Subsequently, statements by Secretary Carter, Chairman Dempsey, and other
U.S. officials indicated the United States might deploy additional U.S. personnel to other bases in
Iraq to develop a network of locations close to areas where Iraqi forces might undertake new
operations against the Islamic State. Some experts refer to this as a “lilypad” strategy.
61 Ahmed Ali. “Calm Down. ISIS Isn’t Winning.” New York Times, May 22, 2015.
62 White House Office of the Press Secretary. Press Briefing by Josh Earnest. May 19, 2015.
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Emplace Airstrike Targeters Closer to Front Lines.63 A related recommendation some military
experts make is to position U.S. military personnel as “forward air controllers” to be able to better
target Islamic State forces. The option has not been adopted, to date.
Arm and Train Sunni Tribal Fighters. Some suggest that the key to defeating the Islamic State is
to use many of the same Sunni tribal fighters that helped U.S. forces defeat Al Qaeda in Iraq
during 2006-2011. Those who advocate this option assert that it is an extension of existing U.S.
efforts to persuade Iraq’s Shiite leadership to devolve power to Sunni areas and to undertake
additional steps to win Sunni loyalties. The deployment of the additional 450 military personnel
to Taqaddum air base, discussed above, suggests adoption of this option, at least to some extent.
Support Shiite Militia Forces. Another option proposed by some Iraqi officials and outside
experts would be to drop U.S. objections to supporting with airstrikes operations by Shiite militia
and Popular Mobilization Forces. Suggesting some Administration attraction to forms of this
option, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Stuart Jones reportedly told some Iraqi Sunni figures that the
United States would conduct airstrikes in support of Shiite militia forces that are under Iraq
command, but not those under the command of Iranian advisers.64
Strategy Change: Containment of the Islamic State. Some experts assert that the existing or likely
level of U.S. resources devoted to the anti-Islamic State mission in Iraq is unlikely to defeat the
Islamic State, given the dynamics in Iraq that are driving its successes. Some who agree with that
assessment argue that the U.S. goal should be adjusted to containing the Islamic State—for
example by using U.S. direct military action primarily to prevent the Islamic State from seizing
Baghdad or areas controlled by the Kurds or other minority communities, or attacking countries
bordering Iraq. A component of a containment strategy would be to try to prevent Islamic State
fighters from transiting from the Iraq (or Syria) battlefields to Europe, the United States, or
elsewhere for the purpose of conducting terrorist attacks. The containment policy, according to
advocates of this approach, would provide time for Iraqi politicians to take the steps required to
defeat the organization long term.65
Strategy Change: Support “Federalism” or “Soft-Partition” of Iraq. An option related to
“containment” would be to support a de facto partition, or “soft-partition” of Iraq by supporting
the concept of “federalism.” This option would envision accepting Iraq’s decentralization along
ethnic and sectarian lines, potentially including the formation of legal Sunni autonomous “region”
similar to the Kurdistan Regional Government already formed by Iraq’s Kurds. This option could
conceivably entail a de facto acceptance of a role for—or domination by—the Islamic State in the
Sunni areas. Many experts and U.S. officials might oppose this option as an abandonment of the
goal of defeating the Islamic State, perhaps based on an uncertain hope that moderate Sunni
forces living under Islamic State control might be able to moderate the group’s ideology and
goals over time.
63 Gen. Dempsey told the House Armed Services Committee on November 13, “I'm not predicting, at this point, that I
would recommend that those [Iraqi] forces in Mosul and along the border would need to be accompanied by U.S.
forces, but we're certainly considering it.”
64 Tim Arango. “Key Iraqi City Falls to ISIS as Last of Security Forces Flee.” New York Times, May 17, 2015.
65 http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-best-strategy-handle-isis-good-old-containment-11341
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Economic Resources and Human Rights Issues
Iraq has not developed well-established institutions and rule of law, perhaps in part because of the
state of nearly nonstop internal conflict in Iraq since 2003. However, the success of Iraq’s energy
sector has enabled Iraq’s economy to continue to develop despite the setbacks on governance and
human rights.
Economic Development and the Energy Sector
The growth of oil exports has fueled rapid expansion of the economy. Iraqi officials estimated
that growth was about 9% for 2013, and averaged 5% growth per year during 2004-2014. The
more stable areas of Iraq, such as the Shiite south, have experienced an economic boom as they
accommodate increasing numbers of Shiite pilgrims to Najaf and Karbala. GDP reached about
$150 billion by the end of 2013. However, violence slowed Iraq’s economy dramatically in 2014
to zero growth or perhaps even slight contraction. Iraq implemented a $150 billion budget for
2014, but, addressing falling oil prices, on January 29, 2015, the COR adopted a much smaller
$105 billion budget for 2015.
During Prime Minister Abbadi’s visit to Washington, DC in mid-April, Iraqi officials estimated
that they face a $22 billion budget deficit for 2015 and the visit includes talks with the IMF and
major multi-national banks to discuss possible bond issues and loans. In his meeting with Abbadi
on April 14, 2015, President Obama did not announce any additional major economic aid to Iraq
but he did announce a new grant of $200 million in humanitarian aid to help the Iraqi government
cope with the financial burden of assisting persons displaced by the Islamic State’s offensives.
Iraq also sought $500 million in short-term funding from the Export-Import Bank to purchase
Boeing commercial aircraft for a reviving Iraqi Airways, but such a benefit was not announced in
the official documents resulting from the Abbadi visit.
Iraq’s economy remains dependent on the energy sector, which provides 90% of Iraq’s budget.
Iraq possesses a proven 143 billion barrels of oil. After long remaining below the levels achieved
prior to the ouster of Saddam Hussein, Iraq’s oil exports recovered to Saddam-era levels of about
2.1 million barrels per day by March 2012. Production reached the milestone 3 million barrels per
day mark in February 2012, and expanded further to about 3.6 million barrels per day as of mid-
2014. The Islamic State offensive interrupted export of Iraqi oil through the northern route (25%
of total exports), but exports from the south of the country (75% of Iraq’s totals) have been
unaffected. The group also captured some small oil fields from which the Islamic State reportedly
produces about 20,000-30,000 barrels per day of crude oil. The loss of revenue from the northern
route apparently contributed to the KRG-Baghdad oil sales deal for 2015, discussed above.
Iraqi leaders say they plan to increase production to over 10 million barrels per day by 2017. The
International Energy Agency estimates more modest but still significant gains: it sees Iraq
reaching 6 mbd of production by 2020 if it attracts $25 billion in investment per year, and
potentially 8 mbd by 2035. What is helping the Iraqi production is the involvement of foreign
firms, including BP, Exxon-Mobil, Occidental, and Chinese firms. China now buys about half of
Iraq’s oil exports. Reaching the production goals is likely predicated on the defeat of the Islamic
State organization.
Adopting national oil laws has been considered key to developing and establishing rule of law
and transparency in a key sector. Substantial progress appeared near in August 2011 when both
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the COR and the Cabinet drafted the oil laws long in the works to rationalize the energy sector
and clarify the rules for foreign investors. However, there were differences in their individual
versions: the version drafted by the Oil and Natural Resources Committee was presented to the
full COR on August 17, 2011. The Cabinet adopted its separate version on August 28, 2011—a
version that the KRG opposed as favoring too much “centralization” (i.e., Baghdad control) in the
energy sector. A 2012 KRG-Baghdad agreement on KRG oil exports included a provision to set
up a six-member committee to review the different versions of the oil laws under consideration
and decide which version to submit to the COR for formal consideration. There was little
subsequent movement on this issue, but the KRG-Baghdad interim deal on oil sales—coupled
with an improved working relationship between the KRG and the Abbadi government as
compared to the Maliki government—increases the potential for agreement on the issue.
General Human Rights Issues
The State Department human rights report for 2013, released February 27, 2014, largely repeated
the previous years’ criticisms of Iraq’s human rights record. The report for 2013 states that a
“culture of impunity” largely protected members of the security services and others in
government from accountability or punishment for abuses.66 The State Department report cited a
wide range of human rights problems committed by Iraqi government security and law
enforcement personnel—as well as by KRG security institutions—including unlawful killings;
torture and other cruel punishments; poor conditions in prison facilities; denial of fair public
trials; arbitrary arrest; arbitrary interference with privacy and home; limits on freedoms of speech,
assembly, and association due to sectarianism and extremist threats; lack of protection of stateless
persons; wide scale governmental corruption; human trafficking; and limited exercise of labor
rights. Many of these same abuses and deficiencies are alleged in reports by outside groups such
as Human Rights Watch.
Additional human rights issues have arisen from the reemergence of the Shiite militias. Some of
these militias reportedly have executed Sunnis for alleged collaboration with the Islamic State.
The militias have also, in some cases, allegedly prevented Sunnis from returning to their homes in
towns recaptured from the Islamic State. Such actions have been reported in the case of Jurf al-
Sakhar, see above, a mostly Sunni town that was recaptured from the Islamic State in November
2014. Curbing militia abuses by bringing them more firmly under control was reportedly a focus
of Prime Minister Abbadi’s meeting with President Obama on April 14, 2015.67
Trafficking in Persons
The State Department’s Trafficking in Persons report for 2014, released in June 2014, again
places Iraq in Tier 2, as did the report for 2013.68 The Tier 2 placement of 2013 was an upgrade
from the Tier 2 Watch List rating for Iraq for four previous years. The upgrade was a product of
the U.S. assessment that Iraq is making “significant efforts” to comply with the minimum
standards for the elimination of trafficking. Previously, Iraq received a waiver from automatic
downgrading to Tier 3 (which happens if a country is “watchlisted” for three straight years)
66 http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2013&dlid=220355#wrapper.
67 Peter Baker and Michael Gordon. “Obama Gives Visiting Iraqi Premier Aid and Endorsement.” New York Times,
April 15, 2015.
68 http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/226846.pdf.
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because it had developed a plan to make significant efforts to meet minimum standards for the
elimination of trafficking and was devoting significant resources to that plan. On April 30, 2012,
the COR enacted a law to facilitate elimination of trafficking in persons, both sexual and labor-
related.
Media and Free Expression
While State Department and other reports attribute most of Iraq’s human rights difficulties to the
security situation and factional infighting, apparent curbs on free expression appear independent
of such factors. Human rights activists criticized a law, passed by the COR in August 2011, called
the Journalist Rights Law. It purported to protect journalists, but left many of the provisions of
Saddam-era libel and defamation laws in place, such as imprisonment for publicly insulting the
government. The State Department human rights reports have noted continuing instances of
harassment and intimidation of journalists who write about corruption and the lack of government
services. Much of the private media that operate is controlled by individual factions or powerful
personalities. There are no overt government restrictions on access to the Internet.
In early 2013, the COR adopted an Information Crimes Law to regulate the use of information
networks, computers, and other electronic devices and systems. Human Rights Watch and other
groups criticized that law as “violat[ing] international standards protecting due process, freedom
of speech, and freedom of association,”69 and the COR revoked it February 2013.
Corruption
The State Department human rights report for 2013 repeated previous years’ reports that political
interference and other factors such as tribal and family relationships regularly thwart the efforts of
anti-corruption institutions, such as the Commission on Integrity (COI). The report says that
corruption among officials across government agencies was widespread. A Joint Anti-Corruption
Council, which reports to the Cabinet, is tasked with implementing the government’s 2010-2014
Anti-Corruption Strategy. Another body is the Supreme Board of Audits, which monitors the use
of government funds. The COR has its own Integrity Committee that oversees the executive
branch and the governmental anti-corruption bodies. The KRG has its own separate anti-
corruption institutions, including an Office of Governance and Integrity in the KRG Cabinet.
Religious Freedom/Situation of Religious Minorities
The Iraqi constitution provides for religious freedom and the government generally respected
religious freedom, according to the State Department’s report on International Religious Freedom
for 2013, released July 28, 2014.70 However, reflecting the conservative Islamic attitudes of many
Iraqis, Shiite and Sunni clerics seek to enforce aspects of Islamic law and customs, sometimes
coming into conflict with Iraq’s generally secular traditions as well as constitutional protections.
In February 2014, the Cabinet adopted a Shiite “personal status law” that would permit underage
marriages—reportedly an attempt by Maliki to shore up electoral support among Shiite Islamists.
69 Human Rights Watch. “Iraq’s Information Crimes Law: Badly Written Provisions and Draconian Punishments
Violate due Process and Free Speech.” July 12, 2012.
70 http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?year=2013&dlid=222291#wrapper.
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A major concern is the safety and security of Iraq’s Christian and other religious minority
populations which are concentrated in northern Iraq as well as in Baghdad. These other groups
include most notably the Yazidis, which number about 500,000-700,000; the Shabaks, which
number about 200,000-500,000 and most of whom are Shiites; the Sabeans, who number about
4,000; the Baha’i’s that number about 2,000; and the Kakai’s of Kirkuk, which number about
24,000. Conditions for these communities have deteriorated sharply since the Islamic State-led
offensives that began in June 2014. See also CRS Report IN10111, Conflict in Syria and Iraq:
Implications for Religious Minorities, by Christopher M. Blanchard.
Christians. Even before the 2014 Islamic State-led offensives, recent estimates indicate that the
Christian population of Iraq had been reduced to 400,000-850,000, from an estimated 1 million-
1.5 million during Saddam’s time. About 10,000 Christians in northern Iraq, fearing bombings
and intimidation, fled the areas near Kirkuk during October-December 2009. On October 31,
2010, a major attack on Christians occurred when a church in Baghdad (Sayidat al-Najat Church)
was besieged by militants and as many as 60 worshippers were killed. Partly as a result,
subsequent Christian celebrations of Christmas were said to be subdued, and other attacks
targeting Iraqi Christians have taken place since. After the Islamic State capture of Mosul in June
2014, the city’s remaining Christians were expelled and some of their churches and other
symbolic locations destroyed.
Prior to the Islamic State capture of much of Nineveh Province, Iraqi Assyrian Christian groups
advocated a Nineveh Plains Province Solution, in which the Nineveh Plains would be turned into
a self-administering region, possibly its own province. Supporters of the idea claimed such a zone
would pose no threat to the integrity of Iraq, but others say the plan’s inclusion of a separate
Christian security force could set the scene for violence and confrontation. The Iraqi government
adopted a form of the plan in its January 2014 announcement that the Cabinet had decided to
convert the Nineveh Plains into a new province. The Islamic State’s takeover of much of the north
has probably mooted this concept. One prominent Iraqi human rights NGO, the Hammurabi
Organization, is largely run by Iraqi Assyrians.
Even at the height of the U.S. military presence in Iraq, U.S. forces did not specifically protect
Christian sites at all times, partly because Christian leaders do not want to appear closely allied
with the United States. The State Department religious freedom report for 2011 said that during
2011, U.S. Embassy Baghdad designated a “special coordinator” to oversee U.S. funding,
program implementation, and advocacy to address minority concerns.
Funding Issues. Appropriations for FY2008 and FY2009 each earmarked $10 million in ESF to
assist the Nineveh Plain Christians. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-117)
made a similar provision for FY2010, although focused on Middle East minorities generally and
without a specific dollar figure mandated for Iraqi Christians. The State Department International
Religious Freedom report for 2012 said that the United States funded more than $73 million for
projects to support minority communities in Iraq from 2003 up to that time.
Women’s Rights
Iraq has a tradition of secularism and liberalism, and women’s rights issues have not been as large
a concern for international observers and rights groups as they have in Afghanistan or the Persian
Gulf states, for example. Women serve at many levels of government, as discussed above, and are
well integrated into the work force in all types of jobs and professions. By tradition, many Iraqi
women wear traditional coverings but many adopt Western dress. In October 2011, the COR
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passed legislation to lift Iraq’s reservation to Article 9 of the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women.
Mass Graves
As is noted in State Department reports on human rights in Iraq, the Iraqi government continues
to uncover mass graves of Iraqi victims of the Saddam regime. This effort is under the authority
of the Human Rights Ministry. The largest to date was a mass grave in Mahawil, near Hilla, that
contained 3,000 bodies, discovered shortly after the fall of Saddam’s regime. In July 2012, a mass
grave was discovered near Najaf, containing the bodies of about 500 Iraqi Shiites killed during
the 1991 uprising against Saddam Hussein. Excavations of mass graves in Wasit and Dhi Qar
Provinces took place in April and May 2013, respectively.
Regional Relationships
Iraq’s neighbors, both Sunni and Shiite-led, have significant interest in Iraq’s stability and in
defeating the Islamic State. The Sunni Arab states have joined efforts to defeat the Islamic State,
despite continuing reservations about the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad. Iraq’s
instability has interrupted its efforts to reintegrate into the Arab fold after more than 20 years of
ostracism following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. That reintegration took a large step
forward with the holding of an Arab League summit in Baghdad during March 27-29, 2012, even
though only nine heads of state out of the 22 Arab League members attended. Only one of them
was a Persian Gulf state leader (Amir Sabah al-Ahmad Al Sabah of Kuwait). On May 23-24,
2012, Iraq hosted nuclear talks between Iran and six negotiating powers. Iraq has also begun to
assist other Arab states, for example by assisting post-Qadhafi authorities in Libya destroy
chemical weapons stockpiles from the Qadhafi regime.
Iran
Iran is the chief regional supporter and ally of the Baghdad government; its influence in Iraq has
increased steadily since the fall of Saddam Hussein and the accession of Shiite Muslim factions in
Baghdad. Iran’s leverage over Baghdad has increased further since mid-2014 as a result of
Tehran’s military assistance to the Iraqi government against the Islamic State. Iran has reportedly
sent as many as 1,000 advisers from the Qods Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC-QF) to help organize the defense of Baghdad and ISF counterattacks, in part by
reactivating the established Iraqi Shiite militia forces that had largely been dormant since 2011, as
discussed above. Prime Minister Abbadi, during his U.S. visit in April 2015, put that number at
110—possibly an attempt to downplay Tehran’s involvement in Iraq for U.S. official audiences.
Iran also has provided to Baghdad substantial quantities of military equipment including a
reported five to seven Su-25 combat aircraft; flown drone surveillance flights over Iraq; and
conducted at least one airstrike (December 2014) directly against Islamic State forces near Iran’s
border. The aircraft Iran has provided to Iraq might have been from among 100+ combat aircraft
that Iraq flew to Iran at the beginning of the 1991 war against the United States and which Iran
integrated into its own air force.71 (Iran had not previously returned the jets, asserting that they
71 Gareth Jennings. “Iraq Receives Additional Su-25 Jets, Purportedly from Iran.” Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 2, 2014.
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represented “reparations” for Saddam’s invasion of Iran in 1980.) KRG leaders have also praised
Tehran for delivering military equipment to the peshmerga almost immediately after the Islamic
State’s major offensive in northern Iraq began in mid-2014.
Iran’s military assistance to Iraq furthers the overall U.S. objective in Iraq of countering the
Islamic State. And, by many accounts, Iran cooperated with U.S. efforts to achieve a replacement
for Maliki as Prime Minister. Senior U.S. officials have reportedly discussed Iraq’s situation with
Iranian officials on the sidelines of talks on Iran’s nuclear program, although U.S. officials have
said there is no formal U.S. coordination with Iran in Iraq and Iran is not formally part of the 60-
nation anti-Islamic State coalition. U.S. officials also have said that there is no linkage between
any Iranian cooperation on Iraq and the substance of the nuclear negotiations. Still, after the fall
of Ramadi in May 2015, U.S. officials stated that they would support operations by Shiite Popular
Mobilization Forces that are commanded by the ISF, but not those commanded by or trained by
Iran. This shift represented an apparent U.S. calculation that Iraqi forces would not be successful
against the Islamic State without at least some help from Shiite militia forces.
Iran has also apparently viewed Iraq as an avenue for reducing the effects of international
sanctions. Some reports say Iraq is enabling Iran’s efforts by allowing it to interact with Iraq’s
energy sector and its banking system. In July 2012, the Treasury Department imposed sanctions
on the Elaf Islamic Bank of Iraq for allegedly conducting financial transactions with the Iranian
banking system in violation of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and
Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA, P.L. 111-195). Those sanctions were lifted in May 2013 when
Elaf reduced its involvement in Iran’s financial sector.
The Iraqi government treatment of the population of Camp Ashraf and Camp Hurriya, camps in
which over 2,700 Iranian oppositionists (People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, PMOI) still
reside, is another indicator of the government’s close ties to Iran. The residents of the camps
accuse the Iraqi government of recent attacks on residents. This issue is discussed in substantial
detail in CRS Report RL32048, Iran, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy , by Kenneth Katzman Iran
has periodically acted against other Iranian opposition groups based in Iraq, including the Free
Life Party (PJAK) that consists of Iranian Kurds and is allied with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party
that opposes the government of Turkey. Iran has shelled purported camps of the group on several
occasions. Iran is also reportedly attempting to pressure the bases and offices in Iraq of such
Iranian Kurdish parties as the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDP-I) and Komaleh.
The close Iran-Iraq relationship today contrast sharply with the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, in
which an estimated 300,000 Iraqi military personnel (Shiite and Sunni) died. Still, Iraq’s Shiite
clerics resist Iranian interference and take pride in Najaf as a more prominent center of Shiite
theology than the Iranian holy city of Qom.
Syria
One of the major disagreements between the United States and the government of Iraq has been
on Syria. U.S. policy is to achieve the ouster of President Bashar Al Assad, whereas Iraq’s
government apparently sees Assad as an ally that is, like Iraq, governed by Shiite leaders.
(Assad’s Alawite community practices a religion that is an offshoot of Shiism.) Iraq has generally
refrained from criticizing Assad’s military tactics, and it abstained on an Arab League vote in
November 2011 to suspend Syria’s membership. Perhaps to ensure Arab participation at the
March 2012 Arab League summit in Baghdad, Iraq voted for a January 22, 2012, Arab League
plan for a transition of power in Syria. As an indication of Iraq’s policy of simultaneously
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engaging with the United States on the Syria issue, Iraqi officials have attended meetings of
countries that are seeking a political transition in Syria.
An issue that divided Iraq and the United States in 2012-2014 was Iraq’s reported permission for
Iranian arms supplies to overfly Iraq en route to Syria.72 Iraq searched a few of these flights,
particularly after specific high-level U.S. requests to do so, but routinely allowed the aircraft to
proceed after finding no arms aboard, sometimes because the Iranian aircraft had already dropped
off their cargo in Syria. Following a March 24, 2013 visit of Secretary of State Kerry to Baghdad,
the United States agreed to provide Iraq with information on the likely contents of the Iranian
flights, and the overflights decreased in frequency.
The unrest in Syria has involved Iraqi factions. As noted above, the Islamic State operates on both
sides of the Iraq-Syria border and Iraqi Shiite militiamen from groups discussed above went to
Syria to fight on behalf of the Assad regime, although many returned to Iraq in 2014 to counter
the Islamic State’s offensive. The KRG has trained some Syrian Kurdish militia forces to secure
an autonomous Kurdish area if Assad loses control and sent about 200 peshmerga to assist Syrian
Kurdish forces (YPG, a successor to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, PKK) in the successful defense
of the town of Kobane in 2014-15.
Turkey
Turkey’s policy toward Iraq has historically focused almost exclusively on the Iraqi Kurdish
insistence on autonomy and possible push for independence. Turkey has always expressed
concern that Iraqi Kurdish independence could embolden Kurdish oppositionists in Turkey. The
anti-Turkey Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has long maintained camps inside Iraq, along the
border with Turkey, and during the 1990s and 2000s, Turkey conducted periodic cross-border
military operations against the group’s camps in Iraq. More recently, the PKK issue has not
prevented Turkey from building a pragmatic and positive relationship with the KRG and
becoming the largest outside investor in northern Iraq. Turkey did not openly oppose the KRG’s
seizure of Kirkuk in June 2014, even though the capture would help a KRG independence drive.
Turkey’s positive relations with the KRG have complicated relations between Turkey and the
Iraqi government. On August 2, 2012, then Turkish Foreign Minister (now Prime Minister)
Ahmet Davotoglu visited the disputed city of Kirkuk, prompting Iraq’s Foreign Ministry to
criticize the visit as an inappropriate interference in Iraqi affairs. In an effort to improve relations
with Baghdad, Davotoglu visited Baghdad in mid-November 2013 and, aside from meeting Iraqi
leaders, visited Najaf and Karbala—Iraqi cities holy to Shiites. That visit appeared intended to
signal Turkish evenhandedness with regard to sectarian disputes in Iraq and to minimize any
dispute with Baghdad over KRG oil exports through Turkey. During that visit, Maliki reportedly
proposed to develop a “north-south” energy corridor through which Iraqi energy exports could
flow to Europe via Turkey, but Davotoglu apparently did not commit to the proposal. Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State Brett McGurk testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee
on November 13, 2013, that the United States supports that concept as well as another export
pipeline that would carry Iraqi oil to Jordan’s Red Sea outlet at Aqaba.
72 Kristina Wong, “Iraq Resists U.S. Prod, Lets Iran Fly Arms to Syria.” Washington Times, March 16, 2012.
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Gulf States
Most of the Sunni-led Persian Gulf states (Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC: Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman) have not fully accepted Iraq’s domination by Shiite
factions. Iraq- GCC relations worsened during 2012-2014 as the Maliki government marginalized
Iraq’s Sunni leaders. Amir Sabah of Kuwait was the only Gulf head of state to attend the March
27-29, 2012, Arab League summit in Baghdad; the other Gulf states sent low-level delegations.
The GCC states have joined the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State, but have to date
limited their airstrikes to Syria, not Iraq, apparently not wanting to directly support the Shiite-
dominated government in Baghdad.
Saudi Arabia had been widely criticized by Iraqi leaders for delaying opening an embassy in
Baghdad, a move Saudi Arabia pledged in 2008. This issue faded somewhat after February 2012,
when Saudi Arabia announced that it had named its ambassador to Jordan, Fahd al-Zaid, to serve
as a nonresident ambassador to Iraq concurrently—although still not opening an embassy in
Baghdad. On September 15, 2014, Saudi Arabia announced that it would open an embassy in
Baghdad and, during the visit of Prime Minister Abbadi to Washington, DC in mid-April 2015,
Saudi Arabia named a resident Ambassador to Iraq. The appointment coincided with comments
by Abbadi during his U.S. visit that were critical of Saudi intervention against advancing Zaidi
Shiite Houthi rebels in Yemen. Using language similar to that used by Iran about the Saudi
intervention, Abbadi said “There is no logic to the [Saudi] operation [in Yemen] at all in the first
place.”73 The other Gulf countries have opened embassies and all except the UAE have appointed
full ambassadors to Iraq.
Iraq’s relationship with Kuwait is always fraught with sensitivity because of the legacy of the
1990 Iraqi invasion. However, greater acceptance of the Iraqi government was demonstrated by
the visit of Kuwait’s then prime minister to Iraq on January 12, 2011. Maliki subsequently visited
Kuwait on February 16, 2011, and, as noted, the Amir of Kuwait attended the Arab League
summit in Baghdad in March 2012. The current Prime Minister of Kuwait visited in June 2013,
producing an agreement to remove the outstanding issues of Kuwaiti persons and property
missing from the Iraqi invasion from U.N. Security Council (Chapter VII) to oversight by
UNAMI under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter. This transition was implemented by U.N. Security
Council Resolution 2107 of June 27, 2013. The two countries have also resolved the outstanding
issues of maintenance of border demarcation. In late October 2013, the Iraqi Cabinet voted to
allow Kuwait to open consulates in Basra and Irbil. These issues are discussed in detail in CRS
Report RS21513, Kuwait: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
73 Michael Gordon and Eric Schmitt. “Tensions Flare Between Allies in U.S. Coalition.” New York Times, April 16,
2015.
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Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Iraq Since FY2003
(appropriations/allocations in millions of dollars)
FY
04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
‘03
(req)
IRRF
2,475
18,389 —
10
— — — — — —
ESF
—
—
— 1,535.4 1,677 429 541.5 382.5 325.7
250 72.3 72.3
22.5 72.5
Democracy
Fund
— — — — 250 75 — — — —
IFTA
(Treasury
Dept.
Asst.)
— — — 13.0 2.8 — — — — —
NADR
—
— 3.6
— 18.4 20.4 35.5 30.3 29.8
32 31.1 31.1 23.86
Refugee
Accounts
(MRA and
ERMA)
39.6
.1 — — 78.3 278 260 316 280
—
IDA
22 — 7.1 .3
45 85 51 42 17 —
Other
USAID
Funds
470 — — — —
23.8 — — — —
INCLE
— — — 91.4 170 85 20 702
114.6 137
13.5 13.5
11 11
FMF
— — — — — — — — — 850
471.3
471.3 250
250
IMET
—
1.2
—
—
1.1
—
2
2
1.7
2
1.1
1.7
1.4
1.0
DOD—
ISFF
Funds
—
— 5391 3007 5542 3000 1000 1000 1155
—
1618 715
DOD—
Iraq
Army 51.2 — 210 — — — — — — —
DOD—
CERP
— 140 718 708 750 996 339
263 44.0
—
DOD—Oil
Repair
802 — — — — — — — — —
DOD—
Business
Support
— — — —
50.0
50.0
74.0 — — —
Total
3,859 18548 6329 5365 8584 5042 2323 2738 1968 1519 589.4 590 1927 1050
Sources: State Department FY2015 budget documents, and CRS calculations. Figures include regular and
Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding.
Notes: Table prepared by Curt Tarnoff, Specialist in Foreign Affairs, This table does not contain separate agency
operational costs. IMET=International Military Education and Training; IRRF=Iraq Relief and Reconstruction
Fund; INCLE=International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Fund; ISF=Iraq Security Force;
NADR=Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related: ESF=Economic Support Fund;
IDA=International Disaster Assistance; FMF=Foreign Military Financing; ISF= Iraqi Security Forces. FY2015 and
2016 ISF funding are funds to equip and train the ISF, peshmerga, and Sunni tribal fighters.
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Author Contact Information
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612
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