April 3, 2015
Al Shabaab
death. Al Shabaab announced Ahmed Umar (aka Abu
Al Shabaab (aka Harakat Shabaab al Mujahidin, or
Ubaidah), a member of Godane’s inner circle, as Godane’s
Mujahidin Youth Movement) is an insurgent and terrorist
successor days after his death, and reaffirmed the group’s
group that evolved out of a militant wing of Somalia’s
allegiance to Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri. Some
Council of Islamic Courts in the mid-2000s. In its formative
analysts suggest that Kenyan members of the group play an
years, Al Shabaab drew on historic anti-Ethiopian sentiment
increasing role in decision-making. As of April 2015, there
among Somalis for recruits and support, including among
have been no public indications that Al Shabaab is prepared
the Somali diaspora in the United States and Europe. The
to shift its allegiance toward the self-described Islamic State
group held significant territory in south-central Somalia,
organization based in Iraq and Syria, although some
including the capital, Mogadishu, in the late 2000s, until the
Shabaab defectors have told media outlets that the group’s
U.N.-authorized African Union Mission in Somalia
ties with Al Qaeda leaders have atrophied.
(AMISOM) gained momentum against the insurgency
through a series of military offensives in 2011-2012. Al
Objectives
Shabaab continues to wage an asymmetric campaign
against the Somali government, AMISOM, and
Al Shabaab broadly ascribes to an irredentist and
international targets in Somalia. Thousands of Somali
religiously driven vision of uniting ethnic Somali-inhabited
civilians have been killed in those attacks.
areas of Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Somalia under an
Islamist government. Its leaders have also repeatedly
While Al Shabaab has primarily focused on its agenda in
expressed their commitment to the global jihad movement,
Somalia, it has threatened the countries contributing troops
although there is some question as to how committed the
to AMISOM and successfully conducted deadly terrorist
group’s Somali footsoldiers are to this aspect of its agenda.
attacks in Djibouti, Kenya, and Uganda. Al Shabaab
The group has justified its attacks outside Somalia as
activity in Kenya has increased significantly in recent years;
retaliation for participation in, or support for, AMISOM
more than 600 people have been killed in its attacks there
and/or as retribution for alleged abuses against Muslims in
since 2012. The group’s April 2, 2015, assault on a
Somalia and the broader region. Its operations in Kenya
university in northeast Kenya, which killed at least 147
appear focused on sowing internal dissent and fear, and on
people, was the deadliest terrorist attack in the country
fomenting a domestic insurgency. Al Shabaab uses a
since the 1998 U.S. embassy bombing by Al Qaeda.
variety of propaganda tools to spread its message, including
social media, posts online in Jihadist forums, and a
Al Shabaab’s ability to recruit abroad and the presence of
magazine, Gaidi Mtaani (“Terrorist on the Street”), with
foreign fighters, among them U.S. citizens, in Somalia have
English and Swahili articles.
been of significant concern to U.S. policymakers. Its ties
with other terrorist groups, most notably Al Qaeda, and its
Areas of Operation
threats against international targets also elevate its profile
among extremist groups on the continent. Some of its
While Al Shabaab’s primary base of operations remains in
foreign fighters have reportedly deserted in recent years,
Somalia, it has increasingly conducted attacks in Kenya
either out of disillusion with its military losses or because
since 2011, and has demonstrated an ability to strike targets
of internal dissent. Reports suggest some fighters may have
in Uganda and Djibouti as well. Regional military
left for other jihadist theaters, while others, including
offensives in 2011-2012 pushed Al Shabaab out of
Kenyan recruits, may be trained in Somalia and then
Mogadishu and other major southern cities and ports, and
deployed to conduct attacks elsewhere in East Africa.
more recent offensives against the group have reclaimed
additional key towns, including the port city of Barawe, a
Leadership
key militant base until October 2014. Al Shabaab maintains
the ability to conduct attacks in these areas, however, and
Al Shabaab’s emir, Ahmed Abdi Godane (aka Abu
continues to control territory in some rural parts of south-
Zubeyr), was killed in a U.S. airstrike on September 1,
central Somalia. AMISOM and the Somali forces have
2014. His predecessor, Aden Hashi Ayro, was killed in a
struggled to provide security in liberated areas and along
2008 U.S. missile strike. The group suffered infighting in
main supply routes. Al Shabaab is also operational in parts
its senior ranks under Godane, who consolidated power by
of northern Somalia and reportedly maintains cells and/or
neutralizing his rivals within the movement in 2012-2013.
relationships with affiliated groups in Ethiopia, Kenya,
American jihadist Omar Hammami was among his most
Tanzania, and Uganda. The U.N. Panel of Experts on
vocal critics before the Al Shabaab leader reportedly had
Somalia suggests that regional military pressure has made
him killed in 2013. Godane’s highly centralized leadership
the group more “operationally audacious” and more
style and strategic approach led several prominent Shabaab
focused expanding its reach beyond Somalia. Its April 2,
figures to leave the group or surrender to local authorities.
2015, attack on a university in the northeast town of Garissa
Some additional defections have occurred since Godane’s
reportedly targeted non-Muslims specifically.
www.crs.gov | 7-5700


Al Shabaab
Attacks against U.S. interests
P.L. 107-40). Some of Al Shabaab’s founding members
fought with Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and senior Al Qaeda
Al Shabaab leaders have issued repeated threats against
operatives in East Africa, including Fazul Mohammed,
U.S. and Western targets in Somalia and beyond, and have
mastermind of the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya
called for strikes against the United States. In February
and Tanzania, have been associated with the group. After
2015, the group released a video advocating attacks in
multiple public expressions of allegiance by Al Shabaab to
Kenya and abroad, and naming several shopping malls in
Al Qaeda, the two entities announced their formal alliance
Europe and the United States as potential targets, including
in February 2012. The practical effect of the merger is
Minnesota’s Mall of America. Al Shabaab threats have led
unclear—while Al Shabaab’s leaders appear broadly to
the State Department to issue travel warnings and tighten
share Al Qaeda’s transnational agenda, the group operates
security at U.S. embassies in East Africa. Two Sudanese
largely independently. It maintains ties with other AQ
citizens who were involved in the January 2008 murder of a
affiliates, most notably Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
U.S. diplomat in Sudan are believed to be among Al
(AQAP) in nearby Yemen. Some observers have expressed
Shabaab’s ranks. The group’s July 2010 bombings in
concern that Al Shabaab may seek closer ties with the self-
Kampala, Uganda, killed more than 70 people, including
proclaimed Islamic State (aka ISIS or ISIL). Others contend
one American. No Americans were killed in Al Shabaab’s
that Al Shabaab may view the Islamic State as a rival for
September 2013 assault on the upscale Westgate Mall in
recruits and resources, and that its relationship with AQAP
Nairobi, Kenya, but that incident and subsequent attacks
would discourage an alliance with the Islamic State.
have underscored the serious threat to Western citizens in
Kenya. In confirming the U.S. strike that killed Godane,
Outlook
Obama Administration officials cited his oversight of “plots
targeting Westerners, including U.S. persons in East
While Al Shabaab has, by many accounts, been greatly
Africa” and suggested that the strike was conducted in
weakened by AMISOM gains and international air strikes,
response to an “imminent threat” to U.S. interests in the
the group remains a major threat in East Africa. The Somali
region. U.S. officials have confirmed several successful
government faces significant challenges in extending its
strikes against terrorist targets in Somalia in early 2015.
authority beyond Mogadishu, and its nascent security forces
are unable to secure territory without AMISOM support. Al
Size, Financing, and Capabilities
Shabaab has progressively extended its operational reach
beyond Somalia, and appears increasingly focused on trying
The State Department has estimated Al Shabaab to have
to manipulate local grievances in Kenya. The group has
several thousand members, including a few hundred foreign
demonstrated resilience and flexibility in its operational
fighters. The group has successfully recruited Americans,
evolution and, while internal disputes and lethal external
some but not all of Somali descent, and citizens of other
action may weaken Al Shabaab, its defeat does not appear
Western countries. Allied clan militias may augment Al
imminent. The challenge for U.S. policymakers is
Shabaab’s strength in parts of south-central Somalia. The
calibrating the appropriate response—determining how,
Somali government has offered amnesty to Al Shabaab
through regional partners or directly, the United States can
members who turn themselves in and renounce violence. In
most effectively counter the group without playing into its
March 2015, at Somalia’s request, the United States
narratives and fueling radicalization.
removed a $3 million bounty under the State Department’s
Rewards for Justice program for the group’s former
Figure 1. Al Shabaab Logo and Imagery
intelligence chief after he surrendered to Somali authorities.
Increasing recruitment in Kenya is a serious concern.
While Al Shabaab’s loss of Mogadishu and other strategic
port cities deprived the group of valuable revenue sources,
the group continues to profit from taxation and road
checkpoints in areas under its control. It also reportedly
continues to tax charcoal production in southern Somalia,
despite a U.N. embargo on the Somali charcoal trade.
Foreign donations contribute to its financing; the United
States and others have sought to sanction several Kenyan

clerics, for example, who are alleged to raise funds and
Source: U.S. Government Open Source Center
recruit for the group. The United States has prosecuted
several U.S. citizens for fundraising on behalf of the group.
For more information, see CRS Report R43245, The
Relationship with Al Qaeda and AQ
September 2013 Terrorist Attack in Kenya: In Brief, CRS
Affiliates
Report IF10155, Somalia, and CRS Report R42967, U.S.-
Kenya Relations: Current Political and Security Issues
.
The Obama Administration characterizes Al Shabaab as Al
Lauren Ploch Blanchard, lploch@crs.loc.gov, 7-7640
Qaeda’s largest affiliate in Africa and considers elements of

the group to be associated with Al Qaeda in the context of
the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF,
IF10170
www.crs.gov | 7-5700