Cybersecurity and Information Sharing:
Comparison of H.R. 1560 and H.R. 1731
Eric A. Fischer
Senior Specialist in Science and Technology
April 20, 2015
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R43996

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Cybersecurity and Information Sharing: Comparison of H.R. 1560 and H.R. 1731

Summary
It is generally recognized that effective sharing of information in cybersecurity is an important
tool in the protection of information systems and their contents from unauthorized access by
cybercriminals and other adversaries. Five bills on information sharing in cybersecurity have
been introduced in the 114th Congress (H.R. 234, H.R. 1560, H.R. 1731, S. 456, and S. 754). The
White House has also submitted a legislative proposal and issued an executive order on the topic.
In the House, H.R. 1560, the Protecting Cyber Networks Act (PCNA), was reported out of the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on April 13, 2015, and H.R. 1731, the
National Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act of 2015 (NCPAA), was ordered reported by
the House Committee on Homeland Security on April 14. Both bills are expected to receive floor
action in the House the week of April 20. They both focus on information sharing among private
entities and between them and the federal government. They address the structure of the
information-sharing process, issues associated with privacy and civil liberties, and liability risks
for private-sector sharing, and both address some other topics in common. In addition to other
provisions, the NCPAA would explicitly amend portions of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6
USC 101 et seq.), and the PCNA would amend parts of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
USC 3021 et seq.). Comparison of the bills reveals many similarities but also significant
differences, for example in how they define terms in common such as cyber threat indicator, the
roles they provide for federal agencies (especially, the Department of Homeland Security and the
intelligence community), processes for nonfederal entities to share information with the federal
government; processes for protecting privacy and civil liberties, uses permitted for shared
information, and reporting requirements.
H.R. 1560, H.R. 1731, and the other bills would all address concerns that are commonly raised
about barriers to sharing of information on threats, attacks, vulnerabilities, and other aspects of
cybersecurity—both within and across sectors. Barriers to sharing have long been considered by
many to be a significant hindrance to effective protection of information systems, especially those
associated with critical infrastructure. Private-sector entities often claim that they are reluctant to
share such information among themselves because of concerns about legal liability, antitrust
violations, and protection of intellectual property and other proprietary business information.
Institutional and cultural factors have also been cited—traditional approaches to security tend to
emphasize secrecy and confidentiality, which would necessarily impede sharing of information.
All the bills have provisions aimed at facilitating sharing of information among private-sector
entities and providing protections from liability that might arise from such sharing.
While reduction or removal of such barriers may provide benefits in cybersecurity, concerns have
also been raised about potential adverse impacts, especially with respect to privacy and civil
liberties, and potential misuse of shared information. The legislative proposals all address many
of the concerns. In general, the proposals limit the use of shared information to purposes of
cybersecurity and law enforcement, and they limit government use, especially for regulatory
purposes. All also include provisions to shield information shared with the federal government
from public disclosure, including exemption from disclosure under the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA). All the proposals require reports to Congress on impacts of their provisions. All have
provisions aimed at protecting privacy and civil liberties with respect to shared information that is
not needed for cybersecurity purposes.
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Cybersecurity and Information Sharing: Comparison of H.R. 1560 and H.R. 1731

Most observers appear to believe that legislation on information sharing is either necessary or at
least potentially beneficial—provided that appropriate protections are included—but two
additional factors in particular may be worthy of consideration as the legislative proposals are
debated. First, resistance to sharing of information among private-sector entities might not be
substantially reduced by the actions contemplated in the legislation. Second, information sharing
is only one of many facets of cybersecurity that organizations need to address to secure their
systems and information.

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Cybersecurity and Information Sharing: Comparison of H.R. 1560 and H.R. 1731

Contents
Current Legislative Proposals .......................................................................................................... 1
Comparison of H.R. 1560 and H.R. 1731 ........................................................................................ 4
Glossary of Abbreviations in the Table ..................................................................................... 4
Notes on the Table ..................................................................................................................... 5

Tables
Table 1. Side-by-Side Comparison of Two House Bills on Information Sharing ............................ 5

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 25
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 25

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Cybersecurity and Information Sharing: Comparison of H.R. 1560 and H.R. 1731

This report compares provisions in two bills in the House of Representatives that address
information sharing and related activities in cybersecurity:1
• H.R. 1560, the Protecting Cyber Networks Act (PCNA), as reported by the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on April 13; and
• H.R. 1731, the National Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act of 2015 (NCPAA),
as ordered reported by the Committee on Homeland Security on April 14.2
Both bills are expected to receive floor action in the House the week of April 20. They both focus
on information sharing among private entities and between them and the federal government.
They address the structure of the information-sharing process, issues associated with privacy and
civil liberties, and liability risks for private-sector sharing, and both address some other topics in
common. In addition to other provisions, the NCPAA would explicitly amend portions of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 USC 101 et seq.), and the PCNA would amend parts of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 USC 3021 et seq.).
This report consists of a discussion of those and other legislative proposals on information
sharing, along with selected associated issues, followed by a side-by-side analysis of the two
House bills.3 For information on economic aspects of information sharing, see CRS Report
R43821, Legislation to Facilitate Cybersecurity Information Sharing: Economic Analysis, by N.
Eric Weiss. For discussion of legal issues, see CRS Report R43941, Cybersecurity and
Information Sharing: Legal Challenges and Solutions, by Andrew Nolan. For an overview of
cybersecurity issues, see CRS Report R43831, Cybersecurity Issues and Challenges: In Brief, by
Eric A. Fischer.
Current Legislative Proposals
Five bills on information sharing have been introduced in the 114th Congress. The White House
has also submitted a legislative proposal4 (WHP) and issued an executive order on the topic.5
Other proposals include the following:
• The Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA), which passed the
House in the 113th Congress, has been reintroduced as H.R. 234.
• S. 456 is an amended version of the White House proposal.6

1 The analysis is limited to a textual comparison of the bills and is not intended to reach any legal conclusions regarding
them.
2 The Rules Committee print is available at http://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/20150420/CPRT-114-HPRT-RU00-
HR1731.pdf.
3 The NCPAA is used as the basis for comparison. This approach was taken for purposes of efficiency and convenience
only. CRS does not advocate or take positions on legislation or legislative issues.
4 The White House, Updated Information Sharing Legislative Proposal, 2015, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/omb/legislative/letters/updated-information-sharing-legislative-proposal.pdf.
5 Executive Order 13691, “Promoting Private Sector Cybersecurity Information Sharing,” Federal Register 80, no. 34
(February 20, 2015): 9349–53, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-02-20/pdf/2015-03714.pdf.
6 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, Protecting America from Cyber Attacks: The
Importance of Information Sharing, 2015, http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/protecting-america-from-cyber-
(continued...)
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Cybersecurity and Information Sharing: Comparison of H.R. 1560 and H.R. 1731

• S. 754, the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (CISA), from the
Senate Intelligence Committee, has many similarities to a bill with the same
name introduced in the 113th Congress and shares many provisions with the
PCNA, although there are also significant differences between S. 754 and the
PCNA.
All the bills would address concerns that are commonly raised about barriers to sharing of
information on threats, attacks, vulnerabilities, and other aspects of cybersecurity—both within
and across sectors. It is generally recognized that effective sharing of information is an important
tool in the protection of information systems and their contents from unauthorized access by
cybercriminals and other adversaries.
Barriers to sharing have long been considered by many to be a significant hindrance to effective
protection of information systems, especially those associated with critical infrastructure.7
Private-sector entities often claim that they are reluctant to share such information among
themselves because of concerns about legal liability, antitrust violations, and protection of
intellectual property and other proprietary business information. Institutional and cultural factors
have also been cited—traditional approaches to security tend to emphasize secrecy and
confidentiality, which would necessarily impede sharing of information. While reduction or
removal of such barriers may provide benefits in cybersecurity, concerns have also been raised
about potential adverse impacts, especially with respect to privacy and civil liberties, and
potential misuse of shared information.
The legislative proposals all address many of those concerns, but they vary somewhat in
emphasis and method. The NCPAA focuses on the role of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), and in particular the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center
(NCCIC). The PCNA, in contrast, focuses on the role of the intelligence community (IC),8
including authorization of the recently announced Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center
(CTIIC). Both CISPA and CISA address roles of both DHS and the IC. The NCPAA, S. 456, and
the WHP address roles of information sharing and analysis organizations (ISAOs).9
All of the proposals have provisions aimed at facilitating sharing of information among private-
sector entities and providing protections from liability that might arise from such sharing. They
vary somewhat in the kinds of private-sector entities and information covered, but almost all of
them address information on both cybersecurity threats and defensive measures, the exception
being S. 456 and the WHP, which cover only cyber threat indicators. In general, the proposals

(...continued)
attacks-the-importance-of-information-sharing. The hearing was not specifically on the White House proposal but it
was held after the proposal was submitted and before the introduction of S. 456.
7 See, for example, CSIS Commission on Cybersecurity for the 44th Presidency, Cybersecurity Two Years Later,
January 2011, http://csis.org/files/publication/110128_Lewis_CybersecurityTwoYearsLater_Web.pdf.
8 The IC consists of 17 agencies and others as designated under 50 U.S.C. 3003.
9 The House Committee on Homeland Security held two hearings on the White House proposal before H.R. 1731 was
introduced (House Committee on Homeland Security, Examining the President’s Cybersecurity Information Sharing
Proposal, 2015, http://homeland.house.gov/hearing/hearing-administration-s-cybersecurity-legislative-proposal-
information-sharing; House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure
Protection, and Security Technologies, Industry Perspectives on the President’s Cybersecurity Information Sharing
Proposal, 2015, http://homeland.house.gov/hearing/subcommittee-hearing-industry-perspectives-president-s-
cybersecurity-information-sharing).
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limit the use of shared information to purposes of cybersecurity and law enforcement, and they
limit government use, especially for regulatory purposes.
All address concerns about privacy and civil liberties, although the mechanisms proposed vary to
some extent, in particular the roles played by the Attorney General, the DHS Secretary, Chief
Privacy Officers, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), and the Inspectors
General of DHS and other agencies. All the proposals require reports to Congress on impacts of
their provisions. All also include provisions to shield information shared with the federal
government from public disclosure, including exemption from disclosure under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA).
While most observers appear to believe that legislation on information sharing is either necessary
or at least potentially beneficial—provided that appropriate protections are included—two caveats
in particular may be worthy of consideration as the legislative proposals are developed. The first
is that resistance to sharing of information among private-sector entities might not be
substantially reduced by the actions contemplated in the legislation. Information received can
help an entity prevent or mitigate an attack. However, there is no direct benefit associated with
providing information. While the legislative proposals may reduce the risks to private-sector
entities associated with providing information, none include explicit incentives to stimulate such
provision. In the absence of mechanisms to balance that asymmetry, the degree to which
information sharing will increase under the provisions of the various legislative proposals may be
uncertain.
The second point is that information sharing is only one of many facets of cybersecurity.10
Entities must have the resources and processes in place that are necessary for effective
cybersecurity risk management. Sharing may be relatively unimportant for many organizations,
especially in comparison with other cybersecurity needs.11 In addition, most information sharing
relates to imminent or near-term threats. It is not directly relevant to broader issues in
cybersecurity such as education and training, workforce, acquisition, or cybercrime law, or major
long-term challenges such as building security into the design of hardware and software,
changing the incentive structure for cybersecurity, developing a broad consensus about
cybersecurity needs and requirements, and adapting to the rapid evolution of cyberspace.

10 See, for example, Testimony of Martin C. Libicki before the House Committee on Oversight & Government Reform,
Subcommittee on Information Technology, hearing on Industry Perspectives on the President’s Cybersecurity
Information Sharing Proposal, 2015, http://homeland.house.gov/hearing/subcommittee-hearing-industry-perspectives-
president-s-cybersecurity-information-sharing.
11 For example, in the Cybersecurity Framework developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology,
target levels of information sharing vary among the four tiers of cybersecurity implementation developed for
organizations with different risk profiles (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Framework for Improving
Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, Version 1.0, February 12, 2014, http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/upload/
cybersecurity-framework-021214-final.pdf).
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Comparison of H.R. 1560 and H.R. 1731
The remainder of the report consists of a side-by-side comparison of provisions in H.R. 1560 as
reported to the House and H.R. 1731 as ordered reported. Note that the language in the bills may
be subject to additional amendment before floor consideration—for example through a manager’s
amendment.
Glossary of Abbreviations in the Table
AG Attorney
General
CI Critical
Infrastructure
CPO
Chief Privacy Officer
CRADA
Cooperative research and development agreement
CTIIC
Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center
DHS
Department of Homeland Security
DNI
Director of National Intelligence
DOD
Department of Defense
DOJ
Department of Justice
HSA
Homeland Security Act
HSGAC
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
IC Intelligence
community
ICS
Industrial control system
ICS-CERT
Industrial Control System Cyber Emergency Response Team
IG Inspector
General
ISAC
Information sharing and analysis center
ISAO
Information sharing and analysis organization
MOU
Memorandum of understanding
NCCIC
National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center
NCPAA
National Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act of 2015
ODNI
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
PCLOB
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board
PCNA
Protecting Cyber Networks Act
SSA Sector-specific
agency
Secretary
Secretary of Homeland Security
U.S. United
States
USC
United States Code
US-CERT
United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team
U/S-CIP
DHS Under Secretary for Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection
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Notes on the Table
Bold formatting denotes that the identified provision is the subject of the subsequent text (e.g., (d)
or Sec. 2 (a)). Numbers and names of sections, subsections, and paragraphs (except definitions)
added by the bills are enclosed in single quotation marks for clarity (e.g., ‘(a)’). Entries
describing provisions in a bill are summaries or paraphrases, with direct quotes enclosed in
double quotation marks. Page numbers in this table refer to pages in the pdf version of this report.
Underlined text is used in selected cases as a visual aid to highlight differences with a
corresponding provision in other bills or laws that might otherwise be difficult to discern. Related
provisions in different proposals are adjacent to each other. H.R. 1731 serves as the basis for
comparison. The names of titles, sections, and some paragraphs are stated the first time a
provision from them is discussed in the table, but only the number, to the paragraph level or
higher, is used thereafter. For the PCNA, some provisions appear out of sequence in the table. In
such cases, the section number is repeated before a provision from a previously cited section that
appears immediately below an entry on a provision from another section. (For example, the entry
Sec. 3. Authorizations for Preventing, Detecting, Analyzing, and Mitigating Cybersecurity
Threats is used the first time a provision from that section is discussed, but the next appearance
of one of its provisions occurs immediately after an entry for Sec. 9. Construction and
Preemption and is therefore labelled Sec. 3(c)(3). That is followed immediately by a discussion
of subsection (a), which is not preceded by a section number.) The entry “[Similar to NCPAA]”
means that the text in that provision in the PCNA is closely similar in meaning but not identical to
the corresponding provision in the NCPAA. See the “Glossary of Abbreviations in the Table” for
meanings of those abbreviations.
Table 1. Side-by-Side Comparison of Two House Bills on Information Sharing
NCPAA—H.R. 1731
PCNA—H.R. 1560
“To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to enhance
“To improve cybersecurity in the United States through
multi-directional sharing of information related to
enhanced sharing of information about cybersecurity threats,
cyber­security risks and strengthen privacy and civil liberties
and for other purposes.”
protections, and for other purposes.”
Sec. 1. Short Title
Sec. 1. Short Title
National Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act of 2015
Protecting Cyber Networks Act
Sec. 2. National Cybersecurity and Communications

Integration Center
Amends Sec. 226 of the Homeland Security Act (HSA). [Note:

This is the section establishing the National Cybersecurity and
Communications Integration Center added by P.L. 113-282
and is referred to in the bill as the “second section 226” to
distinguish it from an identically numbered section added by
P.L. 113-277.]
(a) Definitions
Sec. 11. Definitions
Adds the following:

Agency: As in 44 USC 3502.

Appropriate Federal Entities: Departments of Commerce,
Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, and Treasury;
and Office of the ODNI.
Cybersecurity
Threat: An action unprotected by the 1st
Amendment to the Constitution that involves an information
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NCPAA—H.R. 1731
PCNA—H.R. 1560
system and may result in unauthorized efforts to adversely
impact the security, integrity, confidentiality, or availability of
the system or its contents, but not including actions solely
involving violations of consumer terms of service or licensing
agreements.
Cyber Threat Indicator:
Cyber Threat Indicator:
Technical information necessary to describe or identify
Information or a physical object necessary to describe or
identify
- a method for network awareness [defined below] of an
- malicious reconnaissance, including
information system to discern its technical vulnerabilities, if
the method is known or reasonably suspected of association
with a known or suspected cybersecurity risk, including
- communications that reasonably appear to have “the
- anomalous patterns of communications that appear to have
purpose of gathering technical information related to a
“the purpose of gathering technical information related to a
cybersecurity risk,”
cybersecurity threat or security vulnerability,”
- a method for defeating a technical or security control,
- a method of defeating a security control or exploiting a
security vulnerability,
- a technical vulnerability including anomalous technical
- a security vulnerability or anomalous activity indicating the
behavior that may become a vulnerability,
existence of one,
- a method of causing a legitimate user of an information
- a method of causing a legitimate user of an information
system or its contents to
system or its contents to
inadvertently enable defeat of a technical or operational
unwittingly enable defeat of a security control or exploitation
control,
of a security vulnerability,
- a method for unauthorized remote identification, access, or
- “malicious cyber command and control,”
use of an information system or its contents, if the method is
known or reasonably suspected of association with a known
or suspected cybersecurity risk, or
- actual or potential harm from an incident, including
[Identical to NCPAA]
exfiltration of information; or
- any other cybersecurity risk attribute that cannot be used to - any other cybersecurity threat attribute the
identify specific persons believed to be unrelated to the risk,
and
disclosure of which is not prohibited by law
disclosure of which is not prohibited by law.
- any combination of the above.



Cybersecurity Purpose:
Cybersecurity Purpose:
Protecting an information system or its contents from a
Protecting (including by using defensive measures) an
cybersecurity risk or incident.
information system or its contents from a cybersecurity
threat or security vulnerability or
identifying a threat source.
Defensive Measure:
Defensive Measure:
An “action, device, procedure, signature, technique, or other
An “action, device, procedure, technique, or other measure”
measure” applied to an information system that “detects,
executed on an information system or its contents that
prevents or mitigates a known or suspected cybersecurity risk “prevents or mitigates a known or suspected cybersecurity
or incident” or
threat or security vulnerability.”
attributes that could help defeat security controls, but not
including measures that destroy, render unusable, or
substantial y harm an information system not operated by that
entity or by another entity that consented to such actions.
Federal
Entity:
A US department or agency, or any component
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NCPAA—H.R. 1731
PCNA—H.R. 1560
thereof.
Information
System: As in 44 USC 3502.
Local
Government: A political subdivision of a state.

Malicious Cyber Command and Control: “A method for
unauthorized remote identification of, access to, or use of an
information system” or its contents.
Malicious
Reconnaissance:
A method, associated with a known
or suspected cybersecurity threat, for probing or monitoring
an information system to discern its vulnerabilities.
Network Awareness:
Monitor:
Scanning, identifying, acquiring, monitoring, logging, or
Scanning, identifying, acquiring, or otherwise possessing the
analyzing the contents of an information system.
contents of an information system.
Non-Federal
Entity: A private or governmental entity that is not
federal, but not including foreign powers as defined in 50 USC
1801.
Private Entity:
Private Entity:
A nonfederal entity that is an individual, nonfederal
A person, nonfederal government utility, or
government utility, or
private group, organization, proprietorship, partnership, trust,
[Identical to NCPAA]
cooperative, corporation, or other commercial or nonprofit
entity ,
including personnel.
including personnel, but
not including a foreign power as defined in 50 USC 1801.
Real
Time:
Automated, machine-to-machine system processing
of cyber threat indicators where the occurrence and
“reporting or recording” of an event are “as simultaneous as
technologically and operationally practicable.”
Security Control: The management, operational, and technical
Security Control: The management, operational, and technical
controls used to protect an information system and its
controls used to protect an information system and its
contents against unauthorized attempts to adversely affect
contents against unauthorized attempts to adversely impact
their confidentiality, integrity, or availability.
their confidentiality, integrity, or availability.
Security
Vulnerability: “Any attribute of hardware, software,
process, or procedure that could enable or facilitate the
defeat of a security control.”
Sharing: “Providing, receiving, and disseminating.”

Tribal: As in 25 USC 450b.
(b) Amendment

Specifies tribal governments, private entities, and ISACs as

appropriate members of the NCCIC in DHS.
Sec. 3. Information Sharing Structure and Processes
Sec. 2. Sharing of Cyber Threat Indicators and
Defensive Measures by the Federal Government With
Non-federal Entities

(a) In General
Amends Sec. 226 of the HSA.
Amends Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 by adding
a new section.

‘Sec. 111. Sharing of Cyber Threat Indicators and
Defensive Measures by the Federal Government With
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NCPAA—H.R. 1731
PCNA—H.R. 1560
Non-Federal Entities’

‘(a) Sharing by the Federal Government’
(1) revises the functions of the NCCIC by specifying that it is
‘(1)’ requires the DNI, in consultation with the heads of
the “lead” federal civilian interface for information sharing,
other appropriate federal entities, to develop and promulgate
adding “cyber threat indicators” and “defensive measures” to
procedures consistent with protection of classified
the subjects it addresses, and expanding its functions to
information, intelligence sources and methods, and privacy
include
and civil liberties, for
- providing information and recommendations on information

sharing,
- in consultation with other appropriate agencies,

collaborating with international partners, including on
enhancing “the security and resilience of the global
cybersecurity ecosystem,” and
- sharing “cyber threat indicators, defensive measures,” and
timely sharing of classified cyber threat indicators and
information on cybersecurity risks and incidents with federal
declassified indicators and information with relevant
and nonfederal entities, including across critical-infrastructure
nonfederal entities, and sharing of information about imminent
(CI) sectors and with fusion centers.
or ongoing cybersecurity threats to such entities to prevent
[Note: See also the provisions on the CTIIC in H.R. 1560, p.
and mitigate adverse impacts.
10.]
- notify the Secretary, the HSC, and the HSGAC of significant

violations of privacy and civil liberties protections under ‘Sec.
226(i)(6),’
- promptly notifying nonfederal entities that have shared

information known to be in error or in contravention to
section requirements,
- participating in DHS-run exercises, and

‘(2)’
requires that the procedures incorporate existing
information-sharing mechanisms of federal and nonfederal
entities, including ISACs, as much as possible, and

include methods to promote efficient granting of security
clearances to appropriate representatives of nonfederal
entities.
(2) expands NCCIC membership to include the fol owing

[Note: all are existing entities]:
- an entity that collaborates with state and local governments

on risks and incidents and has a voluntary information sharing
relationship with the NCCIC,
- the US-CERT for col aboratively addressing, responding to,

providing technical assistance upon request on, and
coordinating information about and timely sharing of threat
indicators, defensive measures, analysis, or information about
cybersecurity risks and incidents,
- the ICS-CERT to coordinate with ICS owners and

operators, provide training on ICS cybersecurity, and timely
share information about indicators, defensive measures, or
cybersecurity risks and incidents of ICS,
- the “National Coordinating Center for Communications to

coordinate the protection, response, and recovery of
emergency communications,” and
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NCPAA—H.R. 1731
PCNA—H.R. 1560
- “an entity that coordinates with small and medium-sized

businesses.”
(3) adds “cyber threat indicators” and “defensive measures”

to the subjects covered in the principles of operation of the
NCCIC,
requires that information be shared as appropriate with small
and medium-sized businesses,
specifies that information be guarded against disclosure, and
stipulates that the NCCIC must work with the DHS CPO to
ensure that the NCCIC follows privacy and civil liberties
policies and procedures under ‘Sec. 226(i)(6)’;
(4) adds new subsections to Sec. 226 of the HSA:

‘(g) Rapid Automated Sharing’

‘(1)’ requires the DHS U/S-CIP to develop capabilities, in
ensure the capability of real-time sharing consistent with
coordination with stakeholders and based as appropriate on
protection of classified information. [Note: ‘Sec. 111(b)(2)’
existing standards and approaches in the information
requires procedures to ensure such sharing—see p. 10.]
technology industry, that support and advance automated and
timely sharing of threat indicators and defensive measures to
and from the NCCIC and with SSAs for each CI sector in
accordance with ‘Sec. 226(h).’.
‘(2)’ requires the U/S-CIP to report to Congress twice per

year on the status and progress of that capability until it is
fully implemented.
‘(h) Sector Specific Agencies’

Requires the Secretary to col aborate with relevant CI sectors
and heads of appropriate federal agencies to recognize each
CI SSA designated as of March 25, 2015, in the DHS National
Infrastructure Protection Plan. Designates the Secretary as
SSA head for each sector for which DHS is the SSA. Requires
the Secretary to coordinate with relevant SSAs to
- support CI sector security and resilience activities,
- provide knowledge, expertise, and assistance on request,
and
- support timely sharing of threat indicators and defensive
measures with the NCCIC.

[Note: For other provisions of ‘Sec. 111(a)(2)’, see pp. 14 and
17.]
‘(b)
Definitions’

Defines the following terms by reference to Sec. 11 of the bill:
Appropriate Federal Entities, Cyber Threat Indicator, Defensive
Measure, Federal Entity, and Non-Federal Entity.

(b) Submittal to Congress

Requires that the procedures developed by the DNI be
submitted to Congress within 90 days of enactment of the bill.

(c) Table of Contents Amendment

Revises the table of contents of the National Security Act of
1947 to reflect the addition of ‘Sec. 111’.

Sec. 4. Sharing of Cyber Threat Indicators and
Defensive Measures With Appropriate Federal
Entities Other Than the Department of Defense or
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NCPAA—H.R. 1731
PCNA—H.R. 1560
the National Security Agency

(a) Requirement for Policies and Procedures
(1)
Adds new subsections to ‘Sec. 111’ of the National
Security Act of 1947
‘(i) Voluntary Information Sharing Procedures’
‘(b) Policies and Procedures for Sharing with the
Appropriate Federal Entities Other Than the
Department of Defense or the National Security
Agency’
‘(1)’ permits voluntary information-sharing relationships for
‘(1)’ requires the President to develop and submit to
cybersecurity purposes between the NCCIC and nonfederal
Congress policies and procedures for federal receipt of cyber
entities but prohibits requiring such an agreement.
threat indicators and defensive measures.
Permits the NCCIC to terminate an agreement for repeated,
intentional violation of the terms of ‘(h).’
Permits the Secretary to deny an agreement for national
security reasons.
‘(2)’ permits the relationship to be established through a

standard agreement for nonfederal entities not requiring
specific terms.
Stipulates negotiated agreements with DHS where
appropriate.
Permits other agreements between the NCCIC and
consenting nonfederal entities.
Stipulates that any agreement in effect prior to enactment of
the bill will be deemed in compliance with requirements in
‘(h).’Requires that those agreements include “relevant privacy
protections as in effect under Cooperative Research and
Development Agreement for Cybersecurity Information
Sharing and Collaboration, as of December 31st 2014.”
‘(2)’
requires that they be developed in accordance with the
privacy and civil liberties guidelines under Sec. 4(b) of the bill,
ensure
- real-time sharing of indicators from nonfederal entities with
appropriate federal entities except DOD,
- receipt without delay except for good cause, and
- provision to all relevant federal entities,
- audit capability, and
- appropriate sanctions for federal personnel who knowingly
and willfully use shared information other than in accordance
with the bill.
(2)
requires that an interim version of the policies and
procedures be submitted to Congress within 90 days of
enactment of the bill, and the final version within 180 days.

(c) National Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration
Center
(1)
Adds a new section to the National Security Act of 1947.

‘Sec. 119b. Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration
Center’
‘(a)
Establishment’

Establishes the CTIIC within the ODNI.
‘(b)
Director’
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Cybersecurity and Information Sharing: Comparison of H.R. 1560 and H.R. 1731

NCPAA—H.R. 1731
PCNA—H.R. 1560

Creates a director for the CTIIC, to be appointed by the DNI.

‘(c) Primary Missions’

Specifies the missions of the CTIIC with respect to
cyberthreat intelligence as
- serving as the primary federal organization for analyzing and
integrating it,
- ensuring full access and support of appropriate agencies to
activities and analysis,
- disseminating analysis to the President, appropriate agencies,
and Congress,
- coordinating agency activities, and
- conducting strategic federal planning.
‘(d)
Limitations’

Requires that the CTIIC
- have no more than 50 permanent positions,
- may not augment staff above that limit in carrying out its
primary missions, and
- be located in a building owned and operated by an element
of the IC,
(4) revises the table of contents of the National Security Act
of 1947.

Sec. 3. Authorizations for Preventing, Detecting,
Analyzing, and Mitigating Cybersecurity Threats
‘(3) Information Sharing Authorization’
(c) Authorization for Sharing or Receiving Cyber
Threat Indicators or Defensive Measures
Permits nonfederal entities to share, for cybersecurity
(1) permits nonfederal entities to share, for cybersecurity
purposes, cyber threat indicators, and defensive measures,
purposes and consistent with privacy requirements under
from their own information systems or those of other entities (d)(2), lawfully obtained cyber threat indicators or defensive
upon written consent,
measures
with other nonfederal entities or the NCCIC,
with other nonfederal entities or appropriate federal entities
except DOD,
notwithstanding any other provision of law, except that
[Similar to NCPAA].
recipients must comply with lawful restrictions on sharing and
use imposed by the source.

(d) Protection and Use of Information
Requires reasonable efforts by nonfederal and federal entities,
(2) requires reasonable efforts by nonfederal entities, before
prior to sharing, to
sharing a threat indicator, to
safeguard personally identifying information from unintended
disclosure or unauthorized access or acquisition and
remove such information where it is reasonably believed
remove information reasonably believed to be personal or
when it is shared to be unrelated to a cybersecurity risk or
personally identifying of a specific person not directly related
incident.
to a cybersecurity threat, or

implement a technical capability for removing such
information.

Sec. 9. Construction and Preemption

(f) Information Sharing Relationships
Stipulates that nothing in ‘(3)’
Stipulates that nothing in the bill
- limits or modifies an existing information sharing relationship - (1) limits or modifies an existing information sharing
or prohibits or requires a new one,
relationship or (2) prohibits or requires a new one,

Sec. 3(c)(3) stipulates that nothing in (c)
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Cybersecurity and Information Sharing: Comparison of H.R. 1560 and H.R. 1731

NCPAA—H.R. 1731
PCNA—H.R. 1560
- authorizes information sharing other than as provided in (c),
- permits unauthorized sharing of classified information,
- authorizes federal surveillance of any person,
- prohibits a federal entity, at the request of a nonfederal
entity, from technical discussion of threat indicators and
defensive measures and assistance with vulnerabilities and
threat mitigation,
- prohibits an authorized nonfederal entity from sharing
indicators or defensive measures with DOD, or
- limits otherwise lawful activity, or
- limits otherwise lawful activity.
- impacts or modifies existing procedures for reporting
criminal activity to appropriate law enforcement authorities,
or participating in an investigation.
Requires the U/S-CIP to coordinate with stakeholders to

develop and implement policies and procedures to coordinate
disclosures of vulnerabilities as practicable and consistent with
relevant international industry standards.
‘(4) Network Awareness Authorization’
(a) Authorization for Private-Sector Defensive
Monitoring
permits nonfederal, nongovernment entities, notwithstanding
(1) permits private entities, notwithstanding any other
any other provision of law, to conduct network awareness,
provision of law, to
for cybersecurity purposes and to protect rights or property,
monitor, for cybersecurity purposes,
of
- its own information systems,
[Similar to NCPAA],
- with written consent, information systems of a nonfederal or [Similar to NCPAA], or
federal entity, or
- the contents of such systems.
[Similar to NCPAA].
Stipulates that nothing in ‘(4)’
(2) Stipulates that nothing in (a)
- authorizes network awareness other than as provided in the - authorizes monitoring other than as provided in the bill,
section, or
- limits otherwise lawful activity,
- limits otherwise lawful activity, or
- authorizes federal surveillance of any person.
‘(5) Defensive Measure Authorization’
(b) Authorization for Operation of Defensive
Measures
permits nonfederal, nongovernment entities to operate
(1) permits private entities to operate defensive measures, for
defensive measures, for cybersecurity purposes and to
cybersecurity purposes and to protect rights or property, that
protect rights or property, that are applied to
are operated on and the effects of which are limited to
- its own information systems,
[Similar to NCPAA], or
- with written consent, information systems of a nonfederal or [Similar to NCPAA],
federal entity, or
- the contents of such systems,
notwithstanding any other provision of law, except that
(3) notwithstanding any other provision of law, except that
measures may not be used except as authorized in the
measures may not be used except as authorized in (b), and (b)
section, and ‘(5)’ does not limit otherwise lawful activity.
does not limit otherwise lawful activity.

(2) stipulates that (1) does not authorize operation of
defensive measures that intentionally or recklessly destroy,
render whol y or partly unusable or inaccessible, substantial y
harm, or initiate a new action, process, or procedure on an
information system or its contents not owned by either the
private entity operating the measure or a nonfederal or
federal entity that provided written authorization to that
private entity.

(e) No Right or Benefit
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Cybersecurity and Information Sharing: Comparison of H.R. 1560 and H.R. 1731

NCPAA—H.R. 1731
PCNA—H.R. 1560

Stipulates that sharing of indicators with a nonfederal entity
creates no right or benefit to similar information by any
nonfederal entity.
‘(6) Privacy and Civil Liberties Protections’
Sec. 4 (b) Privacy and Civil Liberties
Requires the U/S-CIP, in coordination with the DHS CPO and (1) requires the AG, in consultation with appropriate federal
Chief Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Officer,
agency heads and agency privacy and civil liberties officers,
to establish and review annually policies and procedures on
to develop and review periodical y guidelines on privacy and
information shared with the NCCIC under the section.
civil liberties to govern federal handling of cyber threat
indicators obtained through the bill’s provisions.
Requires that they apply only to DHS, consistent with the
(2) requires that, consistent with the need for protection of
need for timely protection of information systems from and
information systems and threat mitigation, the guidelines
mitigation of cybersecurity risks and incidents, the policies and
procedures
- be consistent with DHS Fair Information Practice Principles, - be consistent with Fair Information Practice Principles in the
White House National Strategy for Trusted Identities in
Cyberspace [Note: The two versions of the principles are
identical, except that the DHS version applies the principles to
DHS whereas the White House document applies them to
“organizations”],
- “reasonably limit, to the extent practicable, receipt,
- limit receipt, retention, use, and dissemination of
retention, use, and disclosure of cybersecurity threat
cybersecurity threat indicators containing personal
indicators and defensive measures associated with specific
information of or identifying specific persons,
persons” not needed for timely protection of systems and
networks,

including by establishing processes for prompt destruction of
information known not to be directly related to uses under
the bill, and notification of recipients that indicators may be
used only for cybersecurity purposes, and setting limitations
on retention of indicators,
- minimize impacts on privacy and civil liberties,
- limit impacts on privacy and civil liberties of federal activities
under the bill, including
- provide data integrity through prompt removal and
guidelines for removal of personal and personally identifying
destruction of obsolete or erroneous personal information
information handled by federal entities under the bill,
unrelated to the information shared and retained by the
NCCIC in accordance with this section,
- include requirements to safeguard from unauthorized access
- include requirements to safeguard from unauthorized access
or acquisition cyber threat indicators and defensive measures
or acquisition cyber threat indicators
retained by the NCCIC,
identifying specific persons, including proprietary or business-
containing personal information of or identifying specific
sensitive information,
persons,
- protect the confidentiality of cyber threat indicators and

defensive measures associated with specific persons, to the
greatest extent practicable,
- ensure that relevant constitutional, legal, and privacy
- be consistent with other applicable provisions of law,
protections are observed.

- include procedures to notify entities if a federal entity
receiving information knows that it is not a cyber threat
indicator,

- include steps to ensure that dissemination of indicators is
consistent with the protection of classified and other sensitive
national security information.
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Cybersecurity and Information Sharing: Comparison of H.R. 1560 and H.R. 1731

NCPAA—H.R. 1731
PCNA—H.R. 1560
Stipulates that the U/S-CIP may consult with NIST in

developing the policies and procedures.
Requires the DHS CPO and the Officer for Civil Rights and
Requires the AG to submit to Congress
Civil Liberties, in consultation with the PCLOB, to submit to
appropriate congressional committees
the policies and procedures within 180 days of enactment and
interim guidelines within 90 days of enactment and final
annual y thereafter.
guidelines within 180 days.
Requires the U/S-CIP, in consultation with the PCLOB and

the DHS CPO and Chief Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Officer, to ensure public notice of and access to the policies
and procedures.
Requires the DHS CPO to

- monitor implementation of the policies and procedures,
- submit to Congress an annual review on their effectiveness,
- work with the U/S-CIP to carry out provisions in ‘(c)’ on
notification about violations of privacy and civil liberties
policies and procedures and about information that is
erroneous or in contravention of section requirements,
- regularly review and update impact assessments as
appropriate to ensure that all relevant protections are
followed, and

‘Sec. 111(a)(2)’ requires that procedures for sharing
developed by the DNI include methods to

notify nonfederal entities that have received information from
a federal entity known to be in error or in contravention to
bill requirements.
- ensure appropriate sanctions for DHS personnel who
Sec. 4(b)(2) requires that the AG’s guidelines include
knowingly and willfully conduct unauthorized activities under
appropriate sanctions for federal activities in contravention of
the section.
them. [Note: The provision does not specify whether these
sanctions are limited to violation of requirements for
safeguarding information or the guidelines as a whole.],

Sec. 7. Oversight of Government Activities
(b) Reports on Privacy and Civil Liberties.
Requires the DHS IG, in consultation with the PCLOB and
(2) requires the IGs of DHS, the IC, DOJ, and DOD to jointly
IGs of other agencies receiving shared indicators or defensive
submit a biennial report to Congress on
measures from the NCCIC, to submit a report to HSC and
HSGAC within two years of enactment and periodically
thereafter reviewing such information, including
- receipt, use, and dissemination of cybersecurity indicators
- receipt, use, and dissemination of cybersecurity indicators
and defensive measures shared with federal entities under the
and defensive measures shared with federal entities under the
section,
bill,
- information on NCCIC use of such information for purposes
other than cybersecurity,
- types of information shared with the NCCIC,
- types of indicators shared with federal entities,
- actions taken by NCCIC based on shared information;
- actions taken by federal entities as a result of receiving
shared indicators,
- metrics to determine impacts of sharing on privacy and civil

liberties,
- a list of federal agencies receiving the information,
- a list of federal entities receiving the indicators,
- identification of inappropriate stovepiping of shared
- identification of inappropriate barriers to sharing
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Cybersecurity and Information Sharing: Comparison of H.R. 1560 and H.R. 1731

NCPAA—H.R. 1731
PCNA—H.R. 1560
information, information,
- recommendations for improvements or modifications to
- recommendations for improvements or modifications to
sharing under the section.
authorities under the bill.

Requires that the reports be submitted in unclassified form
but permits a classified annex.

Requires public availability of unclassified parts of the reports.
Requires the DHS CPO and Chief Civil Rights and Civil
(1) requires the PCLOB to
Liberties Officer, in consultation with the PCLOB, the DHS
IG, and senior privacy and civil liberties officers of each federal
agency receiving indicators or defensive measures shared with
the NCCIC, to
submit a biennial report to Congress
submit a biennial report to Congress and the President
assessing impacts on privacy and civil liberties of federal
assessing impacts of activities under the bill on and sufficiency
activities under ‘(6)’, including
of policies, procedures, and guidelines in addressing concerns
about privacy and civil liberties, including
recommendations to minimize or mitigate such impacts.
recommendations for improvements or modifications to
authorities under the bill.

Requires that the reports be submitted in unclassified form
but permits a classified annex.

Requires public availability of unclassified parts of the reports.

(a) Biennial Report on Implementation

Adds to ‘Sec. 111’ of the National Security Act

‘(c) Biennial Report on Implementation’

‘(1)’ requires the DNI to submit a report to Congress on
implementation of the bill, ‘(2)’ within one year of enactment
and ‘(1)’ at least biennially thereafter, including

- review of types of indicators shared with the federal
government,

- the degree to which such information may impact privacy
and civil liberties of specific persons, along with quantitative
and qualitative assessment of such impacts and adequacy of
federal efforts to reduce them,

- assessment of sufficiency of policies, procedures, and
guidelines to ensure effective and responsible sharing under
Sec. 4 of the PCNA,

- sufficiency of procedures under Sec. 3 for timely sharing,

- appropriateness of classification of indicators and accounting
of security clearances authorized,

- federal actions taken based on shared indicators, including
appropriateness of subsequent use or dissemination under the
bill,

- description of any significant federal violations of the
requirements of the bill, including assessments of all reports of
federal personnel misusing information provided under the bill
and all disciplinary actions taken, and

- a summary of the number and types of nonfederal entities
receiving classified indicators from the federal government and
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Cybersecurity and Information Sharing: Comparison of H.R. 1560 and H.R. 1731

NCPAA—H.R. 1731
PCNA—H.R. 1560
evaluation of risks and benefits of such sharing.

‘(3)’ permits reports to include recommendations for
improvements or modifications to authorities and processes
under the bill.

‘(4)’ requires that the reports be submitted in unclassified
form but permits a classified annex.
‘(5)’ requires public availability of unclassified parts of the
reports.
‘(7) Uses and Protection of Information’
Sec. 3. Authorizations for Preventing, Detecting,
Analyzing, and Mitigating Cybersecurity Threats
(d) Protection and Use of Information
[Nonfederal Entities]

Permits a nonfederal, nongovernment entity that shares
(3) permits a nonfederal entity [Note: including government
indicators or defensive measures with the NCCIC to
entities], for a cybersecurity purpose, to
use, retain, or disclose indicators and defensive measures,
use indicators or defensive measure shared or received under
solely for cybersecurity purposes.
(d) to monitor or operate a defensive measure on its own
information systems or those of other nonfederal or federal
entities upon written authorization from them, with
Requires reasonable efforts prior to sharing to safeguard
[See (2), p. 11, describing requirements for removal of
personally identifying information from unintended disclosure
personal information].
and unauthorized access or acquisition, and remove such
information where it is reasonably believed when shared to be
unrelated to a cybersecurity risk or incident.
Requires compliance with appropriate restrictions on
further use, retention, or sharing subject to lawful restrictions
subsequent disclosure or retention placed by a federal or
by the sharing entity or otherwise applicable provisions of law.
nonfederal entity on indicators or defensive measures
disclosed to other entities.
Stipulates that the information shall be deemed voluntarily

shared.
Requires implementation and utilization of security controls
(1) requires implementation of appropriate security controls
to protect against unauthorized access or acquisition.
to protect against unauthorized access or acquisition.

Prohibits use of such information to gain an unfair competitive
advantage.
[Federal Entities]
Sec. 4(d) Information Shared with or Provided to the
Federal Government
Permits federal entities receiving indicators or defensive
(5) permits federal entities or personnel receiving indicators
measures from the NCCIC or otherwise under the section to or defensive measures under the bill to, consistent with
use, retain, or further disclose it solely for
otherwise applicable provisions of federal law, use, retain, or
disclose it solely for
- cybersecurity purposes.
- a cybersecurity purpose,

- responding to, prosecuting, or otherwise preventing or
mitigating threats of death or serious bodily harm or offenses
arising out of such threats,

- responding to serious threats to minors, including sexual
exploitation and threats to physical safety, and

- preventing, investigating, disrupting, or prosecuting fraud and
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Cybersecurity and Information Sharing: Comparison of H.R. 1560 and H.R. 1731

NCPAA—H.R. 1731
PCNA—H.R. 1560
identity theft, espionage and censorship, protection of trade
secrets, and serious violent felonies.

Prohibits federal disclosure, retention, or use for any purpose
not permitted under (5).
Requires reasonable efforts prior to sharing to safeguard
Stipulates that the policies, procedures, and guidelines in Sec.
personally identifying information from unintended disclosure
4(a) [on provision of information to the federal government]
and unauthorized access or acquisition, and remove such
and (b) [on privacy and civil liberties] of the bill apply to such
information where it is reasonably believed when shared to be information.
unrelated to a cybersecurity risk or incident.
‘Sec. 111(a)(2)’ requires that procedures for sharing
developed by the DNI include methods for federal entities to
assess, prior to sharing, whether an indicator contains
information known to be personal or personally identifying of
a specific person and to remove such information, or to
implement a technical capability to do so.
Stipulates that the indicators and defensive measures shall be
Sec. 4(d)(3) stipulates that the information shall be deemed
deemed voluntarily shared.
voluntarily shared.
Requires implementation and utilization of security controls
‘Sec. 111(a)(2)’ requires that procedures for sharing
to protect against unauthorized access or acquisition.
developed by the DNI include requirements for federal
entities to implement security controls to protect against
unauthorized access to or acquisition of shared information.

Sec. 9(a) Prohibition of Surveillance
Prohibits use in surveillance or collection activities to track an Stipulates that the bill does not authorize DOD or any
individual’s personally identifiable information.
element of the IC to target a person for surveillance.
Stipulates that the information is exempt from disclosure
Sec. 4(d)(3) [Similar to NCPAA], and
under 5 USC 552 [the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)]
or nonfederal disclosure laws and withheld, without
discretion, from the public under 5 USC 552(3)(B).

exempt from disclosure under nonfederal disclosure laws,
except for those requiring disclosure in criminal prosecutions.


Prohibits use for regulatory purposes.
[Note: No specific corresponding prohibition, but Sec. 4(d)(5)
above prohibits federal disclosure, retention, or use for any
purpose other than those specified in the paragraph.]
Specifies that there is no waiver of applicable privilege or
(1) [Similar to NCPAA].
protection under law, including trade-secret protection;
Requires that the information be considered the commercial,
(2) requires that, consistent with Sec. 3(c)(2), the information
financial, and proprietary information of the nonfederal entity
be considered the commercial, financial, and proprietary
when so designated by it.
information of the originating nonfederal source, when so
designated by such source or nonfederal entity acting with
written authorization from it.
Stipulates that the information is not subject to judicial
(4) [Similar to NCPAA]
doctrine or rules of federal entities on ex-parte
communications.
[Nonfederal Government Entities]
[Note: See also Nonfederal Entities, p. 16]
Permits indicators or defensive measures shared under the
Sec. 3(d)(4) permits state, local, and tribal government
section with state, local, and tribal government to be
entities
used, retained, or further disclosed solely for cybersecurity
to use shared cyber threat indicators for cybersecurity
purposes.
purposes,
responding to, prosecuting, or otherwise preventing or
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Cybersecurity and Information Sharing: Comparison of H.R. 1560 and H.R. 1731

NCPAA—H.R. 1731
PCNA—H.R. 1560
mitigating threats of death or serious bodily harm or offenses
arising out of such threats, or
responding to serious threats to minors, including sexual
exploitation and threats to physical safety.
Requires reasonable efforts prior to sharing to safeguard
[See (2), p. 11, describing requirements for removal of
personally identifying information from unintended disclosure
personal information].
and unauthorized access or acquisition, and remove such
information where it is reasonably believed when shared to be
unrelated to a cybersecurity risk or incident.
Stipulates that the information be considered “commercial,
[Note: Sec. 3(d)(3) stipulates that further use, retention, or
financial, and proprietary” if so designated by the provider.
sharing of information received by a nonfederal entity is
subject to lawful restrictions by the sharing entity or
otherwise applicable provisions of law. See Nonfederal
Entities, p. 16.]
Stipulates that the indicators and defensive measures shall be
Stipulates that such shared indicators be deemed voluntarily
deemed voluntarily shared.
shared and exempt from disclosure, and
Requires implementation and utilization of security controls

to protect against unauthorized access or acquisition.
Exempts the information from disclosure under nonfederal
exempts the shared indicators from disclosure under
disclosure laws or regulations.
nonfederal disclosure laws or regulations, except as required
in criminal prosecutions.
Prohibits use for regulation of lawful activities of nonfederal

entities.
‘(8) Liability Exemptions’
Sec. 6. Protection from Liability

(a) Monitoring of Information Systems
States that “no cause of action shall lie or be maintained in any States that “no cause of action shall lie or be maintained in any
court” against nonfederal, nongovernment entities for
court” against private entities for monitoring information
conducting network awareness under ‘(4)’ conducted under
systems under Sec. 3(a) conducted in good faith in accordance
Sec. 3(a) in accordance with the section or
with the bill or

(b) Sharing or Receipt of Cyber Threat Indicators
for sharing indicators or defensive measures under ‘(3),’ or a
for information sharing under Sec. 3(c) in accordance with the
failure to act if sharing is done in accordance with the section.
bill or a good-faith failure to act if sharing is done in
accordance with the bill.
stipulates that nothing in the section
(c)(1) stipulates that nothing in the section
- requires dismissal of a cause of action against a nonfederal,
- requires dismissal of a cause of action against a nonfederal
nongovernment entity that engages in willful misconduct in
entity that engages in willful misconduct in the course of
the course of activities under the section.
activities under the bill, or
- undermines or limits availability of otherwise applicable
[Identical to NCPAA]
common law or statutory defenses.
Establishes the burden of proof as clear and convincing
(2) [Similar to NCPAA]
evidence from the plaintiff of injury-causing gross negligence
or willful misconduct,
Defines willful misconduct as an act or omission taken
(3) [Similar to NCPAA].
intentional y to achieve a wrongful purpose, knowingly
without justification, and in disregard of risk of highly probable
harm that outweighs any benefit.
‘(9) Federal Government Liability for Violations of
Sec. 5. Federal Government Liability for Violations of
Restrictions on the Use and Protection of Voluntarily
Privacy or Civil Liberties
Shared Information’
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Cybersecurity and Information Sharing: Comparison of H.R. 1560 and H.R. 1731

NCPAA—H.R. 1731
PCNA—H.R. 1560

(a) In General
Makes the federal government liable to injured persons for
Makes the federal government liable to injured persons for
intentional or willful violation of restrictions on federal
intentional or willful violation of privacy and civil liberties
disclosure and use under ‘Sec. 226’, with minimum damages of guidelines under Sec. 4(b), with minimum damages of $1,000
$1,000 plus
plus
reasonable attorney fees as determined by the court and
[Identical to NCPAA]
other reasonable litigation costs in any case under (a) where
“the complainant has substantially prevailed.”

(b) Venue
Stipulates the federal district courts where the case may be
[Identical to NCPAA]
brought as the one in which the complainant resides or the
principal place of business is located, the District of Columbia,
or
where the federal department or agency that disclosed the
where the federal department or agency that violated the
information is located.
guidelines is located.

(c) Statute of Limitations
Sets the statute of limitations at two years from the date of
Sets the statute of limitations at two years from the date of
violation of restrictions in provisions on information-sharing
violation of guidelines on privacy and civil liberties.
authorization (‘(h)(3),’) privacy and civil liberties (‘(h)(6),’) or
federal use and protection of information (‘(h)(7)(B)’).

(d) Exclusive Cause of Action.
Sets action under ‘(h)’ as the exclusive remedy for violation of Sets action under (d) as the exclusive remedy for federal
restrictions under ‘(h)(3),’ ‘(h)(6),’ or ‘(h)(7)(B)’.
violations under the bill.
‘(10) Anti-Trust Exemption’

Exempts nonfederal entities from violation of antitrust laws

for sharing indicators or defensive measures or providing
assistance for cybersecurity purposes, provided that the
action is taken to assist with preventing, investigating, or
mitigating a cybersecurity risk or incident. Prohibits specified
monopolistic activities such as price-fixing.
‘(11) Construction and Preemption’
Sec. 9(b) Otherwise Lawful Disclosures
Stipulates that the section does not limit or prohibit
Stipulates that the bill does not limit or prohibit otherwise
otherwise lawful disclosures or participation in an
lawful disclosures by a nonfederal entity of information to any
investigation by a nonfederal entity of information to any
other federal or nonfederal entity, or
other federal or nonfederal entity.
any otherwise lawful use by a federal entity, whether or not
the disclosures duplicate those made under the bill.

(c) Whistle Blower Protections
Stipulates that the section does not prohibit or limit
Stipulates that the bill does not prohibit or limit disclosures
disclosures protected under 5 USC 2302(b)(8), 5 USC 7211,
protected under 5 USC 2302(b)(8), 5 USC 7211, 10 USC
10 USC 1034, 50 USC 3234, or similar provisions of federal
1034, or similar provisions of federal or state law.
or state law.

(e) Relationship to Other Laws
Stipulates that the section does not affect any requirements
Stipulates that the bill does not affect any requirements under
under other provisions of law for nonfederal entities providing other provisions of law for nonfederal entities providing
information to federal entities.
information to federal entities.

(g) Preservation of Contractual Obligations and
Rights
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Cybersecurity and Information Sharing: Comparison of H.R. 1560 and H.R. 1731

NCPAA—H.R. 1731
PCNA—H.R. 1560
Stipulates that the section does not change contractual
Stipulates that the bill does not change contractual
relationships between nonfederal entities or them and federal
relationships between nonfederal entities or them and federal
entities or abrogate trade-secret or intellectual property
entities, or abrogate trade-secret or intellectual property
rights.
rights.

(h) Anti-Tasking Restriction
Stipulates that the section does not permit the federal
Stipulates that the bill does not permit the federal government
government to require nonfederal entities to provide it with
to require nonfederal entities to provide it with information,
information, or
or
condition sharing of indicators or defensive measures on
condition sharing of indicators on provision of indicators, or
provision by such entities of indicators or defensive measures,
or
condition award of grants, contracts, or purchases on such
condition award of grants, contracts, or purchases on such
provision.
provision.

(i) No Liability for Non-Participation
Stipulates that the section does not create liabilities for any
Stipulates that the bill does not create liabilities for any
nonfederal entities that choose not to engage in the voluntary
nonfederal entities that choose not to engage in the voluntary
activities authorized in the section.
activities authorized in the bill.

(j) Use and Retention of Information
Stipulates that the section does not authorize or modify
Stipulates that the bill does not authorize or modify existing
existing federal authority to retain and use information shared federal authority to retain and use information shared under
under the bill for uses other than those permitted under the
the bill for uses other than those permitted under the bill.
section.
Stipulates that the section does not restrict or condition

sharing for cybersecurity purposes among nonfederal entities
or require sharing by them with the NCCIC.

(k) Federal Preemption
Specifies that the section supersedes state and local laws
(1) specifies that the bill supersedes state and local laws
relating to its provisions
relating to its provisions.

(2) stipulates that the bill does not supersede state and local
laws on use of authorized law enforcement practices and
procedures.
Requires the Secretary to develop policies and procedures for
direct reporting by the NCCIC Director of significant risks
and incidents.
Requires the Secretary to build on existing mechanisms to

promote public awareness about the importance of securing
information systems.
Requires a report from the Secretary within 180 days of

enactment to HSC and HSGAC on efforts to bolster
collaboration on cybersecurity with international partners.
Requires the Secretary, within 60 days of enactment, to

publicly disseminate information about ways of sharing
information with the NCCIC, including enhanced outreach to
CI owners and operators.

(d) Protection of Sources and Methods

Stipulates that the bill does not affect federal enforcement
actions on classified information or conduct of authorized
law-enforcement or intelligence activities, or modify the
authority of the President or federal entities to protect and
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NCPAA—H.R. 1731
PCNA—H.R. 1560
control dissemination of classified information, sources and
methods, and U.S. national security.
Sec. 4. Information Sharing and Analysis

Organizations
Amends Sec. 212 of the HSA to

(1) broaden the functions of ISAOs to include cybersecurity

risk and incident information beyond that relating to critical
infrastructure, and
(2) add by reference the definitions of cybersecurity risk and

incident in 6 USC 148(a).
Sec. 5. Streamlining of Department of Homeland

Security Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection
Organization
(a) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection

Directorate
Renames the DHS National Protection and Programs

Directorate as the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Protection. [Sic.]
(b) Senior Leadership of the Cybersecurity and

Infrastructure Protection Directorate
Provides a specific title for the undersecretary in charge of

critical infrastructure protection as U/S-CIP. Also adds two
deputy undersecretaries, one for cybersecurity and the other
for infrastructure protection. Does not require new
appointments for current officeholders and specifies that
appointment of the undersecretaries does not require Senate
confirmation.
(c) Report

Requires a report to HSC and HSGAC from the U/S-CIP

within 90 days of enactment on the feasibility of becoming an
operational component of DHS, If that is determined to be
the best option for mission fulfillment, requires submission of
a legislative proposal and implementation plan. Also requires
that the report include plans for more effective execution of
the cybersecurity mission, including expediting of information
sharing agreements.
Sec. 6. Cyber Incident Response Plans

(a) In General

Amends Sec. 227 of the HSA to change “Plan” to “Plans” in

the title, to specify the U/S-CIP as the responsible official, and
to add a new subsection:
‘(b) Updates to the Cyber Incident Annex to the

National Response Framework’
Requires the Secretary, in coordination with other agency

heads and in accordance with the National Cybersecurity
Incident Response Plan, to update, maintain, and exercise
regularly the Cyber Incident Annex to the DHS National
Response Framework.
(b) Clerical Amendment

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PCNA—H.R. 1560
Amends the table of contents of the act to reflect the title

change made by (a).
Sec. 7. Security and Resiliency of Public Safety

Communications; Cybersecurity Awareness
Campaign
(a) In General

Adds two new sections to the HSA:

‘Sec. 230. Security and Resiliency of Public Safety

Communications’
Requires the NCCIC to coordinate with the DHS Office of

Emergency Communications to assess information on
cybersecurity incidents involving public safety communications
to facilitate continuous improvement in those
communications.
‘Sec. 231. Cybersecurity Awareness Campaign’

‘(a) In General’

Requires the U/S-CIP to develop and implement an awareness
campaign on risks and best practices for mitigation and
response, including at a minimum public service
announcements and information on best practices that are
vendor- and technology-neutral.
‘(b) Consultation’

Requires consultation with a wide range of stakeholders.

(b) Clerical Amendment

Amends the table of contents of the act to include the new

sections.
Sec. 8. Critical Infrastructure Protection Research

and Development
(a) Strategic Plan; Public-Private Consortiums

Adds a new section to the HSA:

‘Sec. 318. Research and Development Strategy for

Critical Infrastructure Protection’
‘(a) In General’

Requires the Secretary to submit to Congress within 180 days
of enactment, and biennially thereafter, a strategic plan to
guide federal research and development in technology relating
to both cyber- and physical security for CI.
‘(b) Contents of Plan’

Requires the plan to include

- CI risks and technology gaps identified in consultation with
stakeholders and a resulting risk and gap analysis,
- prioritized needs based on that analysis, emphasizing
technologies to address rapidly evolving threats and
technology and including clearly defined roadmaps,
- facilities and capabilities required to meet those needs,
- current and planned programmatic initiatives to foster
technology advancement and deployment, including
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PCNA—H.R. 1560
col aborative opportunities, and
- progress on meeting plan requirements.
‘(c) Coordination’

Requires coordination between the DHS Under Secretaries

for Science and Technology and for the National Protection
and Programs Directorate. [Note: Sec. 5 renames the latter
position as the U/S-CIP.]
‘(d) Consultation’

Requires the Under Secretary for Science and Technology to

consult with CI Sector Coordinating Councils, heads of other
relevant federal agencies, and state, local, and tribal
governments as appropriate.
(b) Clerical Amendment

Amends the table of contents of the act to include the new

section.
Sec. 9. Report on Reducing Cybersecurity Risks in

DHS Data Centers
Requires a report to HSC and HSGAC within one year of

enactment on the feasibility of creating an environment within
DHS for reduction in cybersecurity risks in data centers,
including but not limited to increased compartmentalization of
systems with a mix of security controls among compartments.

Sec. 8. Report on Cybersecurity Threats

(a) Report Required

Requires the DNI, in consultation with heads of other
appropriate elements of the IC, to submit within 180 days of
enactment a report to the House and Senate Intelligence
Committees on cybersecurity threats, including attacks, theft,
and data breaches.

(b) Contents

Requires that the report include

(1) assessments of current U.S. intelligence sharing and
cooperation relationships with other countries on such
threats directed against the United States and threatening U.S.
national security interests, the economy, and intellectual
property, identifying the utility of relationships, participation
by elements of the IC, and possible improvements,

(2) a list and assessment of countries and nonstate actors
constituting the primary sources of such threats,

(3) description of how much U.S. capabilities to respond to
or prevent such threats to the U.S. private sector are
degraded by delays in notification of the threats,

(4) assessment of additional technologies or capabilities that
would enhance the U.S. ability to prevent and respond to such
threats, and

(5) assessment of private-sector technologies or practices
that could be rapidly fielded to assist the IC in preventing and
responding to such threats.
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(c) Form of Report

Requires that the report be unclassified, but may include a
classified annex.

(d) Public Availability of Report

Requires that the unclassified portion of the report be publicly
available.

(e) Intelligence Community Defined

Defines intelligence community as in 50 USC 3003.
Sec. 10. Assessment

Requires the Comptroller General, within two years of

enactment, to submit a report to HSC and HSGAC assessing
implementation of the bill and, as practicable, findings on
increased sharing at NCCIC and throughout the United
States.
Sec. 11. Consultation

Requires a report from the U/S-CIP on “the feasibility of a

prioritization plan in the event of simultaneous multi-CI
incidents.
Sec. 12. Technical Assistance

Requires the DHS IG to review US-CERT and ICS-CERT

operations to assess their capacity for responding to current
and potential y increasing requests for technical assistance
from nonfederal entities.
Sec. 13. Prohibition on New Regulatory Authority
Sec. 9(l) Regulatory Authority
Stipulates that the bill does not grant DHS new authority to
Stipulates that the bill does not authorize (1) promulgation of
promulgate regulations or set standards relating to
regulations or (2) establishment of regulatory authority not
cybersecurity for nonfederal, nongovernmental entities.
specified by the bill, or (3) duplicative or conflicting regulatory
actions.
Sec. 14 Sunset

Ends all requirements for reports in the bill seven years after

enactment.
Sec. 8. Prohibition on New Funding

Stipulates that the bill does not authorize additional funds for

implementation and must be carried out using available
amounts.

Sec. 10. Conforming Amendments

Adds information shared under the bill to the kinds of
information exempt from disclosure under FOIA.
Source: CRS.
Notes: See “Notes on the Table.”

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Cybersecurity and Information Sharing: Comparison of H.R. 1560 and H.R. 1731

Author Contact Information
Eric A. Fischer
Senior Specialist in Science and Technology
efischer@crs.loc.gov, 7-7071

Acknowledgments
Stephanie Logan, an intern, provided valuable assistance with the comparative analysis and other
preparation for this report.
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