China’s Economic Rise:
History, Trends, Challenges, and
Implications for the United States
Wayne M. Morrison
Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance
June 14, 2015
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33534
China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the United States
Summary
Prior to the initiation of economic reforms and trade liberalization 35 years ago, China
maintained policies that kept the economy very poor, stagnant, centrally-controlled, vastly
inefficient, and relatively isolated from the global economy. Since opening up to foreign trade and
investment and implementing free market reforms in 1979, China has been among the world’s
fastest-growing economies, with real annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth averaging
nearly 10% through 2014. In recent years, China has emerged as a major global economic power.
It is now the world’s largest: economy (on a purchasing power parity basis), manufacturer,
merchandise trader, and holder of foreign exchange reserves.
The global economic crisis that began in 2008 greatly affected China’s economy. China’s exports,
imports, and foreign directly investment (FDI) inflows declined, GDP growth slowed, and
millions of Chinese workers reportedly lost their jobs. The Chinese government responded by
implementing a $586 billion economic stimulus package and loosening monetary policies to
increase bank lending. Such policies enabled China to effectively weather the effects of the sharp
global fall in demand for Chinese products. However, the Chinese economy has slowed in recent
years. Real GDP fell from10.4% in 2010 to 7.8% in 2012, to 7.4% in 2014.The IMF projects that
over the next six years China’s real annual GDP growth will average 5.9%.
The ability of China to maintain a rapidly growing economy in the long run will depend largely
on the ability of the Chinese government to implement comprehensive economic reforms that
more quickly hasten China’s transition to a free market economy; rebalance the Chinese economy
by making consumer demand, rather than exporting and fixed investment, the main engine of
economic growth; boost productivity and innovation; address growing income disparities; and
enhance environmental protection. The Chinese government has acknowledged that its current
economic growth model needs to be altered and has announced several initiatives to address
various economic challenges. In November 2013, the Communist Party of China held the Third
Plenum of its 18th Party Congress, which issued a communique outlining a number of broad
policy statements on reforms that would be implemented by 2020. Many of the proposed reforms
are measures that would seek to boost competition and economic efficiency. For example, the
communique stated that the market would now play a “decisive” role in allocating resources in
the economy. At the same time, however, the communique emphasized the continued important
role of the state sector in China’s economy. In addition, many foreign firms have complained that
the business climate in China has worsened in recent years. Thus it remains unclear how
committed the Chinese government is to implementing new comprehensive economic reforms.
China’s economic rise has significant implications for the United States and hence is of major
interest to Congress. On the one hand, China is a large (and potentially huge) export market for
the United States. Many U.S. firms use China as the final point of assembly in their global supply
chain networks. However, some analysts contend that China maintains a number of distortive
economic policies (such as protectionist industrial policies and cyber theft of U.S. trade secrets)
that undermine U.S. economic interests. Other analysts note China’s rising global economic
influence, including its creation (along with Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa) of a new
$100 billion New Development Bank in July 2014 to assist developing countries; and it’s launch
of a new $100 billion Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in October 2014. This report provides
background on China’s economic rise; describes its current economic structure; identifies the
challenges China faces to maintain economic growth; and discusses the challenges, opportunities,
and implications of China’s economic rise for the United States.
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China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the United States
Contents
The History of China’s Economic Development ............................................................................. 2
China’s Economy Prior to Reforms ........................................................................................... 2
The Introduction of Economic Reforms .................................................................................... 4
China’s Economic Growth and Reforms: 1979-the Present ...................................................... 5
Causes of China’s Economic Growth ........................................................................................ 7
Measuring the Size of China’s Economy ......................................................................................... 8
China as the World’s Largest Manufacturer ............................................................................ 10
Changes in China’s Wage Advantage ...................................................................................... 12
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in China..................................................................................... 13
China’s Growing FDI Outflows ..................................................................................................... 17
China’s Merchandise Trade Patterns .............................................................................................. 20
China’s Major Trading Partners ............................................................................................... 23
Major Chinese Trade Commodities ......................................................................................... 24
China’s Regional and Bilateral Free Trade Agreements .......................................................... 26
Major Long-Term Challenges Facing the Chinese Economy ........................................................ 26
China’s Incomplete Transition to a Market Economy ............................................................. 27
Industrial Policies and SOEs ............................................................................................. 27
A Weak Banking Sector and Growing National Debt ....................................................... 27
Large Internal Imbalances of Savings, Fixed Investment, and Consumption ................... 29
Growing Pollution ............................................................................................................. 31
Corruption and the Relative Lack of the Rule of Law ...................................................... 32
Demographic Challenges .................................................................................................. 33
Plans Announced by the Chinese Government to Reform and Restructure the Economy ............ 34
The Central Government Five-Year Plans ............................................................................... 35
The Drive for “Indigenous Innovation” ................................................................................... 36
Economic Policies Outlined in the November 2013 Third Plenum ......................................... 37
Challenges to U.S. Policy of China’s Economic Rise ................................................................... 39
Figures
Figure 1. Chinese Per Capita GDP: 1950-1978 ............................................................................... 3
Figure 2. Comparison of Chinese and Japanese Per Capita GDP: 1950-1978 ................................ 4
Figure 3. Chinese Real GDP Growth: 1979-2014 ........................................................................... 6
Figure 4. China’s Real GDP Growth 2007-2014 and Projections through 2020 ............................. 6
Figure 5. Projections of U.S. and Chinese Annual Real GDP Growth Rates: 2014-2050 ............... 8
Figure 6. Chinese and U.S. GDP on a PPP Basis: 1980-2014 ....................................................... 10
Figure 7. Gross Value Added Manufacturing in China, the United States, and Japan:
2004-2013 ................................................................................................................................... 11
Figure 8. Average Monthly Wages for Selected Countries: 2000-2014 ......................................... 12
Figure 9. Industrial Output by Foreign-Invested Firms in China as a Share of National
Output Total: 1990-2011 ............................................................................................................. 13
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China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the United States
Figure 10. Share of China’s Exports and Imports
Attributed to Foreign-Invested Enterprises in China: 1990-2014............................................... 14
Figure 11. Chinese Data on Annual FDI Inflows to China: 1985-2014 ......................................... 15
Figure 12. UN Estimates of the Largest Recipients of Global FDI Inflows in 2014 ..................... 16
Figure 13. Chinese Data on Annual U.S. FDI Inflows into China: 1985-2014 ............................. 17
Figure 14. UN Estimates of Chinese Annual FDI Outflows: 2000-2014 ...................................... 19
Figure 15. Major Sources of Global FDI Outflows in 2014 .......................................................... 20
Figure 16. China’s Merchandise Trade: 2000-2014 ....................................................................... 22
Figure 17. Annual Change in China’s Merchandise Exports and Imports: 1990-2015* ............... 22
Figure 18. China’s Share of Global Merchandise Exports: 1990-2014 ......................................... 23
Figure 19. Chinese Gross Savings, Gross Fixed Investment, and Private Consumption as
a Percent of GDP: 1990-2013 ..................................................................................................... 30
Figure 20. Chinese Disposable Personal Income as a Percent of GDP: 2000-2014 ...................... 30
Figure 21. Sources of Chinese GDP Growth: 2007-2014: Percentage Points ............................... 31
Figure 22. Current Account Balances as a Percent of GDP for China
and the United States: 2000-2014 ............................................................................................... 40
Figure 23. Average Annual Growth in Private Consumption: 2005-2014 ..................................... 41
Tables
Table 1. Comparisons of Chinese, Japanese, and U.S. GDP and Per Capita GDP
in Nominal U.S. Dollars and a Purchasing Power Parity Basis: 2014 .......................................... 9
Table 2. Chinese Data on Major Sources of FDI Flows to China: 1979-2014 .............................. 16
Table 3. Major Destinations of Chinese Non-Financial FDI Outflows in 2013: Flows and
Stock ........................................................................................................................................... 18
Table 4. China’s Merchandise World Trade: 1979-2014 ............................................................... 21
Table 5. China’s Major Trading Partners in 2014 .......................................................................... 24
Table 6. Major Chinese Exports: 2014 .......................................................................................... 25
Table 7. Major Chinese Imports: 2014 .......................................................................................... 25
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 43
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China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the United States
he rapid rise of China as a major economic power within a time span of about three
decades is often described by analysts as one of the greatest economic success stories in
Tmodern times. From 1979 (when economic reforms began) to 2014, China’s real gross
domestic product (GDP) grew at an average annual rate of nearly 10%.1 The World Bank
estimates that from 1981 to 2010, 679 million people in China were raised out of extreme
poverty.2 China has emerged as a major global economic power. It is now the world’s largest
economy (on a purchasing power parity basis) manufacturer, merchandise exporter and importer,
and holder of foreign exchange reserves.
China’s rapid economic growth has led to a substantial increase in bilateral commercial ties with
the United States. According to U.S. trade data, total trade between the two countries grew from
$5 billion in 1980 to $592 billion in 2014. China is currently the United States’ second-largest
trading partner, its third-largest export market, and its largest source of imports. Many U.S.
companies have extensive operations in China in order to sell their products in the booming
Chinese market and to take advantage of lower-cost labor for export-oriented manufacturing.3
These operations have helped some U.S. firms to remain internationally competitive and have
supplied U.S. consumers with a variety of low-cost goods. China’s large-scale purchases of U.S.
Treasury securities (which totaled $1.22 trillion as of February 2015) have enabled the federal
government to fund its budget deficits, which help keep U.S. interest rates relatively low.4
However, the emergence of China as a major economic power has raised concern among many
U.S. policy makers. Some claim that China uses unfair trade practices (such as an undervalued
currency and subsidies given to domestic producers) to flood U.S. markets with low-cost goods,
and that such practices threaten American jobs, wages, and living standards. Others contend that
China’s growing use of industrial policies to promote and protect certain domestic Chinese
industries or firms favored by the government, and its failure to take effective action against
widespread infringement and theft of U.S. intellectual property rights (IPR) in China, threaten to
undermine the competitiveness of U.S. IP-intensive industries. In addition, while China has
become a large and growing market for U.S. exports, critics contend that numerous trade and
investment barriers limit opportunities for U.S. firms to sell in China, or force them to set up
production facilities in China as the price of doing business there. Other concerns relating to
China’s economic growth include its growing demand for energy and raw materials and its
emergence as the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gasses.
The Chinese government views a growing economy as vital to maintaining social stability.
However, China faces a number of major economic challenges which could dampen future
growth, including distortive economic policies that have resulted in over-reliance on fixed
investment and exports for economic growth (rather than on consumer demand), government
support for state-owned firms, a weak banking system, widening income gaps, growing pollution,
and the relative lack of the rule of law in China. The Chinese government has acknowledged
1 China’s economic reform process began in December 1978 when the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central
Committee of the Communist Party adopted Deng Xiaoping’s economic proposals. Implementation of the reforms
began in 1979.
2 The World Bank, World DataBank, Poverty and Inequality Database. Extreme poverty is defined as those living on
less than $1.25 per day on a purchasing power parity basis.
3 Some companies use China as part of their global supply chain for manufactured parts, which are then exported and
assembled elsewhere. Other firms have shifted the production of finished products from other countries (mainly in
Asia) to China; they import parts and materials into China for final assembly.
4 See CRS Report RL33536, China-U.S. Trade Issues, by Wayne M. Morrison.
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China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the United States
these problems and has pledged to address them by implementing policies to increase the role of
the market in the economy, boost innovation, make consumer spending the driving force of the
economy, expand social safety net coverage, and encourage the development of less-polluting
industries (such as services), and crack down on official government corruption. The ability of the
Chinese government to implement such reforms will likely determine whether China can continue
to maintain relatively rapid economic growth rates, or will instead begin to experience
significantly lower growth rates.
China’s growing economic power has led it to become increasingly involved in global economic
policies and initiatives, especially aimed at financing infrastructure development abroad,
including the recent creation by China of two new investment banks. China’s growing economic
influence globally has raised a number of questions, and in some cases, concerns, as to how
China’s rise will impact U.S. economic interests and influence on global economic policies
China’s economic rise has become a factor in congressional debate over various aspects of U.S.
trade policy (that are not directly related to China), such as the renewal of trade promotion
authority (TPA) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).5
This report provides background on China’s economic rise; describes its current economic
structure; identifies the challenges China faces to maintain economic growth; and discusses the
challenges, opportunities, and implications of China’s economic rise for the United States.
The History of China’s Economic Development
China’s Economy Prior to Reforms
Prior to 1979, China, under the leadership of Chairman Mao Zedong, maintained a centrally
planned, or command, economy. A large share of the country’s economic output was directed and
controlled by the state, which set production goals, controlled prices, and allocated resources
throughout most of the economy. During the 1950s, all of China’s individual household farms
were collectivized into large communes. To support rapid industrialization, the central
government undertook large-scale investments in physical and human capital during the 1960s
and 1970s. As a result, by 1978 nearly three-fourths of industrial production was produced by
centrally controlled, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), according to centrally planned output
targets. Private enterprises and foreign-invested firms were generally barred. A central goal of the
Chinese government was to make China’s economy relatively self-sufficient. Foreign trade was
generally limited to obtaining those goods that could not be made or obtained in China. Such
policies created distortions in the economy. Since most aspects of the economy were managed
and run by the central government, there were no market mechanisms to efficiently allocate
resources, and thus there were few incentives for firms, workers, and farmers to become more
productive or be concerned with the quality of what they produced (since they were mainly
focused on production goals set by the government).
5 For additional information on TPA and TPP, see CRS Report IF10038, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), by Ian F.
Fergusson, and CRS Report IF10000, Proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership, by Brock R. Williams and Ian F.
Fergusson.
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China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the United States
According to Chinese government statistics, China’s real GDP grew at an average annual rate of
6.7% from 1953 to 1978, although the accuracy of these data has been questioned by many
analysts, some of whom contend that during this period, Chinese government officials (especially
at the sub-national levels) often exaggerated production levels for a variety of political reasons.
Economist Angus Maddison puts Chinas actual average annual real GDP during this period at
about 4.4%.6 In addition, China’s economy suffered significant economic downturns during the
leadership of Chairman Mao Zedong, including during the Great Leap Forward from 1958 to
1960 (which led to a massive famine and reportedly the deaths of up to 45 million people)7 and
the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976 (which caused widespread political chaos and greatly
disrupted the economy). From 1950 to 1978, China’s per capita GDP on a purchasing power
parity (PPP) basis, 8a common measurement of a country’s living standards, doubled. However,
from 1958-1962, Chinese livings standards fell by 20.3%, and from 1966-1968, they dropped by
9.6% (see Figure 1). In addition, the growth in Chinese living standards paled in comparison to
those in the West, such as Japan, as indicated in Figure 2.
Figure 1. Chinese Per Capita GDP: 1950-1978
($billions, PPP basis)
1,200
1,000
800
600
400
200
0
Source: Angus Maddison, Historical, Statistics of the World Economy: 1-2008 AD.
6 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run,
960-2030, by Angus Maddison, 2007.
7 New York Times, Editorial, Mao's Great Leap to Famine, December 15, 2010.
8 Purchasing power parities are a method used to measure and compare the economic data of other countries expressed
in U.S. dollars. That method adjusts the data to reflect differences in prices across countries. This method is discussed
in more detail later in the report.
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Figure 2. Comparison of Chinese and Japanese Per Capita GDP: 1950-1978
($billions, PPP basis)
14,000
12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
China
Japan
Source: Angus Maddison, Historical, Statistics of the World Economy: 1-2008 AD.
The Chinese government in 1978 (shortly after the death of Chairman Mao in 1976) decided to
break with its Soviet-style economic policies by gradually reforming the economy according to
free market principles and opening up trade and investment with the West, in the hope that this
would significantly increase economic growth and raise living standards. As Chinese leader Deng
Xiaoping, the architect of China’s economic reforms, put it: “Black cat, white cat, what does it
matter what color the cat is as long as it catches mice?”9
The Introduction of Economic Reforms
Beginning in 1979, China launched several economic reforms. The central government initiated
price and ownership incentives for farmers, which enabled them to sell a portion of their crops on
the free market. In addition, the government established four special economic zones along the
coast for the purpose of attracting foreign investment, boosting exports, and importing high
technology products into China. Additional reforms, which followed in stages, sought to
decentralize economic policymaking in several sectors, especially trade. Economic control of
various enterprises was given to provincial and local governments, which were generally allowed
to operate and compete on free market principles, rather than under the direction and guidance of
state planning. In addition, citizens were encouraged to start their own businesses. Additional
coastal regions and cities were designated as open cities and development zones, which allowed
them to experiment with free market reforms and to offer tax and trade incentives to attract
foreign investment. In addition, state price controls on a wide range of products were gradually
eliminated. Trade liberalization was also a major key to China’s economic success. Removing
9 This reference appears to have meant that it did not matter whether an economic policy was considered to be
“capitalist” or “socialist,” what really mattered was whether that policy would boost the economy.
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trade barriers encouraged greater competition and attracted FDI inflows. China’s gradual
implementation of economic reforms sought to identify which policies produced favorable
economic outcomes (and which did not) so that they could be implemented in other parts of the
country, a process Deng Xiaoping reportedly referred to as “crossing the river by touching the
stones.”10
China’s Economic Growth and Reforms: 1979-the Present
Since the introduction of economic reforms, China’s economy has grown substantially faster than
during the pre-reform period, and, for the most part, has avoided major economic disruptions.11
From 1979 to 2014, China’s annual real GDP averaged nearly 10% (see Figure 3). This has
meant that, on average, China has been able to double the size of its economy in real terms every
eight years.
The global economic slowdown, which began in 2008, impacted the Chinese economy (especially
the export sector). China’s real GDP growth fell from 14.2% in 2007 to 9.6% in 2008, and slowed
to 9.2% in 2009. In response, the Chinese government implemented a large economic stimulus
package and an expansive monetary policy. These measures boosted domestic investment and
consumption and helped prevent a sharp economic slowdown in China. From 2009 to 2011,
China’s real GDP growth averaged 9.6%. China’s economy has slowed in recent years – real GDP
growth fell from10.4% in 2010 to 7.8% in 2012, to 7.4% in 2014. The IMF projects that over the
next six years China’s real annual GDP growth will average 5.9% (see Figure 4).12
10 Many analysts contend that Deng’s push to implement economic reforms was largely motivated by a belief that the
resulting economic growth would ensure that the Communist Party stayed in power.
11 China’s economic growth slowed significantly followed the aftermath of the Tiananmen massacre that occurred in
June 1989. Several countries, including the United States, imposed trade sanctions against China. In addition, Chinese
economic reforms were essentially put on hold. China’s real GDP growth rate fell from 11.3% in 1988 to 4.1% in 1989,
and declined to 3.8% in 1990. In 1991, Chinese economic reforms were resumed, and several economic sanctions were
listed. As a result, China’s rapid economic growth rates resumed.
12 IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2015.
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Figure 3. Chinese Real GDP Growth: 1979-2014
(percent)
16
15.2
14.2
14.2
13.5
13.9
14
13.1
12.7
11.6
12
11.3
10.9
11.3
10.9
10.4
10
10 10.1
9.6
10
9.3
9.3
9
9.2
9.2
8.9
9.1
8.48.3
7.9
7.6
7.87.6
7.8 7.8
8
7.4
6
5.3
4.13.8
4
2
0
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook.
Figure 4. China’s Real GDP Growth 2007-2014 and Projections through 2020
(percent)
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Source:
IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2015.
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Causes of China’s Economic Growth
Economists generally attribute much of China’s rapid economic growth to two main factors:
large-scale capital investment (financed by large domestic savings and foreign investment) and
rapid productivity growth. These two factors appear to have gone together hand in hand.
Economic reforms led to higher efficiency in the economy, which boosted output and increased
resources for additional investment in the economy.
China has historically maintained a high rate of savings. When reforms were initiated in 1979,
domestic savings as a percentage of GDP stood at 32%. However, most Chinese savings during
this period were generated by the profits of SOEs, which were used by the central government for
domestic investment. Economic reforms, which included the decentralization of economic
production, led to substantial growth in Chinese household savings as well as corporate savings.
As a result, China’s gross savings as a percentage of GDP is the highest among major economies.
The large level of savings has enabled China to substantially boost domestic investment. In fact,
China’s gross domestic savings levels far exceed its domestic investment levels, which have made
China a large net global lender.
Several economists have concluded that productivity gains (i.e., increases in efficiency) have
been another major factor in China’s rapid economic growth. The improvements to productivity
were caused largely by a reallocation of resources to more productive uses, especially in sectors
that were formerly heavily controlled by the central government, such as agriculture, trade, and
services. For example, agricultural reforms boosted production, freeing workers to pursue
employment in the more productive manufacturing sector. China’s decentralization of the
economy led to the rise of non-state enterprises (such as private firms), which tended to pursue
more productive activities than the centrally controlled SOEs and were more market-oriented and
more efficient. Additionally, a greater share of the economy (mainly the export sector) was
exposed to competitive forces. Local and provincial governments were allowed to establish and
operate various enterprises without interference from the government. In addition, FDI in China
brought with it new technology and processes that boosted efficiency.
However, as China’s technological development begins to approach that of major developed
countries (i.e., through its adsorption of foreign technology), its level of productivity gains, and
thus, real GDP growth, could slow significantly from its historic levels unless China becomes a
major center for new technology and innovation and/or implements new comprehensive
economic reforms. Several developing economies (notably several in Asia and Latin America)
experienced rapid economic development and growth during the 1960s and 1970s by
implementing some of the same policies that China has utilized to date to develop its economy,
such as measures to boost exports and to promote and protect certain industries. However, at
some point in their development, some of these countries began to experience economic
stagnation (or much slower growth compared to previous levels) over a sustained period of time,
a phenomenon described by economists as the “middle-income trap.”13 This means that several
developing (low-income) economies were able to transition to a middle income economy, but
because they were unable to sustain high levels of productivity gains (in part because they could
not address structural inefficiencies in the economy), they were unable to transition to a high-
13 Japan was able to become a high-income economy, but since the mid-1980s, its economic growth has been relatively
stagnant.
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income economy.14 China may be at a similar crossroads now.15 The Economist Intelligence Unit
(EIU) projects that China’s real GDP growth will slow considerably in the years ahead, averaging
5.6% from 2015 to 2024, 3.1% from 2025 to 2034, and 2.1% from 2035 to 2044. Eventually,
according to the EIU, Chinese real GDP growth rates will be similar to U.S. levels (Figure 5).16
The Chinese government has indicated its desire to move away from its current economic model
of fast growth at any cost to more “smart” economic growth, which seeks to reduce reliance on
energy-intensive and high-polluting industries and rely more on high technology, green energy,
and services. China also has indicated it wants to obtain more balanced economic growth. (These
issues are discussed in more detail later in the report.)
Figure 5. Projections of U.S. and Chinese Annual Real GDP Growth Rates: 2014-2050
(percent)
8.0
7.0
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
4
6
8
0
2
4
6
8
0
2
4
6
8
0
2
4
6
8
0
201
201
201
202
202
202
202
202
203
203
203
203
203
204
204
204
204
204
205
China
United States
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit Database (accessed on March 25, 2015).
Note: Long-range economic projections should be viewed with caution.
Measuring the Size of China’s Economy
The rapid growth of the Chinese economy has led many analysts to speculate if and when China
will overtake the United States as the “world’s largest economic power.” The “actual” size of
China’s economy has been a subject of extensive debate among economists. Measured in U.S.
dollars using nominal exchange rates, China’s GDP in 2014 in nominal dollars was $10.4 trillion,
about 60% the size of the U.S. economy, according estimates made by the IMF in April 2015.
China’s per capita GDP in 2014 was $7,589, which was 14% the size of U.S. level.
14 These designations are based on World Bank per capita GDP measurements.
15 For a discussion of this issue, see the World Bank, China 2030, 2013, p. 12, at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/
external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/03/27/000350881_20130327163105/Rendered/PDF/
762990PUB0china0Box374372B00PUBLIC0.pdf.
16 Note, long-term economic projections should be viewed with caution.
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Many economists contend that using nominal exchange rates to convert Chinese data (or that of
other countries) into U.S. dollars fails to reflect the true size of China’s economy and living
standards relative to the United States. Nominal exchange rates simply reflect the prices of
foreign currencies vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar and such measurements exclude differences in the
prices for goods and services across countries. To illustrate, one U.S. dollar exchanged for local
currency in China would buy more goods and services there than it would in the United States.
This is because prices for goods and services in China are generally lower than they are in the
United States. Conversely, prices for goods and services in Japan are generally higher than they
are in the United States (and China). Thus, one dollar exchanged for local Japanese currency
would buy fewer goods and services there than it would in the United States. Economists attempt
to develop estimates of exchange rates based on their actual purchasing power relative to the
dollar in order to make more accurate comparisons of economic data across countries, usually
referred to as purchasing power parity (PPP).
The PPP exchange rate increases the (estimated) measurement of China’s economy and its per
capita GDP. According to the IMF (which uses price surveys conducted by the World Bank),
prices for goods and services in China are about 56% the level they are in the United States.
Adjusting for this price differential raises the value of China’s 2014 GDP from $10.4 trillion
(nominal dollars) to $17.6 trillion (on a PPP basis) (see Table 1).17 This would indicate that China
in 2014 overtook the United States as the world’s largest economy.18 China’s share of global GDP
on a PPP basis rose from 2.3% in 1980 to 16.5% in 2014, while the U.S. share of global GDP on a
PPP basis was 24.3% in 1980, but by 2014, had fallen to 16.3%. This would not be the first time
in history that China was the world’s largest economy (see text box). China’s economic
ascendency has been impressive, especially considering that in 1980, China’s GDP on a PPP basis
was only one-tenth that of the United States (see Figure 6). The IMF predicts that by 2019,
China’s economy will be 21.3% larger than the U.S. economy.
Table 1. Comparisons of Chinese, Japanese, and U.S. GDP and Per Capita GDP
in Nominal U.S. Dollars and a Purchasing Power Parity Basis: 2014
China
United
States
Nominal GDP ($ billions)
10,355
17,419
GDP in PPP ($ billions)
17,617
17,419
Nominal Per Capita GDP ($)
7,589
54,597
Per Capita GDP in PPP ($)
12,880
54,597
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2015.
17 In other words, the PPP data reflect what the value of China’s goods and services would be if they were sold in the
United States.
18 The IMF originally first projected that China would overtake the United States as the largest economy in its October
2014 World Economic Outlook report.
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The Decline and Rise of China’s Economy
According to a study by economist Angus Maddison, China was the world’s largest economy in 1820, accounting for
an estimated 32.9% of global GDP. However, foreign and civil wars, internal strife, weak and ineffective governments,
natural disasters (some of which were man-made), and distortive economic policies caused China’s share of global
GDP on a PPP basis to shrink significantly. By 1952, China’s share of global GDP had fallen to 5.2%, and by 1978, it slid
to 4.9%.19 The adoption of economic reforms by China in the late 1970s led to a surge in China’s economic growth
and has helped restore China as a major global economic power.
Source: The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Chinese Economic Performance in the Long
Run, 960-2030, by Angus Maddison, 2007.
Figure 6. Chinese and U.S. GDP on a PPP Basis: 1980-2014
($trillions)
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook.
The PPP measurement also raises China’s 2014 nominal per capita GDP (from $7,589) to
$12,880, which was 24% of the U.S. level. Even with continued rapid economic growth it would
likely take many years for Chinese living standards to approach U.S. levels. The EIU projects
that, even by the year 2050, Chinese living standards will be 47% those of the United States.20
China as the World’s Largest Manufacturer
China has emerged as the world’s largest manufacturer according to the United Nations. Figure 7
lists estimates of the gross value added of manufacturing in China, the United States, and Japan
expressed in U.S. dollars for 2004 to 2013. Gross value added data reflect the actual value of
manufacturing that occurred in the country (i.e., they subtract the value of intermediate inputs and
raw materials used in production). These data indicate that China overtook Japan as the world’s
19 In comparison, the U.S. share of global GDP was estimated to have risen from 1.8% in 1820 to 27.5% in 1952, but
declined to 21.6% by 1978.
20 EIU database, surveyed on March 25, 2015.
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second-largest manufacturer on a gross value added basis in 2006 and the United States in 2010.
In 2013, the value of China’s manufacturing on a gross value added basis was 35.1% higher than
that in the United States. Manufacturing plays a considerably more important role in the Chinese
economy than it does for the United States and Japan. In 2013, China’s gross valued added
manufacturing was equal to 28.9% of GDP, compared to 12.1% for the United States and 18.7%
for Japan.21
In its 2013 Global Manufacturing Competitiveness Index, Deloitte (an international consulting
firm) ranked China first in manufacturing in 2013 and projected it would remain so in five years
(the United States ranked third in 2013 and was projected to rank fifth in 2018). The report stated
that “China’s competitiveness is bolstered by conducive policy environment either encouraging or
directly funding investments in science and technology, employee education and infrastructure
development,” and further stated that “the landscape for competitive manufacturing is in the
midst of a massive power shift, in which twentieth-century manufacturing stalwarts like the
United States, Germany and Japan will be challenged to maintain their competitive edge to
emerging nations, including China.”22
Figure 7. Gross Value Added Manufacturing in China, the United States, and Japan:
2004-2013
($ billions)
3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
China
United States
Japan
Source: United Nations, UNdata.
21 United Nations, UNdata, available at
http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=SNAAMA&f=grID%3a201%3bcurrID%3aUSD%3bpcFlag%3a0.
22 Deloitte, Press Release, January 22, 2013, available at http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_CN/cn/Pressroom/pr/
105280463d16c310VgnVCM2000003356f70aRCRD.htm. The index was based on a survey of 550 chief executive
officers and senior leaders in manufacturing companies around the world.
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Changes in China’s Wage Advantage
China’s huge population and relatively low wage rates gave it a significant competitive advantage
when economic reforms and trade liberalization were first begun by the government in the late
1970s. However, this advantage appears to be eroding as wages in China have risen in recent
years. From 2005 to 2014, Chinese wages rose by 309%. As indicated in Figure 8, China’s
average monthly wages (converted into U.S. dollars) in 2005 were $187 compared with $381 per
month for Mexico (China’s wages were 49% the size of Mexican wages).23 However, in 2014,
China’s average monthly wages at $763 were 72.2% higher than those in Mexico ($443). A 2014
survey by the U.S.-China Business Council indicated that a majority of U.S. firms American
surveyed reported that they have been increasing wages between five and ten percent annually for
at least the last three years and they anticipate this trend would continue as the labor market
becomes even tighter.24 Rising labor costs are one of the main reasons why the Chinese
government has focused on boosting the nation’s innovation and productivity levels.25
Figure 8. Average Monthly Wages for Selected Countries: 2000-2014
(U.S. dollars)
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.
Notes: Because data are listed in U.S. dol ars rather than local currency, changes to monthly
wages may also partial y reflect changes to exchange rates with the U.S. dol ar. However, such
23 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Data Tool.
24 U.S. China Business Council, USCBC 2014 China Business Environment Survey Results: Growth Continues Amidst
Rising Competition, Policy Uncertainty, 2014, at
https://www.uschina.org/sites/default/files/USCBC%202014%20China%20Business%20Environment%20Survey%20
Results%20%28English%29_0.pdf.
25 Despite rising labor costs, China continues to enjoy a significant excess supply of labor, estimated by the IMF to be
currently at 150 million. However, that level is projected to fall to around 30 million by 2020. See IMF, 2012 Article IV
Report, People’s Republic of China, July 2012, p. 8.
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data reflect average labor costs that U.S.-invested firms might face in their overseas
operations.
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in China
China’s trade and investment reforms and incentives led to a surge in FDI beginning in the early
1990s. Such flows have been a major source of China’s productivity gains and rapid economic
and trade growth. There were reportedly 445,244 foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) registered in
China in 2010, employing 55.2 million workers or 15.9% of the urban workforce.26 As indicated
in Figure 9, FIEs account for a significant share of China’s industrial output. That level rose from
2.3% in 1990 to a high of 35.9% in 2003, but fell to 25.9% as of 2011.27 In addition, FIEs are
responsible for a significant level of China’s foreign trade. In 2014, FIEs in China accounted for
45.9% of China’s exports and 46.4% of its imports, although this level was down from its peak in
2006 when FIEs’ share of Chinese exports and imports was 58.2% and 59.7%, respectively, as
indicated in Figure 10.28 FIEs in China dominate China’s high technology exports. From 2002 to
2010, the share of China’s high tech exports by FIEs rose from 79% to 82%. During the same
period, the share of China’s high tech exports by wholly owned foreign firms (which excludes
foreign joint ventures with Chinese firms) rose from 55% to 67%.
Figure 9. Industrial Output by Foreign-Invested Firms in China as a Share
of National Output Total: 1990-2011
(percent)
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Source: Invest in China (http://www.fdi.gov.cn) and China’s 2012 Statistical Yearbook.
26 China 2012 Statistical Yearbook.
27 Industrial output is defined by the Chinese government as the total volume of final industrial products produced and
industrial services provided during a given period. Source: China 2012 Statistical Yearbook.
28 For January-June 2014, the shares for exports and imports were 46.6% and 45.1%, respectively.
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Figure 10. Share of China’s Exports and Imports
Attributed to Foreign-Invested Enterprises in China: 1990-2014
(percent)
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Exports
Imports
Source: Invest in China (http://www.fdi.gov.cn).
According to the United Nations, annual FDI flows to China grew from $2 billion in 1985 to
$128 billion in 2014 (see Figure 11). The U.N. further estimates the stock of FDI in China
through 2013 at nearly $1.1 trillion.29 As indicated in Figure 12, China was the world’s largest
destination for FDI inflows flows in 2014 (followed by Hong Kong and the United States).30
According to Chinese government data on non-financial FDI inflows, the largest sources of
cumulative FDI in China for 1979-2014 were Hong Kong (48.9%),31 the British Virgin Islands
(BVI), Japan, the United States, and Taiwan (see Table 2).32 The largest sources of non-financial
FDI inflows into China in 2014 were Hong Kong (71.7% of total), Singapore, Taiwan, Japan, and
South Korea (the United States ranked 6th). According to Chinese data, annual U.S. non-financial
FDI flows to China peaked at $5.4 billion in 2002 (10.2% of total FDI in China). In 2014, they
were $2.7 billion or 2.3% of total FDI flows to China (see Figure 13).33 According to Chinese
data, the stock of U.S. non-financial FDI in China (based on Chinese data) was $77.6 billion
29 U.N. data differ from Chinese data, in part because Chinese data include only nonfinancial FDI.
30 According to the United Nations, the United States was the largest source of FDI flows in 2013. The fall in the U.S.
ranking in 2014 was largely the result of $130 billion buy-back of shares by the U.S. firm Verizon from the British firm
Vodafone (which reduced the level of U.S. equity inflows).
31 Much of the FDI originating from Hong Kong may originate from other foreign investors, such as Taiwan. In
addition, some Chinese investors might be using these locations to shift funds overseas in order to re-invest in China to
take advantage of preferential investment policies (this practice is often referred to as “round-tipping”). Thus, the actual
level of FDI in China may be overstated.
32 Cumulative values are totals of the data collected each year, are not adjusted for inflation, and do not reflect
divestment that may have occurred.
33 U.S. data on bilateral FDI flows with China differ significantly with Chinese data. For additional info on bilateral
FDI flows based on U.S. data, see CRS Report RL33536, China-U.S. Trade Issues, by Wayne M. Morrison.
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through 2014.34 According BEA, U.S. affiliates in China employed nearly $1.6 million workers in
2012 (the most recent year data are available).
Figure 11. Chinese Data on Annual FDI Inflows to China: 1985-2014
($ billions)
140
128
124
124
121
120
108
115
95
100
84
80
72 73
61
60
53 54
47
42 45 45
38
40 41
40
34
28
20
11
2 2 2 3 3 3 4
0
1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
Source: The United Nations.
Note: U.N. FDI data differ from that of official Chinese data.
34 These data are accumulated annul data on FDI flows reported by the Chinese government and do not reflect the
historic-cost value of current U.S. FDI in China.
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Figure 12. UN Estimates of the Largest Recipients of Global FDI Inflows in 2014
($ billions)
140
128
111
120
100
86
81
80
62
61
53
49
60
42
36
40
20
0
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Investment.
Note: U.N. FDI data on China’s FDI inflows differ from China’s official data.
Table 2. Chinese Data on Major Sources of FDI Flows to China: 1979-2014
($ billions and percentage of total)
Estimated Cumulative Utilized
FDI: 1979-2014
Utilized FDI in 2014
Country
Amount
% of Total
Amount
% of Total
Total 1,572.9
100.0
119.6
100.0
Hong Kong
768.5
48.9
85.7
71.7
British Virgin Islands*
111.8
7.1
NA
NA
Japan
98.7 6.3 4.3
3.6
United
States
77.3 4.9 2.7
2.3
Taiwan
75.3 4.8 5.2
4.3
Singapore
73.1 4.6 5.9
4.9
South
Korea
60.1 3.8 4.0
3.3
Source: Chinese Ministry of Commerce and Chinese Statistical Yearbook.
Notes: Ranked according to the top seven sources of FDI in China through 2014. * Data for the British Virgin
Islands are through 2010. China’s cumulative data are the sum of annual data and do not reflect disinvestment or
current value.
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Figure 13. Chinese Data on Annual U.S. FDI Inflows into China: 1985-2014
($ billions)
6
5.4
5
4.4
4.4
4.2
4.2
3.9
3.9
4
3.4
3.1
3.1 3.0
2.9
3.0
3
2.6
2.6
2.6
2.7
2.4
2
1
0.4 0.5
0
Source: Chinese Ministry of Commerce and Chinese Yearbook, various years.
Notes: Chinese and U.S. data on bilateral FDI flows differ sharply because of different methodologies used.
China’s Growing FDI Outflows
A key aspect of China’s economic modernization and growth strategy during the 1980s and 1990s
was to attract FDI into China to help boost the development of domestic firms. Investment by
Chinese firms abroad was sharply restricted. However, in 2000, China’s leaders initiated a new
“go global” strategy, which sought to encourage Chinese firms (primarily SOEs) to invest
overseas. One key factor driving this investment is China’s massive accumulation of foreign
exchange reserves. Traditionally, a significant level of those reserves has been invested in
relatively safe, but low-yielding, assets, such as U.S. Treasury securities. On September 29, 2007,
the Chinese government officially launched the China Investment Corporation (CIC) in an effort
to seek more profitable returns on its foreign exchange reserves and diversify away from its U.S.
dollar holdings. The CIC was originally funded at $200 billion, making it one of the world’s
largest sovereign wealth funds.35 Another factor behind the government’s drive to encourage more
outward FDI flows has been to obtain natural resources, such as oil and minerals, deemed by the
government as necessary to sustain China’s rapid economic growth.36 Finally, the Chinese
government has indicated its goal of developing globally competitive Chinese firms with their
own brands. Investing in foreign firms, or acquiring them, is viewed as a method for Chinese
35 See CRS Report RL34337, China’s Sovereign Wealth Fund, by Michael F. Martin.
36 Chinese oil and mineral companies are dominated by SOEs.
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firms to obtain technology, management skills, and often, internationally recognized brands,
needed to help Chinese firms become more globally competitive. For example, in April 2005,
Lenovo Group Limited, a Chinese computer company, purchased IBM Corporation’s personal
computer division for $1.75 billion.37 Similarly, overseas FDI in new plants and businesses is
viewed as developing multinational Chinese firms with production facilities and R&D operations
around the world. According to UN data, China’s annual FDI outflows rose from $12.3 billion in
2005 to $116 billion in 2014, an 843% increase (see Figure 14). According to UN estimates,
China ranked as the third-largest source of global FDI in 2014 (at $116 billion), up from sixth in
2011, (see Error! Reference source not found.).38 The stock of China’s outward FDI through
2014 is estimated at $646.3 billion.39
China’s FDI outflows by destination for 2013 (the most recent year country data are available) are
listed in Table 3. These data indicate that the largest destinations of the stock total Chinese FDI
through 2013 were Hong Kong (57.5% of total), the BVI, the Cayman Islands, the United States,
and Australia. In terms of annual Chinese FDI outflows, the largest recipients of the flows in 2013
were Hong Kong (58.3% of total), the Cayman Islands, the United States, Australia, and
Singapore. It seems highly likely that a significant level of Chinese FDI that goes to Hong Kong,
the BVI, and the Cayman Islands is redirected elsewhere.40 Many analysts contend that a large
share of FDI flows from China to Hong Kong represents “round tripping” where money flows
from Chinese entities shift money to Hong Kong, but then re-invest the money in China.
Table 3. Major Destinations of Chinese Non-Financial FDI Outflows in 2013:
Flows and Stock
($ billions)
Stock of FDI through
Share of FDI Stock
Destination
FDI Flows in 2013
2013
through 2013 (%)
Total 107.8
660.5
--
Hong Kong
62.8
377.1
57.1
British Virgin Islands
3.2
33.9
5.1
Cayman Islands
9.3
42.3
6.4
United States
3.9
21.9
3.3
Australia 3.5
17.4
2.6
Singapore 2.0
14.8
2.2
United Kingdom
1.4
11.8
1.8
Source: Chinese Ministry of Commerce.
Note: Ranked according to the top seven destinations of the stock of Chinese FDI outflows through 2013.
37 The Chinese government is believed to be Lenovo’s largest shareholder. For additional information on China’s FDI
flows to the United States, see CRS Report RL33536, China-U.S. Trade Issues, by Wayne M. Morrison.
38 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2014, July 3, 2014.
39 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
40 Some share of FDI flows into Hong Kong from China may be profits from Hong Kong-invested firms on the
mainland.
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Figure 14. UN Estimates of Chinese Annual FDI Outflows: 2000-2014
($ billions)
140
116.0
120
101.0
100
87.8
80
74.7
68.8
56.5
60
55.9
40
26.5
21.2
20
12.3
6.9
0.9
2.5
2.9
5.5
0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Source: Data for 2000-2013 are estimates made by the United Nations. Data for 2014 are from
the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and exclude FDI in financial assets.
Note: U.N. data on Chinese FDI differ from official Chinese data.
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Figure 15. Major Sources of Global FDI Outflows in 2014
$billions
400
337
350
300
250
200
150
150
116
114
112
100
56
56
52
41
41
50
0
Source:
United Nations, Global Investment Trends Monitor, May 18, 2015.
Notes: UN FDI data differ from Chinese data.
China’s Merchandise Trade Patterns
Economic reforms and trade and investment liberalization have helped transform China into a
major trading power. Chinese merchandise exports rose from $14 billion in 1979 to $2.3 trillion
in 2014, while merchandise imports grew from $18 billion to nearly $2.0 trillion (see Table 4 and
Figure 16). China’s rapidly growing trade flows have made it an increasingly important (and
often the largest) trading partner for many countries. According to the Chinese government,
China was the largest trading partner for 130 countries in 2013.41
From 1990 to 2014, the annual growth of China’s exports and imports averaged 18.0% and
16.6%, respectively (see Figure 17).42 China’s exports and imports in 2014 grew by 6.0% and
0.7%, respectively. China’s merchandise trade surplus grew sharply from 2004 to 2008, rising
from $32 billion to $297 billion. That surplus fell each year from 2009 to 2011, dropping to $158
billion. However, China’s trade surplus has risen in each of the past three years, and was $380
billion in 2014.
In 2009, China overtook Germany to become both the world’s largest merchandise exporter and
the second-largest merchandise importer (after the United States). In 2012, China overtook the
41 China.org.cn, “Promoting China-Japan relations through Culture,” June 18, 2014, at
http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2014-06/18/content_32690843.htm.
42 Chinese exports and imports dropped sharply in 2009 (over 2008 levels) because of the global economic slowdown.
By 2010, China’s trade had recovered and exceeded pre-crisis levels.
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United States as the world’s largest merchandise trading economy (exports plus imports).43 As
indicated in Figure 18, China’s share of global merchandise exports grew from 3.8% to 12.4%;44
the World Bank projects this figure could increase to 20% by 2030.45 Merchandise trade
surpluses, large-scale foreign investment, and large purchases of foreign currencies to maintain its
exchange rate with the dollar and other currencies, have enabled China to become by far the
world’s largest holder of foreign exchange reserves at $3.7 trillion as of March 2015.46
Table 4. China’s Merchandise World Trade: 1979-2014
($ billions)
Year Exports
Imports
Trade
Balance
1979 13.7
15.7
–2.0
1980 18.1
19.5
–1.4
1985 27.3
42.5
–15.3
1990 62.9
53.9
9.0
1995 148.8
132.1
16.7
2000 249.2
225.1
24.1
2001 266.2
243.6
22.6
2002 325.6
295.2
30.4
2003 438.4
412.8
25.6
2004 593.4
561.4
32.0
2005 762.0
660.1
101.9
2006 969.1
791.5
177.6
2007 1,218.0
955.8
262.2
2008
1,428.9
1,131.5
297.4
2009 1,202.0
1,003.9
198.2
2010 1,578.4
1,393.9
184.5
2011 1,899.3
1,741.4
157.9
2012
2,050.1
1,817.3
232.8
2013
2,210.7
1,949.3
261.4
2014
2,343.2
1,963.1
380.1
Source: Global Trade Atlas.
Notes: Chinese data often differ from those of its trading partners.
43 In 2013, China became the largest trading economy for goods and services.
44 Economist Intelligence Unit, Data Tools.
45 The World Bank, China 2030, Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative High-Income Society, 2012, p. 14.
Hereinafter referred to as World Bank, China 2030.
46 China’s foreign exchange reserves peaked at nearly $4.0 trillion in August 2014.
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Figure 16. China’s Merchandise Trade: 2000-2014
($ billions)
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
380.1
262.2297.4
177.6
198.2184.5
232.8261.4
101.9
157.9
24.1 22.6 30.4 25.6 32
0
200020012002200320042005200620072008200920102011201220132014
Trade Balance
Exports
Imports
Source: World Trade Atlas.
Note: Chinese data often differ from those of its trading partners.
Figure 17. Annual Change in China’s Merchandise Exports and Imports: 1990-2015*
(percent)
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
-10.0
-20.0
-30.0
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
5
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
ar 201
M
Exports
Imports
Jan-
Source: Global Trade Atlas using official Chinese data.
Note: * Data for 2015 are for January-March 2015, year on year change.
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Figure 18. China’s Share of Global Merchandise Exports: 1990-2014
(percent)
14.0
12.2
11.8
12.0
11.2
10.310.4
9.5
10.0
8.6 8.9
7.9
8.0
7.2
6.3
5.7
6.0
4.9
4.2
3.8
4.0
3.3 3.4 3.3
2.8 2.9 2.8
1.8 2.1 2.3 2.5
2.0
0.0
0
2
4
6
8
0
2
4
6
8
0
2
14
199
199
199
199
199
200
200
200
200
200
201
201
20
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.
China’s Major Trading Partners
Table 5 lists official Chinese trade data on its seven largest trading partners in 2014 (based on
total trade). These include the 28 countries that make up the European Union (EU28), the United
States, the 10 nations that constitute the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Hong
Kong, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.47 China’s top three export markets were the United
States, the EU28, and Hong Kong, while its top sources for imports were the EU28, ASEAN, and
South Korea. According to Chinese data, it maintained large trade surpluses with Hong Kong
($350 billion), the United States ($243 billion), and the EU28 ($127 billion), and reported large
trade imbalances with Taiwan ($106 billion) and South Korea ($93 billion). China’s trade data
differ significantly from those of many of its trading partners. These differences appear to be
largely caused by how China’s trade via Hong Kong is counted in official Chinese trade data.
China treats a large share of its exports through Hong Kong as Chinese exports to Hong Kong for
statistical purposes, while many countries that import Chinese products through Hong Kong
generally attribute their origin to China for statistical purposes, including the United States.48
47 ASEAN members include Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), the Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
48 See CRS Report RS22640, What’s the Difference?—Comparing U.S. and Chinese Trade Data, by Michael F.
Martin.
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Table 5. China’s Major Trading Partners in 2014
($ billions)
Chinese
Chinese
China’s Trade
Country Total
Trade
Exports
Imports
Balance
European
Union
614.8 370.9 243.9 127.0
United
States
549.2 396.1 153.1 243.0
ASEAN 479.8
271.7
208.1
63.6
Hong Kong
376.1
362.2
12.9
350.3
Japan
312.2
149.5
162.7
-12.2
South Korea
293.7
100.4
193.3
-92.9
Taiwan 198.6
46.3
152.3
-106.0
Sources: Global Trade Atlas and World Trade Atlas.
Notes: Rankings according to China’s total trade in 2014. China’s bilateral trade data often differ from that of its
trading partners.
Major Chinese Trade Commodities
China’s abundance of low-cost labor has made it internationally competitive in many low-cost,
labor-intensive manufactures. As a result, manufactured products constitute a significant share of
China’s trade. A substantial amount of China’s imports is comprised of parts and components that
are assembled into finished products, such as consumer electronic products and computers, and
then exported. Often, the value-added to such products in China by Chinese workers is relatively
small compared to the total value of the product when it is shipped abroad.
China’s top 10 exports and imports in 2014 are listed in Table 6 and Table 7, respectively, using
the harmonized tariff system (HTS) on a two-digit level. Major exports included electrical
machinery,49 machinery (including computers), furniture and bedding, and knit apparel, while
major imports included electrical machinery, mineral fuel, machinery, and ores.
49 This includes electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television
image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles.
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Table 6. Major Chinese Exports: 2014
($ billions)
Percent of
2014/2013
HS Code
Description
$ Billions Total Exports
% Change
85 Electrical
machinery
571
24.4%
1.7%
84 Machinery
401
17.1%
4.7%
94 Furniture
and
bedding
93
4.0%
8.1%
61 Knit
apparel
92
3.9%
-5.0%
62 Woven
apparel
81
3.5%
19.3%
90
Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring
74 3.2% -0.9%
checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments
and apparatus; parts and accessories thereof
39 Plastics
67
2.9%
8.2%
87
Vehicles, except railway (mainly auto parts, motorcycles,
64 2.7% 9.6%
trucks, and bicycles)
71
Precious stones and metals
63
2.7%
26.2%
73
Iron and steel products
61
2.6%
5.8%
Source: World Trade Atlas, using official Chinese statistics.
Note: Top 10 exports in 2014, two-digit level, harmonized tariff system.
Table 7. Major Chinese Imports: 2014
($ billions)
Percent of
2014/2013
HS Code
Description
$ billions Total Imports
% change
85 Electrical
machinery
425
21.7%
-3.2%
27
Mineral fuel, oil etc.
317
16.1%
0.7%
84 Machinery
180
9.2%
5,3%
26
Ores, slag, and ash
136
6.9%
-8.1%
90
Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring,
106 5.4% -1.8%
checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments
and apparatus; parts and accessories thereof
87
Vehicles, not railway (mainly autos and parts)
89
4.6%
20.7%
98 Special
Classification
83
4.2%
-20.9%
39 Plastics
75
3.8%
3.9%
29 Organic
chemicals
61
3.1%
-7.6%
74
Copper and articles thereof
48
2.4%
-5.4%
Source: World Trade Atlas, using official Chinese statistics.
Note: Top 10 imports in 2014, two-digit level, harmonized tariff schedule.
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China’s Regional and Bilateral Free Trade Agreements
The Chinese government has maintained an active policy of boosting trade and investment ties
around the world, especially with countries in Asia.50 To that end, China has entered into a
number of regional and bilateral trade agreements, or is in the process of doing so. China
currently has free trade agreements (FTAs) with ASEAN, Chile, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, Iceland,
Macau, New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, Singapore, and Switzerland. China also has an “economic
cooperation framework agreement” (ECFA) with Taiwan, which is the equivalent to an FTA.
China is currently in the process of negotiating FTAs with the Cooperation Council for the Arab
States of the Gulf (which includes Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and
Bahrain), Australia, Norway, and the Southern African Customs Union (which includes South
Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland), Sri Lanka, Japan, and South Korea.51
China has also considered negotiating FTAs with India, Columbia, Moldova, and Maldives.
In December 2012, China joined with the 10 members of ASEAN, Japan, South Korea, Australia,
and New Zealand to begin negotiations toward a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
(RCEP), which, if concluded, could constitute the world’s largest free trade bloc (in terms of
combined population and GDP).52 In November 2014, during the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) summit in Beijing, Chinese President Xi called for renewed efforts to
achieve a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) agreement, an idea that was first proposed
over a decade ago. China has also expressed interest in joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP) negotiations, a proposed FTA that currently includes the United States and 11 other
countries.53
Major Long-Term Challenges Facing the
Chinese Economy
China’s economy has shown remarkable growth over the past several years, and many economists
project that it will enjoy fairly healthy growth in the near future. However, economists caution
that these projections are likely to occur only if China continues to make major reforms to its
economy. Failure to implement such reforms could endanger future growth. They note that
China’s current economic model has resulted in a number of negative economic (and social)
outcomes, such as over-reliance on fixed investment and exporting for its economic growth,
extensive inefficiencies that exist in many sectors (due largely to government industrial policies),
50 The Chinese government states that it deems FTAs as “a new platform to further opening up to the outside and
speeding up domestic reforms, and speeding up domestic reforms, an effective approach to integrate into global
economy and strengthen economic cooperation with other economies, as well as particularly an important supplement
to the multilateral trading system.”
51 China has held individual FTA talks with South Korea and Japan with the goal of a forming a trilateral FTA. China is
also negotiating with ASEAN for an upgraded FTA.
China is also negotiating with ASEAN
52 The RCEP countries combined have 3 billion people and total GDP of $17 trillion.
53 On the one hand, Chinese official news media has often criticized the TPP as an effort to economically isolate China.
However, in recent years, China’s media has indicated that the Chinese government may be interested in joining the
TPP. For example, in May 2013, Xinhua News Agency reported that the Chinese government “would study the
possibility of joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, and that “China
hoped to exchange information and materials with TPP members on the negotiations.”
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wide-spread pollution, and growing income inequality, to name a few. Many of China’s economic
problems and challenges stem from its incomplete transition to a free market economy and from
imbalances that have resulted from the government’s goal of economic growth at all costs.
China’s Incomplete Transition to a Market Economy
Despite China’s three-decade history of widespread economic reforms, Chinese officials contend
that China is a “socialist-market economy.” This appears to indicate that the government accepts
and allows the use of free market forces in a number of areas to help grow the economy, but the
government still plays a major role in the country’s economic development.
Industrial Policies and SOEs
According to the World Bank, “China has become one of the world’s most active users of
industrial policies and administrations.”54 China’s SOEs may account for up of 50% of non-
agriculture GDP.55 In addition, although the number of SOEs has declined sharply, they continue
to dominate a number of sectors (such as petroleum and mining, telecommunications, utilities,
transportation, and various industrial sectors); are shielded from competition; are the main sectors
encouraged to invest overseas; and dominate the listings on China’s stock indexes.56 One study
found that SOEs constituted 50% of the 500 largest manufacturing companies in China and 61%
of the top 500 service sector enterprises.57 It is estimated that there were 154,000 SOEs as of
2008, and while these accounted for only 3.1% of all enterprises in China, they held 30% of the
value of corporate assets in the manufacturing and services sectors.58 Of the 95 Chinese firms on
the 2014 Fortune Global 500 list, 82 were identified as having government ownership of 50% or
more.59 The World Bank estimates that more than one in four SOEs lose money.60
A Weak Banking Sector and Growing National Debt
China’s banking system is largely controlled by the central government, which attempts to ensure
that capital (credit) flows to industries deemed by the government to be essential to China’s
economic development. SOEs are believed to receive preferential credit treatment by government
banks, while private firms must often pay higher interest rates or obtain credit elsewhere.
According to one estimate, SOEs accounted for 85% ($1.4 trillion) of all bank loans in 2009.61 In
54 The World Bank, China: 2030, p. 114.
55 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, An Analysis of State-owned Enterprises and State
Capitalism in China, by Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, October 26, 2011, p.1.
56 The nature of China’s SOEs has become increasing complex. Many SOEs appear to be run like private companies.
For example, and a number of SOEs have made initial public offerings in China’s stock markets and those in other
countries (including the United States), although the Chinese government is usually the largest shareholder. It is not
clear to what extent the Chinese government attempts to influence decisions made by the SOE’s which have become
shareholding companies.
57 Xiao Geng, Xiuke Yang, and Anna Janus, State-owned Enterprises in China, Reform Dynamics and Impacts, 2009,
p. 155.
58 The World Bank, State-Owned Enterprises in China: How Big Are They?, January 19, 2010.
59 Fortune, Global 500, 2014, available at http://fortune.com/global500/.
60 World Bank, China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative Society, February 2012, p. 25.
61 The Economist, State Capitalism’s Global Reach, New Masters of the Universe, How State Enterprise is Spreading,
(continued...)
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addition, the government sets interest rates for depositors at very low rates, often below the rate
of inflation, which keeps the price of capital relatively low for firms.62 It is believed that
oftentimes SOEs do not repay their loans, which may have saddled the banks with a large amount
of nonperforming loans. Some contend these measures could further add to the amount of
nonperforming loans held by the banks. Many analysts contend that one of the biggest
weaknesses of the banking system is that it lacks the ability to ration and allocate credit according
to market principles, such as risk assessment.
Local government debt is viewed as a growing problem in China, largely because of the potential
impact it could have on the Chinese banking system. During the beginning of the global financial
slowdown, many Chinese subnational government entities borrowed extensively to help stimulate
local economies, especially by supporting infrastructure projects. In December 2013, the Chinese
National Audit Office reported that from the end of 2010 to mid-year 2013, local government
debt had increased by 67% to nearly $3 trillion.63
A 2015 report by the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) stated that high debt levels are prevalent
throughout the Chinese economy (especially the corporate sector), and that the combined debt of
Chinese corporations, government, households, and financial institutions China’s total debt rose
from $7 trillion in 2007 to $28 trillion by mid-2014. China’s debt as of mid-2014 was equivalent
to 282% of China’s GDP, which was higher than the total U.S. level of 269% of GDP).64 The
report indicated that the rapid increase in China’s debt levels was largely caused by real estate and
shadow banking loans.65 While many analysts contend that the Chinese government has the
resources to intervene to stem a potential economic crisis caused by China’s high debt levels,
others warn that the rapid increase in debt is unsustainable and argue that much of the debt
incurred may have involved wasteful spending on projects that will likely do little to enhance
future economic growth.
Many economists blame China’s closed capital account for a much of China’s debt problems. The
Chinese government has maintained restrictions on capital inflows and outflows for many years,
in part to control the exchange of its currency, the renminbi (RMB), against the dollar and other
currencies in order to boost exports. Many argue the Chinese government’s restrictions on capital
flows has greatly distorted financial markets in China, preventing the most efficient use of capital,
such as over-investment in some sectors (such as real estate) and under-investment in others (such
as services).
(...continued)
January 21, 2012, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21542925.
62 Some economists argue that a significant portion of China’s SOEs could not stay in business if they had to pay a
market-based interest rate for credit.
63 The Wall Street Journal, Xi Faces Test over China’s Local Debt; Risks From Debt are Still Controllable, Audit
Office Says, December 30, 2013.
64 The breakdown of Chinese debt by sector as a percent of GDP was as follows: non-financial corporations (125%),
financial institutions (65%), government (55%), and households (38%).
65 MGI, Debt and (not Much) Deleveraging, February 2015, available at
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/economic_studies/debt_and_not_much_deleveraging#.
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Large Internal Imbalances of Savings, Fixed Investment, and Consumption
Many economists contend that China’s economic model has produced large internal imbalances,
characterized by high savings and fixed investment and relatively low private consumption,
which may no longer sustainable. As indicated in Figure 19, from 1990 to 2014, Chinese gross
savings as a percent of GDP and gross fixed investment as a percent of GDP both increased
significantly, while private consumption as a percent of GDP declined sharply.66 In addition, as
indicated in Figure 20, personal disposable income in China as a share of GDP was lower in 2014
(44.0%) than it was in 2000 (47.9%).67 China’s gross savings as a percent of GDP and gross fixed
investment as a percent of GDP are the highest among any of the world’s largest economies,
while China’s private consumption as a share of GDP is among the lowest.68 These data would
imply that Chinese households have not benefited as much from China’s economic growth as
other sectors of the economy.
Many economists contend that the falling share of private consumption and disposable income
relative to GDP is largely caused by two main factors: China’s banking policies and the lack of an
adequate social safety net. The Chinese government places restrictions on the export of capital.
As a result, Chinese households put a large share of their savings in domestic banks. The Chinese
government sets the interest rate on deposits. Often this rate is below the rate of inflation, which
lowers household income. Some economists consider this policy to constitute a transfer of wealth
from Chinese households to Chinese firms which benefit from low interest rates. This “tax” on
household income negatively affects household consumption. Secondly, China’s lack of an
adequate social safety net (such as pensions, health care, unemployment insurance, and
education) induces households to save a large portion of their income. According to one estimate,
between 1982 and 2012, the average urban household saving rate rose from 12% to 32%.69
Corporations are also a major contributor to the high savings rate in China. Many Chinese firms,
especially SOEs, do not pay out dividends and thus are able to retain most of their earnings.
Many economists contend that requiring the SOEs to pay dividends could boost private
consumption in China if the money was then used to help fund social welfare programs. Chinese
economic policies have resulted in gross fixed investment being the main engine of the country’s
economic growth for every year from 2000 to 2014. (In 2011 gross fixed investment and private
consumptions each accounted for 3.0 percentage points; see Figure 19.)70
A 2009 IMF report estimated that fixed investment related to tradable goods plus net exports
together accounted for over 60% of China’s GDP growth from 2001 to 2008 (up from 40% from
1990 to 2000), which was significantly higher than in the G-7 countries (16%), the euro area
(30%), and the rest of Asia (35%).71 The global financial crisis led to a sharp fall in demand for
Chinese exports, which helped sharply reduced China’s trade surpluses. The Chinese government
66 Over the past few years, savings as a percent of GDP has fallen (from 52.1% in 2010 to 48.6% in 2014), while
private consumption has risen from 34.9% to 36.8%). However, fixed investment as a percent of GDP has renamed
near its historic highs.
67 Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.
68 Chinese private consumption as a percent of GDP in 2013 was 36.4%. Rates for other countries include the United
States (at 68.3%), Brazil (62.9%), Japan (61.4%), Germany (57.6%), India (56.1%), and Russia (51.3%). Source: EIU.
69 London School of Economic, The One-Child Policy and Household Savings, LSE working papers, September 18,
2014, p.1. The authors contend that China’s one child policy is largely the cause of the rise in household savings,
70 The last time private consumption was the largest contributor to GDP was 1999.
71 Guo, Kai and Papa N’Diaye, Is China’s Export-Oriented Growth Sustainable, IMF Working Paper, August 2009
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responded in part by sharply increasing spending on fixed investment. As a result, fixed
investment as a share of GDP rose from 40.5% in 2008 to 45.9% in 2013.
Figure 19. Chinese Gross Savings, Gross Fixed Investment, and
Private Consumption as a Percent of GDP: 1990-2013
(percent)
60.0
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0
1
2
3
4
199
199
199
199
199
199
199
199
199
199
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
201
201
201
201
201
Private consumption
Gross fixed investment
Gross national savings
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.
Figure 20. Chinese Disposable Personal Income as a Percent of GDP: 2000-2014
(percent)
50.0
47.9 47.6 47.7
48.0
47.0
46.0
45.3
44.6
44.0
42.3
42.6
42.1
41.9
42.0
41.4
41.6 41.5
40.0
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.
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Figure 21. Sources of Chinese GDP Growth: 2007-2014: Percentage Points
(percent)
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Gross fixed investment
Private consumption
External balance
Government consumption
Stockbuilding
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.
Growing Pollution
China’s economic growth model has emphasized the growth of heavy industry in China, much of
which is energy-intensive and high polluting. The level of pollution in China continues to worsen,
posing serious health risks to the population. The Chinese government often disregards its own
environmental laws in order to promote rapid economic growth. China’s environmental
challenges are illustrated by the following incidents and reports:
• A 2014 OECD report estimated the health costs of China’s air pollution in 2010
at $1.4 trillion.72
• The U.S. Embassy in Beijing, which monitors and reports air quality in China
based on an air quality index of particle matter (developed by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency) considered to pose a health concern, reported
that the air quality in Beijing for a majority of the days in January 2013 ranged
from “unhealthy” to “hazardous” (based on 24-hour exposure) and, on a few
days, it recorded high readings that were “beyond index.”73 The level of poor air
quality in Beijing was termed by some in China as “Airpocalypse,” and
reportedly forced the government to shut down some factories and reduce the
level of official cars on the road.74 On December 9, 2013, China’s media reported
that half of China was blanketed by smog.75 The U.S. Consulate General in
72 OECD, the Cost of Air Pollution: Health Impacts of Road Transportation, 2014, p. 12.
73 Hazardous is the worst category for air quality used by the U.S. embassy, based on a numerical value of its index
ranging from 301 to 500. A measurement of below 50 is considered good. On several occasions, the air quality index in
Beijing has surpassed 500, and on January 12, 2013, it reportedly hit 755.
74 National Public Radio, “Beijing’s ‘Airpocalypse’ Spurs Pollution Controls, Public Pressure,” January 14, 2013.
75 Xinhua, December 9, 2013.
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Shanghai reported that were a number of days in December 2013 where its
measurement of the air quality in Shanghai was hazardous or very unhealthy, and
during some time periods on December 5, 2013, its readings were “beyond
index.”
• In February 2013, China’s Geological Survey reportedly estimated that 90% of
all Chinese cities had polluted groundwater, with two-thirds having “severely
polluted” water.76
• According to a 2012 report by the Asian Development Bank, less than 1% of the
500 largest cities in China meet the air quality standards recommended by the
World Health Organization, and 7 of these are ranked among the 10 most
polluted cities in the world.77
• The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) projected in 2011 that by
2035, China’s carbon dioxide emissions (CO2) could be nearly double its current
levels.78 A study by ExxonMobil projects that, by 2030, China’s CO2 emissions
could equal the level in the United States and EU combined.79
• The World Health Organization estimated that air pollution in China caused the
death of 470,649 people in 2008.80
The Chinese government has sharply criticized foreign governments for reporting air quality in
China, calling their readings inaccurate and complaining that releasing such data violates
international conventions and Chinese laws.81 At the same time, China’s media has boosted its
reporting of China’s environmental problems in response to public anger, prompting central
government officials to promise new steps to reduce emissions. However, the central government
has often found it difficult to induce SOEs and local governments to comply with environmental
laws, especially when such officials feel doing so will come at the expense of economic growth.
Corruption and the Relative Lack of the Rule of Law
The relative lack of the rule of law in China has led to widespread government corruption,
financial speculation, and misallocation of investment funds. In many cases, government
“connections,” not market forces, are the main determinant of successful firms in China. Many
U.S. firms find it difficult to do business in China because rules and regulations are generally not
consistent or transparent, contracts are not easily enforced, and intellectual property rights are not
protected (due to the lack of an independent judicial system). The relative lack of the rule of law
and widespread government corruption in China limit competition and undermine the efficient
allocation of goods and services in the economy. A New York Times article reported that (former)
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s family controlled assets worth at least $2.7 billion.82 One study
76 New York Times, “Concerns Grow About ‘Severely Polluted’ Water in China’s Cities,” February 20, 2013.
77 The Asian Development Bank, Toward an Environmentally Sustainable Future, Country Environmental Analysis of
the People’s Republic of China, 2012, p. xviii.
78 EIA, International Energy Outlook, September 19, 2011, available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/ieo.
79 ExxonMobil, The Outlook for Energy, A View to 2030, December 29, 2009, p. 4.
80 World Health Organization chart at http://gamapserver.who.int/gho/interactive_charts/phe/oap_mbd/atlas.html.
81 See Xinhua, “Foreign Embassies’ Air Data Issuing Inaccurate, Unlawful: Official,” June 5, 2012, at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-06/05/c_131633044.htm.
82 New York Times, “Billions in Hidden Riches for Family of Chinese Leader,” October 25, 2012.
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estimates that between 2001 and 2010, China was the world’s largest source of illicit capital
outflows at $3.8 trillion.83 A 2012 survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project
reported that 50% of respondents said that corrupt officials are a very big problem (up from 39%
in 2008).84 Chinese officials often identify government corruption as the greatest threat to the
Chinese Communist Party and the state. The Chinese government’s anti-corruption watchdog
reported that 106,000 officials were found guilty of corruption in 2009.85 Since assuming power
in 2012, Chinese Xi Jinping has carried out an extensive ant-corruption drive. China has
reportedly sought cooperation with the United States to obtain extradition of 150 alleged corrupt
officials who have fled to the United States.86 However, many analysts contend that government
anti-corruption campaigns are mainly used to settle political scores with out-of-favor officials.
Some analysts contend that President’s Xi anti-corruption drive is more about consolidating his
own political than instituting reforms.87 In addition, there are some indicators that the current ant-
corruption campaign may be having a negative impact on the Chinese economy, due to hesitancy
by some local officials to pursue projects they feel will lead to scrutiny from the central
government.88 Many observers and argue that meaningful progress against government corruption
cannot occur without greater government transparency, a system of checks and balances, a free
press, Internet freedom, and an independent judiciary.89
China maintains a weak and relatively decentralized government structure to regulate economic
activity in China. Laws and regulations often go unenforced or are ignored by local government
officials. As a result, many firms cut corners in order to maximize profits. This has led to a
proliferation of unsafe food and consumer products being sold in China or exported abroad. Lack
of government enforcement of food safety laws led to a massive recall of melamine-tainted infant
milk formula that reportedly killed at least four children and sickened 53,000 others in 2008.
Demographic Challenges
Many economists contend that China’s demographic policies, particularly its one-child policy
(first implemented in 1979), are beginning to have a significant impact on the Chinese economy.
For example, according to a McKinsey Global Institute study, China’s fertility rate fell from about
5.8 births per woman in 1964 to 1.6 in 2012.90 This is now affecting the size of the Chinese
workforce.
83 Global Financial Integrity, Chinese Economy Lost $3.79 Trillion in Illicit Financial Outflows Since 2000, Reveals
New GFI Report, October 25, 2012. It is not known how much of the illicit financial outflows in China are directly
linked to government corruption.
84 Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, Growing Concerns in China about Inequality, Corruption, October 16, 2012.
85 BBC News, “Corruption Up Among China Government Officials,” January 8, 2010.
86 The Atlantic Monthly, How to Discipline 90 Million People, April 2015, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/04/xi-jinping-china-corruption-political-culture/389787/
87 The Washington Post, China’s Leader, Xi Jinping, Consolidates Power with Crackdowns on Corruption, Internet,
October 3, 2013.
88 A study reportedly issue by Bank of America Merrill Lynch estimated that China’s current anti-graft campaign
would cost the Chinese economy more than $100 billion. See, BBC, China Blog, the Real Costs of China's Anti-
Corruption Crackdown, April 2, 2014, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-china-blog-26864134.
89 New York Times, “Chinese Officials Find Misbehavior Now Carries Cost,” December 25, 2012.
90McKinsey Global Institute, Can Long-Term Global Growth be Saved?, January 2015, available at
http://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/dotcom/Insights/Growth/Can%20long-
term%20global%20growth%20be%20saved/MGI_Global_growth_Full_report_February_2015pdf.ashx
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The existence of a large and underemployed labor force was a significant factor in China’s rapid
economic growth when economic reforms were first introduced. Such a large labor force meant
that firms in China had access to a nearly endless supply of low-cost labor, which helped enable
many firms to become more profitable, which in turn led them to boost investment and
production. Some economists contend that China is beginning to lose this labor advantage.
China’s working population has reportedly fallen for three straight years (in 2014, it reportedly
dropped by 3.7 million people).91 McKinsey Global Institute predicts that over the next 50 years,
China’s labor force could shrink by one-fifth. Some economists contend such factors will lead to
much smaller rates of future economic growth. As the labor force shrinks, Chinese wages could
begin to rise faster than productivity and profits growth, which could make Chinese firms less
competitive, and result in a shift of labor–intensive manufacturing overseas.92
The one-child policy has also resulted in a rapidly-aging society in China.93 According to the
Brooking’s Institute, China already has 180 million people aged over 60, and this could reach 240
million by 2020 and 360 million by 2030. The population share of people aged over 60 could
reach 20% by 2020, and to 27% by 2030.94 With a declining working population and a rising
elderly population, the Chinese government will face challenges trying to boost worker
productivity (such as enhancing innovation and high-end technology development) and to expand
spending on health care and elderly services.
Plans Announced by the Chinese Government
to Reform and Restructure the Economy
Various government officials have publicly stated the need for China to change course from its
traditional economic growth model of growth at all cost to one that balances economic growth
with a number of social goals in order to develop a “socialist harmonious society,” and to further
modernize the economy. In March 2007, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao stated that there are
“structural problems in China’s economy which cause unsteady, unbalanced, uncoordinated and
unsustainable development.” He defined “unsteady development” as overheated investment,
excessive credit and liquidity, and merchandise trade and current account surpluses. “Unbalanced
development” was described as economic disparities between rural and urban areas, regions of
the country, and between economic and social development. “Uncoordinated development” was
described as the lack of balance between various sectors of the economy (especially in regards to
the services sector) and between investment and consumption (i.e., economic growth is mainly
driven by investment and exports rather than consumer demand). Lastly, “unsustainable
development” referred to problems caused by China’s inefficient use of energy and resources and
failure to protect the environment.
91 The Washington Post, One is enough: Chinese Families Lukewarm over Easing of One-Child Policy, January 27,
2015, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/one-is-enough-chinese-families-lukewarm-over-
easing-of-one-child-policy/2015/01/22/bdfeff1e-9d7e-11e4-86a3-1b56f64925f6_story.html.
92 International Monetary Fund, the End of Cheap Labor, June 2013, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2013/06/das.htm.
93 Some analysts contend that because of it demographics, China will grow old before it grows rich.
94 Brookings Institute, Racing Towards the Precipice, by: Feng Wang, June 2012, available at
http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2012/06/china-demographics-wang.
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The Central Government Five-Year Plans
China’s last two five-year plans (FYP), the 11th FYP (2006-2010) and the 12th FYP (2011-2015),
have placed strong emphasis on promoting consumer demand, addressing income disparities
(such as by boosting spending on social safety net programs), boosting energy efficiency,
reducing pollution, improving the rule of law, and deepening economic reforms. Those plans have
also identified a number of industries and technologies that the government has targeted for
development (see text box).
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China’s 12th Five-Year Plan95
China’s Five-Year Plans (FYPs) have been issued by the government since 1953. The FYP is the major vehicle for the
government to establish broad economic and social goals for the time period under consideration, to coordinate
investments between the central and local governments, and to oversee implementation of policy. Not only does the
plan influence investments by government entities, it also provides direction for bank lending and government
approvals and regulation of private and semi-private industries. In March 2011, China’s National People’s Congress
approved the 12th Five-Year Plan (covering the years 2011 to 2015).
The 12th FYP (2011-2015) contains three broad themes or areas of focus: (1) economic restructuring, (2) promoting
greater social equality, and (3) protecting the environment. Chinese industrial policy comes into play primarily in
economic restructuring but also is apparent in the other areas of focus. Particularly noteworthy is the targeting of
seven strategic emerging industries that are intended to become the backbone of China’s economy in the future and
to be able to compete well on a global scale. These seven industries are (1) biotechnology; (2) new energy; (3) high-
end equipment manufacturing; (4) energy conservation and environmental protection; (5) clean-energy vehicles; (6)
new materials; and (7) next-generation information technology. The government reportedly intends to spend up to
$2.1 trillion on these industries during the 12th FYP. Some of the highlights of the FYP include the fol owing:
•
Achieving an average real GDP growth rate of 7% and ensuring that incomes rise at least as fast as GDP;
•
Consolidating inefficient sectors and promoting the services industry (with the goal of expanding service sector
output to account for 47% of GDP—up four percentage points from the current level);
•
Promoting energy saving and new energy industries; promoting the development of nuclear, water, wind, and
solar power; and expanding non-fossil fuel to account for 11.4% of primary energy consumption;
•
Welcoming foreign investment in modern agriculture, high-technology, and environmental protection industries;
•
Turning coastal regions from “world’s factory” to hubs of research and development, high-end manufacturing,
and services;
•
Lengthening high-speed railway and highway networks;
•
Increasing expenditure on R&D to account for 2.2% of GDP;
•
Expanding non-fossil fuel to account for 11.4% of primary energy consumption;
•
Cutting water consumption per unit of value-added industrial output by 30%, energy consumption per unit of
GDP by 16%, and carbon dioxide emission per unit of GDP by 17%;
•
Increasing the minimum wage by no less than 13% on average each year; and
•
Building 36 million affordable apartments for low-income people.
Sources: Xinhua News Agency, Highlights of China’s 12th Five-Year Plan, March 5, 2011; and APCO Worldwide,
China’s 12th Five-Year Plan: How it Actually Works and What’s in Store For the Next Five Years, December 10, 2010.
The Drive for “Indigenous Innovation”
Many of the industrial policies that China has implemented or formulated since 2006 appear to
stem largely from a comprehensive document issued by China’s State Council (the highest
executive organ of state power) in 1996 titled The National Medium-and Long-Term Program for
Science and Technology Development (2006-2020), often referred to as the MLP. The MLP
appears to represent an ambitious plan to modernize the structure of China’s economy by
transforming it from a global center of low-tech manufacturing to a major center of innovation
(by the year 2020) and a global innovation leader by 2050. As some observers describe it, China
wants to go from a model of “made in China” to “innovated in China.” It also seeks to sharply
reduce the country’s dependence on foreign technology. The MLP includes the stated goals of
95 “Highlights of China's Draft 12th Five-Year Plan,” Xinhua, March 5, 2011.
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“indigenous innovation, leapfrogging in priority fields, enabling development, and leading the
future.”96 Some of the broad goals of the MLP state that by 2020:
• The progress of science and technology will contribute 60% or above to China’s
development.
• The country’s reliance on foreign technology will decline to 30% or below (from
an estimated current level of 50%).
• Gross expenditures for research and development (R&D) would rise to 2.5% of
gross domestic product (from 1.3% in 2005). Priority areas for increased R&D
include space programs, aerospace development and manufacturing, renewable
energy, computer science, and life sciences.97
The document states that “China must place the strengthening of indigenous innovative capability
at the core of economic restructuring, growth model change, and national competitiveness
enhancement. Building an innovation-oriented country is therefore a major strategic choice for
China’s future development.” This goal, according to the document, is to be achieved by
formulating and implementing regulations in the country’s government procurement law to
“encourage and protect indigenous innovation,” establishing a coordination mechanism for
government procurement of indigenous innovative products, requiring a first-buy policy for major
domestically made high-tech equipment and products that possess proprietary intellectual
property rights, providing policy support to enterprises in procuring domestic high-tech
equipment, and developing “relevant technology standards” through government procurement.
Economic Policies Outlined in the November 2013 Third Plenum
From November 9-12, 2013, the Communist Party of China held the Third Plenum of its 18th
Party Congress, a meeting that many analysts anticipated would result in the initiation of
extensive new economic reforms under China’s new leadership. Following the meeting, the
Communist Party issued a communique with a number of broad (and often vague) policy
statements on reforms to be implemented by 2020, and then a few days later it issued a 60-point
document that provided more detail of the Plenum’s results. Many of the proposed reforms
addressed issues to boost competition and economic efficiency. The Plenum also established a
new “Central Leading Group” to design and coordinate the proposed reforms.
One of the major results of the Plenum highlighted by the Chinese media was that the market
would now play a “decisive” role in allocating resources in the economy. China’s media stated the
economic reforms announced in the communique were comparable to those announced in 1978,
when major reforms were first undertaken, and in 1992, when the Communist party agreed that
the market should be the “basic” means of allocating resources under the concept of a socialist
market economy. The 2013 Plenum communique thus elevated markets from having a “basic”
96 The MLP identifies main areas and priority topics, including energy, water and mineral resources, the environment,
agriculture, manufacturing, communications and transport, information industry and modern service industries,
population and health, urbanization and urban development, public security, and national defense. The report also
identifies 16 major special projects and 8 “pioneer technologies.”
97 R&D Magazine, December 22, 2009.
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role in resource allocation to having a “decisive” role.98 It further stated that “both public and
non-public ownership are key components of China’s socialist market economy.”
While appearing to elevate the role of the private sector in the economy, the Plenum communique
also emphasized the importance of the public sector in the economy, stating that China “must
unwaveringly consolidate and develop the publicly owned economy, persist in the dominant role
of the public ownership system, give rein to the leading role of the State-owned economy, and
incessantly strengthen the vitality, control, strength and influence of the State-owned economy.”
Some observers contend that this could indicate that the Chinese government will continue to
actively support and protect state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Others argue that the Plenum
documents indicate that SOEs will be subject to structural and market-based reforms.
For example, the 60-point document indicates that China plans to push forward with market-
based price reforms, including for water, oil, natural gas, electricity, transport, and
telecommunications (sectors that generally been dominated by SOEs and used to subsidize other
SOEs); allow nonpublic entities to invest in SOEs; and increase the level of dividends SOEs are
required to transfer back to the government for use in social safety net programs. The document
emphasizes the goals of perfecting a mechanism where prices are determined by the market;
making market rules that are fair, open, and transparent; implementing a unified market entrance
system where market players of all kind are allowed to compete (except in sectors on a “negative
list”); reducing regional protectionism; and improving market exit mechanisms to promote the
“survival of the fittest.”
Other proposed areas of reforms include improving protection of intellectual property rights;
implementing new financial reforms (such as allowing more private banks, improving market
mechanisms for the exchange rate of the renminbi, and accelerating interest rate liberalization and
capital account convertibility); liberalizing rules on foreign investment and establishing new free
trade zones; and improving macroeconomic control over the economy while reducing
government involvement in market operations.
The extent of China’s economic reforms resulting from the meeting (and how they will be
implemented) will not be fully understood until more information is made available by the
Chinese government. As noted by U.S. Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew, who visited Beijing shortly
after the Plenum: “I think there is going to continue to be progress, but the question is how much
and how quickly.”
98 For example, an editorial by Xinhua on November 13, 2013, stated that this was “not only a change in wording, but
more importantly, a breakthrough in China's market reform and highlighting the importance of market power. The
expression also means that the state should exert the government's role under the domination of the market, rather than
exerting the market's role under the domination of the government.”
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Challenges to U.S. Policy of China’s Economic Rise
China’s rapid economic growth and emergence as a major economic power have given China’s
leadership increased confidence in its economic model. Many believe the key challenges for the
United States are to convince China that (1) it has a stake in maintaining the international trading
system, which is largely responsible for its economic rise, and to take a more active leadership
role in maintaining that system; and (2) that further economic and trade reforms are the surest
way for China to grow and modernize its economy. For example, by boosting domestic spending
and allowing its currency to appreciate, China would import more, which would help speed
economic recovery in other countries, promote more stable and balanced economic growth in
China, and lessen trade protectionist pressures around the world. Lowering trade barriers on
imports would boost competition in China, lower costs for consumers, and increase economic
efficiency. However, many U.S. stakeholders are concerned that China’s efforts to boost the
development of indigenous innovation and technology could result in greater intervention by the
state (such as subsidies, trade and investment barriers, and discriminatory policies), which could
negatively affect U.S. IP-intensive firms. Failure by China to take meaningful steps to rebalance
its economy could increase tensions with its trading partners, especially if China’s share of global
exports continues to increase rapidly, and if that increase is viewed as being the result of non-
market policies that give Chinese exports an unfair competitive advantage.99
Some analysts contend that some economic rebalancing by China appears to have taken place in
recent years, noting that China’s current account surplus as a percent of GDP declined from a
historical high of 10.1% in 2007 to 2.0% in 2014 (see Figure 22). In addition, private
consumption as a percent of GDP has risen annually from 2011 to 2014 (see Figure 23). However,
many economists contend that much of the reduction in China’s current account surplus may
largely be the result of sluggish global demand for Chinese products, rather than a significant
change in Chinese economic policies. In July 2012, the IMF stated that, although the fall of
China’s current account surplus was a welcome sign, the external rebalancing was achieved at the
cost of rising internal imbalances—namely the high rate of investment spending, which, the IMF
assessed, would be difficult to sustain.100 In addition, gross fixed investment as a percent of GDP
grew each year from 2011 to 2014, and continues to be the dominant source of China’s GDP
growth.
99 Sharp increases in Chinese exports of higher-end manufacturing could also raise trade tensions between China and its
major trading partners. This has already occurred in some areas, such as wind turbines and solar panels.
100 IMF, People’s Republic of China: 2010 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report For the 2012 Article IV Consultation,
July 6, 2011, p. 1.
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Figure 22. Current Account Balances as a Percent of GDP for China
and the United States: 2000-2014
(percent)
12.0
10.1 9.2
10.0
8.3
8.0
5.9
6.0
4.8
3.6
4.0
4.0
2.4
2.6
2.6
1.7
1.9
1.9
2.0
1.3
2.0
0.0
-2.0
-4.0
-2.6 -3.0 -3.0 -2.9 -2.4
-4.0 -3.7 -4.2 -4.5
-6.0
-5.1
-5.0 -4.7
-5.6 -5.8
-8.0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
China
United States
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2015.
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Figure 23. Average Annual Growth in Private Consumption: 2005-2014
(percent)
10
8.9
9
7.3
8
6.9
7
6
4.7
4.5
5
4
3
1.8
2
1.1
1.0
0.8
0.8
1
0
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit
Opinions differ as to the most effective way of dealing with China on major economic issues.
Some support a policy of engagement with China using various forums, such as the U.S.-China
Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED), which holds discussions on major long-term
economic issues at the highest government level as is scheduled to meet next in June 2016.
Others support a somewhat mixed policy of using engagement when possible, coupled with a
more aggressive use of the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement procedures to
address China’s unfair trade policies. Still others, who see China as a growing threat to the U.S.
economy and the global trading system, advocate a policy of trying to contain China’s economic
power and using punitive measures when needed to force China to “play by the rules.” Media
reports of extensive cyber espionage by Chinese entities (including the Chinese military) against
U.S. firms have also raised concern in the United States over how to respond to what many see as
a serious threat to U.S. economic interests.101
China’s growing economic power has made it a critical and influential player on the global stage
(see text box) on a number of issues important to U.S. interests, such as global economic
cooperation, climate change, nuclear proliferation, and North Korean aggression.102 China is in a
position to help advance U.S. interests or to frustrate them. China’s rising economy has also
enabled it to boost its military capabilities.
101 For example, see Mandiant, APT1, Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units, February 19, 2013. The report
documents cyber espionage by a Chinese entity (believed to be linked to the Chinese People’s Liberation) against more
than 141 companies in 20 industries.
102 For additional information on these issues, see CRS Report R41108, U.S.-China Relations: An Overview of Policy
Issues, by Susan V. Lawrence.
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China’s Growing Soft Power
China’s emergence as major global economic and trading power has made it increasingly relevant in the global
economy and this trend will likely continue as long it continues to maintain rapid economic growth. China’s continued
economic rise may lead it to seek a larger role in setting global trade rules and economic policies, which may not
always coincide with U.S. goals. Some view China’s economic ascendency as a major source of its rising “soft power,”
the ability to influence other nations, because they admire and/or seek to emulate China’s economic system.
China has also undertaken a number of initiatives that could boost its soft power around the world. For example:
In July 2014, China, along with Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa, announced the creation of a $100 billion “New
Development Bank,” to be headquartered in Shanghai, China. The new bank would be aimed at assisting developing
economies.
in October 2014; and China’s plans announced in 2013 for a Silk Road Economic Belt and a 21st Century Maritime
Silk Road (together, referred to as the “One Belt, One Road initiative).
In October 2014, China launched the creation of a new $100 billion Asian Infrastructure Development Bank (AIIB),
reportedly to be headquartered in Beijing, aimed at funding infrastructure projects in Asia. Fifty seven nations joined
as founding members. U.S. officials have expressed concerns over the AIIB in terms of governess and environmental
standards and it is unclear whether or not the United States will eventually join the AIIB.
In November 2014, China announced that would contribute $40 billion to a new Silk Road Fund designed to improve
trade and transport links in Asia.
In April 2015, China announced that it would invest $46 billion in infrastructure development in Pakistan.
U.S. policy makers face a number of complex challenges on how to deal with these issues. Can
the United States compel better behavior from China via quiet diplomacy or public confrontation?
Has U.S. leverage over Beijing lessened in the wake of China’s economic rise, and has China’s
leverage over Washington increased? Are China’s new leaders serious about undertaking
comprehensive reforms as outlined in the Third Plenum?103 Does Chinese President Xi Jinping
have the power to implement new economic reforms if they are opposed by other factions of the
government that have a stake in maintaining the status quo? To what extent will the Chinese
government be willing to reduce or eliminate preferential policies (such as subsidies and
preferential bank loans) given to SOEs? Will the reforms result in a significant reduction in trade
and investment barriers against U.S. firms? China has become increasingly active in boosting its
economic ties with other countries, such by negotiating FTAs and pledging to help finance large-
scale infrastructure projects in numerous countries. What implications could these initiatives have
on U.S. economic interests?
103 In March 2013, Xi Jinping formally replaced Hu Jintao as China’s President (Xi is also general secretary of the
Communist Party of China Central Committee). Many analysts argue that during the eight years of Hu’s presidency,
economic reforms in China were essentially stalled (and in some instances, reversed) compared to policies under the
previous Chinese leader, President Jiang Zemin. On several occasions, China’s media has reported President Xi call for
deepening economic reforms, but few specific reforms been announced by the government to date.
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Author Contact Information
Wayne M. Morrison
Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance
wmorrison@crs.loc.gov, 7-7767
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