.

Iran-North Korea-Syria Ballistic Missile and
Nuclear Cooperation

Paul K. Kerr
Analyst in Nonproliferation
Steven A. Hildreth
Specialist in U.S. and Foreign National Security Programs
Mary Beth D. Nikitin
Specialist in Nonproliferation
May 11, 2015
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R43480

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Summary
Congress has at times expressed concern regarding ballistic missile and nuclear programs in Iran,
North Korea, and Syria. This report focuses primarily on unclassified and declassified U.S.
Intelligence Community (IC) assessments over the past two decades. These assessments indicate
that
• there is no evidence that Iran and North Korea have engaged in nuclear-related
trade or cooperation with each other, although ballistic missile technology
cooperation between the two is significant and meaningful, and
• Syria has received ballistic missiles and related technology from North Korea
and Iran and also engaged in nuclear technology cooperation with North Korea.
All three countries discussed in this report have short-range ballistic missiles. Iran and North
Korea also have medium-range ballistic missiles; North Korea has intermediate-range ballistic
missiles as well. North Korea has tested nuclear weapons on three occasions; Iran and Syria’s
nuclear programs have raised suspicions that those countries are pursuing nuclear weapons.
However, Iran has, according to the IC, halted its nuclear weapons program, and Syria does not
appear to have an active nuclear weapons program.
Congress has held numerous hearings regarding these countries’ nuclear and missile programs. It
has also passed legislation providing for sanctions on countries whose entities assist Iran, North
Korea, and Syria to obtain weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile delivery systems.
For example, the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA, P.L. 106-178)
imposes penalties on countries whose companies’ exports assist the efforts of Iran, North Korea,
and Syria to acquire WMD and missile delivery systems.
Congress has also established reporting requirements concerning these countries’ missile and
nuclear programs. Congress may wish to consider requiring additional reporting from the
executive branch on WMD proliferation because the number of unclassified reports to Congress
on WMD-related issues has decreased considerably in recent years.
This report describes the key elements of a nuclear weapons program; explains the available
information regarding cooperation among Iran, North Korea, and Syria on ballistic missiles and
nuclear technology; and discusses some specific issues for Congress.



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Contents
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Nuclear Weapons Program Elements ............................................................................................... 1
Ballistic Missile Cooperation........................................................................................................... 3
Iran and North Korea ................................................................................................................. 3
Syria: Cooperation with Iran and North Korea ......................................................................... 5
Nuclear Technology Cooperation .................................................................................................... 5
North Korea and Syria ............................................................................................................... 6
Iran and North Korea ................................................................................................................. 7
Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act ........................................................................ 10
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 10

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 11

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Introduction
Congress has at times expressed concern regarding ballistic missile and nuclear programs in Iran,
North Korea, and Syria. For decades, most in Congress have viewed these three countries with
unease because these programs, coupled with the governments’ strong anti-U.S. positions and
their antagonism toward U.S. regional friends and allies, pose what are widely regarded as threats
to U.S. national security interests. Congress has held numerous hearings and passed laws
designed to slow and deter Iran, North Korea, and Syria from developing ballistic missiles and
nuclear weapons. Congress has also established reporting requirements concerning these
countries’ missile and nuclear programs.
This report focuses primarily on unclassified and declassified U.S. Intelligence Community (IC)
assessments and reports over the past two decades.1 These assessments indicate that
• no public evidence exists that Iran and North Korea have engaged in nuclear-
related trade or cooperation with each other, although ballistic missile technology
cooperation between the two is significant and meaningful, and
• Syria has received ballistic missiles and related technology from North Korea
and Iran and also engaged in nuclear technology cooperation with North Korea.
It should be noted that nonofficial assessments, including journal articles, foreign and domestic
media reports, and Internet commentaries, are not always consistent with the official assessments
summarized in this report. Although such unofficial sources allege a fairly significant and
persistent level of cooperation among these three countries on their ballistic missile and nuclear
programs, such reports lack the credibility of official assessments because they are often
unsourced or attributed to anonymous government officials, frequently at odds with each other,
and unverifiable.
This report begins with a description of the key elements of a nuclear weapons program. It then
explains the available information regarding cooperation among Iran, North Korea, and Syria on
ballistic missiles and nuclear technology. Last, the report discusses some specific issues for
Congress.
Nuclear Weapons Program Elements
An effective nuclear weapons program has three major elements, each of which presents its own
unique challenges. Each of these elements must work together to create an operational and
effective system.
1. The program must produce fissile material in sufficient quantity and quality for a
nuclear device. Plutonium and weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU)
are the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. Plutonium is
obtained by separating it from spent nuclear reactor fuel—a procedure called

1 These include the IC’s annual testimony to Congress regarding worldwide threat assessments, as well as other annual
or regular reports to Congress on global developments in weapons of mass destruction technology.
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“reprocessing.” Weapons-grade HEU is produced by enriching uranium—a
process that increases the concentration of uranium-235 (the relevant fissile
isotope). Both Iran and North Korea are in various stages of pursuing and
producing different kinds of nuclear material. Syria does not appear to be
producing fissile material.
2. The program must produce an effective and reliable means of delivering a
nuclear weapon, such as a ballistic missile. Both Iran and North Korea have
medium-range ballistic missiles, which have been assessed as capable of
delivering a nuclear warhead should such a warhead capability be developed and
deployed. Moreover, both countries have demonstrated the capability to launch
an object into space orbit, but neither country currently has an intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) capability. Syria possesses only short-range ballistic
missiles (SRBMs).2
3. The program must produce a nuclear warhead that can be delivered to its
intended target, especially at long-range.3 The IC does not assess that any of the
three countries discussed in this report has produced such a warhead, although
North Korea has conducted several nuclear tests.

Iran, North Korea, and Syria: Major Nuclear and Missile Programs
Iran4
Nuclear:
Iran has a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment program and is producing low-enriched uranium. Tehran is also building
a heavy-water moderated nuclear reactor but does not have a reprocessing facility; such a facility is required to
separate plutonium from spent reactor fuel. Iran has limited and reversed some aspects of these programs’ progress
since the government began implementing a November 2013 multilateral agreement designed to reduce concerns
about Iran’s nuclear program. Iran has, according to the U.S. intelligence community, halted its nuclear weapons
program.
Ballistic Missiles:
The U.S. intelligence community assesses that Iran has the largest number of ballistic missiles in the Middle East. It
also notes that Iran’s ballistic missiles are inherently capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction and that Iran’s
progress on space launch vehicles improves Tehran’s ability to develop longer-range missiles, including an
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).5 Iran has fewer than 100 short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) launchers that

2 The National Air and Space Intelligence Center (Air Force) describes the following missile ranges: Short-Range
Ballistic Missile: less than 1,000 kilometers; Medium-Range Ballistic Missile: 1,000-3,000 kilometers; Intermediate-
Range Ballistic Missile: 3,000-5,500 kilometers; Intercontinental Ballistic Missile: 5,500 kilometers.
3 Gen. Eugene Habiger, former Commander U.S. Strategic Command, has said that “the miniaturization of a nuclear
warhead is probably the most significant challenge any proliferant would have to face.” See General Eugene Habiger,
“Problems and Prospects of New Alaska Missile Interceptor Site,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
September 20, 2004, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Habiger.pdf. See also Joe Cirincione and Elise Connor, “How
Iran Can Build a Bomb, Ploughshares Fund,” July 2, 2010, http://www.ploughshares.org/blog/2010-07-02/how-iran-
can-build-bomb.
4 For more information about Iran’s nuclear program, see CRS Report RL34544, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status, by
Paul K. Kerr, and CRS Report R43333, Iran: Efforts to Achieve a Nuclear Accord, by Kenneth Katzman, Paul K. Kerr,
and Michael John Garcia. For more information about Iran’s ballistic missile program, see CRS Report R42849, Iran’s
Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Programs
, by Steven A. Hildreth.
5 The National Air and Space Intelligence Center (Air Force) describes the following missile ranges: Short-Range
Ballistic Missile: less than 1,000 kilometers; Medium-Range Ballistic Missile: 1,000-3,000 kilometers; Intermediate-
(continued...)
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could be reloaded and fewer than 50 silo and mobile medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) launchers that could
reach targets throughout the Middle East and portions of NATO’s southern flank.
North Korea6
Nuclear:
North Korea has produced plutonium in a nuclear reactor and reprocessing plant located at Yongbyon, where it is
also building a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility. North Korea tested nuclear explosive devices in October
2006, May 2009, and February 2013. The first device contained plutonium; whether the others contained plutonium
or highly-enriched uranium is unclear.
Ballistic Missiles:
North Korea has fewer than 100 road-mobile SRBM launchers that could be reloaded, fewer than 50 mobile No
Dong MRBM launchers, and fewer than 50 mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile launchers (IRBMs) that could
reach targets throughout the Asia Pacific region. The U.S. intelligence community believes North Korea has publicly
displayed a road-mobile ICBM that has not been tested or fielded and that the country’s space launch program can aid
in the development of its ICBM program.
Syria7
Nuclear:
In 2007, Israel destroyed a Syrian nuclear reactor under construction. Syria does not appear to have an active nuclear
weapons program.
Ballistic Missiles:
Syria possesses less than 100 road-mobile SRBM launchers (mostly older SCUD missiles) that could strike U.S. friends
and allies in the Middle East and NATO’s southern flank.

Ballistic Missile Cooperation
Iran and North Korea
Iran has developed a close working relationship with North Korea on many ballistic missile
programs, starting with acquisition of Scud missiles from North Korea in the 1980s. In the mid-
1980s, North Korea developed the 300-kilometer range Scud B ballistic missile “from prototypes
obtained from Egypt” and subsequently began to export them.8 Pyongyang developed the 500-
kilometer range Scud C in 1991.9 North Korea sold both types of missiles, as well as missile
production technology, to several countries in the Middle East, including Iran and Syria.10 In 1992

(...continued)
Range Ballistic Missile: 3,000-5,500 kilometers; Intercontinental Ballistic Missile: 5,500 kilometers.
6 For more information about North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and ballistic missile program, see CRS Report
RL34256, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues, by Mary Beth D. Nikitin.
7 For more information about Syria’s ballistic missile program, see CRS Report R42848, Syria’s Chemical Weapons:
Issues for Congress
, coordinated by Mary Beth D. Nikitin.
8 Nonproliferation Delivery Systems Problem Countries: North Korea, Department of State, 1993; North Korean
Missile Proliferation, Department of State, April 16, 1997.
9 North Korean Missile Proliferation, 1997.
10 Ibid.
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testimony, then-Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Robert Gates identified Iran and Syria as
recipients of North Korean Scud missiles.11 In 1993, then-DCI R. James Woolsey12 provided
more detail, stating that North Korea had sold Syria and Iran extended range Scud C missiles and
apparently agreed to sell other forms of missile technology. A Russian intelligence report, which
the U.S. IC deemed “credible,”13 stated that Iran’s missile potential during this period was
confined to Scud B SRBMs received from Syria and North Korea.
During the 1990s, IC annual threat assessments described several recurring trends between Iran
and North Korea. First, North Korea’s ongoing export of ballistic missiles provided a qualitative
increase in capabilities to countries such as Iran. Second, Iran was using North Korean ballistic
missile goods and services to achieve its goal of self-sufficiency in the production of medium-
range ballistic missiles. Third, Iran’s acquisition of missile systems or key missile-related
components, including potentially significant inputs of space launch vehicle technology and
support, could significantly improve Iran’s ability to produce an ICBM. In the latter 2000s, the IC
continued to assess that North Korean cooperation with Iran’s ballistic missile programs was
ongoing and significant. More recently, 2013 and 2014 Department of Defense reports to
Congress on North Korea’s military capabilities and proliferation activities identified Iran as a
past recipient of North Korean ballistic missiles and associated technology.14
In 2006, Iran publicly acknowledged for the first time that it had obtained missiles from North
Korea during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, but added that it no longer needed Pyongyang’s
assistance: “We received these [Scuds] from foreign countries like North Korea but 17 years after
the war we were able to design all of these pieces and even their fuel,” said the chief commander
of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.15
Iran has likely exceeded North Korea’s ability to develop, test, and build ballistic missiles. But
Tehran may, to some extent, still rely on Pyongyang for certain materials for producing Iranian
ballistic missiles, Iran’s claims to the contrary notwithstanding. For example, some observers
argue that Iran may not be able to produce even its Scud B and Scud C equivalents (Shahab-1 and
Shahab-2, respectively) without some foreign support for key materials or components.16
Nevertheless, Director of National Intelligence (DNI) James Clapper stated during a February 11,
2014, Senate Armed Services Committee hearing that Iran is not currently receiving assistance
with its ICBM program.17

11 Threat Assessment, Military Strategy, and Defense Planning, Senate Committee on Armed Services, January 22,
1992.
12 Proliferation Threats of the 1990's, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, February 24, 1993.
13 In response to hearing questions, the IC responded thusly some months later. See Proliferation Threats of the 1990's,
1993.
14 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic
of North
Korea, February 15, 2013. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, February 4, 2014.
15 “Iran Admits Buying Missiles from North Korea During Iraq War,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific—Political,
November 7, 2006, translated from Nezavisimaya Gazeta, November 3, 2006, p. 7.
16 Michael Elleman, Iran’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment (London: The International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 2010), pp.91-92.
17James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, Sen. Carl Levin Holds A Hearing On Worldwide Threats, Senate
Committee On Armed Services, February 11, 2014.
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Syria: Cooperation with Iran and North Korea
Syria acquired both Scud B and Scud C missiles from North Korea, according to a 1995 CIA
assessment.18 Damascus has also produced missiles with North Korean-supplied equipment,
according to official U.S. accounts; a 1997 State Department document indicated that Syria had
received missile “production technology” from North Korea and was producing “Scuds with
North Korean assistance.”19 Furthermore, a State Department report to Congress covering 2008
explained that:
Over the past decade, Syria has focused on enhancing the capabilities of this [SRBM] force
while also achieving self-sufficiency in indigenous missile production. With North Korean
assistance, Syria has made progress toward domestic production of Scud missile variants.20
Syria continues to rely on North Korean and Iranian assistance for its missile programs, according
to official U.S. accounts. Defense Intelligence Agency Director Michael Flynn testified on April
18, 2013, that “Syria’s liquid-propellant missile program”—apparently a reference to Syria’s
Scud B, Scud C, and Scud D missiles—“depends on essential foreign equipment and assistance,
primarily from North Korean entities.”21 Flynn also stated that “Damascus relies on foreign help,
mainly from Iran, to advance its solid-propellant rocket and missile development and production
capability.”22
Nuclear Technology Cooperation
According to official sources, Iran, North Korea, and Syria have engaged in various forms of
clandestine nuclear cooperation possibly related to nuclear weapons. North Korea and Iran
obtained designs and materials related to uranium enrichment from a clandestine procurement
network run by former Pakistani nuclear official Abdul Qadeer Khan.23 The CIA expressed
concern in 2004 that the network could also have transferred nuclear “expertise or technology” to
Syria,24 but there appears to be no public official evidence that this potential transfer is still a

18 The Weapons Proliferation Threat, Central Intelligence Agency, 1995. North Korea had “sold hundreds of Scuds” to
several countries in the Middle East, including Iran and Syria, a 1997 State Department document said (North Korean
Missile Proliferation, 1997).
19 North Korean Missile Proliferation, 1997
20 Report on the Proliferation of Missiles and Essential Components of Nuclear, Biological, Chemical and Radiological
Weapons, January 1 – December 31, 2008
, Department of State, April 22, 2009. It is worth noting that a 2006 report
from the National Air and Space Intelligence Center described Syria as a “producer” of Scud-D SRBMs (Ballistic and
Cruise Missile Threat,
National Air and Space Intelligence Center, March 2006).
21 Michael Flynn, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Current and Future Worldwide Threats, Senate Armed
Services Committee Hearing, April 18, 2013. Flynn issued a similar assessment during a 2014 hearing (Worldwide
Threats to National Security
; Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, February 11, 2014). See also Unclassified
Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced
Conventional Munitions
, 1 January-31 December 2011.
22 Syria has SS-21 SRBMs and M600 ballistic missiles; Flynn described the latter as a “domestic version of the Iranian
600 mm Fateh-110 SRBM.” Both of these missiles use solid fuel.
23 See CRS Report RL34248, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues, by Paul K. Kerr and
Mary Beth D. Nikitin.
24 Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and
Advanced Conventional Munitions
, 1 January-31 December 2004.
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matter of concern.25 Syrian President Bashar al Asad stated in a 2007 newspaper interview that
his government had been approached by the Khan network but had conducted no transactions
with it.26
North Korea and Syria27
North Korea assisted Syria with building a nuclear reactor that may have been part of a Syrian
nuclear weapons program, according to U.S. official accounts.28 Both the United States and the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) assessed that Damascus was building a nuclear
reactor; Israel destroyed the facility in a September 2007 air strike.29 According to a May 2011
IAEA report, the agency assessed that the destroyed Syrian structure “was very likely a nuclear
reactor,” a claim Syria denied.30 The IC assessed that the reactor’s purpose was to produce
plutonium for nuclear weapons, a senior intelligence official stated during an April 2008 briefing,
but added that the IC had “low confidence” in this judgment.31 According to a 2013 State
Department report, the United States assessed that “the reactor’s intended purpose” was to
produce plutonium, rather than to conduct research or produce electricity, “because the reactor
was not configured for power production, was isolated from any civilian population, and was ill-
suited for research.”32

25 An October 2012 speech by Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Countryman named Iran, Libya, Pakistan, and
North Korea, but not Syria, as Khan network customers. (Thomas Countryman, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
International Security and Nonproliferation, “Addressing Next Generation Proliferation Challenges,” October 26,
2012.)
26 George Jahn, “Syrian Leader Says His Country Was Approached By Head Of Nuclear Black Market,” Associated
Press,
December 19, 2007.
27 In addition to its dealings with Syria, North Korea was also a probable supplier to Libya’s nuclear weapons program.
According to a February 2013 Defense Department report, “North Korea provided Libya with uranium hexafluoride,”
which is the material fed into the uranium enrichment process. (Military and Security Developments Involving the
Democratic People’s Republic of North
Korea, February 15,2013). Conveying slightly less certainty about the matter, a
September 2011 International Atomic Energy Agency report stated that “it is very likely that” natural uranium
hexafluoride contained in a cylinder that Libya received in 2001 via the Khan network “originated in” North Korea
(Application of Safeguards in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, GOV/2011/53-GC(55)/24), September 2,
2011).
28 Although there have been press reports regarding nuclear cooperation between Syria and Iran, they are not
corroborated by official U.S. open-source assessments. See, for example, Erich Follath and Holger Stark, “The Story of
‘Operation Orchard’: How Israel Destroyed Syria’s Al Kibar Nuclear Reactor,” Der Spiegel, February 11, 2009; and
Hans Ruehle, “How Iran Pushed Forward Syria’s Nuclear Armament; Background of the Israeli Action Against the
Reactor of Al-Kibar,” Neue Zuercher Zeitung, March 19, 2009.
29 Richard Cheney, Vice President during the George W. Bush Administration, wrote in 2011 that Israel destroyed the
reactor. (Dick Cheney, In My Time: A Personal and Political Memoir [New York: Threshold Editions], 2011, p. 472.)
See also George W. Bush, Decision Points (New York: Crown Publishing), 2010, p. 422; and Elliott Abrams,
“Bombing the Syrian Reactor: The Untold Story,” Commentary, February 2013.
30 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic, GOV 2011/30 May 24, 2011. The
IAEA also wants information about “three other locations allegedly functionally related” to the reactor site, the May
2011 report said. According to an August 2012 IAEA report, the IAEA “remains unable to provide any assessment
concerning” these sites’ “nature or operational status.” (Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian
Arab Republic
, GOV 2012/42, August 30, 2012). Syria has not since complied with the board’s request.
31 “Background Briefing with Senior U.S. Officials on Syria’s Covert Nuclear Reactor and North Korea’s
Involvement,” April 24, 2008.
32 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and
Commitments, Department of State
, July 2013.
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Syria was constructing the reactor with “North Korean assistance,” the same 2013 report said.33 A
senior U.S. intelligence official stated during the 2008 briefing that “North Korea has assisted
Syria with this reactor,” citing similarities between the Syrian reactor and the North Korean
reactor that has produced plutonium for that country’s nuclear weapons program.34 The official
also cited the “involvement of nuclear-related North Koreans in a project somewhere in the area,”
as well as “evidence of cargo being transferred from North Korea, most likely to [the] reactor site,
in 2006.” More recently, a February 2014 Defense Department report stated that North Korea
“provided Syria with nuclear reactor technology until 2007.”35
It is worth noting that an IAEA investigation discovered Syrian uranium conversion activities that
the government had failed to declare to the IAEA. Uranium conversion is the process by which
uranium hexafluoride (the feedstock for centrifuges) is produced. However, the IAEA has
apparently resolved its concerns regarding these activities.36
Iran and North Korea
Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter stated during an April 2015 interview that North Korea and
Iran “could be” cooperating to develop a nuclear weapon.37 Moreover, U.S. intelligence officials
have expressed concern that North Korea might export its nuclear technology or fissile material.
According to testimony from DNI Clapper before Congress in February 2012, North Korea’s
export of “ballistic missiles and associated materials,” as well as its assistance to Syria’s nuclear
reactor, “illustrate the reach of the North’s proliferation activities.” The IC “remain[s] alert to the
possibility that North Korea might again export nuclear technology,” he added.38
North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has been based on plutonium produced in a nuclear
reactor located at Yongbyon. North Korea also has a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment program.
North Korea tested nuclear explosive devices in October 2006, May 2009, and February 2013.
The first device contained plutonium; whether the others contained plutonium or HEU is still
unclear.39 The 2014 Defense Department report said that North Korea could conduct another
nuclear test at any time.40
Iran has a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment program and is building a heavy-water moderated
nuclear reactor. However, the reactor program is a lesser proliferation concern because Iran does
not have a reprocessing facility, which, as noted, is required to produce plutonium for weapons. A
November 2007 National Intelligence Estimate assessed that Iran “halted its nuclear weapons
program” in 2003. The estimate, however, also assessed that Tehran is “keeping open the option

33 Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea, 2013.
34 “Background Briefing with Senior U.S. Officials on Syria’s Covert Nuclear Reactor and North Korea’s
Involvement,” April 24, 2008.
35 Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea, 2014.
36 GOV 2011/30.
37 Ashton Carter, Erin Burnett Outfront, CNN, April 10, 2015.
38 Clapper, Unclassified Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence
Community
, Senate Committee on Armed Services, February 16, 2012.
39 According to open sources, the second and third tests did not vent gases that could be used to identify the type of
fissile material used in the explosive device. See also CRS Report R41160, North Korea’s 2009 Nuclear Test:
Containment, Monitoring, Implications
, by Jonathan E. Medalia.
40 Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea, 2014.
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to develop nuclear weapons.”41 The intelligence community has reaffirmed this conclusion on
several occasions.42
Then-DNI Dennis Blair discussed in 2009 the circumstances under which North Korea might
transfer nuclear weapons or fissile material:43
Pyongyang is less likely to risk selling nuclear weapons or weapons-quantities of fissile
material than nuclear technology or less sensitive equipment to other countries or non-state
actors, in part because it needs its limited fissile material for its own deterrent. Pyongyang
probably also perceives that it would risk a regime-ending military confrontation with the
United States if the nuclear material was used by another country or group in a nuclear strike
or terrorist attacks and the United States could trace the material back to North Korea. It is
possible, however, that the North might find a nuclear weapons or fissile material transfer
more appealing if its own stockpile grows larger and/or it faces an extreme economic crisis
where the potentially huge revenue from such a sale could help the country survive.
Nuclear-related cooperation could also include sharing technology related to nuclear weapons
material production, or data from nuclear or explosive testing. Some analysts have argued that
both Pyongyang and Tehran could benefit if the former were to provide nuclear test data to the
latter in exchange for Iranian information about enrichment, missile, or other nuclear-related
expertise.44 Iran could also pay for North Korean nuclear assistance with currency or petroleum.45
Some press reports have pointed to alleged instances of nuclear-related cooperation, such as the
possibility of Iranian officials witnessing North Korean nuclear tests.46 However, this information
remains speculative and unconfirmed by official sources. Furthermore, U.S. intelligence
assessments have not mentioned nuclear cooperation between the two countries, even though
such assessments have described cooperation on ballistic missiles. For example, although the
2013 and 2014 Defense Department reports did, as noted, describe North Korean nuclear
assistance to Libya, they did not indicate that North Korea had provided or received nuclear
assistance to or from Iran.47
Moreover, U.S. officials have stated publicly that there is no nuclear cooperation between Iran
and North Korea. During a February 27, 2007, Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, U.S.

41 See Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities, National Intelligence Estimate, November 2007.
42 See CRS Report R43333, Iran: Efforts to Achieve a Nuclear Accord, by Kenneth Katzman, Paul K. Kerr, and
Michael John Garcia.
43 Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 12, 2009.
44 “Hecker Takes Hard Look At N. Korean Test,” CISAC website, February 14, 2013, http://cisac.stanford.edu/news/
hecker_takes_hard_look_at_north_koreas_nuclear_test_20130214/; Siegfried S. Hecker and William Liou, “Dangerous
Dealings: North Korea’s Nuclear Capabilities and the Threat of Export to Iran,” Arms Control Today, March 2007.
45 Hecker and Liou, 2007.
46 See, for example, “N. Korea Conducts Nuke Test in Presence of Iranian Scientists: Source,” Kyodo News, February
15, 2013. See also: Choe Sang-Hun, “North Korean Missile Said To Have Military Purpose,” The New York Times,
December 24, 2012; “Iran Defence Team Visited North Korea, Discussed Uranium Enrichment – Agency,” Kyodo
News Service
, January 7, 2012; Con Coughlin, “Iran ‘Is Seeking N Korea’s Nuclear Expertise,’” The Daily Telegraph
(London
), April 17, 2007; and “Hundreds of NK Nuclear And Missile Experts Working In Iran,” Korea Times,
November 13, 2011.
47 Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea, 2013; Military and
Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea
, 2014.
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officials stated that there is “no evidence” that Iran and North Korea are cooperating to develop
nuclear capabilities. Furthermore, senior U.S. intelligence officials stated during an April 24,
2008, background briefing that the two countries are not cooperating on “nuclear issues.” More
recently, Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Countryman indicated in June 2013 that North
Korea and Iran were not engaged in nuclear cooperation, but added that “it’s a valid reason to be
concerned and we keep an eye on it.”48 Similarly, when asked during a February 20, 2014, press
briefing about nuclear cooperation between Iran and North Korea, a senior Administration
official responded only by noting that the United States “is always concerned about reports of
shared technology and proliferation of technology and of nuclear weapons technology.”49 Lastly,
knowledgeable current and former U.S. officials contacted by CRS said that they were unaware
of official unclassified U.S. government evidence of nuclear cooperation between Iran and North
Korea.
In a September 2014 interview, Iran’s ambassador to South Korea denied that Tehran and
Pyongyang had cooperated on nuclear weapons.50
The two countries may not have recently engaged in nuclear cooperation because Iran has,
according to the IC, apparently halted its nuclear weapons program. Furthermore, the extent to
which Iran and North Korea could benefit from nuclear-related cooperation is uncertain. Although
some analysts have argued that Pyongyang could provide nuclear test data to Tehran, the extent to
which Iran could benefit from such data is unclear. North Korea’s nuclear weapons program to
date has apparently been based on plutonium;51 Iran would most likely use weapons-grade HEU,
rather than plutonium, as fissile material in nuclear weapons, at least in the short term.52 Although
Tehran could provide Pyongyang with access to Iran’s enrichment technology, such access would
be of limited benefit to North Korea because North Korea’s centrifuge appears to differ from the
two types of centrifuges that Iran has installed.53 54
It is also possible that, rather than collaborating, the two countries may be competing with each
other in their efforts to circumvent international sanctions by obtaining dual-use technologies

48 Thomas Countryman, “The Implications of the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) Regime for Nonproliferation,” June
18, 2013.
49 “Background Briefing on the P5+1 Talks,” February 20, 2014.
50 “Iran Envoy in South Korea Says No Similarity to North Nuclear Programme – Yonhap,” Yonhap News Agency,
September 25, 2014.
51 As noted, there is no public official evidence regarding the fissile material used in the second and third nuclear
explosive devices tested by North Korea.
52 Iran’s enrichment program is considerably more advanced than its heavy-water reactor program. Moreover, there is
no evidence that Iran has a reprocessing program; a reprocessing facility is necessary to separate plutonium from spent
nuclear fuel.
53 Iran is enriching uranium with some of its IR-1 centrifuges and has installed significant numbers of IR-2m
centrifuges; the latter have not yet produced enriched uranium. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and
Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran
, GOV/2014/10, February 20, 2014.
Iran is also testing other types of centrifuges.
54 Iran’s IR-1 centrifuge is of a different design than the North Korean centrifuge and has rotors made primarily of
high-strength aluminum with small maraging steel components. The more-advanced IR-2m is also of a different design
and is made of different materials. The IR-2m rotors are made primarily of carbon fiber, whereas the North Korean
centrifuges are reportedly made of maraging steel. (Knowledgeable former U.S. official, August 7, 2013; Simon
Henderson and Olli Heinonen, “Nuclear Iran: A Glossary of Terms,” Policy Focus 121, May 2013; Olli Heinonen,
Arms Control Association, “The Status of Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Programs,” Transcript, November 22, 2010;
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2004/11, February 24, 2004).
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from the same supply networks, particularly via trading companies in China. Both Tehran and
Pyongyang remain dependent on foreign suppliers for their nuclear program, and some
components may be in demand by both countries. The Institute for Science and International
Security has concluded from examining procurement data that both countries have well-
established supply chains in China, but North Korea is able to secure shipments with greater ease
than is Iran.55 The two countries may be reluctant to export components to one another that they
themselves have difficulty procuring. Moreover, involved Chinese trading companies would have
a financial interest in maintaining business with both Iran and North Korea.
Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act
Congress has passed legislation providing for sanctions on countries whose entities assist Iran,
North Korea, and Syria to obtain weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile delivery
systems.56 For example, the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA, P.L.
106-178) imposes penalties on countries whose companies assist the efforts of Iran, North Korea,
and Syria to acquire WMD and missile delivery systems. Congress originally targeted only Iran’s
proliferation activities, but amended the law in 2005 to address Syria (P.L. 109-112, the Iran
Nonproliferation Amendments Act). In 2006, Congress added North Korea (P.L. 109-353).
INKSNA requires a biannual report from the President to Congress on any transfers of controlled
items from any foreign person to Iran, North Korea, or Syria. INKSNA and other sanctions laws
are aimed at discouraging foreign entities from assisting any WMD and missile programs of these
three countries. Congress also authorizes U.S. nonproliferation programs, such as export control
assistance, that are meant to bolster the ability of other countries to detect and interdict such
transfers. In addition, U.N. sanctions on Iran and North Korea prohibit the transfer of nuclear or
ballistic missile technology to them.57 It is also worth noting that international export control
regimes, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Missile Technology Control Regime, restrict
the transfer of nuclear and missile technologies.58
Issues for Congress
Congress may wish to consider requiring additional reporting from the executive branch on
WMD proliferation. The number of unclassified reports to Congress on WMD-related issues has
decreased considerably in recent years. Most recently, Section 310 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (P.L. 112-277) repealed the requirement for the IC to
provide an unclassified annual report to Congress regarding the “Acquisition of Technology
Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions.” The report
had been required by Section 721 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (P.L.

55 David Albright and Christina Walrond, North Korea’s Estimated Stocks of Plutonium and Weapon-Grade Uranium,
Institute for Science and International Security, August 16, 2012.
56 For more information on nonproliferation sanctions, see CRS Report RL31502, Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and
Missile Proliferation Sanctions: Selected Current Law
, by Dianne E. Rennack. For more information about sanctions
on Iran, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman.
57 For more information about the effects of sanctions on Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, see CRS Report
RL34544, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status, by Paul K. Kerr.
58 For further information, see CRS Report RL31559, Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status,
coordinated by Mary Beth D. Nikitin.
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104-293). Congress also may wish to consider requesting information from the executive branch,
through hearings or reports, regarding the extent to which entities in countries other than Iran,
North Korea, and Syria aid those three countries’ unconventional weapons programs.

Author Contact Information

Paul K. Kerr
Mary Beth D. Nikitin
Analyst in Nonproliferation
Specialist in Nonproliferation
pkerr@crs.loc.gov, 7-8693
mnikitin@crs.loc.gov, 7-7745
Steven A. Hildreth

Specialist in U.S. and Foreign National Security
Programs
shildreth@crs.loc.gov, 7-7635


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