Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Coordinator
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Mark E. Manyin
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Ian E. Rinehart
Analyst in Asian Affairs
Rebecca M. Nelson
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
Brock R. Williams
Analyst in International Trade and Finance
April 23, 2015
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33436
Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress
Summary
Japan is a significant partner for the United States in a number of foreign policy areas,
particularly in U.S. security priorities, which range from hedging against Chinese military
modernization to countering threats from North Korea. The alliance facilitates the forward
deployment of about 50,000 U.S. troops and other U.S. military assets based in Japan. In addition,
Japan’s participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) talks increases the credibility and
viability of the proposed trade pact, which is a core component of Obama Administration efforts
to “rebalance” U.S. foreign policy priorities toward the Asia-Pacific region.
After years of turmoil, Japanese politics has entered a period of stability with the December 2012
and December 2014 election victories of current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP). The Japanese constitution does not require new elections until 2018.
The LDP’s recent election may have given Abe some political capital to pursue the more
controversial initiatives of his agenda, such as joining the proposed TPP trade pact and increasing
the Japanese military’s capabilities and flexibility. The political continuity in Tokyo has allowed
Abe to reinforce his agenda of revitalizing the Japanese economy and boosting the U.S.-Japan
alliance, both goals that the Obama Administration has actively supported.
On the other hand, comments and actions on controversial historical issues by Abe and his
Cabinet have raised concern that Tokyo could upset regional relations in ways that hurt U.S.
interests. Abe is known for his strong nationalist views. Abe’s approach to issues like the so-
called “comfort women” forced prostitutes from the World War II era, Japanese history textbooks
that critics claim whitewash Japanese atrocities, visits to the Yasukuni Shrine that honors Japan’s
war dead and includes Class A war criminals, and statements on territorial disputes in the Sea of
Japan and the East China Sea are all ongoing points of tension in the region. To many U.S.
observers, Abe brings both positive and negative qualities to the alliance, at once bolstering it but
also renewing historical animosities that could disturb the regional security environment. The
upcoming 70th anniversary of the end of World War II could be a sensitive time for Asia as Japan
and other countries reflect on a difficult period that remains politically potent today.
U.S.-Japan defense cooperation has improved and evolved in recent decades as the allies adjust to
new security challenges, such as the ballistic missile threat from North Korea and the
confrontation between Japan and China over disputed islets. In April 2015, the United States and
Japan updated their bilateral defense guidelines to modernize security cooperation and improve
the speed and flexibility of alliance coordination during contingencies. The Abe Cabinet’s 2014
decision to relax Japan’s prohibition on participating in collective self-defense activities could
allow the Japanese military to play a greater role in global security, but domestic legislation is
needed for implementation. Despite overcoming a major hurdle in 2013 to relocate the
controversial Futenma base on Okinawa, many local politicians and activists are opposed to the
plans to realign U.S. forces.
Japan is one of the United States’ most important economic partners. Outside of North America, it
is the United States’ second-largest export market and second-largest source of imports. Japanese
firms are the United States’ second-largest source of foreign direct investment, and Japanese
investors are the largest foreign holders of U.S. treasuries. Japan, the United States, and 10 other
countries are participating in the TPP free trade agreement negotiations. If successful, the
negotiations could reinvigorate a bilateral economic relationship by addressing long-standing,
difficult issues in the trade relationship. On the other hand, failure to do so could set back the
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relationship. If a TPP agreement is reached, Congress must approve implementing legislation
before it would take effect in the United States.
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Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress
Contents
Recent Developments ...................................................................................................................... 1
Abe Visits Washington............................................................................................................... 1
Revised Mutual Defense Guidelines Announced ...................................................................... 2
Regional Relations and Upcoming Anniversary........................................................................ 2
Possible Endgame for TPP Negotiations ................................................................................... 3
Opposition to U.S. Base Relocation in Okinawa ....................................................................... 4
Japan’s Foreign Policy and U.S.-Japan Relations ............................................................................ 6
Abe and Historical Issues .......................................................................................................... 6
Yasukuni Shrine .................................................................................................................. 7
Comfort Women Issue ......................................................................................................... 8
Territorial Dispute with China ................................................................................................... 8
China’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) .................................................................... 10
Japan and the Korean Peninsula .............................................................................................. 10
Japan’s Ties with South Korea .......................................................................................... 10
Shifts in Japan’s North Korea Policy ................................................................................ 11
Renewed Relations with India, Australia, and ASEAN ........................................................... 11
Japan-Russia Relations ............................................................................................................ 12
International Child Custody Disputes...................................................................................... 12
U.S. World-War II-Era Prisoners of War (POWs) ................................................................... 13
Energy and Environmental Issues .................................................................................................. 14
Nuclear Energy Policy ............................................................................................................. 15
U.S. Exports of Liquefied National Gas (LNG) to Japan ........................................................ 16
Japanese Participation in Sanctions on Iran ............................................................................ 17
Alliance Issues ............................................................................................................................... 18
Revised Mutual Defense Guidelines ....................................................................................... 20
Collective Self-Defense ........................................................................................................... 21
Realignment of the U.S. Military Presence on Okinawa ......................................................... 21
Marine Corps Realignment to Guam................................................................................. 23
Burden-Sharing Issues ............................................................................................................. 23
Extended Deterrence ............................................................................................................... 24
Economic Issues ............................................................................................................................ 25
Overview of the Bilateral Economic Relationship .................................................................. 25
Abenomics ............................................................................................................................... 26
Emphasis on “Womenomics” ............................................................................................ 28
Bilateral Trade Issues .............................................................................................................. 28
Japan and the Proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) ............................... 28
Debates about Exchange Rates and “Currency Manipulation” ......................................... 30
Japanese Politics ............................................................................................................................ 31
The Stabilization of Japanese Politics Around the LDP .......................................................... 31
The DPJ and Alternative Political Forces ................................................................................ 32
Structural Rigidities in Japan’s Political System ..................................................................... 32
Japan’s Demographic Challenge ............................................................................................. 33
Selected Legislation ....................................................................................................................... 33
113th Congress ......................................................................................................................... 33
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Figures
Figure 1. Map of Japan .................................................................................................................... 5
Figure 2. Map of U.S. Military Facilities in Japan ........................................................................ 19
Figure 3. Host Nation Support for USFJ ....................................................................................... 24
Figure 4. Party Affiliation in Japan’s Lower House of Parliament ................................................ 31
Figure 5. Party Affiliation in Japan’s Upper House of Parliament ................................................ 32
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Merchandise Trade with Japan, Selected Years ....................................................... 25
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 35
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Recent Developments
Abe Visits Washington
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is scheduled to address a joint meeting of Congress on April
29, becoming the first Japanese leader to do so. His address is part of an eight-day visit to the
United States, including a summit with President Obama and a state dinner at the White House.
The visit is expected to focus heavily on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations as well
as expanded security cooperation in the alliance.
Since they took over the reins of government in December 2012, Abe and his Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP) have consolidated political power. Most recently, Abe in December 2014 led the
LDP victory in elections for the Lower House of Japan’s Parliament (called the Diet). These
results likely will perpetuate the weakness of Japan’s opposition parties and the dominance of the
LDP, Japan’s main conservative party and the ruling party for nearly all of the past 60 years. As a
result of the December election, the Lower House does not have to be dissolved again until 2018.
It is expected that Abe will continue to have both a positive and negative impact on the U.S.-
Japan relationship, at once bolstering it but also testing it by renewing historical animosities with
China and South Korea that could disturb the regional security environment. (See “Japan’s
Foreign Policy and U.S.-Japan Relations” section below for more.)
History of Japanese Dignitaries Addressing Congress
When Prime Minister Shinzo Abe addresses a joint meeting of Congress on April 29, it will be the 117th such speech
by a foreign leader or dignitary. Although Abe will be the first Japanese prime minister to address both chambers
simultaneously, as shown by the list below, other Japanese officials have addressed either the House or the Senate
individual y, a practice that used to be far more common. For more background, see CRS Report IN10236, Foreign
Heads of State Addressing Congress, by Jacob R. Straus.
•
1872: On March 6, Ambassador Tomomi Iwakura, a minister and leader of Japan’s early Meiji government,
addressed the House;
•
1917: Ambassador and former Minister of Foreign Affairs Kikujiro Ishii addressed the Senate on August 30 and
the House on September 5;
•
1950: Member of the Japanese Diet (legislature) Chojiro Kuriyama addressed the Senate on July 28. Three days
later, Diet member Tokutaro Kitamura addressed the House;
•
1951: Diet Members Tadao Kuraishi and Aisuke Okamoto addressed the Senate on July 2; Diet member Zentaro
Kosaka addressed the Senate on August 23;
•
1954: Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida gave brief remarks to the Senate on November 12;
•
1957: Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi (current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s grandfather) spoke to the Senate and
then to the House on June 20;
•
1961: on June 22, Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda gave brief remarks to the Senate and then addressed the House.1
In 2006, many government officials and analysts expected Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to be invited to
address a joint meeting, in part to recognize the close cooperation between the Koizumi and George W. Bush
governments. However, according to an account by a former staffer to former Chairman of the House International
1 Congressional Directory, “Joint Sessions and Meetings, Addresses to the Senate or the House, and Inaugurations,”
available at http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/four_column_table/Joint_Sessions.htm (click the Joint
Sessions and Meetings, Addresses to the Senate or the House, and Inaugurations link at the bottom of the page).
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Relations Committee Henry Hyde, plans for the meeting were dropped after the publication of a letter from Hyde to
Speaker Dennis Hastert expressing concerns about Koizumi’s annual visits to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine.2 At
the time, Shinzo Abe served as Prime Minister Koizumi’s Chief Cabinet Secretary, arguably the second-most
important post in the Japanese government.
Revised Mutual Defense Guidelines Announced
In late April 2015, the United States and Japan announced the revision of their Mutual Defense
Guidelines (MDG), the culmination of a process that began in late 2013. The MDG outlines how
the U.S. and Japanese militaries interact in peacetime and in war as the basic framework for
defense cooperation based on a division of labor. The United States and Japan first codified the
MDG in 1978 and then updated the guidelines in 1997, after their main security concerns had
shifted from the Soviet Union to regional hotspots like the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan
Strait. The new MDG accounts for developments in military technology, improvements in
interoperability of the U.S. and Japanese militaries, and the complex nature of security threats in
the 21st century. For example, the MDG addresses bilateral cooperation on cybersecurity, the use
of space for defense purposes, and ballistic missile defense, none of which were mentioned in the
1997 guidelines.
The expanded scope of U.S.-Japan security cooperation in the new guidelines is a result of a
deepening alliance partnership. For Washington and Tokyo, this incremental entanglement brings
both opportunities and risks. The new guidelines for the defense of Japan’s outlying islands may
deter China from an adventurous attempt to seize territory, but they also have the effect of making
it nearly impossible for Washington to avoid entanglement in a Japan-China conflict surrounding
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (see “Territorial Dispute with China” section below). Conversely, the
Abe Administration’s decision to enable collective self-defense (see section “Collective Self-
Defense”) will facilitate Japan’s involvement in more U.S. conflicts, in more significant ways.
The Japanese military would be able to defend U.S. vessels and aircraft, provide non-combat
logistical support to U.S. troops, and engage in minesweeping operations during a war.
Regional Relations and Upcoming Anniversary
With the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II approaching in August 2015, there is
increased attention to the historical issues that have dogged Japan’s relationship with its
neighbors. International audiences will be watching closely on how Abe handles the upcoming
commemorations. At his first press conference of 2015, Abe pledged that his government would
uphold the 1995 Murayama Statement that apologized for the suffering caused by Japan during
the war. Abe also indicated that his government would issue its own statement “expressing
remorse” for the war, setting off speculation in the region that the planned document may stop
short of a forthright apology.
Prime Minister Abe and South Korean President Park Geun-hye have not yet held a bilateral
summit, though they have met on several occasions, and Chinese President Xi Jinping’s brief
meeting with Abe in November was the leaders’ first since both took office in 2012 (they held
2 Dennis Halpin, “Korea Scores a Milestone with President Park’s Address to U.S. Congress,” Korea Chair Platform,
Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 14, 2013. The House International Relations Committee is now
called the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
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another short meeting on April 23). Leaders in Seoul and Beijing were outraged by Abe’s
December 2013 visit to Yasukuni Shrine, a Shinto shrine established to “enshrine” the “souls” of
Japanese soldiers who died during war, but that also includes 14 individuals who were convicted
as Class A war criminals after World War II. South Korea has criticized the Abe Administration’s
moves that appear to downplay the Imperial Japanese government’s involvement in the “comfort
women” system, referring to the thousands of women recruited to provide sex to Japanese
soldiers. Critics claim that the Abe government has attempted to change the prevailing
understanding that Japan coerced the women into sexual slavery.
Possible Endgame for TPP Negotiations3
Japan has been negotiating a potential free trade agreement (FTA) with the United States since it
became the 12th and latest country to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) talks in July 2013.
From a U.S. perspective, Japan’s participation greatly increased the economic significance of the
potential FTA, but also introduced a number of challenges into the TPP negotiations, particularly
in the areas of auto and agricultural trade. Addressing these sensitive bilateral issues will be
important for the conclusion of the broader 12-country talks, which negotiators contend is
“coming into focus.” A number of factors may affect the speed at which these issues are resolved.
Abe’s December 2014 electoral victory may give him more leverage to make the politically
difficult decisions necessary to conclude the TPP talks. In addition, Japan’s continued slow
growth, including the dip into economic recession in 2014, could create greater impetus for
concluding the TPP as a pro-growth strategy, although it could also shift the Japanese
government’s focus to other domestic economic issues, including ongoing fiscal challenges.
Abe’s U.S. visit could also be an action-forcing event for the conclusion of the bilateral
negotiations, though Japanese government officials have raised doubts that conclusion is possible
in such short order.4 If negotiations proceed much into the summer, some argue that U.S.
congressional consideration of the agreement could be impacted by the 2016 presidential
elections, as certain domestic procedures must be completed after the negotiations conclude but
before Congress votes on the agreement.5
Ultimately, Congress would be required to approve implementing legislation if a completed TPP
agreement is to apply to the United States. During the TPP negotiating process, Congress has a
formal and informal role in influencing U.S. negotiating positions. The Obama Administration
contends that it has been negotiating the TPP as if trade promotion authority (TPA), which
expired in 2007, were in force, including through consultation with and notifications to Congress.
TPA is the authority that allows for trade agreements negotiated by the President to receive
expedited legislative consideration if congressional negotiating objectives are followed. Some
observers contend that the absence of TPA has contributed to Japan’s reluctance to put forward its
best offers in the TPP negotiations—without TPA in place the TPP agreement could be subject to
amendment when considered by Congress, and Prime Minister Abe may be reluctant to offer
politically painful concessions without greater certainty that the Obama Administration can gain
congressional support for them. The Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability
3 For more on the TPP negotiations, see CRS Report R42694, The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Negotiations and
Issues for Congress, coordinated by Ian F. Fergusson.
4 “Tokyo Says Don't Expect TPP Deal at Summit,” The Oriental Economist Alert, April 20, 2015.
5 Ibid.
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Act of 2015, which would renew TPA, was introduced in the House (H.R. 1890) and Senate (S.
995) on April 17 and 16, respectively.6 (See “Bilateral Trade Issues” section for more details.)
Opposition to U.S. Base Relocation in Okinawa
Japanese politicians who oppose the relocation of a U.S. Marine Corps base within Okinawa won
all major elections in Okinawa in late 2014. The incumbent governor of Okinawa, Hirokazu
Nakaima, lost the November gubernatorial election to a former ally, Takeshi Onaga, a
conservative who ran on a platform opposed to the controversial base relocation. Nakaima had
approved construction of an offshore landfill necessary to build the replacement facility for
Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma. The new facility, located in the sparsely populated
Henoko area of Nago City, would replace the functions of MCAS Futenma, located in the center
of a now crowded town in southern Okinawa. In the December nationwide Diet elections,
opposition party candidates won in all of Okinawa’s four districts, including the first victory in a
single-seat constituency for a Japanese Communist Party politician in nearly 20 years. The Abe
Administration’s forceful promotion of the Futenma base relocation within Okinawa reportedly
was a major factor in the defeat of LDP candidates.7
The new governor, Onaga, has vowed to work toward canceling the planned base relocation, and
in March 2015 he requested that the Japanese central government cease work on the offshore
landfill. Although the governor’s legal and administrative capability to block construction is
limited—Tokyo rejected the stop-work order—his stance seems to have galvanized the anti-base
civic movement on Okinawa.8 Regular protests that are larger and more vocal than in the past
have created complications for construction at the Henoko site, a sign that Okinawa’s political
environment could make it difficult for Tokyo to implement the base relocation as planned. (See
“Realignment of the U.S. Military Presence on Okinawa” section for background information and
further discussion.)
The broader realignment of the U.S. Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam received a boost from
the passage of the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 113-291). Section 2821 of
the act allows the Department of Defense to proceed with its planned military construction for the
realignment on Guam, including the expenditure of Japanese government funds allocated for that
purpose. Although challenges remain, especially those related to civilian infrastructure on Guam,
Congress’s removal of previous restrictions on military construction should facilitate the Marine
Corps realignment and the reduction of the U.S. military presence on Okinawa.
6 For more on TPA, see CRS Report RL33743, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and the Role of Congress in Trade
Policy, by Ian F. Fergusson; CRS Report R43491, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA): Frequently Asked Questions, by
Ian F. Fergusson, Richard S. Beth, and William H. Cooper; and CRS In Focus IF10038, Trade Promotion Authority
(TPA), by Ian F. Fergusson.
7 “LDP Suffers Crushing Defeat in Okinawa, a Blow to Base Relocation,” Asahi Shimbun, December 17, 2014.
8 Matthew M. Burke and Chiyomi Sumida, “Okinawa Protests Intensify as Futenma Relocation Construction Begins,”
Stars and Stripes, April 5, 2015.
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Figure 1. Map of Japan
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.
Japan Country Data
Population: 127.1 million
Percentage of Population over 64: 25% (U.S. = 12.4%)
Life Expectancy: 84 years
Area: 377,835 sq km (slightly smal er than California)
Per Capita GDP: $37,100 (2013 est.) purchasing power parity
Primary Export Partners: China 18.1%, U.S. 17.8%, South Korea 7.7%, Thailand 5.5%, Hong Kong 5.1% (2012)
Primary Import Partners: China 21.3%, U.S. 8.8%, Australia 6.4%, Saudi Arabia 6.2%, UAE 5.0%, South Korea
4.6%, Qatar 4.0% (2012)
Yen: Dollar Exchange Rate: 97.44 (2013 est.), 79.42 (2012 est.), 79.81 (2011 est.), 87.78 (2010 est.)
Source: CIA, The World Factbook, September 2014.
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Japan’s Foreign Policy and U.S.-Japan Relations
The U.S.-Japan relationship is broad, deep-seated, and stable. Regionally, Tokyo and Washington
share the priorities of managing relations with a rising China and addressing the North Korean
threat. Globally, the two countries cooperate on scores of multilateral issues, from nuclear
nonproliferation to climate negotiations. In 2014, Japan contributed significantly to the
international humanitarian responses to the conflict in Syria and the outbreak of Ebola.
The return of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to power in late 2012, led by
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, has stabilized Japanese politics. The LDP coalition controls both
chambers of the Japanese parliament, known as the Diet, with no elections required until 2018.
This period of expected stability follows a prolonged stretch of divided government from 2007
until 2012, when six different men served as Prime Minister, each for about one year.
The consolidation of power around Abe and his conservative base in the LDP has both positive
and negative implications for the United States. On the one hand, the combination of political
continuity in Tokyo and Abe’s implementation of many policies that the United States favors have
provided a much firmer foundation for U.S.-Japan cooperation and planning on a wide range of
regional matters. Specifically, Abe has taken steps to break the logjam on the realignment of U.S.
forces in Japan, increased Japan’s diplomatic and security presence in East Asia, and brought
Japan into the 12-nation Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade negotiations that include the
United States. He has also moved aggressively to accelerate the slow economic growth that has
characterized the economy for much of the past two decades. Simultaneously, however, Abe and
his government may have jeopardized U.S. interests in the region by taking steps that aggravate
historical animosities between Japan and its neighbors, particularly China and South Korea.
Abe and Historical Issues
Historical issues have long colored Japan’s relationships with its neighbors, particularly China
and South Korea, which argue that the Japanese government has neither sufficiently “atoned” for
nor adequately compensated them for Japan’s occupation and belligerence in the early 20th
century. Abe’s selections for his cabinets include a number of politicians known for advocating
nationalist, and in some cases ultra-nationalist, views that many argue appear to glorify Imperial
Japan’s actions.
During a previous year-long stint as prime minister in 2006-2007, Abe was known for his
nationalist rhetoric and advocacy for more muscular positions on defense and security matters.
Some of Abe’s positions—such as changing the interpretation of Japan’s constitution to allow for
Japanese participation in collective self-defense—were largely welcomed by U.S. officials eager
to advance military cooperation. Other statements, however, suggest that Abe embraces a
revisionist view of Japanese history that rejects the narrative of Imperial Japanese aggression and
victimization of other Asians. He has been associated with groups arguing that Japan has been
unjustly criticized for its behavior as a colonial and wartime power. Among the positions
advocated by these groups, such as Nippon Kaigi Kyokai, are that Japan should be applauded for
liberating much of East Asia from Western colonial powers, that the 1946-1948 Tokyo War
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Crimes tribunals were illegitimate, and that the killings by Imperial Japanese troops during the
1937 “Nanjing massacre” were exaggerated or fabricated.9
In his first term in 2006-2007, Abe took a generally pragmatic approach to regional relations and
had some success at the time mending poor relations with Seoul and Beijing. During his second
term, Abe has demonstrated an inconsistent pattern of making, and then at least partially
recanting, controversial statements that upset China and South Korea. In April 2013, he made
comments to the Diet that suggested that his government would not re-affirm the apology for
Japan’s wartime actions issued by then-Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama in 1995. The
Murayama Statement is regarded as Japan’s most significant official apology for wartime acts.
Through his spokesperson, Abe later said, “during the wars of the 20th century, Japan caused
tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian
nations ... this understanding is an understanding that the Abe Cabinet shares with previous
cabinets.”10 From the earliest days of the Abe Administration, his chief spokesman has said that
the Abe government will abide by the Murayama Statement. Similar treatment was given to the
1993 Kono Statement (see “Comfort Women Issue” section below); an official inquiry into its
drafting seemed to undermine the legitimacy of the apology, even as the Chief Cabinet Secretary
pledged to uphold the statement.
Yasukuni Shrine
The controversial Yasukuni Shrine has been a flashpoint for regional friction over history. The
Tokyo shrine was established to house the spirits of Japanese soldiers who died during war, but
also includes 14 individuals who were convicted as Class A war criminals after World War II. The
origins of the shrine reveal its politically charged status. Created in 1879 as Japan’s leaders
codified the state-directed Shinto religion, Yasukuni was unique in its intimate relationship with
the military and the emperor.11 The Class A war criminals were enshrined in 1978; since then, the
emperor has not visited the shrine, and scholars suggest that it is precisely because of the
criminals’ inclusion. Adjacent to the shrine is the Yushukan, a war history museum, which to
many portrays a revisionist account of Japanese history that at times glorifies its militarist past.
In December 2013, Prime Minister Abe paid a highly publicized visit to Yasukuni Shrine, his first
since becoming prime minister. Response to the visit, which had been discouraged in private by
U.S. officials, was uniformly negative outside of Japan. Unusually, the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo
directly criticized the move, releasing a statement that said, “The United States is disappointed
that Japan’s leadership has taken an action that will exacerbate tensions with Japan’s
neighbors.”12 Since then, sizeable numbers of LDP lawmakers, including three Cabinet ministers,
have periodically visited the Shrine on ceremonial days, including the sensitive date of August 15,
the anniversary of Japan’s surrender in World War II. The Japanese politicians say that they go to
Yasukuni to pay respects to the nation’s war dead, as any national leaders would do. Some
politicians and observers have suggested that the Chidorigafuchi National Cemetery, which
9 See, for instance, Asia Policy Point, The Abe Administration Cabinet 2012-2014, August 2, 2014.
10 Press conference by the Chief Cabinet Secretary, May 8, 2013, at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/tyoukanpress/
201305/08_a.html.
11 John Breen, ed., Yasukuni, the War Dead and the Struggle for Japan’s Past (New York: Columbia University Press,
2008).
12 “Statement on Prime Minister Abe’s December 26 Visit to Yasukuni Shrine,” U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, Japan,
December 26, 2013, http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20131226-01.html.
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houses the remains of unidentified Japanese killed in World War II, could serve as an alternative
place to honor Japan’s war dead. In October 2013, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel paid their respects at Chidorigafuchi. Abe attended a
ceremony at Chidorigafuchi (and not Yasukuni Shrine) on August 15, 2014, and has paid his
respects at Chidorigafuchi on other occasions in 2013 and 2014.
Comfort Women Issue
Other regional powers have criticized Abe’s statements on the so-called “comfort women,” who
were forced to provide sexual services for Japanese soldiers during the imperial military’s
conquest and colonization of several Asian countries in the 1930s and 1940s. In the past, Abe has
supported the claims made by many conservatives in Japan that the women were not directly
coerced into service by the Japanese military. When he was prime minister in 2006-2007, Abe
voiced doubts about the validity of the 1993 Kono Statement, an official statement issued by
then-Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono that apologized to the victims and admitted
responsibility by the Japanese military. At that time, the U.S. House of Representatives was
considering H.Res. 121 (110th Congress), calling on the Japanese government to “formally
acknowledge, apologize, and accept historical responsibility” for forcing young women into
military prostitution, Abe appeared to soften his commentary and asserted that he would stand by
the statement. (The House later overwhelmingly endorsed the resolution.)13
In the past, Abe has suggested that his government might consider revising the Kono Statement, a
move that would be sure to degrade Tokyo’s relations with South Korea and other countries.
Since the days after Abe’s election in December 2012, Abe’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide
Suga has said that the Abe government would abide by the Kono statement. However, in June
2014, in response to a request by an opposition party Diet member, the Abe government released
a study that examined the Kono Statement and concluded that it had been crafted in consultation
with Seoul, implying that the document was not based solely on historical evidence. The Abe
Cabinet did not take any steps to disavow the Kono Statement, but critics claim that the study
discredits the apology and gives further proof of Tokyo’s (and specifically Abe’s) revisionist
aims.
The issue of the so-called comfort women has gained visibility in the United States, due in part to
Korean-American activist groups. These groups have pressed successfully for the erection of
monuments commemorating the victims, passage of a resolution on the issue by the New York
State Senate, and the naming of a city street in the New York City borough of Queens in honor of
the victims.
Territorial Dispute with China
Japan and China have engaged in a struggle over islets in the East China Sea known as the
Senkakus in Japan, Diaoyu in China, and Diaoyutai in Taiwan, which has grown increasingly
heated since summer 2012. The uninhabited territory, administered by Japan but also claimed by
13 In the 113th Congress, the 2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 113-76, H.R. 3547) indirectly referred to this
resolution. P.L. 113-76’s conference committee issued a Joint Explanatory Statement that called on Federal Agencies to
implement directives contained in the July 2013 H.Rept. 113-185, which in turn “urge[d] the Secretary of State to
encourage the Government of Japan to address the issues raised” in H.Res. 121.
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China and Taiwan, has been a subject of contention for years, despite modest attempts by Tokyo
and Beijing to jointly develop the potentially rich energy deposits nearby, most recently in 2008-
2010. In August 2012, the Japanese government purchased three of the five islands from a private
landowner in order to preempt their sale to Tokyo’s nationalist governor, Shintaro Ishihara.14
Claiming that this act amounted to “nationalization” and thus violated the tenuous status quo,
Beijing issued sharp objections. Chinese citizens held massive anti-Japan protests, and the
resulting tensions led to a drop in Sino-Japanese trade. In April 2013, the Chinese foreign
ministry said for the first time that it considered the islands a “core interest,” indicating to many
analysts that Beijing was unlikely to make concessions on this sensitive sovereignty issue.
Starting in the fall of 2012, China began regularly deploying maritime law enforcement ships
near the islands and stepped up what it called “routine” patrols to assert jurisdiction in “China’s
territorial waters.”15 Chinese military surveillance planes reportedly have entered airspace that
Japan considers its own, in what Japan’s Defense Ministry has called the first such incursion in 50
years.16 Since early 2013, near-daily encounters have occasionally escalated: both countries have
scrambled fighter jets, and, according to the Japanese government, a Chinese navy ship locked its
fire-control radar on a Japanese destroyer and helicopter on two separate occasions. In November
2014, Japan and China agreed to re-start talks on establishing a maritime communication
mechanism to prevent unexpected military encounters.
U.S. administrations going back at least to the Nixon Administration have stated that the United
States takes no position on the territorial disputes. However, it also has been U.S. policy since
1972 that the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty covers the islets, because Article 5 of the treaty
stipulates that the United States is bound to protect “the territories under the Administration of
Japan” and Japan administers the islets. China’s increase in patrols appears to be an attempt to
demonstrate that Beijing has a degree of administrative control over the islets, thereby casting
into doubt the U.S. treaty commitment. In its own attempt to address this perceived gap, Congress
inserted in the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4310, P.L. 112-239) a
resolution stating, among other items, that “the unilateral action of a third party will not affect the
United States’ acknowledgment of the administration of Japan over the Senkaku Islands.” For
more information, see CRS Report R42761, Senkaku (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Islands Dispute: U.S.
Treaty Obligations, and CRS Report R42930, Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia: Issues
for Congress.
The Senkaku/Diaoyu conflict embodies Japan’s security challenges. The maritime confrontation
with Beijing is a concrete manifestation of the threat Japan has faced for years from China’s
rising regional power. It also brings into relief Japan’s dependence on the U.S. security guarantee
and its anxiety that Washington will not defend Japanese territory if Japan risks going to war with
China. Operationally, Japan has built up the capacity of its military, known as the Japan Self
Defense Forces, in the southwest part of the archipelago.
14 In April 2012, Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara announced in Washington, DC, that he intended to purchase three
of the five islets from their private Japanese owner. Ishihara, who is known for expressing nationalist views, called for
demonstrating Japan’s control over the islets by building installations on the island and raised nearly $20 million in
private donations for the purchase. In September, the central government purchased the three islets for ¥2.05 billion
(about $26 million at an exchange rate of ¥78:$1) to block Ishihara’s move and reduce tension with China.
15 “Chinese Ships Continue Patrol Around Diaoyu Island,” China Daily, October 28, 2012.
16 “Japan Scrambles Jets in Islands Dispute with China,” New York Times, December 13, 2012.
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China’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)
In November 2013, China abruptly announced that it would establish an air defense identification
zone in the East China Sea, covering the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islets as well as airspace that
overlaps with the existing ADIZs of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The move appeared to fit
with an overall pattern of China asserting territorial claims more actively in the past few years.17
China’s announcement produced indignation and anxiety in the region and in Washington for
several reasons: the ADIZ represented a new step to pressure—to coerce, some experts argue—
Japan’s conciliation in the territorial dispute over the islets; China had not consulted with affected
countries; the announcement used vague and ominous language that seemed to promise military
enforcement within the zone; the requirements for flight notification in the ADIZ go beyond
international norms and impinge on the freedom of navigation; and the overlap of ADIZs could
lead to accidents or unintended clashes, thus raising the risk of conflict in the East China Sea.
Some analysts argue that China’s ADIZ also represents a challenge to Japanese administration of
the Senkaku/Diaoyu islets, which is the basis of the U.S. treaty commitment to defend that
territory.
The United States and Japan coordinated at a high level their individual and joint responses to
China’s ADIZ announcement. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel declared that the ADIZ is a
destabilizing attempt to alter the status quo and will not change how the U.S. military conducts
operations. Two days after the announcement, the U.S. Air Force flew B-52 bombers on a planned
training flight through China’s new ADIZ without notifying China, and Japanese military aircraft
did the same soon after. However, the respective instructions of each government to commercial
airlines differed. Whereas the State Department said that the United States generally expects U.S.
commercial air carriers to follow Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs), including Chinese requests for
identification in the controversial ADIZ, Tokyo instructed Japanese commercial airlines to not
respond to Chinese requests when traveling through the ADIZ on routes that do not cross into
Chinese airspace. The discrepancy contributed to latent anxieties in Tokyo about U.S.-Japan unity
and the relative prioritization of China and Japan in U.S. policymaking.18
Japan and the Korean Peninsula
Japan’s Ties with South Korea
Japan’s relations with South Korea have been strained since 2012, a situation that spurred
President Obama to convene a trilateral meeting of heads of state on the sidelines of the Nuclear
Security Summit in The Hague in March 2014. The meeting focused on cooperation to deal with
North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, but the underlying goal appeared to be to encourage
Seoul and Tokyo to mend their frayed relations. The meeting appears to have opened the door for
the two sides to improve their relationship somewhat, leading to more frequent and higher level
bilateral meetings—up to the Foreign Ministers’ level—between March 2014 and April 2015. In
late 2014, U.S. defense officials pushed Tokyo and Seoul to sign on to a trilateral intelligence-
sharing agreement that enables Japan and South Korea to exchange information regarding North
17 For more information and analysis, see CRS Report R42930, Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia: Issues for
Congress, by Ben Dolven, Mark E. Manyin, and Shirley A. Kan.
18 Nanae Kurashige and Yoshihiro Makino, “Japan Baffled by U.S. Telling Airlines to Respect New Chinese Air
Zone,” Asahi Shimbun, December 1, 2014.
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Korea’s missile and nuclear threats. A poor relationship between Seoul and Tokyo jeopardizes
U.S. interests by complicating trilateral cooperation on North Korea policy and other regional
challenges. Tense relations also complicate Japan’s desire to expand its military and diplomatic
influence, goals the Obama Administration generally supports, as well as the creation of an
integrated U.S.-Japan-South Korea ballistic missile defense system.
As of April 2015, Abe and his South Korean counterpart, President Park Geun-hye, had yet to
hold a summit. The high-level interaction that has occurred between the two governments
frequently has been contentious, though it appears to have been less so between the fall of 2014
and spring of 2015. South Korean leaders have objected to a series of statements and actions by
Abe and his Cabinet officials that many have interpreted as denying or even glorifying Imperial
Japan’s aggression in the early 20th century. Officials in Japan refer to rising “Korea fatigue,” and
express frustration that for years South Korean leaders have not recognized and in some cases
rejected the efforts Japan has made to acknowledge and apologize for Imperial Japan’s actions.
Past overtures, including a proposal that the previous Japanese government floated in 2012 to
provide a new apology and humanitarian payments to the surviving “comfort women,” have
faltered. In addition to the comfort women issue, the perennial issues of Japanese history
textbooks and a territorial dispute between Japan and South Korea continue to periodically rile
relations. A group of small islands in the Sea of Japan, known as Dokdo in Korean and Takeshima
in Japanese (the U.S. government refers to them as the Liancourt Rocks), are administered by
South Korea but claimed by Japan. Mentions of the claim in Japanese defense documents or by
local prefectures routinely spark official criticism and public outcry in South Korea. Similarly,
Seoul expresses disapproval of some of the history textbooks approved by Japan’s Ministry of
Education that South Koreans claim diminish or whitewash Japan’s colonial-era atrocities.
Shifts in Japan’s North Korea Policy
Since 2009, Washington and Tokyo have been largely united in their approach to North Korea,
driven by Pyongyang’s string of missile launches and nuclear tests. Japan has employed a
hardline policy toward North Korea, including a virtual embargo on all bilateral trade and vocal
leadership at the United Nations to punish the Pyongyang regime for its human rights abuses and
military provocations.
In 2014, Abe appeared to adjust his approach to Pyongyang by addressing the long-standing issue
of Japanese citizens kidnapped by North Korean agents decades ago. In 2002, then-North Korean
leader Kim Jong-il admitted to the abductions and returned five survivors, claiming the others had
perished from natural causes. Since that time, Abe has been a passionate champion for the
abductees’ families and pledged as a leader to bring home all surviving Japanese. In May 2014,
back-channel negotiations between Tokyo and Pyongyang yielded an agreement by North Korea
to reopen the investigation into the remaining abductees’ fates in exchange for Japan’s relaxing
some of its unilateral sanctions. By early 2015, however, many analysts doubt that North Korea
will deliver on its promises, and forward progress in bilateral relations appeared limited.
Renewed Relations with India, Australia, and ASEAN
The Abe Administration’s foreign policy has displayed elements of both power politics and an
emphasis on democratic values, international laws, and norms. Shortly after returning to office,
Abe released an article outlining his foreign and security policy strategy titled “Asia’s Democratic
Security Diamond,” which described how the democracies of Japan, Australia, India, and the
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United States could cooperate to deter Chinese aggression on its maritime periphery.19 In Abe’s
first year in office, Japan held numerous high-level meetings with Asian countries to bolster
relations and, in many cases, to enhance security ties. Abe had summit meetings in India, Russia,
Great Britain, all 10 countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and
several countries in the Middle East and Africa. This energetic diplomacy indicates a desire to
balance China’s growing influence with a loose coalition of Asia-Pacific powers, but this strategy
of realpolitik is couched in the rhetoric of international laws and democratic values.
Abe’s international outreach has yielded mixed results. Bilateral ties with Australia are robust;
Abe’s highly publicized July 2014 visit to Canberra yielded new economic and security
arrangements, including an agreement to transfer defense equipment and technology. Overall
relations with ASEAN are also strong and provide quiet support for Japan’s increasing role in
Southeast Asia. India’s new leader, Narendra Modi, and Abe held a summit meeting soon after
Modi’s inauguration.
Japan-Russia Relations
Part of Abe’s international diplomacy push has been to reach out to Russia. Japan and the Soviet
Union never signed a peace treaty following World War II due to a territorial dispute over four
islands north of Hokkaido in the Kurile Chain, known in Japan as the Northern Territories. Both
Japan and Russia face security challenges from China and may be seeking a partnership to
counter Beijing’s growing economic and military power. Ambitious plans to revitalize relations
with Moscow, including resolution of the disputed Islands, however, have faltered. Russia’s
aggression in the Ukraine disrupted the improving relationship in 2014: Tokyo signed on to the
G7 statement condemning Russia’s action and implemented sanctions and asset freezes. Since
then, relations have chilled, yet Japan has attempted to salvage the potential breakthrough by
imposing only relatively mild sanctions despite pressure from the United States and other western
powers. At an Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) sideline meeting in November 2014,
Abe reportedly secured an agreement for Putin to visit Japan in 2015. Tokyo may face pressure
from the United States to curb any further rapprochement with Moscow due to continued tension
in the U.S.-Russia relationship.
International Child Custody Disputes
After several years of persistent but low-decibel pressure from the United States (including from
Members of Congress), in April 2014 Japan acceded to the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction. The Hague Convention sets out rules for resolving
child custody in failed international marriages. In July 2014, Congress took further action to
ensure worldwide compliance with the Hague Convention by passing the Sean and David
Goldman International Child Abduction Prevention and Return Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-150). The
law directs the U.S. government, especially the State Department, to devote additional resources
to assist “left-behind” parents and to prevent child abduction with existing authorities. P.L. 113-
150 also instructs the Secretary of State to take actions, which range from a demarche to the
suspension of U.S. development and security assistance funding, against consistently
noncompliant countries.
19 Shinzo Abe, “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond,” Project Syndicate, December 27, 2012.
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The United States reportedly has as many as 200 custody disputes with Japan.20 In the months
following Japan’s accession to the Hague Convention, the rate of reported parental child
abductions from the United States to Japan dropped significantly.21 Some experts suggest that the
provisions of the convention act as a strong deterrent. In its domestic laws, Japan only recognizes
sole parental authority, under which only one parent has custodial rights, and there is a deep-
rooted notion in Japan that the mother should assume custody. Japanese officials say that in many
cases the issue is complicated by accusations of abuse or neglect on the part of the foreign spouse,
though State Department officials dispute that claim.22 Some observers fear that, given the
existing family law system, Japanese courts may cite clauses in the Hague Convention that
prevent return of the child in the case of “grave risk.”23 Furthermore, the Hague Convention
process for repatriation of a kidnapped child will only apply to cases initiated after April 2014,
although parents in preexisting custody disputes now have a legal channel for demanding a
meeting with the child.
U.S. World-War II-Era Prisoners of War (POWs)
For decades, U.S. soldiers who were held captive by Imperial Japan during World War II have
sought official apologies from the Japanese government for their treatment. A number of
Members of Congress have supported these campaigns. The brutal conditions of Japanese POW
camps have been widely documented.24 In May 2009, the Japanese Ambassador to the United
States attended the last convention of the American Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor to
deliver a cabinet-approved apology for their suffering and abuse. In 2010, with the support and
encouragement of the Obama Administration, the Japanese government financed a
Japanese/American POW Friendship Program for former American POWs and their immediate
family members to visit Japan, receive an apology from the sitting Foreign Minister and other
Japanese Cabinet members, and travel to the sites of their POW camps. Annual trips were held in
2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014.25
In the 112th Congress, three resolutions—S.Res. 333, H.Res. 324, and H.Res. 333—were
introduced thanking the government of Japan for its apology and for arranging the visitation
program.26 The resolutions also encouraged the Japanese to do more for the U.S. POWs,
20 “U.S. Fathers Urge Japan to Comply with Child Custody Treaty,” Kyodo News Agency, March 31, 2014.
21 “Hague Reduces Child Abductions,” Yomiuri Shimbun, July 6, 2014. CRS interviews with State Department officials
in November 2014 confirmed that the rate of new U.S.-Japan custody cases declined significantly after April 2014.
22 U.S. State Department, “Press Availability on International Parent Child Abduction,” Kurt Campbell, Assistant
Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, February 2, 2010.
23 Koji Kawamura, “Japan Implements Domestic Law Concerning the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction,” Monday Business Briefing, April 4, 2014.
24 By various estimates, approximately 40% held in the Japanese camps died in captivity, compared to 1%-3% of the
U.S. prisoners in Nazi Germany’s POW camps. Thousands more died in transit to the camps, most notoriously in the
1942 “Bataan Death March,” in which the Imperial Japanese military force-marched almost 80,000 starving, sick, and
injured Filipino and U.S. troops over 60 miles to prison camps in the Philippines. For more, see out-of-print CRS
Report RL30606, U.S. Prisoners of War and Civilian American Citizens Captured and Interned by Japan in World War
II: The Issue of Compensation by Japan, by Gary Reynolds (available from the co-authors of this report).
25 For more on the program, see http://www.us-japandialogueonpows.org/. Since the mid-1990s, Japan has run similar
programs for the POWs of other Allied countries.
26 S.Res. 333 (Feinstein) was introduced and passed by unanimous consent on November 17, 2011. H.Res. 324 (Honda)
and H.Res. 333 (Honda) were introduced on June 22, 2011, and June 24, 2011, respectively, and referred to the House
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific.
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including by continuing and expanding the visitation programs as well as its World War II
education efforts. They also called for Japanese companies to apologize for their or their
predecessor firms’ use of un- or inadequately compensated forced laborers during the war.
Energy and Environmental Issues
Japan and the United States cooperate on a wide range of environmental initiatives both
bilaterally and through multilateral organizations. In April 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry
and the Japanese Foreign Minister launched a new bilateral dialogue to push for a post-2020
international agreement to combat climate change and to cooperate in advancing low-emissions
development worldwide. Japan is considered to be closely aligned with the Obama
Administration in international climate negotiations in its position that any international climate
agreement must be legally binding in a symmetrical way, with all major economies agreeing to
the same elements. The U.S. Department of Energy and Japan’s Ministry of Energy, Trade, and
Industry signed agreements in 2013 to step up civil nuclear cooperation on light-water nuclear
reactor research and development (R&D) and nuclear nonproliferation. The U.S.-Japan Bilateral
Commission on Civil Nuclear Cooperation focuses on safety and regulatory matters, emergency
management, decommissioning and environmental management, civil nuclear energy R&D, and
nuclear security. The U.S.-Japan Clean Energy Policy Dialogue (EPD) focuses on clean energy
technology and development. Tokyo and Washington also cooperate on climate issues in
multilateral and regional frameworks such as the International Energy Agency (IEA), the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Clean Energy Ministerial (CEM), the International
Energy Forum (IEF), and the East Asian Summit (EAS). However, because of the shutdown of
Japan’s nuclear reactors (see below), international observers have raised concerns about losing
Japan as a global partner in promoting nuclear safety and nonproliferation measures and in
reducing greenhouse gas emissions.27
27 Hideshi Futori, “Japan’s Role in Asia’s Nuclear Security,” Woodrow Wilson Center, February 10, 2014.
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March 2011 “Triple Disaster”
On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake jolted a wide swath of Honshu, Japan’s largest island. The quake,
with an epicenter located about 230 miles northeast of Tokyo, generated a tsunami that pounded Honshu’s
northeastern coast, causing widespread destruction in Miyagi, Iwate, Ibaraki, and Fukushima prefectures. Some
20,000 lives were lost, and entire towns were washed away; over 500,000 homes and other buildings and around
3,600 roads were damaged or destroyed. Up to half a million Japanese were displaced. Damage to several reactors
at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant complex led the government to declare a state of emergency and
evacuate nearly 80,000 residents within a 20-kilometer radius due to dangerous radiation levels.
In many respects, Japan’s response to the multifaceted disaster was remarkable. Over 100,000 troops from the Self
Defense Forces (SDF), Japan’s military, were deployed quickly to the region. After rescuing nearly 20,000 individuals
in the first week, the troops turned to a humanitarian relief mission in the displaced communities. Construction of
temporary housing began a week after the quake. Foreign commentators marveled at Japanese citizens’ calm
resilience, the lack of looting, and the orderly response to the strongest earthquake in the nation’s modern history.
Japan’s preparedness—strict building codes, a tsunami warning system that alerted many to seek higher ground, and
years of public drills—likely saved tens of thousands of lives.
Appreciation for the U.S.-Japan alliance surged after the two militaries worked effectively together to respond to
the 2011 earthquake and tsunami. Years of joint training and many interoperable assets facilitated the integrated
alliance effort. “Operation Tomodachi,” using the Japanese word for “friend,” was the first time that SDF helicopters
used U.S. aircraft carriers to respond to a crisis. The USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier provided a platform for air
operations as well as a refueling base for Japanese SDF and Coast Guard helicopters. Other U.S. vessels transported
SDF troops and equipment to the disaster-stricken areas. Communication between the allied forces functioned
effectively, according to military observers. For the first time, U.S. military units operated under Japanese command
in actual operations. Specifically dedicated liaison officers helped to smooth communication. Although the U.S.
military played a critical role, the Americans were careful to emphasize that the Japanese authorities were in the
lead.
Despite this response to the initial event, the uncertainty surrounding the nuclear reactor meltdowns and the failure
to present longer-term reconstruction plans led many to question the government’s handling of the disasters. As
reports mounted about heightened levels of radiation in the air, tap water, and produce, criticism emerged
regarding the lack of clear guidance from political leadership. Concerns about the government’s excessive
dependence on information from Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), the firm that owns and operates the
power plant, amplified public skepticism and elevated criticism about conflicts of interest between regulators and
utilities.
Nuclear Energy Policy
Japan is undergoing a national debate on the future of nuclear power, with major implications for
businesses operating in Japan, U.S.-Japan nuclear energy cooperation, and nuclear safety and
nonproliferation measures worldwide. Prior to 2011, nuclear power was providing roughly 30%
of Japan’s power generation capacity, and the 2006 “New National Energy Strategy” had set out a
goal of significantly increasing Japan’s nuclear power generating capacity. However, the policy of
expanding nuclear power encountered an abrupt reversal in the aftermath of the March 11, 2011,
natural disasters and meltdowns at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Public trust in the
safety of nuclear power collapsed, and a vocal anti-nuclear political movement emerged. This
movement tapped into an undercurrent of anti-nuclear sentiment in modern Japanese society
based on its legacy as the victim of atomic bombing in 1945. As the nation’s 52 nuclear reactors
were shut down one by one for their annual safety inspections in the months after March 2011,
the Japanese government did not restart them (except a temporary reactivation for two reactors at
one site in central Japan). Since September 2013, no reactors have been operating.
The drawdown of nuclear power generation resulted in many short- and long-term consequences
for Japan: rising electricity costs for residences and businesses; heightened risk of blackouts in
the summer, especially in the Kansai region; widespread energy conservation efforts by
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businesses, government agencies, and ordinary citizens; the possible bankruptcy of major utility
companies; and increased fossil fuel imports (see next section). The Institute of Energy
Economics, Japan, calculated that the nuclear shutdowns led to the loss of 420,000 jobs and $25
billion in corporate revenue in 2012 alone.28
The LDP has promoted a relatively pro-nuclear policy, despite persistent anti-nuclear sentiment
among the public. The Abe Administration released a Strategic Energy Plan in April 2014 that
identifies nuclear power as an “important base-load power source,” although the plan does not
provide target percentages for Japan’s ideal mix of different energy sources.29 In September 2014,
following a safety review, Japan’s Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) issued its approval to
restart two nuclear reactors operated by Kyushu Electric. Although the actual restart is still
subject to approvals by local politicians, some analysts project that the first nuclear restarts will
occur in the first quarter of 2015.30 In the coming years, the government likely will approve the
restart of many of Japan’s existing 48 nuclear reactors, but as many as half, or even more, may
never operate again. Approximately 60% of the Japanese public opposes the restart of nuclear
reactors, compared to approximately 30% in favor.31 The Abe Cabinet faces a complex challenge:
how can Japan balance concerns about energy security, promotion of renewable energy sources,
the viability of electric utility companies, the health of the overall economy, and public concerns
about safety? If Japan closes down its nuclear power industry, will it still play a lead role in
promoting nuclear safety and nonproliferation around the world?
U.S. Exports of Liquefied National Gas (LNG) to Japan
Japan imports more LNG than any other country and is a large potential market for U.S. LNG
exports. Due to the suspension of nuclear power at present, Japan has become increasingly
dependent on fossil fuels for electric power generation (see previous section). Japan imported a
record 87.5 million metric tons of LNG in 2013, with Australia, Malaysia, and Qatar the leading
suppliers. Japanese utilities have been attracted to the large difference between their oil-linked
prices for natural gas and the much lower price prevailing in North America. The lower price is
largely a result of the expansion of natural gas production from shale. For more information, see
CRS Report R42074, U.S. Natural Gas Exports: New Opportunities, Uncertain Outcomes, by
Michael Ratner et al.
As of December 2014, the Department of Energy (DOE) has approved, either fully or
conditionally, nine terminals in the continental United States to export LNG to countries with
which the United States does not have a free trade agreement (FTA).32 The first LNG export
terminal is due to come online in 2016, and other terminals will begin operations in subsequent
years, after constructing the infrastructure necessary to liquefy natural gas. Japanese energy and
trading companies have already signed contracts for delivery of LNG in 2017 with multiple U.S.
export projects. The Natural Gas Act requires that DOE issue a permit to export natural gas to
28 Masakazu Toyoda, “Energy Policy in Japan: Challenges after Fukushima,” Institute of Energy Economics, Japan,
presentation prepared for delivery on January 24, 2013.
29 “Strategic Energy Plan,” Japan Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, April 2014,
http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/en/category/others/basic_plan/pdf/4th_strategic_energy_plan.pdf.
30 Bloomberg New Energy Finance, “Japan Nuclear Restart Likely in 2015,” August 8, 2014
31 “Over Half Oppose Japan Engaging in Collective Self-Defense: Survey,” Kyodo News Agency, January 26, 2014.
“30% Approve of Raising Sales Tax to 10% as Scheduled; Cabinet Support Flat,” Nikkei, August 25, 2014.
32 Japan currently imports less than 1% of its natural gas supply from Alaska.
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non-FTA countries, including Japan, if DOE determines that such export would be in the public
interest. A DOE-commissioned study concluded in December 2012 that LNG exports would
produce net economic benefits for the United States, but the study has been controversial. Critics
of increased exports have raised concerns about the environment and higher gas prices for
domestic industries and consumers. As of December 2014, there are approximately 28 terminals
awaiting DOE approval to export LNG to non-FTA countries.
Some Members of Congress have joined the debate on LNG exports to Japan. Senator Lisa
Murkowski reportedly wrote in a letter to the Secretary of Energy, Steven Chu, “Exporting LNG,
particularly to allies that face emergency or chronic shortages, but with whom we do not have
free-trade agreements, is in the public interest.”33 On the other side of the debate, Senator Ron
Wyden, then-chairman of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, wrote in a letter
to Secretary Chu, “The shortcomings of the [DOE] study are numerous and render this study
insufficient for the Department to use in any export determination.”34 Numerous bills on the issue
were introduced in the 113th Congress. The Domestic Prosperity and Global Freedom Act (H.R.
6), introduced by Representative Cory Gardner, was passed by the House as amended on June 25,
2014. Senator Mark Udall introduced the American Job Creation and Strategic Alliances LNG
Act (S. 2083) on March 5, 2014, and then introduced S. 2274 to expedite the LNG approval
process.
Japanese Participation in Sanctions on Iran
Over the past decade, concerns over Iran’s nuclear program have led to increased scrutiny of
Japan’s long-standing trade with and investments in Iran. Japan is one of the top consumers of
Iranian oil exports, albeit now at greatly reduced volumes. As part of their efforts to enhance
economic penalties on Iran, the Bush and Obama Administrations have pushed Japan to curtail its
economic ties with Tehran. In general, although Japan has been a follower rather than a leader in
the international campaign to pressure Tehran, Japanese leaders have in recent years cooperated
with the U.S.-led effort, reducing significantly what had been a source of tension between
Washington and Tokyo during the 1990s and early 2000s. For most of the past decade Iran was
Japan’s third-largest source of crude oil imports, but it fell to sixth after sanctions took effect in
2011, and Iran accounted for only 5% of Japan’s oil imports in 2012-2013.35 Japanese firms have
withdrawn from energy sector investments in Iran, and some major companies, such as Toyota
Motors, have ceased doing business there, viewing it as a “controversial market.”
In December 2014, the Obama Administration granted Japan another six-month waiver under P.L.
112-81, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, which could have placed
strict limitations on the U.S. operations of Japanese banks that process transactions with Iran’s
Central Bank.36 Japan has reduced its imports of Iranian oil over the past several years, despite its
increased need for oil imports with the shutdown of virtually all of its nuclear power industry.
33 Geof Koss, “With Eye on Japan, Murkowski Makes Case for Gas Exports,” CQ Roll Call, January 25, 2013.
34 Office of Senator Ron Wyden, “Wyden Highlights Flaws in DOE Export Study,” press release, January 10, 2013,
http://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/wyden-highlights-flaws-in-doe-export-study-.
35 Takeo Kumagai, “Japan’s 2013 Crude Imports from Iran Drop 6% on Year to 177,414 b/d,” Platts Commodity News,
February 2, 2014.
36 State Department Press Release, “Statement on Significant Reductions of Iranian Crude Oil Purchases,” March 20,
2012. For more on Iran sanctions, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman.
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Japan’s crude oil imports from Iran fell by roughly 40% in 2012 and declined a further 6% in
2013.37 Additionally, Japan has restricted the activities of 21 Iranian banks.38
U.S. sanctions that went into effect in February 2013 pressure banks that deal with the Iranian
Central Bank to either prevent repatriation of Iran’s foreign currency (non-rial) assets or else be
frozen out of the U.S. financial system. Iran can still use the funds to finance trading activities not
covered by sanctions, but, since it runs a large trade surplus with Japan (and other Asian oil
importers), a significant portion of its oil export earnings are held in Japan and other importing
countries.39 An interim agreement on Iran’s nuclear program in November 2013 allowed for the
repatriation of $4.2 billion of Iranian foreign currency assets held abroad. The Bank of Japan
transferred the first $550 million of this sum to Iran in February 2014.
Alliance Issues
The U.S.-Japan alliance has long been an anchor of the U.S. security role in Asia. Forged in the
U.S. occupation of Japan after its defeat in World War II, the alliance provides a platform for U.S.
military readiness in the Pacific. About 50,000 U.S. troops are stationed in Japan and have the
exclusive use of approximately 90 facilities (see Figure 2). In exchange, the United States
guarantees Japan’s security, including through extended deterrence, known colloquially as the
U.S. “nuclear umbrella.” The U.S.-Japan alliance, which many believe has been missing a
strategic rationale since the end of the Cold War, may have found a new guiding rationale in
shaping the environment for China’s rise. In addition to serving as a hub for forward-deployed
U.S. forces, Japan provides its own advanced military assets, many of which complement U.S.
forces. For more information and analysis, see CRS Report RL33740, The U.S.-Japan Alliance.
37 “Corrected: Japan Nov Crude Imports from Iran Fall 20.3 Pct yr/yr—METI,” Reuters News, January 7, 2013.
38 Ministry of Economy, Industry, and Trade Press Release, “Addition of an Entity Subject to Accompanying Measures
Implemented Pursuant to the UN Resolution Against Iran,” March 13, 2012.
39 “Asian Buyers to Deepen Iranian Crude Import Cuts in 2013,” Metis Energy Insider, December 24, 2012.
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Figure 2. Map of U.S. Military Facilities in Japan
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.
Notes: MCAS is the abbreviation for Marine Corps Air Station. NAF is Naval Air Facility.
Since the early 2000s, the United States and Japan have taken significant strides to improve the
operational capability of the alliance as a combined force, despite political and legal constraints.
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Japan’s own defense policy has continued to evolve, and its major strategic documents reflect a
new attention to operational readiness and flexibility. The original, asymmetric arrangement of
the alliance has moved toward a more balanced security partnership in the 21st century, and
Japan’s decision to engage in collective self-defense may accelerate that trend. Unlike 25 years
ago, the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) are now active in overseas missions, including efforts
in the 2000s to support U.S.-led coalition operations in Afghanistan and the reconstruction of
Iraq. Japanese military contributions to global operations like counter-piracy patrols relieve some
of the burden on the U.S. military to manage security challenges. Due to the co-location of U.S.
and Japanese command facilities in recent years, coordination and communication have become
more integrated. The joint response to a 2011 tsunami and earthquake in Japan demonstrated the
interoperability of the two militaries. The United States and Japan have been steadily enhancing
bilateral cooperation in many other aspects of the alliance, such as ballistic missile defense,
cybersecurity, and military use of space. Alongside these improvements, Japan continues to pay
nearly $2 billion per year to defray the cost of stationing U.S. forces in Japan.
In late 2013, Japan released two new documents that reflect its concerns with security threats
from North Korea and the territorial dispute with China over a set of islets in the East China Sea.
The National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) emphasized Japan’s need to upgrade its
capabilities to respond to threats to its territory from ongoing Chinese incursions by purchasing a
variety of new military hardware and improving its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) capabilities. The NDPG also called for a new approach termed “Proactive Pacifism” that
involves Japan taking a greater role in international operations in concert with other countries.
The NDPG was reinforced by the release of Japan’s first-ever National Security Strategy that also
calls for Japan’s “proactive contribution to peace” and outlines a further increase in defense
spending to respond to “complex and grave national security challenges.”
Revised Mutual Defense Guidelines
In late April 2015, the United States and Japan announced the completion of the revision of their
Mutual Defense Guidelines (MDG), a process that began in late 2013. First codified in 1978 and
later updated in 1997, the MDG outlines how the U.S. and Japanese militaries will interact in
peacetime and in war as the basic framework for defense cooperation based on a division of labor.
The new MDG accounts for developments in military technology, improvements in
interoperability of the U.S. and Japanese militaries, and the complex nature of security threats in
the 21st century. For example, the MDG addresses bilateral cooperation on cybersecurity, the use
of space for defense purposes, and ballistic missile defense, none of which were mentioned in the
1997 guidelines. The new guidelines lay out a framework for bilateral, whole-of-government
cooperation in defending Japan’s outlying islands. The MDG also significantly expands the scope
of U.S.-Japan security cooperation to include defense of sea lanes and, potentially, Japanese
contributions to U.S. military operations outside East Asia. The Abe Administration is developing
legislation to implement these far-reaching defense reforms (see next section), with the intent to
secure passage of these bills in the Diet by summer 2015.
The new MDG also seeks to improve alliance coordination. The guidelines establish a standing
Bilateral Coordination Mechanism (BCM), which will involve participants from all the relevant
agencies in the U.S. and Japanese governments, as the main body for coordinating a bilateral
response to any contingency. This new mechanism removes the major “seam” between war and
peace that had inhibited alliance coordination in the past. The previous BCM only would have
assembled if there was a state of war, meaning that there was no formal organization to
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coordinate military activities in peacetime, such as during the disaster relief response to the
March 2011 disasters in northeast Japan.
Collective Self-Defense
Perhaps the most symbolically significant—and controversial—security reform of the Abe
Administration has been Japan’s potential participation in collective self-defense. Dating back to
his first term in 2006-2007, Abe has shown a determination to adjust this highly asymmetric
aspect of the alliance: the inability of Japan to defend U.S. forces or territory under attack.
According to the traditional Japanese government interpretation, Japan possesses the right of
collective self-defense, which is the right to defend another country that has been attacked by an
aggressor,40 but exercising that right would violate Article 9 of the Japanese constitution.41
However, Japan has interpreted Article 9 to mean that it can maintain a military for national
defense purposes and, since 1991, has allowed the SDF to participate in noncombat roles overseas
in a number of United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping missions and in the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq.
In July 2014, the Abe Cabinet announced a new interpretation, under which collective self-
defense would be constitutional as long as it met certain conditions. These conditions, developed
in consultation with the LDP’s dovish coalition partner Komeito and in response to cautious
public sentiment, are rather restrictive and could limit significantly the latitude for Japan to craft a
military response to crises outside its borders. Other legal and institutional obstacles in Japan
likely will inhibit full implementation of this new policy in the near term. However, the removal
of the blanket prohibition on collective self-defense will enable Japan to engage in more
cooperative security activities, like noncombat logistical operations and defense of distant sea
lanes, and to be more effective in other areas, like U.N. peacekeeping operations. For the U.S.-
Japan alliance, this shift could mark a step toward a more equal and more capable defense
partnership. Chinese and South Korean media, as well as some Japanese civic groups and media
outlets, have been critical, implying that collective self-defense represents an aggressive,
belligerent security policy for Japan.
Realignment of the U.S. Military Presence on Okinawa
Due to the legacy of the U.S. occupation and the island’s key strategic location, Okinawa hosts a
disproportionate share of the U.S. military presence in Japan. About 25% of all facilities used by
U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) and over half of USFJ military personnel are located in the prefecture,
which comprises less than 1% of Japan’s total land area. The attitudes of native Okinawans
toward U.S. military bases are generally characterized as negative, reflecting a tumultuous history
and complex relationships with “mainland” Japan and with the United States. Because of these
widespread concerns among Okinawans, the sustainability of the U.S. military presence in
Okinawa remains a critical challenge for the alliance.
40 Article 51 of the U.N. Charter provides that member nations may exercise the rights of both individual and collective
self-defense if an armed attack occurs.
41 Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, drafted by American officials during the post-war occupation, outlaws war as a
“sovereign right” of Japan and prohibits “the right of belligerency,” stipulating that “land, sea, and air forces, as well as
other war potential, will never be maintained.”
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In the last days of 2013, the United States and Japan cleared an important political hurdle in their
long-delayed plan to relocate a major U.S. military base on the island of Okinawa.42 Hirokazu
Nakaima, then-governor of Okinawa, approved construction of an offshore landfill necessary to
build the replacement facility. This new base, located in the sparsely populated Henoko area of
Nago City, would replace the functions of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma, located in
the center of a crowded town in southern Okinawa. The encroachment of residential areas around
the Futenma base over decades has raised the risks of a fatal aircraft accident, which could create
a major backlash on Okinawa and threaten to disrupt the alliance. Nakaima’s approval of the
landfill permit in theory should allow Washington and Tokyo to consummate their agreement to
return the land occupied by MCAS Futenma to local authorities, while retaining a similar level of
military capability on Okinawa. A U.S.-Japan joint planning document in April 2013 indicated
that the new base at Henoko would be completed no earlier than 2022. For more information and
analysis, see CRS Report R42645, The U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma Base
Controversy.
Despite the decision by Nakaima, most Okinawans oppose the construction of a new U.S. base
for a mix of political, environmental, and quality-of-life reasons. Politicians opposed to the
Futenma relocation won elections in 2014 for governor of Okinawa, mayor of Nago City, and all
four Okinawan districts in the Lower House of the Diet. In March 2015, the current Okinawan
governor ordered the Japanese central government to cease construction at the Henoko site.
Although most experts agree that the power to cancel construction of the new facility is probably
beyond the authorities of the governor and mayor—the Abe Administration denied the governor’s
request—their combined resistance could delay progress and send a strong political signal.43
Okinawan anti-base civic groups have ramped up their protest activities recently, and some
groups may take extreme measures to prevent construction of the facility at Henoko.
The Abe Administration, having invested significant time and money in gaining Nakaima’s
consent, will likely need to invest additional political capital to ensure that the base construction
proceeds without significant delays and without further alienating the Okinawan public. Failure to
implement the Futenma relocation could solidify an impression among some American observers
that the Japanese political system struggles to follow through with difficult tasks. On the other
hand, the risk remains that heavy-handed actions by Tokyo or Washington could lead to more
intense anti-base protests.
42 The relocation of the Futenma base is part of a larger bilateral agreement developed by the U.S.-Japan Special Action
Committee on Okinawa (SACO) in 1996. In the SACO Final Report, the United States agreed to return approximately
20% of land used for U.S. facilities on Okinawa, including all or parts of a dozen sites. Handover of MCAS Futenma
was contingent on “maintaining the airfield’s critical military functions and capabilities.” The plan for implementing
the SACO agreement evolved over the late 1990s and early 2000s until Washington and Tokyo settled on a “roadmap”
in 2006: once Japan constructed the Futenma replacement facility at the Henoko site, the United States would relocate
roughly 8,000 marines from Okinawa to Guam, about half of the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) presence then on
Okinawa. In 2012, the allies revised the implementation plan to “de-link” the Futenma relocation and the realignment
of marines to Guam. The 2012 agreement also revised the USMC realignment: 9,000 marines would be relocated from
Okinawa; 4,700 to Guam; 2,500 to Australia (on a rotational basis); and the remainder to Hawaii and the continental
United States.
43 Matthew M. Burke and Chiyomi Sumida, “Tokyo Vows to Defy Order to Halt Okinawa Construction,” Stars and
Stripes, March 24, 2015.
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Marine Corps Realignment to Guam
The realignment of marines from Okinawa to Guam and elsewhere is now proceeding on its own
timeline, separate from the issue of the Futenma replacement facility. The FY2015 National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 113-291) removed prior restrictions on military
construction for the Guam realignment, though the freeze on Department of Defense (DOD)
spending on Guam’s civilian infrastructure remains. DOD is now able to spend Japanese
government funds allocated for the realignment. Japan has agreed to pay $3.1 billion of the
estimated $8.7 billion total cost and will have preferential access to some of the new training
facilities. In the FY2013 and FY2014 NDAAs, Congress had imposed several requirements on
DOD before it could begin military construction for the Marine Corps realignment. DOD was
able to fulfill most of those requirements, culminating in its submission of the Guam Master Plan
to Congress in August 2014. The U.S. Navy expects to announce a Record of Decision (a key
planning milestone) for the Guam realignment in spring 2015. DOD still faces a number of
challenges on Guam, particularly regarding civilian infrastructure and public services, but the
FY2015 NDAA has given momentum to this massive project.
Burden-Sharing Issues
The Japanese government provides nearly $2 billion per year to offset the cost of stationing U.S.
forces in Japan (see Figure 3). The United States spends an additional $2 billion per year (on top
of the Japanese contribution) on nonpersonnel costs for troops stationed in Japan.44 Japanese host
nation support is composed of two funding sources: Special Measures Agreements (SMAs) and
the Facilities Improvement Program (FIP). Each SMA is a bilateral agreement, generally covering
five years, that obligates Japan to pay a certain amount for utility and labor costs of U.S. bases
and for relocating training exercises away from populated areas. The current SMA, which runs
from 2011 to 2015, allows a gradual decline in Japan’s contributions to labor and utility costs,
although U.S. costs are slowly rising, according to an April 2013 report issued by the Senate
Armed Services Committee.45 The amount of FIP funding is not strictly defined, other than an
agreed minimum of $200 million per year, and thus the Japanese government adjusts the total at
its discretion. Tokyo also decides which projects receive FIP funding, taking into account, but not
necessarily deferring to, U.S. priorities. The United States and Japan will negotiate the next SMA
in 2015.
44 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Inquiry into U.S. Costs and Allied Contributions to Support
the U.S. Military Presence Overseas, 113th Cong., April 15, 2013, S.Rept. 113-12 (Washington: GPO, 2013).
45 Ibid.
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Figure 3. Host Nation Support for USFJ
Source: U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Inquiry into U.S. Costs and Allied Contributions
to Support the U.S. Military Presence Overseas, 113th Congress, April 15, 2013, S.Rept. 113-12 (Washington:
GPO, 2013).
Notes: Chart from U.S. Forces Japan, Presentation: Special Measures Agreement Overview (June 27, 2012).
Tng Reloc = Training Relocation
Extended Deterrence
The growing concerns in Tokyo about North Korean nuclear weapons development and China’s
modernization of its nuclear arsenal in the 2000s provoked renewed attention to the U.S. policy of
extended deterrence, commonly known as the “nuclear umbrella.” The United States and Japan
initiated the bilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogue in 2010, recognizing that Japanese
perceptions of the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence were critical to its effectiveness.46 The
dialogue is a forum for the United States to assure its ally and for both sides to exchange
assessments of the strategic environment. The views of Japanese policymakers (among others)
influenced the development of the 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review.47 Reportedly, Tokyo
discouraged a proposal to declare that the “sole purpose” of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter
nuclear attack.
Japan also plays an active role in extended deterrence through its ballistic missile defense (BMD)
capabilities. The United States and Japan have cooperated closely on BMD technology
development since the earliest programs, conducting joint research projects as far back as the
1980s. Japan’s purchases of U.S.-developed technologies and interceptors after 2003 give it the
46 Brad Roberts, “Extended Deterrence and Strategic Stability in Northeast Asia,” National Institute of Defense Studies
(Japan), Visiting Scholar Paper Series, No. 1, August 9, 2013.
47 Roberts (2013).
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second-most potent BMD capability in the world. The U.S. and Japanese militaries both have
ground-based BMD units deployed on Japanese territory and BMD-capable vessels operating in
the waters near Japan. The number of U.S. and Japanese BMD interceptors is judged to be
sufficient for deterring North Korea without affecting strategic stability with China. North
Korea’s long-range missile launches in 2009 and 2012 provided opportunities for the United
States and Japan to test their BMD systems in real-life circumstances. For more information, see
CRS Report R43116, Ballistic Missile Defense in the Asia-Pacific Region: Cooperation and
Opposition.
Economic Issues
U.S. trade and broader economic ties with Japan remain highly important to U.S. national interest
and, therefore, to the U.S. Congress. By the most conventional method of measurement, the
United States and Japan are the world’s largest and third-largest economies (China is number
two), accounting for nearly 30% of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2013.
Furthermore, their economies are intertwined by trade in goods and services and by foreign
investment. For more information, see CRS Report RL32649, U.S.-Japan Economic Relations:
Significance, Prospects, and Policy Options.
Overview of the Bilateral Economic Relationship
Japan remains an important economic partner of the United States, but its importance arguably
has been eclipsed by other partners, notably China. Japan was the United States’ fourth-largest
merchandise export market (behind Canada, Mexico, and China) and the fourth-largest source of
U.S. merchandise imports (behind China, Canada, and Mexico) in 2014. These numbers probably
underestimate the importance of Japan in U.S. trade since Japan exports intermediate goods to
China that are then used to manufacture finished goods that China exports to the United States.
The United States was Japan’s largest export market and second-largest source of imports in
2014. The global economic downturn had a significant impact on U.S.-Japan trade: both exports
and imports declined in 2009 from 2008. U.S.-Japan bilateral trade increased since 2009 and until
2012, but declined in 2013. (See Table 1.)
Table 1. U.S. Merchandise Trade with Japan, Selected Years
($ billions)
Year Exports
Imports
Balances
1995 64.3
123.5
-59.1
2000 65.3
146.6
-81.3
2003 52.1
118.0
-66.0
2004 54.4
129.6
-75.2
2005 55.4
138.1
-82.7
2006 59.6
148.1
-88.4
2007 62.7
145.5
-82.8
2008 66.6
139.2
-72.3
2009 51.2
95.9
-44.8
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Year Exports
Imports
Balances
2010 60.5
120.3
-59.8
2011 66.2
128.8
-62.2
2012 70.0
146.4
-76.3
2013 65.2
138.6
-73.4
2014 67.0
133.9
-67.0
Source: U.S. Commerce Department, Census Bureau. FT900. Exports are total exports valued on a free
alongside ship (f.a.s.) basis. Imports are general imports valued on a customs basis. Figures may not add due to
rounding.
Despite some outstanding issues, tensions in the U.S.-Japan bilateral economic relationship have
been much lower than was the case in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s. A number of factors
may have contributed to this trend:
• Japan’s slow, if not stagnant, economic growth, which began with the burst of the
asset bubble in the 1990s and continued as a result of the 2008-2009 financial
crisis and the 2011 disasters, has changed the general U.S. perception of Japan
from one as an economic competitor to one as a “humbled” economic power;
• the rise of China as an economic power and trade partner has caused U.S.
policymakers to shift attention from Japan to China as a source of concern;
• the increased use by both Japan and the United States of the WTO as a forum for
resolving trade disputes has de-politicized disputes and helped to reduce friction;
and
• shifts in U.S. and Japanese trade policies that have expanded the formation of
bilateral and regional trade agreements with other countries have lessened the
focus on their bilateral ties.
Abenomics
Between the end of World War II and 1980s, Japan experienced high levels of economic growth.
It was dubbed an “economic miracle” until the collapse of an economic bubble in Japan in the
early 1990s brought an end to rapid economic growth. Many economists have argued that, despite
the government’s efforts, Japan never fully recovered from the 1990s crisis. Japan’s economy has
suffered from chronic deflation (falling prices) and low growth over the past two decades.
Additionally, in the past several years, Japan’s economy was hit by two economic crises: the
global financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, and the March 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear
reactor meltdowns in northeast Japan (see box on the March 2011 “Triple Disaster”).
Prime Minister Abe has made it a priority of his administration to boost economic growth and to
eliminate deflation. Abe has promoted a three-pronged, or “three arrow,” economic program,
nicknamed “Abenomics.” The three arrows include monetary stimulus, fiscal stimulus, and
structural reforms that improve the competitiveness of Japan’s economy. Many economists agree
that progress across the three arrows has been uneven.48
48 For example, see IMF, “Japan: 2014 Article IV Consultation-Staff Report; and Press Release,” July 31, 2014,
(continued...)
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• The most progress has been made on the first arrow, monetary stimulus to reverse
deflation. In the spring of 2013, Japan’s central bank (Bank of Japan, or BOJ)
announced a continued loose monetary policy with interest rates of 0%,
quantitative easing measures, and a target inflation rate of 2%.
• In terms of fiscal policy, the Japanese government initially implemented fiscal
stimulus packages worth about $145 billion, aimed at spending on infrastructure,
particularly in the areas affected by the March 2011 disaster. However, concerns
about Japan’s fiscal position became more prominent; Japan’s public debt, at over
240% of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP), is the highest of any
economy in the world. To address the fiscal pressures, the government raised the
sales tax from 5% to 8% in April 2014.
• There has been more skepticism about progress on the third arrow: structural
reforms.49 The government announced several growth-enhancing proposals,
including restructuring the agricultural, medical services, and electricity sectors;
reducing labor market rigidities; and opening markets; among others. Although
some reforms have been implemented, such as those relating to corporate
governance, electricity sector reform, and a bill to encourage farmland
consolidation, some reforms are politically contentious and more remains to be
done. In a July 2014 assessment of the Japanese economy, the IMF recommended
that the Japanese government should take steps to increase the employment of
women, older workers, and foreign labor, to offset Japan’s aging labor force;
reduce labor market duality; and accelerate agricultural and services sector
deregulation.50
In terms of the economic impact of “Abenomics” to date, results have been mixed. In November,
data releases revealed that Japan’s economy had slipped back into recession (meaning that GDP
fell two quarters in a row). This was Japan’s fourth recession since 2008, and was largely
attributed to the April 2014 sales tax increase. In response to the negative economic news, the
Japanese government postponed a second sales tax increase by 18 months to April 2017 and Abe
called for snap elections on the grounds that he sought a new mandate for his economic program.
The BOJ is also implementing a second round of quantitative easing, announced in October 2014.
In February 2015, data releases showed that the economy started growing again in the fourth
quarter of 2014. Some economists attributed improved economic conditions to the government’s
policy response to the recession, as well as booming tourism, improving consumer confidence,
and a weaker yen, which may be spurring domestic manufacturing. In April 2014, the IMF
projected that Japan’s economy contracted slightly in 2014 (by 0.06%) and will grow modestly in
2015, by 1.0%. Longer-term, many analysts suggest that structural reforms will be critical for
reviving economic growth. Abe’s reelection may provide political leeway to purse these reforms,
although low voter turnout in his re-election may signal weakened popular support for Abe’s
policy proposals.
(...continued)
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=41800.0.
49 “Same Race, Same Horse,” Economist, November 22, 2014.
50 IMF, “Japan’s Bumpy Growth Path Puts Premium on Structural Reforms,” IMF Survey, July 31, 2014,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2014/car073114a.htm.
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Emphasis on “Womenomics”
A key component of the third arrow focuses on “womenomics,” or boosting economic growth
through reforms and policies to encourage the participation and advancement of women in the
workforce. Japan lags behind many other high-income countries in terms of gender equality, with
one of the lowest rates of female participation in the workforce among Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development countries. A strategist with Goldman Sachs in Japan
estimates that closing the gender employment gap could boost Japan’s GDP by nearly 13%.51 To
advance its “womenomics” initiative, the government has proposed, and is in various stages of
implementing, a number of policies, such as expanding the availability of day care, increasing
parental leave benefits, and allowing foreign housekeepers in special economic zones, among
other measures. Although some are optimistic that the measures will help close the gender gap in
Japan, others express concern about potential challenges, such as a work culture that demands
long hours and makes it hard to balance work and family demands. For further information, see
CRS Report R43668, “Womenomics” in Japan: In Brief.
Bilateral Trade Issues
Japan and the Proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP)
The proposed TPP is an evolving regional free trade agreement (FTA). Originally formed as an
FTA among Singapore, New Zealand, Chile, and Brunei, the TPP is now an agreement under
negotiation among the original four countries plus the United States, Australia, Canada, Mexico,
Peru, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Japan. The negotiators envision a comprehensive and high standard
agreement to liberalize trade and to establish enhanced trade rules and disciplines. They also
envision the TPP to be a “21st century” framework for governing trade within the Asia-Pacific
region and, therefore, addressing cross-cutting issues, such as regulatory coherence, global supply
chains, digital trade, and state-owned enterprises.
As the second-largest East Asian economy and a crucial link in Asian production networks,
Japan’s participation in the TPP (officially joining in July 2013) is economically significant,
although it continues to be the subject of debate within the Japanese political leadership and
among Japanese and U.S. stakeholders. In deciding to participate in the TPP, Abe confronted
influential domestic interests that argued against the move. Among the most vocal have been
Japanese farmers, especially rice farmers, and their representatives. They argued that Japanese
agriculture will be severely harmed by foreign competition if Japan removes its high tariffs and
other protective measures on imports of agricultural products. Some Japanese health providers
have argued that Japan’s national health insurance system will be adversely affected because, they
claim, the TPP could force Japanese citizens to buy foreign-produced pharmaceuticals and
medical devices. Abe has acknowledged those domestic sensitivities, but has also insisted that
Japan needs to be part of TPP to support economic growth. Other Japanese business interests,
including manufacturers, strongly support the TPP.
51 Kathy Matsui et al., “Womenomics 4.0: Time to Walk the Talk,” Goldman Sachs, May 30, 2014,
http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/investing-in-women/womenomics4-folder/womenomics4-time-to-talk-the-
talk.pdf.
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Underlying Abe’s decision to enter the TPP talks is a growing feeling among many Japanese that,
after two decades of relatively sluggish growth, Japan’s economic and political influence is
waning in comparison with China and with middle powers such as South Korea. The rapid aging
and gradual shrinking of Japan’s population have added to a sense among many in Japan that the
country needs to develop new sources of growth to maintain, if not increase, the country’s living
standards.
If an agreement is reached, Japan’s membership in the proposed TPP would constitute a de facto
U.S.-Japan FTA. Japan’s participation enhances the clout and viability of the proposed TPP,
which would be a core component of Obama Administration efforts to rebalance U.S. foreign
policy priorities toward the Asia-Pacific region. When Japan entered the talks, the share of the
world economy accounted for by TPP countries rose from around about 30% to about 38%. If
successful, the negotiations could reinvigorate a bilateral economic relationship that has remained
steady but stagnant by forcing the two countries to address long-standing, difficult trade issues.
On the other hand, failure to resolve these bilateral issues could indicate that the underlying
problems are too fundamental to overcome, which could set back the relationship.
Parallel U.S.-Japan Negotiations
Because Japan joined the TPP talks after they had begun, it was required to reach agreements with the 11 other
members over the terms of its entry. As a result of its discussions with the United States, Japan in April 2013 made a
number of concessions, or confidence-building measures, and agreed to address a number of other outstanding issues
in separate talks with the United States that would occur in parallel with the main TPP negotiations. Among other
steps, Japan agreed that under the proposed TPP, U.S. tariffs on imports of Japanese motor vehicles will be phased
out over a period equal to the longest phase-out period agreed to under the agreement. Japan also agreed to increase
the number of U.S.-made vehicles that can be imported into Japan under its Preferential Handling Procedure (PHP),
from 2,000 per vehicle type to 5,000 per vehicle type. In addition, the two countries agreed to convene separate
negotiations that are to address issues regarding non-tariff measures (NTMs) pertaining to auto trade. Furthermore,
the two sides agreed to hold another separate set of bilateral negotiations, parallel to the TPP talks, to address issues
regarding NTMs in insurance, government procurement, competition policy, express delivery, and sanitary and
phytosanitary measures. The paral el negotiations are to achieve “tangible and meaningful” results by the completion
of the main TPP negotiations and will be legally binding at the time a TPP agreement would enter into force.
Despite a continued push for progress by both governments, U.S. bilateral negotiations with
Japan remain a key challenge in the overall TPP negotiations. (As discussed in the accompanying
text box, the separate U.S.-Japan negotiations are occurring in parallel with the plurilateral TPP
talks.) On many of the non-tariff issues in the agreement, such as intellectual property rights
protections, U.S. and Japanese goals are reportedly closely aligned. In the areas of auto and
agricultural trade, however, disagreements remain. U.S. automakers are closely watching the
negotiations and have expressed concerns with reducing U.S. auto import tariffs without greater
reciprocal access to the Japanese market. Although U.S. auto exports to Japan face no tariff, U.S.
import penetration is low, which U.S. automakers partially blame on allegedly discriminatory
regulations and other non-tariff measures. On agriculture, Japan has highlighted the importance of
maintaining certain import protections for the five “sacred” commodities, while some U.S.
industry groups are strongly opposed to any agricultural carve-outs and have suggested that the
TPP be concluded without Japan if Japan refuses to provide sufficient market access.
Japan is also participating in other bilateral and regional trade negotiations in the Asia-Pacific.
Japan, together with the 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
China, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and India, announced in November 2012, their
intention to begin negotiations to form a trade arrangement—the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP). While not ostensibly in conflict with the TPP, some have
suggested the RCEP could be a less ambitious alternative to the more comprehensive TPP, and
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thus, perhaps easier to conclude. While RCEP would include some TPP partners, the absence of
the United States and the inclusion of China is noteworthy.52 In 2013, Japan began negotiating a
trilateral FTA with China and South Korea.
Debates about Exchange Rates and “Currency Manipulation”
The first “arrow” of Abenomics, expansionary monetary policies, has contributed to a
depreciation of the yen against the U.S. dollar. In mid-2012, the yen was valued at an average of
79 yen (¥) per dollar. Since that time, the yen has depreciated by about 50% against the dollar, to
120 yen (¥) per dollar in early April 2015, similar to the value of the yen against the dollar in
2007.53 Some policymakers and analysts allege that Japan is manipulating its exchange rate to
drive down the value of the yen and boost its exports at the expense of other countries, including
the United States. Japanese officials deny any manipulation of the yen. Some analysts argue that
Japan’s monetary policies, similar to the Fed’s quantitative easing programs, are aimed at
boosting economic growth and that any impact on the value of the yen is a side effect, rather than
the goal, of the policies.54
Some Members of Congress and analysts have expressed concerns about “currency
manipulation” in the context of the proposed TPP, primarily focused on Japan. It has been argued
that Japan has a history of intervening in foreign exchange markets to impact the value of the yen,
manipulation of exchange rates has a large and unfair impact on competitiveness, current forums
for addressing exchange rate disputes are ineffective, and trade agreements should tackle
“currency manipulation” to create a level playing field. In 2013, 230 Representatives and 60
Senators sent letters to the Obama Administration calling for “currency manipulation” to be
addressed in TPP.55 Additionally, addressing currency manipulation is identified as a principal
negotiating objective in Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation introduced in the House and
the Senate in April 2015 (H.R. 1890; S. 995). Some Members are also exploring legislation
(outside of trade agreements) to address concerns about the exchange rate policies of other
countries. For example, legislation was introduced in February 2015 to impose countervailing
duties on countries with undervalued currencies (H.R. 820; S. 433).
However, proposals to address “currency manipulation” in TPP are controversial. Some argue that
seeking to include currency issues in a trade agreement is not a straightforward process and could
make the agreement more difficult to conclude. There is also disagreement among economists
about how to define currency manipulation and what benchmarks should be used. Still others
question whether currency manipulation is a significant problem. They raise questions about
whether government policies have long-term effects on exchange rates; whether it is possible to
differentiate between “manipulation” and legitimate central bank activities; and the net effect of
52 See, for example, Beginda Pakpahan, “Will RCEP Compete with the TPP?” EastAsiaForum,
http://www.eastasiaforum.org.
53 Federal Reserve.
54 For more information about exchange rates and “currency manipulation,” see CRS In Focus IF10049, Debates over
“Currency Manipulation”, by Rebecca M. Nelson, and CRS Report R43242, Current Debates over Exchange Rates:
Overview and Issues for Congress, by Rebecca M. Nelson.
55 Representative Mike Michaud, “Majority of House Members Push Obama to Address Currency Manipulation in
TPP,” Press Release, June 6, 2013, http://michaud.house.gov/press-release/majority-house-members-push-obama-
address-currency-manipulation-tpp; Senator Debbie Stabenow, “Sixty Senators Urge Administration to Crack Down on
Currency Manipulation in Trans-Pacific Partnership Talks,” Press Release, September 24, 2013,
http://www.stabenow.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=1171.
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currency manipulation on the U.S. economy. As TPP negotiations progress, it is not clear to what
extent negotiators are discussing exchange rate issues.
Japanese Politics
The Stabilization of Japanese Politics Around the LDP
From 2007 to 2012, Japanese politics was plagued by instability. The premiership changed hands
six times in those six years, and no party controlled both the Lower and Upper Houses of the
parliament for more than a few months. The LDP coalition’s dominant victories in three
parliamentary elections, in December 2012, July 2013, and December 2014, appear to have ended
this period of turmoil. The first event, the 2012 elections for Japan’s Lower House, returned the
LDP and its coalition partner, the New Komeito party, into power after three years in the minority.
The 2013 election consolidated the LDP coalition’s hold by giving it a majority in the Upper
House. The aforementioned December 2014 Lower House elections appear to have cemented the
LDP’s dominance. Although the vote, which was held two years earlier than required by law,
changed little in Japan’s political balance, it preserved the “supermajority” of more than two-
thirds of Lower House seats held by the LDP and its coalition partner, Komeito. (See Figure 4
and Figure 5 for a display of major parties’ strength in Japan’s parliament, which is called the
Diet.) The fact that Lower House elections do not have to be held until 2018 presumably gives
Abe and the LDP a relatively prolonged period in which to promote their agenda. Since 1955, the
LDP has ruled Japan for all but about four years.
Figure 4. Party Affiliation in Japan’s Lower House of Parliament
(The LDP and its partner, New Komeito, control the Lower House, which elects the prime minister)
Source: Open Source Center, “Breakdown of Lower House Election Results,” December 15, 2014.
Notes: The Lower House’s official name is the “House of Representatives.” The Lower House must be
dissolved, and elections held for all Members’ seats, at least once every four years. The last such elections were
held in December 2014.
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Figure 5. Party Affiliation in Japan’s Upper House of Parliament
(The LDP-New Komeito coalition controls the Upper House)
Source: Website of the Upper House of the Japanese Diet, December 14, 2014.
Notes: The Upper House’s official name is the “House of Council ors.” Upper House members serve for six-
year terms, with elections for half the Members occurring every three years. The last Upper House elections
were held in July 2013.
The DPJ and Alternative Political Forces
The December 2012 parliamentary elections drastically reduced the size of Japan’s largest
opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which was the ruling party from 2009 to
2012. The DPJ’s party support numbers have remained in the single digits since it lost its hold on
power. Although the party gained nearly 20 seats in the 2014 Lower House election, it holds less
than a third of the 230 seats when it was the ruling party in 2012. Formed in the late 1990s by an
amalgamation of former conservative and progressive politicians, the party continues to be riven
by divisions among its more hawkish and dovish factions, as well as among its market-oriented
and socialist factions, that are likely to manifest themselves in 2015 in debates over collective
self-defense legislation and the TPP (if an agreement is reached). On January 18, 2015, the DPJ
chose its former head Katsuya Okada as party president.
Over the past 20 years, growing frustration with Japan’s political status quo has periodically
given rise to small-to-moderate protest movements. One party that has emerged in recent years is
the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), led by Osaka mayor Toru Hashimoto, who among other
programs champions economic deregulation and decentralization of political power to Japan’s
regional governments. Hashimoto is known to support nationalist positions on matters of security
and history, and thus could perhaps be a natural ad hoc ally for Abe on these matters, as well as
on some economic issues. However, some in the DPJ have talked openly about joining forces
with the JIP to form a bigger opposition bloc.
Structural Rigidities in Japan’s Political System
Compared to most industrialized democracies, the Japanese parliament is structurally weak, as is
the office of the prime minister and his cabinet. Though former Prime Minister Koizumi and his
immediate predecessors increased politicians’ influence relative to bureaucrats’, with important
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exceptions Japan’s policymaking process tends to be compartmentalized and bureaucratized,
making it difficult to make trade-offs among competing constituencies on divisive issues. The
result is often paralysis or incremental changes at the margins of policy, particularly during
periods of weak premierships such as the one Japan experienced from 2006 to 2013. These
difficulties were a major reason Abe took the unprecedented decision in early 2013 to house
Japan’s TPP negotiating team in the prime minister’s office, in the hopes that this would help
overcome the bureaucratic obstacles to making the trade-offs that are likely to be necessary to
enable Japan’s joining a final agreement, if one is reached.
Japan’s Demographic Challenge
Japan’s combination of a low birth rate, strict immigration practices, and a shrinking and rapidly
aging population presents policymakers with a significant challenge. Polls suggest that Japanese
women are avoiding marriage and child-bearing because of the difficulty of combining career and
family in Japan; the fertility rate has fallen to 1.25, far below the 2.1 rate necessary to sustain
population size. Japan’s population growth rate is -0.1%, and its current population of 127 million
is projected to fall to about 95 million by mid-century. Concerns about a huge shortfall in the
labor force have grown, particularly as the elderly demand more care. The ratio of working age
persons to retirees is projected to fall from 5:2 around 2010 to 3:2 in 2040, reducing the resources
available to pay for the government social safety net.56 Japan’s immigration policies have
traditionally been strictly limited, closing one potential source of new workers.
Selected Legislation
113th Congress
P.L. 113-291. Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for
FY2015. Section 2821 removes prior restrictions on DOD spending to implement the realignment
of the Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam, including DOD expenditure of Japanese
government funds transferred for that purpose. Section 1251 requires DOD to develop a strategy
to prioritize U.S. defense interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Section 1255 encourages greater
cooperation among the United States and its partners in Northeast Asia on ballistic missile
defense. Section 1258 reaffirms Congress’s support for the U.S.-Japan alliance, including Japan’s
initiative to engage in collective self-defense. Became law on December 19, 2014.
P.L. 113-66. National Defense Authorization Act for FY2014. Section 2822 prohibits DOD
spending (including expenditure of funds provided by the Japanese government) to implement the
realignment of the Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam, with certain exceptions, until DOD
provides reports to Congress. The bill requests a report on U.S. force posture strategy in the Asia-
Pacific region, a master plan for military construction on Guam and Hawaii, and a plan for
upgrades to the civilian infrastructure on Guam. Became law on December 26, 2013.
56 Lynann Butkiewicz, “Implications of Japan’s Changing Demographics,” National Bureau of Asian Research,
Washington, DC, October 2012.
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P.L. 113-150. Sean and David Goldman International Child Abduction Prevention and Return Act
of 2014; expresses the sense of Congress that the United States should set a strong example for
other countries under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction in the resolution of cases involving children abducted abroad and brought to the
United States. The law directs the U.S. government, especially the State Department, to devote
additional resources to assisting “left-behind” parents and to preventing child abduction with
existing authorities. P.L. 113-150 also instructs the Secretary of State to identify and take actions
against consistently noncompliant countries, including the suspension of U.S. development and
security assistance funding. Became law on August 8, 2014.
H.R. 44 (Bordallo). Recognizes the suffering and the loyalty of the residents of Guam during the
Japanese occupation of Guam in World War II. Directs the Secretary of the Treasury to establish a
fund for the payment of claims submitted by compensable Guam victims and survivors of
compensable Guam decedents. Directs the Secretary to make specified payments to (1) living
Guam residents who were raped, injured, interned, or subjected to forced labor or marches, or
internment resulting from, or incident to, such occupation and subsequent liberation; and (2)
survivors of compensable residents who died in the war (such payments to be made after
payments have been made to surviving Guam residents). Referred to House Subcommittee on
Fisheries, Wildlife, Oceans, and Insular Affairs on January 31, 2013.
S. 192 (Barrasso). Expedited LNG for American Allies Act of 2013; “the exportation of natural
gas to Japan shall be deemed to be consistent with the public interest ... during only such period
as the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, signed at Washington January 19, 1960, and
entered into force June 23, 1960, between the United States and Japan, remains in effect.”
Referred to Senate committee on January 31, 2013.
S.Res. 412 (Menendez). States that the Senate (1) condemns coercive actions or the use of force
to impede freedom of operations in international airspace to alter the status quo or to destabilize
the Asia-Pacific region; (2) urges China to refrain from implementing the declared East China Sea
Air Defense Identification Zone; (3) commends Japan and the Republic of Korea for their
restraint; and (4) calls on China to refrain from risky maritime maneuvers. Sets forth U.S. policy
regarding (1) supporting allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region; (2) opposing claims that
impinge on the rights, freedoms, and lawful use of the sea; (3) managing disputes without
intimidation or force; (4) supporting development of regional institutions to build cooperation and
reinforce the role of international law; and (5) assuring continuity of operations by the United
States in the Asia-Pacific region. Passed/agreed to in the Senate on July 10, 2014.
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Author Contact Information
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Coordinator
Rebecca M. Nelson
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
echanlettavery@crs.loc.gov, 7-7748
rnelson@crs.loc.gov, 7-6819
Mark E. Manyin
Brock R. Williams
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Analyst in International Trade and Finance
mmanyin@crs.loc.gov, 7-7653
bwilliams@crs.loc.gov, 7-1157
Ian E. Rinehart
Analyst in Asian Affairs
irinehart@crs.loc.gov, 7-0345
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