CRS Insights
Israel After the 2015 Elections: What Does Netanyahu's Victory Mean for U.S. Policy?
Jim Zanotti, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs (jzanotti@crs.loc.gov, 7-1441)
March 24, 2015 (IN10251)
The Israeli Knesset elections held on March 17, 2015, were a subject of significant interest for the
United States. The leading candidates openly differed on how to manage disagreements with the
United States and the international community on various matters, though how that might have
translated into substantively different policy stances is unclear. The timing and manner of official Israeli
statements and actions influence regional and international attitudes and developments, and may
shape how the Obama Administration and Congress work together and with Israel on these issues.
Since the beginning of March 2015, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has
spoken assertively at a joint meeting of Congress in opposition to the presumed parameters of a
possible diplomatic agreement on Iran's nuclear program;
appeared to renounce his previously expressed willingness to accept the creation of a Palestinian
state, before claiming shortly after the election that he still supports a "two-state solution" in
principle but not under current realities;
declared that foreign sources were funding and advising Israeli left-leaning and Arab groups in an
effort to unseat him, amid evidence of substantial private American support for both Netanyahu's
right-of-center Likud party and its main rival—the left-of-center Zionist Union.
Likud finished with a six-seat advantage over the Zionist Union, which was particularly striking because
Likud had trailed by four seats in final pre-election polls. Many commentators attribute Likud's win at
least partly to statements by Netanyahu in the final days of the campaign to persuade right-leaning
voters to choose Likud over smaller parties in order to prevent Zionist Union from taking power. To
some extent, such statements may have been calculated to counter media reports that Netanyahu had
previously considered making concessions to the Palestinians.
Figure 1. 2015 Election Results
(as compared with 2013)
Source: Economist.com (citing Haaretz.com and Knesset)
Note: See http://static.bicom.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/israels-
partys-2015.pdf for more information on Israeli parties.


Under the laws governing Israel's multi-party parliamentary system, within seven days of the
publication of election results, Israeli President Reuven Rivlin will assign the person he determines to
be best-positioned to form a majority coalition—most likely Netanyahu—to do so within 28 days, with a
possible 14-day extension at Rivlin's discretion.
Netanyahu appears to be poised to form a government with the support of various parties seen as
natural Likud coalition partners (see Figure 2 below). The recommendation of Kulanu's Moshe Kahlon
that Netanyahu form the government has presumably delivered Netanyahu the majority support he
needs without him having to court left-of-center parties. Kahlon gained notoriety as a member of Likud
for helping liberalize the mobile phone market as communications minister in the Netanyahu-led
government from 2009 to 2013. A common analytical view is that Kahlon, who reportedly left Likud
because of differences with Netanyahu, is nevertheless inclined to join the government to gain greater
experience and prominence, probably in return for influence over the new government's socioeconomic
agenda and the post of finance minister.
Figure 2. Probable Israeli Political Alignments
Source: nytimes.com
Expectations by U.S. officials and other actors that a new Netanyahu-led government is likely to have a
rightward orientation on various national security issues are reportedly affecting the calculations of and
options being weighed by U.S. officials and other actors on a number of subjects, including:
Overall U.S.-Israel Relations: In recent months, longstanding policy differences between
President Obama and Netanyahu have become increasingly public, most prominently over
Netanyahu's March 3 speech to Congress on Iran, and now over Netanyahu's stance on a two-
state solution. There is no indication that U.S. security assistance for and cooperation with Israel
will be affected. However, it may be difficult to discern whether and how public bilateral
disagreements on key issues, to the extent they persist or intensify, are driven by divergences in

how the countries broadly assess their respective national interests, or by contrasting views and
personalities among specific leaders or groups.
Iranian Nuclear Issue: The "P5+1" and Iran are continuing negotiations focused on reaching a
political framework for a comprehensive agreement by March 31 (see CRS Report R43333, Iran:
Interim Nuclear Agreement and Talks on a Comprehensive Accord), with the deal to be finalized
by the end of June. Netanyahu continues his outspoken opposition to the expected parameters of
the potential deal. It is unclear to what extent Israel will seek to influence action on the issue,
and, if so, where it will choose to focus. Will it seek to obstruct a deal entirely, influence specific
terms (Iranian nuclear infrastructure, enforcement of the deal, punishment of potential violations,
conditions attached to the deal's probable expiration), encourage stronger congressional review,
or strengthen or maintain sanctions? What means will Israel use to make its case, and will it
resume hinting at possible unilateral military action?
Palestinian Issues: Netanyahu's statements before and after the campaign regarding a
potential Palestinian state, and U.S. and international responses to those statements, have
further complicated Israeli-Palestinian relations. Contention persists and has in some cases
deepened over possible curtailment of security cooperation, questions regarding the Palestinian
Authority's fiscal and political stability, Israeli settlement construction, and Palestinian actions vis-
à-vis the International Criminal Court (see CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background
and U.S. Relations).
In a March 19 congratulatory call with Netanyahu, President Obama reportedly told him that he
values the "deep and abiding partnership" between the two countries. However, the President
gave an interview shortly thereafter in which he said, "We take him [Netanyahu] at his word
when he said that it [the creation of a Palestinian state] wouldn't happen during his prime
ministership, and so that's why we've got to evaluate what other options are available to make
sure that we don't see a chaotic situation in the region."
The Administration appears to be considering options to minimize Israeli-Palestinian crises and
maintain U.S. preeminence internationally in promoting a peace process. White House officials
have been cited in media reports as saying that the United States might consider supporting a
potential U.N. Security Council resolution that uses pre-1967 armistice lines as reference points
for negotiating Israeli-Palestinian borders. In March 19 congressional testimony, one
Administration official appeared to deny these reports. The United States has routinely blocked or
stood against U.N. initiatives opposed by Israel.