Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations
Christopher M. Blanchard
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
April 29, 2015
Congressional Research Service
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www.crs.gov
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Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations

Summary
The kingdom of Saudi Arabia, ruled by the Al Saud family since its founding in 1932, wields
significant global political and economic influence through its administration of the birthplace of
the Islamic faith and by virtue of its large oil reserves. Close U.S.-Saudi official relations have
survived a series of challenges since the 1940s, and, in recent years, shared concerns over Sunni
Islamist extremist terrorism and Iranian regional ambitions have provided a renewed logic for
continued strategic cooperation. Political upheaval and conflict in the Middle East and North
Africa appear to have strained bilateral ties, but their full effect has yet to be determined.
Amid regional turmoil, Obama Administration officials have referred to the Saudi government as
an important regional partner in recent years, and U.S. arms sales and related security cooperation
programs have continued with congressional oversight. Since October 2010, Congress has been
notified of proposed sales to Saudi Arabia of fighter aircraft, helicopters, missile defense systems,
missiles, bombs, armored vehicles, and related equipment and services, with a potential value of
more than $90 billion. In March and April 2015, the U.S.-trained Saudi military used U.S.-origin
weaponry, U.S. logistical assistance, and shared intelligence to carry out strikes in Yemen. Some
Members of Congress have expressed skepticism about Saudi leaders’ commitment to combating
extremism and sharing U.S. policy priorities. However, U.S.-Saudi counterterrorism ties
reportedly remain close, and Saudi forces have participated in coalition strikes on Islamic State
targets in Syria since 2014.
In parallel to these close security ties, official U.S. concerns about human rights and religious
freedom in the kingdom persist, and, in part, reflect deeper concerns for the kingdom’s stability.
Saudi activists advance a range of limited economic and political reform demands, continuing
trends that have seen liberals, moderates, and conservatives publicly press the kingdom’s leaders
for change for decades. Since 2011, initiatives to organize nationwide protests have been met with
some popular criticism and official rejection. Local protests occur sporadically, but public clashes
with security forces have remained contained to certain predominantly Shia areas of the oil-rich
Eastern Province. The Obama Administration has endorsed Saudi citizens’ rights to free assembly
and free expression. Saudi leaders reject foreign interference in the country’s internal affairs.
The death of King Abdullah bin Abdelaziz in January 2015 brought to a close a long chapter of
consistent leadership, and his half-brother King Salman bin Abdelaziz assumed leadership of the
kingdom. He has moved quickly to assert his authority by reorganizing several government
entities, naming new heirs and officials, and distributing public funds. Succession arrangements
have attracted particular attention in recent years, as senior leaders in the royal family have
passed away or faced reported health issues and a series of appointments and reassignments has
altered the responsibilities and relative power of leading members of the next generation of the Al
Saud family, the grandsons of the kingdom’s founder.
Current U.S. policy seeks to coordinate with Saudi leaders on regional issues and help them
respond to domestic economic and security challenges. Time will tell whether U.S. initiatives
and, more importantly, Saudi leaders’ efforts will ensure stability. Shared security challenges have
long defined U.S.-Saudi relations, and questions about political, economic, and social reform may
become more pertinent in light of the calls for change and patterns of conflict that are now
swirling around the kingdom. Saudi assertiveness in confronting perceived threats may affect
U.S. regional security priorities, including with regard to Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and negotiations
with Iran in the near future. In turn, Congress may examine the scope, terms, and merits of U.S.-
Saudi partnership as it considers proposed arms sales and security commitments.
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Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations

Contents
Overview .......................................................................................................................................... 1
Domestic Issues ............................................................................................................................... 3
Leadership and Succession ........................................................................................................ 4
Cabinet Shifts, Declining Oil Prices, and Consistent Budget Priorities .................................... 5
Gender Issues, Minority Relations, and Human Rights ............................................................ 7
Terrorism Threats and Bilateral Cooperation ................................................................................... 8
The Islamic State and Related Security Issues .......................................................................... 9
Terrorist Financing and Material Support: Concerns and Responses ...................................... 10
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Saudi Arabia ................................................................................. 11
Arms Sales and Security Training ........................................................................................... 11
Consensus and Contention in Regional Affairs ............................................................................. 13
Saudi Arabia and Iran .............................................................................................................. 13
Saudi Military Campaigns and Policy in Yemen ..................................................................... 14
Egypt and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict ............................................................................... 17
U.S.-Saudi Trade and Energy Issues .............................................................................................. 18
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 20

Figures
Figure 1. Saudi Arabia: Map and Country Data .............................................................................. 2

Tables
Table 1. Proposed Major U.S. Defense Sales to Saudi Arabia ....................................................... 12

Appendixes
Appendix. Historical Background ................................................................................................. 21

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 21

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Overview
King Salman bin Abdelaziz Al Saud succeeded his late half-brother King Abdullah in January
2015 and in April 2015 announced dramatic changes to succession arrangements left in place by
King Abdullah, elevating the next generation of the ruling Al Saud family as heirs. In an April 28
decree, King Salman replaced his half-brother Crown Prince Muqrin bin Abdelaziz with Interior
Minister Prince Mohammed bin Nayef bin Abdelaziz, a nephew to both men and leading member
of the generation of grandsons of the kingdom’s founder. King Salman named his relatively
young son, Prince Mohammed bin Salman, as Deputy Crown Prince in addition to the other
influential roles he has held since January as Defense Minister and head of a new national
economic council of ministers. Long-serving Foreign Minister Prince Saud al Faisal stepped
down and has been replaced by Saudi Ambassador to the United States Adel al Jubeir. Military
and civilian security officials received a month’s pay bonus in conjunction with the
announcements. The moves surprised many observers of the kingdom’s affairs, but it is not
immediately apparent that the leadership changes will result in major changes in Saudi domestic
and foreign policy or Saudi-U.S. relations.
In spite of apparent differences of opinion over regional developments, U.S.-Saudi security
cooperation and U.S. concern for the global availability of Saudi energy supplies continue to
anchor official bilateral relations as they have for decades. Bilateral ties are bolstered by major
new arms sales, continued security training arrangements, enhanced counterterrorism
cooperation, and shared concerns about Iran, Al Qaeda, and, more recently, the rise of the group
known as the Islamic State (formerly known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Al Sham/the Levant,
ISIL/ISIS). The latter group’s military advances in Syria and Iraq appear to have generated
serious concern among Saudi officials, as have reports that suggest popular support for the group
may be strong among a small but potentially dangerous minority of Saudis.
Saudi leaders have reacted viscerally to the ouster of Yemen’s transitional government by the
Zaydi Shia Ansar Allah (aka Houthi) movement and backers of former Yemeni President Ali
Abdullah Saleh. A U.S.-supported, Saudi-led air campaign has launched hundreds of strikes
across the country since late March 2015 aimed at halting the advance of Houthi-Saleh forces and
compelling them to negotiate with U.N.-recognized exiled transition leaders. Meanwhile Al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, perhaps the kingdom’s most dangerous local adversary, has taken
advantage of the resulting disorder to reassert itself across southern Yemen.
U.S.-origin weaponry features prominently in Saudi military operations in Yemen and against the
Islamic State organization in Syria, drawing new attention to congressionally approved arms
sales. Since late 2012, the Administration has notified Congress of over $24 billion in proposed
arms sales to the kingdom, including proposed sales that would continue long-established training
programs, upgrade legacy platforms, support critical infrastructure protection, and deliver
advanced stand-off air weaponry to equip Saudi-purchased U.S. fighter aircraft. Parallel joint
diplomatic efforts to build stronger economic, educational, and interpersonal ties are intended to
broaden the basis of the bilateral relationship and help meet the demands and aspirations of the
kingdom’s young population for employment and more economic growth.
The Obama Administration, like its predecessors, has engaged the Saudi government as a
strategic partner to promote regional security and global economic stability. Current U.S. policy
initiatives seek to help Saudi leaders, under the leadership of King Salman bin Abdelaziz, address
economic and security challenges. U.S. government statements warn of ongoing terrorist threats
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in Saudi Arabia, and in February the State Department said that “security threats are increasing.”1
U.S. officials have not indicated that they expect large-scale public unrest to emerge in the near
term, but U.S. statements cite ongoing attacks against Westerners, including Americans, in the
kingdom, identify no-go areas for U.S. diplomats, and describe attacks on Saudi borders by
terrorist adversaries to the north and south.
Figure 1. Saudi Arabia: Map and Country Data



1 U.S. Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs, Travel Warning - Saudi Arabia, February 24, 2015.
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It is still unclear whether U.S. initiatives and, more importantly, Saudi leaders’ own choices will
enable the kingdom to meet its citizens’ security, employment, energy consumption, and
education needs. Its considerable financial clout and deepening energy ties to major U.S. trading
partners in Asia are important factors for U.S. and Saudi decision makers to consider when
assessing the future of the bilateral relationship. Significant shifts in the political and economic
landscape of the Middle East also have focused greater international attention on Saudi domestic
policy issues and reinvigorated social and political debates among Saudis. These shifts may make
sensitive issues such as political reform, unemployment, education, human rights, corruption,
religious freedom, and extremism more important to U.S.-Saudi relations than in the past.
However, the history of these bilateral ties suggests that any official U.S. criticisms of the
kingdom’s restrictive political and social environment or any perceived failings by the Saudi
government to live up to its reform or counterterrorism commitments are likely to remain subjects
of private diplomatic engagement rather than public discussion. Saudi concerns about U.S.
leadership in the region appear to have grown in recent years, in parallel to U.S. concerns about
Saudi priorities and choices. Leaders in both countries have long favored continuity over policy
differences in the face of controversy and some Saudis’ and Americans’ calls for change. With a
new generation of leaders assuming prominent positions in the kingdom, change is under way—
its direction and implications remain to be seen.
Domestic Issues
U.S. officials credited the late King Abdullah’s government with taking a more responsive and
transparent approach to citizens’ concerns than those of his predecessors, and observers are
watching closely for signals indicating whether King Salman will continue that approach or adopt
his own. Regardless of the new king’s personal style, decision -wmaking in the kingdom reflects
consensus among a closed elite dominated by aging members of the Al Saud family. The
government seeks to manage increasingly vocal and public demands for improved economic
opportunities, political rights, and improved social conditions while security forces monitor and
tightly limit political activity and social activism. The government launched large scale social
spending programs targeting housing and unemployment in response to popular demands since
2011, and has expelled hundreds of thousands of foreign workers to boost employment of Saudis.
The third nationwide municipal council elections are to be held in August-September 2015, and
will expand the elected membership to two-thirds, lower the voter registration age to 18 from 21,
and be the first in which Saudi women can vote and stand as candidates.
In 2013, former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia James Smith attributed what he viewed as an
atmosphere of tension and anxiety among some Saudis and their leaders to the range of economic,
social, political, and foreign policy challenges that the kingdom faces, saying:
on one hand you have those [Saudis] with a deep and abiding confidence in the kingdom—
its religion, its culture, and they’re excited about the future. On the other hand you have
those who are deeply worried that somehow the culture is weak, that it is vulnerable, that
social change might erode the very fabric of their society. The chorus of caution feels the
need to control events, to keep out new ideas and outside views as if the proud heritage will
be threatened.... As the Saudi leadership scans the neighborhood they see an uncertain future,
political instability, economic chaos, refugee flows, and meddling from Iran and other
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regional players. Domestically they see a demand for jobs, the need for energy alternatives,
and requests for more freedom and opportunity. They have a full plate.2
In July 2014, Smith described the regional challenges facing the kingdom as “a maelstrom.”3 The
months since have seen new pressures created by the Islamic State’s advance, King Abdullah’s
death, the collapse of the Saudi-backed transitional government in neighboring Yemen, and
continuing U.S.-Iranian negotiation over nuclear issues.
Leadership and Succession
Saudi leaders are likely to continue to face complex questions about political consent, economic
performance, and social reform while managing leadership transitions that are now set to transfer
power from the sons of the kingdom’s founder, King Abdelaziz, to his grandsons. By most
accounts, the Al Saud family has managed a series of recent leadership transition decisions
smoothly, and formal announcements of major changes in succession have stated that an
Allegiance Council made up of senior family members has considered and endorsed recent
transition decisions. This includes decisions made in the wake of King Abdullah’s death on
January 22, 2015, and in conjunction with the succession and leadership changes announced on
April 29. Saudi authorities state that Prince Muqrin bin Abdelaziz stepped down as Crown Prince
at his own choosing and credit new Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef bin Abdelaziz with
selecting King Salman’s son to serve as Deputy Crown Prince, with the approval of a majority of
the Allegiance Council.
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef and Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman hold a
range of other positions, placing them in powerful roles to shape Saudi foreign and domestic
policy, under King Salman’s overall guidance. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef has
continued his duties as Minister of Interior and assumed leadership of a newly created Council for
Political and Security Affairs in January. Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman became
Defense Minister, head of the royal court, and the head of the Council for Economic and
Development Affairs in January, ceding the royal court position to an adviser following his
elevation to the chain of succession in April. King Salman created the new councils overseen by
the princes to handle day-to-day decision making and raise issues for the council of ministers and
king to resolve.
The April 2015 succession changes marked the clear reversal of a key decision taken by King
Abdullah in the run-up to his death—he had named Prince Muqrin as Deputy Crown Prince in
March 2014. In January King Salman also removed two of the late King Abdullah’s sons from
key governorships, along with a prominent adviser of Abdullah’s—Khalid al Tuwaijiri. The late
king Abdullah’s son Prince Abdelaziz bin Abdullah remains the Deputy Foreign Minister, but
King Salman chose a close, but non-royal, adviser to the late king—long-time Saudi Ambassador
to the United States Adel al Jubeir—to replace ailing Foreign Minister Prince Saud al Faisal.
Prince Miteb bin Abdullah (King Abdullah’s most prominent son) leads the security forces of the
Ministry of the National Guard. Debate among observers on these moves is still evolving, with
some individuals suggesting that King Salman and his appointed successors are reversing some

2 Ambassador James Smith (ret.), Remarks at National Council on U.S. Arab Relations Conference, October 2013.
3 Ambassador James Smith (ret.), Conversation with Saudi-U.S. Relations Information Service, July 14, 2014.
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liberal initiatives launched under King Abdullah’s tenure in a bid to shore up domestic support for
generational leadership transition and a more independent and active Saudi foreign policy.4
In recent years there has been increased press reporting of competition among the grandsons of
King Abdelaziz and clear indications that positions of influence were being redistributed among
them. However, there are no clear public signals that the royal family is poised to revert to the
level of tension that characterized intra-family relations in the mid-20th century, which divided
supporters of King Saud (the first son to succeed King Abdelaziz) and King Faisal (the following
successor). Prominent next-generation princes in government service include former intelligence
director/former Saudi land forces commander/former deputy defense minister Prince Khalid bin
Bandar; his brother, Qassim Province Governor Faisal bin Bandar; and Prince Saud bin Nayef
and Prince Faisal bin Salman, governors of the Eastern Province and Medina Province,
respectively.
One critic of the Saudi monarchy has warned that the division of security ministries among
leading princes is an indicator that the future could reflect “a kingdom with multiple heads” and
“a decentralized monarchy consisting of multiple fiefdoms.”5 The ability of the monarchy’s next
generation to successfully manage their relationships with each other and with competing
domestic interest groups is among the factors likely to determine the country’s future stability,
with direct implications for regional stability and U.S. national security and economic interests.
Crown Prince and Minister of Interior Prince Mohammed bin Nayef bin Abdelaziz Al Saud,
Minister of the National Guard Prince Miteb bin Abdullah bin Abdelaziz Al Saud, and then-
Intelligence Chief Prince Khalid bin Bandar bin Abdelaziz Al Saud visited the United States for
consultations with U.S. officials in 2014, and senior U.S. officials have engaged repeatedly with
new leaders across the Saudi government on a range of regional issues in 2015. The succession
and leadership changes announced on April 29 may raise the amount of scrutiny given to the
planned May 2015 visit of King Salman and other leading Saudis to the United States for
President Obama’s summit with Arab Gulf leaders. Observers are likely to interpret the outcomes
of the summit as signals about the direction of U.S.-Saudi relations and regional security.
Cabinet Shifts, Declining Oil Prices, and Consistent Budget
Priorities

In public statements, Saudi leaders have highlighted continuing regional security threats and
domestic economic challenges and have sought to project an image of continuity and consistency
in outlining their diplomatic, economic, and security policy plans for 2015. A cabinet reshuffle in
December 2014 under the late King Abdullah brought new leadership to the ministries of
agriculture, communications and information technology, culture and information, health, higher
education, Islamic affairs, social affairs, and transport.6 King Salman in turn appointed new
leaders in the ministries of Islamic affairs, health, information, municipal affairs, justice, and
agriculture, in addition to abolishing several state councils and replacing them with the
overarching security and economic councils described above. Several of these ministries have

4 See, for example, Yaroslav Trofimov, “New Saudi King Brings Major Change at Home and Abroad,” Wall Street
Journal
, April 29, 2015.
5 Madawi al Rasheed, “Saudi Arabia’s Unpredictable Succession Plan,” Al Monitor (blog), April 23, 2013.
6 Background information on Saudi cabinet members is available at http://www.saudiembassy.net/about/Biographies-
of-Ministers.aspx.
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responsibility for government programs in areas where domestic popular demands are high, and
close observers of Saudi domestic policy have described the successive leadership changes as
indications of both leaders’ desire to reinvigorate current policy approaches and place their own
mark on the country’s direction.
Drastic reductions in global market prices for crude oil are driving questions about Saudi Arabia’s
oil production plans and fiscal outlook. Prices for Brent crude oil and West Texas Intermediate
crude oil dropped by more than half to roughly $46 per barrel from June 2014 to January 2015.
As of late-April 2015, prices were around $64 per barrel, but Saudi oil officials signaled the
kingdom intended to continue production of more than 10 million barrels per day in what many
analysts view as a bid to increase its global market share. Saudi Arabia has enjoyed large budget
surpluses in recent years as a result of formerly high oil prices, and the kingdom’s leaders have
used expansionary spending on social programs, housing, education, and infrastructure in a bid to
prevent domestic unrest. Since 2011, the kingdom has approved a series of record annual budgets
and launched major additional spending programs to meet economic and social demands that
some feared could fuel stronger calls from citizens for political change.
Actual spending reached an all-time high in 2013, and the 2014 budget set a higher spending
target than 2013, with 38% of total spending earmarked for education and healthcare initiatives.
Defense and security spending exceeded 30% of the budget in 2013. The kingdom ran a budget
deficit of $14.4 billion in FY2014 as a result of a more than 28% increase in expenditures and
declining oil revenues. The FY2015 budget presumes a slight increase in spending in spite of
lower oil prices, and the Saudi Ministry of Finance expects that the kingdom will post a larger
deficit of $38.6 billion in FY2015. Approximately one-half of Saudi government expenditures
support “salaries, wages, and allowances.”7
Overall, analysts view recent Saudi budget and oil production decisions as indications that the
kingdom’s leaders are prepared to engage in deficit spending and draw on an estimated $750
billion in foreign currency reserves.8 Some observers speculate that these decisions are driven by
a desire to pressure adversaries in Iran and Russia, maintain Saudi Arabia’s share in Asian oil
markets, continue the growth of the non-oil sector at home, and reduce the economic viability of
unconventional oil production in North America and other regions. Saudi officials, including Oil
Minister Ali al Naimi, have stated that they do not expect oil prices to rebound to mid-2014 levels
in the near future and that Saudi Arabia is positioned to weather pressures created by low oil
prices better than other high-cost producers.9
In December 2013, an IMF official observed that significant Saudi labor force growth in the
coming decade will require “a large increase in the absorption of nationals into private sector jobs
... to avoid an increase in unemployment.” The kingdom’s investments in the education sector are
an acknowledgement of the challenges related to preparing the large Saudi youth population to
compete and prosper in coming decades. It also is possible that a more educated and
economically engaged youth population could make new social or political reform demands as

7 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Finance, “Press Release: Recent Economic Developments and Highlights of
Fiscal Years 1435/1436 (2014) & 1436/1437 (2015),” December 25, 2014.
8 Jay Solomon and Summer Said, “Why Saudis Decided Not to Prop Up Oil, In American Shale Oil, A Perceived
Threat to OPEC Market Share,” Wall Street Journal, December 21, 2014.
9 Steven Mufson, “How low can oil prices go? Welcome to the oil market’s old normal,” Washington Post
Wonkblog Online, January 12, 2015.
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well. In this regard, recent U.S. efforts to expand the number of Saudi students enrolled in U.S.
colleges and universities may have cumulative economic, social, and political effects in future
decades. According to U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Joseph Westphal, as of mid-2014 there
were more than 83,000 young Saudi men and women studying at U.S. universities and colleges.10
Gender Issues, Minority Relations, and Human Rights
The late King Abdullah recognized women’s right to vote and stand as candidates in 2015
municipal council elections and expanded the size of the national Shura Council to include 30
women in the current session. These moves, while controversial in the kingdom, have been seen
by some outsiders as signs that managed, limited political and social reforms are possible. Many
gender-rights issues remain subject to domestic debate and international scrutiny: Saudi women
continue to face restrictions on travel and employment; male guardianship rules continue to
restrict their social and personal autonomy; and Saudi officials regularly detain, fine, or arrest
individuals associated with protests by advocates for Saudi women’s right to drive automobiles
and travel freely.
The most recent (2013) U.S. State Department report on human rights in the kingdom identifies
“a lack of equal rights for women” in the kingdom, and states that, despite conditions in which
“discrimination based on widespread gender segregation excluded women from many aspects of
public life ... women increasingly participated in political life, albeit with significantly less status
than men did.” In April 2015, King Salman removed the highest-ranking female government
minister, Deputy Education Minister Norah al Faiz. The kingdom also confirmed that upcoming
municipal elections would allow women to vote and stand as candidates for the first time, in line
with a change announced by King Abdullah.
Periodic clashes involving the Shia minority in the oil-rich Eastern Province (see Ash Sharqiyah
in Figure 1 above) and low-level protests by students and families of security and political
detainees create continuing strains on public order and overall stability. Saudi authorities continue
to pursue a list of young Shia individuals wanted in connection with protests and clashes with
security forces in the Eastern Province. Saudi courts have handed down lengthy jail terms and
travel bans for Shia protestors and activists accused of participating in protests and attacking
security force personnel. A Saudi security force officer was killed at a checkpoint in the Eastern
Province in December 2014, and another officer was killed and others injured in reported gun
battles in the province in April 2015. Tensions have been high in light of ongoing protests by
some Shiite residents of the region, the death sentence given to opposition Shiite cleric Nimr al
Nimr on terrorism and incitement charges in October 2014, and an Islamic State-linked attack
described below.
Saudi authorities also have moved to restrict the activities of groups and individuals advocating
for political change and campaigning on behalf of individuals detained for political or security
reasons, including advocates for the rights of terrorism suspects. In March 2013, Saudi authorities
convicted two prominent human rights activists and advocates for detainee rights, Mohammed al
Qahtani and Abdullah al Hamid, on a range of charges, including “breaking allegiance” to the
king.11 Some young Saudis who have produced social media videos criticizing the government

10 Abdul Hannan Tago, “King’s scholarship program takes U.S. ties to a new level,” Arab News (Jeddah) May 9, 2014.
11 According to Amnesty International, the defendants were convicted on charges including “breaking allegiance to and
disobeying the ruler, questioning the integrity of officials, seeking to disrupt security and inciting disorder by calling
(continued...)
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and socioeconomic conditions in the kingdom have reportedly been arrested. At the same time,
the late King Abdullah moved to restrict and redefine some of the responsibilities and powers of
the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, often referred to by non-
Saudis as “religious police,” in response to public concerns.
A series of other prominent arrests and public punishments have attracted attention to contentious
social and human rights issues in recent months. Women’s rights activists Loujain Hathloul and
Maysa al Amoudi were detained at the Saudi-UAE border in December for attempting to drive
and publicizing their efforts and detention using social media. Their cases were referred to the
Specialized Criminal Court (also referred to as the terrorism court), where cases involving those
accused of “undermining social cohesion” are tried. Both were released in February 2015. In
January 2015, Saudi blogger Raif Badawi began receiving public flogging punishments following
his conviction for “insulting Islam,” a charge levied in response to Badawi’s establishment of a
website critical of certain Saudi religious figures and practices. Badawi was sentenced in May
2014 to 1,000 lashes (to be administered in 20 sessions of 50 lashes) and 10 years in prison. After
the first session, his subsequent punishments were delayed for medical reasons, and the case has
caused disruptions in Saudi Arabia’s bilateral relationships with some European governments
pressing for Badawi’s release.
Terrorism Threats and Bilateral Cooperation
The Saudi Arabian government views Al Qaeda, its affiliates, other Salafist-Jihadist groups, and
their supporters as direct threats to Saudi national security and has taken increased action since
2014 to prevent Saudis from travelling abroad in support of extremist groups or otherwise
supporting armed extremists. The aggressive expansion of the terrorist insurgent group known as
the Islamic State in neighboring Iraq and in Syria has raised Saudi Arabia’s level of concern about
the group, and may be leading the Saudis to seek stronger partnerships with the United States,
select Syrian opposition forces, Iraqi Sunnis, and select regional countries. Saudi leaders also
seek regional and U.S. support for their efforts to confront what they describe as Iranian efforts to
destabilize Yemen through support for the Ansar Allah/Houthi movement (see “Saudi Military
Campaigns and Policy in Yemen” below).
Recent State Department reports have credited the Saudi government with working to preserve “a
strong counterterrorism relationship with the United States” characterized by “enhanced bilateral
cooperation.”12 Saudi and U.S. officials have stated that Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP), based in Yemen and led by Saudi nationals, constitutes the leading terrorist threat to the
kingdom. The State Department has assessed that AQAP has “continued its efforts to inspire
sympathizers to support, finance, or engage in conflicts outside of Saudi Arabia and encouraged
individual acts of terrorism within the Kingdom.”13 In July 2014, AQAP reportedly attacked a
remote Saudi-Yemeni border checkpoint, killing and wounding Saudi security officers. It is
unclear whether the Islamic State may pose an even greater ideological and security threat to the
kingdom’s stability.

(...continued)
for demonstrations, disseminating false information to foreign groups and forming an unlicensed organization.”
Amnesty International, “Saudi Arabia punishes two activists for voicing opinion,” March 11, 2013.
12 U.S. State Department Bureau of Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, April 2014.
13 Ibid.
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The Islamic State and Related Security Issues
The late King Abdullah’s January 2015 address to the consultative Shura Council (delivered at the
time by now-King Salman) cited “extremely sensitive and delicate international and regional
conditions” and pledged to continue the kingdom’s uncompromising approach to those seeking to
undermine security and unity in Saudi Arabia. Attacks on border personnel and facilities
(presumably by Islamic State fighters) along the Iraqi border in July 2014 and January 2015 drew
new attention to the threat of potential infiltration and attacks from violent extremists in Iraq.
Saudi officials linked the Islamic State to an attack on Saudi Shiites in the Eastern Province
village of Dalwa in November 2014 that killed 8 people and wounded 13 others. Security forces
detained more than 75 people in connection with the attack, including dozens who had been
imprisoned in the past or were facing trial for terrorism charges. Following the attack, Islamic
State leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi released a message threatening the kingdom and calling on the
group’s supporters there to attack Shiites, Saudi security forces, and foreigners.14 Shootings of
police officers in Riyadh in 2015 have been linked by Saudi authorities to Saudi Islamic State
supporters. In May 2014, the Saudi Interior Ministry estimated that at least 1,200 Saudis had
travelled to fight in Syria, and some independent estimates suggest the figure may be more than
2,500 Saudis.15
The April 2015 arrest of more than 90 Saudi and foreign suspects in connection with alleged IS
plots drew new attention to the potential for IS-related terror attacks in the kingdom. According to
Saudi officials, some among those arrested planned to attack the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh. U.S.
diplomatic facilities closed temporarily in March 2015 in connection with possible attack
information. As noted above, U.S. officials continue to warn of the potential for attacks on U.S.
persons and facilities in the kingdom, along with other Western and Saudi targets.
Saudi military forces are listed as participants in coalition air strike operations against the Islamic
State in Syria, and Saudi officials have agreed to host aspects of a new U.S. training program for
vetted Syrian opposition members and other vetted Syrians. Saudi officials may prefer that efforts
to expand training and assistance focus on increasing pressure on pro-Asad forces rather than on
defending opposition-held areas. On the diplomatic front, Saudi officials have welcomed Iraqi
government officials in Riyadh following the change in leadership from Nouri al Maliki to
Hayder al Abbadi in Baghdad, and Saudi Arabia has renewed plans to reopen its embassy in Iraq.
Saudi officials have offered more than $500 million in humanitarian assistance to displaced
Iraqis, and some regional media outlets speculate that the kingdom may offer expanded assistance
to Iraqi Sunni tribal fighters organized to fight the Islamic State under the auspices of the
Baghdad government’s planned operations in Al Anbar Province.

14 Baghdadi said, “O sons of al Haramayn [the two holy mosques]...O people of tawhid [monotheism]... O people of
wala’ and bara’ [allegiance and disavowal]... the serpent’s head and the stronghold of the disease are beside you. Thus,
draw your swords and break their sheaths. Divorce the Dunya [world], for there will be no security nor rest for Al Salul
[derogatory term for the Saudi royal family] and their soldiers after today. There is no place for the mushrikin
[polytheists] in the peninsula of Mohammed. Draw your swords. Deal with the rafidah [Rejectionists, derogatory term
for Shiites] first, wherever you find them, then Al Salul and their soldiers before the Crusaders and their bases. Deal
with the rafidah, Al Salul, and their soldiers. Dismember their limbs. Snatch them as groups and individuals. Embitter
their lives and make them occupied with themselves instead of us. Be patient and do not hasten. Soon—in sha’allah
[God willing]—the vanguards of the Islamic State will reach you.” U.S. Government Open Source Center Report
TRR2014111361251279, “ISIL Amir Al-Baghdadi Accepts Pledges of Allegiance, Announces 'Expansion' to Saudi
Arabia, Yemen, Twitter in English, Arabic November 13, 2014.
15 Richard Barrett, Foreign Fighters in Syria, The Soufan Group, June 2014.
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Terrorist Financing and Material Support: Concerns and Responses
According to U.S. government sources, financial support for terrorism from Saudi individuals
likely remains a serious threat to the kingdom and the international community, even though the
Saudi government has “affirmed its commitment to combating terrorist fundraising and sought to
further establish itself as a regional leader in disrupting terrorist finance efforts.”16 Saudi
authorities have forbidden Saudi citizens from travelling to Syria to fight and have taken steps to
limit the flow of privately raised funds from Saudis to armed Sunni groups and charitable
organizations in Syria. Nevertheless, references by some Saudi officials and clerics to genocide
against Syrian Sunnis and foreign invasion by Iran and Hezbollah may contribute to apparent
popular perceptions of the crisis in Syria as one that demands action by Saudi individuals.
In January 2014, the kingdom issued a decree setting prison sentences for Saudis who may be
found to have travelled abroad to fight with extremist groups, including tougher sentences for any
members of the military who may be found to have done so. The decree was followed by the
release in March of new counterterrorism regulations under the auspices of the Ministry of
Interior outlawing support for terrorist organizations including Al Qaeda and the Islamic State as
well as organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood.17 The regulations have drawn scrutiny and
criticism from human rights advocates concerned about further restrictions of civil liberties.
In August 2014, Saudi Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdelaziz bin Abdullah bin Mohammed Al al Shaykh
declared “the ideas of extremism ... and terrorism” to be the “first enemies of Muslims,” and
stated that all efforts to combat Al Qaeda and the Islamic State were required and allowed
because those groups “consider Muslims to be infidels.”18 The statement, coupled with state
crackdowns on clerics deviating from the government’s anti-terrorism messaging, appears to
signal the kingdom’s desire to undercut claims by the Islamic State, Al Qaeda, and their followers
that support for the groups and their violent attacks is religiously legitimate.
In conjunction with the government’s expanded efforts to dissuade Saudi citizens from supporting
the Islamic State and other extremist groups, Saudi security entities continue to arrest cells of
individuals suspected of plotting attacks, recruiting, or fundraising for terrorist groups. In addition
to the arrests noted above, in May 2014, security officers announced the arrest of more than 60
individuals as part of what they described as an active terrorist cell with ties to Yemen and Syria,
and, in August 2014, officials reportedly raided a small community northwest of the capital in
pursuit of individuals suspected of recruiting Saudis to join the Islamic State abroad. On

16 Ibid. According to a March 2014 State Department report, “Bulk cash smuggling from individual donors and Saudi-
based charities has reportedly been a major source of financing to extremist and terrorist groups over the past 25 years.
With the advent of tighter bank regulations, funds are reportedly collected and illicitly transferred in cash, often via
pilgrims performing Hajj and Umrah. Despite serious and effective efforts to counter the funding of terrorism
originating from within its borders, entities in Saudi Arabia likely continue to serve as sources of cash flowing to
Sunni-based extremist groups. Some Saudi officials acknowledge difficulty in following the money trail with regard to
illicit finance due to the preference for cash transactions in the country and the regulatory challenge posed by hawalas.
Recent turmoil in Syria and the expanding usage of social media have allowed charities outside of Saudi Arabia with
ties to extremists to solicit donations from Saudi donors, a trend that is proving difficult to stop.” U.S. State
Department, 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR)—Volume II: Money Laundering and
Financial Crimes Country Database, March 2014.
17 Saudi Ministry of Interior, List of the Security and Intellectual Prohibitions for the Citizens and Residents, Saudi
Press Agency, March 7, 2014.
18 OSC Report IML2014081943429793, “Saudi Grand Mufti Issues Statement Saying ISIL, Al-Qa'ida Are ‘Khawarij,’
‘Primary Enemies’ of Islam,” Al Sharq (Dammam), August 19, 2014.
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September 1, the kingdom announced the arrest of 88 people suspected of involvement in active
terrorist plots, 59 of whom reportedly had been arrested in the past on terrorism related charges.
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Saudi Arabia
The Obama Administration requests appropriations of a small amount of International Military
Education and Training assistance funding for Saudi Arabia (approximately $10,000) in its annual
budget requests. This nominal amount makes Saudi Arabia eligible for a substantial discount on
the millions of dollars of training it purchases through the Foreign Military Sales program.19 The
Administration’s FY2016 budget request includes the nominal amount and notes that the program
and the related discounts result in increased Saudi participation in U.S. training, opportunities to
promote purchases of U.S. weaponry, and improved Saudi capabilities.
In the past, Congress enacted prohibitions on IMET and other foreign assistance to Saudi Arabia
in annual appropriations legislation, subject to waiver provisions, and the Bush and Obama
Administrations subsequently issued national security waivers enabling the assistance to
continue. Saudi officials have been privately critical of the congressional prohibitions and appear
to prefer to avoid contentious public debate over U.S. foreign assistance, arms sales, and security
cooperation. The overwhelmingly Saudi-funded nature of U.S. training reflects Saudi Arabia’s
ability to pay for the costly programs. It may also point to a shared view among Saudi leaders and
successive U.S. Administrations that U.S.-funded training programs for Saudis would be more
vulnerable to potential congressional scrutiny and pressure.
Arms Sales and Security Training
A series of high-value U.S. proposed arms sales to Saudi Arabia have been announced in the
wake of the 2010 announcement that the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) would reconstitute and
expand its main fighter forces with advanced U.S. F-15 aircraft (see Table 1 below). The F-15
sale will perpetuate the reliance of the RSAF (the elite military service in the country) on material
and training support provided by the U.S. military and U.S. defense contractors.
The RSAF sale and others will guide the immediate future of the United States Military Training
Mission (USMTM) in Saudi Arabia and the Saudi Arabian National Guard Modernization
Program (PM- SANG), which have been active under special bilateral agreements and funded by
Saudi purchases since the 1950s and 1970s, respectively. The sales would considerably improve
Saudi military capabilities, and appear to be seen by decision makers in both countries as
symbolic commitments to cooperation during a period of generational leadership change.


19 The Administration argues that the discount supports continued Saudi participation in U.S. training programs and this
participation supports the maintenance of important military-to-military relationships and improves Saudi capabilities.
The conference report for H.R. 3288 (H.Rept. 111-366) required the Administration to report to Congress within 180
days (by June 14, 2010) on the net savings this eligibility provides to Saudi Arabia and other IMET recipients.
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Table 1. Proposed Major U.S. Defense Sales to Saudi Arabia
October 2010 to October 2014, $ billion
Recipient
Estimated
Formal Notification Date
System
Force
Cost
October 2010
F-15 Sales, Upgrades, Weaponry and Training
RSAF
$29.400
October 2010
APACHE, BLACKHAWK, AH-6i, and MD-530F Helicopters
SANG
$25.600
October 2010
APACHE Longbow Helicopters
RSLF
$3.300
October 2010
APACHE Longbow Helicopters
Royal Guard
$2.200
November 2010
JAVELIN Missiles and Launch Units

$0.071
May 2011
Night Vision and Thermal Weapons Sights
RSLF
$0.330
June 2011
CBU-105D/B Sensor Fuzed Weapons
RSAF
$0.355
June 2011
Light Armored Vehicles

$0.263
June 2011
Light Armored Vehicles
SANG
$0.350
September 2011
Howitzers, Fire Finder Radar, Ammunition, HMMWVs

$0.886
October 2011
Up-Armored HMMWVs
RSLF
$0.033
December 2011
PATRIOT Systems Engineering Services

$0.120
August 2012
RSAF Fol ow-on Support
RSAF
$0.850
August 2012
Link-16 Systems and ISR Equipment and Training
RSAF
$0.257
November 2012
C-130J-30 Aircraft and KC-130J Air Refueling Aircraft
RSAF
$6.700
November 2012
RSLF Parts, Equipment, and Support
RSLF
$0.300
November 2012
PATRIOT (PAC-2) Missiles Recertification
RSADF
$0.130
June 2013
SANG Modernization Program Extension
SANG
$4.000
July 2013
Mark V Patrol Boats
RSNF
$1.200
August 2013
RSAF Fol ow-on Support
RSAF
$1.200
October 2013
U.S. Military Training Mission (USMTM) Program Support Services
MOD
$0.090
October 2013
SLAM-ER, JSOW, Harpoon Block II, GBU-39/B Munitions
RSAF
$6.800
November 2013
C4I System Upgrades and Maintenance
RSNF
$1.100
December 2013
TOW 2A and 2B Missiles
RSLF
$0.170
December 2013
TOW 2A and 2B RF Missiles
SANG
$0.900
April 2014
Facilities Security Forces- Training and Advisory Group (FSF-TAG) Support Services
MOI
$0.080
August 2014
AWACS Modernization
RSAF
$2.000
October 2014
Patriot Air Defense System with PAC-3 enhancement

$1.750
Total


$90.435
Source: U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).
Notes: Includes proposed sales to Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF), Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG), Royal
Saudi Land Forces (RSLF), Royal Guard, Royal Saudi Air Defense Force (RSADF), Royal Saudi Naval Forces
(RSNF), Ministry of Interior (MOI), and Ministry of Defense (MOD). Dashes indicate unspecified recipient force
in DSCA public notice.

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U.S.-Saudi counterterrorism and internal security cooperation has expanded since 2008, when a
bilateral technical cooperation agreement was signed establishing a U.S.-interagency critical
infrastructure protection advisory mission to the kingdom. Modeled loosely on embedded
advisory and technology transfer programs of the U.S.-Saudi Joint Commission for Economic
Cooperation, the Office of the Program Manager-Ministry of Interior (OPM-MOI) is a Saudi-
funded, U.S.-staffed senior advisory mission that provides embedded U.S. advisors to key
industrial, energy, maritime, and cyber security offices within the Saudi government. In parallel to
these ministry advisory efforts, the United States Military Training Mission also oversees a Saudi-
funded Training and Advisory Group supporting the Ministry of Interior’s Facilities Security
Force (FSF-TAG), which protects key infrastructure locations.
Consensus and Contention in Regional Affairs
Close U.S.-Saudi security cooperation continues in parallel with apparent U.S.-Saudi differences
of strategic opinion on some regional security threats and over some preferred responses.
President Obama’s March 2014 visit to Riyadh occurred in the midst of rising international
speculation about reportedly growing differences between U.S. and Saudi leaders on key issues,
most notably the conflict in Syria, Iran’s nuclear program, and U.S. policy toward Egypt. Many of
those issues—in addition to political-military developments in Yemen and campaigns against the
Islamic State and other violent extremists—remain prominent in on the U.S.-Saudi policy agenda.
Saudi Arabia and Iran
Iran’s regional policies and nuclear program are the focal point for many of Saudi Arabia’s
current security concerns and thus are a focal point for Saudi-U.S. cooperation and debate.
Statements by some Saudi leaders suggest that they see Iran’s policies as part of an expansionist,
sectarian agenda aimed at empowering Shia Muslims in the region at the expense of Sunnis.
Iranian leaders attribute similarly sectarian motives to their Saudi counterparts and remain critical
of GCC cooperation with the United States. Saudi leaders are particularly critical of Iranian
support for the government of Bashar al Asad in Syria, where Saudi Arabia supports anti-Asad
groups and favored U.S. military intervention in response to chemical weapons use by pro-Asad
forces in August 2013. Saudi support for the Sunni monarchy in Bahrain and antipathy toward
former Iraqi prime minister Nuri al Maliki and pro-Iranian Shia militia reflects similar Saudi
suspicion of Iranian intentions and the sympathies of broader Shia communities. Saudi leaders
also have been critical of U.S. attempts to pressure Bahraini leaders to accommodate the demands
of Bahrain’s largely Shia opposition. Although Yemen’s Zaydi Shia population differs markedly
in its beliefs, background, and makeup from larger Twelver Shia populations in Iran and the
kingdom, Saudi Arabia nevertheless has described the predominantly Zaydi Ansar Allah/Houthi
movement as partner of Iran’s in a plot to destabilize Yemen and the kingdom (see below).
Saudi officials have responded relatively positively to agreements associated with U.S. and other
P5+1 members’ negotiation with Iran over its nuclear program, while remaining skeptical of
Iran’s intentions. The Saudi cabinet described the 2013 interim nuclear agreement with Iran as
a primary step towards a comprehensive solution to the Iranian nuclear program, as long as
good intentions are provided and as long as it concludes in a Middle East and Gulf region
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free of all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. The Kingdom hopes that
such a step will be followed by more important steps leading to a guarantee of the right for
all countries in the region to peacefully use nuclear energy.20
Saudi leaders have used a similar formulation in response to the March 2015 announcement that a
political framework had been agreed to for reaching a final agreement with Iran, but have
emphasized the broader context of concern that they have about Iranian regional policies:
On the framework agreement that was reached in the city of Lausanne, Switzerland, between
the major powers and Iran over its nuclear program, the Council of Ministers expressed hope
that a final, binding and definitive agreement would be reached leading to the strengthening
of security and stability in the region and the world. The cabinet renewed support by the
kingdom for peaceful solutions based on ensuring the right of states of region in the peaceful
use of nuclear energy in accordance with the standards and procedures of the International
Atomic Energy Agency and under its supervision and in line with the Arab League's decision
aimed at making the Middle East and the Arab Gulf region free of all weapons of mass
destruction, including nuclear weapons. In this regard, the cabinet stressed that the
promotion of security and stability in the region requires a commitment to the principles of
good neighborliness and non-interference in the internal affairs of the Arab countries and
respect of their sovereignty.21
On March 24, 2015, then-Foreign Minister Prince Saud al Faisal said Saudi Arabia viewed the
negotiations as a means to limit a potential threat to regional and international security,
“particularly in light of the aggressive policies pursued by Iran in the region and ongoing
interventions in the affairs of the Arab countries and its endeavors to stir up sectarian conflict.”22
He further said, “It is not possible to grant Iran deals which it does not deserve in contrast.”
Many observers speculate about how Saudi Arabian leaders would respond to an outcome of
negotiations with Iran that they viewed as inadequate or any perceived failings by Iran or the
United States to live up to their commitments as outlined in a final agreement. Specifically,
analysts continue to debate whether the kingdom would seek to acquire its own nuclear weapons
capability or a formal nuclear guarantee if Iran moved toward creating a nuclear weapon or
retained the capability to do so without sufficient constraints or warning. Saudi officials also may
fear that closer U.S.-Iranian relations could undermine the basis for close Saudi-U.S. relations
and empower Iran to be more assertive in the Gulf region and the broader Middle East. Saudi-
Iranian differences over Syria and Iraq and U.S. policy debates over solutions to conflicts there
may be critical in this regard.
Saudi Military Campaigns and Policy in Yemen
Saudi Arabia has long exercised a strong role in Yemen, seeking to mitigate potential threats to
the kingdom through liaison relationships and security interventions. Saudi officials expressed
increasing concern about developments in Yemen over the course of 2014, as the Saudi and GCC-
backed transition process stalled and an alliance of northern Yemen-based insurgents and forces
loyal to former president Ali Abdullah Saleh grew more aggressive in their attempts to coerce

20 Saudi Cabinet Statement, November 25, 2013.
21 Saudi Cabinet Statement, April 6, 2015.
22 Saudi Arabian Foreign Ministry, Foreign Minister Prince Saud al Faisal’s Introductory Remarks to the Joint Press
Conference with British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond, March 24, 2015.
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transitional President Abed Rabbo Mansour al Hadi.23 Some analysts have viewed Saudi support
for President Hadi and the transition since 2011 as a hedge against potential threats to Saudi
interests posed by a broad range of Yemeni political forces and armed movements, including the
ousted Saleh and his disgruntled supporters; the northern Yemen-based, Zaydi Shiite Ansar Allah
movement (Partisans of God, aka Houthi movement);24 the tribal and Sunni Islamist supporters of
the Islah (Reform) movement; and armed Salafi-jihadists, including Al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula.25 Saudi air, ground, and border forces fought Houthi militia members in late 2009 in a
campaign that ejected Houthi fighters who had crossed the Saudi border, but failed to defeat the
movement or end the potential threat it posed to Saudi interests in Yemen.
In mid-2014, pro-Saleh and Houthi forces took control of the Yemeni capital, Sana’a, and, in late
September, they continued military operations in contravention of an agreed power-sharing
arrangement with the Hadi government. In response, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al Faisal
warned the U.N. General Assembly that the conflict in Yemen would “undoubtedly escalate and
threaten the security and stability at the regional and international levels, and “could even reach a
stage of no return regardless of the efforts and resources used to avoid such a situation.”26 In
October 2014, the U.S. State Department encouraged Yemenis to implement the September
agreement peacefully and called for an inclusive resumption of the transition.27
Houthi forces’ unwillingness to withdraw from the capital and unilateral moves by Houthi leaders
and Saleh supporters to circumvent Hadi’s authority precipitated a crisis that culminated in the
outbreak of renewed conflict and Hadi’s resignation and de facto house arrest in January 2015.
Houthi leaders announced a new governance plan in February and in March launched an
offensive against pro-Hadi forces in central and southern Yemen, prompting the Saudi Foreign
Minister to decry “the serious escalation in Yemen—carried out by an Al Houthi militia coup
against constitutional legitimacy.”28 Days later, as Houthi forces advanced on the southern city of
Aden, Saudi Arabia and members of a coalition launched air strikes in response to a specific
request from President Hadi “to provide instant support by all necessary means, including
military intervention to protect Yemen and its people from continuous Houthi aggression and
deter the expected attack to occur at any hour on the city of Aden and the rest of the southern
regions, and to help Yemen in the face of Al Qaeda and ISIL.”29

23 For background on Yemen, its transition process, conflict there, and U.S. Policy, see CRS Report RL34170, Yemen:
Background and U.S. Relations
, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
24 The Ansar Allah movement is a predominantly Zaydi Shiite revivalist political and insurgent movement that formed
in the northern province of Sa’da in 2004 under the leadership of members of the Al Houthi family. It originally sought
an end to what it viewed as efforts to marginalize Zaydi communities and beliefs, but its goals grew in scope and
ambition in the wake of the 2011 uprising and government collapse to embrace a broader populist, anti-establishment
message. Members of its Zaydi Shiite base of support are closer in their beliefs to Sunni Muslims than most other
Shiites, and some Yemeni observers argue that the motives of the Houthi movement are evolving to include new
political and social goals that cannot be explained strictly in sectarian terms. Skeptics highlight the movement’s
ideological roots, its alleged cooperation with Iran, and the slogans prominently displayed on its banners: “God is
great! Death to America! Death to Israel! Curse the Jews! Victory to Islam!”
25 See, for example, International Crisis Group, “The Huthis: From Saada to Sanaa,” June 10, 2014.
26 Statement of His Royal Highness Prince Saud Al-Faisal, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Before the United ·Nations General Assembly, 69th Regular Session, September 27, 2014.
27 Office of the State Department Spokesperson, Taken Question on Yemen, Washington, DC, October 31, 2014.
28Minister of Foreign Affairs Stresses Depth of Historical and Strong Relations Between Saudi Arabia and Britain
29 Text of Hadi request letter in “GCC statement: Gulf countries respond to Yemen developments,” The National
(UAE), March 26, 2015.
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The Obama Administration announced its support for Hadi and the provision of logistical and
intelligence support to GCC-led military operations “in support of GCC actions to defend against
Houthi violence.” A joint U.S.-Saudi planning cell also was established to coordinate the
provision of military and intelligence support for the campaign, and the provision of U.S.
assistance reportedly has been adjusted over time to allow for U.S. vetting of Saudi-chosen
targets.30 Ansar Allah leader Abdel Malik Al Houthi has lashed out at the Saudi-led operation as
“aggression” against Yemenis and blamed the United States, alleging: “The Americans determine
targeting of every child, residential compound, house, home, shop, market, or mosque targeted in
this country. They determined for the Saudi regime the targets to hit. Then, they supervised and
ran the striking operation. Therefore, the Saudi regime is a soldier and servant of the
Americans.”31 Press reports citing unnamed U.S. officials suggest that U.S. advice and assistance
has been intended to support the Saudi campaign, but to limit its potential scope and duration. In
one discussion about the campaign with King Salman, the leaders discussed “the importance of
responding to the humanitarian needs of the Yemeni people.”32
A Saudi military spokesman indicated that the immediate goals of Operation Storm of
Determination (also called Decisive Storm in media accounts) were focused on eliminating
specific potential military threats emanating from Yemen. Initial air strikes targeted ballistic
missiles, air defense systems, Houthi formations near the Saudi border, command and control
elements, and air force infrastructure seized by Houthi and pro-Saleh forces. More broadly, Saudi
authorities stated that the campaign’s goals included “ensuring the return of the state to extend its
authority over all Yemeni territories, the return of the arms to the state, and non-threatening of the
security of neighboring states.”33 The Saudi military stated “the ultimate aim” was “to restore the
legitimate government of Yemen to power.”34
Some international observers viewed these goals as overly ambitious for an air-only campaign
and questioned the likelihood that the Saudi-led, U.S.-facilitated strikes could achieve those
outcomes directly.35 As the campaign continued, reports of civilian casualties and displacement,
advances by AQAP forces, and persistence by the Houthis and their pro-Saleh allies fueled some
international criticism of Saudi policy.36 Saudi officials blamed their adversaries for reported
civilian deaths and announced a shift in their goals and operations on April 22, stating that
specific threat targets had been eliminated and the goals of their initial operation had been
achieved. Saudi officials said that a new operation, named Restoring Hope, would focus on
efforts to support a return to negotiations and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
U.S. officials welcomed the announcement and said “we look forward to a shift from military
operations to the rapid, unconditional resumption of all-party negotiations” and to the operational

30 Maria Abi-Habib and Adam Entous, “U.S. Widens Role in Saudi-led Campaign Against Houthi Rebels in Yemen,”
Wall Street Journal, April 12, 2015.
31 OSC Report IMN2015042022777830, “Yemen: Top Huthi Leader Says Israel, US Play Role in Saudi ‘Aggression,’
Vows To Counter ‘Invasion,’” Al-Masirah TV (Beirut) April 19, 2015.
32 The White House, Readout of the President’s Call with King Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud of Saudi Arabia, April
17, 2015.
33 Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques Chairs Cabinet's Session, March 30, 2015.
34 MD Al Sulami: "Operation To Continue Till Goals Achieved,” Arab News (Jeddah), March 27, 2015.
35 Maria Abi-Habib and Adam Entous, “U.S. Widens Role in Saudi-led Campaign Against Houthi Rebels in Yemen,”
Wall Street Journal, April 12, 2015.
36 Ahmed Al Omran, Asa Fitch, and Adam Entous, “Saudi-Led Coalition Announces End of Yemen Military
Operation,” Wall Street Journal, April 21, 2015.
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shift “significantly increasing the opportunities for international and Yemeni humanitarian
organizations to access and deliver assistance to the Yemeni people.”37
Nevertheless, Saudi military operations continued to strike Houthi and pro-Saleh positions across
Yemen in the wake of the announcement. On April 24, a Saudi military spokesman told Egyptian
media that the Houthis and others had misunderstood the implications of the announced
operational shift: Saudi strikes were continuing, he stated, because the Houthis and others had
made military advances following the Saudi announcement that it would respond to any such
advances against pro-Hadi forces. According to the spokesman, “there will not be any military
operations, unless the Houthi militias carry out movements on the ground.”38 United Nations
Security Council Resolution 2216 (April 2015) demands that the Houthis “immediately and
unconditionally” end the use of violence and urges all parties to agree to conditions that will
allow for an end to violence and the resumption of “inclusive” U.N.-brokered talks.
Egypt and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
With regard to Egypt, Saudi Arabia was critical of what it described as a U.S. failure to back a
longtime ally when former President Hosni Mubarak initially came under pressure to resign in
2011. The Saudis later embraced the Egyptian military’s July 2013 ouster of the elected
government led by Mohammed Morsi, who was affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, and
offered billions of dollars in financial assistance to the military-backed government. Some Saudi
officials publicly promised to replace any U.S. assistance withheld in protest of the military’s
actions. Some leading Saudi clerics defied the government’s embrace of the Egyptian military’s
move, illustrating the potential for rifts among the government, some members of the religious
establishment, and their respective supporters. Saudi financial and political support to Morsi’s
successor and his government have continued, and King Salman sought and obtained Egyptian
support for Saudi military operations in Yemen, although as of late April 2015, no large-scale
Egyptian military deployments in conjunction with the Saudi operations had been reported.
Shared antipathy to the Iranian government’s policies, parallel cooperation with the United States,
and shared terrorism concerns do not appear to have contributed to closer Saudi-Israeli ties in
recent years. Saudi Arabia remains a vocal advocate for the Palestinian cause and statements by
Saudi officials are routinely critical of Israeli policy. Nevertheless, the late King Abdullah
remained committed to the terms of the peace initiative he put forward under the auspices of the
Arab League in 2002, which calls for normalization of Arab relations with Israel if Israel were to
(1) withdraw fully from the territories it occupied in 1967, (2) agree to the establishment of a
Palestinian state with a capital in East Jerusalem, and provide for the (3) “[a]chievement of a just
solution to the Palestinian Refugee problem in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution
194.”39

37 Statement by NSC Spokesperson Bernadette Meehan, April 22, 2015.
38 OSC Report IMN2015042541340921, “Egypt: Decisive Storm Spokesman Says Military Operations in Yemen
Decided Based on Huthis' Movements,” Al-Qahirah wa al-Nas (Cairo), April 24, 2015.
39 In April 2013, representatives of the Arab League agreed that land swaps could be an element of a conflict-ending
agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. However, in early 2014, Arab foreign ministers reportedly informed
Secretary of State John Kerry that they will “not accept Israel as a Jewish state nor compromise on Palestinian
sovereignty in Jerusalem.” Elhanan Miller, “Arab ministers back Abbas in rejecting ‘Jewish’ Israel,” Times of Israel,
January 13, 2014.
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However, Saudi authorities vociferously criticized Israeli conduct during the summer 2014 Gaza
war with Hamas, condemning what they described as “Israeli inhuman aggression” and pledging
Saudi support “to the Palestinian brothers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to alleviate the
difficult conditions in which they live because of the Israeli aggression and terrorism.”40 Saudi
Arabia supports the international recognition of a Palestinian state and full Palestinian
membership at the United Nations. Following a November 20, 2013, meeting with Palestinian
Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, then-Crown Prince and now-King Salman bin Abdelaziz
released a statement renewing:
the kingdom’s firm stance in support of the Palestinian cause until the Palestinian people
regain all their occupied territories, including Al-Quds [Jerusalem]. The Crown Prince
expressed the kingdom’s condemnation of all Israeli plans to build settlements, stressing that
these schemes constitute an obstacle to peace, a flagrant violation of the resolutions of
international legitimacy, and a blatant attack on the firm legitimate rights of the Palestinian
people.41
In response to March 2015 statements by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that cast
doubt on Netanyahu’s support for a “two state solution” to the conflict, then-Foreign Minister
Saudi al Faisal said,
The Kingdom considered the Prime Minister [of] the Zionist entity’s statements and
commitments regarding not establishment of the Palestinian state in his era as a flagrant
challenge to the international will and principles of its legitimacy, resolutions and
agreements. In this regard, the international community should fulfill its responsibilities
towards these aggressive policies if we really want to reach a just, comprehensive and lasting
solution to the conflict, restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and
establishment of an independent and viable state.42
On April 6, the Saudi cabinet welcomed the International Criminal Court’s acceptance of “the
State of Palestine as a full member,” saying it “strengthens its presence in the international field
to preserve the rights of the Palestinian people.” Saudi authorities declined a seat on the United
Nations Security Council in October 2013, citing their views of its “double standards” and
general “inability to carry out its duties and assume its responsibilities.” Saudi officials have
called for “profound and comprehensive reform” of the Council, including “abandoning the veto
system or restricting its use” and “expanded membership of the Council that includes permanent
seats for Arab States, African States and other under-represented groups.”43
U.S.-Saudi Trade and Energy Issues
Saudi Arabia remained the largest U.S. trading partner in the Middle East in 2014.44 According to
the U.S. International Trade Administration, Saudi exports to the United States in 2013 were

40 Saudi Press Agency (Riyadh), Deputy Crown Prince Chairs Cabinet’s Session, August 18, 2014.
41 Saudi Press Agency, “Crown Prince Receives Palestinian President,” November 20, 2013.
42 Saudi Arabian Foreign Ministry, Foreign Minister Prince Saud al Faisal’s Introductory Remarks to the Joint Press
Conference with British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond, March 24, 2015.
43 Statement of Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations, November 8, 2013.
44 Comparable 2014 figures for Israel, the second-largest U.S. trading partner in the Middle East, were more than $23
billion in exports to the United States and more than $15 billion in U.S. exports to Israel. U.S. exports to the United
Arab Emirates in 2014 are estimated at more than $22.1 billion.
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worth more than $47 billion (up more than $25 billion from 2009 but below the 2008 figure of
$54.8 billion). In 2014, U.S. exports to Saudi Arabia were valued at more than $18.6 billion
(down slightly from 2013, but up roughly $8 billion since 2009). To a considerable extent, the
high value of U.S.-Saudi trade is dictated by U.S. imports of hydrocarbons from Saudi Arabia and
U.S. exports of weapons, machinery, and vehicles to Saudi Arabia. Fluctuations in the volume
and value of U.S.-Saudi oil trade account for declines in the value of Saudi exports to the United
States in some recent years. Declines in global oil prices from their early 2014 highs have had a
pronounced effect on the value of Saudi exports to the United States.
Since Saudi Arabia remains dependent on oil export revenues for much of its national budget,
these trends have been viewed with some mild public and official concern in the kingdom. Rising
demand in South and East Asia is expected to compensate for declining oil imports in North
America in coming years, and Saudi officials appear committed to preserving and expanding their
share of Asian oil markets. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, as of mid-
April 2015, Saudi Arabia was the second-largest source of U.S crude oil imports, providing about
1.1 million barrels per day (mbd) of the 7.53 mbd in gross U.S. crude imports, behind only
Canada.45 As of 2013, oil exports to the United States accounted for roughly 15% of Saudi
exports, with East Asia accounting for more than 68%.46
In early 2015, Saudi Arabia produced an average of more than 10 mbd of its estimated 12.5 mbd
capacity and had indicated that it may not expand that capacity in light of current trends in
international oil markets. In August 2014, Saudi Aramco’s chief executive outlined the company’s
plans for future investment, saying, “Although our investments will span the value chain, the bulk
will be in upstream, and increasingly from offshore, with the aim of maintaining our maximum
sustained oil production capacity at twelve million barrels per day, while also doubling our gas
production.”47
By some estimates, the volume of oil consumed in Saudi Arabia may exceed oil exports by 2030
if domestic energy consumption patterns do not change.48 Some analysts have suggested that
Saudi leaders could avoid the risks posed by this scenario by adopting “tough policy reforms in
areas such as domestic pricing of energy and taxation, an aggressive commitment to alternative
energy sources, especially solar and nuclear power, and increasing the Kingdom’s share of global
oil production.”49 However, subsidy changes and taxation are viewed as politically sensitive given
the lack of popular representation in the kingdom’s government. In July 2014, International
Monetary Fund (IMF) directors said, “an upward adjustment in energy prices would support a
strong fiscal position and the efficient use of energy. The price adjustment should be well-planned
and communicated, while ensuring that vulnerable groups are not adversely affected.”50

45 Based on EIA data – “Weekly Imports & Exports: Crude” and “Weekly Preliminary Crude Imports by Country of
Origin – Four Week Average,” April 10, 2015.
46 EIA Country Analysis Brief—Saudi Arabia, February 2013.
47 Arab News (Jeddah), “Saudi Aramco CEO: Oil industry ‘needs timely investments,’” August 26, 2014.
48 Glada Lahn and Paul Stevens, Burning Oil to Keep Cool: The Hidden Energy Crisis in Saudi Arabia, Chatham
House (UK), December 2011; and, John Sfakianakis, “Saudi Arabia’s Essential Oil,” Foreign Affairs, January 8, 2014.
49 Brad Bourland and Paul Gemble, “Saudi Arabia’s coming oil and fiscal challenge,” Jadwa Investments, July 2011.
50 IMF 2014 Article IV Consultation with Saudi Arabia, Press Release No. 14/356, July 21, 2014.
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Outlook
As described above, Saudi Arabia has close defense and security ties with the United States
anchored by long-standing military training programs and supplemented by ongoing high-value
weapons sales and new critical infrastructure security cooperation and counterterrorism
initiatives. These ties would be difficult and costly for either side to fully break or replace. The
rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria presents new shared risks and new opportunities for
expanded security partnership. King Salman has warned of the shared threat posed by the Islamic
State and has called for joint action to combat it. Nevertheless, differences in preferred tactics and
methods may continue to complicate bilateral coordination on regional security issues, including
on action against the Islamic State and other terrorist groups. Saudi officials have expressed
frustration with some recent U.S. policy decisions and pursued an independent course on some
issues, but, at present, leaders on both sides of the bilateral relationship appear fundamentally
committed to maintaining U.S.-Saudi partnership.
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Appendix. Historical Background
The modern kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the third state established in the Arabian Peninsula since
the end of the 18th century based on the hereditary rule of members of the Al Saud family. In the
mid-18th century, a local alliance developed between the Al Saud and the members of a
puritanical Sunni Islamic religious movement led by a cleric named Mohammed ibn Abd Al
Wahhab. The Saudi-Wahhabi alliance built two states in the Arabian Peninsula during the next
century that eventually collapsed under pressure from outside powers and inter- and intra-family
rivalries.
During the first quarter of the 20th century, an Al Saud chieftain named Abd al Aziz ibn Abd al
Rahman Al Saud (commonly referred to as Ibn Saud) used force to unify much of the Arabian
Peninsula under a restored Al Saud state. Ibn Saud’s forces overcame numerous tribal rivals with
the support of an armed Wahhabi contingent known as the Ikhwan (or brotherhood), and, at times,
with the financial and military backing of the British government. By 1932, King Abd al Aziz and
his armies had crushed an Ikhwan revolt, consolidated control over most of the Arabian
Peninsula, and declared the establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Six of Ibn Saud’s sons—Kings Saud, Faisal, Khaled, Fahd, Abdullah, and Salman—have
succeeded him as rulers of the Saudi kingdom during the subsequent eight decades. This era has
been dominated by the development and export of the kingdom’s massive oil resources and the
resulting socioeconomic transformation of the country. A series of agreements, statements by
successive U.S. Administrations, arms sales, military training arrangements, and military
deployments have demonstrated a strong U.S. security commitment to the Saudi monarchy since
the 1940s. That security commitment was built on shared economic interests and antipathy to
Communism and was tested by regional conflict during the Cold War. It has survived the
terrorism-induced strains of the post-Cold War era relatively intact, and appears poised to
continue as recently concluded arms sales to Saudi Arabia—the largest in U.S. history—are
implemented.

Author Contact Information

Christopher M. Blanchard

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
cblanchard@crs.loc.gov, 7-0428


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