U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement
Mark Holt
Specialist in Energy Policy
Mary Beth D. Nikitin
Specialist in Nonproliferation
May 6, 2015
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33192


U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

Summary
Negotiated by the Reagan Administration nearly 30 years ago, the current U.S. peaceful nuclear
cooperation agreement with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is set to expire on December
30, 2015. President Obama submitted a new 30-year U.S.-China nuclear cooperation agreement
for congressional review on April 21, 2015. Among other provisions, the agreement would allow
for uranium enrichment up to a level less than 20% U-235 and Chinese reprocessing of U.S.-
obligated material at safeguarded facilities.
Such agreements are often called “123 agreements” because they are required by Section 123 of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (P.L. 95-242). They are a prerequisite for any
significant nuclear cooperation with another country, such as exports of nuclear power plants and
components and the transfer of nuclear material. Since the original agreement was concluded
before China was a member of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), some changes to the text were
required. The renewal agreement was submitted for congressional review on April 21, 2015. It
complies with the relevant provisions of the Atomic Energy Act and therefore is subject to a
review period totalling 90 days of continuous session. If no resolution of disapproval is passed
into law before that deadline, then the agreement may enter into force.
Almost 13 years passed between the time President Reagan submitted the current 123 agreement
to Congress in July 1985 and its implementation in March 1998 under President Clinton. While
Congress did not reject the agreement outright, it passed a Joint Resolution, P.L. 99-183, which
required that certain nonproliferation-related certifications be made by the President before the
agreement could be implemented. P.L. 99-183 required a presidential certification and a report
followed by a period of 30 days of continuous session of Congress. After the 1989 Tiananmen
Crackdown, Congress enacted sanctions in P.L. 101-246, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act
for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, suspending nuclear cooperation with China and requiring an
additional presidential certification on the PRC’s nuclear nonproliferation assurances.
Ahead of a summit with the PRC, President Clinton, on January 12, 1998, signed certifications
(as required by P.L. 99-183) on China’s nuclear nonproliferation policy and practices. Some
sources indicate this was after China agreed to cease cooperation with Iran. Clinton also issued a
certification and waived a sanction imposed under P.L. 101-246. Congressional review ended on
March 18, 1998, allowing the agreement to be implemented.
U.S. nuclear commerce with China has expanded in the past decade. On February 28, 2005,
Westinghouse submitted an initial bid to sell four nuclear power reactors to China, as supported
by the Bush Administration. In Beijing in December 2006, Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman
signed a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding that granted the deal to Westinghouse. The first
four Westinghouse reactors under the deal are now being constructed, with six more planned and
as many as 30 more proposed.
At the same time, Members of Congress continue to question whether China is fulfilling its
nonproliferation commitments, particularly regarding transfers to North Korea by Chinese
entities. Proliferation sanctions on Chinese companies and individuals remain in place, and the
United States cooperates with China in improving export control and detection systems. In
addition, China continues to develop its own nuclear arsenal.
Along with the text of the agreement, the President submitted a Nonproliferation Assessment
Statement that evaluates these issues. As Congress reviews the terms of this agreement, it may
choose to examine whether the PRC’s record on nuclear proliferation warrants continued
Congressional Research Service

U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

cooperation in nuclear power. A key issue for the U.S. nuclear industry is its continued
participation in the construction of new Chinese nuclear power plants.

Congressional Research Service

U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

Contents
Introduction and Current Status ....................................................................................................... 1
Highlights of New Agreement ......................................................................................................... 2
Congressional Concerns .................................................................................................................. 2
Nuclear Exports and Jobs .......................................................................................................... 3
Chinese Re-export of U.S. Reactor Technology ........................................................................ 4
Safety and Environmental Benefits ........................................................................................... 6
Plutonium Separation from U.S.-Origin Reactor Fuel .............................................................. 7
Nuclear Proliferation ................................................................................................................. 9
History of the U.S.-China Agreement on Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation ...................................... 10
Strategic Interests .................................................................................................................... 10
Summits and Timeline ............................................................................................................. 11
Congressional Concerns in Early 1980s .................................................................................. 11
President Reagan Visits China in 1984 .................................................................................... 12
United States Initials Agreement ....................................................................................... 12
PRC Nonproliferation Pledges .......................................................................................... 12
President Reagan Submits Agreement in 1985 ........................................................................ 13
Administration’s Concerns ................................................................................................ 13
Proliferation Concerns ....................................................................................................... 14
Formal Submission ............................................................................................................ 15
Issues During 1985 Congressional Review ............................................................................. 15
Legislation and P.L. 99-183 ..................................................................................................... 17
Sanctions After the Tiananmen Crackdown ............................................................................ 18
Initial Legislation .............................................................................................................. 18
P.L. 101-246 ...................................................................................................................... 19
Implementation of the 1985 Agreement .................................................................................. 19
Congressional Action Before Certification ....................................................................... 19
U.S.-PRC Summit Agreements ......................................................................................... 20
President Clinton Certifies Agreement in 1998 ................................................................. 20
Congressional Review of Clinton Certifications ............................................................... 21
Memorandum of Understanding on Ensuring Peaceful Uses ............................................ 22
Retransfers of Nuclear Technology ................................................................................... 22
Nuclear Cooperation Restrictions on Countries Assisting Iran ............................................... 23

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 23
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 23

Congressional Research Service

U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

Introduction and Current Status
This CRS Report discusses renewal of the peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement between the
United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The current agreement was signed in
1985 and implemented in 1998. The agreement is set to expire on December 30, 2015, and a new
agreement was submitted for congressional review on April 21, 2015.1
The discussion in this report focuses on congressional roles in crafting and carrying out the
agreement. Such agreements are subject to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as
amended (AEA, P.L. 95-242, 42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.) and commonly are called “123
agreements.”2 They are a prerequisite for any significant nuclear cooperation3 with another
country, such as exports of nuclear power plants and components and the transfer of nuclear
material.4
The first such agreement with the PRC was concluded in the mid 1980s. On July 24, 1985,
President Reagan submitted to Congress the “Agreement Between the United States and the
People’s Republic of China Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.” President Clinton, on
January 12, 1998, signed certifications (as required by P.L. 99-183) on China’s nuclear
nonproliferation policy and practices to implement the agreement. Clinton also issued a
certification and waived a sanction imposed after the 1989 Tiananmen Crackdown (as required by
P.L. 101-246). Congressional review ended on March 18, 1998, allowing the agreement to be
implemented.
The Obama Administration has submitted the new U.S.-China nuclear cooperation agreement to
Congress for the required review period. According to President Obama’s letter to Congress, the
agreement meets all the terms of the Atomic Energy Act5 and does not require any exemptions
from the law’s requirements. Therefore, the agreement could enter into force after a 30-day
consultation period and a review period of 60 days of continuous session6 unless Congress
enacted a joint resolution of disapproval. Congress also has the option of adopting either a joint
resolution of approval with (or without) conditions, or stand-alone legislation that could approve
or disapprove the agreement. Any congressional efforts to block the agreement would be subject
to presidential veto. CRS estimates that the agreement could reach the end of the review period
on approximately July 20 if no adjournments of more than three days are called. If Adjournment

1 Full text at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-114hdoc28/pdf/CDOC-114hdoc28.pdf.
2 Nuclear cooperation includes the distribution of special nuclear material, source material, and byproduct material, to
licensing for commercial, medical, and industrial purposes. These terms, “special nuclear material,” “source material,”
and “byproduct material,” as well as other terms used in the statute, are defined in 42 U.S.C. §2014. See also CRS
Report RS22937, Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer, by Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth D. Nikitin.
3 Significant nuclear cooperation includes the physical transfer of reactors, reactor components, or special nuclear
material, source material, and byproduct material, under license for commercial, medical, and industrial purposes.
4 The Atomic Energy Act also sets out procedures for licensing exports to states with whom the United States has
nuclear cooperation agreements. (Sections 126, 127, and 128 codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 2155, 2156, 2157.)
Even with a 123 agreement in place, each export of nuclear material, equipment, or technology requires a specific
export license or other authorization.
5 Under section 123.a., codified at 42 U.S.C. 2153(a)), Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755 (1946), as
amended.
6 Days on which either House is in a recess of more than three days (pursuant to a concurrent resolution authorizing the
recess) do not count toward the total. If Congress adjourns its session sine die, continuity is broken, and the count starts
anew when it reconvenes.
Congressional Research Service
1

U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

Resolutions are adopted for projected state and district work periods, the end of the review period
could be as late as October 6.7

Highlights of New Agreement
In the President’s letter of transmittal to the Congress,8 he says that the U.S.-China 123 agreement
“will advance the nonproliferation and national security interests of the United States.” Once a
section 123 agreement is in place, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or the Department of
Energy approves licenses for specific transfers. The agreement does not permit the transfer of
restricted data or sensitive nuclear technology. It does allow for the enrichment up to a level less
than 20% U-235 and reprocessing of U.S.-obligated material at safeguarded or safeguards-
eligible sites. The agreement’s duration is 30 years. Either country may terminate the agreement
with one year’s notice.
The proposed agreement includes an Agreed Minute, which lays out steps that are to be pursued if
either side has concerns about the application of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
safeguards on transferred material, including facility design review, exchange of records to ensure
material accounting, and the designation of individuals who may access and inspect material
accountancy systems. This is to ensure that fuel and other transferred technology remain in
peaceful use.
The Agreed Minute also addresses byproduct material, and says that that there will be annual
information exchanges on byproduct material, including tritium, subject to the agreement. Any
byproducts shall only be used for peaceful purposes under Article 8 of the agreement.
The Agreed Minute includes a section on retransfers and technology exchanges. Retransfers to a
third country are still subject to the requirements of the original supplier country and will need to
have written consent. The United States and China are to implement a process for “obtaining
government assurances needed for certain technology or information transfers.” This includes a
Pre-Approved Activity and Nuclear Technology List (based on the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG) trigger list) and a Pre-Approved Entity List. For example, if China or the United States
authorizes a transfer of a technology on the preapproved list to an entity on the preapproved list, it
will notify the other party of this transfer. These lists will be updated on a yearly basis. This
transfer will still be subject to transfer conditions. These measures are to give additional
assurance for U.S. consent rights on further transfers within and outside of China.

Congressional Concerns
The renewal of the U.S.-China peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement is likely to raise
significant issues for the 114th Congress. This section outlines primarily economic and
nonproliferation concerns.

7 These dates are estimates. Changes in the meeting schedule of the chambers will change these estimates. CRS
estimates are unofficial and non-binding. The House and Senate Parliamentarians are the sole definitive arbiter of this
statutory rule.
8 Full text of agreement and supporting documents available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-114hdoc28/pdf/
CDOC-114hdoc28.pdf
Congressional Research Service
2

U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

Nuclear Exports and Jobs
The U.S. nuclear industry lobbied Congress vigorously in the 1990s to implement the U.S.-China
123 agreement, contending that China’s planned growth in nuclear power generation would
provide tremendous opportunities for U.S. businesses. The U.S. firm Westinghouse (now mostly
owned by Toshiba of Japan) signed a contract in 2007 to supply its most advanced reactor, the
AP1000, to China. Westinghouse also agreed to transfer its reactor technology to China so that
Chinese firms could eventually build them.
Some in Congress expressed concern about the technology transfer arrangement, but the AP1000
technology transfer is now well underway. The first four Westinghouse reactors are under
construction, and 32 more are planned, with Chinese firms to take over an increasing share of the
work. China has developed a larger version of the AP1000, as allowed by the Westinghouse
technology transfer agreement, and is reportedly about to start construction of the first unit.9
The PRC’s nuclear power expansion program is the most agressive in the world. Although
China’s 26 operating power reactors currently account for less than 2% of the country’s electric
generating capacity, the PRC has an additional 23 reactors under construction and plans to build
up to 100 more by 2030.10 For comparison, the United States has a total of 99 power reactors as
of April 2015. The PRC announced in December 2014 that it would spend about $11.2 billion
annually on reactor construction during the next 10 years, providing a large potential market for
nuclear equipment suppliers around the world.11 The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), the major
U.S. nuclear industry trade association, called “timely renewal” of U.S. nuclear cooperation
agreements with China and other countries “critical to continuation of nuclear trade between U.S.
firms and firms in these nations.”12
The value of U.S. nuclear exports to China and resulting U.S. employment are difficult to
quantify. According to NEI, “Major Chinese contracts awarded to U.S. nuclear suppliers have
created billions in U.S. exports and tens of thousands of American jobs,” as well as employment
providing engineering, construction, and other services.13
Westinghouse’s 2007 sale of four AP1000 reactors to China was announced at a value of $8
billion. Under an engineering and procurement agreement and a separate technology licensing
agreement, “Westinghouse will provide nuclear fuel and safety-related major components, as well
as information on design, operation and plant maintenance,” according to the law firm Baker
Donelson, which represents the nuclear industry.
Approximately 30 percent of the work outlined under current contracts is being
performed in the United States by Westinghouse or its subcontractors and suppliers,
which has created or is sustaining approximately 8,000 direct jobs and another
approximately 20,000 indirect and induced jobs in twenty U.S. states, with significant

9 World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in China,” March 31, 2015, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-
Profiles/Countries-A-F/China—Nuclear-Power/.
10 WNA, “Nuclear Power in China,” op. cit.
11 Platts Nuclear News Flashes, “China Plans to Spend $11 Billion a Year on Reactor Construction,” December 23,
2014.
12 Nuclear Energy Institute, “Nuclear Cooperation Agreements,” viewed December 23, 2014, http://www.nei.org/
Issues-Policy/Exports-Trade/Nuclear-Cooperation-Agreements.
13 Nuclear Energy Institute, “Nuclear Energy in China,” White Paper, January 2015, http://www.nei.org/Master-
Document-Folder/Backgrounders/White-Papers/Nuclear-Energy-in-China.
Congressional Research Service
3

U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

sourcing from Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Connecticut, Utah, Minnesota, and New
Hampshire.14
Westinghouse has acknowledged that the technology-transfer provisions in the contract would
reduce U.S. participation in Chinese AP1000 projects over time, much as has occurred in a
similar reactor contract signed with South Korea in the mid-1980s. U.S. firms initially provided
most of the nuclear-related components of the plants supplied under the deal, valued at several
hundred million dollars per reactor,15 and by 2006, U.S. firms were continuing to provide about
$100 million in components and services for each new South Korean reactor, according to
Westingouse.16 South Korea’s $20 billion sale of four of its U.S.-derived reactors to the United
Arab Emirates in 2010 included $2 billion in U.S. participation.17
According to Baker Donelson,
Currently Westinghouse is in discussions in China for contracts for the next wave of up
to 20 additional AP1000 units. This would result in 2,000 to 2,500 direct jobs and 5,000-
6,000 in indirect/induced USA jobs, for a total of 7,000-8,000 jobs in the U.S. Although
China has indigenized significant manufacturing capabilities as part of their self-reliance
program, a key reason for renewing the Section 123 agreement is that certain products
and services necessary to fulfill that program cannot be procured solely in China. This
means that the Chinese will have to use some of the suppliers that were used on the initial
AP1000 plants, many of whom are located in the United States.18
Chinese Re-export of U.S. Reactor Technology
China’s plans to export nuclear power plants based on Westinghouse technology have raised a
number of concerns. A key question is the level of U.S. control that would continue to be
exercised over the export of reactors based on U.S. designs and the use of nuclear materials
produced by those reactors. The potential for Chinese dominance of the world nuclear power
market with U.S. help is also an issue. A related area of concern is the extent to which U.S.
nuclear power technology could be transferred to the Chinese naval reactor program, particularly
the unique sealed pumps used by the AP1000.
According to Baker Donelson, the Westinghouse technology transfer agreement for the AP1000
reactor grants the Chinese only a “nonexclusive license to use that technology in China,” with
Westinghouse retaining all its intellectual property rights. The agreement allows the Chinese to
modify the AP1000 design but they cannot export such variants “unless they do so with
Westinghouse under a marketing alliance.”
However, the Westinghouse agreement does give China the right to export a “large passive plant,”
essentially a larger version of the AP1000. Such plants could be sold to any country except the
United States and Japan, subject to U.S. export control laws, according to Baker Donelson.
Westinghouse would have the right to participate in such export projects to the extent that they
incorporated AP1000 technology. If China did not include Westinghouse in such exports, then

14 Email from John H. Kinney, Senior Advisor, Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, April 1, 2015.
15 MacLachlan, Ann, “C-E Selected to Supply NSSS for Two New South Korean Units,” Nucleonics Week, October 2,
1986, p. 1.
16 Hibbs, Mark, “Westinghouse Wins China Contract; Chinese Look at Next Expansion,” Nucleonics Week, December
21, 2006.
17 For details, see CRS Report R41032, U.S. and South Korean Cooperation in the World Nuclear Energy Market:
Major Policy Considerations
, by Mark Holt.
18 Email from John H. Kinney, op. cit.
Congressional Research Service
4

U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

Westinghouse would have to be compensated for any of its technology that was used.19 China is
currently developing a “large passive plant,” as envisioned by the Westinghouse agreement. The
first of these reactors, called the CAP1400, is to begin construction in China in 2015, with exports
planned to follow.20
Aggressive Chinese exports of nuclear technology, particularly to countries that do not currently
have nuclear power, could pose proliferation risks, as noted above. China’s policies for ensuring
that countries that import its reactors are fully compliant with international safeguards will be of
particular concern. Moreover, even fully safeguarded nuclear power programs could raise U.S.
concerns if they create a perceived need to develop fuel cycle facilities such as uranium
enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing plants, which can be used to produce nuclear weapons
material. Without Westinghouse’s advanced reactor technology, China was not generally believed
to have a reactor that could compete in world markets. Therefore, the AP1000 technology transfer
appears to be crucial to China’s planned nuclear export program.21
Transfers of nuclear technology to a foreign country require authorization by the Secretary of
Energy under 10 C.F.R. Part 810. Such “Part 810 authorizations” must be based on assurances
from the recipient government that the technology will be used for peaceful purposes only and
will not be retransferred without approval of the supplying country, as explained by this statement
from Export.gov website:
Government-to-government assurances obtained by either the Department of State or the
Department of Energy are required for the 810 approval and 110 licensing process.
The assurances for 810 approvals affirm that the recipient government pledges to use the
acquired technology exclusively for peaceful purposes and will not re-transfer it to
another country without the consent of the supplier-country government.22
As discussed above, the Agreed Minute to the 123 Agreement prohibits China or the United
States from retransferring any technology received from the other country to a third country
without the agreement of the country that originally provided the technology. It goes on to
specify:
Prior to any such transfer of items, technology, or information subject to this Agreement,
the Parties shall by mutual agreement define the conditions (“transfer conditions’”) in
accordance with which such items, technology, or information may be transferred to the
jurisdiction of a third country or destination beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the
transferring Party. Any transfer to which the non-transferring Party consents in writing
shall be subject to the transfer conditions agreed to by the Parties.23


19 Email from John H. Kinney, op. cit.
20 World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in China,” March 31, 2015, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/
Country-Profiles/Countries-A-F/China—Nuclear-Power/.
21 Mycle Schneider Consulting, World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2014, p. 46, http://www.worldnuclearreport.org.
22 Export.gov, “Company Files for Part 810 Authorization with DOE,” December 1, 2010, http://www.export.gov/
civilnuclear/eg_main_022102.asp. See also: National Nuclear Security Administration, “10 CFR Part 810,”
http://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/ourprograms/nonproliferation-0/npac/policy/10cfr810.
23 Agreed Minute, “Retransfers,” paragraph 1.
Congressional Research Service
5

U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

Safety and Environmental Benefits
Increased nuclear safety and reduced carbon emissions have been cited as reasons to support the
extension of the U.S.-China nuclear cooperation agreement.
“U.S. equipment and technology exports have enabled China to deploy the safest technologies,
including a U.S. advanced reactor design that has been standardized for most of China’s planned
nuclear power stations,” according to NEI. On carbon emissions, NEI asserted, “Nuclear power is
planned to carry the largest share of China’s non-emitting generating capacity additions through
2030. Ending U.S. nuclear cooperation would disrupt China’s nuclear development plans and set
back its efforts to limit carbon emissions.”24
The Westinghouse AP1000 reactor technology that is being transferred to China incorporates
“passive” safety features that are intended to reduce the likelihood of radioactive releases by
orders of magnitude below that of existing commercial nuclear power plants. In approving the
design in the United States, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission noted that it “includes many
features that are not found in the designs of currently operating reactors,” most significantly “the
use of safety systems for accident prevention and mitigation that rely on passive means, such as
gravity, natural circulation, condensation and evaporation, and stored energy.”25
To the extent that the AP1000 and larger reactors derived from it would displace older designs in
the Chinese nuclear power program, the likelihood of accidents could be reduced. A probabalistic
risk assessment by Westinghouse asserted that the risk of nuclear core damage in the AP1000
would be 1% of the level of risk at existing nuclear power plants and 5% of the risk considered
acceptable for advanced reactor designs.26
Targets for controlling carbon emissions were jointly announced by China and the United States
on November 11, 2014. The United States agreed to cut its net emissions of greenhouse gases by
26%-28% below 2005 levels by 2025, while China agreed to halt its rapid rise in carbon dioxide
emissions by no later than 2030. In addition, China agreed to increase its non-fossil-fuel energy
share to 20% by 2030, which “will require China to deploy an additional 800-1,000 gigawatts of
nuclear, wind, solar and other zero emission generation capacity by 2030,” according to the White
House.27 The agreement could provide further impetus to China’s already-ambitious nuclear
growth.
However, the potential safety and environmental benefits of expanded nuclear power in China are
questioned by some environmental groups and analysts. They contend that efforts to reduce
carbon emissions should be focused on energy efficiency and renewable energy, which avoid
nuclear power’s risks of radioactive releases, waste management issues, and nuclear weapons
proliferation.28 Analysts point out that Chinese installation of new wind and solar capacity

24 Nuclear Energy Institute, “Nuclear Energy in China,” White Paper, January 2015, http://www.nei.org/Master-
Document-Folder/Backgrounders/White-Papers/Nuclear-Energy-in-China.
25 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Final Safety Evaluation Report Related to Certification of the AP1000 Standard
Plant Design
, NUREG-1793, Volume 1, Supplement 2, pp. 1-3.
26 Westinghouse, “Unequaled Safety,” company website, viewed April 7, 2015, http://www.westinghousenuclear.com/
New-Plants/AP1000-PWR/Safety.
27 White House, “Fact Sheet: U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change and Clean Energy Cooperation,”
November 11, 2014, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/11/fact-sheet-us-china-joint-announcement-
climate-change-and-clean-energy-c.
28 See, for example, Natural Resources Defense Council Switchboard, “Response to an Open Letter on the Future of
Nuclear Power,” November 5, 2013, http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/dbryk/response_to_an_open_letter_on.html.
Congressional Research Service
6

U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

currently exceeds nuclear: announced capacity additions for 2014 totaled “56.6 GW [gigawatts]
of non-fossil fueled generating capacity, comprising 20 GW of hydro, 18 GW of wind, 10 GW of
solar, and 8.6 GW of nuclear power.”29
Plutonium Separation from U.S.-Origin Reactor Fuel
Article 6 of the new section 123 agreement gives consent for conversion, enrichment to less than
20% U-235, fabrication of low-enriched uranium fuel, post-irradiation examination , and blending
or downblending of uranium to produce low enriched uranium. Article 6(2) says the parties agree
that reprocessing can take place at safeguarded facilities, subject to further agreement on physical
protection, environmental protection, and other arrangements. This type of prior agreement is
generally referred to as “advance consent.” This kind of permission for reprocessing U.S.-
obligated spent fuel has been included in section 123 agreements with India and Euratom. As with
the agreements with India and Euratom, any reprocessing of U.S.-obligated material could take
place only at facilities that are under or are eligible for IAEA safeguards. This agreement also
includes provisions for tracking the material, data exchange, and visits to sites (see “Highlights of
New Agreement”).
China now plans to reprocess most of its spent fuel domestically for reuse as mixed oxide (MOX)
fuel and is now building commercial reprocessing facilities.30 The proposed text explicitly says
that any material separated through reprocessing under this agreement may be used only at agreed
facilities. The resulting material may not be used for military use.
Some analysts have raised concerns that the possible reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel from
reactors built under the U.S.-China 123 agreement could help increase Chinese stockpiles of
plutonium for weapons purposes.31 This was a key issue in the congressional debate when
Congress first reviewed the agreement. Under the 1985 Section 123 agreement, China could
potentially have sought agreement to reprocess spent fuel from U.S.-designed reactors for
peaceful purposes, but no such arrangements were made. Section 5(2) of the agreement said the
parties “will consult immediately and will seek agreement within six months on long-term
arrangements for such activities.”32 The Nonproliferation Assessment Statement which
accompanied that agreement’s submission to Congress interprets Article 5(2) as follows: “China
cannot unilaterally proceed with reprocessing, enrichment, or alteration in the face of U.S.
objection.”33
As detailed below, Congress was concerned that the language in the agreement did not clearly
state U.S. consent rights. One of the Presidential certifications required in P.L. 99-183 said that
“the obligation to consider favorably a request to carry out activities described in Article 5(2) of
the Agreement shall not prejudice the decision of the United States to approve or disapprove such

29 Mycle Schneider Consulting, World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2014, p. 105,
http://www.worldnuclearreport.org.
30 World Nuclear Association, China Country Profile: Nuclear Fuel Cycle, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-
Profiles/Countries-A-F/China—Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle/
31 Henry Sokolski, “America’s Nuclear Deal with China: A Congressional Brief,” Nonproliferation Education Policy
Center, May 6, 2015.
32 Agreement Between the United States and China for Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy,
Article 5, July 23, 1985.
33 Any reprocessing of fuel subject to U.S. controls would require negotiation of separate arrangements as called for by
Article 5(2) of the agreement, and would require a prior report to Congress by DOE and 15 days of continuous session
of Congress thereafter.
Congressional Research Service
7

U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

a request.” In President Clinton’s certification, he said, “The U.S consent rights provided for in
Article 5(2) of the Agreement satisfy this standard because the specific language used ensures that
the United States must exercise an approval right before the activity in question is carried out.”34
As noted above, U.S. nuclear technology transferred to China is to be used only for peaceful
purposes and reprocessing must be done at safeguarded or safeguard-eligible facilities. However,
some observers point out that if China in the future decided to disregard those restrictions or
change the safeguards status at particular facilities, China could potentially use plutonium
produced during the normal operation of commercial reactors for weapons. Such “reactor grade”
plutonium has high levels of plutonium isotopes that are undesirable for weapons, but it is widely
accepted that such use is possible. Alternatively, U.S.-designed commercial reactors (as well as
any other reactor in China) could be refueled more frequently than normal to minimize the
buildup of undesirable isotopes, resulting in plutonium better suited for weapons.
This point of view was summarized in a recent issue paper from the Nonproliferation Policy
Education Center (NPEC), which questioned whether “it is sound policy to allow reprocessing of
material generated in U.S. designed reactors in China if there is reason to believe that timely
warning of a massive military diversion of weapons-usable plutonium from China’s ‘civilian
nuclear sector’ is not possible even if the reprocessed separated plutonium is under IAEA
safeguards or is otherwise inspected.” This study purports that over the next 30 years, China may
want to accelerate a nuclear weapons build-up.35
However, other analysts argue that it would not be necessary for China to use spent fuel for
weapons plutonium. Carnegie Endowment analyst Mark Hibbs writes, “China since 1964 is a
nuclear weapons state with inventories of military-grade plutonium and uranium that were
produced in dedicated Chinese military reactors and reprocessing plants. It is extremely unlikely
that China would violate a bilateral accord with the United States to divert U.S.-obligated civilian
nuclear materials to produce future nuclear weapons.”36 As a recognized nuclear weapons state
under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, China has a military stockpile of about 1.8 metric tons
of plutonium and about 250 nuclear warheads.37 This weapons plutonium was produced by two
reactors: the oldest was shut down in 1984 and the second is believed to have produced plutonium
through 1989.38 While China has not been transparent about its fissile material production,
analysts believe fissile material production for weapons ended in the early 1990s.39 In addition to
existing stocks, China mines domestically and imports uranium and therefore not seen as needing
an alternative supply of fissile material for weapons.
The agreement provides for new bilateral monitoring measures on U.S.-obligated material that
did not exist under the previous agreement. Congress may wish to examine how the United States

34 President William J. Clinton, Letter to Congressional Leaders on the China-United States Nuclear Cooperation
Agreement, January 12, 1998.
35 Sokolski, Henry, “US-China Civilian Nuclear Cooperative (123) Agreement: What’s at Issue,” Nonproliferation
Policy Education Center, Washington Seminar Series, May 1, 2015, http://npolicy.org/event_file/
US_China_123Agreement.pdf.
36 Mark Hibbs, “Addressing Risk in Chinese Nuclear Cooperation,” The Hill, April 21, 2015. http://thehill.com/blogs/
congress-blog/homeland-security/239479-addressing-risk-in-chinese-nuclear-cooperation.
37 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “China,” December 2014, http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/china/.
38 International Panel on Fissile Materials, “China,” January 5, 2011, http://fissilematerials.org/countries/china.html.
39 International Panel on Fissile Materials, “Banning the Production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons: Country
Perspectives on the Challenges to a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty,” 2008, http://fissilematerials.org/library/FMCT-
Perspectives.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
8

U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

will successfully verify Chinese assurances that reprocessing of U.S.-obligated material will be
used only for peaceful purposes.
Nuclear Proliferation40
In its consideration of the Section 123 agreement, Congress also reviews the unclassified
nonproliferation assessment statement (NPAS) and its classified annexes that were submitted as
supporting documents. The NPAS gives a broad overview of China’s adherence to multilateral
nonproliferation treaties and agreements as well as cooperation with the United States to improve
these systems. Since the original nuclear cooperation agreement was concluded, China has joined
the Non-Proliferation Treaty, become a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and has
made nuclear security improvements to its civilian sector. Its civilian reactors are under voluntary
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. In the past decade, China has also
cooperated with the United States on the detection of illicit nuclear materials at ports and border
points. However, there are still concerns about China’s nonproliferation record, especially its
ability to prevent Chinese-based companies and individuals from exporting dual-use goods
relevant to nuclear weapons programs, particularly to Iran and North Korea.
In the 1990s, the most significant proliferation concerns were about Chinese government
assistance to the nuclear weapons programs in Pakistan and Iran. In 1996, China gave assurances
to the United States that it would no longer assist Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. In 1997,
China pledged not to begin new nuclear projects in Iran. These assurances led to the Clinton
Administration’s certifications to Congress that allowed the nuclear cooperation agreement to be
implemented.41
Members of Congress continue to question whether China is fulfilling its nonproliferation
commitments, particularly regarding transfers to North Korea by Chinese entities. Proliferation
sanctions on Chinese companies and individuals remain in place, and the United States
cooperates with China in improving export control and detection systems. In addition, China
continues to develop its own nuclear arsenal.
The NPAS cites some particular areas of continuing concern:
Naval reactors: Concern has been raised about the potential misuse of U.S.
nuclear power technology by the Chinese naval reactor program, particularly the
unique sealed pumps used by the AP1000. According to the NPAS, “China’s
strategy for strengthening its military involves the acquisition of foreign
technology as well as greater civil-military integration, and both elements have
the potential to decrease development costs and to accelerate military
modernization. This strategy requires close scrutiny of all end users of U.S.
technology under the proposed Agreement.” Before technology transfers are
approved by the United States, government-to-government assurances are
required, in which “the recipient government pledges to use the acquired
technology exclusively for peaceful purposes.”42

40 See also CRS Report RL31555, China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy
Issues
, by Shirley A. Kan.
41 See Evan Medeiros, Reluctant Restraint, NUS Press, 2009.
42 Export.gov, “Company Files for Part 810 Authorization with DOE,” December 1, 2010, http://www.export.gov/
civilnuclear/eg_main_022102.asp. See also: National Nuclear Security Administration, “10 CFR Part 810,”
http://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/ourprograms/nonproliferation-0/npac/policy/10cfr810.
Congressional Research Service
9

U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

Cooperation with Pakistan: China is planning to build additional nuclear reactors
in Pakistan, despite Pakistan’s lack of full-scope safeguards. The NPAS says,
“China’s provision to Pakistan of reactors beyond Chasma I and II is inconsistent
with Chinese commitments made when it joined the NSG in 2004.” NSG
guidelines require full-scope safeguards on all exported reactors.
Export controls and sanctioned entities: According to the NPAS, China has
updated its regulations and “improved actions in some areas” but proliferation
involving Chinese “entities” (companies or individuals) remains of concern. State
Owned Enterprises (SOEs) have been sanctioned by the United States on
numerous occasions, as are individuals such as Karl Lee for transferring
proliferation sensitive dual-use materials and technologies. The NPAS says the
United States will continue to engage with China on nonproliferation.
In addition, missile proliferation from Chinese entities is a continuing concern. The 2011 Director
of National Intelligence Worldwide Threat Assessment said, “North Korea and entities in Russia
and China continue to sell technologies and components in the Middle East and South Asia that
are dual use and could support WMD and missile programs.”43 However, the 2015 statement did
not include this. The State Department 2014 Compliance Report said, “In 2013, Chinese entities
continued to supply missile programs in countries of concern. The United States notes that China
made a public commitment in November 2000 not to assist ‘in any way, any country in the
development of ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons (i.e., missiles
capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kilograms to a distance of at least 300
kilometers).’”44 While some experts assess that Chinese government-owned companies have
improved strategic export controls since a national law was passed in 2002,45 Chinese individuals
and companies remain under U.S. sanctions related to proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). Concerns persist about Chinese willingness as well as ability to detect and
prevent illicit transfers. Congress may wish to question what progress has been made on this
issue.
History of the U.S.-China Agreement on Peaceful
Nuclear Cooperation

Strategic Interests
The question for U.S. policymakers since the Reagan Administration in the 1980s has been
whether nuclear cooperation with the PRC would be necessary to advance U.S. diplomatic,
security, and economic interests. There were tensions in the framework for bilateral relations that
affected U.S. consideration of peaceful nuclear cooperation. While the PRC under the rule of the
Communist Party of China already possessed nuclear weapons, the PRC also has had a record of
nuclear proliferation to countries such as Pakistan and Iran.46

43 The Section 721 Report to Congress was last submitted in 2011, http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/
Reports%20and%20Pubs/2011_report_to_congress_wmd.pdf.
44 “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and
Commitments,” U.S. Department of State, July 31, 2014. http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/2014/230047.htm.
45 Ian Stewart, “China and Non-Proliferation: Progress at Last?” The Diplomat, March 25, 2015.
46 For details, see CRS Report 97-391, China: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles, by Shirley A. Kan; CRS Report RL31555,
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
10

U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

The United States and the PRC have not been allies. Nonetheless, in 1970, President Nixon began
a rapprochement with Communist Party ruler Mao Zedong, and both countries cooperated in
various areas during the Cold War until the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991.
Nuclear cooperation involves weighing risks and benefits. The risks include nuclear proliferation
and upgrading technology and knowledge that also might have military uses. The benefits involve
expanding engagement, building mutual confidence, and enabling U.S. businesses to compete for
potentially lucrative nuclear power contracts. Increased nuclear power in China also could help
reduce its emissions of greenhouse gases.
Summits and Timeline
Key developments in the U.S.-China nuclear cooperation agreement were timed for diplomatic
summits between U.S. Presidents and PRC leaders. On April 30, 1984, President Reagan
witnessed the initialing of the nuclear cooperation agreement. Secretary of Energy John
Herrington signed the agreement on July 23, 1985. On July 24, 1985, President Reagan submitted
the agreement to Congress. Consideration of whether a presidential certification (as required by
P.L. 99-183 on China’s nuclear nonproliferation policy and practices) would be the centerpiece of
a summit in 1997 advanced the agreement’s implementation. President Clinton, on January 12,
1998, signed certifications to implement the agreement. The President also waived a sanction
imposed after the 1989 Tiananmen Crackdown (in P.L. 101-246). Congressional review ended on
March 18, 1998, allowing the agreement to be implemented.
Almost 13 years passed between the time that President Reagan submitted the agreement to
Congress in July 1985 and its implementation in March 1998 under the Clinton Administration.
Congress played an important role in determining implementation of the agreement, including
holding hearings, crafting legislation, and requiring and reviewing presidential certifications. One
of the primary congressional actions was P.L. 99-183, the Joint Resolution Relating to the
Approval and Implementation of the Proposed Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation Between the
United States and the People’s Republic of China (December 16, 1985), which required a
presidential certification and a report followed by a period of 30 days of continuous session of
Congress before the agreement could be implemented. After the 1989 Tiananmen Crackdown,
Congress enacted sanctions in P.L. 101-246, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal
Years 1990 and 1991 (February 16, 1990), suspending nuclear cooperation with China and
requiring an additional presidential certification on the PRC’s nuclear nonproliferation
assurances.
Congressional Concerns in Early 1980s
In January 1983, U.S. officials negotiating a nuclear cooperation agreement with China linked
possible U.S. nuclear exports to China with its reported nuclear proliferation practices,
particularly in Pakistan.47 Before an agreement was finalized, Senators Gordon Humphrey,
William Roth, and William Proxmire wrote to Secretary of State George Shultz in December
1983. They urged that an agreement be drafted so that none of the provisions of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Act of 1978 would be waived. They also wrote that the agreement should

(...continued)
China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues, by Shirley A. Kan.
47 Rob Laufer, “China’s Role in Worldwide Nuclear Weapons Buildup Under U.S. Scrutiny,” Nucleonics Week,
January 20, 1983.
Congressional Research Service
11

U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

include explicit pledges by China not to transfer any nuclear weapons equipment or information
to any nation; to support the U.S. requirement for recipients to accept the International Atomic
Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) safeguards on nuclear exports; and to enter into an agreement with the
IAEA to place China’s civilian nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards with terms identical to
those of the U.S.-IAEA safeguards agreement. Reported concerns about China also included its
nuclear proliferation activities in Argentina and South Africa.48
President Reagan Visits China in 1984
United States Initials Agreement
In preparation for President Ronald Reagan’s first visit to the PRC in April 1984 to improve the
bilateral relationship, U.S. officials sought an agreement on civil nuclear cooperation as the
“deliverable” that caught the most attention. Begun in 1981, negotiations intensified before the
visit over the U.S. requirement (under the Atomic Energy Act) for China to obtain U.S. prior
approval before reprocessing, enrichment, or other alteration of transferred nuclear material.
China objected to perceived infringement of its sovereignty. At the end of his visit, on April 30,
1984, President Reagan witnessed the initialing of the nuclear cooperation agreement. The
President said that he was “particularly proud” of the agreement, saying that “it will open broad
opportunities for joint work in development of the energy base which China needs for her
modernization.” According to a summary of the terms provided by officials to the New York
Times
, China agreed that it would not enrich or reprocess fuel from U.S.-built reactors or store
materials without U.S. consent; and the United States agreed not to use its control rights to inhibit
the growth of China’s nuclear industry out of commercial rivalry.49
PRC Nonproliferation Pledges
China also took steps in response to U.S. concerns about nuclear proliferation during negotiations
for the agreement. While at the time China opposed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),
China applied for membership in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in September
1983 and became a member on January 1, 1984. The PRC did not accede to the NPT until March
9, 1992. Also, China joined the Zangger Committee50 in October 1997 and the Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG) in May 2004. In 2004, the Bush Administration supported China’s application to
join the NSG, despite congressional concerns about China’s failure to apply the NSG’s “full-scope
safeguards” to its nuclear projects in Pakistan. Since 1992, the NSG has required “full-scope
safeguards,” or IAEA inspections of all other declared nuclear facilities in addition to the facility
importing supplies to prevent diversions to weapon programs.51

48 Nucleonics Week, August 1, 1983 and December 8, 1983.
49 Steven Weisman, “Reagan Leaves on Trip to China; Seeks to Ease Tension in Relations” and “U.S. Said to Reach
Pact with Chinese on Nuclear Power,” New York Times, April 23 and 24, 1984; Christopher Wren, “Chinese
Concession Permits U.S. Accord on Atom Power,” New York Times, April 17, 1984; “U.S.-Chinese Agreements,” New
York Times
, April 30, 1984.
50 The Zangger Committee, or Nuclear Exporters Committee, has established guidelines for export control of nuclear
items in Article III of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Since the 1970s, the committee has compiled a “trigger
list,” or list of nuclear items which if transferred would trigger a requirement for IAEA safeguards. This list helps to
prevent diversion of nuclear materials and especially designed or prepared material, equipment, and facilities to
programs making nuclear explosives.
51 CRS Report RL31555, China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues, by
Shirley A. Kan.
Congressional Research Service
12

U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

In making China’s first address to the IAEA conference in September 1984, the PRC Minister of
Nuclear Industry said, “China will, in exporting its nuclear materials and equipment, request the
recipient countries to accept safeguards in line with the principles established in the agency’s
statutes. In the same view, when importing nuclear materials and equipment, China will also
make sure that they are used for peaceful purposes.” China did not offer to place its civilian
nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, the only nuclear weapon state that remained outside
such arrangements.52 Also, PRC Premier Zhao Ziyang issued a statement when he visited the
United States in January 1984 that “we do not engage in nuclear proliferation ourselves, nor do
we help other countries develop nuclear weapons.”53 That promise left a question about any
future activities. Later, on January 19, 1985, PRC Vice Premier Li Peng issued an additional
nonproliferation pledge, saying that the PRC “does not and will not in the future help any non-
nuclear states to develop nuclear weapons” and that China would abide by commitments to the
IAEA.54 Still, questions remained about whether there would be written pledges and whether any
such assurances would be publicly issued by China, itself, rather than the United States
expressing its interpretation of an understanding reached with China either verbally or in writing.
President Reagan Submits Agreement in 1985
Although the agreement was initialed during Reagan’s visit to China in April 1984, the President
did not submit it to Congress until July 1985, apparently timed for a visit by PRC President Li
Xiannian, who arrived in Washington, DC, on July 22, 1985, and was invited to a state dinner at
the White House. Prior to this visit, Administration officials briefed Congress and the press about
supposed new written assurances from China about nuclear nonproliferation. Members included
Senator Alan Cranston, who had reported in May 1984 that PRC nuclear technicians were in
Pakistan at a suspected nuclear weapon facility. The Administration, however, did not release the
written assurance and said that the language of the agreement remained largely the same.55
Secretary of Energy John Herrington and Li Peng signed the agreement on July 23, 1985.
Administration’s Concerns
Although President Reagan’s top officials approved the agreement, there were acknowledgments
of problems in the agreement as well as disagreements within the Administration. Kenneth
Adelman, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), wrote in his
memorandum for the President that “the proposed Agreement meets all the applicable
requirements of the Atomic Energy Act and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and its entry into
force will substantially benefit U.S. non-proliferation objectives.”
Nonetheless, Adelman first acknowledged that
the subject agreement is unique among agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation
concluded since the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. It is the first such agreement
with a nuclear-weapon state; and it is with a country that has not, until recently,
supported non-proliferation measures. Although the agreement was initialed in April
1984, we needed to clarify certain matters related to implementation of China’s nuclear
policies. Those discussions concluded successfully last month. A major threat to our non-

52 Ann MacLachlan, “China Makes Strong Nonproliferation Pledge in IAEA Conference Address,” Nucleonics Week,
September 27, 1984.
53 New York Times, April 27, 1984.
54 Ron Redmond, “China Elaborates Nuclear Non-proliferation Policy,” UPI, January 25, 1985.
55 Joanne Omang, “U.S.-China Nuclear Pact Near,” Washington Post, July 22, 1985.
Congressional Research Service
13

U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

proliferation objectives is the potential for “maverick” suppliers to undercut the
safeguards and other controls established through international cooperation and
consensus. In the past, China’s policies were a cause for concern because it neither
adhered to that consensus nor accepted other non-proliferation norms.” [emphasis added]
Adelman also noted that
a few of the major provisions in the agreement were subject to long and difficult
negotiations
. We have had detailed discussions on what it means in practice not to assist
other countries to acquire nuclear explosives.... We understand that China’s policy will be
implemented in a manner consistent with those basic non-proliferation practices common
to the United States and other major suppliers.... The United States sought China’s
acceptance of IAEA safeguards on U.S. supply under the agreement, but they adamantly
refused to accept that condition
. [emphasis added]
Finally, Adelman argued that the agreement for U.S. exports provided for “mutually acceptable
arrangements,” in the future, “to be established prior to approval of U.S. exports” that “will
include exchanges of information and visits by U.S. government personnel to relevant sites in
China where material or equipment subject to the agreement will be stored or used.” He also
contended that “reprocessing of U.S. origin material cannot take place without U.S. consent.” He
concluded that “it will be important to ensure that the specific arrangements provide adequate
confidence
that any material or equipment subject to the agreement will be used only for purposes
consistent with the agreement.”56 [emphasis added]
Adelman also submitted ACDA’s “Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement” that detailed the
Reagan Administration’s justification for the agreement with China, pursuant to Section 123a of
the Atomic Energy Act.57 ACDA reached “a favorable net assessment of the adequacy of the
provisions of the proposed agreement to ensure that any assistance furnished thereunder will not
be used to further any military or nuclear explosive purpose.” It also concluded that execution of
the proposed agreement “would advance the non-proliferation program, policy, and objectives of
the United States.”
Proliferation Concerns
In contrast, Thomas Roberts, Acting Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),
wrote a memorandum to President Reagan that offered a different assessment. He referred to
reviewing not only the State Department’s proposed agreement but also an accompanying
“Agreed Minute.” He wrote that he agreed with the State Department that the agreement met the
legal requirements of Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Act. However, Roberts wrote of concerns about “the adequacy of certain assurances provided by
the PRC.” He wrote that,
We also note that, although we believe the requirements of Section 123 are satisfied, we
would have preferred that the agreement contain a clear statement of U.S. consent rights
for the subsequent reprocessing or enrichment of U.S.-supplied nuclear reactor fuel or
fuel used in U.S.-supplied reactors. Such a statement would eliminate the potential for
future misunderstandings.
Our final observation is that the Agreement contains a provision which would expressly
qualify the authority of the Congress to enact subsequent legislation affecting the

56 Kenneth Adelman, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, “Memorandum for the President;
Subject: U.S.-China Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement,” July 19, 1985.
57 Kenneth Adelman, “Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement,” July 19, 1985.
Congressional Research Service
14

U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

activities covered by the Agreement. Previous agreements for cooperation with other
countries have not contained such a provision. The provision could reduce the flexibility
of the United States in the future.58
Formal Submission
On July 24, 1985, President Reagan submitted to Congress the “Agreement Between the United
States and the People’s Republic of China Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy,”
pursuant to Sections 123(b) and 123(d) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. In his
transmittal message, Reagan did not refer to the NRC’s concerns (the memorandum cited above
was classified at the time). He noted that the proposed agreement was the first peaceful nuclear
cooperation agreement with a Communist country and the only such agreement with another
nuclear-weapon state (because cooperation with the United Kingdom and France was covered by
U.S. agreements with the European Atomic Energy Community, or EURATOM).
The President first cited China’s “ambitious plans” for a “substantial number of nuclear power
stations.” He pointed to China’s steps to “clarify” its non-proliferation and nuclear export
policies, including Premier Zhao’s statement, but Reagan did not mention PRC practices. He
referred to bilateral “talks” rather than statements or agreements and said that “we can expect”
that China’s policy of not assisting a non-nuclear weapon state to acquire nuclear explosives will
be implemented in a manner consistent with the basic non-proliferation practices common to the
United States and other suppliers.
As benefits for U.S. interests, the President wrote that the agreement would “have a significant,
positive impact on overall U.S.-China relations”; “provide the United States and its companies an
opportunity to participate in another aspect of China’s energy programs, with possible substantial
economic benefit”; and “further the non-proliferation and other foreign policy interests of the
United States.” Reagan argued that the agreement would not constitute an “unreasonable risk” to
common defense and security. He noted that he was submitting the agreement to Congress
“without exempting it from any requirement” in Section 123(a) of the Atomic Energy Act.59
Issues During 1985 Congressional Review
The agreement’s submission began the periods of congressional review: 30 days of continuous
session under Section 123(b) to be followed by 60 days of continuous session under Section
123(d) of the Atomic Energy Act (P.L. 83-703). Chaired by Representative Dante Fascell, the
House Foreign Affairs Committee held a hearing on July 31, 1985.60 Secretary of Energy John
Herrington, ACDA Director Kenneth Adelman, Ambassador for Non-proliferation Richard
Kennedy, and Assistant Secretary of State Paul Wolfowitz testified. Members debated a number
of issues, raised in particular by Representative Edward Markey, Chairman of the House Energy

58 Thomas Roberts, Acting Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Memorandum for the President, July 19,
1985 (redacted unclassified version).
59 Ronald Reagan, “Message from the President of the United States Transmitting An Agreement for Cooperation
between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People’s Republic of China
Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, Pursuant to Secs. 123(b) and 123(d) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
as Amended,” July 24, 1985, House Document 99-86.
60 Besides the hearing held by the Committee on Foreign Affairs on July 31, 1985, other hearings were held by the
House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on U.S.-Pacific Rim Trade, on September 12, 1985; the House Foreign
Affairs Committee, closed hearing, on October 3, 1985; and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 9, 1985.
See archived CRS Issue Brief IB86050, Implementation of the U.S.-Chinese Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation, by
Warren Donnelly, September 28, 1989.
Congressional Research Service
15

U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

and Commerce Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Power, who testified and submitted
his legal analysis of the proposed agreement.61
Safeguards and Prior Approvals: Representative Markey raised objections about the agreement,
saying that it contained the same “lax terms” as the draft that was initialed in 1984: objections
based on a lack of guarantee that safeguards will be maintained for U.S. nuclear materials and
equipment to ensure peaceful use; lack of a guarantee of prior approval by the United States of
any reprocessing, enrichment, or alteration of nuclear material; and concerns about China’s
nuclear exports and technical assistance with other countries. He asserted that,
Instead of obtaining a tightening of the language of the agreement, the Administration
reportedly has spent the last year providing itself with classified assurances that the
shadowy Chinese technicians purportedly working at Pakistan’s renegade Kahuta
uranium enrichment plant have disappeared, and that China is no longer exporting
unsafeguarded supplies of heavy water and low-enriched uranium to other threshold
nuclear-weapon states such as Argentina and South Africa. It is not enough that the
Administration satisfy itself on this count.62
Unilateral Understanding of Verbal Assurances: Representative Markey also contended that
the assurances from China were actually assurances in a secret memorandum or “Non-Paper” of
the State Department. In his written statement, he reported that “Ambassador Kennedy reportedly
resorted to the device of writing down his own (classified) understanding of China’s new
improved nonproliferation policy. While declining to sign this ingenious document, responsible
Chinese officials reportedly nodded their assent, and Kennedy raced back to Washington to report
this triumph of diplomacy to the President.”
Ambassador Kennedy testified that the Chinese “understood” U.S. legal requirements, “said” they
had no “plans” to undertake activities in question, and were concerned about whether the United
States would give a timely response. Kennedy also testified that the Chinese made it “clear” that
when they “say” that they will not assist other countries to develop nuclear weapons, “this also
applies to all nuclear explosives,” acknowledging that it was in question.63 (During a meeting of
the committee to mark up legislation in November 1985, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
James Devine confirmed Representative Dan Burton’s assertion of confidential summaries of
discussions that were not in writing. Devine said that the PRC “assured us orally that they would
... require safeguards on their own exports.”)
Compliance with Atomic Energy Act: Representative Markey further testified that the proposed
agreement did not reconcile with all the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act, and so the
President should re-submit the agreement with exemption from the criteria for safeguards and
prior consent, as stipulated in the “Proxmire Amendment” to the Export Administration Act that
amended the Atomic Energy Act.
Exception for China: Representative Markey differed with the Administration on whether China
should be treated as an exception concerning the question of safeguards, stating that “we insisted
that the United Kingdom, a weapons state and our closest ally, accept [safeguards] as part of our
nuclear cooperation agreement. So why not the Chinese?” He said that “under the provisions of
the Atomic Energy Act, the People’s Republic, as a nuclear weapons state, is exempted from the

61 House Committee on Foreign Affairs, “Proposed Nuclear Cooperation Agreement With the People’s Republic of
China,” Hearing and Markup on H.J.Res. 404, July 31, November 13, 1985.
62 Ibid.
63 On the PRC’s refusal to give its own assurances in writing, see R. Gregory Nokes, “How the U.S.-China Nuclear
Agreement was Saved,” AP, August 3, 1985.
Congressional Research Service
16

U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

IAEA safeguards requirement. However, contrary to the agreement’s erroneous implication,
China is not altogether exempted from safeguards requirements.”
Prejudice: Representative Markey objected to the lack of a guarantee of U.S. prior approval for
any reprocessing or enrichment of nuclear materials by China, along with language to consider
the activities “favorably.”
Legislation and P.L. 99-183
Legislative options for Congress included requesting the President to re-submit the agreement;
passing a resolution to disapprove the proposed agreement; passing a resolution to approve it; or
passing a resolution to approve it with conditions.
H.Res. 269. On September 20, 1985, Representative Markey introduced H.Res. 269 to request the
President to re-submit the proposed agreement with exemptions from Sections 123a(1) and
123a(7) of the Atomic Energy Act.
H.R. 3537. On October 9, 1985, Representative Edward Feighan introduced H.R. 3537 to ensure
adequate verification of peaceful uses of nuclear exports to the PRC (modeled on IAEA
safeguards). The Administration opposed the bill.64
S. 1754. Also on October 9, 1985, Senator John Glenn introduced S. 1754 to ensure adequate
verification of peaceful uses of nuclear exports to the PRC (modeled on IAEA safeguards). The
Administration also opposed this bill. Senator Dave Durenberger, Chairman of the Committee on
Intelligence, supported the bill. In a floor speech on October 21, 1985, Senator Alan Cranston
reported questions about China’s assistance for Iran’s nuclear program. Senators Richard Lugar
and Jesse Helms reportedly supported the Administration.65
H.J.Res. 404. On October 1, 1985, Representative Fascell introduced by request H.J.Res. 404, a
joint resolution to approve the proposed agreement. On November 13, 1985, the House Foreign
Affairs Committee met to mark up the resolution. Representative Don Bonker offered an
amendment, favoring the agreement with conditions. The language added requirements for a
presidential certification before the issuance of export licenses or approval of retransfers and a
waiting period of 30 days of continuous session of Congress. The President was to certify that (1)
the verification was designed effectively to ensure the peaceful use of U.S. exports; (2) China
provided additional details about its nuclear non-proliferation policies and all information was in
conformity with Section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act (prohibiting nuclear exports to any
country that engaged in nuclear proliferation); and (3) the obligation to consider activities
favorably shall not prejudice U.S. decision-making. The amendment also declared that each
proposed export would be subject to U.S. laws and regulations in effect at the time of each export.
The language also called for a presidential report detailing in unclassified form the PRC’s past
and current non-proliferation policies as well as practices. Finally, the amendment stated that the
agreement with China would not provide a precedent for negotiating other agreements.
Representative Howard Wolpe objected to the language as a unilateral attempt to address the
agreement’s “deficiencies” with U.S. interpretations. Representative Solarz defended the
language, which the Administration accepted, because China already possessed nuclear weapon
capability and would have “additional incentives” to refrain from nuclear proliferation. The
committee adopted the amendment by voice vote. The committee’s report on the bill, H.Rept. 99-

64 Ibid.
65 Mark Crawford, “Rumors of China-Iran Trade Clouds Nuke Pact,” ASAP, November 8, 1985.
Congressional Research Service
17

U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

382, noted that while U.S. nuclear cooperation with the PRC will in no way further its ability to
use nuclear energy for military or explosive uses, the committee “has long been concerned by
reports of Chinese nuclear assistance to Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear program.” On November
20, 1985, the Foreign Affairs Committee reported H.J.Res. 404 (H.Rept. 99-382). The House
subsequently passed S.J.Res. 238 in lieu.
S.J.Res. 238 (P.L. 99-183). Meanwhile, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed a
resolution identical to that of the Foreign Affairs Committee, S.J.Res. 238, the Joint Resolution
Relating to the Approval and Implementation of the Proposed Agreement for Nuclear
Cooperation Between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. The Senate passed
(by voice vote) S.J.Res. 238 on November 21, 1985. The House then passed it (307-112) on
December 11, 1985. President Reagan signed it on December 16, 1985 (as P.L. 99-183). The
agreement took effect on December 30, 1985.66
In his statement upon signing the bill, the President noted that he was required to submit a one-
time certification and a one-time report, with the decision about certification assigned
“exclusively to the President.”67 However, President Reagan did not issue the certification.
Sanctions After the Tiananmen Crackdown
Initial Legislation
On June 4, 1989, Deng Xiaoping and other PRC leaders used the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) to suppress peaceful demonstrators in Beijing (commonly called the Tiananmen
Crackdown in reference to the square that was the focal point of nationwide protests for political
liberalization). The military crackdown killed or wounded hundreds, if not thousands, of
demonstrators, and mass arrests, executions, and summary imprisonment of demonstrators and
symphathizers ensued.
As part of the U.S. response, on June 21, 1989, Representative Markey sought to limit nuclear
cooperation with the PRC by introducing language to H.R. 2655, to amend the Foreign Assistance
Act. The language sought to ban the issuance of export licenses and nuclear cooperation unless
the President (1) has made certifications and submitted the report required by P.L. 99-183; (2) has
certified to Congress that the PRC government ended martial law and that the human rights
situation has “significantly improved”; and (3) has certified to Congress that the PRC government
has provided the United States with a “written declaration that it is not directly or indirectly
assisting any nation in testing, developing, or acquiring nuclear explosive devices or the materials
and components for such devices.”68 On June 29, Representative Dante Fascell introduced
sanctions on China in an en bloc amendment (H.Amdt. 107) to H.R. 2655, which passed the
House by 418-0. H.R. 2655 was passed in the House but not the Senate.
In the Senate, on July 14, 1989, Senators George Mitchell and Robert Dole introduced an
amendment (S.Amdt. 271) to S. 1160, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1990,
seeking to impose additional sanctions against the PRC. Those sanctions included the limitation

66 Archived CRS Issue Brief IB86050, Implementation of the U.S.-Chinese Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation, by
Warren Donnelly, September 28, 1989.
67 Ronald Reagan, “U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, President’s Statement, December 16, 1985,” Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents
, December 23, 1985.
68 Archived CRS Issue Brief IB86050, Implementation of the U.S.-Chinese Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation, by
Warren Donnelly, September 28, 1989; and Congressional Record, June 21, 1989, p. H2995.
Congressional Research Service
18

U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

of nuclear cooperation. The Senate passed the amendment by 81-10. On July 21, the Senate
incorporated the bill in the House version (H.R. 1487) and passed it in lieu of S. 1160.
P.L. 101-246
In the end, Congress legislated comprehensive sanctions in response to the Tiananmen
Crackdown in H.R. 3792, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991
(introduced on November 21, 1989, and enacted as P.L. 101-246 on February 16, 1990). Section
902(a)(6) of P.L. 101-246 suspended nuclear cooperation with China until the President (1)
certified to Congress that the PRC “has provided clear and unequivocal assurances to the United
States that it is not assisting and will not assist any non-nuclear weapon state, either directly or
indirectly, in acquiring nuclear explosive devices or the materials and components for such
devices”; (2) makes the certifications and submits the report required by P.L. 99-183; and (3)
makes a report under subsection (b)(1) or (2), reporting that the PRC government has made
progress in political reforms or that it is “in the national interest” of the United States to terminate
a suspension or disapproval.
Implementation of the 1985 Agreement
Presidents Reagan and George H. W. Bush did not issue the certifications to implement the
agreement. After the deterioration in bilateral ties after the Tiananmen Crackdown of 1989, the
relationship with China again deteriorated in the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-1996. Questions
persisted about U.S. sanctions for PRC nuclear proliferation activities in Pakistan and Iran.69
President Clinton’s 1998 certification to Congress conceded that “the United States [had] decided
not to proceed with implementation of the 1985 nuclear cooperation agreement because of
continuing questions about contacts between Chinese entities and elements associated with the
Pakistani nuclear weapons program.” He also noted that “nuclear cooperation between China and
Iran dates from June 1985.”70
Congressional Action Before Certification
By the spring of 1997, Washington and Beijing discussed efforts to improve ties, including the
first formal U.S.-PRC summit in the United States in 12 years. Those discussions included
China’s request for implementation of the agreement. The Clinton Administration considered a
presidential certification for implementation as the “centerpiece” of a state visit by PRC ruler
Jiang Zemin to Washington, DC, in October 1997. (Jiang was the Communist Party General-
Secretary, Central Military Commission Chairman, and PRC President.)
In Congress, Representatives Markey and Solomon led a total of 62 Members to write a letter to
President Clinton in July 1997, urging him not to certify.71 Chaired by Representative Benjamin
Gilman, the House International Relations Committee held a hearing on the agreement on
October 7, 1997.72 In the Senate, the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, chaired by

69 For more discussion, see CRS Report RL31555, China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and
Missiles: Policy Issues
, by Shirley A. Kan.
70 William Clinton, “Unclassified Report to Congress on Nonproliferation Policies and Practices of the People’s
Republic of China,” January 12, 1998.
71 Representatives Edward Markey and Gerald Solomon, “Dear Colleague,” June 5, 1997; “Clinton Urged to Deny
Nuclear Certification to China,” Reuters, July 31, 1997.
72 House International Relations Committee, “Implementation of the U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement:
Whose Interests are Served?,” October 7, 1997.
Congressional Research Service
19

U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

Senator Frank Murkowski, held a hearing on October 23, 1997.73 On November 5, 1997, the
House passed (by 393-29) an amendment sponsored by Representative Gilman to extend
congressional review for implementation of the agreement from 30 to 120 days and provide for
expedited review procedures. The language amended H.R. 2358, the Political Freedom in China
Act of 1997, which passed the House on November 5, 1997. Meanwhile, U.S. firms, such as
Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Bechtel Power Corporation, and Stone and Webster
Engineering, lobbied Congress to allow them to bid in a market worth as much as $50 billion.74
U.S.-PRC Summit Agreements
On the eve of the U.S.-China summit in October 1997, the PRC advanced its nuclear
nonproliferation policy by joining the Zangger Committee (the NPT’s Exporters’ Committee) on
October 16 and promising in writing not to begin new nuclear projects in Iran (in a confidential
letter to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright).75
At the summit on October 29, 1997, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the PRC State
Planning Commission signed an “Agreement of Intent on Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses
of Nuclear Technology.” Later, at a summit in Beijing in June 1998, DOE and the PRC State
Planning Commission signed an Agreement on Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of
Nuclear Technologies, including bringing PRC scientists to U.S. national laboratories,
universities, and nuclear reactor facilities.76
President Clinton Certifies Agreement in 1998
On January 12, 1998, President Clinton signed certifications (as required by P.L. 99-183) on
China’s nuclear nonproliferation policy and practices to implement the 1985 Nuclear Cooperation
Agreement. The President also issued the certification and waived a sanction imposed after the
Tiananmen Crackdown (in P.L. 101-246). President Clinton submitted his certifications to
Congress, contending that “the Agreement will have a significant, positive impact in promoting
U.S. nonproliferation and national security interests with China and in building a stronger
bilateral relationship with China based on respect for international norms.”77
Under Section 902(b)(2) of P.L. 101-246 (waiver authority), President Clinton reported that it was
in the “national interest” to terminate the suspension of nuclear cooperation:
• “it is in the U.S. national interest to consolidate and build on the progress China
has made in the nonproliferation area, and the implementation of the Agreement
for Cooperation between the U.S. and the People’s Republic of China
Concerning the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy will establish a promising
framework for doing so”;

73 Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, “U.S.-China Relations,” October 23, 1997.
74 Dan Morgan and David Ottaway, “U.S. Reactor Firms Maneuvering to Tap China’s Vast Market,” Washington Post,
October 21, 1997.
75 R. Jeffrey Smith, “China’s Pledge to End Iran Nuclear Aid Yields U.S. Help,” Washington Post, October 30, 1997;
also see CRS Report RL31555, China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues,
by Shirley A. Kan.
76 “Agreement Between the Department of Energy of the United States of America and the State Development
Planning Commission of the People’s Republic of China on Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear
Technologies”; and White House, “Fact Sheet: Achievements of the U.S.-China Summit,” June 29, 1998.
77 William Clinton, letter to Newt Gingrich, Speaker of the House, January 12, 1998.
Congressional Research Service
20

U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

• “it is also in the U.S. national interest to build stronger, mutually advantageous
bilateral relations with China based on respect for international norms”;
• “the United States also has an economic national interest ... The Agreement will
enable U.S. companies to compete for contracts in the world’s fastest growing
nuclear energy market.”
In making his certification, Clinton submitted to Congress:
• Presidential Determination No. 98-10 (Memorandum for the Secretary of State,
“Certification Pursuant to Section (b)(1) of P.L. 99-183 and to Section 902
(a)(6)(B) of P.L. 101-246”) dated January 12, 1998;
• Unclassified Report on the PRC’s Nonproliferation Policies, Practices, and
Assurances Required by P.L. 99-183;
• U.S.-PRC Memorandum of Understanding on Exchanges of Information and
Visits (initialed on June 23, 1987) and Side Notes on Protection of Business
Confidential Information (signed on October 22, 1997);
• Basis for certification under Section (b)(1)(A) of P.L. 99-183;
• Rationale for Report Required by P.L. 101-246.
Congressional Review of Clinton Certifications
During debate on the agreement, some Members of Congress, the nonproliferation community,
and other interests were skeptical that PRC nonproliferation policies and practices had changed
sufficiently to warrant the certifications and that they served U.S. interests. They also pointed out
that China had not joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which required full-scope
safeguards. The House International Relations Committee held a hearing on February 4, 1998, in
which Robert Einhorn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation, testified for the
Clinton Administration. Einhorn testified to Congress that
We must, therefore, approach implementation of the agreement with a healthy
skepticism. President Reagan’s advice to trust but verify is clearly warranted here. So we
will be monitoring China’s behavior carefully, and the Chinese will know that any
actions inconsistent with their commitments will jeopardize future cooperation.78
Congressional review ended on March 18, 1998, with no legislation to block the agreement,
allowing it to be implemented. U.S. firms may apply for Export-Import Bank financing and
licenses from the NRC and DOE for nuclear exports to China, and foreign firms may apply to re-
export U.S. technology.
On March 19, 1998, 13 Members in the House led by Representative Markey wrote to President
Clinton to urge him to terminate implementation of the agreement. Also, as amended by
Representative Gilman, Section 1523 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY1999 (P.L.
105-261), enacted on October 17, 1998, requires the President to notify Congress “upon” granting
licenses by the NRC for nuclear exports or re-exports to a non-NATO country that has detonated
a nuclear explosive device (e.g., China). As required, the State Department, on June 9, 2000,
issued the first notification to Congress that the NRC issued a license on February 3, 2000, for the
export of tantalite ore to China.

78 House International Relations Committee, hearing, “Implementation of the U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation
Agreement,” February 4, 1998.
Congressional Research Service
21

U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

Memorandum of Understanding on Ensuring Peaceful Uses
President Clinton had submitted his certification with a Memorandum of Understanding (pursuant
to Article 8 of the agreement) that was initialed in Washington, DC, on June 23, 1987, but not
signed. The President contended that this initialed Memorandum provided for arrangements that
met the certification standard of P.L. 99-183 that the arrangements be designed to be effective in
ensuring peaceful uses of nuclear material, facilities, or components.
Concerning “consultations,” Article 8(2) of the agreement stated that the cooperation would be
between two nuclear-weapon states and that bilateral safeguards “are not required.” It called for
“diplomatic channels to establish mutually acceptable arrangements for exchanges of information
and visits to material, facilities, and components.” The Memorandum called for annual visits to
reactors. In the event of discrepancies, it called for the parties to “consult” to make “mutually
acceptable” arrangements for the addition or reduction of visits, in place of safeguards.
In February 1998, the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation of the Department of Energy
published the “Proposed Subsequent Arrangement Concerning Reciprocal Arrangements for
Exchanges of Information and Visits Under the Agreement for Cooperation for Peaceful Uses of
Nuclear Energy” between the United States and the PRC, noting that it sought to sign the initialed
Memorandum which provided the “framework” for arrangements.79 The United States and the
PRC signed the Memorandum of Understanding on May 6, 1998, and DOE published it.80
Retransfers of Nuclear Technology
Given the PRC’s nuclear cooperation with Pakistan that raised questions of U.S. sanctions,81 the
Clinton Administration apparently did not have adequate assurances from the PRC that it would
not re-transfer and divert U.S. nuclear technology to another country, potentially for military use.
The Administration continued negotiations with China on this issue after the agreement’s
implementation.82 According to a reported NRC memorandum of April 4, 2000, DOE officials
had held up 16 applications for authorization to export U.S. technology since 1998, due to
disagreement about assurances, including a U.S. demand for a blanket assurance and a PRC offer
of case-by-case assurances.83 Those cases were called “Part 810 cases” in reference to the DOE’s
export controls that are regulated by Part 810 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
On September 16, 2003, in Vienna, Austria, Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham and the
chairman of China’s Atomic Energy Authority apparently agreed to assurances from China that
U.S. nuclear technology would not be retransferred by China to third parties without prior U.S.
consent. The understanding, however, was reached in an exchange of diplomatic notes to
“establish a process for determining what nuclear technologies require government-to-
government nonproliferation assurances and set forth procedures for exchanging the assurances.”
Afterwards, the Bush Administration continued to seek assurances to prevent unauthorized re-
transfers by China.84

79 Federal Register, February 10, 1998.
80 Federal Register, June 4, 1998.
81 For more, see CRS Report RL31555, China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy
Issues
, by Shirley A. Kan.
82 Nucleonics Week, July 1, 1999.
83 Bill Gertz, “Beijing Stalls on Nuclear Promises,” Washington Times, May 9, 2000.
84 Nucleonics Week, September 18, 2003; April 1, 2004.
Congressional Research Service
22

U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

In September 2004, the State Department publicly stated that the exchange of diplomatic notes in
September 2003 followed as a “second significant event” the 1998 implementation of the
agreement, which permitted transfers of nuclear reactor fuel and components “based on case-by-
case review.” Then, the diplomatic notes “confirmed conditions and assurances governing
transfers of nuclear technology which are not covered by the agreement, and those notes provided
as well for a case-by-case review.” The NRC issued licences for export of nuclear reactor
components under the nuclear cooperation agreement, while the DOE authorized transfers of
nuclear technology to China for its civilian nuclear power program based on the PRC’s “written
nonproliferation assurances.”85
Nuclear Cooperation Restrictions on Countries Assisting Iran
The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA) of 2010 (P.L.
111-195), which became law July 1, 2010, contains additional restrictions on licensing nuclear
exports to countries with entities that have been sanctioned for conducting certain types of
energy-related transactions with Iran.
Section 102(a) of CISADA prohibits the issuance of nuclear export licenses under a 123
Agreement for any country whose nationals have engaged in activities with Iran relating to the
“acquisition or development of nuclear weapons or related technology, or of missiles or other
advanced conventional weapons that are designed or modified to deliver a nuclear weapon.” The
President can waive the provision by making a determination and notification to the appropriate
congressional committees that the country did not know or have reason to know about the
activity, or if the country is taking “all reasonable steps” to prevent recurrence and penalize the
person involved.

Author Contact Information

Mark Holt
Mary Beth D. Nikitin
Specialist in Energy Policy
Specialist in Nonproliferation
mholt@crs.loc.gov, 7-1704
mnikitin@crs.loc.gov, 7-7745

Acknowledgments
A version of this report was originally written for the House International Relations Subcommittee on Asia
and the Pacific in the 109th Congress, and material from that study is made available for general
congressional use with permission. Most of the history section of this report was written by retired CRS
specialist Shirley A. Kan.



85 Department of State, Daily Press Briefing and Question Taken, September 2, 2004.
Congressional Research Service
23