Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
April 16, 2015
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21968

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

Summary
Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic divisions reemerged after the 2011 U.S. military withdrawal to fuel a
major challenge to Iraq’s stability. Many of Iraq’s Sunni Arabs appear willing to support even
radical Sunni Islamist insurgents if doing so will reduce Shiite political domination. Iraq’s Kurds
have been separately embroiled in political and territorial disputes with Baghdad, although those
differences have been muted as the Kurds and the central government address the threat from the
Sunni Islamist extremist group called the Islamic State. Building on successes in Syria and the
political rifts in Iraq, Islamic State fighters took control of several cities in Anbar Province in
early 2014 and captured Mosul and several other mostly Sunni cities in June 2014.
The Islamic State’s gains in Iraq have prompted a U.S. response that includes direct U.S. military
action as well as efforts to promote political inclusiveness in Iraq. The political component of
U.S. strategy has shown some success in the replacement of former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki
with another Prime Minister, Haydar al-Abbadi. Although both men are from the Shiite Islamist
Da’wa Party, Abbadi appears more willing than was Maliki to compromise with Sunni interests,
as well as with Iraq’s Kurdish minority that runs an autonomous region in northern Iraq
(Kurdistan Regional Government, KRG). Abbadi visited Washington, DC for high level meetings
during April 14-16, 2015, during which he requested increased U.S. financial and military aid for
Iraq’s military effort against the Islamic State organization.
The military component of U.S. strategy has begun to show some success; the Defense
Department asserted in mid-April 2015 that about 30% of the territory in Iraq seized by the
Islamic State has been retaken. The ground retrieved includes the key Sunni-inhabited city of
Tikrit. However, the Islamic State has continued to attack Iraqi forces in Anbar Province and
elsewhere, suggesting the group has not been strategically crippled. The Iraqi gains have been
produced in part by the U.S. Administration’s deployment of 3,100 military personnel to advise
and train the ISF and the KRG’s peshmerga forces; the deployment of 1,500 advisers and trainers
by U.S. partner countries; and the coalition’s use of air power against Islamic State positions. The
United States is also proceeding with pre-existing Foreign Military Sales of combat aircraft, as
well as with new sales of tanks and armored vehicles to replenish the equipment lost during the
2014 ISF partial collapse.
The Islamic State challenge has upended Iraqi politics. The ISF retreat from northern Iraq in 2014
enabled the KRG’s peshmerga forces to seize control of the long-coveted city of Kirkuk and its
crucial oil fields, giving the Kurds leverage to begin resolving disputes with the central
government over the separate exportation of oil from the KRG-controlled region. And, the crisis
has caused Shiite militia forces to revive their military operations; these militias are politically
aligned not only with dominant Shiite factions in Iraq but also are advised and trained by Iran.
These forces have helped the ISF recapture territory from the Islamic State, but the militias have
also reportedly committed human rights abuses against many Sunnis and thereby hindered
government efforts to win back Sunni loyalties. The United States has repeatedly ruled out any
direct military cooperation with the militias or with their backers in Tehran. Abbadi has had
difficulty controlling the Shiite militias but has acknowledged publicly that Sunni security forces
will need to be empowered to secure Sunni areas that might be freed from Islamic State control.
Please see also CRS Report R43612, The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy, by Christopher
M. Blanchard et al.
Congressional Research Service

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

Contents
Overview of the Post-Saddam Political Transition .......................................................................... 1
Initial Transition and Construction of the Political System ....................................................... 1
Permanent Constitution ....................................................................................................... 3
December 15, 2005, Elections Establish the First Full-Term Government ......................... 4
2006-2011: Sectarian Conflict and U.S. “Surge” ............................................................................. 4
Iraqi Governance Strengthens And Sectarian Conflict Abates .................................................. 5
U.S. Involvement Winds Down After 2010 Iraqi Election ........................................................ 7
The Post-2011 Diplomatic and Economic Relationship ...................................................... 8
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and U.S. Support .......................................................................... 10
Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I).................................................................... 10
Major Arms Sales .............................................................................................................. 11
Other Post-2011 Security Assistance and Training Programs ........................................... 12
Post-2011 Regional Reinforcement Capability ................................................................. 13
Political and Security Threats Remaining at the Time of the U.S. Withdrawal ............................. 14
Armed Sunni Groups ............................................................................................................... 14
Al Qaeda in Iraq/Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Islamic State ..................... 14
Naqshabandi Order (JRTN) and Ex-Saddam Military Commanders ................................ 15
Sunni Tribal Leaders/Sons of Iraq Fighters ....................................................................... 15
The Sadr Faction and Shiite Militias ....................................................................................... 16
Shiite Militia/Popular Mobilization Forces ....................................................................... 17
The Kurds and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) .................................................. 18
KRG Structure/Intra-Kurdish Divisions ............................................................................ 18
KRG-Baghdad Disputes .................................................................................................... 19
Tier Three Designations of the KDP and PUK.................................................................. 21
Post-U.S. Withdrawal Political Unraveling ................................................................................... 21
Insurrection Escalates as 2013 Ends ........................................................................................ 23
June 2014 Islamic State-Led Offensive and ISF Collapse ...................................................... 23
Government Formation Process Amidst Security Collapse .............................................. 24
U.S. Policy Response to the Islamic State in Iraq .......................................................................... 28
Results of the Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq and Way Forward ..................................... 32
Governance, Economic Resources, and Human Rights Issues ...................................................... 33
Economic Development and the Energy Sector ...................................................................... 33
General Human Rights Issues.................................................................................................. 34
Trafficking in Persons ....................................................................................................... 35
Media and Free Expression ............................................................................................... 35
Corruption ......................................................................................................................... 35
Religious Freedom/Situation of Religious Minorities ....................................................... 36
Women’s Rights ................................................................................................................ 37
Mass Graves ...................................................................................................................... 37
Regional Relationships .................................................................................................................. 37
Iran ........................................................................................................................................... 38
Syria ......................................................................................................................................... 39
Turkey ...................................................................................................................................... 39
Gulf States ............................................................................................................................... 40
Congressional Research Service

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy


Tables
Table 1. Major Political Factions in Post-Saddam Iraq ................................................................... 2
Table 2. Major Coalitions in April 30, 2014, COR Elections ........................................................ 26
Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Iraq Since FY2003 ............................................................................. 42
Table 4. Recent Democracy Assistance to Iraq: FY2009-2012 ..................................................... 43

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 43

Congressional Research Service

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

Overview of the Post-Saddam Political Transition
A U.S.-led military coalition, in which about 250,000 U.S. troops participated, crossed the border
from Kuwait into Iraq on March 19, 2003, to oust the regime of Saddam Hussein and eliminate
suspected programs to produce weapons of mass destruction (WMD). After several weeks of
combat, the regime of Saddam Hussein fell on April 9, 2003. During the 2003-2011 presence of
U.S. forces, Iraq completed a transition from the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein to a plural
political system in which varying sects and ideological and political factions compete in elections.
A series of elections began in 2005, after a one-year occupation period and a subsequent seven-
month interim period of Iraqi self-governance that gave each community a share of power and
prestige to promote cooperation and unity. Still, disputes over the relative claim of each
community on power and economic resources permeated almost every issue in Iraq and were
never fully resolved. These unresolved differences—muted during the last years of the U.S.
military presence—reemerged in mid-2012 and have returned Iraq to sectarian conflict.
After the fall of Saddam Hussein, all U.S. economic sanctions against Iraq were lifted, removing
impediments to U.S. business dealings with Iraq. During 2003-2004, Iraq was removed from the
“terrorism list,” and the Iraq Sanctions Act (Sections 586-586J of P.L. 101-513), which codified a
U.S. trade embargo imposed after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, was terminated. In subsequent years,
a series of U.N. Security Council resolutions removed most remaining “Chapter VII” U.N.
sanctions against Iraq that stemmed from the 1990 invasion of Kuwait—opening Iraq to receiving
arms from any country. Iraq still is required to comply with international proliferation regimes
that bar it from reconstituting Saddam-era weapons of mass destruction programs, and still pays
into a U.N.-run fund to compensate victims of the 1990 Kuwait invasion. On October 24, 2012,
Iraq demonstrated its commitment to compliance with remaining proliferation restrictions by
signing the “Additional Protocol” of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Initial Transition and Construction of the Political System
After the fall of Saddam’s regime, the United States set up an occupation structure based on
concerns that immediate sovereignty would favor established Islamist and pro-Iranian factions
over nascent pro-Western secular parties. In May 2003, President Bush named Ambassador
L. Paul Bremer to head a Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which was recognized by the
United Nations as an occupation authority. In July 2003, Bremer ended Iraqi transition
negotiations and appointed a non-sovereign Iraqi advisory body, the 25-member Iraq Governing
Council (IGC). U.S. and Iraqi negotiators, advised by a wide range of international officials and
experts, drafted a Transitional Administrative Law (TAL, interim constitution), which became
effective on March 4, 2004.1
On June 28, 2004, Bremer appointed an Iraqi interim government, ending the occupation period.
The TAL also laid out a 2005 elections roadmap, based on agreement among all Iraqi factions that
elections should determine future political outcomes. The interim government was headed by a
prime minister (Iyad al-Allawi) and a president (Sunni tribalist Ghazi al-Yawar). It was heavily
populated by parties and factions that had long campaigned to oust Saddam.

1 Text, in English, is at http://www.constitution.org/cons/iraq/TAL.html.
Congressional Research Service
1

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

In accordance with the dates specified in the TAL, the first elections process, on January 30,
2005, produced a 275-seat transitional parliament and government that supervised writing a new
constitution, held a public referendum on a new constitution, and then held elections for a full-
term government. Elections for four-year-term provincial councils in all 18 provinces (“provincial
elections”) and a Kurdistan regional assembly (111 seats) were held concurrently. The election
was conducted according to the “proportional representation/closed list” election system, in
which voters chose among “political entities” (a party, a coalition of parties, or people). The
ballot included 111 entities, 9 of which were multi-party coalitions. Sunni Arabs (20% of the
overall population) boycotted and won only 17 seats in the transitional parliament. The
government included PUK leader Jalal Talabani as president and Da’wa party leader Ibrahim al-
Jafari as prime minister. Sunni Arabs held the posts of parliament speaker, deputy president, one
of the deputy prime ministers, and six ministers, including defense.
Table 1. Major Political Factions in Post-Saddam Iraq
Faction Leadership/Description
Da’wa Party/State of Law
The largest faction of the Da’wa Party has been led since 2006 by Nuri al-Maliki, who
Coalition
displaced former Da’wa leader (and former Prime Minister) Ibrahim al-Jaafari. Da’wa
was active against Saddam but also had operatives in some Persian Gulf states, including
Kuwait, where they committed attacks against the ruling family during the 1980s. Da’wa
is the core of the “State of Law” political coalition. Iraq’s current Prime Minister,
Haydar al-Abbadi, is a Da’wa member.
Islamic Supreme Council
Current leader is Ammar al-Hakim, who succeeded his father Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim
of Iraq (ISCI)
upon his death in 2009. The Hakims descend from the revered late Grand Ayatol ah
Muhsin Al Hakim, who hosted Iran’s Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini when he was in exile
in Iraq during 1964-1978. Abd al-Aziz’s elder brother, Mohammad Baqr al-Hakim,
headed the movement when it was an underground armed opposition group against
Saddam, but he was killed outside a Najaf mosque shortly after returning to Iraq
following Saddam’s overthrow.
Sadrists
Thirty-two year old Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr leads a sizeable Shiite political faction.
Sadr is the son of revered Ayatollah Mohammad Sadiq Al Sadr, who was killed by
Saddam’s security forces in 1999, and a relative of Mohammad Baqr Al Sadr, a Shiite
theoretician and contemporary and colleague of Ayatol ah Khomeini. Moqtada formed a
Shiite militia cal ed the Mahdi Army during the U.S. military presence, which was
formally disbanded in 2009 but has regrouped under an alternate name to combat the
Islamic State organization. The Sadrists have competed in all Iraqi elections since 2006.
In 2014, the group competed under the “Al Ahrar” (Liberal) banner.
Kurdish Factions:
Masoud Barzani heads the KDP and is the elected President of the Kurdistan Regional
Kurdistan Democratic
Government (KRG). The PUK is led by Jalal Talabani, who was President of Iraq until
Party (KDP), Patriotic
the 2014 government section process. Iraq’s current president, Fouad Masoum, is a
Union of Kurdistan (PUK), senior PUK leader as well. Gorran (“Change”) is an offshoot of the PUK.
and Gorran
Iraqi National
Led by Iyad al-Allawi, a longtime anti-Saddam activist who was transitional Prime
Alliance/”Iraqiyya”
Minister during June 2004-February 2005. Al awi is a Shiite Muslim but most of his bloc’s
supporters are Sunnis, of which many are ex-Baath Party members. Iraqiyya bloc
fractured after the 2010 national election into blocs loyal to Allawi and to various Sunni
leaders including ex-COR peaker Osama al-Nujaifi and deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-
Mutlaq. Allawi and Nujaifi are both vice presidents in the government formed in
September 2014, and Mutlaq has retained his deputy prime ministerial post.
Iraqi Islamic Party
Sunni faction loyal to ousted Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi. Hashimi was part of the
Iraqiyya alliance in the 2010 election. He fled a Maliki-ordered arrest warrant in late
2011 and has remained mostly in Turkey since.
Sources: Various press reports and author conversations with Iraq experts.
Congressional Research Service
2

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

Permanent Constitution2
A 55-member drafting committee—in which Sunnis were underrepresented—produced a draft
constitution, which was adopted in a public referendum of October 15, 2005. It major provisions
are as follows:
• The constitution did not stipulate any ethnic or sectarian-based distribution of
positions. An informal agreement developed in the process of forming successive
governments in which a Shiite Muslim is Prime Minister, a Kurd is President,
and a Sunni is Speaker of the Council of Representatives (COR, parliament).
• The three Kurdish-controlled provinces of Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniyah to
constitute a legal “region” administered by the Kurdistan Regional Government
(KRG), which has its own elected president and parliament (Article 113). Legal
regions are able to organize internal security forces, legitimizing the Kurds’
fielding of their peshmerga militia (Article 117). This continued a TAL provision.
There would be a December 31, 2007, deadline to hold a referendum on whether
Kirkuk (Tamim Province) would join the Kurdish region (Article 140).
• Any two or more provinces may join together to form a new “region.” This
provision was implemented by an October 2006 law on formation of regions.
• Islam was designated as “a main source” of legislation.
• All orders of the CPA are to be applicable until amended (Article 126), and a
“Federation Council” (Article 62), a second chamber with size and powers would
be determined in future law (not adopted to date).
• A 25% electoral goal was set for women (Article 47).
• Families would choose which courts to use for family issues (Article 41), and
only primary education is mandatory (Article 34). Islamic law experts and civil
law judges would serve on the federal supreme court (Article 89).
• The central government distributes oil and gas revenues from “current fields” in
proportion to population, and regions will have a role in allocating revenues from
new energy discoveries (Article 109).
These provisions left many disputes unresolved, particularly the balance between central
government and regional and local authority and the amount of discretion given to males in
family legal matters. The TAL made approval of the constitution subject to a veto if a two-thirds
majority of voters in any three provinces voted it down. Sunnis registered in large numbers (70%-
85%) to try to defeat the constitution, despite a U.S.-mediated agreement of October 11, 2005, to
have a future vote on amendments to the constitution. The Sunni provinces of Anbar and
Salahuddin had a 97% and 82% “no” vote, respectively, but the constitution was adopted because
Nineveh Province voted 55% “no”—short of the two-thirds “no” majority needed to vote the
constitution down.

2 Text of the Iraqi constitution is at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/
AR2005101201450.html.
Congressional Research Service
3

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

December 15, 2005, Elections Establish the First Full-Term Government
The December 15, 2005, elections were for a full-term (four-year) national government (also in
line with the schedule laid out in the TAL). Each province contributed a set number of seats to a
“Council of Representatives” (COR), a formula adopted to attract Sunni participation. There were
361 political “entities,” including 19 multi-party coalitions, competing in a “closed list” voting
system (in which votes are cast only for parties and coalitions, not individual candidates). The
Shiites and Kurds again emerged dominant. The COR was inaugurated on March 16, 2006, and
Jafari was replaced with a then-obscure Da’wa figure, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, as Prime Minister.
Talabani was selected to continue as president, with deputies Adel Abd al-Mahdi (incumbent) of
ISCI and Tariq al-Hashimi, leader of the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP). Of the 37 Cabinet posts,
there were 19 Shiites; 9 Sunnis; 8 Kurds; and 1 Christian. Four were women.
2006-2011: Sectarian Conflict and U.S. “Surge”
The election did not resolve the Sunnis’ grievances over their diminished positions in the power
structure, and subsequent events reinforced their political weakness and sense of resentment. The
bombing of a major Shiite shrine (Al Askari Mosque) in the Sunni-dominated city of Samarra
(Salahuddin Province) in February 2006 set off major Sunni-Shiite violence that became so
serious that many experts, by the end of 2006, were considering the U.S. mission as failing. The
“Iraq Study Group” concluded that U.S. policy required major change.3
In August 2006, the United States and Iraq agreed on “benchmarks” that, if implemented, might
achieve political reconciliation. Under Section 1314 of a FY2007 supplemental appropriation
(P.L. 110-28), “progress” on 18 political and security benchmarks—as assessed in Administration
reports due by July 15, 2007, and September 15, 2007—was required for the United States to
provide $1.5 billion in Economic Support Funds (ESF) to Iraq.4 In early 2007, the United States
began a “surge” of about 30,000 additional U.S. forces—bringing U.S. troop levels from their
2004-2006 levels of 138,000 to a high of about 170,000—intended to blunt insurgent momentum
and take advantage of growing Sunni Arab rejection of Islamist extremist groups. The
Administration cited as partial justification for the surge the Iraq Study Group’s recommendation
of such a step. As 2008 progressed, citing the achievement of many of the agreed benchmarks and
a dramatic drop in sectarian violence, the Bush Administration asserted that political
reconciliation was advancing. However, U.S. officials maintained that the extent and durability of
the reconciliation would depend on further compromises among ethnic groups.



3 “The Iraq Study Group Report.” Vintage Books, 2006. The Iraq Study Group was funded by the conference report on
P.L. 109-234, FY2006 supplemental, which provided $1 million to the U.S. Institute of Peace for operations of an Iraq
Study Group. The legislation did not specify the Group’s exact mandate or its composition.
4 President Bush exercised the waiver provision of that law in order to provide that aid. The law also mandated an
assessment by the Government Accountability Office, by September 1, 2007, of Iraqi performance on the benchmarks,
as well as an outside assessment of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).
Congressional Research Service
4

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

United Nations Assistance Mission—Iraq (UNAMI)
The United Nations contributed to political reconciliation through its U.N. Assistance Mission—Iraq (UNAMI). The
head of UNAMI is also the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Iraq. The mandate of UNAMI was
established in 2003 and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2110 of July 24, 2013, provided the latest yearly renewal
(until July 31, 2014). UNAMI’s primary activities have been to help build civil society, assist vulnerable populations,
consult on possible solutions to the Arab-Kurd dispute over Kirkuk Province (see below), and resolve the status of
the Iranian opposition group People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran that remains in Iraq (see below). The first head
of the office was killed in a car bombing on his headquarters in August 2003. In late February 2015, the U.N.
Secretary General announced that Jan Kubis, the former head of UNAMA in Afghanistan, as head of UNAMI,
replacing Bulgarian diplomat Nickolay Mladenov.

Iraqi Governance Strengthens And Sectarian Conflict Abates
The passage of Iraqi laws in 2008 that were considered crucial to reconciliation, continued
reductions in violence accomplished by the U.S. surge, and the Sunni militant turn away from
violence, facilitated political stabilization. A March 2008 offensive ordered by Maliki against the
Sadr faction and other militants in Basra and environs (Operation Charge of the Knights) pacified
the city and caused many Sunnis and Kurds to see Maliki as willing to take on armed groups even
if they were Shiite. This contributed to a decision in July 2008 by several Sunni ministers to end a
one-year boycott of the Cabinet.
U.S. officials also pressed Maliki to devolve power from Baghdad, in large part to give Iraq’s
Sunnis more ownership of their own affairs and regions. Such devolution could take the form of
establishment of new “regions,” modeled along the lines of the KRG, or allowing provinces or
groups of provinces more autonomy and powers. Opponents of that proposal asserted that
devolving power from the central government would lead to the breakup of Iraq.
In part to address U.S. advice, in 2008, a “provincial powers law” (Law Number 21) was adopted
to decentralize governance by delineating substantial powers for provincial (governorate)
councils, such as enacting provincial legislation, regulations, and procedures, and choosing the
province’s governor and two deputy governors. The provincial administrations, which serve four-
year terms, draft provincial budgets and implement federal policies. Some central government
funds are given as grants directly to provincial administrations for their use. Provinces have a
greater claim on Iraqi financial resources than do districts, and many communities support
converting their areas into provinces. The 2008 law replaced a 1969 Provinces Law (Number
159).
Since enactment, Law 21 has been amended on several occasions to try to accommodate restive
areas of Iraq. A June 2013 amendment gave provincial governments substantially more power, a
move intended to satisfy Sunnis. In December 2013, the central government announced it would
convert the district of Halabja into a separate province—Halabja is symbolic to the Kurds because
of Saddam’s use of chemical weapons there in 1988. In January 2014, the government announced
other districts that would undergo similar conversions: Fallujah (in Anbar Province), a hotbed of
Sunni restiveness; Tuz Khurmato (in Salahuddin Province) and Tal Affar (in Nineveh Province),
both of which have Turkmen majorities; and the Nineveh Plains (also in Nineveh), which has a
mostly Assyrian Christian population. These announcements came amid a major Sunni uprising
Congressional Research Service
5

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

in Anbar Province, discussed below, and appeared intended to keep minorities and Sunnis on the
side of the government. The Cabinet decisions have not been implemented to date.
Second Provincial Elections in 2009
The second set of provincial elections were planned for October 1, 2008, but were postponed
when Kurdish opposition caused a presidential veto of a July 2008 draft election law that
provided for equal division of power in Kirkuk (among Kurds, Arabs, and Turkomans). The
proposal would have diluted Kurdish dominance there. On September 24, 2008, the COR passed
another election law, providing for the provincial elections by January 31, 2009, but postponing
provincial elections in Kirkuk and the three KRG provinces. About 14,500 candidates (including
4,000 women) vied for the 440 provincial council seats in the 14 Arab-dominated provinces of
Iraq. About 17 million Iraqis (any Iraqi 18 years of age or older) were eligible for the vote, which
was run by the Iraqi Higher Election Commission (IHEC). Pre-election violence was minimal but
turnout was lower than expected at about 51%.
The certified vote totals (March 29, 2009) gave Maliki’s State of Law Coalition a very strong 126
out of the 440 seats available (28%). Its main Shiite rival, ISCI, went from 200 council seats to
only 50, a result observers attributed to its perceived close ties to Iran. Iyad al-Allawi’s faction
won 26 seats, a gain of 8 seats, and a Sunni faction loyal to Tariq al-Hashimi won 32 seats, a loss
of 15. Sunni tribal leaders who boycotted the 2005 elections participated in the 2009 elections.
Their slate came in first in Anbar Province. Although Maliki’s State of Law coalition fared well,
his party still needed to strike bargains with rival factions to form provincial administrations.
The March 7, 2010 National Elections
With the strong showing of the State of Law list in the provincial elections, Maliki was favored to
retain his position in the March 7, 2010 COR elections that would choose the next government.
Yet, as 2009 progressed, Maliki’s image as protector of law and order was tarnished by several
high-profile attacks, including major bombings in Baghdad on August 20, 2009, in which the
buildings housing the Ministry of Finance and of Foreign Affairs were heavily damaged. As
Maliki’s image faded, Shiite unity broke down and a strong rival Shiite slate took shape—the
“Iraqi National Alliance (INA)” consisting of ISCI, the Sadrists, and other Shiite figures. Sunni
Arabs rallied around the nominally cross-sectarian Iraq National Movement (Iraqiyya) of former
transitional Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi.
The election was clouded by several disputes. Under the Iraqi constitution, the elections were to
be held by January 31, 2010, in order to allow 45 days before the March 15, 2010, expiry of the
COR’s term. The COR repeatedly missed self-imposed deadlines to pass election laws that run
the election. Many COR members leaned toward a closed list system, but those who wanted an
open list vote (allowing voters to vote for candidates as well as coalition slates) prevailed. Each
province served as a single constituency.
The version of the election law passed by the COR on November 8, 2009 (141 out of 195 COR
deputies voting), expanded the size of the COR to 325 total seats. Of these, 310 were allocated by
province, with the constituency sizes ranging from Baghdad’s 68 seats to Muthanna’s seven. The
remaining 15 seats were to be minority reserved seats and “compensatory seats”—seats allocated
from “leftover” votes for parties and slates that did not meet a minimum threshold to win a seat.
Congressional Research Service
6

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

The goal of bringing Sunni Arabs further into the political structure was jeopardized by a dispute
over candidate eligibility. In January 2010, the Justice and Accountability Commission (JAC, the
successor to the De-Baathification Commission that worked since the fall of Saddam to purge
former Baathists from government) invalidated the candidacies of 499 individuals (out of 6,500
candidates running) on various slates. Appeals reinstated many of them. Maliki later named the
Minister for Human Rights to also serve as JAC chairman. The JAC continues to vet candidates.
The final candidate list contained about 6,170 total candidates spanning 85 coalitions (depicted in
Table 2). Total turnout was about 62%, and certified results were announced on June 1, 2010,
showing Iraqiyya winning two seats more than did Maliki’s State of Law slate. The Iraqi
constitution (Article 73) mandates that the COR “bloc with the largest number” of members
should be afforded the first opportunity to form a government. However, on March 28, 2010,
Iraq’s Supreme Court ruled that a coalition that forms after the election could be deemed to meet
that requirement. On October 1, 2010, a six-month deadlock among major blocs over major
positions broke when Maliki received the backing of most of the 40 COR Sadrist deputies. The
Obama Administration initially appeared to favor Allawi’s efforts to form a governing coalition
but, as that effort failed, the Administration acquiesced to a second Maliki term.
On November 10, 2010, an “Irbil Agreement” was reached in which (1) Maliki and Talabani
would serve another term; (2) Iraqiyya would be extensively represented in government—one of
its figures would become COR Speaker, another would be defense minister, and another
(presumably Allawi himself) would chair an oversight body called the “National Council for
Strategic Policies”;5 and (3) de-Baathification laws would be eased. At the November 11, 2010,
COR session to implement the agreement, Iraqiyya figure Usama al-Nujaifi (brother of Nineveh
Governor Atheel Nujaifi) was elected COR speaker. Several days later, Talabani was reelected
president and Talabani tapped Maliki as prime minister-designate, giving him until December 25,
2010, to achieve COR confirmation of a Cabinet. That requirement was met on December 21,
2010. The Cabinet divided the positions among the major factions, but Maliki, who retained the
Prime Ministership and formally held the positions of Defense Minister, Interior Minister, and
Minister of State for National Security. Other officials headed these ministries on an “acting”
basis, without the full authority they would normally have as COR-approved ministers.
Some experts assert that the Islamic State gains in Iraq were an inevitable outgrowth of the U.S.
withdrawal from Iraq in 2011. Others argue that a continuing U.S. presence in Iraq would not
have altered the Iraqi political dysfunction that contributed to the crisis. The withdrawal process
began on February 27, 2009, when President Obama announced that U.S. troop levels in Iraq
would decline to 50,000 by September 2010 (from 138,000 in early 2009) and the U.S. mission
would shift from combat to training the ISF. U.S. troops ceased patrolling Iraqi cities as of June
30, 2009. With the formal end of the U.S. combat mission on August 31, 2010, U.S. force levels
were at 47,000 and declined steadily thereafter until the last U.S. troop contingent crossed into
Kuwait on December 18, 2011.
U.S. Involvement Winds Down After 2010 Iraqi Election
As the second full term government took shape in Iraq, the United States began implementing its
long-planned military withdrawal from Iraq. A full U.S. withdrawal by the end of 2011 was a

5 Fadel, Leila and Karen DeYoung. “Iraqi Leaders Crack Political Deadlock.” Washington Post, November 11, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
7

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

stipulation of the November 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement (SA), which took effect on
January 1, 2009. With that deadline approaching, fears of expanded Iranian influence, and
perceived remaining deficiencies in the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) caused U.S. officials to seek
to revise the SA to keep some U.S. troops in Iraq after 2011. Some U.S. experts feared the rifts
among major ethnic and sectarian communities were still wide enough that Iraq could still
become a “failed state” unless some U.S. troops remained. U.S. officials emphasized that the ISF
remained unable to defend Iraq’s airspace and borders, and Iraqi commanders indicated that the
ISF would be unable to execute full external defense until 2020-2024.6 Renegotiating the SA to
allow for a continued U.S. troop presence required discussions with the Iraqi government and a
ratification vote of the Iraqi COR; Iraq’s constitution requires a COR vote on formal bilateral
agreements with foreign countries.
Several high-level U.S. visits and statements urged the Iraqis to consider extending the U.S. troop
presence. Maliki told Speaker of the House John Boehner during his April 16, 2011, visit to
Baghdad that Iraq would welcome U.S. training and arms after that time.7 Subsequently, Maliki
stated that a continued U.S. troops presence would require a “consensus” among political blocs
(which he later defined as at least 70% concurrence)8—an apparent effort to isolate the Sadr
faction, the most vocal opponent of a continuing U.S. presence. On August 3, 2011, most major
factions gave Maliki their backing to negotiate an SA extension, but Sadr threatened to activate
his Mahdi Army militia to oppose any extension of the U.S. presence. As U.S.-Iraq negotiations
on a post-2011 U.S. presence got underway, scenarios and proposals ranging from 3, 000 to
15,000 remaining U.S. troops were widely discussed.9
With Sadrist opposition unyielding, on October 5, 2011, Iraq stated that it would not extend the
legal protections contained in the existing SA. That stipulation failed to meet the Defense
Department requirements that U.S. soldiers not be subject to prosecution under Iraq’s constitution
and its laws. On October 21, 2011, President Obama announced that the United States and Iraq
had agreed that, in accordance with the November 2008 Security Agreement (SA), all U.S. troops
would leave Iraq at the end of 2011. Whether the Obama Administration made substantial efforts
to overcome the Iraqi resistance remains an issue of debate.
The Post-2011 Diplomatic and Economic Relationship
In his 2011 Iraq withdrawal announcement, President Obama stated that, through U.S. assistance
programs, the United States would be able to continue to develop all facets of the bilateral
relationship with Iraq and help strengthen its institutions.10 The bilateral civilian relationship was
the focus of a visit to Iraq by Vice President Biden in early December 2011, just prior to the
December 12, 2011, Maliki visit to the United States.
The cornerstone of the bilateral relationship is the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA). The
SFA, signed and entered into effect at the same time as the SA, presents a framework for long-

6 “Iraq General Says Forces Not Ready ‘Until 2020.’” Agence France Presse, October 30, 2011.
7 Prashant Rao. “Maliki Tells US’ Boehner Iraqi Troops Are Ready.” Agence France Presse, April 16, 2011.
8 Aaron Davis. “Maliki Seeking Consensus on Troops.” Washington Post, May 12, 2011.
9 Author conversations with Iraq experts in Washington, DC, 2011; Eric Schmitt and Steven Lee Myers. “Plan Would
Keep Military in Iraq Beyond Deadline.” September 7, 2011.
10 Remarks by the President on Ending the War in Iraq. http://www.whitehouse.gov, October 21, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
8

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

term U.S.-Iraqi relations, and is intended to help orient Iraq’s politics and its economy toward the
West and the developed nations, and reduce its reliance on Iran or other regional states. The SFA
set up a Higher Coordination Committee (HCC) as an institutional framework for high-level
U.S.-Iraq meetings, and subordinate Joint Coordinating Committees. No meeting of the HCC was
held in 2012, but Foreign Minister Zebari’s August 2013 visit was in conjunction with one of the
JCCs. During Maliki’s October 29-November 1, 2013, visit, the HCC was convened—the fourth
meeting of the HCC since the SFA was signed.
The SFA provides for the following (among other provisions):
• U.S.-Iraq cooperation “based on mutual respect,” and that the United States will
not use Iraqi facilities to launch any attacks against third countries, and will not
seek permanent bases.
• U.S. support for Iraqi democracy and support for Iraq in regional and
international organizations.
• U.S.-Iraqi dialogue to increase Iraq’s economic development, including through
the Dialogue on Economic Cooperation and a Trade and Investment Framework
Agreement (TIFA). The United States and Iraq announced on March 6, 2013, that
a bilateral TIFA had been finalized.
• Promotion of Iraq’s development of its electricity, oil, and gas sector.
• U.S.-Iraq dialogue on agricultural issues and promotion of Iraqi participation in
agricultural programs run by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and USAID.
• Cultural cooperation through several exchange programs, such as the Youth
Exchange and Study Program and the International Visitor Leadership Program.
The joint statement following Maliki’s meeting with President Obama said that
nearly 1,000 Iraqi students were studying in the United States and that the two
sides had a “shared commitment” to increase that number and to increase
cultural, artistic, and scientific exchanges.
State Department-run aid programs are intended to fulfill the objectives of the SFA, according to
State Department budget documents. These programs are implemented mainly through Economic
Support Funds. State Department budget justification documents in recent fiscal years have
indicated that most U.S. economic aid to Iraq now goes to programs to promote democracy,
adherence to international standards of human rights, rule of law, and conflict resolution.
Programs funded by the State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement (INL) focus on rule of law, moving away from previous use of INL funds for police
training. Funding continues for counterterrorism operations (NADR funds), and for anti-
corruption initiatives. U.S. officials stress that, for programs run by USAID in Iraq, Iraq matches
one-for-one the U.S. funding contribution.
The State Department became the lead U.S. agency in Iraq as of October 1, 2011, and closed its
“Office of the Iraq Transition Coordinator” in March 2012. The Ambassador in Iraq is Stuart
Jones, who was nominated in May 2014 and sworn in on September 17, 2014. In July 2011, as
part of the transition to State leadership in Iraq, the United States formally opened consulates in
Basra, Irbil, and Kirkuk. An embassy branch office was considered for Mosul but cost and
security issues kept the U.S. facility there limited to a diplomatic office. The Kirkuk consulate
closed at the end of July 2012 in part to save costs. The State Department has planned to replace
the U.S. consulate in Irbil with a New Consulate Compound in Irbil, and the FY2014
Congressional Research Service
9

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

Consolidated Appropriation, P.L. 113-76, provided $250 million for that purpose. The U.S.
Embassy in Baghdad, built at a cost of about $750 million, controlled over 16,000 personnel at
the time of the 2011 U.S. withdrawal, but fell to about 5,500 at the end of 2013.11
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and U.S. Support
At the time of the U.S. withdrawal, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) was assessed as a relatively
well-trained and disciplined force. At that time, the total force, including Iraqi Police Service, was
about 800,000, of which about 350,000 were Iraqi Army and associated military forces. A mostly-
Shiite Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS), of which about 4,100 are Iraqi Special Operations
Forces (ISOF), were considered highly capable but reported directly to Maliki’s “Office of the
Commander-in-Chief. The ISF ground forces were also relatively well armed, utilizing heavy
armor supplied by the United States. However, the Air Force remained limited at the time of the
withdrawal, utilizing mostly propeller-driven aircraft. The U.S. funding expended to establish,
train, and equip the ISF is portrayed in the tables below.
After the withdrawal announcement, senior U.S. officials stated that the United States would be
able to continue to help Iraq secure itself using programs commonly provided for other countries.
Administration officials stressed that the U.S. political and residual security-related presence
would be sufficient to ensure that Iraq remained stable, allied to the United States, continuing to
move toward full democracy, and economically growing. At the time of the withdrawal, there
were about 16,000 total U.S. personnel in Iraq, about half of which were contractors. Of the
contractors, most were on missions to protect the U.S. Embassy and consulates, and other U.S.
personnel and facilities throughout Iraq.
2011-2014 Deterioration. The following sections discuss aspects of the U.S.-Iraq security
relationship in place at the time of the U.S. withdrawal in 2011—programs that apparently did not
prevent a sharp deterioration in in quality of the ISF. Competent commanders were in some cases
replaced by Maliki loyalists, and corruption was considered rife by all accounts. Many
commanders viewed their positions as financial and political rewards rather than tasks and
responsibilities to be managed. In addition, during his April 2014 visit to the United States, Prime
Minister Abbadi did not dispute assertions that the Iraqi military is about 80% Shiite Muslim—a
possible explanation of why Iraqi Sunnis in some areas express resentment of the ISF as an
“occupation force” or an “Iranian force.” As discussed below, the force collapsed in northern Iraq
in the face of the Islamic State offensive in 2014, and some observers say the Iraqi Army might
have been reduced to as few as 50,000 personnel as a result of the disintegration.
Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I)
The Office of Security Cooperation—Iraq (OSC-I), operating under the authority of the U.S.
Ambassador to Iraq, was the primary Iraq-based U.S. entity tasked with interacting with the post-
2011 Iraqi military. Its primary mission is to administer the Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
programs (U.S. arms sales to Iraq). OSC-I, funded with the Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
funds discussed in the aid table below, is the largest U.S. security cooperation office in the world.
Prior to the June 2014 ISIL-led offensive, it worked out of the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and five

11 Ernesto Londono. “U.S. Clout Wanes in Iraq.” Washington Post, March 24, 2013.
Congressional Research Service
10

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

other locations around Iraq (Kirkuk Regional Airport Base, Tikrit, Besmaya, Umm Qasr, and
Taji). It left the facility in Tikrit before the Islamic State captured that city in June 2014.
Total OCS-I personnel number over 3,500, but the vast majority are security and support
personnel, most of which are contractors. Of the staff, about 175 are U.S. military personnel and
an additional 45 are Defense Department civilians. Some of these personnel have been seconded
to the anti-Islamic State missions discussed below, but some remain as OSC-I personnel
performing the same functions they have since 2012. About 46 members of the staff administer
the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program and other security assistance programs such as the
International Military Education and Training (IMET) program.
Major Arms Sales
The United States continued to supply Iraq with substantial quantities of arms after the 2011
withdrawal. In August 2012, the United States completed delivery to Iraq of 140 M1A1 Abrams
tanks. The tanks cost about $860 million, of which $800 million was paid out of Iraq’s national
funds. In December 2012, the U.S. Navy delivered two support ships to Iraq, which assist Iraq’s
fast-attack and patrol boats that secure its offshore oil platforms and other coastal and offshore
locations. The United States also has sold Iraq equipment that its security forces can use to restrict
the ability of insurgent and terrorist groups to move contraband across Iraq’s borders and
checkpoints (RAPISCAN system vehicles), at a cost of about $600 million. Some refurbished air
defense guns were provided gratis as excess defense articles (EDA).
F-16s
The largest FMS case is the sale of 36 U.S.-made F-16 combat aircraft to Iraq, notified to
Congress in two equal tranches, the latest of which was made on December 12, 2011 (Transmittal
No. 11-46). The total value of the sale of 36 F-16s is up to $6.5 billion when all parts, training,
and weaponry are included. As noted above, deliveries of the aircraft began in July 2014,
although the planes are being delivered to Iraqi control at a U.S. air base in Arizona prior to
securing from the Islamic State the area around their permanent home at Balad Air Base, north of
Baghdad. The aircraft and their trained pilots are expected to deploy to Iraq later in 2015.
Apache Attack Helicopters and Stingers
In 2013 Iraq requested to purchase from the United States the Integrated Air Defense System and
Apache attack helicopters, with a total sale value of about $10 billion.12 The sale of the Air
Defense system was notified to Congress on August 5, 2013, with a value of $2.4 billion, and
included 681 Stinger shoulder held units, 3 Hawk anti-aircraft batteries, and other equipment.
DSCA simultaneously notified about $2.3 billion worth of additional sales to Iraq including of
Stryker nuclear, chemical, and biological equipment reconnaissance vehicles, 12 Bell helicopters,
the Mobile Troposcatter Radio System, and maintenance support.
The provision of Apaches involves the lease of 6 of the helicopters, with an estimated cost of
about $1.37 billion, and the sale of 24 more, with an estimated value of $4.8 billion. The 6 to be
leased were to arrive in July 2014 and the 24 to be sold would be delivered by 2017. As noted

12 John Hudson. “Iraqi Ambassador: Give Us Bigger Guns, And Then We’ll Help on Syria.” July 17, 2013.
Congressional Research Service
11

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

above, the provision of the Apaches was held up by some in Congress until the December 2013
Islamic State-led offensive in Anbar Province.
Other Suppliers. The United States is not the only arms supplier Iraq has. In October 2012, Iraq
and Russia signed deals for Russian arms worth about $4.2 billion. In November 2013, Russia
delivered four Mi-35 attack helicopters to Iraq. As noted above, Russia quickly delivered several
combat aircraft in late June 2014 that Iraq sought to fill a gap in its air attack capabilities. In
October 2012, Iraq agreed to buy 28 Czech-made military aircraft, a deal valued at about $1
billion.13 On December 12, 2013, South Korea signed a deal to export 24 FA-50 light fighter jets
to Iraq at an estimated cost of $1.1 billion; the aircraft will be delivered between 2015 and 2016.14
Iran’s arms supplies to the Iraqi government are discussed above.
Other Post-2011 Security Assistance and Training Programs
OSC-I’s mandate included training and assistance programs for the Iraq military. Because the
United States and Iraq did not conclude a long term Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that
granted legal immunities to U.S. military personnel, the 160 OSC-I personnel involved in these
programs were contractors that train Iraq’s forces on counterterrorism and naval and air defense.
Some are embedded with Iraqi forces as trainers not only tactically, but at the institutional level
by advising Iraqi security ministries and its command structure.
As Sunni unrest increased in 2012, Iraq sought additional security cooperation with the United
States. On August 19, 2012, en route to a visit to Iraq, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Martin Dempsey said that “I think [Iraqi leaders] recognize their capabilities may require
yet more additional development and I think they’re reaching out to us to see if we can help them
with that.”15 Iraq reportedly expressed to Dempsey interest in expanded U.S. training of the ISF
and joint exercises. After the Dempsey visit, it was reported that, at the request of Iraq, a unit of
Army Special Operations forces had deployed to Iraq to advise on counterterrorism and help with
intelligence against AQ-I/ISIL.16 (These forces presumably operated under a limited SOFA or
related understanding crafted for this purpose.) Other reports suggest that Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) paramilitary forces had, as of late 2012, assumed some of the DOD mission of
helping Iraqi counter-terrorism forces (CTS) against ISIL in western Iraq,17 while also potentially
working against ISIL in Syria.
During December 5-6, 2012, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy James Miller and acting
Under Secretary of State for International Security Rose Gottemoeller visited Iraq and a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed with acting Defense Minister Sadoun
Dulaymi. The five year MOU, which appeared to address many of the issues that were hampering
OSC-I from performing its mission to its full potential, provided for:
• high level U.S.-Iraq military exchanges,
• professional military education cooperation,

13 Adam Schreck. “Iraq Presses US For Faster Arms Deliveries.” Yahoo.com, October 18, 2012.
14 Defense News. December 12, 2013.
15 “U.S. Hopes For Stronger Military Ties With Iraq: General.” Agence France-Presse, August 19, 2012.
16 Tim Arango. “Syrian Civil War Poses New Peril For Fragile Iraq.” New York Times, September 25, 2012.
17 Adam Entous et al. “CIA Ramps Up Role in Iraq.” Wall Street Journal, March 12, 2013.
Congressional Research Service
12

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

• counter-terrorism cooperation,
• the development of defense intelligence capabilities, and
• joint exercises.
The concept of enhanced U.S.-Iraq cooperation gained further consideration in mid-2013. In June
2013, General Dempsey said that the United States was looking for ways to improve the military
capabilities of Iraq and Lebanon, two countries extensively affected by the Syria conflict. He
added that enhanced assistance could involve dispatching training teams and accelerating sales of
weapons and equipment. During his August 2013 visit to Washington, DC, conducted primarily to
attend meetings of the U.S.-Iraq Political and Diplomatic Joint Coordination Committee (JCC),
then Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari indicated that Iraq wants to expand security cooperation
with the United States to enhance ISF capability. During his November 1, 2013, meeting with
President Obama, Maliki reportedly discussed enhanced security cooperation, including expanded
access to U.S. intelligence, with U.S. officials, including President Obama and Secretary of
Defense Hagel.18 The joint statement issued at the conclusion of Maliki’s meeting with President
Obama did not specify any U.S. commitments to this level of cooperation, but did express a
“shared assessment of al Qaida affiliated groups threatening Iraq.”
Aside from the U.S. training for the ISF discussed above, the U.S. military sought to integrate the
ISF into regional security exercises and structures that can augment the ISF’s proficiency. The
United States arranged Iraq’s participation in the regional Eager Lion military exercise series in
Jordan. Iraq also participated in the U.S.-led international mine countermeasures exercise off
Bahrain in 2013. In July 2013, the United States convened a strategic dialogue that includes Iraq,
Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt joined the subsequent session of the dialogue
the week of November 18, 2013.
Police Development Program
A separate program, the Police Development Program, was intended to maintain the proficiency
of Iraq’s police forces. It was the largest program that in 2012 transitioned from DOD to State
Department lead, using International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds. However,
Iraq’s drive to emerge from U.S. tutelage produced apparent Iraqi disinterest in the PDP. By late
2012, it consisted of only 36 advisers, about 10% of what was envisioned as an advisory force of
350, and it is being phased out entirely during 2013. Two facilities built with over $200 million in
U.S. funds (Baghdad Police College Annex and part of the U.S. consulate in Basra) are to be
turned over to the Iraqi government by December 2012. Some press reports say there is
Administration consideration of discontinuing the program entirely.19
Post-2011 Regional Reinforcement Capability
At the time of the U.S. withdrawal in 2011, U.S. officials asserted that the United States also
would retain a significant capability in the Persian Gulf—with a potential capability to intervene
in Iraq if there were a collapse there. The United States has maintained about 35,000 military

18 Michael Gordon and Eric Schmitt. “As Security Deteriorates at Home, Iraqi Leader Arrives in U.S. Seeking Aid.”
New York Times, November 1, 2013.
19 Tim Arango. “U.S. May Scrap Costly Efforts to Train Iraqi Policy.” New York Times, May 13, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
13

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

personnel in the region, including about 10,000 mostly U.S. Army forces in Kuwait, about 40% of
which are combat-ready rather than purely support forces. There is also prepositioned armor there
and in Qatar. There are about 7,000 mostly Air Force personnel in Qatar; 5,000 mostly Navy
personnel in Bahrain; and about 5,000 mostly Air Force and Navy in the UAE, with very small
numbers in Saudi Arabia and Oman. The rest are part of at least one aircraft carrier task force in
or near the Gulf at any given time. The forces are in the Gulf under bilateral defense cooperation
agreements with all six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states that give the United States access
to military facilities to station forces and preposition some heavy armor.
Political and Security Threats Remaining at the
Time of the U.S. Withdrawal
Although violence had greatly reduced from the 2006-2010 timeframe, armed groups remained
active even as the United States wound down its military involvement in Iraq. And, many of the
grievances that appeared to be managed or attenuated by the U.S. military presence remained
unresolved and vulnerable to eruption after the U.S. military left Iraq in 2011. The sections below
discuss the various threats to the political and security situation, and the positions and actions of
some of the groups in causing and responding to the Islamic State challenge to the integrity and
vitality of the Iraqi state.
Armed Sunni Groups
At the time of the completion of the U.S. withdrawal, some Sunni antigovernment armed groups
were still operating, although at low levels of activity. Such groups included Baath Party and
Saddam Hussein supporters as well as hardline Islamists, some of whom were linked to Al Qaeda.
After the U.S. military departure in 2011, these groups increased their armed opposition to the
Maliki government, drawing on increasing Sunni resentment of Shiite political domination.
Al Qaeda in Iraq/Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Islamic State
Iraq’s one-time Al Qaeda affiliate constitutes the most violent component of the Sunni rebellion
that has become a major threat to Iraqi stability. Its antecedent called itself Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-
I), which was led by Jordanian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi until his death by U.S. airstrike in
2006.20 In 2013 it adopted the name Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or, alternately,
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). In June 2014, the group changed its name to the Islamic
State (IS), and declared its leader, Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi, as the “Commander of the Faithful”—a
term essentially declaring him leader of all Muslims. It also declared a caliphate in the territory it
controls in Iraq and Syria. AQ-I was an Al Qaeda affiliate, but the Islamic State has publicly
broken with Al Qaeda leaders based in Pakistan.
Baghdadi asserts a vision of an Islamic caliphate spanning the Islamic world. A major question is
whether it has ambitions to attack the U.S. homeland, U.S. facilities or personnel in or outside the
Middle East, or other non-Muslim countries. The Central Intelligence Agency estimates that the

20 An antecedent of AQ-I was named by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in March 2004
and the designation applies to AQ-I and now the Islamic State.
Congressional Research Service
14

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

Islamic State can “muster” between 20,000 and 31,500 fighters in both Iraq and Syria.21 In
October 2012, Jordanian authorities disrupted an alleged plot by AQ-I to bomb multiple targets in
Amman, Jordan, possibly including the U.S. Embassy there.
Largely dormant during the latter years of the U.S. presence in Iraq and for a few years after the
2011 U.S. withdrawal, ISIL-initiated attacks escalated significantly after an assault on Sunni
protesters in the town of Hawija on April 23, 2013. The group increased its violent activity to
about 40 mass casualty attacks per month, far more than the 10 per month of 2010, and including
attacks spanning multiple cities.22 In 2013, the group began asserting control of territory and
operating training camps close to the Syria border.23 The head of the National Counterterrorism
Center, Matt Olsen, told Congress on November 14, 2013, that ISIL was the strongest it had been
since its peak in 2006.24 Its capture of large portions of Iraqi territory is discussed below.
Naqshabandi Order (JRTN) and Ex-Saddam Military Commanders
Some insurgent groups are composed of members of the Saddam-era regime or Iraqi military.
These groups, which allied with the Islamic State or remained independent, include the 1920
Revolution Brigades, the Islamic Army of Iraq, and, most prominently, the Naqshabandi Order—
known by its Arabic acronym “JRTN.”25 The JRTN, based primarily in Nineveh Province, has
been designated by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).
In mid-2012, JRTN attacks on U.S. facilities in northern Iraq apparently contributed to the State
Department decision to close the Kirkuk consulate. The faction has supported Sunni
demonstrators and, to some extent, the Islamic State offensive in 2014. In February 2013 Sunnis
linked to the JRTN circulated praise for the protests from the highest-ranking Saddam regime
figure still at large, Izzat Ibrahim al Duri. He reportedly issued anti-Iraq government statements
during the course of the 2014 Islamic State offensive.
Some JRTN ex-Saddam military officers operate under a separate structure called the “General
Military Council for Iraqi Revolutionaries,” which includes Sunni tribal fighters and other ex-
insurgent figures. Some press reports assert that some of these ex-military officers might be
helping the Islamic State with tactical and strategic military planning.
Sunni Tribal Leaders/Sons of Iraq Fighters
Approximately 100,000 Iraqi Sunnis are known as “Sons of Iraq,” also called Awakening, or
“Sahwa” fighters—gunmen who fought the U.S. military during 2003-2006 but then cooperated
with U.S. forces against AQ-I. The Iraqi government had promised all of the Sons of Iraq
integration into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) or government jobs but, by the time of the U.S.
withdrawal in 2011, only about two-thirds of the Sons had received these benefits. The remainder

21 “ISIS Can ‘Muster’ Between 20,000 and 31,500 Fighters, CIA Says.” CNN, September 12, 2014.
22 Michael Knights. “Rebuilding Iraq’s Counterterrorism Capabilities.” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July
31, 2013.
23 Ben Van Heuvelen. “Al Qaeda-Linked Group Gaining Ground in Iraq.” Washington Post, December 8, 2013.
24 Eileen Sullivan. “Official: Al-Qaida in Iraq Strongest Since 2006.” Associated Press, November 14, 2013.
25 The acronym stands for Jaysh al-Rijal al-Tariq al-Naqshabandi, which translated means Army of the Men of the
Naqshabandi Order.
Congressional Research Service
15

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

continued to man checkpoints in Sunni areas and were paid about $500 per month by the
government but were not formally added to security ministry rolls. As a result, some of these
fighters became disillusioned with the Maliki government and some (numbers unknown)
reportedly joined the Islamic State offensives in 2014.
Many of the Sons of Iraq belong to the tribes of Anbar Province that, in general, seek a more
representative central government in Baghdad but oppose the Islamic State. The tribal leaders
include Ahmad Abu Risha, Hatem al-Dulaymi, and Dulaymi tribe leader Majid al-Ali al-
Sulayman. Abu Risha is the brother of the slain tribal leader Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, who was a
key figure in starting the Awakening movement that aligned Sunni insurgents with the U.S.
military. The tribal figures oppose the involvement of Shiite militiamen in Iraqi efforts to
recapture Sunni-inhabited territory from the Islamic State, and have recruited Sunni tribal fighters
that might spearhead government offensives against Islamic State positions in Anbar.
Some of the Sons of Iraq and their tribal recruiters support Sunni Islamist organizations, such as
the Muslim Scholars Association (MSA). The MSA is led by Harith al-Dari, who in 2006 fled
U.S. counter-insurgency operations to live in Jordan. Harith al-Dari’s son, Muthana, reportedly is
active against the government. The degree to which supporters of the MSA and the Dari clan are
supporting the Islamic State offensive, if at all, is unclear.
The Sadr Faction and Shiite Militias
The 2006-2008 period of sectarian conflict was fueled in part by retaliatory attacks by Shiite
militias, such as those linked to Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr. Sadr is considered an Iraqi
“nationalist,” who did not go into exile during Saddam’s rule, and his following is particularly
strong among lower class Shiites. Sadr opposed Maliki in the March 2010 elections but
acquiesced to a second Maliki term, joined an unsuccessful 2012 effort to vote no-confidence
against Maliki, and then publicly opposed Maliki serving a third term (after 2014 election). In
February 2014, Sadr publicly announced his formal withdrawal from Iraqi politics, but Sadrist
representatives remain in their Cabinet and National Assembly posts and continue to compete in
elections.
Sadr was an adversary of the United States for most of the 2003-2011 period of the large U.S.
military intervention in Iraq. Sadr formed his large Mahdi Army militia in 2004 to combat the
U.S. military presence in Iraq, and U.S. troops fought several major battles with the Mahdi Army
and an offshoot, called the “special groups,” from 2004 to 2008. Sadr, through demonstrations
and threats of armed action by militias under his control, pressed for the full U.S. withdrawal at
the end of 2011.
Sadr’s campaign meshed with Iran’s policy to ensure that the United States completely withdrew
from Iraq. U.S. officials accused Shiite militias—both those loyal to Sadr and others answerable
to other Shiite figures—of causing an elevated level of U.S. troop deaths in June 2011 (14 killed,
the highest in any month in over one year). U.S. officials accused Iran of arming these militias
with upgraded rocket-propelled munitions, such as Improvised Rocket Assisted Munitions
(IRAMs), and pressed the Iraqi government to insist that Iran to stop aiding the militias.
However, until the U.S. withdrawal in December 2011, some rocket attacks continued against the
U.S. consulate in Basra.
Congressional Research Service
16

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

Shiite Militia/Popular Mobilization Forces
The Sadrist pressure on the United States was amplified by the activities of several other Shiite
militias, some of which left Sadr’s control. These include Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH, League of the
Family of the Righteous), Khata’ib Hezbollah (Hezbollah Battalions), and the Promised Day
Brigade, the latter organization of which still answers to Sadr. In June 2009, Khata’ib Hezbollah
was designated by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). On November 8,
2012, the Treasury Department designated several Khata’ib Hezbollah operatives, and their
Iranian Revolutionary Guard—Qods Force mentors as terrorism supporting entities under
Executive Order 13224. AAH’s leader, Qais al-Khazali, took refuge in Iran in 2010 after three
years in U.S. custody for his alleged role in a 2005 raid that killed five American soldiers, but
returned to Iraq after the 2011 U.S. withdrawal.
After the U.S. withdrawal in 2011, most Shiite militia activity declined. Much of the Mahdi Army
had already been slowly integrating into the political process as a charity and employment
network called Mumahidoon, or “those who pave the way.” Other Shiite militias followed suit,
including In 2011, AAH’s leaders, including Khazali, returned from Iran and opened political
offices, trying to recruit loyalists, and setting up social service programs. The group did not
compete in the April 20, 2013, provincial elections, but competed as an informal Maliki ally in
the 2014 national elections (Al Sadiqun, “the Friends,” slate 218).26
All of the militias began to reactivate as unrest in the Sunni areas escalated during 2012-2014. In
the face of the 2014 Islamic State offensives, the militias mobilized in large numbers and were
joined by Shiite “Popular Mobilization” forces answering Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s call for
Shiites to rally to fight the Islamic State. Mahdi Army militiamen reorganized as the “Salaam
(Peace) Brigade.” Some Shiite militia forces now fighting returned from Syria, where they were
protecting Shiite shrines and conducting other combat in support of the government of Bashar Al
Assad.27The Popular Mobilization forces operate under a variety of names, but are generally
subordinate to and supply manpower to the more established militias.
One major Shiite militia that mobilized to counter the Islamic State is not a Sadrist offshoot. The
Badr Organization was the armed wing of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, headed now by
Ammar al-Hakim. The Badr Organization largely disarmed after Saddam’s fall and integrated into
the political process. It did not conduct attacks against U.S. military forces in Iraq during 2003-
2011. Its leader is Hadi al-Amiri, an elected member of the National Assembly. It has
approximately 30,000 militia fighters.
Current estimates of the total Shiite militiamen available to assist the ISF—including the Sadrist
militia, the Sadrist offshoots, the Badr Organization, and Popular Mobilization units operating
under various names—number about 100,000. In February 2015, following a killing of a
prominent Sunni cleric in Baghdad, Sadr ordered Salaam and other militias still loyal to him to
suspend their operations. Sadr warned of increasing sectarianism and, in late February 2015, he
forged an alliance with Iyad al-Allawi (see above) to try to form a non-sectarian bloc in the COR.
However, the Salaam Brigades reportedly were deployed to participate in the government-led
offensive to recapture Tikrit in March-April 2015.

26 Liz Sly. “Iran-Tied Group Is On Rise in Iraq.” Washington Post, February 19, 2013.
27 Abigail Hauslohner. “Iraqi Shiites Take Up the Cudgels for Syrian Government.” Washington Post, May 27, 2013.
Congressional Research Service
17

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

Lebanese Hezbollah. Hezbollah has long been involved in assisting Iraq’s Shiite militias, in part
because Hezbollah members speak Arabic, whereas Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard personnel
speak mostly Persian (although many speak Arabic as well). In February 2015, Hezbollah leader
Hassan Nasrallah publicly acknowledged that Hezbollah had sent personnel to Iraq to help the
ISF and the Shiite militias to combat the Islamic State.
The Kurds and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)28
Since the end of the U.S.-led war to end Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait in early 1991, the United
States has helped ensure Iraqi Kurdish autonomy, while insisting that Iraq’s territorial integrity
not be compromised by an Iraqi Kurdish move toward independence. Iraq’s Kurds have tried to
preserve the “special relationship” with the United States and use it to their advantage. The
collapse of the ISF in northern Iraq enabled the Kurds to seize long-coveted Kirkuk and many of
its oilfields. However, the collapse of Baghdad’s forces also contributed to the advance of the
Islamic State force close to the KRG capital Irbil before U.S. airstrikes beginning on August 8,
2014, drove Islamic State fighters back.
KRG threats to seek outright independence had been increasing in recent years as the issues
dividing the KRG and Baghdad have expanded. A key issue dividing the KRG and the central
government has been the KRG’s assertion of the right to export oil produced in the KRG region—
which Baghdad strongly opposes. The seizure of Kirkuk gives the Kurds even more control over
economic resources, so much so that in June 2014, Kurdish leaders indicated the region might
hold a referendum on independence within a few months. However, the subsequent Islamic State
threat to KRG-controlled territory muted further public discussion of Iraqi Kurdish independence.
As permitted in the Iraqi constitution, the KRG fields its own force of peshmerga and Zeravani
ground forces, which together number about 150,000 active duty fighters. They have about 350
tanks and 40 helicopter gunships, but have not been eligible to separately purchase additional
U.S. weaponry. All U.S. foreign military sales (FMS) go through central governments, and
Baghdad has generally refused to provide a portion of its U.S. weaponry to the KRG. A provision
of the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 3979, P.L. 113-291) permits direct U.S.
provision of U.S. arms to the peshmerga. The Kurdish militias are under the KRG’s Ministry of
Peshmerga Affairs and are paid out of the KRG budget. Prior to the June 2014 Islamic State
offensive, the KRG had made some headway in its plans to transform the peshmerga into a
smaller but more professional and well trained force, and the peshmerga is expected to benefit
significantly from the U.S. training discussed below.
KRG Structure/Intra-Kurdish Divisions
The Iraqi Kurds’ two main factions—the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and the Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP)—are the dominant factions in the KRG. The head of the KDP is Masoud
Barzani, son of the revered Kurdish resistance fighter Mullah Mustafa Barzani. The PUK is led
by Jalal Talabani, who served two terms as Iraq’s President and is ailing following a 2012 stroke.
Masoud Barzani is President of the KRG, directly elected in July 2009. The KRG has an elected
Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA, sometimes called the Kurdistan Parliament of Iraq, or KPI),

28 For more information on Kurd-Baghdad disputes, see CRS Report RS22079, The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq, by
Kenneth Katzman.
Congressional Research Service
18

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

and an appointed Prime Minister. Since January 2012, the KRG Prime Minister has been
Nechirvan Barzani (Masoud’s nephew), who replaced PUK senior figure Barham Salih. Masoud
Barzani’s son, Suroor, heads KRG security issues. On July 1, 2013, the KNA voted to extend
Barzani’s term two years, until August 19, 2015. In July 2014, another senior PUK figure, Fouad
Masoum, succeeded Talabani as Iraq’s President—continuing the informal understanding that has
existed since 2006 that a PUK figure will be Iraq’s President.
The KDP and PUK have sometimes clashed over territorial control and resources, and a serious
armed conflict between them flared in 1996. Since the fall of Saddam, the two parties have
generally abided by a power-sharing arrangement. However, a new faction emerged in 2005 and
has become a significant factor in Kurdish politics—Gorran (Change), a PUK breakaway. It is
headed by Neshirvan Mustafa, a longtime critic of the PUK. Aram al-Sheikh Mohammad, a
Gorran leader, became second deputy COR speaker, becoming the first Gorran leader to obtain a
senior leadership post in the central government.
The latest KNA elections were held on September 21, 2013, and further complicated the political
landscape in the KRG. About 1,130 candidates registered to run for the 111 available seats, 11 of
which are reserved for minority communities that live in the north, such as Yazidis, Shabaks,
Assyrians, and others. As a result of those elections, Gorran continued to increase its political
strength, winning 24 seats, second to the KDP’s 38 (which was up from 30 in 2010). The PUK
came in third with only 18 seats, down from 29 in the 2010 election. In part because of Gorran’s
increased representation, the Kurds could not agree on a new government for the KRG region
until June 2014. Nechirvan Barzani remained KRG prime minister. Jalal Talabani’s son, Qubad,
who headed the KRG representative office in Washington, DC, until 2012, became deputy prime
minister of the KRG. Provincial elections in the KRG-controlled provinces were held concurrent
with the Iraq-wide parliamentary elections on April 30, 2014.
KRG-Baghdad Disputes
There has been little progress in resolving the various territorial disputes between the Kurds and
the central government dominated by Iraq’s Arabs. The most emotional of these is the Kurdish
insistence that Tamim/Kirkuk Province (which includes oil-rich Kirkuk city) is “Kurdish land”
and must be formally affiliated to the KRG. Most of the oil in northern Iraq is in Kirkuk, and legal
KRG control over the province would give the KRG substantial economic leverage. However, the
Kirkuk dispute may have been mooted by the Kurds’ seizure of Kirkuk in the face of the ISF
collapse in the Islamic State offensive of June 2014. Many experts assess that the Kurds will be
hesitant to yield back their positions to the central government.
Under the Iraqi constitution, there was to be a census and referendum on the affiliation of the
province by December 31, 2007 (Article 140), but the Kurds agreed to repeated delays in order to
avoid antagonizing Iraq’s Arabs. Nor has the national census that is pivotal to any such
referendum been conducted; it was scheduled for October 24, 2010, but then repeatedly
postponed by the broader political crises. On the other hand, a Property Claims Commission that
is adjudicating claims from the Saddam regime’s forced resettlement of Arabs into the KRG
region is functioning.
Congressional Research Service
19

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

KRG Oil Exports
The KRG and Baghdad have been at odds over the Kurds’ insistence on being able to export oil
that is discovered and extracted in the KRG region. Baghdad terms the KRG’s separate oil
exports and energy development deals with international firms “illegal,” insisting that all KRG oil
exports go through the national oil export pipeline grid and that revenues earned under that
arrangement go to the central government. Under an agreement forged shortly after the fall of
Saddam, a fixed 17% share of those revenues goes to the KRG. The Obama Administration has
generally sided with Baghdad’s position that all Iraqi energy projects and exports be implemented
through a unified central government.
In recent years, KRG oil exports through this system have been repeatedly suspended over KRG-
central government disputes on related issues, such as Baghdad’s arrears due to the international
firms operating Kurdish-controlled oil fields. In January 2014, the Iraqi government suspended
almost all of its payments to the KRG of about $1 billion per month on the grounds that the KRG
was not contributing oil revenue to the national coffers. In what it described as an effort to
compensate for that loss of revenue, the KRG began exporting oil through a newly constructed
pipeline to Turkey that bypasses the Iraqi national grid. The pipeline is capable of carrying
300,000 barrels per day of oil.29 Some shipments were initially not offloaded as a result of an
Iraqi government legal challenge to the KRG right to sell that oil, but eventually international
buyers bought all the exports.30
The need to cooperate against the Islamic State organization apparently paved the way for a
resolution of the oil export dispute. In November 2014, the KRG provided 150,000 barrels of oil
to Iraq’s state marketing organization (SOMO) in exchange for a one-time payment from
Baghdad to the KRG of $500 million. On December 2, the KRG and Baghdad signed a broader
deal under which the KRG would provide to SOMO 550,000 barrels per day of oil (300,000 from
the Kirkuk fields now controlled by the KRG and 250,000 barrels from fields in the KRG itself)
in exchange for a restoration of the 17% share of national revenues (which will amount to about
$600 million per month at current oil prices.)31 In addition, Baghdad will provide the KRG with
approximately $100 million per month to pay for peshmerga salaries and weapons purchases.
Baghdad also agreed to facilitate the transfer of some U.S. weapons to the peshmerga.32 The
agreement is incorporated into the 2015 Iraqi budget, adopted by the COR on January 29, 2015,
and it reportedly is being implemented in line with both sides’ commitments.
KRG fields, excluding those in Kirkuk, have the potential to export 500,000 barrels per day and
are expected to eventually be able to increase exports to 1 million barrels per day.33 It appears that
the KRG would be able to separately export any amounts over the 250,000 barrels per day that
the December deal requires the KRG to transfer to Baghdad’s control. Left unresolved was the

29 Much of the dispute centers on differing interpretations of a 1976 Iraq-Turkey treaty, which was extended in 2010,
and which defines “Iraq” (for purposes of oil issues) as the “Ministry of Oil of the Republic of Iraq.” See “Analysis:
Iraq-Turkey Treaty Restricts Kurdistan Exports.” Iraq Oil Report, April 18, 2014.
30 Michael Knights, “Making the Iraqi Revenue-Generating Deal Work,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
December 3, 2014.
31 Ibid.
32 Tim Arango, “Iraq Government Reaches Accord with the Kurds.” New York Times, December 3, 2014.
33 Jane Arraf, “Iraq’s Unity Tested by Rising Tensions Over Oil-Rich Kurdish Region.” Christian Science Monitor,
May 4, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
20

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

disagreement over separate foreign firm investment deals with the KRG. Baghdad has sought to
deny energy deals with the central government to any company that signs a separate development
deal with the KRG. This dispute has affected such firms as Exxon-Mobil and Total SA of France.
Tier Three Designations of the KDP and PUK
Since 2001, U.S. immigration officials have placed the KDP and PUK in a Tier Three category
that makes it difficult for members of the parties to obtain visas to enter the United States. The
categorization is a determination that the two parties are “groups of concern”—meaning some of
their members have committed acts of political violence. The designation was based on the fact
that the Kurdish parties, particularly their peshmerga, had used violence to try to overthrow the
government of Saddam Hussein. The designation was made before the United States militarily
overthrew Saddam in 2003, and has not been revoked.
The characterization seems to many in Congress and the Administration to be inconsistent with
the close political relations between the United States and the KDP and PUK. KRG President
Barzani has said he will not visit the United States until the designation is removed. Two bills,
H.R. 4474 and S. 2255, would legislatively remove the PUK and KDP from Tier 3 categorization.
A provision of the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 3979, P.L. 113-291) gives
the Administration authority, without judicial review, to revoke the Tier 3 designation.
Post-U.S. Withdrawal Political Unraveling
With the grievances discussed above unresolved and U.S. forces not present, the 2010 power-
sharing arrangement unraveled after 2011, casting doubt on President Obama’s assertion, marking
the U.S. withdrawal, that Iraq is now “sovereign, stable, and self-reliant.” Maliki’s opponents
accused him of concentrating power by retaining the three main security portfolios for himself.34
On December 19, 2011, the day after the final U.S. withdrawal (December 18, 2011)—and one
week after Maliki met with President Obama in Washington, DC, on December 12, 2011—the
government announced an arrest warrant against Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, a major Sunni
figure, for allegedly ordering his security staff to commit acts of assassination. Hashimi fled to
the KRG region and refused to return to face trial in Baghdad unless his conditions for a fair trial
there were met. A trial in absentia in Baghdad convicted him and sentenced him to death on
September 9, 2012, for the alleged killing of two Iraqis. Hashimi remains in Turkey.
U.S. officials intervened with various political factions and obtained Maliki’s agreement to
release some Baathists prisoners and to give provinces more autonomy (discussed above). The
concessions prompted Sunni COR members and ministers to resume their duties.35 In March
2012, all factions tentatively agreed to hold a “national conference,” to be chaired by then
President Talabani, respected as an even-handed mediator, to try to reach a durable political
solution. However, late that month KRG President Barzani accused Maliki of a “power grab” and
the conference was not held. Maliki critics subsequently collected signatures from 176 COR
deputies to request a no-confidence vote against Maliki. Under Article 61 of the constitution,

34 Sadun Dulaymi, a Sunni Arab, is acting Defense Minister; Falih al-Fayad, a Shiite, is acting Minister of State for
National Security; and Adnan al-Asadi, another Shiite, is acting Interior Minister.
35 Tim Arango. “Iraq’s Prime Minister Gains More Power After Political Crisis.” New York Times, February 28, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
21

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

signatures of 20% of the 325 COR deputies (65 signatures) are needed to trigger a vote, but then
President Talabani stated on June 10, 2012, that there were an insufficient number of valid
signatures to proceed.36
The disputes flared again after Talabani suffered a stroke on December 18, 2012, and left Iraq for
treatment in Germany. On December 20, 2012, Maliki moved against another major Sunni figure,
Finance Minister Rafi al-Issawi, by arresting 10 of his bodyguards. Al Issawi took refuge in
Anbar Province with Sunni tribal leaders, sparking anti-Maliki demonstrations in the Sunni cities
in several provinces and in Sunni districts of Baghdad. Demonstrators demanded the release of
prisoners; repeal of Article 4 antiterrorism laws under which many Sunnis are incarcerated;
reform or end to the de-Baathification laws that has been used against Sunnis; and improved
government services in Sunni areas.37
During January-March 2013, the use of small amounts of force against demonstrators caused the
unrest to worsen. On January 25, 2013, the ISF killed nine protesters on a day when
oppositionists killed two ISF police officers. Sunni demonstrators, possibly emboldened by the
Sunni-led rebellion in neighboring Syria, set up encampments in some cities. The unrest, coupled
with the U.S. departure, provided “political space” for extremist Sunni elements such as ISIL
(now called the Islamic State) to step up attacks on the ISF in support of Sunni protesters.
April 2013 Hawijah Incident. On April 23, 2013, three days after the first group of provinces
voted in provincial elections, the ISF stormed a Sunni protest camp in the town of Hawijah and
killed about 40 civilians. In the following days, many Sunni demonstrators and tribal leaders took
up arms, and some gunmen took over government buildings in the town of Suleiman Pak. U.S.
officials reportedly pressed Maliki not to use the military to suppress Sunni protests but rather to
work with Sunni tribal leaders to appeal for calm. Maliki undertook some conciliatory gestures,
including amending (in June 2013) the 2008 provincial powers law (No. 21, see above) to give
the provinces substantially more authority, such as control over security forces (Article 31-10); to
specify a share of revenue to be given to the provinces; and to mandate that province-based
operations of central government ministries be transferred to the provincial governments.38 In
July 2013, the Cabinet approved a package of reforms easing de-Baathification laws to allow
many former Baathists to serve in government.
April 2013 Provincial Elections Occur Amid the Tensions. The escalating violence only slightly
affected the April 2013 provincial elections. The government postponed the elections in two
Sunni provinces, Anbar and Nineveh, until June 20, 2013, but the election in the remaining
provinces went forward as planned on April 20, 2013. The COR’s law to govern the election for
the 447 provincial council seats (including those in Anbar and Nineveh that voted on June 20,
2013), passed in December 2012, provided for an open list vote. A total of 50 coalitions
registered, including 261 political entities as part of those coalitions or running separately, and
comprising about 8,150 individual candidates.
With the April 20, 2013, vote being held mostly in Shiite areas, the election was largely a test of
Maliki’s popularity. Maliki’s State of Law coalition remained relatively intact, including Fadilah

36 “Embattled Iraqi PM Holding On To Power for Now.” Associated Press, June 12, 2012.
37 Author conversations with Human Rights Watch researchers, March 2013.
38 Reidar Vissar. “Provincial Powers Revisions, Elections Results for Anbar and Nineveh: Is Iraq Headed for Complete
Disintegration?” June 27, 2013.
Congressional Research Service
22

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

(virtue) and the ISCI-offshoot the Badr Organization. It won 112 of the 447 seats up for election,
a decrease from 2009. ISCI registered its own Citizen Coalition, which won 75 seats. Sadr
registered a separate Coalition of Liberals and it won 59 seats.
Among the mostly Sunni groupings, Allawi’s Iraqiyya and 18 smaller entities ran as the Iraqi
National United Coalition. A separate United Coalition consisted of supporters of the Nujaifis
(COR speaker and Nineveh governor), Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, and Rafi al-Issawi. A
third Sunni coalition was loyal to Saleh al-Mutlaq. The two main Kurdish parties ran under the
Co-Existence and Fraternity Alliance. The June 20, 2013, election in Anbar and Nineveh was
primarily a contest among these blocs. In Anbar, the Nujaifi bloc won a slight plurality, but in
Nineveh, where the Nujaifis previously held an outright majority of provincial council seats (19
or 37), Kurds won 11 out of the province’s 39 seats and the Nujaifi group came in second with
eight seats. However, Atheel Nujaifi was selected to another term as governor. The results
suggested to some experts that many Sunnis want to avoid a return to sectarian conflict.39
Insurrection Escalates as 2013 Ends
Unrest in Sunni areas escalated sharply at the end of 2013, after yet another arrest order by Maliki
against a prominent Sunni leader—parliamentarian Ahmad al-Alwani. The order, which followed
an ISIL attack that killed 17 ISF officers, prompted a gun battle with security forces that killed
Alwani’s brother and several of his bodyguards. Maliki subsequently ordered security forces to
close down a protest tent camp in Ramadi (capital of Anbar Province), prompting ISIL to attack,
and to take over, Ramadi, Fallujah, and some smaller Anbar cities. ISIL fighters were joined by
some Sunni protesters, defectors from the ISF, and some Sons of Iraq and other tribal fighters.
However, most Sons of Iraq fighters appear to have obeyed the urgings of many tribal leaders to
back the government and help suppress the insurrection.
Partly at the urging of U.S. officials, Maliki opted primarily to arm and fund loyal Sunni tribal
leaders and Sons of Iraq fighters to help them expel the ISIL fighters. By early January 2014,
these loyalists had helped the government regain most of Ramadi, but Fallujah remained in
insurgent hands. In early April 2014, ISIL-led insurgents also established a presence in Abu
Ghraib, only about 10 miles from Baghdad, prompting the government to close the prison. Some
ISF officers told journalists that the ISF effort to recapture Fallujah and other opposition-
controlled areas suffered from disorganization and ineffectiveness.40
June 2014 Islamic State-Led Offensive and ISF Collapse
By the time the April 30, 2014, national (COR) elections were held, the ISIL-led insurrection in
Anbar appeared contained. That stability was upended on June 10, 2014, when Islamic State
fighters—apparently assisted by large numbers of its fighters moving into Iraq from the Syria
theater—captured the large city of Mosul amid mass surrenders and desertions by the ISF. The
group later that month formally changed its name to “The Islamic State.” Apparently supported
by many Iraqi Sunni residents, Islamic State-led fighters subsequently advanced down the Tigris
River valley as far as Tikrit as well as east into Diyala Province. The offensive captured the

39 Kirk Sowell. “Sunni Voters and Iraq’s Provincial Elections.” July 12, 2013.
40 Loveday Morris. “Iraqi Army Struggles in Battles Against Islamist Fighters in Anbar Province.” Washington Post,
February 27, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
23

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

Mosul Dam and enabled Islamic State fighters to loot banks, free prisoners, and capture U.S.-
supplied military equipment such as Humvees, tanks, and armored personnel carriers. From
positions around Abu Ghraib, IS-led forces moved to within striking distance of Baghdad
International Airport, which is southwest of the city. The Islamic State, along with its partners,
also expanded previous gains in Anbar Province, including encroaching on the Haditha Dam.
By the end of June, Shiite militias had mobilized in large numbers to assist the ISF and the
remaining ISF regrouped to some extent. These developments, coupled with the fact that Islamic
State fighters faced resistance from any location not dominated by Sunni inhabitants, appeared to
lessen the threat to Baghdad itself. The defense of Baghdad was aided by U.S. advisers (discussed
below), as well as by Iran’s sending of military equipment as well as Islamic Revolutionary
Guard-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) units into Iraq. The ISF was able to prevent IS-led forces from
capturing the Baiji refinery, which produces about one-third of Iraq’s gasoline supplies.
The KRG came under major threat by August 2014 when IS-led forces advanced into territory
controlled by the peshmerga. The relatively lightly-armed Kurdish forces withdrew under
pressure from numerous towns (Sinjar, Zumar, Wana, and Qaraqosh) inhabited mostly by
Christians and other Iraqi minorities, particularly the Yazidis—a Kurdish-speaking people who
practice a mix of ancient religions, including Zorastrianism, which held sway in Iran before the
advent of Islam.41 Fearing IS threats to execute them if they refused its demands that they convert
to Islam, about 35,000-50,000 Yazidis fled to Sinjar Mountain, where they were surrounded by
Islamic State forces. By August 8, 2014, IS-led fighters had advanced to within about 30 miles of
the KRG capital of Irbil, causing substantial panic among Iraq’s Kurds, who had long thought the
KRG region fully secure, and causing U.S. concern about the security of U.S. diplomatic and
military personnel there. The threat to the KRG and the humanitarian crisis prompted U.S.
military action that is discussed in greater detail below.
Government Formation Process Amidst Security Collapse
U.S. officials considered the outcome of the April 30, 2014, national elections as crucial to
reversing Islamic State gains. Large scale participation by Sunni voters, some asserted, would
signal a rejection of the Sunni extremist groups. An election law to regulate the election, passed
on November 4, 2013, expanded the COR to 328 seats (from 325). A total of 39 coalitions,
comprising 275 political entities (parties), registered. The campaign period nationwide began on
April 1. Turnout on election day was about 62%, about the same level as in the 2010 COR
elections, and violence was unexpectedly minimal. Elections for 89 total seats on the provincial
councils in the three KRG provinces were held simultaneously.
Maliki appeared positioned to secure a third term because his State of Law bloc had remained
relatively intact, whereas rival blocs had fractured. Even the heretofore cohesive Kurdish bloc
fragmented into KDP and PUK slates. On June 17, 2014, the Independent Higher Election
Commission (IHEC) announced certified election results showing Maliki’s State of Law winning
92 seats—3 more than it won in 2010 and far more than those won by ISCI (29) or the Sadrists
(32). Major Sunni slates won a combined 53 seats—far fewer than the 91 seats they won in 2010
as part of the Iraqiyya bloc.42 The Kurdish slates collectively won about 62 seats. Maliki’s

41 Ishaan Tharoor. “Who Are the Yazidis?” Washington Post, August 7, 2014.
42 “Iraq: PM’s Group Is Biggest Election Winner.” Associated Press, May 19, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
24

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

individual candidate vote reportedly was exceptionally strong, most notably in Baghdad Province,
which sends 69 deputies to the COR—results that had appeared to put Maliki in a commanding
position to retain his post.
New Government Formed. Maliki’s route to a third term was upended by the June 2014 IS-led
offensive. U.S. officials largely blamed the offensive’s success on Maliki’s efforts to marginalize
Sunni leaders and citizens. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani appeared to undermine Maliki by
calling for an inclusive government that “avoids mistakes of the past.” The factions ultimately
agreed to start filling some key positions before reaching consensus on a Prime Minister. The
process unfolded as follows:
• On July 15, the COR named a leadership team. Salim al-Jabburi, a moderate
Sunni Islamist (IIP), was named speaker. The two deputy speakers selected were
Aram al-Sheikh Mohammad of the Kurdish Gorran party and Haydar al-Abbadi
of Maliki’s Shiite Da’wa Party. Jabburi is about 43 years old and worked as a law
professor at the University of Mesopotamia.
• On July 24, the COR selected a senior PUK leader, Fouad Masoum, as Iraq’s
President. No deputy presidential slots were selected. Masoum is about 76 years
old and helped draft Iraq’s constitution. He was a close cohort of Jalal Talabani in
forming the PUK in 1975.
• On August 11, Masoum tapped deputy COR speaker Abbadi as leader of the
“largest bloc” in the COR as Prime Minister-designate, giving him a 30-day
period specified by the constitution (until September 10) to achieve COR
confirmation of a government. Abbadi’s designation came after several senior
figures in the State of Law bloc abandoned Maliki—apparently bowing to
pressure from the United States, Iran, Iraq’s Sunnis and Kurds, and others. Maliki
initially called the designation “illegal” on the grounds that Masoum was
required to tap him first as Prime Minister-designate as leader of the largest bloc
elected. However, U.S. officials and Iranian officials welcomed the Abbadi
designation, causing Maliki’s support to collapse and him to step down.
The Cabinet. Abbadi obtained COR confirmation of a new government on September 8, two days
ahead of the constitutional deadline. The Cabinet appeared to satisfy U.S. and Iraqi factional
demands for inclusiveness of the Sunni Arabs and the Kurds. Factional disputes caused Abbadi to
avoid naming choices for the key security posts of Defense and Interior ministers, and agreement
on the two posts was not achieved until October 23, when the COR confirmed Mohammad Salem
al-Ghabban as Interior Minister and Khalid al-Ubaydi as Defense Minister. The selection of
Ghabban drew criticism from many Sunni figures because he is a leader of the Badr Organization,
the political arm of the Shiite militia of the same name. The faction is headed by Hadi Al-Amiri,
who many Shiites were suggesting be named Interior Minister, but who was strongly opposed by
Sunnis because of the militia’s abuses of Sunnis during the sectarian conflict of 2006-2008.
Ubaydi, a Sunni, was an aircraft engineer during the rule of Saddam Hussein, and became a
university professor after Saddam’s downfall.
A major feature of the Abbadi government is that it incorporates many senior faction leaders,
although some posts lack significant authority. Among the major government posts are:
• Maliki, Iyad al-Allawi, and Osama al-Nujaifi, all major faction leaders and all
discussed earlier, were made vice presidents. The position lacks authority but the
posts ensure that their views will be heard in internal government deliberations.
Congressional Research Service
25

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

On the other hand, Maliki reportedly has used his vice presidential post to exert
authority independently, perhaps to the detriment of Abbadi’s authority, by
holding meetings of the State of Law political bloc.
• Ex-Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari, a KDP leader whom Maliki ousted in mid-
2014 over a KRG-Baghdad rift, became deputy prime minister and Finance
Minister. The two other deputy prime ministers are Saleh al-Mutlaq (Sunni Arab,
discussed above) and Baha al-Araji, who heads the Sadrist bloc in the COR.
• Ibrahim al-Jafari, who served as transitional Prime Minister in 2005 and part of
2006, is Foreign Minister.
• A senior leader of ISCI, Adel Abdul Mahdi, is Minister of Oil.
• Hussein Shahristani, a senior member of Maliki’s State of Law bloc, is Minister
of Higher Education.
Table 2. Major Coalitions in April 30, 2014, COR Elections
Coalition
Leaders and Components
Seats Won
State of Law (277)
Maliki and Da’wa Party; deputy P.M.
92-95
Shahristani; Badr Organization
Muwatin (Citizens Coalition) (273)
ISCI list. Includes former Interior
29
Minister Bayan Jabr Solagh; Ahmad
Chalabi; many Basra politicians
Al Ahrar (Liberals) (214)
Sadrists. Allied with ISCI in 2010 but
32
separate in 2014.
Wataniya (Nationalists) (239)
Iyad al-Al awi (ran in Baghdad),
21
Includes Allawi followers from
former Iraqiyya bloc
Mutahiddun (United Ones) (259)
COR Speaker Nujaifi (ran in
23
Nineveh). No candidates in Shiite-
dominated provinces. Was part of
Al awi Iraqiyya bloc in 2010.
Arabiyya (Arabs) (255)
Deputy P.M. Saleh al-Mutlaq (ran in
9
Baghdad) Also limited to mostly
Sunni provinces. Was part of Iraqiyya
bloc in 2010.
Kurdish parties
KDP, PUK, and Gorran ran
62 (combined)
separately in most constituencies.
Fadilah (219)
Shi te faction, was allied with ISCI in
Not available
2010 election but ran separately in
2014.
Da’wa (Jaafari) (205)
Da’wa faction of former P.M. Ibrahim
Not available
al-Jafari (who ran in Karbala). Was
allied with ISCI in 2010.
Source: Reidar Vissar, “Iraq and Gulf Analysis.”
Congressional Research Service
26

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

Abbadi’s Policies
U.S. officials say they have pressed Abbadi, with some success, to adopt policies that can win
greater support among Sunnis. He has ordered the ISF to cease shelling Sunni-inhabited areas that
are under the control of Islamic State forces and abolished the “Office of the Commander-in-
Chief,” restoring the regular chain of command. In November 2014, he replaced 36 Iraqi Army
commanders and 24 Interior Ministry officials. Abbadi has also sought to publicly disclose
significant instances of corruption; he announced in November 2014 that 50,000 ISF personnel on
the payrolls were not actually performing military service.
In an attempt to alter Sunni opinion, Abbadi has also announced that a “National Guard” force
will be established in which locally recruited fighters, reporting to provincial governments, will
protect their home provinces from the Islamic State. The program appears mostly intended to
blunt Islamic State influence from Sunni-inhabited areas, and appears intended to revive the
concept behind the “Awakening”/Sons of Iraq program, discussed above. The announced
program, which received Cabinet approval in February 2015 and requires COR approval, appears
to reflect acknowledgment by Abbadi that Sunni Iraqis do not want Shiite-led security forces
policing Sunni areas. However, the program is planned to also apply to Shiite militias who want
to secure Shiite areas, sparking opposition from Sunnis.43 Also in February 2015, the Cabinet
approved an amendment to the “de-Baathification” laws (see above) to further re-integrate former
members of Saddam’s Baath Party into the political process and presumably reduce Sunni
resentment of the government. In February 2015, Abbadi lifted the long-standing Baghdad curfew
as part of an effort to reduce the sense of Islamic State siege on the government.
As a result of Abbadi’s efforts to promote inclusiveness, President Obama praised Abbadi in the
course of their bilateral meeting at the White House on April 14, 2015, saying:
And in a significant change from some past practices, I think both Sunni leaders and Kurdish
leaders feel that they are heard in the halls of power, that they are participating in governance
in Baghdad...Prime Minister Abbadi has kept true to his commitments to reach out to them
and to respond to their concerns and to make sure that power is not solely concentrated
within Baghdad....44
On the other hand, abuses committed by Shiite militias, as well as the appointment of Badr
Organization figure Mohammad al-Ghabban as Interior Minister, appear to be slowing any broad
Sunni shift toward the government and away from supporting the Islamic State. Abbadi’s visit to
Iran during October 20-21, 2014, raised questions among experts that Abbadi might still be
susceptible to arguments from some Iranian leaders to rally the Shiite base and refuse
compromise with Sunni factions. After the killing by the militias of a senior Sunni cleric, Shaykh
Qasim al-Janabi, in February 2015, Sunni members boycotted the COR for one week. And, the
apparent Iraqi decision in late March 2015 to move forward with an attempt to take back the city
of Tikrit with Shiite militia and Iranian advisory help—rather than the assistance of the U.S.-led
coalition—caused many experts to assess that Abbadi remains dependent politically and militarily
on the Shiite militias. Abbadi addressed this perception in an April 3, 2015 interview in the

43 Loveday Morris. “Iraq’s Plans for Force to Fight Islamic State Meet Distrust.” Washington Post, September 14,
2014.
44 White House. “President Obama Holds a Media Availability with Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi. April 14,
2015.
Congressional Research Service
27

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

German newspaper Spiegel by indicating that “[the militias] are very powerful because they are
ideologically motivated. Honestly, it would be a challenge to deal with this. 45
And, Abbadi’s attempts to address Sunni demands have also caused agitation among the
government’s core Shiite base. Activists in Basra Province, through which the majority of Iraq’s
oil is exported, are attempting to revive a 2008 effort to convert the province into an autonomous
region similar to the KRG. Those supporting forming a region assert that the province does not
receive a fair share of national revenues. Holding a referendum on region formation requires
obtaining signatures of 10% of the province’s 160,000 voters, or the support of one-third of the
members of the Basra provincial council. Neither of these benchmarks has been achieved to date.
Abbadi also faces challenges from within his governing coalition. Some observers report that
former Prime Minister Maliki continues to seek to exert his influence by holding meetings of the
State of Law parliamentary bloc, by working with harder line Shiite figures to undermine Abbadi,
and by cultivating an image of personal affinity for and control over Popular Mobilization Shiite
militia forces that are helping the government counter the Islamic State challenge. Some
observers indicate that Maliki might be plotting to try to return to the prime ministership by
undermining Abbadi, but U.S. officials and U.S. allies would almost certainly try to counter any
Maliki comeback as an impediment to the joint effort against the Islamic State.

Prime Minister Haydar al-Abbadi
Abbadi is about 62 years old and holds a doctorate in engineering from the University of Manchester. He is from a
traditional elite family. He is a longtime Da’wa Party member but his exile during the Saddam Hussein regime was
spent mostly in London, and not in Iran or Syria. He is fluent in English language and often speaks in English in press
conferences in Western countries.
During his time as a Da’wa underground activist, he assisted the party by writing tracts and promoting its message,
and he apparently was not involved in planning or executing any of the attacks carried out by the Da’wa Party in Iraq
or Kuwait during the 1980s.46 His familiarity with Western culture and his lack of ties to senior Iranian leaders
apparently contributed to Iran’s initial reluctance to support him for the prime ministership. However, Abbadi
reportedly attracted strong support from Ayatol ah Ali al-Sistani and within Da’wa ranks, and Iran acquiesced to his
selection.

U.S. Policy Response to the Islamic State in Iraq47
The gains by the Islamic State in Iraq since June 2014 caused the Obama Administration to
resume an active military role in Iraq, pursuant to a strategy to degrade and ultimately defeat the
Islamic State articulated by President Obama on September 10, 2014.

45 Susanne Koelbl, “Interview with Iraqi Prime Minister Al-Abadi: 'The Liberation of Tikrit Is Very Encouraging,'”
Spiegel (Hamburg), April 3, 2015.
46 Adam Taylor. “Meet Haider al-Abadi, the Man Named Iraq’s New Prime Minister.” Washingtonpost.com, August
11, 2014.
47 For a comprehensive analysis of U.S. policy against the Islamic State in both Iraq and Syria, see CRS Report
R43612, The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard et al.
Congressional Research Service
28

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

From the late 2013 ISIL offensive in Anbar until its June 2014 capture of Mosul, the United
States took the following actions:
• Delivered and sold additional weaponry. The Defense Department supplied Iraq
with several hundred HELLFIRE air-to-surface missiles for use against ISIL
training camps.48 The Administration also obtained the concurrence of Congress
to release for sale and lease 30 Apache attack helicopters to Iraq—a transaction
some in Congress were holding up out of stated concerns that the Iraqi
government would use them against nonviolent opponents.49 The Administration
had earlier agreed to sell 36 F-16 combat aircraft, although the production
schedule did not permit accelerated delivery. On May 13, 2014, DSCA notified
Congress of potential sales to Iraq of up to 200 Humvee armored vehicles, up to
24 propeller-driven AT-6C Texan II military aircraft, and related equipment with
a total estimated value of about $1 billion.50
• Sales of Drones. The United States sold Iraq several unmanned aerial vehicles to
perform surveillance of Islamic State camps in western Anbar Province. In early
2014, the United States provided 10 Scaneagle aerial vehicles.51
• Additional Training. The Department of Defense increased bilateral and regional
training opportunities for Iraqi counterterrorism (CTS) units to help burnish ISF
counter-insurgency skills. By June 2014, U.S. Special Operations Forces had
conducted two sessions of training for Iraqi CT forces in Jordan.52
After the Islamic State’s capture of Mosul in June 2014—and particularly after the August 2014
move by the group toward Irbil and its beheadings of two captured U.S. citizens—the U.S.
response broadened significantly. President Obama presented a multifaceted strategy to defeat the
Islamic State in a speech to the nation on September 10, 2014—after the formation of the
relatively inclusive Abbadi government met U.S. conditions for additional assistance against the
Islamic State. The operation to defeat the Islamic State, termed “Operation Inherent Resolve,” is
run by U.S. Central Command. It is commanded by Lieutenant General James Terry, who leads
Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve, based in the Camp Arijan facility in
Kuwait that is used by the U.S. military under a bilateral defense accord with Kuwait.
The current parameters of U.S. military involvement in Iraq are discussed below.
Advice and Training
President Obama has deployed 3,100 U.S. military personnel to train and advise the ISF,
peshmerga forces, and Sunni tribal fighters; gather intelligence on the Islamic State; and protect
U.S. facilities and personnel. Of these personnel, 1,500 deployed subsequent to congressional

48 http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140106/DEFREG02/301060019/US-Speeds-Up-Drone-Missile-Deliveries-
Aid-Iraq.
49 Josh Rogin. “Congress to Iraq’s Maliki: No Arms for a Civil War.” Daily Beast, January 8, 2014.
50 DSCA notifications to Congress: Transmittal Nos. 13-79; 14-04; and 14-03. May 13, 2014.
51 “US Speeds Up Drone Missile Deliveries to Aid Iraq.” Defense News, January 6, 2014.
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140106/DEFREG02/301060019/US-Speeds-Up-Drone-Missile-Deliveries-Aid-
Iraq.
52 Missy Ryan. “U.S. Renews Training of Elite Forces in Jordan.” Reuters, May 7, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
29

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

approval of a requested $1.6 billion in train and equip funds, to “expand our advise and assist
mission and initiate a comprehensive training effort for Iraqi forces.”53 Those funds were
authorized and appropriated by P.L. 113-291 and the FY2015 appropriations act (P.L. 113-235).
Of the 3,100, about 820 are securing the U.S. Embassy and other U.S. facilities in Baghdad and
Irbil, as well as protecting evacuation routes such as the international airport in Baghdad.
The mission of the U.S. force includes advising the ISF and peshmerga at the brigade level,
working out of two “Joint Operations Centers” (one with the ISF in Baghdad and one with the
peshmerga in Irbil). About 1,000 personnel of the U.S. force are training nine ISF brigades (about
20,000 troops) and three peshmerga brigades (about 5,000 forces). Training sites in Baghdad (two
sites), Irbil (for the peshmerga), Taji (north of Baghdad), Al Asad (in Anbar Province), and
Besmaya, south of Baghdad, reportedly were all established as of the end of February 2015 and
are currently staffed. The site at Al Asad hosts about 300 U.S. military personnel and is under
threat from Islamic State positions, including those at the town of Al Baghdadi that the Islamic
State captured in February 2015. Islamic State forces have shelled the site but caused no U.S.
deaths to date. The U.S. trainers are being joined by about 1,500 trainers from coalition partner
countries including the U.K., Norway, Australia, New Zealand, Italy, Germany, and Spain.54
Training will continue until mid-2015, depending on assessments of the progress of the forces
trained.
Sunni tribal fighters are considered a key component of the effort because Sunni tribal fighters
presumably would be supported in their operations by Sunni inhabitants now living under Islamic
State rule. U.S. military personnel have trained a unit of about 250 Sunni tribal fighters now
operating in Anbar Province.
Air Operations
Since August 8, 2014, the U.S. military action in Iraq has included airstrikes on Islamic State
positions and infrastructure. U.S. air assets also have dropped humanitarian aid to vulnerable
minorities affected by Islamic State gains. Other countries conducting air strikes in Iraq include
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and the U.K. The air operations
have contributed significantly to the successes observed on the ground, which are discussed
below. As of September 23, 2014, U.S. and partner country strikes have taken place in Syria, as
well, to destroy Islamic State equipment and infrastructure it is using to support its offensive in
Iraq.
Weapons Resupply
Since the capture of Mosul by the Islamic State in mid-2014, the United States reportedly has sold
Iraq at least 5,000 HELLFIRE missiles. The F-16s and Apaches previously purchased (see above)
are in the process of delivery, but the F-16s are being delivered to Iraqi control, and training for
the Iraq pilots is being provided, in the United States (Arizona) because the key airbase at Balad
is surrounded by the Islamic State. In December 2014, the Defense Department notified to
Congress potential sales to Iraq that may be worth nearly $3 billion for 1,000 M1151AI Up-

53 Statement by Rear Admiral John Kirby on the Authorization to Deploy Additional Forces to Iraq, Release No: NR-
562-14, November 7, 2014.
54 Comments by Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Martin Dempsey. CNN, April 16, 2015.
Congressional Research Service
30

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

Armored High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) and 175 M1A1 tanks with
spare parts, communications, and ammunition. The tank sale would more than replace the tanks
the ISF lost during the ISF offensive in June 2014; the ISF reportedly lost as much as half of the
140 tanks it had received from the United States as of 2012. During his mid-April 2015 visit to
Washington, DC, Prime Minister Abbadi denied asking for additional U.S. weaponry, and no new
U.S. sales were announced, but he says he requested that delivery of purchased new weaponry be
completed expeditiously.
In addition to support for the ISF, the Administration also reportedly has been supplying mostly
lighter weaponry and ammunition directly to the security forces (peshmerga) of the Kurdistan
Regional Government (KRG), through the Central Intelligence Agency.55 The Administration also
has, with Iraqi government concurrence, delivered some of the ISF’s weaponry stockpiles to the
peshmerga. A number of European countries, such as the U.K, Germany, and France, also have
been supplying weaponry to the peshmerga.
The Administration has sought to provide U.S. weaponry directly to the peshmerga and
potentially to Sunni tribal fighters as well. A provision of the FY2015 NDAA (P.L. 113-291)
gives the Administration the authority to do so. Under the provision, the Secretary of Defense, in
coordination with the Secretary of State, is authorized:
to provide assistance, including training, equipment, logistics support, supplies, and services,
stipends, facility and infrastructure repair and renovation, and sustainment, to military and
other security forces of or associated with the Government of Iraq, including Kurdish and
tribal security forces or other local security forces, with a national security mission, through
December 31, 2016.
Despite the sales, both Abbadi and KRG and peshmerga leaders have complained that they are
receiving insufficient quantities of U.S. weaponry in light of the challenge from the Islamic State.
Kurdish leaders, in particular, have complained of a lack of heavy weaponry and that U.S.
weapons supplies are not commensurate with the leading role of the peshmerga in pushing back
Islamic State forces in the north.
Direct U.S. combat deployment? President Obama has repeatedly ruled out the deployment of
ground combat units, maintaining that U.S. troops will not fix the underlying political problems
that facilitated or caused the IS-led insurrection. However, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Martin Dempsey acknowledged in November 2014 that as the campaign against the Islamic State
progresses and more complex operations are required by Iraqi Security Forces, he could
recommend that U.S. personnel accompany Iraqi forces.56 Others note that the shelling of Al Asad
base, where U.S. trainers are working, amounts to the same physical risk as that incurred by
ground combat units. In February 2015, President Obama sent to Congress a request for a new
Authorization for the Use of Military Force that would, if approved, provide flexibility to conduct
ground combat operations in limited circumstances such as rescue operations and raids on Islamic

55 That channel is a means of adapting to U.S. law and policy that requires all U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS, run by
the Defense Department) to be provided to a country’s central government, and not to subnational forces. Craig
Whitlock and Greg Jaffe, “U.S. Directly Arms Kurdish Forces,” Washington Post, August 12, 2014.
56 Gen. Dempsey told the House Armed Services Committee on November 13, “I'm not predicting, at this point, that I
would recommend that those [Iraqi] forces in Mosul and along the border would need to be accompanied by U.S.
forces, but we're certainly considering it.”
Congressional Research Service
31

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

State leadership targets, as well to deploy personnel on missions that would help guide precise air
strikes or advise forward Iraqi forces.57
Funding Issues. The Administration requested authority and $1.618 billion in FY2015 Overseas
Contingency Operation funding for an “Iraq Train and Equip Fund” to support the expanded
training mission—part of a broader $5.6 billion request for the anti-IS mission for FY2015.58 As
noted above, the funds were authorized and appropriated at the end of the 113th Congress. Of that
$1.6 billion in train-and-equip funding, the Administration plans to use $1.23 billion for the ISF;
$354 million for the peshmerga; and $24 million for the Sunni tribal fighters. The Administration
funding request stipulated that 40% of the requested U.S. train-and-equip funds would not be
eligible to be expended unless foreign contributions equal to 40% of the $1.618 billion are
contributed (of which half that contributed amount would come from the Iraqi government). P.L.
113-291 includes this cost-sharing provision, but would also limit the availability of funds for
newly authorized Iraq training program to 25% until the Administration submits required program
and strategy reports to Congress. That law also requires 90-day progress reporting. For FY2016,
the Administration has requested $715 million in train and equip funds for Iraq, for the same uses,
supplemented by a request for $250 million in Foreign Military Financing for FY2016.
Results of the Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq and Way Forward
U.S. officials assert that Operation Inherent Resolve has, to date, halted IS fighters’ momentum,
severely reduced their weapons arsenal and infrastructure, and placed them in a largely defensive
posture.59 The Department of Defense stated in March 2015 that Iraqi forces—ISF, peshmerga,
Shiite militia forces, and some Sunni tribal forces—have thus far recaptured about 30% of the
territory taken by the Islamic State. Among the key locations recaptured are the Mosul Dam, the
town of Zumar, areas in the northwestern Sinjar region, the Anbar towns of Haditha and Karma,
several towns in Diyala Province, the town of Jurf al-Sakhar that is 40 miles south of Baghdad,
and, in April 2015, the key Sunni-inhabited town of Tikrit in Salah ad-Din Province.60
On the other hand, Islamic State fighters are able to launch local offensives, perhaps to divert
Iraqi forces or perhaps to show that the movement is still advancing. The February 2015 Islamic
State capture of the town of Al Baghdadi represents one such local setback. Potentially more
significant are Islamic State advances on the Anbar Province capital Ramadi in mid-April; about
80% of the province is still held by Islamic State forces. There has not, to date, been a noticeable
major shift of Sunnis to support of the Iraqi government. Recent IS attacks against border security
personnel on the Saudi-Iraqi border and mortar attacks on Iraqi facilities hosting U.S. advisors
may reflect IS leaders’ goals for targeting foreign supporters of the Iraqi government and
broadening their campaign to neighboring countries.

57 Text of White House’s Formal War Authorization Proposal. February 11, 2015.
58 Office of Management and Budget, memorandum from Shaun Donovan, Director of OMB, November 10, 2014, p.
12.
59 Department of Defense Press Briefing by Rear Admiral John Kirby, January 6, 2014. CENTCOM Background
Briefing, February 19, 2015.
60 Paul McLeary. “1,000 82nd Airborne Troops Iraq-Bound in January.” Defense News, December 19, 2014;
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/01/26/Iraq-forces-liberate-Diyala-province-from-ISIS-officer-
.html.
Congressional Research Service
32

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

Future Plans. The reported U.S. and Iraqi intent is to prepare the Iraqi forces to take the offensive
against major Islamic State strongholds in Iraq, possibly including Mosul. A February 19, 2015,
briefing by CENTCOM, referenced above, specified April-May 2015 as a possible timing of an
Iraqi offensive to liberate Mosul that would involve about 25,000 ISF and peshmerga forces.
About half of the force would constitute an assault force, while others would constitute a reserve
and still others would secure Mosul after the Islamic State is expelled. However, the timing
apparently will depend on whether U.S. and partner trainers consider the Iraqi forces sufficiently
prepared to undertake the battle and Iraqi military officials currently indicate that the offensive
might wait until after the holy month of Ramadan, which ends in mid-July. U.S. and outside
experts assess a battle for Mosul as likely to be difficult, given that it is defended by about 2,000
Islamic State fighters who have dug in and might have the support of at least some of the Sunni
inhabitants.
Governance, Economic Resources, and
Human Rights Issues
Iraq has not developed well-established institutions and rule of law, perhaps in part because of the
state of nearly nonstop internal conflict in Iraq since 2003. However, the success of Iraq’s energy
sector has enabled Iraq’s economy to continue to develop despite the setbacks on governance and
human rights.
Economic Development and the Energy Sector
The growth of oil exports has fueled rapid expansion of the economy. Iraqi officials estimated
that growth was about 9% for 2013, and averaged 5% growth per year during 2004-2014. The
more stable areas of Iraq, such as the Shiite south, have experienced an economic boom as they
accommodate increasing numbers of Shiite pilgrims to Najaf and Karbala. GDP reached about
$150 billion by the end of 2013. However, violence slowed Iraq’s economy dramatically in 2014
to zero growth or perhaps even slight contraction. Iraq implemented a $150 billion budget for
2014, but, addressing falling oil prices, on January 29, 2015, the COR adopted a much smaller
$105 billion budget for 2015.
During Prime Minister Abbadi’s visit to Washington, DC in mid-April, Iraqi officials estimated
that they face a $22 billion budget deficit for 2015 and the visit includes talks with the IMF and
major multi-national banks to discuss possible bond issues and loans. In his meeting with Abbadi
on April 14, 2015, President Obama did not announce any additional major economic aid to Iraq
but he did announce a new grant of $200 million in humanitarian aid. Iraq is also seeking $500
million in short-term funding from the Export-Import Bank to purchase Boeing commercial
aircraft for a reviving Iraqi Airways.
Iraq’s economy remains dependent on the energy sector provides 90% of Iraq’s budget. Iraq
possesses a proven 143 billion barrels of oil. After long remaining below the levels achieved prior
to the ouster of Saddam Hussein, Iraq’s oil exports recovered to Saddam-era levels of about 2.1
million barrels per day by March 2012. Production reached the milestone 3 million barrels per
day mark in February 2012, and expanded further to about 3.6 million barrels per day as of mid-
2014. The Islamic State offensive interrupted export of Iraqi oil through the northern route (25%
of total exports), but exports from the south of the country (75% of Iraq’s totals) have been
Congressional Research Service
33

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

unaffected. The group also captured some small oil fields from which the Islamic State reportedly
produces about 20,000-30,000 barrels per day of crude oil. The loss of revenue from the northern
route apparently contributed to the KRG-Baghdad oil sales deal for 2015, discussed above.
Iraqi leaders say they plan to increase production to over 10 million barrels per day by 2017. The
International Energy Agency estimates more modest but still significant gains: it sees Iraq
reaching 6 mbd of production by 2020 if it attracts $25 billion in investment per year, and
potentially 8 mbd by 2035. What is helping the Iraqi production is the involvement of foreign
firms, including BP, Exxon-Mobil, Occidental, and Chinese firms. China now buys about half of
Iraq’s oil exports. Reaching the production goals is likely predicated on the defeat of the Islamic
State organization.
Adopting national oil laws has been considered key to developing and establishing rule of law
and transparency in a key sector. Substantial progress appeared near in August 2011 when both
the COR and the Cabinet drafted the oil laws long in the works to rationalize the energy sector
and clarify the rules for foreign investors. However, there were differences in their individual
versions: the version drafted by the Oil and Natural Resources Committee was presented to the
full COR on August 17, 2011. The Cabinet adopted its separate version on August 28, 2011—a
version that the KRG opposed as favoring too much “centralization” (i.e., Baghdad control) in the
energy sector. A 2012 KRG-Baghdad agreement on KRG oil exports included a provision to set
up a six-member committee to review the different versions of the oil laws under consideration
and decide which version to submit to the COR for formal consideration. There was little
subsequent movement on this issue, but the KRG-Baghdad interim deal on oil sales—coupled
with an improved working relationship between the KRG and the Abbadi government as
compared to the Maliki government—increases the potential for agreement on the issue.
General Human Rights Issues
The State Department human rights report for 2013, released February 27, 2014, largely repeated
the previous years’ criticisms of Iraq’s human rights record. The report for 2013 states that a
“culture of impunity” largely protected members of the security services and others in
government from accountability or punishment for abuses.61 The State Department report cited a
wide range of human rights problems committed by Iraqi government security and law
enforcement personnel—as well as by KRG security institutions—including unlawful killings;
torture and other cruel punishments; poor conditions in prison facilities; denial of fair public
trials; arbitrary arrest; arbitrary interference with privacy and home; limits on freedoms of speech,
assembly, and association due to sectarianism and extremist threats; lack of protection of stateless
persons; wide scale governmental corruption; human trafficking; and limited exercise of labor
rights. Many of these same abuses and deficiencies are alleged in reports by outside groups such
as Human Rights Watch.
Additional human rights issues have arisen from the reemergence of the Shiite militias. Some of
these militias reportedly have executed Sunnis for alleged collaboration with the Islamic State.
The militias have also, in some cases, allegedly prevented Sunnis from returning to their homes in
towns recaptured from the Islamic State. Such actions have been reported in the case of Jurf al-
Sakhar, see above, a mostly Sunni town that was recaptured from the Islamic State in November

61 http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2013&dlid=220355#wrapper.
Congressional Research Service
34

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

2014. Curbing militia abuses by bringing them more firmly under control was reportedly a focus
of Prime Minister Abbadi’s meeting with President Obama on April 14, 2015.62
Trafficking in Persons
The State Department’s Trafficking in Persons report for 2014, released in June 2014, again
places Iraq in Tier 2, as did the report for 2013.63 The Tier 2 placement of 2013 was an upgrade
from the Tier 2 Watch List rating for Iraq for four previous years. The upgrade was a product of
the U.S. assessment that Iraq is making “significant efforts” to comply with the minimum
standards for the elimination of trafficking. Previously, Iraq received a waiver from automatic
downgrading to Tier 3 (which happens if a country is “watchlisted” for three straight years)
because it had developed a plan to make significant efforts to meet minimum standards for the
elimination of trafficking and was devoting significant resources to that plan. On April 30, 2012,
the COR enacted a law to facilitate elimination of trafficking in persons, both sexual and labor-
related.
Media and Free Expression
While State Department and other reports attribute most of Iraq’s human rights difficulties to the
security situation and factional infighting, apparent curbs on free expression appear independent
of such factors. Human rights activists criticized a law, passed by the COR in August 2011, called
the Journalist Rights Law. It purported to protect journalists, but left many of the provisions of
Saddam-era libel and defamation laws in place, such as imprisonment for publicly insulting the
government. The State Department human rights reports have noted continuing instances of
harassment and intimidation of journalists who write about corruption and the lack of government
services. Much of the private media that operate is controlled by individual factions or powerful
personalities. There are no overt government restrictions on access to the Internet. In June 2012,
the government ordered the closing of 44 new organizations that it said were operating without
licenses. Included in the closure list were the BBC, Voice of America, and the U.S.-funded Radio
Sawa.
In early 2013, the COR adopted an Information Crimes Law to regulate the use of information
networks, computers, and other electronic devices and systems. Human Rights Watch and other
groups criticized that law as “violat[ing] international standards protecting due process, freedom
of speech, and freedom of association,”64 and the COR revoked it February 2013.
Corruption
The State Department human rights report for 2013 repeated previous years’ reports that political
interference and other factors such as tribal and family relationships regularly thwart the efforts of
anti-corruption institutions, such as the Commission on Integrity (COI). The report says that
corruption among officials across government agencies was widespread. A Joint Anti-Corruption

62 Peter Baker and Michael Gordon. “Obama Gives Visiting Iraqi Premier Aid and Endorsement.” New York Times,
April 15, 2015.
63 http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/226846.pdf.
64 Human Rights Watch. “Iraq’s Information Crimes Law: Badly Written Provisions and Draconian Punishments
Violate due Process and Free Speech.” July 12, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
35

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

Council, which reports to the Cabinet, is tasked with implementing the government’s 2010-2014
Anti-Corruption Strategy. Another body is the Supreme Board of Audits, which monitors the use
of government funds. The COR has its own Integrity Committee that oversees the executive
branch and the governmental anti-corruption bodies. The KRG has its own separate anti-
corruption institutions, including an Office of Governance and Integrity in the KRG Cabinet.
Religious Freedom/Situation of Religious Minorities
The Iraqi constitution provides for religious freedom and the government generally respected
religious freedom, according to the State Department’s report on International Religious Freedom
for 2013, released July 28, 2014.65 However, reflecting the conservative Islamic attitudes of many
Iraqis, Shiite and Sunni clerics seek to enforce aspects of Islamic law and customs, sometimes
coming into conflict with Iraq’s generally secular traditions as well as constitutional protections.
In February 2014, the Cabinet adopted a Shiite “personal status law” that would permit underage
marriages—reportedly an attempt by Maliki to shore up electoral support among Shiite Islamists.
A major concern is the safety and security of Iraq’s Christian and other religious minority
populations which are concentrated in northern Iraq as well as in Baghdad. These other groups
include most notably the Yazidis, which number about 500,000-700,000; the Shabaks, which
number about 200,000-500,000 and most of whom are Shiites; the Sabeans, who number about
4,000; the Baha’i’s that number about 2,000; and the Kakai’s of Kirkuk, which number about
24,000. Conditions for these communities have deteriorated sharply since the Islamic State-led
offensives that began in June 2014. See also CRS Report IN10111, Conflict in Syria and Iraq:
Implications for Religious Minorities, by Christopher M. Blanchard.
Christians. Even before the 2014 Islamic State-led offensives, recent estimates indicate that the
Christian population of Iraq had been reduced to 400,000-850,000, from an estimated 1 million-
1.5 million during Saddam’s time. About 10,000 Christians in northern Iraq, fearing bombings
and intimidation, fled the areas near Kirkuk during October-December 2009. On October 31,
2010, a major attack on Christians occurred when a church in Baghdad (Sayidat al-Najat Church)
was besieged by militants and as many as 60 worshippers were killed. Partly as a result, Christian
celebrations of Christmas 2010 were said to be subdued—following three years in which
Christians had felt confident enough to celebrate that holiday openly. Several other attacks
appearing to target Iraqi Christians have taken place since. After the Islamic State capture of
Mosul in June 2014, the city’s remaining Christians were expelled and some of their churches and
other symbolic locations destroyed.
Prior to the Islamic State capture of much of Nineveh Province, Iraqi Assyrian Christian groups
advocated a Nineveh Plains Province Solution, in which the Nineveh Plains would be turned into
a self-administering region, possibly its own province. Supporters of the idea claimed such a zone
would pose no threat to the integrity of Iraq, but others say the plan’s inclusion of a separate
Christian security force could set the scene for violence and confrontation. The Iraqi government
adopted a form of the plan in its January 2014 announcement that the Cabinet had decided to
convert the Nineveh Plains into a new province. The Islamic State’s takeover of much of the north
has probably mooted this concept. One prominent Iraqi human rights NGO, the Hammurabi
Organization, is largely run by Iraqi Assyrians.

65 http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?year=2013&dlid=222291#wrapper.
Congressional Research Service
36

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

Even at the height of the U.S. military presence in Iraq, U.S. forces did not specifically protect
Christian sites at all times, partly because Christian leaders do not want to appear closely allied
with the United States. The State Department religious freedom report for 2011 said that during
2011, U.S. Embassy Baghdad designated a “special coordinator” to oversee U.S. funding,
program implementation, and advocacy to address minority concerns.
Funding Issues. Appropriations for FY2008 and FY2009 each earmarked $10 million in ESF to
assist the Nineveh Plain Christians. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-117)
made a similar provision for FY2010, although focused on Middle East minorities generally and
without a specific dollar figure mandated for Iraqi Christians. The State Department International
Religious Freedom report for 2012 said that the United States funded more than $73 million for
projects to support minority communities in Iraq from 2003 up to that time.
Women’s Rights
Iraq has a tradition of secularism and liberalism, and women’s rights issues have not been as large
a concern for international observers and rights groups as they have in Afghanistan or the Persian
Gulf states, for example. Women serve at many levels of government, as discussed above, and are
well integrated into the work force in all types of jobs and professions. By tradition, many Iraqi
women wear traditional coverings but many adopt Western dress. In October 2011, the COR
passed legislation to lift Iraq’s reservation to Article 9 of the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women.
Mass Graves
As is noted in State Department reports on human rights in Iraq, the Iraqi government continues
to uncover mass graves of Iraqi victims of the Saddam regime. This effort is under the authority
of the Human Rights Ministry. The largest to date was a mass grave in Mahawil, near Hilla, that
contained 3,000 bodies, discovered shortly after the fall of Saddam’s regime. In July 2012, a mass
grave was discovered near Najaf, containing the bodies of about 500 Iraqi Shiites killed during
the 1991 uprising against Saddam Hussein. Excavations of mass graves in Wasit and Dhi Qar
Provinces took place in April and May 2013, respectively.
Regional Relationships
Iraq’s neighbors, as well as the United States, have significant interest in Iraq’s stability. The
Islamic State’s gains in 2014 have threatened Iraq’s territorial integrity and caused many of the
Sunni Arab states to join U.S. efforts to defeat the Islamic State, despite continuing reservations
about the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad. However, Iraq’s instability is likely to
interrupt its efforts to reintegrate into the Arab fold after more than 20 years of ostracism
following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. That reintegration took a large step forward
with the holding of an Arab League summit in Baghdad during March 27-29, 2012, even though
only 9 heads of state out of the 22 Arab League members attended. Only one of them was a
Persian Gulf state leader (Amir Sabah al-Ahmad Al Sabah of Kuwait). On May 23-24, 2012, Iraq
hosted nuclear talks between Iran and six negotiating powers. Iraq has also begun to assist other
Arab states, for example by assisting post-Qadhafi authorities in Libya destroy chemical weapons
stockpiles from the Qadhafi regime.
Congressional Research Service
37

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

Iran
Iran is the chief regional supporter and ally of the Baghdad government; its influence in Iraq has
increased steadily since the fall of Saddam Hussein and the accession of Shiite Muslim factions in
Baghdad. Iran’s leverage over Baghdad has increased further since mid-2014 as a result of
Tehran’s military assistance to the Iraqi government against the Islamic State. Iran has sent as
many as 1,000 advisers from the Qods Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC-
QF) to help organize the defense of Baghdad and ISF counterattacks, in part by reorganizing
revived and expanded Iraqi Shiite militia forces. Prime Minister Abbadi, during his U.S. visit in
April 2015, put that number at only 110—an apparent attempt to downplay Tehran’s involvement
in Iraq for U.S. official audiences.
Iran has provided to Baghdad substantial quantities of military equipment including a reported
five to seven Su-25 combat aircraft; flown drone surveillance flights over Iraq; and conducted at
least one airstrike (December 2014) directly on Islamic State forces near Iran’s border. The
aircraft Iran has provided to Iraq might have been from among 100+ combat aircraft that Iraq
flew to Iran at the beginning of the 1991 war against the United States and which Iran integrated
into its own air force.66 (Iran had not previously returned the jets on the assertion that they were
“reparations” for Saddam’s invasion of Iran in 1980.) Statements issued during Abbadi’s October
20-21, 2014, visit to Iran indicated the two countries were determined to widen and deepen
security cooperation against the Islamic State organization. KRG leaders have also praised
Tehran’s deliveries of military equipment to the peshmerga almost immediately after the Islamic
State’s major offensive in northern Iraq began in mid-2014.
Iran’s military assistance to Iraq furthers the overall U.S. objective in Iraq of countering the
Islamic State. By many accounts, Iran cooperated with U.S. efforts to achieve a replacement for
Maliki as Prime Minister. Senior U.S. officials have discussed Iraq’s situation with Iranian
officials on the sidelines of talks on Iran’s nuclear program, although U.S. officials have said
there is no formal U.S. coordination with Iran in Iraq. Iran is not formally part of the 60-nation
coalition that is attempting to defeat the Islamic State. U.S. officials also have said that there is no
linkage between any Iranian cooperation on Iraq and the substance of the nuclear negotiations.
Iran has viewed Iraq as an avenue for reducing the effects of international sanctions. Some reports
say Iraq is enabling Iran’s efforts by allowing it to interact with Iraq’s energy sector and its
banking system. In July 2012, the Treasury Department imposed sanctions on the Elaf Islamic
Bank of Iraq for allegedly conducting financial transactions with the Iranian banking system that
violated the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010
(CISADA, P.L. 111-195). Those sanctions were lifted in May 2013 when Elaf reduced its
involvement in Iran’s financial sector.
The Iraqi government treatment of the population of Camp Ashraf and Camp Hurriya, camps in
which over 2,700 Iranian oppositionists (People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, PMOI) still
reside, is another indicator of the government’s close ties to Iran. The residents of the camps
accuse the Iraqi government of recent attacks on residents. This issue is discussed in substantial
detail in CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman.
Iran has periodically acted against other Iranian opposition groups based in Iraq, including the

66 Gareth Jennings. “Iraq Receives Additional Su-25 Jets, Purportedly from Iran.” Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 2,
2014.
Congressional Research Service
38

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

Free Life Party (PJAK) that consists of Iranian Kurds and is allied with the Kurdistan Workers’
Party that opposes the government of Turkey. Iran has shelled purported camps of the group on
several occasions. Iran is also reportedly attempting to pressure the bases and offices in Iraq of
such Iranian Kurdish parties as the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDP-I) and Komaleh.
The close Iran-Iraq relationship suggest that the two countries have overcome lingering distrust of
Iran from the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, in which an estimated 300,000 Iraqi military personnel
(Shiite and Sunni) died. Still, Iraq’s Shiite clerics resist Iranian interference and take pride in
Najaf as a more prominent center of Shiite theology than the Iranian holy city of Qom.
Syria
One of the major disagreements between the United States and the government of Iraq has been
on the issue of Syria. U.S. policy is to achieve the ouster of President Bashar Al Assad, whereas
Iraq’s government apparently sees Assad as an ally that is, like Iraq, governed by Shiite leaders.
(Assad’s Alawite community practices a religion that is an offshoote of Shiism.) Iraq has
generally refrained from criticizing Assad’s use of military force against the rebellion, and it
abstained on an Arab League vote in November 2011 to suspend Syria’s membership. Perhaps to
ensure Arab participation at the March 2012 Arab League summit in Baghdad, Iraq voted for a
January 22, 2012, Arab League plan for a transition of power in Syria. As an indication of Iraq’s
policy of simultaneously engaging with the United States on the Syria issue, Iraqi officials have
attended U.S.-led meetings of countries that are seeking a political transition in Syria.
An issue that divided Iraq and the United States in 2012-2014 was Iraq’s reported permission for
Iranian arms supplies to overfly Iraq en route to Syria.67 Iraq searched a few of these flights,
particularly after specific high-level U.S. requests to do so, but routinely allowed the aircraft to
proceed after finding no arms aboard, sometimes because the Iranian aircraft had already dropped
off their cargo in Syria. Following a March 24, 2013 visit of Secretary of State Kerry to Baghdad,
the United States agreed to provide Iraq with information on the likely contents of the Iranian
flights, and U.S. officials said in late 2013 that the overflights had become less frequent.
The unrest in Syria has involved Iraqi factions. As noted above, the Islamic State operates on both
sides of the Iraq-Syria border and Iraqi Shiite militiamen from groups discussed above went to
Syria to fight on behalf of the Assad regime, although many have returned to Iraq to counter the
Islamic State’s offensive. The KRG has trained some Syrian Kurdish militia forces to secure an
autonomous Kurdish area if Assad loses control and sent about 200 peshmerga to assist Syrian
Kurdish forces (YPG, a successor to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, PKK) in the defense of the
town of Kobane. That defense, declared successful in January 2015, was aided by U.S and Arab
coalition partner bombing of Islamic State positions in and around the city.
Turkey
Turkey’s policy toward Iraq has historically focused almost exclusively on the Iraqi Kurdish
insistence on autonomy and possible push for independence—sentiments that Turkey apparently
fears could embolden Kurdish oppositionists in Turkey. The anti-Turkey Kurdistan Workers’
Party (PKK) has long maintained camps inside Iraq, along the border with Turkey, and Turkey

67 Kristina Wong, “Iraq Resists U.S. Prod, Lets Iran Fly Arms to Syria.” Washington Times, March 16, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
39

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

has conducted periodic cross-border military operations against the group’s camps in Iraq. More
recently, Turkey has engaged in peace talks with the group and the PKK issue has not prevented
Turkey from building a pragmatic and positive relationship with the KRG and becoming the
largest outside investor in northern Iraq. Turkey did not openly oppose the KRG’s seizure of
Kirkuk in June 2014, even though that capture bolsters the KRG’s potential for independence.
Turkey’s positive relations with the KRG have complicated relations between Turkey and the
Iraqi government, as has Turkey’s provision of refuge for Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi. On
August 2, 2012, then Turkish Foreign Minister (now Prime Minister) Ahmet Davotoglu visited
the disputed city of Kirkuk, prompting Iraq’s Foreign Ministry to criticize the visit as an
inappropriate interference in Iraqi affairs. In an effort to improve relations with Baghdad,
Davotoglu visited Baghdad in mid-November 2013 and, aside from meeting Iraqi leaders, visited
Najaf and Karbala—Iraqi cities holy to Shiites. That visit appeared intended to signal Turkish
evenhandedness with regard to sectarian disputes in Iraq and to minimize any dispute with
Baghdad over KRG oil exports through Turkey. During that visit, Maliki reportedly proposed to
develop a “north-south” energy corridor through which Iraqi energy exports could flow to Europe
via Turkey, but Davotoglu apparently did not commit to the proposal. Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State Brett McGurk testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on November 13,
2013, that the United States supports that concept as well as another export pipeline that would
carry Iraqi oil to Jordan’s Red Sea outlet at Aqaba.
Gulf States
Prior to the Islamic State’s major offensive in Iraq, Iraq had limited success in reducing tensions
with the Sunni-led Persian Gulf states, which never fully accommodated themselves to the fact
that Iraq is now dominated by Shiite factions. Relations worsened during 2012-2014 as the Maliki
government marginalized Iraq’s Sunni leaders. Amir Sabah of Kuwait was the only Gulf head of
state to attend the March 27-29, 2012, Arab League summit in Baghdad; the other Gulf states sent
low-level delegations. The Gulf states have joined the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State,
but have to date limited their airstrikes to Syria, not Iraq—likely not wanting to appear to be
supporting the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad.
Saudi Arabia had been widely criticized by Iraqi leaders because it has not opened an embassy in
Baghdad, a move Saudi Arabia pledged in 2008 and which the United States has long urged. This
issue faded somewhat after February 2012, when Saudi Arabia announced that it had named its
ambassador to Jordan, Fahd al-Zaid, to serve as a nonresident ambassador to Iraq concurrently—
although still not opening an embassy in Baghdad. On September 15, 2014, Saudi Arabia
announced that it would open an embassy in Baghdad and, during the visit of Prime Minister
Abbadi to Washington, DC in mid-April 2015, Saudi Arabia named a resident Ambassador to
Iraq. However, the appointment coincided with comments by Abbadi during his U.S. visit that
were critical of Saudi intervention against advancing Zaidi Shiite Houthi rebels in Yemen. Using
language similar to that used by Iran about the Saudi intervention, Abbadi said “There is no logic
to the [Saudi] operation [in Yemen] at all in the first place.”68 On July 1, 2014, Saudi Arabia
announced a donation of $500 million to help the United Nations address the crisis caused by the

68 Michael Gordon and Eric Schmitt. “Tensions Flare Between Allies in U.S. Coalition.” New York Times, April 16,
2015.
Congressional Research Service
40

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

Islamic State offensive. The other Gulf countries have opened embassies and all except the UAE
have appointed full ambassadors to Iraq.
Iraq’s relationship with Kuwait is always fraught with sensitivity because of the legacy of the
1990 Iraqi invasion. However, greater acceptance of the Iraqi government was demonstrated by
the visit of Kuwait’s then prime minister to Iraq on January 12, 2011. Maliki subsequently visited
Kuwait on February 16, 2011, and, as noted, the Amir of Kuwait attended the Arab League
summit in Baghdad in March 2012. The current Prime Minister of Kuwait visited in June 2013,
producing an agreement to remove the outstanding issues of Kuwaiti persons and property
missing from the Iraqi invasion from U.N. Security Council (Chapter VII) to oversight by
UNAMI under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter. This transition was implemented by U.N. Security
Council Resolution 2107 of June 27, 2013. The two countries have also resolved the outstanding
issues of maintenance of border demarcation. In late October 2013, the Iraqi Cabinet voted to
allow Kuwait to open consulates in Basra and Irbil. These issues are discussed in detail in CRS
Report RS21513, Kuwait: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
Congressional Research Service
41

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Iraq Since FY2003
(appropriations/allocations in millions of dollars)
FY
04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

‘03

(req)
IRRF
2,475
18,389 —
10
— — — — — —


ESF
—
—
— 1,535.4 1,677 429 541.5 382.5 325.7
250 72.3 72.3
22.5 72.5
Democracy



Fund
— — — — 250 75 — — — —

IFTA



(Treasury
Dept.
Asst.)
— — — 13.0 2.8 — — — — —

NADR

—
— 3.6
— 18.4 20.4 35.5 30.3 29.8
32 31.1 31.1 23.86

Refugee



Accounts
(MRA and
ERMA)

39.6
.1 — — 78.3 278 260 316 280
—

IDA
22 — 7.1 .3
45 85 51 42 17 —


Other



USAID
Funds
470 — — — —
23.8 — — — —

INCLE

— — — 91.4 170 85 20 702
114.6 137
13.5 13.5
11 11
FMF
— — — — — — — — — 850
471.3
471.3 250
250
IMET
—
1.2
—
—
1.1
—
2
2
1.7
2
1.1
1.7
1.4
1.0
DOD—


ISFF
Funds
—
— 5391 3007 5542 3000 1000 1000 1155
—
1618 715
DOD—



Iraq
Army 51.2 — 210 — — — — — — —

DOD—




CERP
— 140 718 708 750 996 339
263 44.0
—
DOD—Oil




Repair
802 — — — — — — — — —
DOD—




Business
Support
— — — —
50.0
50.0
74.0 — — —
Total

3,859 18548 6329 5365 8584 5042 2323 2738 1968 1519 589.4 590 1927 1050
Sources: State Department FY2015 budget documents, and CRS calculations. Figures include regular and
Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding.
Notes: Table prepared by Curt Tarnoff, Specialist in Foreign Affairs, This table does not contain separate agency
operational costs. IMET=International Military Education and Training; IRRF=Iraq Relief and Reconstruction
Fund; INCLE=International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Fund; ISF=Iraq Security Force;
NADR=Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related: ESF=Economic Support Fund;
IDA=International Disaster Assistance; FMF=Foreign Military Financing; ISF= Iraqi Security Forces. FY2015 and
2016 ISF funding are funds to equip and train the ISF, peshmerga, and Sunni tribal fighters.

Congressional Research Service
42

---

Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

Table 4. Recent Democracy Assistance to Iraq: FY2009-2012
(in millions of current dollars)

FY2009 FY2010
(act.)
FY2011

FY2012
Rule of Law and Human Rights
32.45
33.3
16.5
29.75
Good Governance
143.64
117.40
90.33
100.5
Political
41.00 52.60 30.00
16.25
Competition/Consensus-Building
Civil
Society
87.53 83.6 32.5
55.5
Totals 304.62
286.9
169.33
202.0
Source: Congressional Budget Justification, March 2011. Figures for these accounts are included in the overall
assistance figures presented in the table above. FY2013 and FY2014 ESF and INCLE-funded programs focus
extensively on democracy and governance, rule of law, and anti-corruption.


Author Contact Information

Kenneth Katzman

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612


Congressional Research Service
43

---