Congress has indicated a strong interest in ensuring that today's young people—those ages 16 through 24—attain the education and employment experience necessary to make the transition to adulthood as skilled workers and taxpayers. In the wake of the December 2007-June 2009 recession, questions remain about the employment prospects of youth today and the possible effects on their future earnings and participation in the labor market.
This report provides current and historical employment and unemployment information about young people ages 16 through 24. It begins with a brief background on the December 2007-June 2009 recession and its lasting effects on youth currently in the labor force. It then discusses employment and education pathways that young people today can pursue. Following this section is a description of the labor market data used in the report, which includes labor force participation rate, employment-to-population (E/P) ratio, and the unemployment rate.1 The report goes on to discuss these data for the post-World War II period, with a focus on trends since 2000. This discussion compares rates based on age, sex, race/ethnicity, and income, where applicable. The report concludes by exploring the factors that influence the extent to which youth participate in the labor force and their prospects for employment. This last section also discusses the possible consequences of decreasing employment and increasing unemployment among youth. The Appendix includes supplemental tables and figures on the youth employment situation. The findings of the report are discussed in the summary.
Given the challenges that young people experience in the labor market, this report may be of interest to Congress in the context of workforce development, education, unemployment insurance, youth policy, or macroeconomic policy; however, the report does not discuss specific programs or policy implications.2
Although the recession that began in December 2007 officially ended 18 months later, in June 2009, many workers were still struggling to find work, and some continue to do so today. Unemployment since the recession has been as high as 9%. The recession exacerbated challenges that workers have faced in securing and retaining employment over the past decade, when the U.S. economy had the slowest job growth since 1940.3 Coined "The Lost Decade" by some economists, 2000 through 2010 saw no net gains in jobs.4 Against this backdrop, young people ages 16 through 24 have experienced the steepest decreases in employment, though in recent years employment levels have steadily increased for this age group.
Declines in the share of young people working and labor force participation may be due, in part, to overall weak demand for workers and growing enrollment in high school and postsecondary education.5 As discussed throughout this report, education is a protective factor for young workers: greater educational attainment is associated with higher wages and lower unemployment.6 Nonetheless, recent college graduates have faced weakened employment prospects in the wake of the 2007-2009 recession. Calling youth coming of age during the recessionary years "Generation Limbo" or "The Lost Generation," media reports chronicled recent college graduates who were unable to start their careers and instead are relying on their parents or public benefits to get by.7 An analysis by the Federal Reserve in 2014 examined unemployment from 1990 through the first part of 2013 for 22-to-27-year olds with at least a bachelor's degree. The analysis found that securing employment tended to be more difficult for those just out of school at any point over the period, and that the rate of college graduates in 2012 who were underemployed—working in an occupation that does not typically require a bachelor's degree—was comparable to rates during the 1990-1991 recession. Nonetheless, the analysis found that unlike their earlier counterparts, a greater share of young people graduating from college since the early 2000s were working in low-wage jobs (e.g., bartender, food server) as opposed to other non-college jobs with higher wages (e.g., electrician, hygienist).8
Despite an overall negative picture of youth labor force participation, the major indicators of their participation—employment/population ratio and unemployment rate—have shown improvements over the past few years.
For the purposes of this report, youth refers to young people ages 16 through 24. Individuals as young as 16 are included because the Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), which maintains official records of employment and unemployment, counts workers beginning at this age.9 Although traditional definitions of youth have considered adolescence to be a period ending at age 18, cultural and economic shifts have protracted the time for youth to transition to adulthood. Older youth, up to age 24, are included because they are often still in school and/or living with their parents.10 The current move from adolescence to adulthood has become longer and more complex, and policymakers and others are recognizing that adolescence is no longer a finite period that ends at the age of majority.11
Young people ages 16 through 24 may pursue a variety of education and employment pathways. Those of high school age may attend high school and/or work. Youth with a high school diploma can attend a two- or four-year college, enlist in the armed services, or secure part-time or full-time employment. Youth sometimes work and attend school simultaneously. Young people who drop out of high school can do some of these same things, but their opportunities are more limited. They cannot enroll in a four-year college or, in most cases, enlist in the military. They may also face challenges securing employment.12
Even young people who are attending high school or an institution of higher education (or those on a break from school) may still want to work, or feel that they have to work, for a variety of reasons—to have spending cash, contribute to their household income, gain work experience, and save for the future, among other possibilities. In a nationally representative survey in 2005, nearly 7 out of 10 high school seniors reported that they expect work to be a central part of their lives, and almost 90% said they value a job that offers a reasonably predictable future.13 About 80% reported that they valued a job that is intrinsically rewarding because it is interesting to do, uses one's skills and abilities, and allows one to learn new things, among other factors. Nearly the same percentage of seniors valued work because of its extrinsic rewards, including that a job has high status and prestige that most people look up to and respect; allows for advancement and promotion; and provides one with a chance to earn a good deal of money.
Young people can more readily secure employment, especially employment that pays well, if they have some postsecondary education. As the level of education rises, the unemployment rate decreases and median weekly earnings increase for those who work. Among labor force participants without a high school diploma in 2014 the unemployment rate was 9%; this compares to an unemployment rate of 6.0% and 3.5% for those with a high school degree or a bachelor's degree, respectively (see Figure 7 for further detail).14 The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) predicts that the fastest growing occupations between 2010 and 2022 will require some postsecondary education.15 Further, in all career clusters, a bachelor's degree or better offers accessibility to most high-paying jobs.16 As discussed later in the report, the growing need for education to secure employment is likely a major reason why some young people are foregoing work for school. Still, BLS predicts that the occupations with the largest numeric increases will not require workers to have postsecondary education.
This section of the report describes data on participation in the labor force, including how it applies to youth. The data are generally reported by BLS that are based on a household survey conducted by the Census Bureau.17 This survey, known as the Current Population Survey (CPS), collects labor force and other data from a nationally representative sample of 60,000 households on a monthly basis. The survey includes households with civilian non-institutionalized individuals and excludes individuals residing in correctional facilities, residential nursing and mental health facilities, college dorms, military facilities, and other institutions. Employed and unemployed youth (beginning at age 16) and adults (no upper age limit) are counted by BLS as part of the labor force.
BLS considers individuals to be employed if they work at all for pay or profit during the week that they are surveyed.18 This includes all part-time and temporary work, as well as regular full-time, year-round employment. It does not include unpaid internships. Individuals are still counted as employed if they have a job at which they did not work during the survey week, even if they were not paid, because they were on vacation, experiencing child care problems, on maternity or paternity leave, or some other reason. Individuals are considered unemployed if they are jobless, actively looking for jobs, and available for work. Job search activities include sending out resumes or filling out applications, among certain other activities.
Labor market participation by youth, as well as adults, is a proxy indicator of interest in working. Generally, increasing labor force participation indicates greater interest in working, while decreasing labor force participation indicates declining or noninterest in working. Changes in labor force participation rates, however, are not perfect indicators of individual or collective interest in working. For example, labor force participation may decline because individuals become discouraged about job prospects and give up looking for work. Individuals may also decide to pursue education instead because of the returns they will receive later when they are employed.
The E/P ratio and the unemployment rate can help to gauge market conditions. A stable and high E/P ratio suggests that the economy is healthy, in that individuals are able to find employment. The unemployment rate is also an indicator of whether individuals are able to be employed in the labor force. This rate should be interpreted with caution: changes in the unemployment rate can mask the extent to which individuals want to work. The unemployment rate may decline when firms are not hiring because individuals become discouraged and drop out of the labor market.
In addition to the official count of unemployment, the CPS includes the number of people who are not in the labor force. Some individuals out of the labor force indicate that they want a job. Those who want a job are marginally attached to the labor force if they searched for work during the past 12 months and were available to take a job but had not looked for work in the past four weeks. Marginally attached workers are considered discouraged if they did not look for work for one or more of the following reasons: they thought that no work was available, could not find work, lacked the requisite schooling or training, or faced age or other types of discrimination. Marginally attached workers may also be unable to work for such reasons as school or family responsibilities, ill health, and transportation, as well as other reasons for which nonparticipation could not be determined.
Both the E/P ratio and the unemployment rate provide a snapshot of how well youth are faring in the labor market. Table 1 provides these and other relevant labor force data for individuals ages 16 and older and by age groups—youth ages 16 through 19 ("teens"), youth ages 20 through 24 ("young adults"), and other working age groups (through age 69) in 2014. The table shows that for workers generally, the labor force participation rate was 62.9% and the unemployment rate was 6.2%. In addition, 59.0% of individuals in the working population overall were employed. Though not shown in the table, these figures represent improvements from 2012, when the unemployment rate was 8.1% and the employment rate was 58.6%. The labor force participation rate was 63.7% in 2012. The drop in the unemployment rate appears to be due to increased employment that has outpaced growth in the labor force.20
Teens had the second lowest rate of labor force participation (34.0%), after the oldest workers; the lowest rate of employment (27.3%); and the highest rate of unemployment (19.6%). While young adults ages 20 to 24 participated at a high rate in the labor force (70.8%) and about 63.0% were working, they also experienced a relatively high rate of unemployment (11.2%). Individuals of prime working age (25 through 54) had the highest rates of labor force participation (80.9%) and employment (76.7%) and the lowest rate of unemployment (5.2%). Those ages 55 through 64 had a relatively average level of employment (61.4%) and the lowest rate of unemployment (4.3%) among the featured age groups. The oldest individuals in the table, those ages 65 through 69, had the lowest rate of labor force participation (31.6%), reflecting a high likelihood of retirement (and ability to receive Social Security benefits), and a relatively low unemployment rate (4.8%). Table 1 also displays the share of individuals not in the labor force who wanted a job. Overall, 6.9% of workers not in the labor force wanted a job compared to about 9.7% of teens and 15.2% of young adults.
Table 1. Labor Force Participation by Selected Age Groups, 2014
Numbers in thousands, not seasonally adjusted
Age Group |
Civilian Non-institutionalized |
Labor Force Participation Rate |
E/P Ratio |
Unemployment Rate |
Percentage Not in the Labor Force Who Want Job |
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Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS), based on published and unpublished data from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Current Population Survey (CPS).
Note: All workers means workers age 16 and older, including those over age 69. The labor force participation rate is the percentage of individuals in the population who are employed and who are unemployed (those who are not employed and not looking for work are out of the labor force). The E/P ratio represents the percentage of the non-institutionalized population who are employed. The unemployment rate is the percentage of individuals in the labor force who are jobless, looking for jobs, and available for work. The share of persons not in the labor force includes individuals who have looked for work within the past year and those who have not.
Table 2 displays the youth labor force participation rates, E/P ratios, and unemployment rates for all youth by sex and race/ethnicity in four recent years: 2000, 2007, 2012, and 2014. These four years are notable because they include a period when the economy was expanding (2000), a period just before the start of the recent recession (2007), and two recent full years after the recession ended (2012 and 2014). Labor force trends for youth ages 16 through 24 were bleak even before the onset of the recession. From 2000 to 2007, the youth labor force participation decreased from 65.8% to 59.4%; their E/P ratio fell from 59.7% to 53.1%; and their unemployment rate increased from 9.3% to 10.5%.
From 2000 to 2014, the youth labor force participation rate decreased by about 16%: 65.8% of youth were in the labor force in 2000, compared to 55% in 2014. More youth appear to have dropped out of the labor force due likely to downward trends in the economy and the growing importance of education.21 A greater share of males than females left the labor force over this period. Minority youth—black, Hispanic, and Asian—were less likely than their white counterparts to be in the labor force. Asian youth (and black youth) had the lowest rates of labor force participation and E/P ratios in both 2000 and 2014. As discussed later in this report, it appears the lower E/P ratios for Asian youth reflect their greater likelihood of pursuing higher education in lieu of work compared with their racial/ethnic counterparts.
Also over the 14-year period, the E/P ratio for 16-to-24 year olds decreased from 59.7% to 47.6%, a decline of about 12 percentage points. While a greater share of males than females were employed in both 2000 and 2014, males experienced greater declines in their E/P ratio. Employment for all racial/ethnic groups decreased by 7 to 14 percentage points. White and Hispanic youth had the most dramatic declines, with the white E/P ratio decreasing from 64.5% to 50.7%. The Hispanic E/P ratio decreased from 57.6% to 45.8%. However, black and Asian youth had the lowest E/P ratios in both years. About 38.5% of black youth and 36% of Asian youth were employed in 2014, compared to about 45.9% in 2000; however, as noted below, Asian youth also had the lowest rate of unemployment in 2014.
Further, the unemployment rate for youth increased by over 40% during the 2000-2014 period, with a rise from 9.3% to 13.4%. In both 2000 and 2014, males (14.5% in 2014) were more likely to be unemployed than females (12.2% in 2014). Nearly one-quarter (23.1%) of black youth were unemployed in 2014. This is compared to a 2014 unemployment rate of 11.3% for white youth, 14% for Hispanic youth, and 12% for Asian youth.
The relative change in the E/P ratio was nearly constant for each racial/ethnic group over time; however, the relative change in the labor force participation rate and unemployment rate varied by race/ethnicity. Black, Asian, and Hispanic youth experienced the smallest relative change in unemployment of between 25% and 35%, whereas the unemployment rate more than doubled for white youth.
The table also includes labor force data from 2012, as well as absolute and relative changes from 2012 to 2014. The trend over this two-year period reflected overall improvements in the economy, with the unemployment rate declining for all subgroups. The E/P ratio increased generally. Despite these gains, youth of color continued to have high rates of unemployment. At the same time, there was a slight decrease in labor force participation generally and among some subpopulations (white youth and males), due likely to still-improving economic conditions and opportunities to pursue education.
Table A-1 and Table A-2 in the Appendix include labor force participation rates, E/P ratios, and unemployment rates for youth ages 16 to 19 and 20 to 24 in 2000, 2007, 2012, and 2014. From 2000 to 2014, teens saw striking declines in their labor force participation (-18.0%) and E/P ratios
(-17.9%) compared to young adults (-6.9% and -10.7%, respectively). While teen unemployment was higher, the relative change in unemployment for teens and young adults was in the same range (49.6% and 55.6%, respectively).
Table 2. Labor Force Trends of Youth Ages 16-24 by Sex and Race/Ethnicity:
2000, 2007, 2012, and 2014
Not seasonally adjusted
|
2000 |
2007 |
2012 |
2014 |
Absolute Change |
Relative Change |
Absolute Change |
Relative Change |
Labor Force Participation Rate |
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All |
65.8 |
59.4 |
54.9 |
55.0 |
-10.8 |
-16.4% |
0.1 |
0.2% |
Male |
68.6 |
61.5 |
56.5 |
56.4 |
-12.2 |
-17.8% |
-0.1 |
-0.2% |
Female |
63.0 |
57.2 |
53.2 |
53.6 |
-9.4 |
-14.9% |
0.4 |
0.8% |
White |
69.7 |
62.0 |
57.3 |
57.1 |
-12.6 |
-18.1% |
-0.2 |
-0.3% |
Black |
56.1 |
50.2 |
48.9 |
50.0 |
-6.1 |
-10.9% |
1.1 |
2.2% |
Hispanic |
64.3 |
57.9 |
53.2 |
53.3 |
-11.0 |
-17.1% |
0.1 |
0.2% |
Asian |
50.5 |
45.1 |
39.4 |
40.9 |
-9.6 |
-19.0% |
1.5 |
3.8% |
E/P Ratio |
||||||||
All |
59.7 |
53.1 |
46.0 |
47.6 |
-12.1 |
-20.3% |
1.6 |
3.5% |
Male |
61.9 |
54.4 |
46.6 |
48.2 |
-13.7 |
-22.1% |
1.6 |
3.4% |
Female |
57.4 |
51.8 |
45.4 |
47.1 |
-10.3 |
-17.9% |
1.7 |
3.7% |
White |
64.5 |
56.3 |
49.1 |
50.7 |
-13.8 |
-21.4% |
1.6 |
3.3% |
Black |
45.7 |
40.5 |
35.8 |
38.5 |
-7.2 |
-15.8% |
2.7 |
7.5% |
Hispanic |
57.6 |
51.7 |
43.7 |
45.8 |
-11.8 |
-20.5% |
2.1 |
4.8% |
Asian |
45.9 |
41.9 |
34.4 |
36.0 |
-9.9 |
-21.6% |
1.6 |
4.7% |
Unemployment Rate |
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All |
9.3 |
10.5 |
16.2 |
13.4 |
4.1 |
44.1% |
-2.8 |
-17.3% |
Male |
9.7 |
11.6 |
17.6 |
14.5 |
4.8 |
49.5% |
-3.1 |
-17.6% |
Female |
8.9 |
9.4 |
14.7 |
12.2 |
3.3 |
37.1% |
-2.5 |
-17.0% |
White |
7.4 |
9.2 |
14.2 |
11.3 |
3.9 |
52.7% |
-2.9 |
-20.4% |
Black |
18.5 |
19.3 |
26.8 |
23.1 |
4.6 |
24.9% |
-3.7 |
-13.8% |
Hispanic |
10.4 |
10.7 |
17.7 |
14.0 |
3.6 |
34.6% |
-3.7 |
-20.9% |
Asian |
9.1 |
7.2 |
12.7 |
12.0 |
2.9 |
31.9% |
-0.7 |
-5.5% |
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS), based on data from U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey.
Notes: The labor force participation rate is the percentage of individuals in the population who are employed and unemployed (those who are not employed and not looking for work are out of the labor force). Employment-population ratios represent the percentage of the non-institutionalized population who were employed. The unemployment rate is the percentage of individuals in the labor force who are jobless, looking for jobs, and available for work. Persons of Hispanic origin can be of any race and individuals of any race may be Hispanic.
a. Absolute change refers to the percentage point change from 2000 to 2014, and is derived by subtracting 2014 data from 2004 data. Relative change refers to the percentage change over the same period, and is derived by subtracting 2014 data from 2000 data and then dividing that number by the 2000 data.
The 18-month recession that spanned December 2007 through June 2009, which some have called the "Great Recession,"22 disproportionately affected young people. Figure 1 shows the seasonally adjusted unemployment rates for teens, young adults, and adults of prime working age from the fourth quarter of 2007 through the fourth quarter of 2014. Over this period, unemployment rates for all groups steadily increased for each age cohort, peaking in 2009. Teen unemployment climbed from 16.1% at the end of 2007 to 26.8% at the end of 2009. During these same two years, the unemployment rate for young adults increased significantly, almost doubling from 8.7% in the fourth quarter of 2007 to 15.8% in the fourth quarter of 2009. Notably, the unemployment rate for teens increased over the first three quarters of 2011, and then declined (to 23.6%) in the fourth quarter. It increased again during the first two quarters of 2012, and decreased in most subsequent quarters. By the last quarter of 2014, the teen unemployment rate was 17.7%. The young adult quarterly unemployment rate steadily declined over time, but did not decrease in each quarter. The unemployment rate for workers of prime age declined in each quarter since 2011, but these rates were higher than they were in 2007. Rates for both groups of workers reached a post-recession low of 10.7% and 4.8%, respectively, by the end of 2014.
The figures and tables in the remainder of the report include employment and unemployment data over the period following World War II based on age, sex, race/ethnicity, and family income.23
The labor market experiences of youth are different based on their age. Figure 2 shows the E/P ratio from 1948 through 2014 for teens, young adults, and adults ages 25 through 54. (The figure also displays the 11 periods when the country was in recession.24) Over that time, teens had the lowest rates of employment, while adults of prime working age had the highest employment rates.
The E/P ratio for teens was 47.7% in 1948 and reached a post-World War II low of 25.8% in 2011; however, the E/P ratio increased slightly for this population to 27.3% in 2014. In the intervening years, there was variation in the rate—with 41.3% as the average. The data show points at which E/P ratios reached local troughs and peaks. As expected, teen employment generally declined soon after the start of a recession and reached local lows at the end of the recession or a year or two later. Notably, the teen employment rate was below 40% in 20 years over this 66-year period. Seven of those years were between 1958 and 1965 and 13 were between 2002 and 2012. This suggests a fairly recent long-term decline in teen employment. Still, the teen employment rate picked up slightly from 2000 to 2012.
Also over the post-World War II period, the E/P ratio for young adults ages 20 to 24 was higher and more stable than it was for teens. In both 1948 and 2014, approximately 6 out of 10 young adults were employed. Unlike the teen E/P ratio, which had more cyclical trends, the E/P ratio for young adults steadily improved over the period, particularly following the 1960-1961 recession. This could be due, in part, to women entering the labor market in greater numbers starting in the 1960s. Declines in the E/P ratios for young adults over the entire period were fairly small. The greatest change to the E/P ratio for this population occurred in the last decade, when the rate fluctuated from a high of 72.2% in 2000 to a low of 60.3% in 2010; however, the rate increased to 62.9% by 2014.
The long-term decline in E/P ratios for youth ages 16 to 19 appears to reflect, at least in some part, their withdrawal from the labor market. Figure A-1 and Figure A-2 in the Appendix show the labor force participation rate, E/P ratio, and unemployment rate for teens and young adults from 1948 through 2014. Over this period, labor force participation for teens was lower than that of young adults. Teen labor force participation trended upward from the 1960s until reaching a peak in 1979 at nearly 58%. Over the next two decades, the rate was uneven. It then declined by about 9% from 2000 to 2014. In contrast to teens, the labor force participation of young adults steadily increased in most years over the post-World War II period. It was stable at about 70% to 80% in most years; however, at the start of the 2000s it began to tick downward, reaching its lowest point (in 2010) since the early 1970s. From 2010 to 2014, the E/P ratio increased for young adults, from 60.3% to 62.9%.
These changes can likely be viewed as partially a consequence of a positive social trend—the increase in school enrollment, particularly for youth ages 16-19.25 In addition, as discussed later in the report, students are increasingly pursuing unpaid internships to meet high school graduation requirements and improve their prospects for attending college.26 So although they are gaining employment experience, they are not included in the labor force.
Nonetheless, these trends do not necessarily reflect a tendency toward voluntary withdrawal from the workforce to complete schooling. Indeed, some young people may have dropped out of the labor market because of dismal employment prospects, especially in light of the jobless recovery following the 2001 recession. Although the economy rebounded, the E/P ratios of teens and young adults stabilized or declined in subsequent years. The 2007-2009 recession likely further contributed to the downward trend. The growing unemployment rate since 2008 suggests that some youth have withdrawn from the labor force because of their inability to find work. Figure A-1 and Figure A-2 in the Appendix show the unemployment rate for teens and young adults. The unemployment rate for teens was between 10% and 20% in most years over the post-World War II period. In 2010, this rate reached a recorded high of 25.9%. Only in eight years—1982, 1983, 1992, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013—did the teen unemployment rate exceed 20%. Notably, the E/P ratio and unemployment rate for teens converged in 2010 so that about one-quarter of teens in the general population was working and one-quarter of teens in the labor force were unemployed. Since that time, a more positive trend has emerged: as of 2014, 27.3% of teens were working and 19.6% were unemployed.
The unemployment rate for young adults fluctuated over the post-war period, from a low of 4.1% in 1951 to a high of 15.5% in 2010 (and improving to 11.2% in FY2014). The last time unemployment increased above 11% for young adults was during the back-to-back recessions of the early 1980s, when the unemployment rate reached a high of 14.9% (in 1982).
As shown in Figure 2 the employment trend line for prime-age workers 25 through 54 was the highest of the three age groups. Although it was mostly parallel to the employment trend line for 20- through 24-year-olds, older workers increasingly were more likely to be employed over time. From the 1950s through 1970s, workers of prime age had somewhat comparable E/P ratios to young adults, with about 5% more prime-age workers employed in most years on average. Starting in the 1980s, the difference in their E/P ratios began to grow. By the 1990s, about 10% more of the prime-age population was employed than of the young adult population. This difference grew to 14% in 2014. The unemployment rate for workers of prime age was 4.6% on average over the post-World War II period. Only in two years, 2009 and 2010, did it exceed 8%.
The employment experiences of teens and young adults have differed based on sex. Figure 3 shows the E/P ratios for female and male teens and young adults for 1948 through 2014. For many years, the E/P ratios for females were much lower than they were for their male counterparts; however, beginning in the mid-1960s, the E/P ratios for females, particularly young women, turned upward whereas the ratios for males tended to be downward trending. This was due, in part, to increasing numbers of women entering the labor force.27 At this time, women began completing college at a higher rate than previous generations of women,28 which has likely influenced the extent to which they pursued and secured employment. In addition, other factors—lower fertility, declines in marriage rates, and increased likelihood of divorce—have played a role in women's increased participation in the labor force, among other factors that are not easy to quantify (i.e., shifts in expectations about roles based on sex).29 The difference in the E/P ratios for males and females in both age groups began to narrow in the 1990s, but likely for different reasons. For teens, the male E/P ratios started to drop while the female E/P ratios began to rise, so that by 1996 the rates were nearly identical. For young adults, females made significant inroads into the labor market. By the late 1990s, their E/P ratios were virtually the same as those for their male counterparts.
In most years since 2000, the E/P ratios of teen and young adult males and females declined. These declines were greater for male teens, such that the female teen E/P ratio surpassed that of males; however, both groups have experienced decreases in employment in the past few years. About 25%-26% of teen males were employed and about 27%-28% of teen females were employed in each of 2010 through 2014. A slightly greater share of young males was more likely to be employed: in 2014, 64.9% of males and 60.9% of females were employed.
Similar E/P ratios for males and females may be attributable to the changing employment prospects of less-educated individuals, as discussed further below. Young males ages 16 through 24 are somewhat less likely to be enrolled in high school or college than their female counterparts,30 and a smaller share of males ages 25 through 29 have obtained a college degree (see Table 3).31 Overall, young males had more negative labor market outcomes than females. As shown previously in Table 2, males were more likely to be unemployed over the past decade.
Youth employment has varied by race and ethnicity. Data on the E/P ratios of white youth have been available since 1954. The data for black, Hispanic, and Asian youth became available in 1972, 1994, and 2000, respectively. In years where data are available for both white youth and other racial and ethnic groups, the E/P ratio was highest for white youth.
Figure 4 shows the E/P ratio of teens ages 16 to 19 by race and ethnicity. The employment trends for white, black, and Hispanic youth (in applicable years for black and Hispanic youth) reflected cyclical effects of the economy over the period depicted, until the late 1990s. Shortly thereafter, the E/P ratios for all groups declined by about 15 to 20 percentage points, with white teens having the steepest decline in employment over the period of recovery following the 2000 recession. In recent years, about one-third of white teens; almost one-quarter of Hispanic teens; and nearly one-fifth of black and Asian teens were employed. Figure 5 shows the employment trends for young adults by race and ethnicity. Employment for white young adults steadily increased, even during most recessions, over the post-World War II period. In 1954, their E/P ratio was 55.9%, and in 2000 it peaked at 75.2%. It then declined steadily, reaching a recent low of 63.5% in 2010, but increased to 66.4% in 2014.
Despite recent improvements for employment among minority youth, youth of color have had lower E/P ratios relative to white youth. These lower rates may be due, in part, to the fewer employment prospects of individuals with less education (see discussion below). Overall, African Americans and Hispanics ages 16 through 24 are less likely to have completed high school and college.32 Schooling may also explain the relatively low E/P ratios for Asian youth, but for a different reason. Asian youth have had the highest rates of school completion for college (and comparable rates for high school completion compared to white youth).33 The 2012 E/P ratio for Asian teens was at a recorded low of 15.9%. Further, as shown in Table 2, Asian youth had the lowest rates of unemployment in recent years, which is likely a reflection of their high rates of school attainment.
Finally, employment rates tend to vary by family income. An analysis by Northeastern University's Center for Labor Studies shows the summer employment rate of teens ages 16 through 19 increases as household income increases, and that family income (along with other factors) has a statistically significant effect on the probability of youth employment.34 In 2011, less than one out of every five teens in the country's 100 largest metropolitan areas worked in households with earnings below $20,000. This is compared to about one-fifth of teens in the same communities with household incomes of $20,000 to $40,000; and 26% to 28% of teens with household incomes of $40,000 to $60,000, $60,000 to $75,000, and over $75,000. The research literature has not explored the extent to which low-income youth pursue employment because of their family's financial situation.
The decrease in the youth E/P ratio is associated with increasing youth unemployment. Both of these indicators demonstrate that youth have fairly limited opportunities in the labor force, although their prospects have improved in the past few years. There are many factors that affect labor market outcomes for youth; several factors affect the labor market as a whole and some are more specific to youth. This section provides a brief summary of some of these factors.
One likely explanation of the dismal employment opportunities for youth is the supply of jobs and demand for workers. In general, firms lay off workers during recessions to respond to reduced demand for their goods and services. In the latest recession, which started in late 2007, the decline in economic activity (as measured by gross domestic product, or GDP) bottomed out in the second half of 2009. Since that time, there is some evidence that GDP adjusted for inflation (real GDP) has increased, albeit unevenly, in each quarter since the third quarter of 2009.35 The labor market, however, has not fully recovered despite recent economic growth. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) noted in 2014 that the slow recovery of the labor market has resulted from the slow growth in the demand for goods and services.36 Nonetheless, CBO more recently projected increases in GDP in 2015 through 2017 that are greater than in 2014 and prior recent years.37
Experience and education are also important determinants of the success of youth in the labor market. These factors are not specific to youth, of course, but may have a more pronounced effect on youth because of their relative lack of experience and education compared to other labor market participants.
In general, firms are more likely to hire workers with more experience and availability, which puts young workers at a disadvantage. Young workers may especially face challenges in landing a job during tough economic times.38 Further, the labor market trends for youth are associated with their relatively frequent job changes, with each transition potentially involving a spell of unemployment. About two-thirds of all job changes occur within the first 10 years of a young person's working life, during which time he or she will work for eight employers on average.39 This initial period of frequent job turnover has positives and negatives. Frequent job turnover among new labor force members may reflect their trying out different positions and work environments until they find the optimal match; however, it may also reflect employer reluctance to hire inexperienced workers for career ladder positions and young workers in dead-end jobs having little reason to form a lasting attachment to any particular firm. Analyses of data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY)40 generally found that while typical young workers do not enter a long-term job (of at least three years duration) immediately after leaving school, they do so within five years. Job tenure also depended on education. College graduates generally found stable, long-term employment almost immediately while high school dropouts had several short-term jobs even 15 years after leaving school.41 In a recession, a youth's short and disrupted work history may make hiring him or her less desirable.
Education also plays a role in whether youth seek and are able to find work. Youth may decide not to pursue employment and to attend school instead; they may want to do both, but may not have opportunities to work due to a lack of jobs. The rising rate of school enrollment has likely influenced the downward trend in the labor market participation rate for teens and young adults.42 Figure 6 shows that the rates of enrollment in higher education among 18- and 19-year-olds and 20- through 24-year-olds have steadily increased over time, reaching near all-time (or all-time) highs in 2012.43 That year, 47% all teens ages 18 and 19 were attending colleges, universities, and professional schools—an increase of over 34% since 1970. (Notably, the rate of teen attendance declined in each year from 2009 to 2012, which may be due to slight improvements in the employment rate at the end of this three-year period.) Two out of five young adults ages 20 through 24 were enrolled in higher education in 2012, compared to about 1 out of 5 in 1970.44
A Department of Labor study attributes the declining summer teen employment beginning in the early 2000s to education.45 The study found that the proportion of teens enrolled in school during the summer has steadily increased, from about 15% in 1985 to 53% in 2009. Teens appear to face greater academic demands and pressure, which may influence their education and employment choices. The study noted that more high school students are satisfying the requirements needed for attending a four-year college, and that a growing share of students are taking advanced placement (AP) courses. The average number of credits earned by high school graduates increased from 21.6 in 1982 to 26.7 in 2005. Also over this same period, the proportion of graduates who took an advanced mathematics course increased from 26.3% to 48.8% (the gains are similar for other advanced courses). Teens may feel compelled not to pursue work for the summer and instead opt for volunteer opportunities or internships in order to fulfill their graduation requirements and improve their prospects for getting into a four-year college or university. According to the study, Current Population Survey data from 2009 show that over one-quarter of teens ages 16 through 19 had reported volunteering at some time during the prior year.
Young people may also forego working and pursue education instead because of the gains they can make in the labor market at a later time—although the extent to which this occurs is uncertain. Success in the workforce is related to education, with the payoff being lower unemployment and higher wages as educational attainment increases. Figure 7 shows the unemployment rate and median weekly earnings for full-time workers age 25 and older in 2014. As the level of education rises, the unemployment rate decreases and median weekly earnings increase. Among adults with less than a high school degree, 9.0% were unemployed and earnings were $488 per week. This is compared to an unemployment rate of 6.0% and $668 in weekly earnings for a high school graduate. Adults with a bachelor's degree or higher had an unemployment rate of 3.5% or lower and median weekly earnings that ranged from $1,101 to $1,639.
Workers with higher levels of education are more likely to weather hard economic times.46 According to a 2010 analysis, in the past two recessions, "the typical job loser was a high school-educated male in a blue collar job, such as manufacturing or construction, working in the middle of the country. In the past two recoveries, the typical job gainer was a female with a postsecondary education who lived on either coast and worked in a service occupation—particularly healthcare, education, or business services."
Table 3 shows educational attainment by race and sex for young people ages 25 through 29 in three years: 2000, when the economy was expanding but youth employment was beginning a long-term decline; 2007, immediately before the start of the recent recession; and 2014, the most recent full year for which data are available after the recession. Data are available for all racial and ethnic groups, except Asian youth in 2000. These data seem to correspond with data about participation in the labor force. For example, Asian youth were much more likely than their peers to obtain a college degree. They were also the least likely to be in the labor force.
From 2000 to 2014, females and males made the same gains in high school completion but females were much more likely to have attained a college degree. In 2014, males and females were likely to complete high school at almost the same rate (91.5% for females and 90.1% for males); however, 37.2% of females had completed at least a bachelor's degree by age 30, compared to 30.9% of the males. In every racial and ethnic category, females were more likely than males to graduate from high school and college in both 2000 and 2014; however, a slightly greater share of black males were more likely to complete high school.
All racial and ethnic groups also experienced gains over time, except that the Asian female high school graduation rate decreased by about 1 percentage point and the Asian male college rate decreased by about 4 percentage points. In 2014, Hispanic males ages 25 through 29 were far less likely to finish high school (72.4%) than white males (95.4%) and black males (90.2%); however, nearly one-fifth more Hispanic males had a high school degree in 2014 than in 2000. A relatively small share of black males and Hispanic males completed college in both 2000 and 2014, compared to white males. Black females ages 25 through 29 made significant gains in college attainment from 2000 (17.0%) to 2014 (23.4%) as did their Hispanic counterparts over the same period (11% in 2000 and 18.3% in 2014).
Data on Asian youth ages 25 through 29 are available only for 2007 and 2014. A lower share of Asian female youth graduated from high school and a lower share of Asian male youth graduated from college in 2012 than in 2007. Still, Asian young adults were more likely to have completed high school and college. In 2014, about 56% of Asian males and 67% of Asian females were college graduates, compared to about 38% of white males and 44% of white females.
Table 3. Percentage of Young Adults Ages 25-29 Who Completed High School or College, by Sex and Race/Ethnicity: 2000, 2007, and 2014
Educational Attainment by Year |
Total |
Non-Hispanic White |
Black |
Hispanic |
Asiana |
|||||
Males |
Females |
Males |
Females |
Males |
Females |
Males |
Females |
Males |
Females |
|
High School |
||||||||||
2000 |
86.7% |
89.4% |
92.9% |
95.2% |
86.6% |
85.3% |
59.2% |
66.4% |
N/A |
N/A |
2007 |
84.9% |
89.1% |
92.7% |
94.2% |
87.0% |
87.8% |
60.5% |
70.7% |
95.8% |
98.5% |
2014 |
90.1% |
91.5% |
95.4% |
95.9% |
90.2% |
89.4% |
72.4% |
77.8% |
96.3% |
97.2% |
Absolute Change from 2000-2014 |
3.4 |
2.1 |
2.5 |
0.1 |
3.6 |
4.1 |
13.2 |
11.4 |
0.5 |
-1.3 |
Relative Change |
3.9% |
2.3% |
2.7% |
0.6% |
4.2% |
4.8% |
22.3% |
17.2% |
0.5% |
-1.3% |
College |
||||||||||
2000 |
27.9% |
30.1% |
32.3% |
35.8% |
18.1% |
17.0% |
8.3% |
11.0% |
N/A |
N/A |
2007 |
26.3% |
33.0% |
31.9% |
39.2% |
17.9% |
19.9% |
8.6% |
15.4% |
59.8% |
62.0% |
2014 |
30.9% |
37.2% |
37.7% |
43.9% |
19.5% |
23.4% |
12.4% |
18.3% |
56.3% |
66.5% |
Absolute Change from 2000-2014 |
3.0 |
7.1 |
5.4 |
8.1 |
1.4 |
6.4 |
4.1 |
7.3 |
-3.5 |
4.5 |
Relative Change |
10.8% |
23.6% |
16.7% |
22.6% |
7.7% |
37.6% |
49.4% |
66.4% |
-5.9% |
7.3% |
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS), based on U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau, Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the Current Population Survey, Table A-2, "Percent of People 25 Years and Over Who Have Completed High School or College, by Race, Hispanic Origin and Sex: Selected Years: 1940 to 2014."
Note: N/A means not available. College attainment refers to a bachelor's degree or higher.
a. The absolute and relative changes for Asian youth are based on 2007 and 2014 data since 2000 data are not available.
b. Absolute change refers to the percentage point change from 2000 to 2014 and is derived by subtracting 2014 data from 2000 data. Relative change refers to the percentage change over the same period and is derived by subtracting 2014 data from 2000 data and then dividing that number by the 2000 data.
The factors discussed thus far affect the labor market experiences of both youth and adults, although the effects tend to be larger for youth. There are additional factors that have been posited to have particular relevance for youth outcomes in the labor market.
Youth tend to have frequent movements in and out of the labor force. The educational calendar exacerbates the probability of unemployment for young labor force (re)entrants. They typically flood the labor market in May and June either searching for summer jobs after the school year has ended or seeking initial jobs upon graduating (or dropping out). While the regularly occurring swell in the labor supply of youth coincides with increased demand for workers in some seasonal industries, this is not the case for most firms in the economy.
Other external factors can affect the labor status of young people. Among these factors are the characteristics of the neighborhoods in which they live, such as area employment and poverty rates, and proximity of those neighborhoods to jobs. An analysis that utilized data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) and U.S. census tract information for 1980 and 1990 estimated that 14- through 22-year-olds who grew up in metropolitan areas with relatively high poverty rates had a lesser likelihood as adults of being employed in the civilian economy or in the Armed Forces and a greater likelihood of not being in the labor force.47 Being raised in a poor neighborhood appears to more adversely affect young males, especially those in poor families, than females. Other research similarly shows neighborhood effects can vary according to the characteristics of youth. For example, another study based on NLSY data estimated that the adverse impact on labor market attachment of young out-of-school males living in disadvantaged metropolitan areas was harsher for those with less than 12 years of schooling.48
In addition to social isolation from work due to a dearth of role models and job referral networks, geographic isolation from fast-growing job-rich areas (i.e., spatial mismatch) has been shown to affect youths' employment outcomes. Some analyses estimated that limited social access has a more adverse impact than access to transportation. Nonetheless, the proximity of jobs was still found to affect their labor market involvement independent of other factors.49
The consequences of growing youth unemployment and decreasing E/P ratios among youth have not been fully explored in the research literature. The few recent studies that address the effects of youth labor market participation have focused on the individual outcomes for youth and not, for example, on societal or economic outcomes such as reduced gross domestic product (GDP).50 The studies found that on average, early youth unemployment has serious negative effects on income but not as strong of effects on future unemployment. Still, other studies show that youth entering the labor force during a downturn in the economy have poorer labor market outcomes in the long run. These studies are discussed briefly.
Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, researchers estimated the long-term effects of youth unemployment on labor market outcomes.51 They examined the employment status of young men in the sample when they were in their 20s and later in their early 30s. They found that human capital (average level of education and training) increased over time, but also that early unemployment affected both wages and future unemployment. Their economic model projected that a six-month spell of unemployment at age 22 would result in an 8% lower wage rate, on average, one year later. The effects of this early spell persist; at age 26, wages would be 5% lower than what they would have otherwise been, and wages would be 2% to 3% lower at ages 30 and 31. Finally, the study found that past unemployment affected future unemployment, but only in the short term.
Studies of the effects of youth unemployment in OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries have found similar declines in wages as the result of early unemployment.52 A study of youth unemployment in the United Kingdom determined that one year of unemployment at age 22 reduced wages by 13% to 21% 20 years later. The study controlled for education, family income, and personal characteristics. Another study found that unemployment immediately upon graduation from college is associated with substantial and permanent future earnings losses; however, the long-lasting effects of unemployment depend on the labor market conditions in which youth are unemployed.
Other research has examined how young workers fare when entering the labor market during a bad economy. One study used NLSY data to determine the effects of white males graduating from college with a bachelor's degree before, during, and after the recessions of the early 1980s (from 1979 through 1989).53 The study examined how national and state unemployment influenced the wages, probability of being employed, and occupation type for these young men. After controlling for the possibility that individuals decide when to graduate from college in light of economic conditions, the study found that an increase in national unemployment by 1 percentage point decreased the wages of the general sample by about 4% in each of the 17 years following their graduation (relative to graduates who left school in 1989, when unemployment was at its lowest point during the 10-year period). In addition, higher unemployment in the year graduates left school was also associated with lower occupational prestige; however, the effects on the likelihood of being employed and on tenure were insignificant to modest. The analysis of state unemployment rates was more mixed but showed some long-term effects on wage and related labor outcomes.
The study also used Current Population Survey data to examine whether the recession of the early 1990s had similar impacts on workers. The CPS is a cross-sectional data set, and therefore the individuals in each annual survey vary. The study restricted the sample to white males with at least a bachelor's degree from 1997 through 2006, and found that a 1 percentage point increase in the national unemployment rate when these individuals were age 22 resulted in wage losses for 10 years; however, wage effects disappeared after 10 years. This could be due to measurement error because age 22 served as the proxy year for college graduation (which is unknown in the CPS) when, in fact, graduates may have finished college at a different age.
Similar research used the NLSY and CPS (Outgoing Rotation Group, ORG) to estimate the effects of white and black males graduating from college in a bad economy, except that this study also examined whether employers selected college graduates with the highest aptitude during a recession.54 The study found that college graduates hired in a recession have, on average, higher abilities (based on the Armed Forces Qualification Test, or AFQT) compared to college graduates who enter the labor market in a good economy. Both the NLSY (1979 through 1989) and CPS (1979 through 1997) analyses showed, after accounting for a worker's aptitude, that wages declined by about 5% in the first three years of the worker's career. Workers sustained slightly lower wage losses in subsequent years.
This report provided an overview of the youth employment situation. It showed that over time, teens and young adults were less likely to be employed than older workers. This is likely the result of their relative lack of work experience, lower levels of education, and frequent movement in and out of the labor force. Perhaps most striking is that the E/P ratio for youth, especially for teens, has eroded over the past decade—even in years when the economy was growing. The teen E/P ratio has been below 40% since 2002. This suggests a fairly recent long-term decline in teen employment, due to dismal employment prospects and youth withdrawing from the labor force to pursue educational opportunities. While the E/P ratio trend line for 20- to 24-year-olds has been higher and more stable, the employment gains for this population have also been erased. At the start of the decade, the E/P ratio for young adults was about 72%, and by 2014 this rate dropped to about 63.0%. Further, youth unemployment had been at its highest recorded levels until recently. The American ethos that future generations can earn more and live more comfortably than their parents may be out of reach for many youth today.55 Additional research is needed on the effects of recent long-term youth unemployment. Such research could focus on how the current generation of young workers compares in terms of employment and wages to past generations of young workers who entered the labor force during downturns in the economy.
Table A-1. Labor Force Participation of Youth Ages 16-19 by Race and Ethnicity:
2000, 2007, 2012, and 2014
Not seasonally adjusted
2000 |
2007 |
2012 |
2014 |
Absolute Change from |
Relative Change from |
Absolute Change from 2012-2014 |
Relative Change from 2012-2014 (Percentage) |
||
Labor Force Participation Rate |
|||||||||
All |
52.0 |
41.3 |
34.3 |
34.0 |
-18.0 |
-34.6% |
-0.3 |
-0.9% |
|
Male |
52.8 |
41.1 |
34.0 |
33.5 |
-19.3 |
-36.6% |
-0.5 |
-1.5% |
|
Female |
51.2 |
41.5 |
34.6 |
34.5 |
-16.7 |
-32.6% |
-0.1 |
-0.3% |
|
White |
55.5 |
44.4 |
36.9 |
36.2 |
-19.3 |
-34.8% |
-0.7 |
-1.9% |
|
Black |
39.4 |
30.3 |
26.9 |
27.2 |
-12.2 |
-31.0% |
0.3 |
1.1% |
|
Hispanic |
46.3 |
37.1 |
30.9 |
30.3 |
-16.0 |
-34.6% |
-0.6 |
-1.9% |
|
Asian |
35.8 |
24.5 |
20.1 |
21.0 |
-14.8 |
-41.3% |
0.9 |
4.5% |
|
E/P Ratio |
|||||||||
All |
45.2 |
34.8 |
26.1 |
27.3 |
-17.9 |
-39.6% |
1.2 |
4.6% |
|
Male |
45.4 |
33.9 |
24.9 |
26.3 |
-19.1 |
-42.1% |
1.4 |
5.6% |
|
Female |
45.0 |
35.8 |
27.3 |
28.4 |
-16.6 |
-36.9% |
1.1 |
4.0% |
|
White |
49.1 |
38.3 |
29.0 |
29.9 |
-19.2 |
-39.1% |
0.9 |
3.1% |
|
Black |
29.8 |
21.4 |
16.6 |
18.2 |
-11.6 |
-38.9% |
1.6 |
9.6% |
|
Hispanic |
38.6 |
30.4 |
22.1 |
23.5 |
-15.1 |
-39.1% |
1.4 |
6.3% |
|
Asian |
30.7 |
21.4 |
15.9 |
18.1 |
-12.6 |
-41.0% |
2.2 |
13.8% |
|
Unemployment Rate |
|||||||||
All |
13.1 |
15.7 |
24.0 |
19.6 |
6.5 |
49.6% |
-4.4 |
-18.3% |
|
Male |
14.0 |
17.6 |
26.8 |
21.4 |
7.4 |
52.9% |
-5.4 |
-20.1% |
|
Female |
12.1 |
13.8 |
21.1 |
17.7 |
5.6 |
46.3% |
-3.4 |
-16.1% |
|
White |
11.4 |
13.9 |
21.5 |
17.3 |
5.9 |
51.8% |
-4.2 |
-19.5% |
|
Black |
24.5 |
29.4 |
38.3 |
33.0 |
8.5 |
34.7% |
-5.3 |
-13.8% |
|
Hispanic |
16.6 |
18.1 |
28.6 |
22.5 |
5.9 |
35.5% |
-6.1 |
-21.3% |
|
Asian |
14.2 |
12.7 |
20.8 |
14.0 |
-0.2 |
-1.4% |
-6.8 |
-32.7% |
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS), based on data from U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey.
Notes: The labor force participation rate is the percentage of individuals in the population who are employed and unemployed (those who are not employed and not looking for work are out of the labor force). Employment-population ratios represent the percentage of the non-institutionalized population who were employed. The unemployment rate is the percentage of individuals in the labor force who are jobless, looking for jobs, and available for work. Persons of Hispanic origin can be of any race and individuals of any race may be Hispanic.
a. Absolute change refers to the percentage point change from 2000 to 2014 and is derived by subtracting 2014 data from 2000 data. Relative change refers to the percentage change over the same period and is derived by subtracting 2014 data from 2000 data and then dividing that number by the 2000 data.
Table A-2. Labor Force Participation of Youth Ages 20-24 by Race and Ethnicity:
2000, 2007, 2012, and 2014
Not seasonally adjusted
|
2000 |
2007 |
2012 |
2014 |
Absolute Change |
Relative Change |
Absolute Change |
Relative Change |
Labor Force Participation Rate |
||||||||
All |
77.8 |
74.4 |
70.9 |
70.8 |
-6.9 |
-9.0% |
-0.1 |
-0.1% |
Male |
82.6 |
78.7 |
74.5 |
73.9 |
-8.1 |
-10.5% |
-0.6 |
-0.8% |
Female |
73.1 |
70.0 |
67.4 |
67.7 |
-5.7 |
-7.4% |
0.3 |
0.4% |
White |
79.9 |
76.4 |
73.1 |
73.0 |
-6.8 |
-8.6% |
-0.1 |
-0.1% |
Black |
71.8 |
68.3 |
66.5 |
66.6 |
-5.3 |
-7.2% |
0.1 |
0.2% |
Hispanic |
78.2 |
74.8 |
71.2 |
71.4 |
-7 |
-8.7% |
0.2 |
0.3% |
Asian |
63.0 |
59.7 |
52.8 |
54.3 |
-10.2 |
-13.8% |
1.5 |
2.8% |
E/P Ratio |
||||||||
All |
72.2 |
68.4 |
61.5 |
62.9 |
-10.7 |
-12.9% |
1.4 |
2.3% |
Male |
76.6 |
71.7 |
63.8 |
64.9 |
-12.8 |
-15.3% |
1.1 |
1.7% |
Female |
67.9 |
65.0 |
59.2 |
60.9 |
-8.7 |
-10.3% |
1.7 |
2.9% |
White |
75.2 |
71.0 |
64.8 |
66.8 |
-10.4 |
-11.2% |
2.0 |
3.1% |
Black |
61.0 |
57.9 |
51.1 |
53.2 |
-9.9 |
-12.8% |
2.1 |
4.1% |
Hispanic |
72.4 |
69.0 |
61.3 |
63.5 |
-11.1 |
-12.3% |
2.2 |
3.6% |
Asian |
58.6 |
56.4 |
47.3 |
48.0 |
-11.3 |
-18.1% |
0.7 |
1.5% |
Unemployment Rate |
||||||||
All |
7.2 |
8.2 |
13.3 |
11.2 |
6.1 |
55.6% |
-2.1 |
-15.8% |
Male |
7.3 |
8.9 |
14.3 |
12.2 |
7 |
67.1% |
-2.1 |
-14.7% |
Female |
7.1 |
7.3 |
12.1 |
10.1 |
5 |
42.3% |
-2.0 |
-16.5% |
White |
5.9 |
7.0 |
11.4 |
9.1 |
5.5 |
54.2% |
-2.3 |
-20.2% |
Black |
15 |
15.2 |
23.1 |
20.2 |
8.1 |
34.7% |
-2.9 |
-12.6% |
Hispanic |
7.5 |
7.8 |
13.8 |
11.1 |
6.3 |
48.0% |
-2.7 |
-19.6% |
Asian |
6.9 |
5.6 |
10.5 |
11.5 |
3.6 |
66.7% |
1.0 |
9.5% |
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS), based on data from U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey.
Notes: The labor force participation rate is the percentage of individuals in the population who are employed and unemployed (those who are not employed and not looking for work are out of the labor force). Employment-population ratios represent the percentage of the non-institutionalized population who were employed. The unemployment rate is the percentage of individuals in the labor force who are jobless, looking for jobs, and available for work.
a. Absolute change refers to the percentage point change from 2000 to 2014 and is derived by subtracting
2014 data from 2000 data. Relative change refers to the percentage change over the same period and is
derived by subtracting 2014 data from 2000 data and then dividing that number by the 2000 data.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank colleagues [author name scrubbed], Specialist in Labor Economics; [author name scrubbed], Information Research Specialist; [author name scrubbed], Specialist in Social Policy (now retired); and [author name scrubbed], Specialist in Social Policy for their assistance with developing this report.
1. |
Briefly, the labor force participation rate is the percentage of individuals in the population who are employed and who are unemployed. The employment-to-population (E/P) ratio, is the proportion of individuals in the general U.S. population who are employed. The unemployment rate is the share of individuals in the labor force who are unemployed (note that the denominator for the E/P ratio and the unemployment rate are different). |
2. |
For further information about programs and policy responses, see Congressional Research Service, Issues Before Congress, Employment and Training Policy and Economic Recovery, Growth, and Jobs, http://crs.gov/Pages/subissue.aspx?cliid=489&parentid=4&Preview=False. |
3. |
Congressional Research Service (CRS), based on data from U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Current Employment Statistics (CES) Survey. The percent change in total nonfarm employment between the first and last year of the 1940s-2000s period by decade is as follows: 1940s, 35.3%; 1950s, 17.9%; 1960s, 29.9%; 1970s, 26.7%; 1980s, 19.3%; 1990s, 17.8%; 2000s, -1.5%. |
4. |
Neil Irwin, "Aughts were a Lost Decade for U.S. Economy, Workers," Washington Post, January 2, 2010. |
5. |
Maria E. Canon, Marianna Kudlyak, and Yang Liu, Youth Labor Force Participation Continues to Fall, but It Might Be for a Good Reason, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, The Regional Economist, January 2015. (Hereinafter Maria E. Canon, Marianna Kudlyak, and Yang Liu, Youth Labor Force Participation Continues to Fall, but It Might Be for a Good Reason.) |
6. |
Sandy Baum, Higher Education Earnings Premium: Value, Variation, And Trends, Urban Institute, February 2014. |
7. |
Hope Yen, "1 in 2 New College Grads Jobless or Underemployed," The Associated Press, April 24, 2012; Jennifer 8. Lee, "Generation Limbo: Waiting It Out," New York Times, August 31, 2011; and Adam Clark Estes, "More Signs That American Youth are a Lost Generation," The Atlantic Wire, September 22, 2011. |
8. |
Jasion R. Abel, Richard Dietz, and Yaqin Su, Are Recent College Graduates Finding Good Jobs?, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Current Issues in Economics and Finance, vol. 20, no. 1, 2014. |
9. |
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) sets 14 years of age as the minimum age for employment and limits the number of hours worked by minors under the age of 16. |
10. |
Arguably, the age of youth could be even higher than 24. For example, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111-148) uses the age of 26. Specifically, the law requires health insurance companies to provide coverage to the children of parents who are enrolled in their health care plans up to their 26th birthday. It also provides a new Medicaid pathway, effective January 2014, for children who age out of foster care up to their 26th birthday. |
11. |
For further information on the transition to adulthood, see CRS Report RL33975, Vulnerable Youth: Background and Policies, by [author name scrubbed]. |
12. |
For further discussion, see CRS Report R40535, Disconnected Youth: A Look at 16- to 24-Year Olds Who Are Not Working or In School, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. See also Gordon L. Berlin, Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., and Mary C. Waters, "Introducing the Issue," Future of Children Volume on the Transition to Adulthood, vol. 20, no. 1 (Spring 2010), pp. 1-17. |
13. |
Laura Wray-Lake et al., "Exploring the Changing Meaning of Work for American High School Seniors From 1976 to 2005," Youth & Society, vol. 43, no. 3, 2011, pp. 1110-1135. |
14. |
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey; Earnings and Unemployment Rates by Educational Attainment, April 2, 2015, http://www.bls.gov/emp/ep_chart_001.htm. |
15. |
Emily Richards and David Terkanian, "Occupational Employment Projections to 2022," Monthly Labor Review, vol. 135, no. 1 (December 2013), http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2013/article/occupational-employment-projections-to-2022.htm. See also, Anthony P. Carnevale, Nicole Smith, and Jeff Strohl, Help Wanted: Projections of Jobs and Education Requirements through 2018, Georgetown University, Center on Education and the Workforce, June 2010, http://cew.georgetown.edu/JOBS2018/. |
16. |
Anthony P. Carnevale et al., Career Cluster: Forecasting Demand for High School Through College Jobs 2008-2018, November 2011, http://cew.georgetown.edu/clusters/. |
17. |
The terms used in this report are defined by the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Glossary," http://www.bls.gov/bls/glossary.htm. |
18. |
BLS also counts workers who are "unpaid family workers," which includes any person who worked without pay for 15 hours or more per week in a family-owned enterprise operated by someone in their household. Unpaid family workers comprise a relatively small proportion of total employment. |
19. |
The denominator for the E/P ratio and the unemployment rate are different. When restricted to youth, the denominator for the E/P ratio is youth in the labor force and the denominator for unemployment is youth in the civilian non-institutionalized population. Youth refers to young people ages 16-19, 20-24, or 16-24. |
20. |
For further information, see CRS Report R42063, Economic Growth and the Unemployment Rate, by [author name scrubbed]. |
21. |
Maria E. Canon, Marianna Kudlyak, and Yang Liu, Youth Labor Force Participation Continues to Fall, but It Might Be for a Good Reason; and Theresa L. Morisi, "The early 2000s: A Period of Declining Summer Teen Employment Rates," U.S. Department of Labor, Monthly Labor Review, May 2010, p. 32. (Hereinafter Theresa L. Morisi, "The early 2000s: A Period of Declining Summer Teen Employment Rates," May 2010.) |
22. |
See, for example, Catherine Rampell, "'Great Recession': A Brief Etymology," New York Times (Internet edition), March 11, 2009, available at http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/11/great-recession-a-brief-etymology/. |
23. |
The data are not seasonally adjusted, meaning that they have not been adjusted to account for seasonality in employment and unemployment rates. |
24. |
These periods are November 1948 (quarter IV) to October 1949 (IV); July 1953 (II) to May 1954 (II); August 1957 (III) to April 1958 (II); April 1960 (II) to February 1961 (I); December 1969 (IV) to November 1970 (IV); November 1973 (IV) to March 1975 (I); January 1980 (I) to July 1980 (III); July 1981 (III) to November 1982 (IV); July 1990 (III) to March 1991 (I); March 2001 (I) to November 2001 (IV); and December 2007 (IV) to June 2009 (II). See National Bureau of Economic Research, "U.S. Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions," http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html. |
25. |
U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Projections of Education Statistics to 2022, Table 21, "Actual and projected numbers for total enrollment in all postsecondary degree-granting institutions, by age group, sex and attendance status: Fall 1995 through Fall 2022," 2014, https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2014/2014051.pdf. |
26. |
Theresa L. Morisi, "The early 2000s: A Period of Declining Summer Teen Employment Rates," May 2010. |
27. |
From 1948 to 1978, the labor force participation of teen females increased by 11 percentage points from 42.0% to 53.7%. It peaked at 53.9% in 1989 and remained between 49% and 51% until the 2000s, when it began to decline and ultimately reached less than 40% in some subsequent years. Also from 1948 to 1978, the labor force participation of young adult females increased by 23 percentage points from 45.3% to 68.3%. It peaked at 73.2% in 1999 and decreased slightly in subsequent years. |
28. |
U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau, Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the Current Population Survey, Table A-2, "Percent of People 25 Years and Over Who Have Completed High School or College, by Race, Hispanic Origin and Sex: Selected Years 1940 to 2014." (Hereinafter, U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau, "Percent of People 25 Years and Over Who Have Completed High School or College, by Race, Hispanic Origin and Sex: Selected Years 1940 to 2014.") |
29. |
Francine D. Blau, "Women's Economic Well-Being, 1970-1995: Indicators and Trends," Focus, vol. 20, no. 1 (Winter 1998-1999), pp. 6-8. |
30. |
The statistics are available in the following age categories: 16 and 17, 18 and 19, 20 and 21, and 22 to 24. For each of these age categories, females are more likely than males to be enrolled in school, particularly among those ages 18 through 21. U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics: 2012, Table 6, "Percentage of the Population 3 to 34 Years Old Enrolled In School, by Sex, Race/Ethnicity, and Age: Selected years, 1980 through 2011," June 2012; and Table 221, "Total Fall Enrollment in Degree-Granting Institutions, by Attendance Status, Sex of Student, and Control of Institution: Selected Years, 1947 through 2011," June 2012, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/2012menu_tables.asp. |
31. |
U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, "Percent of People 25 Years and Over Who Have Completed High School or College, by Race, Hispanic Origin and Sex: Selected Years 1940 to 2014." |
32. |
U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau, "Percent of People 25 Years and Over Who Have Completed High School or College, by Race, Hispanic Origin and Sex: Selected Years 1940 to 2014." See also, Howard N. Fullerton, Jr., "Labor Force Participation: 75 Years of Change, 1950-98 and 1998-2025," Monthly Labor Review, December 1999, p. 6. In this analysis, which predated collection of data on Asian individuals via the Current Population Survey (CPS), labor force data for Asian youth were combined with individuals who were not identified as white or black. These data were derived by subtracting "black" from the "black and other" group. |
33. |
Ibid. |
34. |
Andrew Sum et al., The Plummeting Labor Market Fortunes of Teens and Young Adults, Brookings Institution, March 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2014/03/14-youth-workforce/youth_workforce_report_final.pdf. |
35. |
See CRS Report R41332, Economic Recovery: Sustaining U.S. Economic Growth in a Post-Crisis Economy, by [author name scrubbed] for a discussion of measuring decline and recovery in the most recent recession. |
36. |
Congressional Budget Office, The Slow Recovery of the Labor Market, pp. 1-3, February 2014, https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/45011-LaborMarketReview.pdf. |
37. |
Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2015 to 2025, January 2015, pp. 27-29, https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/49892-Outlook2015.pdf. |
38. |
Theresa L. Morisi, "The early 2000s: A Period of Declining Summer Teen Employment Rates," May 2010. The research literature is somewhat mixed about the extent to which older workers displace younger workers. Some research shows that older workers are not exiting the labor force but have instead increased their participation, which may make it more difficult for workers with less experience to compete. See for example, Neeta P. Fogg and Paul E. Harrington, "Rising Demand for Older Workers Despite the Economic Recession: Accommodation and Universal Design for the New American Workforce," Public Policy & Aging Report, vol. 21, no. 2 (Winter 2011), pp. 11-13. This analysis concluded that employers substituted older workers for younger workers during the recent recession. It shows that from December 2007 to December 2010, the rise in unemployment among workers 55 and older was countered by their increased entry into the labor market. Further, younger workers ages 16 through 24 had a decline in labor force participation and experienced a greater decrease in their E/P ratio than did older workers. Other analyses show that the employment of older workers does not reduce employment opportunities for younger workers. This research asserts that the "lump of labor" theory—that there is a fixed amount of labor—is false, and that the labor market is flexible and can adapt to changes in economic conditions. One study shows that higher E/P ratios among older persons "leads to better outcomes for the young in the form of reduced unemployment, increased employment, and a higher wage." Alicia H. Munnell and April Yanyuan Wu, "Will Delayed Retirement By the Baby Boomers Lead to Higher Unemployment Among Younger Workers," Center for Retirement Research, Boston College, October 2012, http://crr.bc.edu/working-papers/will-delayed-retirement-by-the-baby-boomers-lead-to-higher-unemployment-among-younger-workers/. See also, The Economist, "Keep on Trucking: Why the old should not make way for the young," February 11, 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21547263/print. |
39. |
Jonathan R. Veum and Andrea B. Weiss, "Education and the Work Histories of Young Adults," Monthly Labor Review, April 1993, http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/1993/04/art2full.pdf. |
40. |
The NLSY is part of BLS' National Longitudinal Surveys program, which surveys cohorts of workers over time. The primary focus of the survey is on the employment experiences of respondents and other experiences related to employment, including education, training, marital status, fertility, participation in government assistance programs, income, and assets. The research discussed above and elsewhere in this report that references the NLSY is based on the 1979 cohort, who were ages 14-22 when the survey began. A somewhat younger group (ages 12-17) began to be surveyed in 1997. |
41. |
Julie A. Yates, "The Transition from School to Work: Education and Work Experiences," Monthly Labor Review, February 2005; and Jacob Alex Klerman and Lynn A. Karoly, "Young Men and the Transition to Stable Employment," Monthly Labor Review, August 1994. |
42. |
Maria E. Canon, Marianna Kudlyak, and Yang Liu, Youth Labor Force Participation Continues to Fall, but It Might Be for a Good Reason. |
43. |
A more recent analysis shows that school attendance for 16-to-24-year olds without a high school diploma increased from 38% in 1998 to 60% in 2014. Among 16-to-19-year olds, the rates were 39.8% and 58.5%, respectively. Still, some youth were not in school or working. This includes 6.1% of 16-19-year olds and 9.2% of 20-to-24-year olds. See, Maria E. Canon, Marianna Kudlyak, and Yang Liu, Youth Labor Force Participation Continues to Fall, but It Might Be for a Good Reason. |
44. |
U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), Digest of Education |
45. |
Theresa L. Morisi, "The early 2000s: A Period of Declining Summer Teen Employment Rates," May 2010. |
46. |
Anthony P. Carneval, Nicole Smith, and Jeff Strohl, Jobs Wanted: Projections of Jobs and Education Requirements Through 2018, Georgetown University, Center on Education and the Workforce, June 2010, http://www9.georgetown.edu/grad/gppi/hpi/cew/pdfs/FullReport.pdf. |
47. |
Steven R. Holloway and Stephen Mulherin, "The Effect of Adolescent Neighborhood Poverty on Adult Employment," Journal of Urban Affairs, vol. 26, no. 4 (June 2004). |
48. |
Bruce A. Weinberg, Patricia B. Reagan, and Jeffrey J. Yankow, "Do Neighborhoods Affect Hours Worked? Evidence from Longitudinal Data," Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 22, no. 4 (2004). (Hereinafter, Weinberg, Reagan, and Yankow, "Do Neighborhoods Affect Hours Worked? Evidence from Longitudinal Data.") |
49. |
See for example, Weinberg, Reagan, and Yankow, "Do Neighborhoods Affect Hours Worked? Evidence from Longitudinal Data;" Katherine M. O'Regan and John M. Quigley, "Where Youth Live: Economic Effects of Urban Space on Employment Prospects," Urban Studies, vol. 35, no. 7 (1998); and Steven Raphael, "Inter- and Intra-Ethnic Comparisons of the Central City-Suburban Youth Employment Differential," Industrial & Labor Relationship Review, vol. 51, no. 3 (April 1998). |
50. |
At least one study, from the United Kingdom, has found evidence that spells of unemployment affect wages as well as non-labor market outcomes many years later. These other outcomes include happiness, job satisfaction, wages, and health. The study also found that youth unemployment involved significant social and economic costs. See David N.F. Bell and David G. Blanchflower, What Should Be Done about Rising Unemployment in the U.K?, Institute for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 4040, February 2009, http://www.operationspaix.net/sites/politiquessociales.net/IMG/pdf/dp4040.pdf. |
51. |
Thomas A. Mroz and Timothy H. Savage, "The Long-Term Effects of Youth Unemployment," Journal of Human Resources, vol. 41, no. 2 (Spring 2006), pp. 259-293. |
52. |
Stefano Scarpetta, Anne Sonnet, and Thomas Manfredi, Rising Youth Unemployment During the Crisis: How to Prevent Negative Long-Term Consequences on a Generation?, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), OECD Social, Employment and Migration Papers, No. 106, April 14, 2010, pp. 14-17, http://www.oecd.org/document/49/0,3343,en_21571361_44315115_45008113_1_1_1_1,00.html. |
53. |
Lisa B. Kahn, The Long-Term Labor Market Consequences of Graduating from College in a Bad Economy, Yale School of Management, August 13, 2009. |
54. |
Hani Mansour, The Career Effects of Graduating From College in a Bad Economy: The Role of Workers' Ability, University of Colorado, Denver and DIW Berlin, November 2009. |
55. |
Eugene Steuerle et al., Lost Generations? Wealth Building Among Young Americans, Urban Institute, March 2013, http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412766-Lost-Generations-Wealth-Building-Among-Young-Americans.pdf. |