A New Authorization for Use of Military
Force Against the Islamic State: Issues and
Current Proposals in Brief
Matthew C. Weed
Analyst in Foreign Policy Legislation
February 20, 2015
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R43760

A New Authorization for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State: In Brief

Contents
The IS Crisis and the U.S. Response ............................................................................................... 1
Presidential Authority to Use Military Force Against the Islamic State .......................................... 1
2001 Post-9/11 Authorization for Use of Military Force ........................................................... 2
2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq ...................................................... 2
Presidential Authority Under Article II of the Constitution ....................................................... 3
Calls for a New AUMF and Congressional Action in the 113th Congress ....................................... 3
IS AUMF-Related Proposals in the 114th Congress ......................................................................... 4
The President’s February 2015 IS AUMF Proposal ........................................................................ 5
Types of Proposed AUMF Provisions and Related Issues ............................................................... 6
Authorization Purpose and Scope.............................................................................................. 7
Identifying Targeted Entities ..................................................................................................... 7
Limitations and Conditions ....................................................................................................... 8
Repealing Previous AUMFs and Sunset Provisions .................................................................. 9
Reporting and Certification ....................................................................................................... 9

Tables
Table A-1. Proposed Authorizations to Use Force Against the Islamic State ................................ 10
Table A-2. Proposed Authorizations for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State in
the 113th Congress ....................................................................................................................... 16

Appendixes
Appendix. Comparison of IS AUMF Proposals from the 113th Congress ..................................... 10

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 24

Congressional Research Service

A New Authorization for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State: In Brief

The IS Crisis and the U.S. Response
In 2014, the armed offensive of the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIL, ISIS, or Daesh) in
northern and western Iraq and northeastern Syria raised significant concerns for the United States.
After first ordering multiple deployments of U.S. troops to Iraq to provide security to diplomatic
personnel and facilities, advise Iraqi security forces, and conduct intelligence gathering and
reconnaissance, President Obama began ordering U.S. military airstrikes on IS forces in Iraq in
August 2014. Later in September, after laying out plans for expanded use of military force against
the Islamic State in a televised speech to the American people, the President ordered U.S. military
airstrikes in Syria against both IS forces and forces of the “Khorasan Group,” identified by the
President as part of Al Qaeda. The intensified U.S. military engagement has raised numerous
questions in Congress and beyond about the President’s authority to use military force against the
Islamic State.1 Efforts began near the end of the 113th Congress to consider enactment of a new
authorization for use of military force targeting the Islamic State, and have continued into the
114th Congress. In addition, the President provided Congress a new authorization proposal in
February 2015.
Presidential Authority to Use Military Force Against
the Islamic State
The President in his August 2014 notifications to Congress of deployments and airstrikes in Iraq
indicated his powers as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive under Article II of the
Constitution gave him authority to undertake such action. Obama Administration officials and the
President’s September 2014 notifications2 to Congress for airstrikes and other actions in Iraq and
Syria, however, stated that two enacted authorizations for use of military force (AUMFs), the
Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001 AUMF; P.L. 107-40), and the Authorization for
Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (2002 AUMF; P.L. 107-243), provide
authorization for certain U.S. military strikes against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, as well
as the Khorasan Group of Al Qaeda in Syria. After these notifications, however, the President
indicated on November 5, 2014, that he intended to enter into discussions with congressional
leaders to develop a new AUMF specifically targeting the Islamic State, in order to “right-size
and update whatever authorization Congress provides to suit the current fight, rather than
previous fights” authorized by the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs.3 The President called on Congress to
enact a new AUMF targeting the Islamic State in his January 2015 State of the Union address, and
transmitted a draft AUMF to Congress on February 11, 2015. Both houses are expected to take up
consideration of a new AUMF in the near term.

1 For more information and analysis of the IS crisis, the U.S. response, and related issues, see CRS Report R43612, The
“Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman et al.; and CRS Report R43720, U.S. Military Action
Against the Islamic State: Answers to Frequently Asked Legal Questions, by Michael John Garcia and Jennifer K.
Elsea.
2 Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/23/letter-president-war-powers-resolution-
regarding-iraq; http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/23/letter-president-war-powers-resolution-
regarding-syria.
3 President Barack Obama, remarks at a press conference, November 5, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/11/05/remarks-president-press-conference.
Congressional Research Service
1

A New Authorization for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State: In Brief

2001 Post-9/11 Authorization for Use of Military Force
In response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Congress enacted the AUMF authorizing the President to
use military force against “those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
harbored such organizations or persons.... ” Although the Islamic State does not appear to fall
within that language, it is possible that the executive branch regards it as one of the “associated
forces” fighting alongside Al Qaeda and the Taliban that it asserts are also targetable under the
2001 AUMF.4 The Obama Administration had stated previous to the latest action against the
Islamic State and the Khorasan Group that it will use force against such associated forces under
the 2001 AUMF only when they are lawful military targets that “pose a continuing, imminent
threat to U.S. persons.... ” Due to Al Qaeda’s February 2014 disavowal of any remaining ties with
the Islamic State, some question whether the Islamic State can be considered an associated force
under the 2001 AUMF. The Obama Administration has stated that the Islamic State can be
targeted under the 2001 AUMF because its predecessor organization, Al Qaeda in Iraq,
communicated and coordinated with Al Qaeda; the Islamic State currently has ties with Al Qaeda
fighter and operatives; the Islamic State employs tactics similar to Al Qaeda; and the Islamic
State, with its intentions of creating a new Islamic caliphate, is the “true inheritor of Osama bin
Laden’s legacy.”5
2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq
Congress enacted the 2002 AUMF prior to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq that toppled the
government of Saddam Hussein, with U.S. military deployments to and operations in Iraq
continuing until December 2011. The 2002 AUMF authorizes the President to use U.S. Armed
Forces to enforce relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and to “defend the
national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq.... ” Although the
2002 AUMF has no sunset provision and Congress has not repealed it, one view is that after the
establishment of a new Iraqi government, the restoration of full Iraqi sovereignty, and the U.S.
withdrawal from Iraq, the 2002 AUMF no longer has force. Obama Administration officials have
recently voiced support for repealing the 2002 AUMF, reflecting the Administration’s belief that
it is no longer needed. Conversely, another view asserts that, although its preamble focuses on the
Saddam Hussein regime and its WMD programs, the 2002 AUMF’s authorization language is
broad, referring only to a “continuing threat” from Iraq, and that the 2002 AUMF could provide
authority to defend against threats to Iraq as well as threats posed by Iraq. Indeed, 2002 AUMF
authority was the basis for the U.S. military presence in Iraq from the fall of Saddam Hussein and
completion of the WMD search to its 2011 withdrawal, a span of over eight years, a period that
could be characterized as dealing with threats to Iraq rather than threats from Iraq. The IS threat
in Iraq could therefore be seen as breathing new life into 2002 AUMF authority. In addition,
former supporters of Saddam Hussein reportedly provide support to the Islamic State, possibly
forming a link between the original aims of the 2002 AUMF and any future actions taken against
the Islamic State.

4 Testimony of Stephen W. Preston, General Counsel, Department of Defense, before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, hearing on the Authorization for Use of Military Force, 113th Cong., 2nd sess., May 21, 2014,
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Preston_Testimony.pdf.
5 White House, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest,” press release, September 11, 2014,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/11/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-9112014.
Congressional Research Service
2

A New Authorization for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State: In Brief

Presidential Authority Under Article II of the Constitution
Article II of the Constitution makes the President Commander in Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces,
and gives the President certain foreign affairs powers. It is debated to what extent Article II
authorizes the President to unilaterally use military force, especially given Congress’s Article I
war powers, including the power to declare war. The President’s authority to use force to defend
the United States, its personnel, and citizens against ongoing or imminent attack has been
generally accepted, while employing such force simply to further foreign policy or general
national security goals is more controversial. In Iraq, the President would seem to have
substantial authority to use force to defend U.S. personnel, the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, and any
other U.S. facilities and property. His August 2014 notifications of airstrikes in Iraq, however,
have also cited as justification furthering U.S. national security and foreign policy interests, and
have described uses of force to provide humanitarian assistance, and to aid Iraqi security forces in
their fight against the Islamic State. In addition, the President’s stated strategy for degrading and
destroying the Islamic State, as well as his September 2014 notifications to Congress of airstrikes
and other actions in Iraq and Syria, are not based primarily on immediate protection of the United
States, its personnel, or citizens. Thus, it can be argued that Article II alone might not provide
sufficient authorization for the use of military force against IS and Khorasan Group forces in Iraq
and Syria.
Calls for a New AUMF and Congressional Action in
the 113th Congress
Although the Obama Administration has claimed 2001 AUMF and 2002 AUMF authority for its
recent and future actions against the Islamic State, these claims have been subject to debate.
Some contend that the Administration’s actions against the IS also fall outside the President’s
Article II powers. Concerned with Congress’s constitutional role in the exercise of the war power,
perceived presidential overreach in that area of constitutional powers, and the President’s
expansion of the use of military force in Iraq and Syria, several Members of Congress have
expressed the view that continued use of military force against the Islamic State requires
congressional authorization. Members have differed on whether such authorization is needed,
given existing authorities, or whether such a measure should be enacted.
Near the end of the 113th Congress, a number of Members proposed new authorization proposals
(several of these are examined in greater detail in the Appendix). In December 2014, the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee conducted a hearing and considered an IS AUMF proposed by
Committee Chairman Robert Menendez. Prior to the committee’s markup of the proposal on
December 11, the committee held a hearing on December 9 with Secretary of State John Kerry to
discuss the Obama Administration’s views on enactment of a new IS AUMF. Senator Menendez’s
IS AUMF proposal, as amended and reported favorably out of committee on December 13
(S.J.Res. 47), would have authorized the use of U.S. Armed Forces against the Islamic State and
“associated persons or forces,” prohibited “ground combat operations” with limited exceptions,
repealed the 2002 AUMF, and sunset the authorization in the 2001 AUMF and the IS AUMF
itself three years after enactment.
At the hearing, Secretary Kerry reiterated President Obama’s earlier-stated position that the
Administration supported enactment of a new AUMF targeting the Islamic State. The Secretary
stated that the Administration agreed with the three-year sunset of the authorization contained in
Congressional Research Service
3

A New Authorization for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State: In Brief

Senator Menendez’s proposal, “subject to provisions for extension” of that authorization. He
stated the Administration’s view, however, that such authority “should give the President the clear
mandate and flexibility he needs to successfully prosecute the armed conflict against [the Islamic
State],” and thus the Administration opposed limitation on the use of ground combat forces, and
geographic restriction limiting operations to Iraq and Syria.6
The 113th Congress did not ultimately enact a new IS authorization bill, and many Members
called upon the President to submit his own proposal. For a comparison of multiple IS AUMFs
proposed in the 113th Congress and issues raised by their provisions, see the Appendix.
IS AUMF-Related Proposals in the 114th Congress
Since the start of the 114th Congress, several new proposals for a new IS AUMF or repeal of
existing AUMFs have been introduced and others are reportedly being drafted.
On February 2, 2015, Representative Adam Schiff introduced the Authorization for Use of
Military Force Against ISIL Resolution (H.J.Res. 27). Pursuant to this proposal, the President
would be authorized to use U.S. Armed Forces against the Islamic State, but limited solely to
operations in Iraq and Syria, except for U.S. Armed Forces “engaged in training of indigenous
Syrian or regional military forces for the purpose of combating” the Islamic State. The resolution
states that the authorization does not include “deployment of ground forces in a combat role,”
except “special operations forces or other forces that may be deployed in a training, advisory, or
intelligence capacity.” The resolution would terminate the new authority provided by the
resolution, as well as repeal the 2001 AUMF, three years after the resolution’s enactment. The
proposed resolution would repeal the 2002 AUMF immediately upon enactment.
On February 10, 2015, Representative Barbara Lee introduced the Comprehensive Solution to
ISIL Resolution (H.J.Res. 30), which does not include a new authorization for the use of military
force, but would repeal the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs and place new requirements on the President
concerning the campaign against the Islamic State. Repeal of the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs would
become effective 60 days after enactment. The proposal states that the policy of the United States
is to work through the United Nations and to carry out relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions,
support regional efforts to counter the Islamic State, and to ensure U.S. foreign assistance is
provided only to Iraqi and Syrian groups subjected to human rights vetting. It requires the
President to develop a comprehensive strategy, including strategy for non-military activities, to
“degrade and dismantle the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and submit to Congress a
report that contains the strategy.” The President would be required to update the report every 90
days.
Representative Adam Kinzinger introduced the Authorization for Use of Military Force against
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (H.J.Res. 33) on February 13, 2015. The proposal would
authorize the President “to use the Armed Forces of the United States as the President determines
to be necessary and appropriate against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (‘ISIL’) or
associated persons or forces.... ” The proposal defines the term “associated persons or forces” as
“individuals and organizations fighting for, on behalf of, or alongside ISIL or any closely-related

6 Testimony of Secretary of State John Kerry, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Authorization
For The Use of Military Force Against ISIL, 113th Cong., 2nd sess., December 11, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
4

A New Authorization for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State: In Brief

successor entity in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.”7 It requires the
President to report on activities undertaken pursuant to the authorization every three months, and
it would repeal the 2002 AUMF.
Senator Ben Cardin introduced Sunset of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force Act (S.
526) on February 12, 2015. The bill would repeal the 2001 AUMF three years upon enactment.
The President’s February 2015 IS AUMF Proposal
On February 11, 2015, the President provided Congress with a draft proposal for a new IS
AUMF,8 stating in an accompanying letter that he “can think of no better way for the Congress to
join [the President] in supporting our Nation’s security than by enacting this legislation, which
would show the world we are united in our resolve to counter the threat posed by ISIL.”9 The
President’s proposal would authorize the use of U.S. Armed Forces that he deems “necessary and
appropriate” against the Islamic State and associated persons or forces. In the proposed
authorization, “the term ‘associated persons or forces’ means individuals and organizations
fighting for, on behalf of, or alongside ISIL or any closely-related successor entity in hostilities
against the United States or its coalition partners.” The authorization does not include authority
for the use of U.S. Armed Forces for “enduring offensive ground combat operations.” The
proposal’s authorization would terminate three years after enactment, and contains a provision
repealing the 2002 AUMF upon enactment. The President would be required to report to
Congress at least every six months on actions taken under the proposed IS AUMF.
A number of aspects of the President’s proposal could be considered and debated among
Members of Congress.
• First, the President’s proposal would prohibit “enduring offensive ground combat
operations,” instead of specifically prohibiting the use of ground combat forces,
or execution of ground combat operations, with exceptions for certain types of
units or operations, as some of the previous IS AUMF proposals have. It is not
clear what that limitation, expressed as it is, would mean in practice, although the
President’s letter states that it is designed to allow the same excepted units and/or
operations.
• Second, the President’s proposal does not include any geographical limitation,
possibly enabling the use of military force in countries other than Iraq and Syria.
• Third, the definition of “associated persons or forces,” especially the inclusion of
the phrase “fighting ... on behalf of ... ISIL,” might be considered lacking in
precision, leading to confusion in the future interpretation of what constitutes a
lawfully targeted entity.

7 This definition is the exact language included in the President’s IS AUMF proposal. See “The President’s February
2015 IS AUMF Proposal,” below.
8 Available at http://www.cq.com/doc/4622425?0&pos=alert&dlvid=115410051&agenttype=13.
9 President Barack Obama, Letter from the President—Authorization for the Use of United States Armed Forces in
connection with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, February 11, 2015, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2015/02/11/letter-president-authorization-use-united-states-armed-forces-connection.

Congressional Research Service
5

A New Authorization for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State: In Brief

• Fourth, the President’s proposal, unlike many of the previous IS AUMF
proposals, does not provide a purpose or objective for the use of U.S. Armed
Forces against the Islamic State in the authorization language itself. This could
lead to concerns that the authorization does not sufficiently direct the President’s
actions or provide a definition of victory, and therefore authorizes military
operations without an endpoint or measurable goal.
• Fifth, although the President states in his letter that he still intends to engage
Congress in reforming the 2001 AUMF, his proposal does not contain a provision
that repeals or sunsets that measure, unlike most of the IS AUMF proposals
previously introduced.
• Finally, the reporting requirement is for a basic periodic “actions taken” report,
and is similar to certain reporting requirements already in place concerning
deployed U.S. Armed Forces. This is in contrast to other IS AUMF proposals,
which have required information concerning all targeted entities, specific reports
on operations and effectiveness of those operations, and the budget effects of
operations.
Types of Proposed AUMF Provisions and
Related Issues
In general, language in a new AUMF targeting the Islamic State and other groups (IS AUMF)
could either broaden the purpose of military force to include unspecified U.S. national security
interests, or narrow the scope of authorization to specific objectives related to the
Administration’s stated goal of “degrading and ultimately destroying” the Islamic State. Congress
could limit the IS AUMF’s geographic scope, authorizing force only in Iraq and/or Syria. With
continued uncertainty surrounding the Iraqi government, Congress might include authorization to
use U.S. Armed Forces in Iraq in furtherance of political stability objectives. Provisions in any IS
AUMF targeting the Islamic State might address the possible effect that targeting the Islamic
State in Syria and Iraq could have on the ongoing conflict in Syria. Congress might also include a
prohibition on the use of appropriated funds for the use of military force outside the scope of the
specified authorization. Proposals for a new IS AUMF might contain provisions to limit
presidential authority to use military force against the Islamic State as to scope and duration, and
in some cases to sunset or repeal the existing authority in the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs.
The President has stated that an IS authorization should provide the flexibility to carry out “not
just our strategy [for the military campaign against the Islamic State] over the next two or three
months, but our strategy going forward.”10 It could be argued, however, that even if limitations
are enacted and perceived later to have a deleterious effect on the U.S. campaign against the
Islamic State, such limitations could be removed or modified through subsequent legislative
action if the need arises. Such limitations and an overall lack of flexibility in any IS AUMF,
however, might be difficult to change legislatively if Members of Congress cannot agree to
changes; neither the 2001 nor 2002 AUMF has been amended, for example, despite the stated
need for amendments by observers and Members over the lifespan of those two measures.

10 President Barack Obama, remarks at a press conference, November 5, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/11/05/remarks-president-press-conference.
Congressional Research Service
6

A New Authorization for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State: In Brief

The following sections address some specific aspects of an AUMF that may come under debate in
the 114th Congress.
Authorization Purpose and Scope
Some observers and Members of Congress have argued that recent open-ended, broadly worded
authorizations can empower a President to continue military operations outside of Congress’s
intent. An IS AUMF could include language in the authorizing provision identifying the specific
purpose for and scope of the President’s use of U.S. military force, narrowing or broadening the
President’s flexibility. An authorization that authorizes force to defend “U.S. national security”
against the threat posed by the Islamic State would seem to provide a broad “national security”
basis for possible long-term, open-ended military operations. Authorizing force to protect U.S.
“interests” generally would seem to provide even wider authority to the President, while
including the goal of protecting both the United States and U.S. allies could expand the range of
purposes for military action. As to scope, many past AUMFs include language stating that the
President can use all “necessary and appropriate” force to achieve the purpose of the
authorization. While this could provide the President with the flexibility he needs to effectively
employ U.S. Armed Forces, such language leaves the determination of the form and extent of
U.S. military force generally to the President. Congress could decide to place limitations and
conditions on any broader purpose and scope provisions in an attempt to shape the President’s use
of U.S. military force. (See “Limitations and Conditions,” below.)
Identifying Targeted Entities
Any new IS AUMF would be expected to name the Islamic State (or one of its other monikers,
including ISIS, ISIL, or Daesh) as the primary entity to be targeted by authorized U.S. military
force. As evidenced by the implementation of the 2001 AUMF, however, a number of issues arise
in determining exactly who can be lawfully targeted under such a provision, and the extent to
which Congress desires to define and/or limit the universe of lawful targets in an IS AUMF. First,
while specifically targeting the Islamic State provides a basic starting point for determining
authorized targets, in many cases it might be unclear whether individuals are in fact part of the
Islamic State, are part of groups fighting alongside the Islamic State, or are merely part of non-
aligned groups also fighting in the region, either against the United States and its allies or
otherwise. Congress might also wish to include language providing for future iterations of the
structure of the Islamic State group. The Islamic State might splinter at multiple points in time
into several new entities with different names and different affiliations, or combine with other
groups to form new entities. Indeed, the Islamic State itself was formerly known, among other
things, as Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and its former close relationship and subsequent reported split
with Al Qaeda has complicated determinations of whether the 2001 AUMF could be applied
against it. An IS AUMF could include language that extends the authority to use military force
against any successor entities of the Islamic State.
Perhaps the aspect of identifying lawful targeted entities considered most fraught is the matter of
“associated forces.” One of the central criticisms of the application of authority in the 2001
AUMF has been the expansion of military force to target entities that successive Administrations
have designated “co-belligerent” with Al Qaeda and the Taliban. In the context of the current
campaign against the Islamic State, the Obama Administration has asserted that the Islamic State
Congressional Research Service
7

A New Authorization for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State: In Brief

can be targeted as it can be considered a branch or in some ways a successor to Al Qaeda.11 It can
be argued that this opens the possibility of military force being used now and in the future against
a number of groups associated with the Islamic State, further expanding the universe of targeted
entities, possibly in countries other than Iraq and Syria.
Some recent IS AUMF proposals have attempted to better define what constitutes “associated
forces,” or requires presidential reporting on or certification of newly designated associated
forces, in an attempt to circumscribe the number of lawfully targeted entities and ensure
congressional input into any expansion of such entities. The term “associated forces” would seem
to apply to forces that are not part of IS forces but are fighting in concert with such forces. Some
proposals, however, such as the President’s IS AUMF proposal, include language that seems to
define both IS and associated forces, stating the term means “individuals and organizations
fighting for, on behalf of, or alongside ISIL.... ” This language might be seen as overly broad and
vague; Members of Congress may desire to more precisely define the term, ensuring that only
those forces that are determined to directly engage in military operations in cooperation with IS
forces are lawfully targeted under any IS AUMF. On the other hand, given the President’s stated
policies of defending U.S. national security, stabilizing and maintaining a democratic Iraq, and
supporting moderate Syrian groups fighting the Syrian forces of the Asad government, an IS
AUMF could eschew the “associated forces” term in favor of targeting the Islamic State and any
other individuals or groups that pose a threat to those policies.
Limitations and Conditions
In considering any proposals to limit the authority of an IS AUMF, for example, by prohibiting
the use of ground forces or constraining operations to a certain geographic area, Congress must
weigh competing interests. The President’s proposal would not allow “enduring offensive ground
combat operations,” while several previous IS AUMF proposals prohibited the use of ground
combat forces or operations with specific carve-outs regarding special forces and training, among
other units/operations. Understanding the expected effect of these different provisions would
likely be key to Congress’s decision on including them into a finalized IS AUMF. The limitation
on the use of ground forces or prohibiting ground combat operations might, as some argue,
significantly restrict the ability of the President and U.S. military leadership to prosecute conflict
against the Islamic State in the manner they feel is most effective. Some in Congress might
consider such restriction acceptable, however, if it is determined to avoid the involvement of the
U.S. Armed Forces in another large-scale ground conflict following so closely upon the end of
two such conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
A geographic limitation might hinder the President’s ability to strike IS and associated forces in
countries other than Iraq and Syria, despite these forces’ proven ability to cross state borders
when it suits their purposes. In addition, as more groups pledge to fight alongside the Islamic
State, or identify themselves as parts of the Islamic State itself, in countries such as Egypt, Libya,
Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, it could be reasonably expected that the President might
determine that U.S. military operations should expand outside Iraq and Syria in the future.
Congress, however, might wish to include such a limitation to prevent a similar geographic
expansion of military operations to the President’s expansion under the 2001 AUMF’s authority
to several countries other than Afghanistan.

11 See “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest,” supra note 5.
Congressional Research Service
8

A New Authorization for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State: In Brief

Repealing Previous AUMFs and Sunset Provisions
The President’s proposal includes a three-year sunset provision automatically terminating the IS-
specific authorization; H.J.Res. 27 would terminate the new authorization and repeal the 2001
AUMF after three years. There is concern that Congress placing time limitations on the
campaigns against the Islamic State, as well as Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups targeted under
the 2001 AUMF, would send the wrong message to such targeted groups and the world about U.S.
resolve to defeat these groups. On the other hand, a sunset on authority to use military force could
be utilized to ensure that the IS and 2001 AUMF authorizations are not interpreted to authorize
the use of military force in perpetuity, and in a manner that some perceive as outside the scope
and intent of the original authorizations. Given the Obama Administration’s continuing reliance
on that authorization to conduct the current campaign against the Islamic State, for example,
leaving the 2001 AUMF in place without amendment might be a continuing source of confusion
and contention concerning presidential authority to use military force against the Islamic State,
and in Iraq, Syria, and the Middle East/North Africa region in general. In any case, some argue,
automatic terminations of authority might force Congress to reconsider previous AUMFs and
their provisions in light of changed circumstances, amending and reauthorizing as Congress sees
necessary.
Reporting and Certification
Although the President has provided information both publicly and in briefings to Members of
Congress concerning the campaign against the Islamic State, Congress may decide to require the
President to report to Congress both before a new authorization can enter into effect, and at
regular intervals as the campaign moves forward. Ensuring Congress is being presented with
substantive, up-to-date information might serve to mitigate concerns over unchecked expansion
of the scope and duration of military operations taken under any IS AUMF. The President’s
proposal would require general reporting on the actions taken under the authorization every six
months, which is in line with the existing reporting requirements in the War Powers Resolution.12
Previous IS AUMF proposals have contained more frequent and detailed reporting
requirements.13 Members of Congress might wish to have clear strategy presented before agreeing
to authorize military force, requiring a report explaining such a strategy to Congress (such as the
report required in H.J.Res. 30), and make it a condition of authorization. Periodic reporting could
require updated information on the effectiveness of previously stated strategy, and the extent to
which strategic goals are being achieved.

12 See Section 4(c) of the War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148; 50 U.S.C. § 1543(c)).
13 See Table A-2 in the Appendix, below.
Congressional Research Service
9

A New Authorization for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State: In Brief

Appendix. Comparison of IS AUMF Proposals from
the 113th Congress14
Near the end of the 113th Congress, a number of Members proposed several new authorizations to
use military force against the Islamic State:
Table A-1. Proposed Authorizations to Use Force Against the Islamic State
Bill or
Resolution Title
Sponsor
Date
Introduced
H.R. 5415
Authorization for Use of Military Force
Representative Frank Wolf
September 8, 2014
against International Terrorism Act
H.J.Res. 123
Authorization for the Use of Military
Representative Darrel Issa
September 8, 2014
Force Against the Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant (ISIL)
S.J.Res. 42
Authorization for Use of Military Force
Senator Bill Nelson
September 8, 2014
against the Islamic State in Iraq and the
Levant
S.J.Res. 43
Authorization for Use of Force Against
Senator James Inhofe
September 8, 2014
the Organization Called the Islamic State
S.J.Res. 44
Authorization for Use of Military Force
Senator Tim Kaine
September 8, 2014
against the Islamic State in Iraq and the
Levant
H.J.Res. 125
Authorization for Use of Military Force
Representative Adam Schiff
September 16, 2014
Against ISIL Resolution
H.J.Res. 128
Authorization for Use of Military Force
Representative John Larson
September 19, 2014
Against ISIL Resolution
S.J.Res. 47
Authorization for the Use of Military
Senator Robert Menendez
December 13, 2014
Force against the Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant
Note: Each proposal was referred to either the House Foreign Affairs Committee or Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, except H.J.Res. 128, which was referred to both the House Foreign Affairs and House Rules
Committees, and S.J.Res. 47, which originated in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and was reported
favorably to the ful Senate.
The analysis provided below compares similar types of provisions included in IS AUMF
proposals from the 113th Congress and issues related to those provisions. Table A-2 provides a
breakdown of seven out of eight of these proposals by type of provision. Treatment of S.J.Res. 47
is included in the section entitled “Calls for a New AUMF and Congressional Action in the 113th
Congress” in the main text of this report.

14 This section does not include proposals introduced earlier in the 113th Congress that would, for example, repeal
existing AUMFs or express a sense-of-Congress about military action in Iraq and/or Syria. Another proposal, H.J.Res.
127, introduced September 8, 2014, would recognize a state of war exists between the United States and the Islamic
State, and authorize the use of military force against the Islamic State and associated forces.
Congressional Research Service
10

A New Authorization for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State: In Brief

Scope of Force and Military Activities Authorized
All but one of the proposed IS AUMFs listed above are substantially similar in their description
of the scope of authorized force, stating that the President is authorized to use “necessary and
appropriate force.” Two of the proposals grant the President the authority to determine what type
and degree of force is necessary and appropriate, while four others state that “necessary and
appropriate force” is authorized, without stating who is authorized to make such a determination.
H.J.Res. 125 does not limit the scope of the use of force in this way, however, stating that the
President is authorized to “use the Armed Forces of the United States,” without requiring such use
of force to be “necessary and appropriate” as determined by the President or otherwise. While it
might be expected that the President, as Commander in Chief, will make the “necessary and
appropriate” determination in all cases regardless, explicitly granting the President that role in the
authorization might preclude congressional challenges to presidential decision making after an
authorization is enacted.
S.J.Res. 44 also specifies the scope of military activities authorized and the objective of those
activities. Under this proposed IS AUMF, the President is authorized “to participate in a campaign
of airstrikes ... to degrade and defeat ISIL.... ” Coupled with a general prohibition against the
President’s use of ground troops against the Islamic State, this provision might be effective in
preventing expansion of the military activities that the President might utilize against IS forces.
Targeted Entities
Each of the proposed IS AUMFs identifies the Islamic State (using that moniker or one of the
ISIS/ISIL aliases) as the target of authorized U.S. military force. S.J.Res. 43 specifies “ISIL” but
also “any successor organization” to the Islamic State. S.J.Res. 44 extends the authorization to IS-
associated forces, subject to the President’s identification of such groups to Congress through a
certification process set out in the resolution. While these provisions seem straightforwardly
effective in ensuring they authorize force against the Islamic State, they might be considered less
than sufficient in their coverage of the overall situation in Iraq and Syria. In late September,
President Obama notified Congress of strikes against IS forces in Syria, but also made a separate
notification of airstrikes in that country against the “Khorasan Group,” identified by the President
as part of Al Qaeda. If Congress intends to enact an AUMF to direct the President to conduct
military activities in Iraq and Syria, it might craft authorization language that can encompass non-
IS associated groups, of which the Khorasan group might be an example. On the other hand,
Congress might choose to deliberately exclude such groups from a new authorization.
H.R. 5415 includes the Islamic State as a target, but also covers a number of other named terrorist
groups and expansive categories of terrorist threats. The lawful targets of the bill include
those countries, organizations, or persons associated with or supporting terrorist groups,
including al Qaeda and its regional affiliates, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, al Shabaab,
Boko Haram, and any other emerging regional terrorist groups that share a common violent
extremist ideology with such terrorist groups, regional affiliates, or emerging terrorist
groups....
This broad language would significantly expand the authorized use of military force not only with
regard to the current crisis with the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, but also in terms of U.S.
counterterrorism activities worldwide. The authorization seems to include every state, other
entity, or person that is part of or supporting a terrorist group, authorizing use of U.S. Armed
Congressional Research Service
11

A New Authorization for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State: In Brief

Forces against each. In this regard, H.R. 5415 would seem to essentially serve as an expansive
replacement for the authorities in the 2001 AUMF, delinking U.S. military action from the
September 11, 2001, attacks that serve as some limitation on the use of military force in that
earlier authorization.
Purpose of Authorization
Most of the proposed IS AUMFs state that their purpose, at least in part, is to “defend the national
security of the United States” against the Islamic State. Some of these proposals include
additional elements, however, that expand the purpose past U.S. national security. S.J.Res. 44, for
example, states that the authorization is also intended to protect the United States and “other
countries” from terrorist attacks. Should the Islamic State expand its operations or shift its tactics
toward an expansive transnational terrorist agenda, such authorization could prove to be far
reaching. S.J.Res. 44 also authorizes the use of force to “protect individuals from acts of violence
in clear contravention of international law and basic human rights....” Read as an additional
purpose to authorize the use of military force against IS forces, this language might be read to
allow the President to use U.S. Armed Forces to fight the Islamic State even in cases where the
United States is not facing a threat to its security. If the additional language were interpreted to be
a second purpose, the authorization could be read to include military action against actors other
than the Islamic State in order to stop human rights violations, greatly increasing the scope of the
authorization.
Another proposal, S.J.Res. 42, does not include the “defend the national security” language,
instead stating the authorization’s purpose is “to prevent terrorist attacks on the people and
interests of the United States and our allies.” While the focus on the prevention of terrorist attacks
is arguably more limited than a general protection of undefined national security interests, the
inclusion of protecting of U.S. “interests” and allies generally from such attacks could be seen as
broadening the authorization beyond the “U.S. national security” language of other proposals.
Limiting the purpose to preventing terrorist attacks also might narrow the authorization insofar as
it would not necessarily include a broader purpose to “defeat” the Islamic State completely or
stop the Islamic State’s ability to operate in a non-ally state such as Syria. H.R. 5415 has similar
purpose language to that of S.J.Res. 42, but also states it is also the authorization’s purpose “to
eliminate” a wide range of terrorist groups (explained in the “Targeted Entities” section, above).
This purpose language, therefore, might not require a known threat to the United States or its
allies prior to the President using military force against a terrorist group. Criteria for assessing the
“defeat” or “elimination” of targeted entities are not included.
Conditions on Use of Military Force
Three of the proposals include authorization language that states the President has authority to use
military force when the United States is part of an effort by the broader international community,
or part thereof, to meet the threat posed by the Islamic State. H.R. 5415 states that the President
may use military force “with the close consultation, coordination, and cooperation with NATO
and regional allies.... ” S.J.Res. 44 authorizes the President to use military force “as part of a
multinational coalition.... ” H.J.Res. 128 includes two authorizing provisions, one of which seems
to be intended to operate when the U.N. Security Council has passed a resolution authorizing its
membership to use force against the Islamic State. Although each of these proposals seems to
indicate an intent to ensure the United States does not use military force without international
Congressional Research Service
12

A New Authorization for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State: In Brief

support, it is difficult to say whether the language might strictly require such multilateral action,
or to what extent cooperation and coordinated action with other nations might be required.
Limitations on Use of Military Force
The proposed IS AUMFs contain a number of provisions intended to limit the authority to use
military force. Some of the proposals include language excluding the deployment of U.S. ground
troops from the President’s authority, except for certain types of military units or to carry out
certain activities. These proposals include language excluding authority for “deployment of
ground forces in a combat role,” “Armed Forces in direct combat operations,” “rotational ground
forces,” or “United States ground combat forces.” Each of these descriptions might be interpreted
to affect the President’s authority differently. Excluding deployment of ground forces “in a
combat role” might be more restrictive than excluding forces that engage in “direct combat
operations,” as there might be combat roles for U.S. Armed Forces that do not fall within the
interpretation of the term “direct.” A number of types of ground combat forces might also fall
outside the definition of “rotational” ground forces. These differences in language might result in
authorizations with limitations on presidential authority of varied effectiveness. In addition, two
of the proposed IS AUMFs provide exceptions to the limitation on ground troops. H.J.Res. 125
would allow deployment of ground troops that are “special operations forces” or forces “deployed
in a training, advisory, or intelligence capacity.” While these exceptions might still exclude most
U.S. Armed Forces units from deployment under the proposed AUMF, the overall number of
troops that could be deployed under the exceptions could be sizeable, and their roles could place
them in harm’s way in many cases. S.J.Res. 44 also includes exceptions to the ban on ground
troops, allowing deployments for military assistance and training, protection or rescue of U.S.
Armed Forces or citizens, and “limited operations against high value targets.”
H.J.Res. 125 and S.J.Res. 44 also include geographic limitations to their respective overall
authority to use military force. Both limit that authority to Iraq and Syria.15 In light of the Islamic
State’s expansive ambitions and operations close to the borders of Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, and
potentially other countries, such language could prove more restrictive in an evolving conflict
than might be initially assumed. In the context of implementation of recent AUMFs, especially
the 2001 AUMF, such limitations seem to be important, as successive Presidents have interpreted
the 2001 AUMF to allow for use of military force in multiple countries that might not have been
contemplated when Congress enacted the original authorization. S.J.Res. 44 also limits any use of
force against IS associated forces, stating that there is no authority to use force against those
forces unless the President identifies such forces in periodic reports to Congress. Again, this
seems to be a response to the executive branch’s implementation of the 2001 AUMF; both
President Bush and Obama have independently interpreted that authority to extend to associated
forces that are “co-belligerents” with Al Qaeda and the Taliban, including forces in multiple
countries outside the original target of U.S. military action, Afghanistan.
Five of the proposed IS AUMFs include a provision that automatically terminates their respective
authorizations after a certain period of time, with sunset provisions of 120 days, one year, 18
months, two years, and three years.

15 H.J.Res. 125 states that the limitation does not apply to foreign military training, although this type of activity would
not be expected to raise questions concerning the authority to use military force.
Congressional Research Service
13

A New Authorization for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State: In Brief

S.J.Res. 44 also includes an interpretive provision, stating that its authorization should not be
construed as “authorizing support for force in support of, or in cooperation with, the national
government of Syria ... or its security services.... ”
Repeal of Previous AUMFs
Four of the proposals would repeal the 2002 AUMF authorizing the use of military force against
Iraq. Two of these four, H.J.Res. 125 and H.J.Res. 128, would also repeal the 2001 AUMF with a
delay, with repeal taking effect 18 months and two years after enactment, respectively. The
Obama Administration had recently adopted the position both that the 2002 AUMF could be
repealed without detriment to U.S. Armed Forces or U.S. interests, and that the 2001 AUMF
could be amended or repealed once the planned U.S. Armed Forces withdrawal from Afghanistan
was completed and a bilateral security agreement with Afghanistan is finalized.16 These repeal
provisions seem to generally correspond with these recent Administration positions. Recent
statements by the Obama Administration and the President’s September 23, 2014, notification to
Congress of strikes against IS forces, however, indicate that the President considers the 2001 and
2002 AUMFs as authority to conduct a military campaign against the Islamic State as well as
other Al Qaeda-related groups. Given this presidential application of existing AUMFs, the repeal
provisions might take on the role of repudiating the President’s positions on his existing authority
to use military force against the Islamic State and other terrorist groups. Repeal of these AUMFs
could be seen as an indication that Congress disagrees with the President’s interpretation of his
existing authorities to use force and that it intends to replace his existing authority with a possibly
narrower authority in an IS AUMF.
Reporting and Certification Requirements
Five of the proposed IS AUMFs require presidential reporting to Congress to include various
information, including
• the Administration’s strategy for military action against the Islamic State and in
Iraq and Syria generally, and implementation of or changes to the strategy;
• the status of military actions taken under a given authorization;
• descriptions of plans for further military action, as well as redeployment of U.S.
Armed Forces after military action is completed;
• expenditures made pursuant to the authorization, or the budgetary effects of
military action taken; and
• the status and actions of any multinational coalition cooperating with the United
States to engage the Islamic State and other groups militarily.
S.J.Res. 44 requires the President to report to Congress every 90 days on his identification of IS
associated forces in order to gain the authority to use military force against such associated
forces. In order for the President to have authority to use military force without a relevant U.N.
Security Council resolution, H.J.Res. 128 requires the President to certify that the United States

16 See testimony of Mary McLeod and Stephen Preston, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
hearing on Authorization for Use of Military Force, 113th Cong., 2nd sess., May 21, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
14

A New Authorization for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State: In Brief

sought approval of such a resolution, that the Security Council is unlikely to approve such a
resolution, and that the President has instead sought to build a broad coalition of nations to
counter the IS threat.
War Powers Resolution and Expedited Consideration Provisions
Each of the proposals states that its respective provision authorizing the use of military force is
intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of Section 5(b) of the
War Powers Resolution (WPR; P.L. 93-148; 50 U.S.C. §§1541-1548). Section 5(b) of the WPR
states that the President shall withdraw U.S. Armed Forces from active or imminent hostilities
within 60 days after a presidential notification of the introduction of U.S. Armed Forces into such
hostilities is made or is required to be made under Section 4(a)(1) of the WPR, unless Congress
has enacted a declaration of war or authorization to use military force, among other exceptions.
The statement that these proposals are intended to act as authorization under the WPR might
indicate Congress’s desire to approve the President’s current military actions, within the scope
and limitations explained above. Although the President ordered the first airstrikes against IS
forces in early August, there does not seem to be clear consensus among experts or Members of
Congress on when the 60-day period began running, and whether it is running currently. The
President’s reliance on the existing AUMFs to conduct military operations against the Islamic
State and other groups in Iraq and Syria, if accepted by Congress, would have stopped any
running of the 60-day clock, whether or not a new IS AUMF is enacted, as there would be
existing congressional authorization for his actions.
Section 6 of the WPR provides for expedited consideration of legislative proposals introduced in
accordance with Section 5(b); it is not apparent that any of the current IS AUMF proposals are
currently being subjected to these expedited procedures. Although the WPR sets out these
procedures in legislation, such procedural provisions do not take precedence over the rulemaking
and procedural prerogatives of either house of Congress, and each house maintains the authority
to enforce its own rules at its discretion.17 H.J.Res. 128 sets out its own procedures for expedited
consideration of a further resolution authorizing military force against the Islamic State, if such
resolution meets H.J.Res. 128’s definition of a “qualified resolution.” The process is described in
Table A-2 below, in the “Expedited Consideration” section.

17 For more information, see CRS Report 98-888, “Fast-Track” or Expedited Procedures: Their Purposes, Elements,
and Implications, by Christopher M. Davis; CRS Report RS20234, Expedited or “Fast-Track” Legislative Procedures,
by Christopher M. Davis; CRS Report RL30599, Expedited Procedures in the House: Variations Enacted Into Law, by
Christopher M. Davis.
Congressional Research Service
15

Table A-2. Proposed Authorizations for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State in the 113th Congress
Comparison of Similar Provisions (as of October 20, 2014)
H.J.Res. 128a
H.J.Res. 128a
without U.N.
with U.N. Security
Security Council
Provision
H.R. 5415
H.J.Res. 123
H.J.Res. 125
Council Resolution
Resolution S.J.Res.
42 S.J.Res. 43
S.J.Res. 44
Scope of
“The President is
“The President is
“The President is “The President is
Same, except subject
“The President is
“the President is
“the President is
authorized
authorized ... to
authorized to use
authorized to use authorized to use the to conditions (see
authorized to use
authorized to use all authorized ... to use
force
use al necessary
the Armed Forces
the Armed Forces United States Armed Reporting/
appropriate force”
necessary and
all necessary and
and appropriate
of the United States of the United
Forces as the
Certification row,
appropriate force”
appropriate force”
force”
as the President
States”
President determines below) and enactment

determines to be
to be necessary and
of a second joint
necessary and
appropriate”
resolution under
appropriate”
expedited procedures
International
“with the close
none specified
none specified
U.N. Security Council No U.N. Security
none specified
none specified
“as part of a
conditions for
consultation,
resolution authorizing Council resolution
multinational
use of force
coordination, and
use of force against
authorizing use of
coalition”
cooperation with
ISIL
force against ISIL
NATO and
regional allies”
CRS-16

H.J.Res. 128a
H.J.Res. 128a
without U.N.
with U.N. Security
Security Council
Provision
H.R. 5415
H.J.Res. 123
H.J.Res. 125
Council Resolution
Resolution S.J.Res.
42 S.J.Res. 43
S.J.Res. 44
Target of use of “those countries,
“Islamic State of
“Islamic State of
“Islamic State of Iraq “Islamic State of Iraq
“Islamic State of Iraq “Islamic State (or
“Islamic State in Iraq
military force
organizations, or
Iraq and the Levant Iraq and the
and the Levant
and the Levant (‘ISIL’)” and the Levant (ISIL)” “IS”), formally known and the Levant
persons associated (ISIL)”
Levant (ISIL)”
(‘ISIL’)”
as the Islamic State
(ISIL)”, as well as
with or supporting
of Iraq and the
ISIL-associated
terrorist groups,
Levant, as well as any forces, subject to
including al Qaeda
successor
requirements in
and its regional
organization”
Section 4 (see
affiliates, the
below)
Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria, al
Shabaab, Boko
Haram, and any
other emerging
regional terrorist
groups that share
a common violent
extremist ideology
with such terrorist
groups, regional
affiliates, or
emerging terrorist
groups”
Purpose
“to eliminate all
“to defend the
none specified
“to ... defend the
“to defend the
“to prevent terrorist “to defend the
“to protect the
such terrorist
national security of
national security of
national security of
attacks on the people national security of
United States and
groups and
the United States
the United States
the United States
and interests of the
the United States
other countries from
prevent any future against the
against the Islamic
against the Islamic
United States and our against the threat
terrorist attacks by
acts of
continuing threat
State of Iraq and the
State of Iraq and the
allies”
posed by the
the Islamic State in
international
posed by the
Levant (‘ISIL’); and
Levant (‘ISIL’)”
organization called
Iraq and the Levant
terrorism against
Islamic State of Iraq
enforce a United
the Islamic State (or (ISIL), and in order
the United States
and the Levant
Nations Security
‘IS’), formally known to protect individuals
or its allies by
(ISIL)”
Council resolution”
as the Islamic State
from acts of violence
such terrorist
that authorizes a
of Iraq and the
in clear
groups, countries,
multilateral coalition
Levant, as well as any contravention of
organization, or
to take several types
successor
international law and
persons”
of action against ISIL
organization”
basic human rights”
CRS-18

H.J.Res. 128a
H.J.Res. 128a
without U.N.
with U.N. Security
Security Council
Provision
H.R. 5415
H.J.Res. 123
H.J.Res. 125
Council Resolution
Resolution S.J.Res.
42 S.J.Res. 43
S.J.Res. 44
Reporting/
none
Not later than 60
“The President
none specified
President must certify none
Not later than 15
Section 4 requires
Certification
days after
shall, at least once
that the United States
days after enactment, the President to
enactment,
every 60 days”
has sought, but the
President is required identify ISIL-
President is
after enactment,
United Nations
to submit
associated forces
required to report report on
Security Council has
comprehensive
targetable under the
on “status of all
relevant matters
not approved, a
strategy to defeat
resolution in a
actions taken”;
including actions
resolution authorizing
the Islamic State; not report every 90 days
“description of all
taken and planned
the use of force, and is
later than 90 days
proposed actions”; actions under the
unlikely to; and that
after the first report
“status of
authorization
the President has
is required, President
engagement of allies
sought to build a
must report on
of the United States
broad international
implementation of
and international
coalition to counter
the strategy; any
coalitions in
ISIL
substantive change
combating” ISIL;
President must
to strategy requires
and “estimated
present a strategy for
an immediate
budgetary effects of
use of military force
additional report
actions proposed”
against ISIL
In both cases, every 60 days the President
must report on uses of lethal force and their
circumstances, civilian casualties resulting from
such use of force, estimate of expenditures
resulting from the use of force, and planning
for redeployment of U.S. Armed Forces after
military action against ISIL is completed
Consultation
none specified
none specified
none specified
“The President shall consult on a regular basis none specified
none specified
none specified
with the congressional committees of
jurisdiction to provide updated information on
actions being taken pursuant to this joint
resolution in either public or closed sessions”
CRS-21

H.J.Res. 128a
H.J.Res. 128a
without U.N.
with U.N. Security
Security Council
Provision
H.R. 5415
H.J.Res. 123
H.J.Res. 125
Council Resolution
Resolution S.J.Res.
42 S.J.Res. 43
S.J.Res. 44
Expedited
none none none none
Provides
expedited
none none none
Consideration
consideration for a
second resolution, if
such resolution is
introduced by the
majority or minority
leader in the House or
Senate within the next
legislative day after a
required presidential
certification is
submitted
In both houses,
second resolution is
to be placed on the
calendar, considered
within one legislative
day, debated for a
maximum of 20 hours,
and voted upon
immediately following
debate; passage of
resolution in one
chamber requires
immediate action by
the second chamber
on the resolution
received
Source: Congress.gov.
a. H.J.Res. 128 contains two separate authorization provisions. Section 3 of the resolution operates when the U.N. Security Council has adopted a resolution
authorizing the use of military force against the Islamic State; Section 4 operates when no such resolution has been adopted. Section 4 does not in fact authorize the
use of military force, but instead creates a process of presidential reporting and certification and expedited consideration procedures for a separate resolution to be
introduced after such reporting and certification has been made to Congress. The table therefore sets out the operative provisions and language in H.J.Res. 128 in
two columns to separate the operative language of the two authorization sections. For provisions that apply no matter which authorization section is operative, or
where the resolution does not contain the type of provision being explained, the two columns are combined.
CRS-23

A New Authorization for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State: In Brief

Author Contact Information
Matthew C. Weed
Analyst in Foreign Policy Legislation
mweed@crs.loc.gov, 7-4589

Congressional Research Service
24